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Playing It Safe: Malaysia's Approach to the South China Sea And FEBRUARY 2015 Playing It Safe: MARITIME Malaysia’s Approach to the South China Sea STRATEGY SERIES and Implications for the United States By Prashanth Parameswaran About this Series Maritime tensions in the East and South China Seas have raised significant questions about the long-term peace and stabil- ity that has enabled Asia’s economic rise over the last several decades. While these disputes are longstanding, recent years have seen attempts to unilaterally change the status quo through tailored coercion that falls short of war. These activities do not appear to be abating despite growing international concern. While policy efforts to alleviate tensions must include engagement and binding, a comprehensive approach must include countering coercive moves by imposing costs on bad behavior. This series aims to explore various types and facets of strategies to deter, deny and impose costs on provocative behavior in maritime Asia. Hopefully these papers will, jointly and severally, generate new thinking on how to both main- tain security and build order across the Indo-Pacific region. Cover Image U.S. Navy Adm. Jonathan Greenert, center, inspects an honor guard during a welcoming ceremony at Defence Ministry in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Tuesday, Feb. 11, 2014. VINCENT THIAN/Associated Press FEBRUARY 2015 Playing It Safe: Malaysia’s Approach to the South China Sea and Implications for the United States By Prashanth Parameswaran About the Author Prashanth Parameswaran is associate editor at The Diplomat magazine based in Washington, D.C. and a visiting fellow at the ASEAN Studies Center at American University. He is also a PhD candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He has written extensively about Southeast Asia and Asian security affairs. Playing It Safe: Malaysia’s Approach to the South China Sea and Implications for the United States Playing It Safe: Malaysia’s Approach to the South China Sea and Implications for the United States INTRODUCTION Since 2009, China has adopted a more assertive posture in its disputes with five other claimants - Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam - over territorial sovereignty and mari- time rights in the South China Sea.1 Over the past few years, Beijing has increased the scope and frequency of its naval patrols within its infa- mous nine-dashed line claim that encompasses the majority of the South China Sea, seized the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, dis- patched a giant oil rig into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and begun reclamation work in the Spratlys. While these moves have caused alarm within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and across the Asia-Pacific, the responses by the claimant states to China’s actions have not been uniform. In particular, while Vietnam and the Philippines have directly confronted Chinese vessels and publicly con- demned Chinese coercion, Malaysia’s approach over the past few years has been quieter and more By Prashanth Parameswaran low-profile.2 However, in 2013 and 2014, growing interna- tional attention to Chinese encroachments into Malaysian waters, combined with Beijing’s furor over Malaysia’s handling of the March 2014 MH370 airline tragedy that killed 153 Chinese nationals, led to discernible discontent among some Malaysian elites about the historically “special” Sino-Malaysian relationship.3 Public dec- larations about new military capabilities and quiet conversations between Malaysian officials and other ASEAN claimants in the South China Sea led some to wonder whether Malaysia was beginning to harden its position in 2014 just as Kuala Lumpur and Beijing were set to celebrate the 40th anniver- sary of their bilateral ties.4 This paper aims to clarify Malaysia’s perspective on the South China Sea issue, focusing particularly on the administration of current Prime Minister Najib Razak from 2009 to 2014. This paper argues that in spite of some adjustments after recent trends | 3 Playing It Safe: FEBRUARY 2015 Malaysia’s Approach to the South China Sea and Implications for the United States – including increased Chinese assertiveness in the for the United States and the new U.S.-Malaysia South China Sea in 2013 and 2014 – Malaysia’s comprehensive partnership inked during President approach has remained largely unchanged. Barack Obama’s historic visit to Malaysia in April Malaysia continues to adopt a “playing it safe” 2014. approach on the South China Sea issue, pursuing a combination of diplomatic, legal, economic, and security initiatives that can secure its interests as a II. MALAYSIA’S INTERESTS IN THE claimant state while being careful not to disrupt its SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUE vital bilateral relationship with China. As a result, while there are some opportunities for Malaysia Malaysia has several interests in the South China to work with the United States and other regional Sea. The first and narrowest one is preserv- players on maritime security, there continues to ing Malaysia’s claims. Within the South China be very little appetite in government circles for Sea, Malaysia claims 11 maritime features in the direct, public measures aimed at curbing Chinese Spratly Islands and occupies eight of them, with coercion. the other three being occupied by Vietnam or the Philippines.5 Malaysia continues to adopt Safeguarding those claims is essential for Malaysia’s prosperity and security. The country – a “playing it safe” approach Southeast Asia’s second-largest oil and natural gas producer and the world’s third-largest liquefied on the South China Sea issue, natural gas (LNG) exporter – derives a significant pursuing a combination of part of its oil and gas resources from the South China Sea. The oil and gas sector constitutes about diplomatic, legal, economic, a third of the Malaysian government’s annual revenue, and several of the fields and platforms and security initiatives that can used to exploit hydrocarbons are within China’s nine-dashed line.6 Security-wise, preventing secure its interests as a claimant encroachments into Malaysia’s portion of the South state while being careful not China Sea is tied to preserving the country’s sover- eignty and territorial integrity, especially since the to disrupt its vital bilateral waterway divides Peninsular Malaysia from East Malaysia. relationship with China. Second, Malaysia has an interest in maintaining a strong bilateral relationship with China beyond The paper proceeds in three parts. It begins by ana- the South China Sea issue. Sino-Malaysian rela- lyzing Malaysia’s interests in the South China Sea. tions have warmed appreciably since the end It then elaborates on the playing-it-safe approach of the Cold War, with tensions over ideological and ethnic Chinese questions easing and both Malaysia has adopted in recent years, explaining 7 the extent to which it has changed given recent countries boosting economic ties. Symbolically, trends in the South China Sea. The last section Malaysia was also the first ASEAN state to nor- examines the implications of Malaysia’s approach malize ties with China, a historic moment that occurred in 1974 when Najib’s father, Tun Abdul 4 | Playing It Safe: Malaysia’s Approach to the South China Sea and Implications for the United States Razak, was prime minister. This and other events to resolve their disputes peacefully rather than since then have given rise to the idea of a special through force. Additionally, as one of the four relationship between the two countries that con- original founding members of ASEAN, Malaysia tinues to permeate official circles.8 Today, China supports the organization’s crucial role in promot- is also Malaysia’s largest trade partner and biggest ing regional peace and stability.14 tourist-generating market outside of ASEAN. That means Beijing is central to Najib’s goal of mak- In Malaysia’s view, laws and norms ing Malaysia a high-income nation and developed country by 2020.9 in the South China Sea help it and Lastly, on the South China Sea more specifically, other claimants seek clarity in the Malaysia has been affected by China’s assertiveness much less than fellow ASEAN claimants Vietnam face of conflicting claims from a and the Philippines, in part because parts of its claims lie in the southernmost part of China’s common basis of understanding nine-dashed line. without resorting to “might makes For these reasons, the Malaysian government right” approaches and destabilizing continues to believe that China presents more of an opportunity than a threat to its interests acts involving military force. and that Malaysia’s needs would be best served by continuing to strengthen the economic core of the relationship while not allowing the South 10 China Sea issue to overshadow bilateral ties. As Malaysia’s fourth and final interest in the South Najib articulated in his 2011 keynote address to China Sea is the preservation of global norms and the Shangri-La Dialogue, while Malaysia is fully international law. These include general prin- committed to a “common ASEAN position” on ciples such as the peaceful settlement of disputes engaging China on the South China Sea issue, it is as well as specific agreements that apply to the “equally determined” to ensure that the bilateral South China Sea issue, such as the United Nations 11 relationship “remains unaffected.” Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). A third interest for Malaysia in the South China In Malaysia’s view, laws and norms in the South Sea is ensuring broader regional peace and stability China Sea help it and other claimants seek clarity and an open commons. The South China Sea is a in the face of conflicting claims from a com- highway for trade, shipping and telecommunica- mon basis of understanding without resorting to tions through which a third of world trade passes.12 “might makes right” approaches and destabilizing This makes free trade, safe and secure sea lines acts involving military force.
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