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(34) Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies Vol. 55, No. 3, March 2007

Haribhadra Suri on Momentariness

HARADA Yasunori

0. Introduction Suri (ca. 8c), a Jaina Svetambara monk and scholar, says that "if we do not acknowledge things lasting for a certain period, we cannot explain the cau- sality". On the contrary, Buddhists think that "things are not eternal"; which makes it a confrontation between two schools. Haribhadra reckons up various conflicts raised from thinking that things are momentary. In this research some of his thoughts are compared with thoughts of another school. The following references are used in this research: Haribhadra's Anekantav- adapravesa (AVP) and Anekantajayapataka (AJP). Furthermore, the Sastravart- tasamuccaya (SVS)by the same author is used for this article1).The similarities and differences of these texts are highlighted in this research. In the comparison it is found that AVP,AJP and SVS, have at least 21 common verses. These texts are very close to each other. In this article referenceswere made also from some non-Jaina,especially Buddhist texts, Santaraksita's Tattvasamgraha (TS), Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika (MMK)to make clear the standpoint of Haribhadra.

1.1 Two categories of criticism about momentariness The Buddhist theory of momentariness was the target of criticisms from other schools. Many of these criticisms can be classified into two categories. The first category is a criticism led by the conflict between momentariness and causality which we experience in fact in daily life. Except for assuming an eternal self, we cannot explain these experiences [causality A]. For example, recollection (smrti), recognition (pratyabhijnana),etc. The second one is causality discussed by philo- sophically considering relations between cause and effect [causality B]. For exam-

1062 Haribhadra Suri on Momentariness (Y. HARADA) (35) ple, cause and effect are the same thing or not and they arise at the same time or not. Haribhadra, Santaraksita and Nagarjuna discuss both view points.

1.2 Criticism about momentariness I pointed out that in AVP Haribhadra discussed momentariness, especially in the viewpoint of liberation from transmigration (samsara)4). The discussion about the [causality A] including that problem will be further analyzed. The following event cannot be explained by momentariness,so the eternal self has to be accepted: a. Relationbetween subject and object(grahyagrahakabhava)5). b. Recollection(smrti). c. Recognizingthat this thing is the sameobject as the past thing(pratyabhijnana). d. Cessationof intention(kutuhalaviramana). e. Peoplereceive the effect of their deeds and do not receiveother's deeds'). f. Peoplewho performthe practicecan go to but those who do not cannotgo there. (a') According to the Buddhist theory, things would disappear immediately after arising. Therefore, we could not recognize an object previously experienced. (b') Even if we would remember the past things, there is extinction between the past consciousness and the present one. Therefore, we cannot remember any thing. (c') When we would recognize the thing which we recognized in the past, we could identify these objects by the establishment of the eternal subject i.e. atman. (d') To be interested in the present object or to hate the same one would be derived from continuance of the past experience.(e') We agree with the discipline that we have to receive the effect of our doing and the doer of the work and the receiver of the ef- fect are the same person. Accordingto the theory of momentariness the act will dis- appear immediately and we have to receive the effect of the act of another person. (f') A person who makes good merit takes salvation from the bondage of this world and who does not make one remains here. If we neglect this rule by the momentari- ness of the self, making good merit will become senseless. Haribhadra discusses causality in these points. Showing these conflicts between real experienceand the theory of momentariness is effective to Buddhists7).

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1.3 Discussion about [causality B] On the other hand, the relationship between cause and effect can be analyzed philosophically.Haribhadra gives the following choices about cause and effect8): (1) Causeand effectare the same thing or not. (2) Causeand effectarise at the same time. (3) Quality() of the causewill be transferredto the effect. (4) They have the relationshipwith the commonthing. (5) Theymake the one goal. (6) Theyarise froma specificcause. (7) Effectarises immediatelyafter a cause. (8) Causeproduces a specificeffect. (1') If cause and effect are the same thing, we cannot distinguish between them. So, it is not causality. This theory that cause and effect are the same thing is main- tained by Samkhya school. The discussion that they are same or not is also seen in MMK 20.19 and Nagarjuna denies both cases. (2') If we think cause and effect arise at the same time, when there is a cause, there is an effect. We cannot say they are causality because there is no relation between them. (3') If quality of cause moves to effect and there is a specific relation between cause and effect, a part of a cause continues to an effect. This phenomenon is not supported by the theory of momen- tariness. We can see this logic also in MMK 20.9. Though Haribhadra criticizes that quality of the cause moves to effect in AVP, Nagarjuna denies eternal self in MMK. (4') Even if cause and effect have something in common, Buddhists do not acknowledge real universal things. They acknowledge only peculiar characteristics and deny the real commonality. If Buddhists acknowledge the real commonality, they go into conflict with their own thought. Jainas acknowledge changing mode (paryaya) and lasting substance (), so they have no conflict. (5) If cause and effect make the one goal, they have to be at the same time, a moment before reach- ing the one goal. This case goes into the same conflict as "case 2". (6') If they arise from a specific cause, we cannot see preeminence on the cause. It is therefore im- possible to arise from a specific cause. (7') If effect arises immediately after cause, every thing which arises immediately after cause is the effect of a cause. Buddhists do not claim that all things that arise immediately after cause are effects, but claim

1064 Haribhadra Sari on Momentariness (Y. HARADA) (37) that effect arises immediately after cause in hindsight. (8') If cause has special ac- tion towards effect, all things have some action, so we cannot classify the relation- ship. In TSP also, we can see the same claim. In addition to these choices, Haribhadra shows the following possibility. (9) Haribhadra says "aggregate cannot become a cause" but he does not analyze this case in detail. (10) If we think cause gives mental impression (samskara)to effect, Haribhadra establishes whether the alternative vasaka is the same thing as mental impression or not. Haribhadra denies each case. In conclusion Haribhadra showes conflicts between causality and momentariness in the viewpoint of [causality A] and [causality B].

2. Comparison between AVP and SVS After discussing materialism, kalavadin and God, in SVS chapter 4 and 5, Haribhadra mentions momentariness and causality. In AVP and SVS, he sometimes uses the same method to criticize the Buddhists' thought. I picked up the point dis- cusses only in SVS. Haribhadra discusses [causality A] and [causality B also in SVS. He states that "there is no recollection (v. 242), recognition, and cessation of interest to object (v. 243) if we accept momentarily. Moreover, it is impossible to have fear of it, act on it, and obtain it. A person cannot accept the effect of the ac- tion which he made (v. 244). Even if one practices religious precepts, its effects will disappear at the moment. One cannot get liberation from samsara". A claim that effect arises immediately after cause in AVP case 7 is denied in SVS v.293 also. Claim that aggregate is cause which is discussed in AVP case 9, is denied in SVS v.306 also. According to SVS, Haribhadra uses the method that many things cannot produce one thing. He discusses this problem generally in AVP.The statement that cause gives mental impression to effect is discussed in AVP case 10 and SVS vv.326-328. The viewpoint which is not discussed in AVP but in SVS, is analyzing momen- tariness changing from existing to non-existing (vv.248-275)and from non-existing to existing (vv.276-302). thinks that changing from existing to non-ex- isting i.e. vanishing is that there is not any thing left (na bhavati).On the contrary Haribhadra thinks that there is "nothing". Even if every thing has vanished, there is

1065 (38) Haribhadra Suri on Momentariness (Y. HARADA)

"nothing". So, this idea conflicts with momentariness. Even if we think that non-existing changes to existence, we cannot add ability (sakti)to a non-existing thing. We cannot acknowledge this change. In another case, Buddha had committed a sin of killing another person in former life 91 kalpa ago, so Buddha is hurt in his foot in the present world (v.361). To es- tablish this logic, we have to acknowledge the self which continues from the former life to the present world. There is conflict between this logic and Buddhist's mo- mentariness.

3. Conclusion I compared Haribhadra's AVP and SVS regarding non-momentarinessin and momentariness in . Haribhadra uses the same logic in each text. But in SVS he uses some new logic from the viewpoint of transition from existence to non-existence and vice versa. He points out in SVS that stories of the Buddha's for- mer life conflicted with momentariness. I also compared Haribhadra's views with some Buddhist texts, MMK, TSP, etc., and found that the same logics are used in these texts, too.

AJP Anekantajayapataka, by Haribhadra Suri with his own commentary and Muni- candra Suri's super commentary, GOS No.88/No. 105, Baroda, 1940/1947. AVP Anekantavadapravesa, by Haribhadra Suri, satippanakah, Patan, 1919. MMK Mulamadhyamakakarika, Madhyamakavrtti:Mulamadhyamakakarikas (Madhy- amikasutras) de Nagarjuna avec la Prasannapada commentaire de Candrakirti, publiee par Louis de la Vallee Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica 4, St. Petersbourg, 1913. SVS Sastravarttasamuccaya, (a) Acarya Haribhadra Suri's Sastravarttasamuccaya with Hindi Translation, Notes and Introduction, translated by K.K. Dixit, L.D. Series 128 (22), Ahmed- abad, 2002. (b) Sastravarttasamuccaya by Sri Haribhadra Suri with his own Commentary named Dikprada, Jain Upashraya, Bombay, 1929. TSP Tattvasamgrahapanjika,by Kamalasila, ed. by E. Krishnamacharya, GOS 30/31, Baroda, 1926. Harada, Yasunori 2006 Moksa in Jainism--with special reference to Haribhadra Suri

1066 Haribhadra Suri on Momentariness (Y. HARADA) (39)

-- , Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies(Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu), 54-3, 1126-1132. Uno, Tomoyuki

2003 The kalavadin as seen by Haribhadra Suri(「 ジ ャ イ ナ 教 文 献 に 現 れ る

kalavadin」), Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Buk-

kyogaku Kenkyu), 51-2, 58-62.

1) SVS contains about 700 verses and Haribhadra wrote an own commentary (Dikprada). Though modern scholars did not pay attention to this text except for Uno [2003] discuss- ing the kalavadin in Jainism, it is very important to study this text. Because there are common verses to AJP, AVP, Saddarsanasamuccaya, Dharmakirti's Pramanavarttika, Samantabhadra'sAptamimamsa. 2) Haribhadra refers to Santaraksita's name in his commentary of SVS v.296. This is a helpful information to decide Haribhadra's date. 3) Though the chapter 20 of MMK is named as samagripariksa, various cases of causal- ity are discussed in reality. 4) See Harada [2006]. 5) See AVP p.51, 11.19-24. 6) See AVP p.53, 1.10-p.54, 1.2. 7) These points are discussed also in TSP. But different points, i.e. decision after doubt, looking for a thing which someone put down etc., are shown there (TSP ad v.476).More- over, Ratnakirti in Sthirasiddhidusana added some other points. 8) See AVP p.55, 11.14-19.

〈Key Words〉 Haribhadra Suri, Anekantavadapravesa, Sastravarttasamuccaya, causality

(Research Fellow, Kyushu University, Ph.D.)

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