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The Problem of the Socratic Elenchus" Jyl Gentzler

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The Problem of the Socratic Elenchus Colloquium 7 Recollection and "The Problem of the Socratic Elenchus" Jyl Gentzler I. The Positive and Negative "Arms of Philosophy" Ever since Socrates' began his mission to cross-examine those with a reputation for wisdom, it has been a matter of dispute just what he was trying to accomplish. This is not because Socrates is reluctant to explain, but rather because the explana- tion that he offers seems so implausible. He says that he ques- tions others in order to test their claim to knowledge,2 to per- suade them to be as virtuous as possible,3 to determine whether a particular proposition is true,4 to inquire into the way things are 5 and to gain knowledge. 6 In addition, he claims to be fight- ing for justice (Ap. 32a). He should be rewarded for his efforts because, as a result of them, he has been making his fellow Athenians happy: "[The Olympian victor] makes you think that you are happy; I make you so" (Ap. 36d9-el). Not only do some of these goals seem overly ambitious for someone who merely cross-examines others, but in addition, they seem to be uncon- nected. 1. Throughout this paper, I will use "Socrates" to refer to the character Socrates in Plato's dialogues. 2. See Ap. 21c; Eu. 4e, 9b; Ch. 166c-d; L. 189e-190c; G. 472c-d. 3. Ap. 30b, e, 31b, 36c; Cr. 48e; L. 181d; Pr. 352e; G. 493c-d, 494a; Eud. 278d. 4. Eu. 6d, 7a, 9a; Ch. 161c, 162e, 166d, 175d; L. 194a-b; Lys. 212a-b; HMi. 369d; 360e-361a; Pr. 384a,G. 458a, 464a, 467b, 473e, 487e, 495a. 5. L. 194a; Ch. 165b, e, 175b, d, e, 176a; G. 457d, 506a. 6. Eu. 9a; G. 453b. However, on Socrates' view, these goals are closely related. Ultimately, I suggest, Socrates represents himself as attempting to make himself and others as happy as possible. For, on Socrates' view, virtue is necessary and sufficient for happiness;7 and moral knowledge8 is necessary and sufficient for virtue.9 So, to make himself and his interlocutors happy, he must insure that they have acquired the moral knowledge that is necessary and sufficient for virtue. Socrates believes that he lacks moral expertise, but many of his interlocutors believe that they possess it. If they do, then, by being cross-examined by Socrates, they can teach him what they know, and thus help him to move clos- er to virtue and happiness (Eu. 9a). If they do not possess moral expertise, then, through Socratic cross-examination, they can be disabused of their false self-conception. Only if they are con- vinced that they lack moral knowledge, can they be persuaded to pursue it. But sometimes even an awareness of their igno- rance is not enough. Some of Socrates' interlocutors are not yet convinced of the importance of moral knowledge or of virtue, and in these cases it is necessary for Socrates to exercise a little persuasion. Socrates claims that his method of cross-examina- tion serves this function, too. Once Socrates' interlocutors are inspired to pursue the moral knowledge necessary and suffi- cient for virtue, they are ready to inquire into the nature of virtue. By pursuing true beliefs and knowledge through cross- examination, Socrates seems to indicate that he believes that cross-examination is also the method of choice for moral inquiry. Socrates' remarks about the function of cross-examination thus fit together into a neat package: through cross-examination, Socrates claims to move his interlocutor from a false conceit of moral knowledge to the genuine possession of such knowledge. However, in most of the early dialogues, Socrates and his inter- 7. Ap. 30b; Cr. 47c-e; Ch. 156a-157b; G. 470e, 472eff. 8. Socrates often speaks of the virtue of wisdom when he has moral knowledge primarily in mind. I will generally use the phrase "moral knowledge", since it is more precise. 9. Ap. 29d-30a; L. 192c-194d; Ch. 174b-176a; Pr. 349e-360e. For some discussion of Socrates' commitment to this view, see Irwin 1977, 71-3, 86-91. locutors conclude by expressing bewilderment and confusion instead of confidence about the positive results of their inquiry. It might seem, then, that there is a tension between Socrates' stated goal of acquiring knowledge and his actual result. Since it is hard to believe that Plato represents Socrates as naively attempting to achieve a goal by means of a method that is com- pletely inadequate to the task, we might be tempted to attribute to Socratic cross-examination a less exalted function. According to Grote, Socrates' procedure of questioning others is merely "the negative arm of philosophy."10 By this, he meant that while Socratic questioning is capable of providing the valuable service of "testing, exercising, [and] refuting" various interlocutors' beliefs, it is incapable of "finding or providing" justified beliefs to put in their place. Instead, according to Grote, "a state of non-belief, or painful consciousness of ignorance" is substituted in the place of a false conceit of knowledge.ll What, then, should we make of Socrates' claims to be inquir- ing ? Those sympathetic to Grote's assessment of the function of the Socratic method suggest two sorts of answers. Richard Robinson argues that we should understand Socrates' character- ization of the purpose of his cross-examinations as a classic instance of Socratic irony.12 Alternatively, in a series of recent articles, Hugh Benson concedes that Socrates is "ultimately con- cerned with the acquisition of knowledge of the nature of F-ness [in this case, virtue]"; and so, we need not read all of Socrates' claims to be pursuing knowledge as ironic. However, Benson insists that the only function that cross-examination by itself is meant to serve is the exposure of ignorance.l4 By exposing his interlocutors' ignorance, Socrates puts himself in a position to move his interlocutors closer to knowledge; but, Benson argues, "[i]n no case ... do we have evidence for Socrates' method [for 10. Grote 1867, vol. 1, 242. 11. Ibid., 245-6. 12. Robinson 1953, 8-9,17. 13. Benson 1990a, 48; my emphasis. 14. Benson 1987, 67-68;1989, 591-599; 1990a, 47-65; and 1990b,137-153. acquiring knowledge] once the false conceit has been eliminat- ed. We do not know how Socrates will proceed to lead the inter- locutor to the knowledge of the nature of F-ness, now that the interlocutor is in a condition to be so led ...."15 There is, however, one more piece of information that we must consider before we agree that the Socratic method of cross- examination is best viewed merely as the negative "arm of phi- losophy"-namely, Socrates' actual procedure in the early dia- logues. I will suggest that a deflationary analysis of the Socratic method cannot provide an adequate explanation of Socrates' procedure on all occasions. II. The Socratic Method of Inquiry Consider, for example, the Euthyphro and the Hippias Major,.16 Questions about value—about the just and the unjust, the fine 15. Benson 1990a, 63. 16. Gregory Vlastos would dispute my suggestion that the Socratic method of cross-examination is practiced in the Hippias Major. Vlastos argues that, in the Euthydemus, Lysis, and Hippias Major, Socrates abandons "adversary argument as [a] method of philosophical investigation" (Vlastos 1983b, 57-58). The method applied in these dialogues is non-adversarial because "the theses which are ser- iously debated in these dialogues are not contested by the interlocutor; Socrates himself is both their author and critic" (ibid., 57). Vlastos must believe that "adversary argument" is essential to the Socratic method of cross-examination, because from the premise that Socrates has abandoned "adversary argument", Vlastos draws the conclusion that "... Socrates ditches the elenchus" (ibid., 58). Since Vlastos maintains that philosophical theses are "seriously debated" in dia- logues in which "adversary argument" has been abandoned, he cannot believe that what is distinctive of "adversary argument" is simply that a proposed philosophical thesis is subjected to severe examination and criticism ("Elenchus and Mathematics", in Vlastos 1991,113 n28). Rather, it seems that it is also essen- tial to "adversary argument" that the author and critic of a particular philosophical thesis are distinct individuals: "Though Socrates is intensely self- critical, confiding that he is always more eager to examine himself than others .. , the procedural form of elenctic argument prevents him from making any of his own doctrines the target of elenctic refutation by himself" (ibid., 113 n 28). That an author and critic of a particular philosophical thesis are distinct individ- uals, however, is not a sufficient condition for an argument counting as "adver- sarial" : this condition is sometimes met in the Euthydemus, the Lysis and the Hippias Major, where, according to Vlastos, the "adversarial" elenchus is never applied. If an argument is "adversarial", Vlastos suggests, each of the interlocu- tors engaged in the argument must be a competent dialectician capable of putting up a good fight (ibid., 113, 115-116). In the Euthydemus, Vlastos com- ments, Socrates' interlocutor is a "yes-man", who "never puts up any sustained and the base, the good and the bad—are much disputed (Eu. 7b-d; HMa. 294d). Yet many of Socrates' interlocutors begin their con- versations believing that they are experts about such things. Euthyphro claims to be an expert about piety (Eu. 4b, 5a), and Hippias claims to be an expert about the fine (HMa. 286a); but after a few rounds of questioning, it becomes clear that neither can defend his views adequately. Like the statues of Daedalus, every proposition that Euthyphro puts forward "goes around and refuses to stay put" (Eu.
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