Negotiating Brexit: Where Now?

1 2 Negotiating Brexit: Contents

Where Now? Index of authors...... 4 Foreword by Hussein Kassim, Simon Usherwood...... 5

Austria by Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann...... 6

Czech Republic by Petr Kaniok...... 9

Denmark by Mads Dagnis Jensen, Jesper Dahl Kelstrup...... 11

France by Christian Lequesne ...... 14

Germany by Eva G. Heidbreder...... 17

Hungary by Robert I. Csehi...... 20

Ireland by Brigid Laffan...... 23

Italy by Marco Brunazzo and Vincent Della Sala...... 28

Lithuania by Ramūnas Vilpišauskas...... 31

Poland by Natasza Styczyńska...... 34

Spain by Ignacio Molina and Salvador Llaudes...... 37

Sweden by Mats Braun...... 39

UK by Simon Usherwood ...... 41 The view from “Brussels” The European Institutions

and the EU27 by Hussein Kassim...... 44

3 List of Authors

Mats Braun, Senior Lecturer, Södertörn University, Sweden

Marco Brunazzo, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Trento

Robert Csehi, Lecturer and Researcher, Hochschule für Politik München, Technical University Munich

Mads Dagnis Jensen, Associate Professor, Roskilde School of Government, University of Roskilde

Jesper Dahl Kelstrup, Associate Professor, University of Roskilde

Vincent Della Sala, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Trento

Eva Heidbreder, Professor, Otto-von Guericke Universität Magdeburg

Petr Kaniok, Associate Professor, Masaryk University

Hussein Kassim, Professor of Politics, University of East Anglia, and Associate Fellow ‘UK in a Changing Europe’

Brigid Laffan, Professor and Director of Robert Schuman, European University Institute

Christian Lequesne, Professor and Director of the Centre d’études et de recherches internationals, Sciences Po Paris

Salvador Llaudes, Analyst, the Elcano Royal Institute and Lecturer, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

Ignacio Molina, Senior Analyst, the Elcano Royal Institute and Lecturer, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann, Professor of Political Theory and, Director of the Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies, University of Salzburg

Natasza Styczyńska, Assistant Professor, Institute of European Studies, Jagiellonian University

Simon Usherwood, Reader in Politics, University of Surrey and Associate Fellow ‘UK in a Changing Europe’

Ramūnas Vilpišauskas, Professor and Director of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University

4 Foreword Hussein Kassim, Simon Usherwood

Amidst the political debate surrounding Brexit in the UK, the views of the EU27 are often overlooked. Or worse, they are assumed or imputed, with no reference to evidence or research. How often since 2016 have we read or been told that the EU will eventually accede to UK demands since “they depend more on us than we do on them” or that German car manufacturers will make Berlin – and through Berlin, all other member states – see sense? Similarly, as UK ministers embark on yet another charm offensive, the story is that if only HMG can speak directly to its counterparts and bypass “Brussels”, it can move the negotiations along towards a satisfactory conclusion. In the wake of the October 2018 European Council, envisaged as the decisive moment when agreement on a withdrawal treaty was reached, we look at the view from other national capitals and the EU institutions. The aim of this publication is to collect the perspectives from the EU side on the state of the negotiations, what progress needs to be made, and what the future holds as the clock ticks towards 29 March 2019. It has been produced as part of a wider research project, “Negotiating Brexit: national governments, EU institutions and the UK”, which was set up to examine the responses of other member states, as well as the European Council, European Commission, and European Parliament, to the UK referendum and monitor their approaches to the Article 50 negotiations. Its purpose is to understand the attitudes, interests, and negotiating positions of the UK, partners. The project is funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) under its ‘Brexit Priority’ scheme. Grant number: ES/R001626/1 In the pages that follow, specialists from the project address the following questions on the country on which they are expert: - What was the reaction to the UK referendum? What approach has your government taken, and what considerations and influences have shaped it? - What have been your governments main concerns in the Article 50 negotiations, and what are its priorities in negotiating the Withdrawal Agreement? What kind of future relationship between the EU and the UK would your government like to see? - What are the prospects, especially after Salzburg and the run-up to the October European Council, for an agreement and orderly Brexit? The conclusions are sobering. The EU27 remain largely attached to the principles adopted by the European Council on the Sunday following the UK referendum. Although they view the UKs departure from the EU as a cause for regret, and many will suffer economic damage, the integrity of the Single Market and EU unity matter more. Importantly, they do not want a “hard border” in Ireland and they support the Good Friday Agreement. Furthermore, they believe that Michel Barnier is doing an excellent job as EU negotiator. As editors, we should like to express our gratitude to the authors for contributing such insightful pieces, and to Richard at Anchor Print yet again for his excellent work.

Hussein Kassim Simon Usherwood

For more information about the project, news, and future publications, see https://www.uea.ac.uk/political-social-international-studies/research/negotiating-brexit Twitter: @NegotBrexit

5 Austria and Brexit 2018: the impact of the Austrian EU Council Presidency Sonja Puntscher Riekmann

What are the effects of Austria’s 2018 EU help with this difficult matter. minister visits to their Austrian counterparts Council presidency on Brexit negotiations? At the beginning of the Presidency in July in Vienna in July and August 2018: Secretary One is tempted to respond: none. Such was 2018, Chancellor Kurz visited May in London of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Greg Clark and Secretary of State for the reply of the Austrian Chancellor Sebastian and also met the Irish Prime Minister Leo Kurz in an interview of August 2018: “We Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Jeremy Varadkar. In a press release, Chancellery Kurz play a very minor role in this”. This echoed Hunt. Perhaps the most interesting encounter emphasized the importance of good and close previous statements. While members of the was that between Clark and Vice-Chancellor bilateral relations with the UK after Brexit: Austrian government repeatedly described Heinz-Christian Strache, who is also leader of “We want to ensure that also after Brexit Brexit as the most important issue for the EU the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ). If Mr Clark the EU and Great Britain work together as during their presidency, they also insisted that had been hoping for a more sympathetic closely and well as possible. We need to avoid Austria stands fully behind the chief negotiator hearing from the FPÖ, he was disappointed. a hard Brexit and a hard border between Michel Barnier and that the main task of the The FPÖs anti-Europeanism and anti- Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Council presidency is to ensure cohesion immigration position had been reinvigorated As the member state holding the EU Council among the 27 member states. The extent to in opposition under the leadership of Mr Presidency, we endorse chief negotiator which the impressively consistent position of Strache against the background of the post- Michel Barnier.” And he expressed a wish to the 27 is due to Austrian policy is debatable. 2008 Euro-crisis and refugee movements in achieve clarity on the form of Brexit as quickly However, even though Prime Minister May 2015. These issues dominated the presidential as possible. After his meeting with the Irish held talks with the Austrian chancellor and election in 2016 in which the Eurosceptic PM, the Austrian Chancellor reiterated his the minister of European Affairs in August candidate of the Freedom Party and the support for the Irish position “to definitely 2018, Austria’s position remained unchanged, pro-European candidate of the Green Party avoid a hard border”. Visiting the border zone the Salzburg Summit ended with criticism of competed in the run-off ballot, when for the the Chancellor referred to the past conflict the Chequers plan and the isolation of the first time since 1945 the candidates of the two which he saw as resolved “precisely because British Prime Minister. It is unknown whether traditional parties were defeated. Whereas a hard border solution had been avoided.” the Austrian Presidency made any attempt to the Green candidate Alexander van der He gave no hint about how a resolution might act as a broker. In an informal talk, a former Bellen finally won by 54%, in the campaign senior official of the Austrian Ministry of look this time, but referred once again to the Freedom Party candidate Norbert Hofer Foreign affairs raised serious doubts about the Barnier. unveiled his sympathy for the outcome of preparedness of the Austrian government to The Council Presidency saw two further UK the Brexit referendum and hinted about

6 the possibility of an “Öxit”. In the wake of leader of the parliamentary party group of the partner. If driving a wedge between the two the French presidential election campaign, ÖVP. The report produced meagre results, and coalition partners, or within the EU27, had Hofer also briefly supported Marine Le Pen’s the topic has since disappeared from Austrian been Mr Clark’s purpose during his visit to advocacy of a withdrawal from the Euro. He public discourse. Vienna, then it clearly failed. eventually backed down from both positions Be that as it may, after Clark’s visit the FPÖ Significantly, Brexit is not an issue of claiming that they had been misinterpreted. vice-chancellor appeared to have dropped contention between government and What he really wanted was a change in the EU his earlier view that the UK’s future would opposition. In the first place, all opposition to avoid further exits. be bright outside the EU. In the joint press parties are pro-European. Thus, while all The national election of 2017 resulted in conference, he stated that as vice-chancellor, of them regret Brexit, they have not come victory for the conservative People’s Party he was not in a position to predict the future. forward with any alternative approaches to (ÖVP) The FPÖ came third behind the Social Although he opposed revanchism of any the current negotiations. Second, the 2017 Democratic Party. It quickly became clear that kind against London, he was not prepared to election has altered the party system. The a reprise of the traditional Grand Coalition had tolerate British cherry-picking, especially in SPÖ, which has become somewhat unstable, been ruled out by the new ÖVP party leader, regard to the four freedoms. He rejected the had had a hard time defining a new role for Sebastian Kurz, who engaged in coalition British criticism of the Commission as hardline itself on the opposition benches. Torn by talks with the FPÖ. While the two parties had and repeated Austria’s support for Barnier, a left-right divide with particular regard to by and large converged with regard to the “who is negotiating for the whole EU”. migration, it is in a process of leadership migration issue – time and again Kurz had Somewhat surprisingly, Mr Strache praised the change. The outgoing party leader and former stylized himself as the successful closer of the Commission that “from the start had aimed chancellor Christian Kern has left the helm in Balkan route – the same was not true of their at reaching an orderly exit of the UK and at order to position himself as social democratic approach to the EU. Having been the political defining the basis for future relations.” This Spitzenkandidat for the EP elections in Austria driving force behind Austrian EU membership, was intriguing as until then the Commission and possibly beyond. The Green Party has the new ÖVP had to integrate the Eurosceptic had been one of the FPÖ’s favourite targets been voted out of parliament and is party at FPÖ, which was eventually achieved by for criticism. Mr Strache added that the overall drift. Positioning itself on Brexit has not been including a commitment to the EU in the goal is to construct a close relationship with a major priority. The centre-liberal NEOS Party, preamble of the coalition accord. At the same the UK built “on a fair balance of rights and meanwhile, regrets the departure of the UK as time, both parties agreed to the negotiation duties”. He welcomed the Chequers White a liberal member state, but remains staunchly of a “subsidiarity pact” with EU partners, Paper in principle, but expressed concern pro-European. which would substantiate the subsidiarity on a number of questions, though he only clause of the Treaty on European Union, as a mentioned the Irish border as a concrete major goal of the Austrian Council presidency. example. While at the time he avowed the Brexit was invoked as part of the justification Austrian presidency’s commitment “to do for this measure. Commission President Jean- whatever it takes to ensure intense and fruitful Claude Juncker reacted by setting up a task negotiations”, there has been little visible force on subsidiarity, which included a former activity on the part of the junior government

7 It has been the business chamber (WKÖ) payer? And who is to inherit the EU agencies Conclusion and the representation of big industry currently located in London? After the shock Whereas the Austrian government defined (Industriellenvereinigung) that have expressed had passed, not only the Austrian political Brexit as one of the top priorities of its real concern about Brexit. They are fearful establishment, but the public at large realized EU Council presidency, its own impact on of the void that Brexit will create in terms of that there will be positive and negative negotiations appears to have been marginal. advocacy of market liberalism in the EU. The implications of Brexit. The government has time and again pointed WKÖ believes that Brexit will damage the With regard to the first question, the reaction to negotiations as the task of the Commission UK economy more than the EU, since the EU was immediate, unequivocal and largely and Michel Barnier in particular, who enjoys accounts for almost half of UK trade, while only consensual: Austria will not pay more into the full support of the Austrian presidency. 6.5% of EU exports go to UK and 3.8% account EU coffers. This was the message of the ÖVP Austria defines its own role as consensus for imports from the UK. For Austria these finance minister and one which most parties in keeper among the 27 member states. In figures are even lower. So although access parliament lent their support. It was reiterated that respect it has been successful. Even to the UK market is important for Austria, in the context of the Austrian EU Council the Eurosceptic coalition party FPÖ has it will suffer considerably less than Ireland presidency, which would oversee an important refrained from voicing opposition to the EU or Germany, even if Austrian industry forms phase of the Multiannual Financial Framework and praised Barnier’s negotiation skills – at part of the supply chain for many German negotiations. Two aspects were of major least in public. The visits of PM Theresa May (automobile) manufacturers. The WKÖ fears concern. First, if the current budget is to be and other members of the British government that problems might arise from new tariffs and maintained without UKs contribution, others to their Austrian counterparts during the non-tariff trade barriers, the end of mutual have to step in or pay-outs will have to be cut. presidency appear not to have produced recognition of technical norms, standards and Second, the gap may make Brexit negotiations results. The overall impression is that Austrian educational certificates, difficulties with the and settling the divorce bill more difficult. elites, as well as the public, have come to the availability and posting of skilled labour, as well As a net contributor, Austria has an interest conclusion that Brexit is irreversible and that it as legal uncertainty and exchange rate risks. in keeping its contributions stable and is not needs to be brought to a fruitful end soon so Hence, a swift negotiation of the withdrawal prepared to compromise. Interestingly, though, that certainty can be restored, in particular for agreement to end uncertainty is paramount in the course of 2018, the proclamations on Austrian business and firms. for Austrian entrepreneurs. On its website the issue have diminished. It seems as if the the WKÖ has posted a number of analyses of Austrian government has gradually appreciated the consequences of Brexit for Austrian firms, that it may be necessary to compromise, but checklists to prepare for all eventualities, and would prefer to do so out of the public eye. links to relevant European information sites. It has also set up a special office to help clients Austria also took part in the battle for the spoils adapt to Brexit. of Brexit, i.e. European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the European Banking Authority Moreover, during the election campaign (EBA). Despite the campaigning for Vienna as of 2017 two major questions were voiced: the ideal place to relocate them, Austria lost to Who is to fill the gap in the EU budget after Amsterdam and Paris. the departure of such an important net- 8 The view from the Czech Republic Petr Kaniok

The discussions that started in the United The position of the Czech government did The Referendum and After: Stability Kingdom in 2013 when David Cameron not change over the following months. In the The result of June referendum was perceived delivered his Bloomberg speech did not beginning of February 2016, the coalition by the majority of Czech politicians – though receive much attention in the Czech Republic. supported the UKs four main demands. not a minority of Eurosceptic hardliners – as The speech itself was noticed by only a small The only significant reservation concerned very bad news for the UK, as well as for the group of politicians: the then Prime Minister social security/benefits, where the Czech Czech Republic and the EU as a whole. No and ODS leader Petr Nečas; Jan Zahradil, an government requested that the safeguard major political party attempted a constructive influential MEP from the same party; Přemysl mechanism should apply only to newly interpretation of the result. Sobotka, vice-chair of the Senate; and Libor arriving citizens. The Czech government also Rouček, a then MEP representing the Czech requested that the obligation to pay social A day later, the Czech government signed a Social Democrats. And for a long time that was benefits would remain with the country where joint declaration of the Visegrad countries, all – Brexit received no mention as a possible the person lives or works. Regarding economic which featured a key demand for the scenario, even in the governmental EU mid- governance, the government warned against protection and equal treatment of EU citizens term strategy that was published in May 2013. a deepening gap among Eurozone and non- in the United Kingdom. The Visegrad platform Eurozone members. As the Czech government was used repeatedly in the following months UK-EU relations only started to attract as a coordination tool, particularly prior to attention in January of 2016. That same felt that its concerns were reflected in the deal agreed at the February 2016 European Council European Council meetings. Brexit and its month, David Cameron visited Prague and consequences were also the main topic of a summit, it supported it without objection. discussed with Czech Prime Minister Sobotka speech delivered by Prime Minister Sobotka the Czech positions on a deal on British on 30th June in the membership. The Czech Republic expressed House of Deputies. its support for some British demands, such as equal treatment of Eurozone and non-Eurozone EU countries, deepening of the internal market, and increased competitiveness. However, it rejected any attempt to limit the free movement of people. Even though there was also disagreement on social benefits, Cameron was given support for a majority of his demands.

9 This speech outlined preferences for the When the ANO 2011 government, installed in of a wider consensus on the EU. The low first phase of the negotiations – a peaceful office in December 2017, failed to win a vote profile approach has appeared to improve – and rational divorce resulting in a fair deal, of confidence, its concern about EU matters and certainly has not damaged – the Czech and the protection of Czech citizens´ rights shifted to finances. Brexit was repeatedly reputation in the EU. Second, Brexit is not an and interests in the United Kingdom – mentioned in this context in terms of the future issue that resonates with the public. There which largely echoed those of the EU. The EU multiannual financial framework. However, has been no serious discussion about a government’s position on the indivisibility of even though acting Prime Minister Andrej “Czexit”. Third, no significant political party the four freedoms and the non-discrimination Babiš had talks with Jean Claude Juncker, has challenged the EU position as defined of EU citizens living in the UK has remained Michel Barnier and David Davis during the in February 2017, which demonstrates that substantially unchanged. The same is true of winter and spring of 2018, Czech involvement the issue has almost no political salience and the “follow the EU approach”. The government in the negotiations was low profile and went does not attract wider interest. Third, the ANO has repeatedly expressed its support for EU little beyond support for the EU approach or movements EU priorities lie elsewhere – with positions on Brexit. It called for a constructive reiterating EU positions. Nor did the Czech migration and the budget – not with Brexit. approach to the negotiations and also warned position change after the second Andrej Babiš To summarise, it would be mistaken to expect against any effort to punish the United government – a minority coalition consisting any significant Czech contribution or input in Kingdom. of ANO 2011 and ČSSD was installed in the final months of the Brexit negotiations. In the first months after the referendum, the beginning of June 2018 – won a vote of At the political level, the Czech government Brexit was framed by some as a “window of confidence. The Czech position was reiterated will very likely continue to follow and support opportunity” – to reform the EU, to recruit in the new Czech PM’s meeting with Theresa the EU mainstream. From this perspective, top British researchers, and to move agencies May in Salzburg in mid-July 2018. In short, Mr. Babiš’s comment to the BBC during from the UK to the Czech Republic. Thus, the the Czech government was concerned about the September informal European Council government bid (unsuccessfully) to provide two issues: the protection of the rights of EU expressing hope for a second referendum in a home for the European Banking Authority citizens based in the UK, and the indivisibility the UK should be regarded as an exceptional (EBA) in April 2017. However, interest in Brexit of the four freedoms. rather than a new turn in the Czech approach declined over the summer as political attention Future Development: Keeping a Low to Brexit. was directed towards the October 2017 Profile parliamentary elections. The election results, which resulted in defeat for the Sobotka Czech politicians have not aspired to take a cabinet, reinforced the trend. The process high profile as a player in Brexit. This is unlikely of forming a new government took almost 9 to change in the coming weeks and months months and politicians focused on domestic for several reasons. First, the existing approach Remain issues rather than on EU affairs. For example, has proved effective and is producing results. Czech politicians did not respond publicly Czech preferences that were articulated and to Theresa May’s speech on future relations advocated in the first phase of the negotiations between the UK and the EU. have not been uncontested and remain part BREXIT

10 Negotiating in a light room – Brexit from a Danish perspective Mads Dagnis Jensen and Jesper Dahl Kelstrup

The final count down European Union play? Needless to say, that stakeholders, which it took to the Commission. this is a sensitive political issue for both the UK An important exercise has been to find areas As negotiations over Brexit have progressed and the EU. of convergence between the EU27 and the only slowly in 2018, a “no deal” scenario has UK. One such area is security where the future become increasingly realistic. Danish officials According to Danish officials, the EU27 made relationship seems promising. Moreover, the did not consider “no deal” a possibility a a conscious move to welcome the Chequers Chequers deal and White Paper recognised year ago, but important and difficult issues plan and the White Paper produced by the principle of a level playing field in some remain in the negotiations, such that even the British government in July 2018, even areas of regulation and services. if agreement is reached between the UK though the content is very far from anything government and the EU27, it could be the EU could accept. For the purpose of the The resignation of a number of UK ministers rejected in the House of Commons. As a negotiations, it was important to recognise following the launch of the Chequers plan has result, preparations for a possible “no deal” that the UK had finally produced a proposal, influenced the dynamics of the negotiations. have begun in Denmark and other member and the Chequers plan has created a new The interaction between Dominic Raab and states. For example, more customs personnel momentum in the negotiations. However, the EU, for instance, has been more intense have been employed. some of the finer details appear contradictory, than was previously the case. Raab and Michel which has prompted the EU to ask for Barnier meet approximately once a week, The Chequers deal clarification. In many cases, the contradictions which is a considerably more frequent as reflect either compromises within the UK compared to David Davis who was rarely in The impression from a Danish point of view government, either as a strategy to postpone Brussels. Thus, the exchange at the political is that the negotiations are proceeding well tough choices or an assumption that the UK level has intensified. Yet, the Chequers plan when it comes to technical matters. However, can have its cake and eat it. has not significantly changed the position of progress has been slow on matters of high the EU – or of Denmark. politics. This is especially so on the issue of The EU27 reacted to Chequers deal and the the Irish border, but extends also to the so- White Paper in a meeting of the Council in late No fudging called “governance structure”: How can it July 2018. From a Danish point of view, there be ensured that an agreement between the was a good dialogue with the Commission on The key position for Denmark is that the UK UK and EU will honoured in practice? And, how to interpret the White Paper. The Brexit cannot continue to “fudge”. There must be what role should the Court of Justice of the task force in Denmark gathered opinions a balance between rights and obligations and questions from various ministries and in any deal. In terms of the outcome of the 11 negotiations four possible scenarios are the rights and obligations in the Single Market undermine the EUs negotiating position. The envisioned. First, a hard Brexit where the must go hand in hand. same approach seems to be taken by other WTO rules will apply. Second, a free trade member states. A contributing factor behind agreement where the UK gets some market Hard Brexit is not doomsday the EU27s unity is the coordination taking access with a few extra commitments (the How Denmark should deal with a “no deal” place in transnational interest associations, “Canada” option). Third, an EEA agreement scenario is being considered more seriously such as Business Europe. Moreover, the where the UK remains part of the single by the government. As negotiating trade strong unity among the EU27 is a function of market, but becomes a rule taker from the agreements with third countries is the the slow progress in the negotiations, which EU (the “Norway” option). A fourth bespoke prerogative of the EU, Denmark would have remain focused mainly focused on the general model might also be possible as long as it to await the Commission initiation of a new principles of the divorce rather than future follows the principle of parity. process of (re)-negotiations with the UK in interaction in specific policy areas. The current UK position, however, is case of no deal. Preparations are therefore The Danish negotiating position interpreted as a “fudge” in the sense that being made for coping with such a situation. it wants to be in parts of the single market The exercise is primarily administrative in The Danish negotiating position is for goods without following the full set of terms of following the rules for engaging with strengthened by the strong congruence common obligations. It is unlikely that the third countries. As with other Brexit-related between the aggregate interest of UK will get such a deal, as it would allow UK issues, the task force is asking ministries and stakeholders and the position of the companies to follow different standards to stakeholders to collect intelligence on the government. This is not a given as stakeholder those that apply to companies in the EU27 and areas that will be affected and to prepare interests are based on economic calculations, thus to gain a competitive advantage. From contingency plans. The task force has also whereas the government interest also takes Denmark’s perspective, it is important to make developed an overall plan developed for into account EU policy calculations and a sure that Danish companies are not at risk handling a “no deal” Brexit. In practical terms, broader geopolitical perspective. The position of being outcompeted in the future because the tax authorities have hired 50 new customs of the Danish government is based on a British firms have been allowed to play by officers to cope with trade with the UK after mapping exercise, which took place shortly rules other than those of the EU’s single Brexit. after the results of the Brexit referendum market. As other countries in the single market From a Danish perspective, a “no deal” Brexit in 2016 and has remained in place since. account for roughly 50% of Danish exports will be a significant administrative challenge Still, whenever there are changes in the a simple cost-benefit analysis suggests that but not doomsday. The default option will be negotiations between the UK and EU, the the single market will remain more important to treat the UK like a third country. It is not in various ministries and their stakeholders are than exports to the UK market, which accounts Denmark’s interest to be too specific about consulted for their opinions on the possible for some 5-8% of Danish exports. Although how it will deal with different types of Brexit consequences for their respective domains. Danish agriculture will be among the industries as this explicitly or implicitly could play into The Danish parliament is continually involved most adversely impacted by Brexit, there is the bilateral negotiations with the UK. Instead, in the process, following its historically strong broad recognition among Danish stakeholders, Denmark is trying to coordinate as much as role in EU affairs. The parliament’s European including the Danish Farmers Association, that possible in EU27 to avoid breaking ranks and Affairs Committee is kept informed of the 12 progress in the negotiations and the relevant government, the issue is handled in outside ministers appear to obtain a negotiating the public eye. In the words of one of our mandate prior to important decisions taking interviewees, it has been “a bit too much light in, for instance, the European Council. There in the room” for the UK strategy to succeed, is general support for the Danish negotiating and even for the UK to think that it might position and tactics among parliamentary succeed. In terms of coping with the potential parties. The Brexit negotiations are perceived distributional consequences of Brexit, policy as a question of Danish national interests, coordination in Denmark has followed a which overrides everyday party political horizontal strategy to minimize potential costs. disagreements. Though Brexit will be costly economically, Among the broader public, Brexit and its it is estimated that the result of impact on the EU and Denmark is not a highly a sector-by-sector approach political issue. Yet, the implications of Brexit would lead to significantly have rather unexpectedly resulted in increased higher costs than a support for the EU in the public. That has horizontal approach to been used as a vehicle by some politicians the negotiations. and stakeholders to make the case for the advantages of the EU in general and the single market in particular. Negotiating in a light room Danish Business organisations have been approached by the British embassy in Denmark. The UK embassy has tried to convey the idea of a deep and special partnership, and to argue that it in the interest of all that the UK gets a good deal. Nevertheless, for Danish business organisations, the single market is an asset that needs to be protected. A discourse on a deep and special relationship does not change that, and Danish business has been concerned not to allow a rift to open between the largest business organisation and the Danish government. Where Danish business does take a different view from 13 Brexit – a French perspective in October 2018 Christian Lequesne

French society and Brexit that ran counter to the “right model” for Precise numbers are unclear, but British Europe. citizens are mostly to found in rural areas There is more debate about Brexit in France where they own properties. As yet, there has since Theresa May proposed her Chequers The fate of the 300,000 French living and plan. Beyond the experts, most French working in London is a greater concern. One not been any xenophobic turn against British people, as Europeans elsewhere in the EU, not-unpopular view is that London-based expatriates in the wake of the UK referendum. have found the negotiations with the EU27 expats decided to cross the Channel in Small cities and villages in France are used to a great deal less complicated than domestic order to avoid paying their taxes in France “their” Brits. Since 2016, British applications debates in the UK. Will the PM secure and are now facing the consequences of for French citizenship have increased by parliamentary approval for her deal? Will there their decision. Of course, this is somewhat 254%. A considerable number are from the be a second referendum? If the Labour Party reductionist. It neglects the large number of South-West of France, notably the Lot, the were to win the next general election, would young French people who work in all kinds of Dordogne, and Charente. Similarly in London, it stop Brexit altogether? These have been jobs – pubs, fast food, au pairing – because the French General Consulate has to deal the issues speculated about in French political of limited job opportunities at home. For the with an increase in applications for French debate since July 2018. Many in France are moment, the French diaspora in London has citizenship, mainly from the British partner in now alert to the possibility of a “no deal” and not decided to go return en masse to France, Franco-British couples. aware that such an outcome would require even if for the first time in the last fifteen huge bilateral work to allow normal business years, French and Franco-British schools in between France and the UK to continue. London (there are 14 in total) have received fewer applications for the school year from For the experts, it has never been easy to French families. There are also vacancies for convince the French public that the UK has residency permits – permanent for persons contributed positively to the EU since 1973. who have lived in the UK for at least five The areas where the UK’s influence has FRENCH years and provisional for others. Some French arguably been greatest – its contribution to Citizenship citizens settled in the UK for longer have even the establishment of the Single Market and to the enlargement of the EU toward Central applied for British citizenship, but they remain +254% and Eastern Europe – are not achievements a minority. that are considered unequivocally positive in If France has around 300,000 citizens living France. Indeed, they are often perceived to in the UK, between 150,000 and 400,000 UK have taken the EU in a neoliberal direction citizens are permanently based in France. 14 Economic worries and hopes There are also moves in the opposite for the 2019 European elections. Macron direction. Chanel Holding moved to London in has delivered several speeches on the EU, In France, worries about Brexit extend across September 2018. According to some business including at the Sorbonne on 26 September several economic sectors. Fisheries is one. sources, the number of French-led SMEs 2017. Macrons speeches are addressed In 2017, Northern France, Normandy and and start-ups has increased since the 2016 mainly to the 20-25% of pro-EU French Brittany vessels made 50% of their catches, referendum. These businesses want to ensure voters who supported him. The rest of the representing revenues of €110 million per that they are firmly established before the UK’s French population is either sceptical about or year, in British waters. French fishermen want departure from the EU actually takes place. indifferent to the EU. A recurrent theme is that to retain their fishing rights in UK waters. Some commentators have highlighted the Brexit is an opportunity for France to re-launch Transport companies, which operate between the EU together with those who believe in it. France and the UK, also worry for their future. opportunities created by Brexit for the French financial sector. French politicians and Calls from the pro-EU camp in France for a The French food industry is concerned about strong Franco-German relationship are hardly the post-Brexit weakening of the pound, which representatives of financial services endlessly repeat in the media that Paris has the chance new. However, Chancellor Merkel’s political had a negative impact on orders from across capacity to get things moving in her own party the Channel. to attract financial companies from the City of London. But at the current time – beyond and in her coalition with the SPD is limited. Frances successful bid for the European The reaction to Macron’s grand ambitions Banking Agency, which will transfer from from Germany, in particular, and from the Canary Wharf to Paris – the number of financial other member states more generally, has been sector workers that have actually moved from muted to say the least. the City of London remains limited. HSBC As usual, the most difficult topics in the reports a total of 1000 people, while Crédit Brexit negotiations have been left to the Agricole estimates that 6-7% of their staff end. Macron has always been clear that the could move to Paris if London loses access to UK cannot implement a Single Market à la the European Financial Passport. Paris appears carte. On this issue, he has the backing of to be more attractive than other continental a majority of member states. The French cities, and not only due its size. Banks need administration gives its full backing to the EU square meterage for offices, houses for their Negotiator Michel Barnier and his team on French-led banks and hedge fund managers staff, and bilingual schools for their staff’s the question of the Irish border. At the same in the City have monitored the negotiations children. The latter appear to be in more time, Macron has always been clear that the without yet taking decisive action. For London- abundant supply in Paris than in Frankfurt or EU door remains open to the UK. A change based French bankers, Jeremy Corbyn’s Dublin. of government in the UK or new referendum leading to the reverse of Brexit process would election would be a bigger business threat President Macron and Brexit than Brexit. Such an outcome could lead them find support in Paris. to move – but not necessarily to France. Brexit negotiations take place as President Emmanuel Macron is preparing an EU narrative 15 Conclusion her electorate, were against an exit from EU France from the Eurozone at the beginning of and from the Euro, due to worries about the her campaign. France has its own Eurosceptic parties both impact on their savings. This explains why on the left and right of the political spectrum. Even among the most established Eurosceptic Le Pen had to create a somewhat strange These parties secured 45% of the total first- party, Brexit is seen as a British idiosyncrasy narrative at the end of her campaign, saying round votes in the 2017 presidential election. that has its own logic, but is not an example that she wanted to go back to the French But French Eurosceptic voters do not support that France should follow. Migration as an Franc but without renouncing the Euro – a a French exit from the EU along UK lines. issue, which was key in Brexit, is much more proposal which makes little sense from an Even exit from the Euro is not popular among important in the French critique of the EU than economic point of view. The resignation of French Eurosceptics. One of Marine Le Pen’s the question of leaving or remaining in the EU. Le Pen’s lieutenant Florian Philippot from the mistakes during the presidential campaign FN is also linked to this debate. Philippot was was to put on the agenda the withdrawal of heavily criticized inside the party for having France from the Eurozone, as many FN voters, wrongly recommended to Le Pen a retreat of especially among the middle-class part of

16 Negotiating Brexit. The German view Eva Heidbreder

A preference for, but increasing This was probably most clearly expressed in The German government: little doubt about, an orderly exit and a German press conference in January 2018. debate, few diverging voices close relations Asked about the visit of two British cabinet members to Berlin, the official speaker of the Since the general elections in September Overall, the German position vis-à-vis the Chancellor, Stefan Seibert, replied: “I can only 2017, German governmental politics have Brexit negotiations remains unchanged since speak for the Chancellery that no meetings are mainly focused on internal issues, above all the initiation of negotiations: continuing planned. I do not know who was contacted quarrels within the coalition government. regret over Brexit that is considered a “lose- before this visit. I just know that [Chancellor While there was some debate over Brexit lose” situation; an unequivocal backing of of the Exchequer Philip] Hammond told the in the initial phase after the referendum in the European Councils negotiation mandates media beforehand that he was happy to meet 2016, the German government position to chief negotiator Michel Barnier; and, clear German companies or economy in order to lay that was soon after established in line with commitment to the necessity of an orderly out the British position”. its EU27 partners has not been changed or Brexit. The notion of an orderly Brexit, from substantially challenged since. Despite the Given the very straight and unchanged line a German perspective, means above all an changes in the Foreign Ministry – the current that negotiations, firstly, are to be conducted exit that is compatible with the EU’s legal Minister Heiko Maas is the third in office according to Article 50 and, secondly, that principles. This includes workable solutions dealing with the Brexit negotiations – has not the future of the EU27 and the integrity of the of the main remaining negotiation issue – the changed the German approach in any respect. single market have absolute priority, German question of the Irish backstop and the free The Chancellor keeps her dominant role in EU- negotiators have mainly been frustrated movement of people and products. In line affairs and also Brexit issues. If anything, the about the lack of a reliable British government with the European Council in Salzburg in German government is marked by continuity position. Economic actors have not diverged September 2018, the Chequers plan is not and absolute stability in its approach and from the main line taken by the government. considered viable in this respect. For both position on Brexit. Unlike the French President Apart from this, there is no substantial public relevant political actors and for the wider Emmanuel Macron who has started to develop debate over Brexit. While the government has public this fundamental legal understanding of concrete measures in face of a possible considered the option of a “no deal” or “cliff the negotiations appears self-explanatory. ”no deal“ scenario such as employing edge” Brexit a possibility since the start of the new border posts, Angela Merkel and the Notions of “political solutions” that do negotiations, this is something that the media government remain much less solid in their not follow a strict rule-of-law principle have only begun to discuss as the deadlines statements on Brexit. Instead of listing specific along Article 50 but suggest that the Brexit for a deal draw closer. The focus is mainly on German measures for a ”no deal“ scenario, negotiations can be derailed on a purely the probable divesting effect on Britain and Germany continues to stress the will for a deal political process have thus not resonated. much less on negative effects for Germany.

17 and to uphold the EU’s red lines. capital and persons in future. The Bundesrat Minister of Interior, Horst Seehofer, issued German internal coordination is particularly notes with great regret that the government of a letter calling for a more flexible approach remarkable for the fact that the 16 the United Kingdom has repeatedly rejected in order to guarantee security after Brexit in governments of the federal states – the Länder a continuous membership of the customs July 2018. The letter did, however, not lead – have successfully established themselves in union and the single market”. The fact that the to any reaction as the government formally the German position-formation and internal Länder and the federal governments share the distanced itself from its content. While the coordination process. Building on a decision main prerogatives, i.e. protection of the single official line remains firmly behind the shared by the second German parliamentary chamber, market and the future of the EU27 as priority EU27 negotiation principles and open in the Bundesrat that represents Länder interests, over the strong wish for as close as possible tone that stresses the priority of avoiding the Länder are firmly integrated in the Brexit future relationships with the UK, renders the a “hard Brexit”, there has been for some negotiations of the federal government. official German position even more stable and time increasing stress on the frustration felt They have established a significant practical consolidated. at the working level over a lack of reliable role in German position formation, above all The most decisive actor for the German negotiation positions from the British through an intense screening process on the Brexit position remains Chancellor Merkel. governments side. implications of the British EU-exit for each In response to the Salzburg Summit in German industry: preparing for the Land. September 2018, which rejected significant unwanted scenario This input has provided the government with elements of the British PMs proposals, Angela a valuable source of information which has Merkel stressed her strong commitment to The dominant position in the German helped to establish a reliable administrative a dignified Brexit process and the German economy, including in particular the car apparatus to coordinate overall position commitment to continue the negotiations manufacturing industry, is that the single formation (including a representation in a good atmosphere. While the Chequers market is more important than the British one. of the Länder in Brussels where Länder proposals are considered to show a This position was established immediately responsibilities are concerned). The federal good number of common points (e.g. on after the referendum in 2016. Even if estimates government and Länder governments internal security, external cooperation and predict that suppliers for the British car share the same positions on general other policies) a lot of work remains to be industry might lose between 14,000 and negotiation lines. Hence, in the Bundesrat done. While she consistently stresses the 18,000 jobs in case of a hard Brexit, there recommendation for the European Council government’s commitment to good future have been no serious signs of lobbying the in May 2018, the Länder stressed that “as an relations and shared interests in selected government to derail from its firm single export oriented, open economy Germany areas, the EUs red lines – especially on the market first” approach. In contrast, there has the greatest interest that the future Irish border and on the integrity of the single have been repeated calls by German car trade agreements with the UK, while fully market – remain non-negotiable. manufacturers on the British government guaranteeing the integrity and functionality Only occasionally have high-ranking politicians to avoid the implications of a hard Brexit of the EU single market, will offer the most voiced a need to respond “more flexibly” scenario, which would eventually lead to the possible open exchange of goods, services, to the UK demands. Most prominently, relocation of production plants out of the UK.

18 More generally, German industry has voiced for a possible, if not probable, hard Brexit. debate focuses more on internal politics than significant concerns over Brexit and takes the The German economy considers that it Brexit. Reactions to the Salzburg summit in option of a hard Brexit scenario seriously. This is the British government that is primarily September 2018 confirm mainly that Germany has even led to some open opposition to the responsible for avoiding the generally has a great interest in a joint deal with Britain British government, calling on it to prevent unwanted hard-Brexit scenario, given that the but that the Chancellor “will not save Theresa a hard Brexit scenario. As the deadline for a German government’s negotiating position May”, reflecting how the mainstream quality deal in November 2018 draws closer and a that prioritises the functioning of the single media does not challenge the government ”no deal“ scenario is taken as an ever-more market is dominant and firmly supported. position outlined above but rather explains the likely outcome, economic actors respond with background of the Brexit process. Whilst no a probable withdrawal from the British market. major new opinion polls have been conducted According to its Brexit Survey Deloitte states since 2016 on positions on Brexit, a 2017 that in 2018, 72% of all companies surveyed Politbarometer poll showed that Germans have occupied themselves intensely with the preferred a hard negotiating position vis-à- Brexit implications (in comparison to 59% in vis the UK. Prior to the May summit in 2017, 2017) and that the majority of the companies only one per cent of Germans were in favour surveyed are starting preparations for a hard of the EU making “major concessions”, 13% Brexit scenario that is considered a probable were in favour of “larger concessions”, 42% for outcome by 50%. Activities most affected will “not too large concessions” and 32% for no be investments into the UK (33% have already £ € concessions at all. This shows public opinion stopped investments, in the car manufacturing also largely in line with the official German industry even 47%) and an adaptation of position. supply chains as well as organisational and personnel management. In addition, the city of Frankfurt has been in the headlines as a probable beneficiary of Brexit. While real estate prices in Frankfurt The German media and public: rose substantially, the number of companies watching the UK move towards the and banks that have actually relocated cliff edge remains limited – with UBS being one of the most prominent banks that has announced to Media reports on Brexit focus mainly on move to Frankfurt in case of a likely ”no deal“ the British side and less strongly on the scenario. Most debates tend to concentrate German position formation or implications for on the competition between cities in the EU27 Germany. While German opposition parties to attack business. In sum, German companies have criticised the very reluctant and rather are mainly concerned with taking preparations passive stance of the Chancellor, public

19 Hungary and the Brexit negotiations: stressing unity but developing special ties? Robert I. Csehi

Introduction explicitly in the campaign, the Hungarian words of one government official, “we had Brexit negotiations became much more government developed closer ties with the UK. an economic interest in a longer transition visible in Hungary in 2018. Although there The strength of the relationship was reflected period”. Otherwise, Hungary was supportive is still no public debate on the details of an in a friendly visit by former Minister of Foreign of the idea that the whole of the acquis should agreement, and information regarding the Affairs, Boris Johnson, and support given to continue to apply in the UK until the end of the transition period, and that the UK would position of the Hungarian government on Orbán by the majority of Conservative MEPs in the European Parliament’s vote on the no longer participate in the institutions and particular issues is somewhat scarce, media initiation of the Article 7 procedure against decision-making procedures of the EU. coverage of the negotiations is much more the Hungarian government. It is yet unclear, frequent. This also involves news reporting on Based on the December 2017 Joint Report, a whether this will influence Hungary’s position the scandals around the “Leave” campaign, draft Withdrawal Agreement was put forward in the Article 50 negotiations, although Orbán from the alleged funding ties to Russia, to the to conclude the first phase of the negotiations has signalled that the EU should treat the UK breaking of UK electoral law. Nevertheless, in February 2018. The draft document fairly and not be punitive. Public opinion is also underwent close scrutiny, and a number of the increased media attention given to Brexit favourable to a fair deal for the UK. is likely due to the approaching end-date alterations were initiated on the text. As a by which a conclusion needs to be reached Issues settled and issues that remain government official argued in Hungary, “the in order to avoid a “no deal” exit. Another Withdrawal Agreement went through a lot of part of the explanation is that European The Hungarian government see resolving the transformation…Hungary had at least twenty become politicized in Hungary during problem of the Irish border as a key issue. points in the text where we wanted changes. Although the border is of little economic the 2018 elections. Prime Minister Victor Some concerned our economic interests, importance to Hungary, Hungary does not while others would have had implications we Orbán’s governing party, Fidesz, used the want a hard border, and supports the integrity wanted to avoid”. While government officials same billboard image depicting migrants of the single market. The transition period were unwilling to give chapter and verse, as the unofficial Leave campaign in the UK is also an important issue. The government they reported that most were clarifications referendum. They also repeated emphasised endorsed the supplementary negotiating introduced in order to avoid unintended the incapacity of the EU to address the refugee directives on the transition period adopted in consequences. Another official observed that crisis throughout the campaign. in January 2018, but was concerned that the small member states seemed to be more While Brexit as an issue was not utilized period on offer was not long enough. In the active participants in the review process. When

20 a partial text on a number of the chapters in On the question of future economic relations, A special relationship between the UK March 2018, Hungary had a special interest in Szijjártó underlined that no agreement and Hungary? citizens’ rights and a strict approach to the UK’s would be disastrous for the EU, as it would financial obligations. contribute to a further decrease of the EU’s As the post-Brexit relations guidelines were competitiveness in the global market. Hungary being negotiated, the UK initiated a charm Guidelines for the future relationship between offensive in Hungary. First, Greg Hands, the the UK and EU were discussed in the same therefore wants the EU to negotiate the widest and most comprehensive free-trade agreement UK’s Minister of State for Trade Policy visited month. For Hungary, security cooperation was, Budapest, where he talked about the relevance and remains, a key issue. A few days before possible – a point stressed multiple times by Szijjártó. of trade relations between the two countries the June 2018 European Council meeting, after Brexit. Soon after the Hands trip, Foreign Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade When in July 2018 the UK government Minister Boris Johnson visited his Hungarian Péter Szijjártó stressed the need to uphold submitted its White Paper, Hungary did colleague in Budapest in March, 2018. The security cooperation with the UK. Noting that not issue a formal response. The reason, as two shared a family dinner together and went “Hungary regards the maintaining of security a government official pointed out, is that for a run on Margaret Island. In their joint cooperation with Great Britain as extremely Hungary is committed to the unity of the press conference they stressed the strong important”, he called for the closest possible EU27 and that the EU27 are represented by relations between the two countries. Szijjártó cooperation between the EU and the UK in the European Commission, and therefore it talked about the unfortunate loss of the UK defence and secret service after Brexit. Baltic would be inappropriate to respond unilaterally. as an ally in the sovereigntist camp within the and Scandinavian countries would need to call However, the UK proposals of a Facilitated EU. Earlier that month he also claimed that on British security capacity in the future. Customs Arrangement, which has important Britain’s decision to leave the EU was due to ramifications for the question on the Irish a failure on the part of Brussels, repeating a border, and a common rulebook, were issues claim made by Viktor Orbán in the wake of of concern. the UK referendum. Johnson, on the other hand, assured his colleague that the UK was committed to guaranteeing the security of East-Central Europe. After Johnson’s departure, Prince Andrew, the Duke of York visited Budapest as well as part of “Brexit diplomacy”. On the question of a potential future charm offensive, a Hungarian official thought it rather unlikely, unless there was no progress made on the final agreement in the coming months. In early June, Orbán received Michel Barnier, the Chief Brexit Negotiator of the European

21 Commission in Budapest. While the details of Conclusion initiation of the Article 7 procedure against their meeting were not shared, the Hungarian Hungary. Brexit has gradually gained more and more Prime Minister stressed the unity of the EU27 coverage the media in 2018, although This act alone shows how great the political in the Brexit negotiations and gave his full the interest of the public remains low. The loss is for Hungary as it loses an ally, and the support to the EU Negotiator Michel Barnier in Hungarian government still stresses the biggest member state in the sovereigntist his effort to maintain this unity. However, this relevance of unity among the EU27 in the club within the EU. How relevant this evolving call for unity started to show some cracks in the negotiations, and welcomes the effort the relationship will be for the coming months late summer, early fall of 2018. First, Orbán met European Commission, and Barnier are in the effort to conclude the negotiations is with Italy’s Interior Minister Matteo Salvini, who making to achieve an agreement. Hungary is yet to be seen. On the other hand, once the criticized the EU, questioning its objectivity supportive of the agreements so far reached, negotiations move from the withdrawal to the and good faith in the Brexit negotiations. Later, and the most relevant remaining issues question of future relationship, these bilateral at the informal meeting on Brexit in Salzburg, include: the Irish border arrangement, the links are expected to play a more relevant role Orbán stressed that the UK should not be UK’s potential participation in the customs as special national interests will play a much punished, and instead a fair Brexit and good union, and the future security and intelligence bigger role. On the question of whether the cooperation between the EU and the UK was cooperation between the UK and the EU. government is preparing for a possible needed. At the same event, Orbán called ”no deal“ Brexit, a government official simply While Hungary is supportive of the united Nigel Farage MEP, and claimed that listening pointed out that any responsible government approach towards the UK, it did not stop the to him was an intellectual gift. This sudden is preparing for any potential outcomes in a UK government from leading a charm offensive Annäherung between Hungary and the UK Brexit-like negotiation situation. was no coincidence. The European Parliament which peaked in Boris Johnson’s official visit presented the Sargentini Report, a vote on to his Hungarian colleague. Although the which meant the initiation of the Article 7 meeting did not break Hungary’s commitment procedure against the Hungarian government. to a common EU position in the negotiations, it Orbán’s tactics seemed to pay off, at least signalled the development of a special political partially, with 16 out of 19 Tory MEPs voting relationship between the two countries which against the motion. was clearly reflected in the EP vote on the

22 Waiting for Godot: Ireland, border Ireland and the backstop Brigid Laffan

As it departs the European Union (EU), the involving two states and the communities Irish relations and has led to strains in the UK has only one land border with the Union. in Northern Ireland based on human rights, relationship not witnessed since the 1990s. When the UK leaves the EU, that border equality and a parity of esteem between the It remains the most contentious issue to be changes from an internal EU border to an two communities. The single market rendered decided before agreement on the Withdrawal external one. It so happens that this border the economic border largely invisible because Agreement is achieved. The border is a was contested from its establishment and it removed barriers to the free flow of goods key sticking point in the process of the UK’s has witnessed violent sectarian conflict for and services. The timely convergence of departure from the EU. This short article these two separate changes normalised the over three decades in the twentieth century. covers three dimensions of a very complex border and transformed the lives of border Two developments in the 1990s rendered set of political relationships; first, it argues communities. this border largely invisible: the single market that Northern Ireland is different to the rest of Great Britain; second, it traces the elusive programme and the Good Friday Agreement Brexit disturbs territorial politics in the United search for a backstop to the Irish border; and (GFA). The GFA was a peace agreement Kingdom and undermines fragile attempts at reconciliation and forgetting in Northern third it analyses the end game in the Brexit Ireland. The GFA enchased an internal negotiations. Northern Ireland power sharing agreement into wider North-South and East-West Northern Ireland is different institutions, which served to transform the When faced with the difficulties created by lived experience of sovereignty in this troubled the Irish border for the Brexit process, UK part of Europe. The GFA took the hard edge Conservative ministers and politicians have off the intersection of states and identities on sought to downplay its significance, frequently the island of Ireland; nationalists in Northern in ways that display a lack of understanding or Ireland could identify as Irish or British or both. care about the sensitivities associated with a In contrast, Brexit is not about pooling contested border. Speaking in February 2018, or sharing sovereignty. Rather it is about the then Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson regaining it: control over borders, money likened the challenge of the border to the and laws. It removes the shared scaffolding collection of congestion charges between that joint EU membership offered British- Camden and Westminster. His implication

23 was that Northern Ireland was just like any related political agreements. Its population that the UK’s departure from the EU will not other part of the UK. In August, Jacob Rees- was divided by ethnic and national differences undermine peace, the fluidity and invisibility Mogg sparked a furious response when underpinned by religion as an identity marker. of the border and the co-operation that has a video emerged in which he suggested Unionism was wedded to the UK state evolved as a result of the GFA. Ireland has a return to checks on the border “as we and in its loyalist variety to the protestant worked with the Article 50 Task Force and had during the Troubles”. David Davis, the people of Ulster. The unionist population is its partners in the Union to ensure that the former DExEU Minister, speaking in early innately defensive because there are possible outcome on the border is one that will not September argued that the border issue was futures that it does not want. More recently, end the normalisation that was achieved in “heavily overemphasised” and that it was a Unionist defensiveness was exacerbated by 1998. This has demanded a high level of straightforward” problem to address. Those demographic shifts in the providence. In 1998, bilateral engagement with EU capitals and living in Northern Ireland and on the border, the DUP opposed the GFA, which it only came the maintenance of strong relationships in have responded with an active twitter feed to grudgingly accept in the 2000s. Internal Brussels. The Irish and UK Governments @BorderIrish and an extraordinary short politics in Northern Ireland was mired in cross- together with the EU are not divided on the film, ”Brexit: A Cry from the Irish Border“, community vetoes and following the last objectives for the border, which is no hard which identifies those UK politicians who are election, its Assembly has failed to produce a border on the island of Ireland. They are, willing to play dangerous games with the Government. Brexit has greatly exacerbated however, very divided on how to achieve it. normalisation of the Irish border and Irelands the North’s fragile politics and the dependence Ireland is insisting on a backstop agreement, peace process. of PM May on 10 DUP votes to maintain her that translates the UK commitment to the border into a legally binding commitment. Northern Ireland differs from the rest of the government reduced trust on the other side. UK for a number of fundamental reasons. It Since the launch of the Brexit negotiations, the is the only part of the UK that is governed search for agreement on a backstop brought by an international treaty, the Good Friday deep differences between the UK and EU27 Agreement, that makes provision for it to sharply into focus. There are differences about cede from the UK with the consent of the the substance of the backstop, the role it people. It is the only part of the UK that can should play and its relationship to the future automatically re-join the EU, if it opts for relationship between the EU and UK. The unification with the rest of the island. The Irish Government backed by the EU26 want GFA guarantees the constitutional status of a legally binding backstop in the Withdrawal Northern Ireland as part of the UK, but this The elusive backstop Agreement that provides an “all weather” guarantee is contingent because the GFA time unlimited guarantee that regardless what allows for a change in that constitutional The Irish Government, as a co-signatory and happens, the UK commits to no hard border position by consent. Unlike the rest of Great co-guarantor of the GFA, and in the interests on the island of Ireland. From the outset, Britain, Northern Ireland is a divided society of its own security as a state, regards the the UK sought to discuss the Withdrawal that experienced a civil war that only entered Brexit impact on the Irish border as existential Agreement in tandem with the talks on the its non-violent phase following the GFA and and of the highest priority. It wants to ensure future relationship. It resisted the EU planned

24 phasing of the negotiations. The UK lost on the Irish border question that largely The agreement of the DUP was achieved this battle before it began because the EU satisfied the Dublin Government. However, the by adding a paragraph 50 which specified negotiating guidelines required sufficient DUP reacted strongly to what was agreed on “that the United Kingdom will ensure that progress on the Withdrawal Agreement before Northern Ireland and refused to support the no new regulatory barriers develop between it was willing to open talks on the future Government. By the 8th of December just a Northern Ireland and the rest of the United relationship. The UK Government maintained week before the December European Council, Kingdom, unless, consistent with the 1998 from the outset that the Irish border issue the London Government and the DUP arrived Agreement, the Northern Ireland Executive was integral to the future relationship and its at a formula enabling the exit negotiations to and Assembly agree that distinct arrangements preferred way to address the border issue was proceed. The agreement was part of a joint are appropriate for Northern Ireland”. In the via the future relationship. From the beginning report from the Brexit Task Force and the UK immediate aftermath of the Joint Report, of the negotiations, there has been a to the December European Council. Paragraph members of the London Government simmering tension on the relationship between 49 of the document, reaffirmed the UK’s appeared to back pedal. The then Minister for the Withdrawal Agreement and the declaration commitment to the GFA and the avoidance DExEU, David Davis, said that the agreement on the future relationship. of a hard border. If offered three options to “was a statement of intent more than anything deliver this: else. It was much more a statement of intent By December 2017 the UK wanted to move to than it was a legally enforceable thing”. phase two of the negotiations as UK business (a) to achieve these objectives through the was concerned by the uncertainty surrounding overall EU-UK relationship; The appearance of backtracking in London led the process. This triggered the first crisis on (b) should this not be possible, the United the Article 50 Task Force to begin to formulate Ireland in the exit negotiations. In the lead-up Kingdom will propose specific solutions to a protocol on Ireland, which would be added to the December European Council, the Irish address the unique circumstances of the to the Withdrawal Agreement. In the early Government signalled that from its perspective island of Ireland part of 2018, the Task Force began drafting sufficient progress had not been made on the Withdrawal Agreement and as part of (c) that in the absence of agreed solutions, the this exercise it formulated a draft protocol on the Withdrawal Agreement, especially on the United Kingdom will maintain full Ireland, which it published on 19th March, border question, to warrant moving to phase alignment with those rules of 2018, as it wanted robust legal commitments two. Ireland was supported in this by the other the Internal Market and the from the UK on the Irish border. The Draft member states and the Brexit Task Force. Customs Union which, now Protocol would effectively keep Northern Speaking in Brussels on November 20, Michel or in the future, support Ireland in the EU’s customs and single market Barnier said “What is … unclear is what rules North-South cooperation, territory but as a fall-back option to be used will apply in Northern Ireland after Brexit. And the all island only if other solutions could not be agreed. what the UK is willing to commit to, in order to economy and the Under this version of the backstop EU tariffs avoid a hard border”. protection and rules of origin would apply to non-EU Under pressure from Brussels and facing of the 1998 goods, as would EU VAT and excise rules, demands from UK business for clarity about a Agreement. EU product safety and quality standards (e.g. transition period, PM May offered language food, chemicals and consumer goods) and

25 EU rules on animal health and welfare. The undertaken so far are respected in full.” become a backdoor for the entry of illegal backstop, which the Commission argued, was Speaking in the Irish parliament on 21 June, goods into the EU market. This the EU will not the working out of the December Agreement Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker accept. There are four types of checks that met with considerable resistance from London. said “other Member States, and Ireland in must take place in order to protect the single However, in an effort not to derail the future particular, should not pay the price for that market; customs, EU standards, animal and relationship talks, the UK PM wrote to Donald choice. This is why when it comes to Brexit, plant hygiene and Value Added Tax (VAT). The Tusk on the 19th of March. In the letter, the UK I have always said that it is a case of ’Ireland EU is hardwired to come up with solutions PM reiterated her commitment “to the Joint first’. He went on to say “There should be no to technical problems related to all of these Report in its entirety, including reaffirming return of a hard border. We need common checks and it may well agree a differentiated the UK Government’s view that the Belfast rules to preserve North-South cooperation. approach that allows for some checks at or Good Friday Agreement of 1998 must And most importantly, this means the Good source, at distribution centres, at ports and be protected in all of its parts” and further Friday Agreement should be preserved in its on the ferries themselves. There are already said “I am committed to agreeing in the entirety. Every line. Every letter”. This remains some checks at the port of Larne relating to Withdrawal Agreement operational legal text one of the key challenges facing the EU and for at least the so called backstop option”. the UK as they attempt to construct an orderly animal and plant health but nothing involving The PM argued in this letter that there was withdrawal of the UK from the Northern Ireland is ever just technical. further work to be done on the backstop but EU. she was not backtracking from the December Given the centrality commitments. This was the minimum of the border issue necessary to get the future relationship talks for the Withdrawal started. Agreement, the EU Following the intensive discussions in March, Chief Negotiator, the UK has failed to engage on the backstop. Michel Barnier London has not come up with a solution has attempted to that avoids a hard border in Ireland that is address London’s compatible with its preferences to exit the concerns by seeking single market and the customs union. The to de-dramatize the June European Council conclusions on the issue. His strategy Article 50 negotiations were intended as a is to map all of the stark warning to the UK. The European Council checks that must be expressed “its concern that no substantial conducted to ensure that not progress has yet been achieved on agreeing a withstanding a soft border, the backstop solution for Ireland/Northern Ireland” integrity of the single market and reminded the UK that “negotiations can could be maintained. Put simply only progress as long as all commitments that Northern Ireland would not 26 Towards the endgame Tusk in his post summit press conference Ireland has invested heavily in multiple described the economic element of the bilaterals with its partners and EU institutions If the UK is not to crash out of the EU on 29 Chequers plan as “unworkable”. The Irish and has persuaded them that its arguments March 2019, there needs to be a Withdrawal Government continues to press the London on the need for a backstop are compelling. Agreement and a political declaration on the Government for proposals. The Minister for Ireland’s partners do not see the Irish border future relationship by end January at the latest European Affairs, Helen McEntee speaking on as an issue of regulation and customs but as although all parties have indicated an earlier Irish radio said on UK backstop proposals that central to a peace process that resonates with end-date to allow time for ratification as the “so what we have asked is that they give this the Union’s self-identity. Many regard the UK’s Withdrawal Agreement is an international information, that it’s in written form, that it’s stance on the border as dangerous to a fragile treaty. The European Council in October, a a legal document, because the backstop has peace. possible special Brexit European Council in to be a legal document and that they give it November and the scheduled December The UK government for its part is dependent to the task force as quickly as possible”. After European Council provide the negotiating on 10 DUP votes for its survival that adds the Conservative Party conference, there is a forums for the final deal. All is contingent a challenging political dimension to its narrow window of opportunity to get the talks on serious work being accomplished in the management of the border issue. The DUP back on track. bilateral negotiations between the UK and opposed the GFA and were regarded as the the EU Negotiator. The UK’s attempt to side- most defensive unionist party in Northern line Michel Barnier has spectacularly failed. If Ireland. As the end game of the negotiations anything his position has been enhanced. draw near, the DUP has doubled down on its objections to any checks on the UK-Ireland The Salzburg informal summit has soured the sea border; its leader, Arlene Foster, has atmosphere between the two sides and this publically argued that “we cannot have either has been compounded by the febrile nature a customs border or a regulatory border down of the Conservative Party conference. Salzburg the Irish Sea”. This runs counter to reports was never intended, as an important meeting that the London Government is contemplating point on Brexit but PM May wanted the EU27 a proposal that makes provision for a UK not to stymy her Chequers deal, which is her wide customs arrangement for goods and desired settlement for the Irish border and regulatory alignment in Northern Ireland. At the future relationship. At a bilateral meeting time of writing, there is no UK proposal on the with PM Varadkar in Salzburg, PM May table that offers a legal text on the backstop. informed him that the UK would not be ready The Irish Government will not shift its position with its backstop proposals by October. The that a legally guaranteed backstop is essential EU27 have been waiting for these proposals for agreement to the Withdrawal Agreement. committed to by the UK for over nine months. Support for the Irish position among the Given the time constraints this was met with member states and the Article 50 Task Force disbelief and a resolute reiteration of where has been rock solid. This is largely because Ireland stood on this matter. President Donald 27 Populist Italy and Brexit Marco Brunazzo and Vincent Della Sala

Brexit was not on the Italian political radar for amount of commercial and economic links at the table with France and Germany, Brexit most of the last year as debate was consumed between the two countries. The overriding could possibly mean that Italy is increasingly first by the election campaign, a protracted concern was and remains the fate of Italian a distant third. It did not help that there negotiation to produce the most Eurosceptic nationals in the UK. Brexit has been seen as an was no effective government for the first six government in Italian history and then a opportunity not only for the EU to gain new months of the year and the new executive led state of high tension as the “government momentum but also for Italy to exploit Britain’s by Giuseppe Conte that came to power in of change” tried to convert its rhetoric into absence, from attracting EU agencies from the June does not seem interested in nurturing a action. On the surface, the Lega-Five Star UK to new power dynamics with France and close relationship with either Paris or Berlin. Movement (M5S) government should have Germany to assume a more prominent role in Italy had often looked to the UK as a counter- been good news for the Brexit side, as there the Council and other EU institutions. On both weight to the French-German access and it was now a government of a large member these fronts, Italy’s Brexit opportunities were has few options if it is isolated by the larger state that did not see leaving the EU as more apparent than real. member states. If anything, the sovereignist necessarily problematic. Indeed, the Minister The recent growth of the Italian nature of the current government has pulled for European Affairs, Paolo Savona, has had pharmaceutical industry, expected to surpass Italy closer to political leadership in Hungary a long-standing Plan B for Italy’s withdrawal Germany’s in 2018 as Europe’s leading and Poland, widening even further the from the Euro. While the M5S leadership producer, was seen as giving the country distance from France and Germany. insists Europe is Italy’s natural “home”, it sits the edge to claim the European Medicines alongside UKIP in the European Parliament; Agency (EMA). The Gentiloni government Enter the populists the Lega’s ally in the EP is France’s National had lobbied, some would later say not hard A measure of the depth of change in Italian Rally of Marine Le Pen. If Prime Minister enough, to re-locate the agency from London politics since the March 2018 elections is May was looking for a sympathetic ear in the to Milan. But it was not able to convince most that the two parties in government received Council, Rome would seem like a good place northern member states nor neighbouring around 30% of the vote in 2013, close to 50% to call upon. Slovenia to back its bid. When it lost out in 2018 and are currently polling consistently to Amsterdam on a coin toss, it missed an A year of missed opportunities? around 65% in opinion polls. The two major opportunity to realise important economic parties that dominated Italian politics for The consistent line that has run throughout gains from Brexit. over two decades and were stalwarts of Italy’s Italian discussion on Brexit since June 2016 Not winning the EMA was perhaps a symptom traditional pro-European stance, the PD and has been that Italy was not exposed to any of a greater missed opportunity, as it revealed Forza Italia, have become minor background great direct risks because of the limited that rather than giving Italy greater weight voices in political debate. As we will see

28 below, there is some ambiguity about the referendum. finances. The Conte government would be ill- consequences for the Brexit debate to have Yet, the new Italian government has not advised to risk losing the little influence it has two Eurosceptic parties leading the country produced any cracks in the united Council on an issue such as Brexit that is not politically and talk of a “Quitaly” might be premature. front. As with many other issues, there is salient nor a priority for its electoral base. However, a profound change has taken place always a distance between what leading Second, Salvini and others who presumably and it raises questions about whether Brexit ministers and party leaders say and what would like to see Italy leave the EU do not played a role and what role it will play in the government does. There are a number have any incentive to have negotiations break shaping Italy’s position in a post-Brexit EU. of reasons why Italy has not broken with down and for post-Brexit Britain to be isolated. All this should be good news for Leavers the Council, all of which suggest that the Support for the EU and the Euro has increased and the British government. The previous government will not seek to break the in Italy since June 2016 so Italian Eurosceptics Renzi and Gentiloni governments were never consensus in the Council on either the have to tread lightly and have little to gain in of the view that a hardline needed to be sequence nor the content of the Brexit seeing negotiations with London end badly. taken in negotiations with the UK in order to negotiations. Prime Minister Conte, reporting to Parliament discourage others thinking of leaving, but First, Italy is engaged in a high stakes before heading off to his first Council meeting they were strong supporters of the EU who negotiation with its EU partners and the in June stated quite clearly that the aim looked to Brexit as a way to propel towards Commission on two issues that figure was to have a negotiated settlement that deeper integration in areas such as monetary prominently on the domestic political agenda was acceptable to both sides and would be union. They also did not want Brexit to seem and are significant for the future of the EU: the basis of continued mobility for goods, too easy and seamless so as to discourage immigration and Eurozone rules on fiscal protection for EU nationals in the UK and any nascent move in Italy to follow suit. The discipline. Italy’s commercial ties with Britain continued cooperation on security questions. formation of a new government that put are not important enough to risk losing Conte stressed the need not to isolate Britain Italian sovereignty at the centre of its political political capital necessary on other issues. and to develop a post-Brexit partnership. project certainly created the possibility that a While Britain and most other parts of Europe Neither he or his government have taken any dissident voice might start to emerge amongst focused on the very public rebuke of Prime concrete measures to be seen as standing the member states as negotiations with the Minister May and her Chequers proposal alone in defence of Brexit. UK hit a critical point in the second half of at the Salzburg summit in October, all the Third, some producer groups, such as 2018. Matteo Salvini, deputy prime minister attention in Italy looked to the continuing Coldiretti representing farmers, have started and leader of the Lega, has said publicly failure to find agreement on the migrant to produce reports of the costs of Brexit to that the EU (presumably the Commission) is question. Moreover, Italy is increasingly faced their members, especially of a total break. The not negotiating in good faith and that Prime with the prospect of being isolated by France cost to the agricultural sector, according to Minister May should walk away with and Germany, as well as the growing alliance Coldiretti’s estimates, would be over €3 billion “no deal” if the wishes of the Brexit vote are of northern member states, especially with annually in exports to the UK: higher than not respected. He has been the most strident respect to the current governments willingness the cost of Russian sanctions that the current in defence of what he sees as the “will of to abandon previous commitments on public government has railed against. Confindustria, the people” expressed in the June 2016

29 the largest employers’ association, had on Brexit but the very real likelihood that rhetoric may compel one or both of the parties expressed its concerns about either a both the void created during the period of to turn words into actions. Breaking with ”no deal“ scenario or one with continued government formation and the deep divisions the other member states on Brexit probably uncertainty over questions of trade and capital that exist within the government mean there would not cost the government very much in mobility. These are two important sector is no interlocutor for London or Brussels of terms of electoral support and could even be representatives politically, especially as the any consequence in Rome. British attempts seen as a sign of its commitment to asserting Lega sees large parts of their membership as to find allies on the continent will probably the principles of national sovereignty. It is an important electoral base. leave London wondering whom to call in not likely to happen but a politically weak Both the Lega and M5S have expressed very Rome. The real danger is not that there could government hostage to two competing parties public and strident support of the Brexit vote be a government in Rome that looks with that control it might take policy decisions and/or UKIP, suggesting that May is likely envy to Brexit but that there might not be that defy Italy’s long history of supporting to find a friendly voice at the negotiating one at all or one that is too politically weak European integration and even public opinion table. But it is hard to see how the current to express a position on key issues such as favourable to the EU. governments position will be all that different the Commissions conditions, the Irish border Whether the Conte government sticks with from what had been the position of the question or the British demand to have a Italy’s EU partners or makes a break in the Gentiloni government. The Italian position role in EU agencies. Prime Minister Conte final stages of the Brexit negotiations may has been to stand behind a common EU27 has no political experience and few political be of little interest or use to supporters of position but to be sympathetic to a bespoke resources that he can call upon to shape Brexit and to the British government itself. It agreement that takes into consideration government policy. The two controlling figures is a government that is not very attentive to the exceptional features of the British case in the government, Di Maio and Salvini, details or to the slow, methodical work that that made it more than just a Canada or alternate between railing against Brussels and is necessary to build alliances and coalitions Norway. The economic costs of Brexit for expressing their credentials as committed to around complex issues such as Brexit. Italian Italian exporters and industry have crept Italy’s place in the “European” home. politics and political leaders have been and into public discussion, with Confindustria There are, then, good reasons to believe continue to be distracted by internal issues emphasising uncertainty about a market that that the populist and Eurosceptic Italian that even pressure from important producer represents over 5% of total Italian exports was government will not, paradoxically, be an groups, such as Confindustria and Coldiretti, is certain to incur costs for Italian industry. The ally of Brexit Britain. Yet, there are also good not enough to get the government engaged M5S-Lega government has tried to ensure reasons to worry that the government’s anti- on the possible costs of Brexit. The good news that those interests, along with the costs EU rhetoric and support for Brexit from some for Remainers and supporters of the EU is to the EU budget and protection of Italian of its components will begin to have an effect that the populists in power have not created a nationals, have priority over any ideological on Italy’s position. The Lega and M5S are powerful ally for Brexit. The bad news for Italy affinity towards what Brexit represents to a strange coalition, with many deep policy and perhaps the EU is that it also has meant a Eurosceptics. divisions and often competing to be seen government that is increasingly isolated and The more important point is not so much as the most “radical” and perhaps the most less consequential on important questions what position Italian governments take anti-EU. At some point, ratcheting up the such as Brexit.

30 Approaching the final stage of Brexit talks: Lithuania’s position Ramūnas Vilpišauskas

Outstanding issues significance since Lithuania is a net beneficiary The rhetoric of “no cherry-picking” has been with a particular interest in preserving funding criticised by some analysts in Lithuania as too From the start of Brexit negotiations Lithuanian for cohesion, agriculture, infrastructural inflexible, since it could potentially alienate the authorities emphasised two issues: protecting connections and the closure of the Ignalina UK in the future. However, for a country like the rights of Lithuania’s citizens in the UK – at nuclear power plant, as well as the need to Lithuania – an open small economy situated over 200,000 people, the largest Lithuanian maintain legal certainty for trade relations in a geopolitically risky neighbourhood – the community abroad; and respect by the UK of between the UK and Lithuania after Brexit unity of the EU is not so much about the its financial obligations to the EU, estimated at (during the transition period). formal application of “no cherry-picking”, €40-45 billion. Both issues formed part of the which arguably has not always been practised withdrawal agreement which, according to the Lithuania has continued to support the main by the EU, even when establishing the single EU, had to be agreed before negotiations on principles of the EUs negotiating position, market – one only has to remember the the future UK-EU relationship. including retaining the integrity of the EU single market and its customs union. In this services directive, which was full of exemptions In early October 2018, the Irish border respect, its supports the view that Chequers – but about the unity of the EU and preventing remained the main outstanding withdrawal is not acceptable because it would provide further fragmentation. issue. Lithuania supported the EU position on the UK access to part of the single market – Security co-operation with the UK post-Brexit finding a backstop option as a condition for free movement of goods – while allowing it is also an important issue for Lithuania. The moving forward. In other words, a solution regulatory divergence in services, which are an UKs contribution to the security and defence acceptable to Ireland will be acceptable to important item in the cost structure of many of the transatlantic community, including in Lithuania. The Canary Islands were considered goods. This would allow the UK business the EU’s neighbourhood and in forging a as one possible solution of how customs to gain a competitive advantage, in view of common position towards Russia, was stressed checks of goods entering Northern Ireland the powers it would grant to UK customs in a joint letter from the Polish, Lithuanian could be carried out. and regulatory institutions. The opposition and Romanian Ministers of Foreign Affairs in As the end of the negotiations approaches to Chequers is based on the possibility September 2018. They urged that the EU’s without significant progress on the Irish border, that it will establish a precedent for other cooperation with the UK in foreign and security Lithuania has stressed the importance of a countries, although trust in the UK institutions matters should be separated from the issues deal. As well as the need to protect the rights and concerns about regulatory and fiscal that are still causing disagreement. The EU of Lithuanian citizens in the UK, the question of competition also play a part. should seek in its future relationship with the the UK contribution has assumed considerable UK “an ambitious and close future economic

31 and security co-operation, taking into account while agreeing broad outlines for the political withdrawal agreement would be “too high”. UKs red lines”, which stresses close co- declaration on the future relationship between As President Grybauskaitė underlined at operation with the UK in the area of the CFSP/ the UK and the EU, flexible wording of the the Salzburg Summit, it is in the interests of CSDP and recognises the UKs special role in political declaration would give time to find Lithuania and the whole EU to avoid a chaotic Europe’s security matters. In formal terms, agreement on the specifics of the future UK-EU Brexit. A “no deal” would put Lithuanian preference is given to a comprehensive EU-UK relationship during the transition period. citizens residing in the UK in uncertainty, and agreement similar to an association partnership If there is no progress on the Irish issue, then would damage the EU economically and agreement which would cover a wide range other scenarios, including postponing the date financially. “No deal” should be avoided “at of issues – trade, economic, security and of Brexit or extending the transition period, nearly all costs”. other areas along the lines of EU-Ukraine were discussed informally. However, this Such a formulation creates flexibility for the DCFTA. Close co-operation regarding mobility would create complications linked to the legal final phase of negotiations. By stating both of persons based on reciprocity and equal changes required for the representation of the the importance of keeping in mind the long- treatment of EU member states is also sought. UK in the EU institutions, such as the European term goal of a strong, integrated and united Possible scenarios Parliament and the start of a new financial EU while maintaining a close relationship with framework post-2020. its strategic special partner UK, it presents From Lithuanian point of view, domestic In May-July 2018, the Ministry of Foreign contradictory objectives, the compatibility politics in the UK, especially within the Affairs began to collect data from other of which eventually will depend on the Conservative party, has been the key factor ministries and institutions of Lithuania on dynamics of negotiations. Lithuania and the causing uncertainty in the negotiations. For the potential effects of “no deal”. Although EU more generally are inclined to insist on this reason, there was little public criticism of intended to facilitate domestic preparations a backstop solution for the Irish border and the Chequers plan, even though key element for Brexit, it also signalled to UK negotiators reject Chequers until the very last night of the were not regarded as acceptable. In addition, that Lithuania and other EU member states negotiations. expectations regarding the outcome of the are ready for such a development. Business Impact of Brexit on coalition politics Salzburg informal EU Summit were low and the organisations in Lithuania such as the assessment of its outcome was that “no real British Chamber of Commerce also advised within the EU talks” took place. As the Lithuanian President companies to start preparations for such a Dalia Grybauskaitė stated at the time, it was The prospect of the UK’s departure has scenario. The growth of Lithuanian exports has already created a new political dynamic particularly important that the UK government already slowed since 2016, mostly due to the should decide how it intended to exit the among smaller EU member states, who are devaluation of sterling, while business deals searching for potential coalition partners EU and that PM Theresa May needed a firm have been put on hold until there is more mandate to negotiate. Further progress and to balance the German and French couple certainty on the future relationship between within the EU institutions. Lithuania, Latvia and the need for a November meeting of the the UK and the EU. European Council is seen as dependent on Estonia have traditionally cooperated with the outcome of internal debate within the Lithuanian officials stress that it is “extremely” the Nordic EU member states, for example, Conservative Party and its support for May. If important to have an orderly withdrawal of by regularly meeting in the format of the she is able to move forward on the Irish border, the UK, since the damage of not concluding a Heads of state and government (NB6) within

32 the margins of EU Summits. Since late 2017, of competence to the EU level. They traditional priority of the UK within the EU. this format was expanded to include the identified completion of the banking union It remains to be seen whether such new Netherlands and Ireland and became known and transforming the European Stability groupings as the “New Hanseatic League” as a “New Hanseatic League”. Its member Mechanism (ESM) into a European Monetary have an impact beyond signalling their states have met mostly within the format of Fund as priority areas. In July 2018, these preferences on select issues, such as Ministers of Finances. They are described eight EU member states presented their responsible fiscal policy or removing barriers as fiscally-conservative, trade-friendly joint position on the capital markets union, within the single market. On some issues, such governments focused on national reforms and referring to the UKs exit from the EU as “a as the size or spending structure of the EU implementation of the exiting EU budgetary catalyst to further redouble our efforts in budget, the preferences of the Baltic States rules rather than further deepening of the EMU further developing and integrating EU capital diverge from the rest of the group. Moreover, and creating new institutions. markets”. In late July 2018, the group was Sweden and Denmark are not members of They presented their first common position on joined by another eight EU member states the euro zone and the banking union, which the architecture of Economic and Monetary (described as “Hansa Plus”) to declare the limits their influence in Euro-group decision Union (EMU) in early March 2018, urging support for the renewal of efforts to advance making. Still, Brexit is likely to have an impact the EU to debate the reforms of the EMU in with the removal of barriers to the single on coalition politics within the EU which a more inclusive EU wide format, proceed market, urging the European Commission to could reinforce the importance of issue-based with national reforms and implementation undertake a stock-taking of existing barriers coalitions, especially if there is further progress of budgetary rules, focus on EMU reform and inefficiencies by December 2018 “to beyond the Meseberg declaration in co- initiatives which have public support in make Europe more attractive for business ordinating French and German positions on EU member states, stressing real value-added and investment and deliver well-being for reform. of reforms rather than far-reaching transfer its citizens” – something that has been a NB6

kr EMU Hansa Plus ESM

EEA

kr kr 33 Polish perceptions of Brexit: between the rights of UK-based Poles, domestic politics and the idea of a less integrated Europe Natasza Styczyńska

The result of the referendum on the United Brexit is exploited by the main parties for their European Union. Brexit negotiations are much Kingdom’s membership in the European own political objectives and mobilising support less discussed. Union came as a surprise for many politicians among the electorate. Poland’s position was expressed in discussions and commentators in Poland, as well as The announcement of the referendum and the between Prime Minister Beata Szydło and Polish public opinion. The first reactions were subsequent election campaign came during her British counterparts David Cameron emotional, especially since public debate a turbulent period in the European Union, and then Theresa May. The appointment of before the referendum had not foreseen a which was struggling with the largest wave of Mateusz Morawiecki as Szydłos replacement “leave” vote. In the first months after the migration, as well as growing populism and in January 2018 and the ensuing government results were announced, the main topic of reshuffle did not affect Poland’s position or discussion was the practical consequences a revival of nationalism. Poland saw a distinct approach to the Brexit negotiations. After of Brexit. Commentators highlighted its change in the discourse on “Europe” following a brief meeting with May at the EU summit, significance for bilateral relations – economic the presidential election in May 2015 and Morawiecki stressed that strategic relations exchange, Polish citizens’ prospects for parliamentary election five months’ later. The and partnership between Poland and the continuing to live and work in the UK, and ruling Law and Justice party (PiS), part of the UK were confirmed”. It was also reported the future of British products and businesses European Conservatives and Reformists Group that he had highlighted the need for more in Poland. Once Brexit negotiations officially in the European Parliament, favours radical detailed discussion on the organisation of the got underway, it became clear that the most reform of the European Union and opposes EU budget, underscoring the importance of important issues for the Polish government deeper political integration. However, Poland’s budget issues for Poland’s position during the would be the rights of UK-based Poles, position became considerably more pragmatic, negotiations. maintaining good economic relations, and with the judiciary reforms implemented by defence. The Brexit problem is not a frequent PiS a bone of contention with the European The Polish government’s position on Brexit was topic of discussion, however, and media Commission. Information on the European published on 29 March 2017. The document reports usually focus on the resolutions made Union in the Polish media is dominated by expressed the hope that after leaving the at EU summits or during bilateral visits. As with the question of the next steps following European Union, the UK would become other major European or international events, the triggering of Article 7 of the Treaty on one of Poland’s most important partners. It 34 emphasised that Poland regretted the result of At the same time, the Law and Justice Trade the referendum, but respected the will of the government is encouraging some of the The UK is second only to Germany among British people. The document went on to note Poles living in the UK to return home. Polish Poland’s trade partners. It was also among that the UK should respect EU law until Brexit ambassador to the United Kingdom Arkady Poland’s five main export markets in 2017, became a reality. A special Brexit working Rzegocki admitted in an interview with the with 6.4% of Polish production sent to the UK. group was set up in the Polish parliament, Daily Telegraph that such a campaign was Trade increased markedly after Poland joined as part of the Committee for EU Affairs. underway. During a joint press conference the EU, and Poland currently enjoys a positive Secretary of State for European Affairs Konrad with Theresa May, Prime Minister Morawiecki trade balance, with a considerably larger value Szymański represents the Polish governments spoke about how it was in Poland’s interest of exports to the United Kingdom than the position in negotiations with the United to attract at least part of the Poles resident in import value. According to experts, however, Kingdom. Analysis of press reports, official the UK to return home country. According to the development of exchange has slowed documents and transcripts from meetings of a Polish Ministry of Investment and Economic significantly. In 2016, the UK was Poland’s the committee gives an indication of the areas Development report, as many as 200,000 second most important export market, but that Poland regards as important in the Brexit Polish citizens might leave Britain. Research in 2017 it had fallen to third. In this context, negotiations. The main concern is to make suggests, however, that even if they are Poland wants to maintain close economic Brexit as painless as possible, with transition considering leaving, most Poles favour a move cooperation. The greatest threat is likely to periods and continued close cooperation to another EU country over Poland. come from a lack of agreement, since Oxford between the EU and the UK. Economics analysts predict that a ”no deal“ Poles in the UK Brexit will cost Poland 0.8% of GDP, i.e. around 18 billion PLN (€4.2 billion). The rights of the Polish diaspora in the United Kingdom is the first priority. Poles comprise The future of the EU budget the largest number of EU citizens living in the As one of the largest beneficiaries of EU funds, UK. Estimates suggest that more than a million Poland wants no changes in the EU budget Polish citizens are permanent residents. The until the end of the current term. The Polish vast majority work in the services and building government argues that all the obligations sector. The rights of self-employed individuals concerning the 2014-2020 budget should be and entrepreneurs are also at stake. Poles have respected to prevent the United Kingdom’s registered approximately 40,000 small and exit from the EU from causing negative micro-enterprises in the UK. Minister Szymański consequences for less wealthy member states. insists that these rights should also apply to the families of employees and company owners. Security The potential and controversial introduction of visas for EU citizens has also been covered in Security issues receive considerably less the Polish media. attention in the media, yet the statements of

35 Polish diplomats and experts and transcripts The Polish media presented Prime Minister of Commission meetings reveal it to be one of Mays visit to Warsaw in December 2017 and the priority areas. Discussions mostly concern the signing of a joint defence treaty covering relations with NATO and the post-Brexit shape training, military exercises, information sharing of the Common Security and Defence Policy. and defence industry cooperation as evidence In Poland there are fears that the United of the excellent relations between the two Kingdom’s departure will result in changes to countries, regardless of any difficulties in the the balance of power between the EU and Brexit negotiations. They also highlighted the Russia. Poland looks on the Russian Federation fact that apart from Poland, only France had as a threat, and saw the UK as an ally in the such a treaty with the United Kingdom. fight against Moscow’s influence. Britain is considerably more cautious and mistrustful of the Russian Federation than that of other large member states, notably Italy and France. Poland regards the UK’s departure from the EU as deeply unfavourable.

36 Brexit and Spain: change, continuity and risk Salvador Llaudes and Ignacio Molina

Change of government with no play a role in these negotiations: the Prime Gibraltar without the agreement between the change of priorities Minister, Pedro Sánchez, the Foreign Minister, Kingdom of Spain and the United Kingdom.” Josep Borrell, and the Secretary of State for Since then, there have been many rounds In June 2018 Pedro Sánchez replaced Mariano European Affairs, Marco Aguiriano. Rajoy as Prime Minister, an event that had of negotiation between the UK and Spain, the potential to have significant impact There is moderate satisfaction with how the dealing with the most sensitive questions for on the Brexit negotiations. Such a change situation has developed in all of those priority Spain at this stage, including tax evasion, was certainly unexpected. Only a week issues. Regarding the first, the efforts by the tobacco smuggling, environmental issues before, Rajoy had secure an agreement on EU27 not to succumb to the constant “divide and the question of the airport. Importantly, the budget with both Ciudadanos (a liberal and rule” approach by the UK have been sovereignty is not currently under negotiation. party) and PNV (a Basque nationalist party). remarkable, with unity maintained so far. On Spain prefers to focus on rebalancing a Nevertheless, a court sentence had a marked citizens, after some unsatisfactory proposals, situation that has been too beneficial for effect on public opinion, putting into question the UK finally agreed last December to Gibraltar since Spain joined the European the testimony of the former Prime Minister – respect the core of the EU’s red lines. Also, Communities in 1986. Progress is slow, but as well as condemning the corruption in the a transition period was requested by the UK, has been positive, as its demands to create Popular Party – and was more than enough to including the commitment to respect the a protocol for Gibraltar – similar to those retire the long-time leader of the PP. rights of everyone coming to the UK until for Ireland and Cyprus – in the Withdrawal the end of 2020 when the transition is due to Agreement, underlining once again the Spanish priorities regarding Brexit during end. A financial settlement was also agreed specificities of the Rock, have been accepted. the first phase of negotiations when the PP in December, which was warmly welcomed, headed the government were in order of and while it is still very early to say how future Much ado about nothing importance: maintaining the unity of the EU27; the situation of citizens; the economic relations will be in economic terms, the new During the negotiations – to the despair of impact of Brexit; and Gibraltar. After only four Spanish government considers, as did the European partners (including Spaniards) – the months in office, these priorities have not previous one, the closer the better. British authorities have had a tendency to really changed under the new government. In On Gibraltar, there was already a victory ramp up the pressure every time an important fact, the stance is pretty much the same, and for Spain in the European Council April deadline appears on the horizon. The need this is explained both because of no important 2017 guidelines, which stated that: “After for a sort of crisis before finally accepting changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs team the United Kingdom leaves the Union, no the deal was most evident in December dealing with Brexit and a similar pro-European agreement between the EU and the United 2017 and September 2018. Moreover, the approach from the new top politicians that Kingdom may apply to the territory of UK has continually tried to “divide and rule”

37 the remaining EU27. such efforts have been of the Union by the Council, acting by a an unhappy one for Spain. But however particularly intense with a number of countries, qualified majority, after obtaining the consent important the loss of one key Atlanticist pro- including Spain, due to their strong interests of the European Parliament”. Moreover, as trade ally in the European Union might be, to maintain a close relationship with the UK. important as Gibraltar is for Spain, the country Spain is ready to move forward with the EU27. Yet the UK has not achieved anything of would never put it over the Commissions The European project is too important for the substance, especially so in the case of Spain, stance on Brexit negotiations or, even, over country. Therefore, Spain’s attitude towards whose national project since the dictatorship the strong ties the UK and Spain maintain. the Article 50 negotiations has been very has been to develop a deep connection with To understand this last question, we have constructive, while at the same time it has the European Union. Democratization, social to go back to basics and see how strong underlined the importance of not punishing progress, modernization of the country or rule the relationship really is. Several hundred the UK unnecessarily. With that, Spain has of law are deeply associated with the EU. thousand Spaniards and Britons live in the received a positive response to its concerns Spain recognised the efforts made by the UK and Spain respectively, more than 18 about Gibraltar, both in the European Council 2018 White Paper, although it agrees with million British tourists travel to Spain a year, April 2017 guidelines and, presumably, in the EU27 that the unity of the four freedoms more than 300 Spanish firms do business the attached protocol in the Withdrawal is indivisible, as underlined in the Salzburg in the UK and more than 700 British firms Agreement. Summit and contrary to the interests of the do so in Spain. In 2017, UK was the third Spain’s interests lie behind reaching an UK. Therefore, something else will have to be trade partner (after France and Germany) agreement with the UK. The sooner the better, put on the table if Theresa May wants to end for Spanish exports of goods and services, the stronger the better. This has not changed the negotiations with a deal. reaching €37.9 million. Any disruption would with the new government. The intense be dramatic. In this sense, a recent report personal and economic links between both A “no deal” that would be too by KPMG shows very interesting data: out of countries make it of essence to minimize the expensive 1,899 Spanish firms interviewed, 64% of them disruption: there, in short, is a lot to lose. said contingency plans were needed (31% Some in the UK have floated the idea that had already elaborated them and 19% were a “no deal” scenario may arise due to a already implementing them). The financial supposed intransigence on the Gibraltar sector is the most conscious, with 83% of question coming from the Spanish side. This the firms affirming the need to elaborate reading comes from a misunderstanding of those contingency plans (and 44% already the European Council guidelines of May 2016. implementing them). On the other hand, in Although the Spanish government was happy the chemicals less than 50% have started. with the inclusion of the clause on Gibraltar’s status after Brexit takes place, Spain has no Conclusion: a constructive approach greater power than any other member state with so much to lose regarding negotiations. As Article 50 states, the agreement shall be concluded on behalf The result of the Brexit referendum was

38 Sweden. A broad and deep deal – protecting the integrity of the common market Mats Braun

Sweden has traditionally been one of the government and available to the public on the united Swedish and British interests within countries in the EU that has the most similar government’s website suggest that Sweden the EU was a strong focus on the single outlook to the UK regarding the future of the is well-prepared for Brexit. Yet, the many market. The Swedish position in the Brexit integration project as well as on particular unknowns regarding the final Brexit deal (or negotiations so far is consistent with this issues. Brexit therefore complicates the no deal) leaves many questions unresolved. traditional focal point. The main aim of Swedish quest for influence within the Council. In addition, despite the action of authorities Swedish officials is the protection of the single Suggestions have been made that Sweden will and business associations there is a lack of market and its integrity. With this ambition the need to find new special partners” within the awareness of the consequences of Brexit, in Swedish government views it as crucial that EU and strengthen its cooperation with Nordic particular among small and medium sized the EU27 keeps a united position. Swedish and Baltic neighbouring states. Sweden is also firms. There are approximately 7,000 small Government representatives have stated likely to suffer from Brexit in economic terms. and medium sized companies in Sweden repeatedly that they would like to see a broad Sweden has a small and export-oriented trading only with EU countries, including the agreement that covers as many areas as economy which is likely to be in particular UK. They are not used to dealing with customs possible. The Swedish minister for EU affairs, negatively affected by Brexit. According to or other formalities and are not prepared for Ann Linde, has argued against the idea of estimates from the Stockholm Chamber of trade outside the EU. They are likely to be a Canada plus agreement. From a Swedish Commerce losses of 0.3% of Swedish GDP in badly hit by Brexit. It is also expected that perspective such an agreement would not 2019-2020 and approximately 8,200 jobs are trade patterns will change as a consequence correspond to the relevance of the UK and the expected. of Brexit, and that the remaining EU market British market as a trading partner for Sweden, The Swedish government has dealt with will become increasingly even more important or for EU at large. Brexit by commissioning investigations into for Swedish businesses. However, the Chequers plan has also been the consequences of Brexit from various The importance of the single market criticized by Swedish representatives as government agencies. Among others, these and rejection of the Chequers plan another attempt at cherry-picking. The include work on the consequences on trade, government initially welcomed the plan in so on research and innovations, on Swedish work Despite traditionally having similar priorities far, that it actually provided a starting point within the Council, on trade, on the financial as the UK within EU negotiations, there has for negotiations. The Swedish government, markets and on the social security system. not been any broader understanding for the in line with the general EU position, has The detailed investigations presented to the British intention to exit. What traditionally repeatedly stressed that the UK needs to

39 come up with concrete proposals, and that any implications on such connections. London main problem for the negotiations in his too much valuable time has been lost waiting is for instance the most popular city among view has been the polarization of the issue for British proposals. The Chequers plan, Swedish students studying outside of Sweden. in the UK. The stumbling block from a however, was viewed as being too narrow and If the impact of Brexit on Swedish perceptions Swedish perspective remains the Ireland as an attempt to breach the integrity of the of the UK is far from clear, it seems more border issue, where the UK is yet to present single market. From the Swedish perspective it obvious that the Brexit negotiations so a credible solution. In 2007 research carried is not possible to single out goods, excluding far have strengthened Swedish support out at Gothenburg University suggested that the other components of the single market. for EU membership. For a long period in Swedish diplomats had British diplomats as Sweden, would among others, like to see an particular in the 1990s and at the turn of their preferred first partners for consultations. agreement also including the services sector. the century Sweden was commonly referred That is when a new issue would appear In 2015 the UK was Sweden’s third largest to as a Eurosceptic country. The country’s Swedish diplomats would rather call up export market for services and fourth largest membership vote in 1994 was a won by a a British colleague than one of the other market for goods. narrow margin. However, over the last decade Scandinavians. The reasons were both an Swedish voters have gradually become more indication that the countries were likely to The EUs increasing popularity among have a similar opinion on the issue, but also Swedes supportive of the country’s EU membership, and this trend seems to have been further the reputation of British diplomats. Even if British diplomats may be as well qualified Theresa May visited Stockholm and the enhanced by the Brexit process. In autumn as ever, this era is gone. The position of UK Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven in April 2017, 56.1% of respondents argued they view for Sweden will be different whatever the 2018. The visit received substantial coverage the Swedish EU membership positively, which outcome of the negotiations and then it will in Swedish newspapers, and journalists is the highest figure ever in the country. In the not matter that Theresa May dances to ABBA. concluded that the visit indicated a special campaign for the 2018 general election both relationship between Sweden and the UK. Eurosceptic parties in the Swedish parliament Löfven used the opportunity to repeat his the Left Party and the rightwing populist – regrets regarding Brexit but also to call for the Swedish Democrats, downplayed their a deep and broad agreement for the future. Euroscepticism, and even if both countries The visit, however, was dominated by security want Sweden to leave the EU, they argued discussion and concerns regarding Russian they will not push for a referendum on activities in the light of the Skripal events. Swedish membership during the next term. Earlier during the year Prince William and Obviously the more long-term impact on Catherine also visited Stockholm. It is difficult public opinion is likely to depend on the to estimate how much such visits might nature of the final outcome. The Prime enhance British popularity in Sweden, but the Minister Löfven stated in relation to the country has long been highly influenced by informal European Council in Salzburg in the UK in cultural terms and it is only in the September 2018 that he thinks “reason long-term that Brexit would be likely to have actually wins” in the end. However, the 40 The UK: The dark heart of Brexit Simon Usherwood

Perhaps the most perplexing paradox of the Ireland or the Netherlands – probably the (DIT) and Boris Johnson at the Foreign Office: entire process of Brexit has been the tension most affected states – have not seen anything organisational efficiency took a second place between the seeming simplicity of the UK’s like the difficulties found in the country that to party management. decision to leave the EU and the difficulty triggered the whole thing. Indeed, the move to create new units also of turning that into reality. The issue has The structure of “doing” Brexit allowed May to put in place a parallel occupied the entire British political system negotiating structure within the Number 10 during the past three years, yet little as yet is The most useful framework for understanding office, which has become progressively more uncontested or settled. In part, that reflects how Brexit has unrolled in the UK remains important as negotiations have proceeded, the depth of divisions of views amplified that of domestic party politics. Key decisions especially since the production of the and generated by the 2016 referendum, but have been made primarily on the basis of December 2017 Joint Report. it also reveals a lack of elite consensus and intra-Conservative and inter-party lines of underlines the complexities of the Article 50 This highlights a second feature of the contestation, from the timing of Article 50 structure of May’s approach to Brexit, namely process itself. Unfortunately, more heat than notification to the general election in 2017 light has been generated. that the circle of decision-makers should be to the troubled emergence of a set of policy kept as small as possible around her. The dual To set this in context, even the decision to preferences around the so-called “Chequers structure for negotiation has been a clear leave the EU is more contested within the plan”. While the EU might have set the manifestation of this, along with the vociferous UK than any other member state: no other schedule and the broad agenda of Article response to according Parliament a role in country has politicians or pressure groups that 50, the UK’s engagement therewith has been the notification, negotiation and ratification actively campaign to reverse the process. Even strongly conditioned by this domestic frame. of Article 50. Using the referendum as a among those who do accept the decision, This is reflected in the organisational model carte blanche mandate, May has consistently there are a surfeit of plans and ideas of how to chosen in the UK for managing Brexit. By argued that it is for her to lead and shape do, none of which command the clear support choosing to create a new Department for negotiations in a way that allows her to of most people. Exiting the EU (DExEU), Theresa May sought “ensure the result is respected”. This confused and confusing situation is the not only to minimise the extent of civil service Given May’s relative political weakness – result of the very high level of politicisation capture of the process, but also to place a especially since the 2017 election, where of the topic in the UK. If other states have potential challenger to her authority, David she failed to capitalise on a substantial lead found it easier to settle and pursue a policy Davis, in a position where he could not claim in polling over the Labour party – there has line on the matter, then that has been made that Brexit policy was not as he wished. Similar been uncertainty about which individuals simpler by the generally much lower level of diversionary roles where found for Liam Fox and organisations might have a role to play popular and political interest. That said, even at the new Department for International Trade in negotiations. The Foreign Office has been 41 marginalised as DExEU and DIT have carved numerous attempts to provide explanations as make. out roles for themselves, while Parliament to the “meaning” of the vote to Leave. In particular, the trilemma of leaving the has built on the role secured for it in Article Of these, it was Theresa May who came single market, preserving the UK’s “territorial 50 notification by the Supreme Court in closest to success with the phatic slogan integrity” and commitment to the Good Miller to build up both scrutiny of talks and “Brexit means Brexit” being used to underpin Friday/Belfast Agreement arrangements a “meaningful vote” on the final Withdrawal a relatively distant post-membership for Northern Ireland/Ireland has proved Agreement. relationship, with the UK outside the single predictably intractable. While the Joint Report As such, Brexit does not fit easily in any market and customs union, but with scope for marked a significant unblocking of progress in prior model of treaty negotiation or even of cooperation in several other areas, notably Article 50, it did so through a postponement EU policy, reflecting both the novelty and security. This reflected May’s longer-term of resolving the Irish dimension rather than the consequence of the process. However unhappiness with free movement of people through its resolution. The setting out of that novelty also carries with it increased and the role of European courts, both of which the three options allowed both the EU to transaction costs for those involved, as they she took as challenges to British sovereignty. secure its backstop and the UK to claim that navigate an unfamiliar terrain. However, the substantial weakening of her alternatives could be pursued. political position from June 2017 made it Brexit policy Those two options – avoiding border checks very much easier for internal and external through a comprehensive trade arrangement Despite the efforts to centralise policy-making opponents to challenge her policy line. or through the use of new technologies to around Number 10, the most striking feature Curiously, the one frame that has stuck in the obviate their use – have framed much of of the resultant policy is the extent to which UK has been the language of “hard” and the subsequent debate in the UK, ultimately it is contested. This was always likely to be soft” Brexit, which depends almost entirely crystallising in the June 2018 Chequers an issue, given how the decision to leave on the degree of economic integration, rather plan, agreed by the Cabinet, and almost the EU occupied such a prominent place in than the immigration issue that had been so immediately weakened by the resignations British political discourse and how unwinding prominent in the period up to June 2016. of DExEU Secretary of State David Davis and membership will have such far-reaching Immigration has become much less of a Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson. impacts on government regulation, public political hot potato in the past two years, and Chequers – elaborated and extended in the policy, economic and social structures. In brief, polling shows that most will make a judgement subsequent White Paper of July 2018 – sets no political, economic or social interest in about the success of any deal on the basis of out a model for the future UK-EU relationship, the UK is unaffected by Brexit and so all have personal economic impact. based on a “common rulebook” for goods, a clear motivation to shape what that Brexit While this downplaying of immigration might facilitated customs arrangements and a joint looks like. have been expected to allow more scope institutional framework. Coupled to continued However, what is more remarkable is the for consensus-building, that does not seem alignment of phytosanitary standards, it inability of any one political discourse or to have been the case at all. Critically, the was asserted that this would allow for the ideology to achieve a dominant, let alone absence of a coherent set of underlying avoidance of any hard Irish/Northern Irish predominant, position. Much of the first year preferences – and thus red lines – has meant border while still allowing the UK to exit from after the 2016 referendum was spent with critiques of May’s policy have been easy to the single market.

42 Quite aside from the EU response to this, the discussion about that future relationship, evident in the continuing rounds of bilateral domestic opinion was highly critical of the leaving technical negotiators without a clear probing through the late summer, to try and proposal. Opposition parties argued that mandate to close the final major sections on exploit any weaknesses in the hitherto-highly this model would involve higher economic the Irish dimension and governance. coordinated EU27 response. The absence costs and might call into question the status of any substantive suggestions on how to of those citizens living in the others territory. The final negotiating stretch bridge the remaining gaps in the negotiations Within the Conservative party, the plan was Where Salzburg was more immediately and the abrasive language that it was “now seen as a step towards further softening by consequential was in the announcement by the EU’s turn to compromise” combined to May from the much more limited Canada-style Donald Tusk that an additional European deprive May of the anticipated warm words to free-trade agreement that could mark a more Council in November would only be called if help move things along. determined break with the EU. there was “maximum progress” in talks by the Given that strength of feeling within the Importantly, while this debate remains at time of the October meeting. Conservative party in Birmingham, it remains the heart of British debates on Brexit, it is Given the structure of talks, this implied hard to see how May can give any ground on important to underline that Chequers does an almost immediate movement following Chequers directly. While opposition parties not immediately apply to the remaining Salzburg. However, once again domestic have indicated that they will vote against any outstanding issues in the Withdrawal politics has constrained May very severely. “final deal” that embodies Chequers, again Agreement. As much as it suggests a model While she gained some sympathy for her there will be a question mark over whether for post-membership arrangements on the treatment in Austria (and on Tusk’s Instagram a fudge is possible, with the Withdrawal island of Ireland, that does not necessarily account), the looming arrival of her party Agreement being held up as a more interim have to be captured within the text that conference in early October meant that she step to whatever deal emerges in the post- parties are currently negotiating, although was not in a position to advance concessions, withdrawal negotiations on the future some reference would logically be made in even if she were so minded. With disquiet relationship. the accompanying Political Declaration. (and worse) in her party and her Cabinet and In this, May might find herself aided by the As a result, while May suffered a very public with an eye to the eventual ratification of progressive strengthening of opposition rebuke by the EU for her plans at the Salzburg the deal, the need to hold things together to leaving without a deal, as the costs, meeting in September 2018, and a difficult through the conference was very evident, in uncertainties and reputational damage have party conference in Birmingham, that does not both interviews and speeches. come more sharply into view. However, as with automatically preclude an agreement being The more difficult question is whether May is so much of the British experience of Brexit, reached in time for approval ahead of 29 actually minded to make concessions in any there remains very much more that is defined March 2019. case. As much as her defence of Chequers is in terms of what it not wanted, than in terms That said, while the Joint Report did open based on it being the only substantial plan of where a positive consensus might lie and the way to the publication of the draft text of on the table on the UK side, the events in how it fits into the wider conception of what a the Withdrawal Agreement in March 2018, and around Salzburg suggest that she might post-EU UK might look like. progress since then has been minimal, with genuinely feel that it is also going to become UK political energies being taken up with acceptable to the EU too. This was most

43 The view from “Brussels” The European Institutions and the EU27 Hussein Kassim

The EU institutions have worked closely acting on their behalf. their statement, they set out four principles: with the governments of the EU27 and with there would be no negotiation with the UK each other since the UK vote in June 2016. “United, we stand” before London had formally triggered the Member governments and the EU institutions The EU27 signalled their unity shortly after Article 50 process; although the UK should established a common understanding soon the result of the UK referendum became remain a close partner of the EU, there would after the result of the referendum was known, known in a pre-prepared text issued by the have to be a balance between its rights and which they have pursued since with a unity of President of the European Council Donald obligations in any future relationship; the purpose that has surprised many. Despite the Tusk. Tusk had cleared this text with them four single market freedoms – goods, capital, differing costs and consequences that Brexit and the governments of the 27 shared his services and people – would be treated as is likely to have for them individually, member concern to preserve stability and promise indivisible in any negotiation; and the terms of governments have continued to prioritise EU business as usual. They underlined their regret the UK’s withdrawal from the EU would need solidarity over their own economic interests. at the outcome of the vote and noted that to be completed before discussion of the UK’s Moreover, the arrangements put in place they would welcome its reversal, but also future relationship with the EU, including a to exchange information between member indicated that they would respect the wishes trade agreement, could begin. governments and the EU institutions and of the British people. The UK would become These principles, agreed by the political to manage negotiations on the EU side a third country, without the privileges of EU leaders of the EU in the wake of the have functioned extremely effectively. membership, but the EU would try to ensure referendum vote, have remained largely Although Article 50 is silent on how exactly an orderly exit and thereby limit the damage unchanged since. They inform the instructions responsibilities should be allocated, the caused by the disruption. In working towards that the EU negotiator, Michel Barnier, has European Council and the European the UKs departure, the EU’s stability would be followed since his appointment. Commission devised a system that has worked the EU27’s paramount consideration, and the to the satisfaction of all parties on the EU protection of EU interests their main priority. Process side. From the evidence of repeated charm offensives and attempts to address heads of These positions were more fully articulated Although it was never in doubt that the state and government directly, only London, when the European Council met in an informal Commission would lead the negotiations it seems, does not appear to recognise that grouping of the EU27 for the first time on with the UK, agreement was needed on the EU27 see Michel Barnier as the negotiator the Sunday following the referendum. In how a historic process of such political and

44 diplomatic sensitivity should be managed. To ensure that Commission and Council would that have become major reference texts, are The creation of a working group in the Council work closely together, the text set out two routinely shared. Secretariat in June 2016, chaired by Didier further provisions. First, the negotiators team The arrangements ensure the continuous Seeuws, led to speculation that the Council should “integrate a representative of the involvement of the governments of the EU27 was making a bid to take ownership, while the rotating Presidency”, include a representative in the process. Moreover, points of substantive appointment by Commission President Jean- of the President of the European Council in all negotiation are developed through Claude Juncker the following month of French negotiation sessions, and report systematically discussions among the EU27 on balancing former Commissioner, Michel Barnier, to head to all levels of the Council. Second, a rights and obligations. There are also regular a Task Force on negotiations with the UK, dedicated Working Party with a permanent bilateral conversations between the President was interpreted as a sign of inter-institutional chair would “ensure that the negotiations are of the European Council and national leaders, rivalry, which officials on both sides deny. conducted in line with the European Council and between the EU negotiator and member The procedural arrangements for the guidelines and the Council negotiating governments. This has cemented a sense of negotiations were outlined at an informal directives, and provide guidance to the unity among the EU27 and dispelled anxieties European Council on 15 December 2016, Union negotiator”. These arrangements that the large member states – Germany and which reaffirmed much of the substance of were endorsed in the first set of negotiating France – are secretly colluding and likely to the 29 June text. It underlined the intention guidelines, which the European Council impose their own fait accompli. “to conduct the withdrawal negotiations in adopted in April 2017, in response to the UK’s triggering of Article 50 the previous month. The process has ensured that the EU a spirit of trust and unity among us”, which institutions and the governments of the has been cardinal throughout the process. Cooperation between the Council and the EU27 communicate the same message. The European Council agreed that it would European Commission has taken place An important example is the Irish border, define negotiating guidelines, after which much as envisaged, as officials in the where both Tusk and Juncker, and the the General Affairs Council would officially two institutions, as well as in the national national capitals have repeated that there initiate the negotiations, “adopt negotiating permanent representations in Brussels, have should not be a hard border and that the directives on substance as well as on the confirmed. The European Council, the Council Good Friday Agreement must be respected. detailed arrangements governing the of the European Union, and the European On most issues of process and substance, relationship between the Council and its Commission work closely together at all levels. representatives of the EU institutions and of preparatory bodies on the one hand and the There is regular and frequent contact between national have very noticeably “sung from the Union negotiator on the other”. Noting that the institutions from President to President, same hymnsheet”. Michel Barnier had been appointed to head the heads of their respective cabinets, a Commission Task Force on the negotiations Secretary General to Secretary General, and The negotiations with the UK, the document stipulated that the Deputy EU negotiator Sabine Weyand and The procedural arrangements described General Affairs Council would also “nominate chair of the Brexit Working Group in the above highlight that Barnier as EU negotiator the European Commission as the Union Council Didier Seeuws, and between the follows guidelines that are defined by the negotiator”. Article 50 Task Force and the Council Working political leaders of the EU27, that he is Group. Draft documents, including those

45 constantly in contact with the governments of flexible and imaginative solutions will be capitals, is highly visible, and accessible. the EU27, and that his activities and actions required, including with the aim of avoiding He and his team have been credited with are constantly monitored by representatives a hard border, while respecting the integrity undertaking the extra diplomatic efforts and of the national capitals. Although some of the Union legal order. In this context, the exploring ways of navigating impossible operational decisions – for example, the Union should also recognise existing bilateral impasses. For example, in the run-up to decision to follow a policy of transparency agreements and arrangements between the Salzburg summit, he proposed three – may have been taken by Barnier or his the United Kingdom and Ireland which are ways of “de-dramatising” the Irish border deputy, Sabine Weyand, they are not out of compatible with EU law.” question, with checks undertaken away line with the wider approach of the European All were laid down in the guidelines adopted from the border, that were intended to de- Council or the EU27. by the European Council on 29 April 2017, politicise the issue. More generally, President A similar point can be made about both which formed the basis of the text agreed by Tusk, President Juncker and Barnier himself the structure of the negotiations and their the General Affairs Council on 22 May. have sought to create positive atmospherics before big negotiations. In the run-up both substance, which are based not on the Whether for domestic political reasons or decisions or whim of the EU negotiator, to Salzburg and the October European because it does not take the EUs approach Council, for example, they have each talked but guidelines set out and agreed by the seriously, the UK has repeatedly appeared EU27. This includes: the stipulation that a up the prospects of reaching an agreement, to overlook that the fact that Barnier is emphasizing that 80% of the agreement is UK withdrawal agreement must be agreed conducting negotiations on the EU’s behalf, before any opening of negotiations on the in place, despite their reservations on the that he has a mandate from the EU so to Chequers plan that PM May had put forward. UK’s future relationship; the separation and do, and that only the EU negotiator has the sequencing of the withdrawal negotiation into authority to negotiate for the EU27. National At the same time, the EU side has been first and second phases; and the identification governments and representatives of EU frustrated by the UK’s approach to the of the three issues on which progression from institutions have reiterated this point on negotiations. While the unsavory rhetoric of the first to the second was made contingent several occasions. PM May, for example, is senior politicians, including Boris Johnson, –EU citizens, settlement of the UK’s financial reported to have insisted in a meeting with David Davis, and most recently, Jeremy obligations, and the Irish border. Since the Commission President Juncker in May 2017 Hunt, has been noted in Brussels, the EU latter has proved so important it is worth that she would take the lead in negotiations has been taken aback by the length of time reproducing the relevant provision in full: in the final stages and also to have wanted it took the UK to deliver its White Paper “The Union has consistently supported the to make the proposal concerning EU citizens after it had triggered Article 50. It has been goal of peace and reconciliation enshrined resident in the UK to other member states in perturbed by the persistence of “magical in the Good Friday Agreement in all its person. thinking” on London’s part on, for example, parts, and continuing to support and the compatibility of leaving the single market, Barnier has proved himself an effective maintaining the UK’s territorial integrity and protect the achievements, benefits and negotiator, who has won plaudits for his commitments of the Peace Process will remain avoiding a hard Irish border, the possibility of desire to make the negotiations succeed. retaining “frictionless trade” once the UK is of paramount importance. In view of the He maintains constant contact with national unique circumstances on the island of Ireland, a third country, the refusal to accept that the 46 UK’s red lines leave only a narrow range of exercises. The first is to communicate attendant operational requirements. options on the table – despite the efforts of the consequences of the UKs departure More recently, in the wake of the Salzburg Barnier to point this out with his now-famous to a range of audiences, including other summit, and following the failure to reach step diagram PowerPoint slide – and the UK’s institutions, member governments, agreement on outstanding issues – essentially, reluctance to take seriously the EU as legal stakeholders and, arguably, the UK itself. In the Irish border, in the run-up to the October order rather than an infinitely flexible political late 2017 and early 2018, the Commission European Council – the Commission has arrangement. published a set of slides that spelt out what suggested that, should no progress be Although it understands that the PM is in third country status would entail for the UK. possible in the negotiations, a meeting of a precarious position at home, and has For each of many sectors and activities, the heads and state of government in November attempted to be diplomatic – as with the texts outlined the options remaining once the may be necessary to prepare for a“no Joint Report, Chequers and the issue of red lines laid down by the UK PM – as well deal”rather than to sign off an agreement, as the backstop in relation to the Irish border as the negotiating guidance set down by the at one-time had been proposed. in September and October 2018 – so that European Council in April 2017 – had been her position is not undermined further, they taken into account. The European Parliament were distinctly unimpressed by the apparent Second, with the slow progress of Although it has no formal role in the ultimatum amounting to “my Chequers plan negotiations since December 2017 and negotiations, the European Parliament is or nothing” that she delivered at Salzburg, concern increasing about the possibility of still influential. First, Barnier regularly meets the UK’s seeming preparedness to regard no deal, the Commission has launched an MEPs to discuss Brexit and the Article 50 the backstop commitment in the December information campaign. With the European Negotiations. Second, since its consent is 2017 Joint Report as reversible, and the Council renewing its call to member states, required for the withdrawal agreement, the view that “none of it is agreed until it is all EU institutions, and stakeholders to step up Parliament is a veto player. As the Parliament’s agreed”, which disregards the “withdrawal their work on preparedness at all levels and lead representative on Brexit, Guy Verhofstadt agreement before negotiations on future for all outcomes. In June 2018, the European MEP, President of the Alliance of Liberals trade” condition on which the EU has Commission’s Secretary General, Martin and Democrats for Europe, has already insisted from the start. Used to the UK’s Selmayr, identified areas where regulatory made several interventions, where he formerly formidable diplomacy, they have provision has already been made and those has been critical of the UK’s position. He been surprised by the maladroitness of its were legislative action is still necessary. will lead preparation of the Parliament’s politicians. The Commission has now published more position together with the EP President and than 60 “preparedness” notices that inform The possibility of “n- deal” the party leaders, relevant parliamentary citizens and identify what actions need to be committees, including the Constitutional While negotiating on behalf of the EU taken by governments, business and other Affairs Committee, chaired by Danuta Hübner, is one treaty-given responsibility of the stakeholders, in order to limit the disruption and coordinate and prepare Parliament’s European Commission, guardian of the flowing from no deal. The documents, which consideration of the UK’s withdrawal as chair treaties is another. In this latter capacity, the cover a full range of sectors and activities, of the Brexit Steering Group. Commission has undertaken two important are based on a detailed review of EU law and 47 Conclusion posed by the Eurozone crisis or by migration consequences, and the formidable negotiating inflows. The EU institutions have worked partner that the EU27, united behind the The EU’s response to the UK referendum closely together, and the European Council EU negotiator and effectively managing the has been marked by agreement and unity of and the European Commission have been process, has turned out to be. purpose that has been noticeably absent from in constant touch with the EU27. Even more its reaction to other challenges, such as those impressive, perhaps, is the seamlessness of the message from national governments with very approaches to the EU that, although the UK’s departure from the EU will cause disruption and Department some economic harm, the EU for Exiting the EU and the EU single market must come first. The other chapters in this present publication reaffirm this finding. By contrast, the UK has found it difficult to set out what it wants and therefore to engage constructively. Divisions within the Conservative Party and the cabinet have, of course, militated against presenting a coherent and enduring position. More practically, however, there is little evidence to suggest that UK politicians have come to terms with the complexity of the choices that confront them, the need to make trade-offs with sometimes unpalatable

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‘Negotiating Brexit: national governments, EU institutions and the UK’ brings together specialists from across Europe to monitor approaches to the negotiations and the internal politics of Brexit. It is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, associated with ‘The UK in a Changing Europe’ programme, and based at the University of East Anglia. It is committed to high quality, independent research. www.uea.ac.uk/political-social-international-studies/research/negotiating-brexit @NegotBrexit

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