Disaster Management Plan for the Salt Lake Stadium/ Vivekananda Yuba Bharati Krirangan (Vybk)

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE SALT LAKE STADIUM/ VIVEKANANDA YUBA BHARATI KRIRANGAN (VYBK)

DISASTER MANAGEMENT & CIVIL DEFENCE DEPARTMENT GOVERNMENT OF WEST BENGAL

TABLE OF CONTENTS;

1 Acknowledgements 2 Acronyms used 3 Background: Salt Lake Stadium or the Vivekanada Yuba Bharathi Krirangan (VYBK) 4 Emergency Telephone Numbers 5 Stadium Management 6 Phase: 1 Infrastructure: Command and Control 6.1 Internal Infrastructure 6.2 External Infrastructure 6.3 Service Providers 7 Phase 2: Risk Assessment (Inner and Out Perimeter) 8 Phase 3:Contingency Planning 9 Phase 4: Training and Development 10 Phase 5: Monitoring and Evaluation 11 Stadium Facts 11.1 Stadium Capacity 11.1 Abstract 12 Facilities 12.1 Mobility impaired 12.2 Stewarding 12.3 Medical Services 13 Stadium Security 13.1 Stadium/ Venue Operations Centre 13.2 Entrances & Exit Points 14 Emergency Evacuation Plan 15 Stadium Maps 16 Emergency Support Response of each Provider

1. Acknowledgements

This document has been prepared in collaboration with the Sports & Services Department, Bidhannagar Police Commissionerate, Fire & Emergency Services Directorate, State Disaster Response Force, Kolkata Police Disaster Management Group, Civil Defence Directorate, 2nd NDRF Battalion, and the LOC of FIFA.

2. ACRONYMS USED

CBRN Chemical Biological Radiological & Nuclear CD Civil Defence CSSR Collapsed Structure Search & Rescue DM & CD Disaster Management & Civil Defence DMG Disaster Management Group ERCC Emergency Response Coordination Centre FIFA Fédération Internationale de Football Association IRS Incident Response System KP Kolkata Police LOC Local Organising Committee of FIFA NDMA National Disaster Management Authority NDRF National Disaster Response Force NSG National Security Guard PWD Public Works Department QRT Quick Response Team SDRF State Disaster Response Force VIP Very Important Person VVIP Very Very Important Person VYBK Vivekanada Yuba Bharathi Krirangan WBP West Bengal Police

3. BACKGROUND: SALT LAKE STADIUM/VYBK Salt Lake Stadium, officially known as Vivekananda Yuba Bharati Krirangan (VYBK), is a multipurpose stadium in Bidhannagar, Kolkata, West Bengal, with a capacity of 85,000. It is the largest stadium in India by capacity. Before its renovation in 2011, it was the second largest football stadium in the world, having a seating capacity of 120,000. The stadium was opened in January 1984 because the club grounds in the Maidan area, each with capacity around 20,000, were proving too small for the huge crowd that occupied the grounds on match days. The stadium is situated on the important Eastern Metropolitan Byepass to the east of the Kolkata downtown. The roof is made of metal tubes and aluminum sheets and concrete. There are two electronic scoreboards and control rooms. The lighting is uniformly distributed to facilitate night kick-offs. There are special arrangements for TV broadcasting. The gigantic stadium features three tiers of concrete galleries. There are many ramps and stairs that go out of the stadium like spokes on a bicycle wheel. There are a total of six gates (gate no 1–5 and VIP gate). The stadium covers an area of 76.40 acres (309,200 m2). The stadium also has a synthetic track for athletic meets. It has a main football arena measuring 105 by 70 metres (344 ft × 230 ft). It also houses electronics scoreboards, elevators, VIP enclosures, peripheral floodlighting arrangement from the roof-top, air-conditioned VIP rest room, conference hall and much more. The stadium has its own water arrangements and standby diesel generation sets1. The Salt Lake Stadium was handed over to Fifa's Local Organising Committee (LOC) on the 10th September, 2017 by the State Government. The stadium has been transformed into a state-of- the-art facility following massive renovation, with the State Government having expended more than Rs 100 crore. The capacity has been reduced from well over 1 lakh to around 80,000, thanks to the installation of bucket seats. Owing to security purposes, however, the official capacity for the U-17 World Cup will be 66,687. The new-look stadium was inaugurated by state Chief Minister on the 12th September. The Salt Lake Stadium will host 10 matches, including the final on October 28. The LOC will now take certain responsibilities and decisions regarding the last phase of rectification and work so that the stadium becomes perfectly operational for the tournament and will make sure that the stadium is fully ready with regard to safety, security and comfort for all. The FIFA schedule at the stadium is as follows: Match Day Match Time Team Team Overall DM Schedule Duty Duration StartHrs End 08-Oct-17 1700 CHILE ENGLAND 14:00 23:00 08-Oct-17 2000 IRAQ MEXICO 11-Oct-17 1700 HONDURAS NEW 14:00 23:00 CALEDONIA

1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_Lake_Stadium

Match Day Match Time Team Team Overall DM Schedule Duty Duration StartHrs End 11-Oct-17 2000 IRAQ CHILE 14-Oct-17 2000 ENGLAND IRAQ 14:00 23:00 17-Oct-17 2000 1F 2E 17:00 23:00 22-Oct-17 2000 W37 W44 17:00 23:00 28-Oct-17 1700 L49 L50 14:00 23:00 28-Oct-17 2000 W49 W50

LOCATION OF VENUES VENUE TYPE ADDRESS POLICE STATION VYBK Main Stadium JB Block, Sector III, Salt Bidhanagar South Lake City VYBK Training Site 1/2/3/4 KA Block, Sector III, Salt Bidhanagar South Lake City Novotel Hotel Team Hotel CF 11, Action Area 1C, New Town New Town Hyatt Hotel FIFA officials JB Block, Sector III, Salt Bidhanagar South Lake City Westin Hotel Referees CBD2, Action Area II, New Town New Town Apollo Gleneagles Team Hospital 58, Canal Circular Phulbagan, Kolkata Road, Kadapara, Police Kolkata

4. EMERGENCY TELEPHONE NUMBERS IMPORTANT TELEPHONE NOS. OF POLICE OFFICERS BIDHANNAGAR CITY POLICE WEBSITE Bidhannagar Police Commissionerate Control Room 2335-1287 (TeleFax) Control Room Telephone No. 033-2335-8788 , 2341-0465 Bidhannagar Spl. Branch Control Room 2334-3080 Bidhannagar Traffic Control Room 9051213100 Designation Office No. 2335-8286 IC / Commissioner of Police, Bidhannagar 2335-7203 (F) Jt. Commissioner of Police, Bidhannagar 2341-0411 D.C.P. HQ Bidnannagar 2334-8287 D.C.P. DD Bidnannagar 2341-0414 D.C.P. SB Bidnannagar 2319-4421 A.D.C.P. Bidhannagar 2319-4406 ADCP Airport 2324-1252 ADCP Traffic 2324-0053 ACP Bidhannagar Zone-I 2358-5024 ACP Bidhannagar Zone II 2367-0184 ACP Airport Zone - I holding addl. charge of ACP DD II 2324-1252 Bidnannagar ACP Rajarhat in charge of T/C Rajarhat PS 2573-3289 Inspector of Police, SB, Bidhannagar 2334-3080 Inspector of Police, DD, Bidhannagar 2341-0445 IC Cyber Crime PS 2359-5589 ROI, Bidhannagar 2319-4420 RI, Bidhannagar 23410-459 O.C. Bidhannagar South P.S. 2335-1047 O.C. Bidhannagar East P.S. 2359-0849 O.C. Bidhannagar North P.S. 2337-3343 O.C. E.C. P.S. 2367-9779 O.C. Lake Town P.S. 2534-4402 O.C. Baguiathi P.S. 2559-8799 O.C. Airport P.S. 2511-8292 O.C. NSCBI Airport P.S. 2511-4001 O.C. New Town P.S. 2324-6076 STADIUM OPERATIONS & COORDINATION- FIFA U-17 WORD CUP INDIA 2017

Kolkata (Vivekananda Yuba Bharati Krirangan) (Proposed venue)

S.A. Baba, IAS Block "A", 6rd Floor, New Phone no: 033 2214 3345 Principal Secretary, Secretariat Building, Fax: 033 2214 5776 Department of Sports, Govt. 1, Kiron Sankar Roy Road, E-mail: of West Bengal Kolkata - 700 001 [email protected] Sri Jyotishman Block "A", 6th Floor, New E-mail: [email protected] Chattopadhyay, WBCS (Exe) Secretariat Building, Special Secretary, 1, Kiron Sankar Roy Road, Department of Sports, Govt. Kolkata - 700 001 of West Bengal Sri Goutam Biswas, WBCS Block "A", 6th Floor, New Phone no: 033 2262 5740 (Exe) Joint Secretary, Secretariat Building, E-mail: [email protected] Department of Sports, Govt. 1, Kiron Sankar Roy Road, of West Bengal Kolkata - 700 001 Sri Mukesh Kumar Singh, Block "A", 6th Floor, New Phone no: 033 2262 5741 WBCS (Exe) Joint Secretary, Secretariat Building, E-mail: [email protected] Department of Sports, Govt. 1, Kiron Sankar Roy Road, of West Bengal Kolkata - 700 001

2 BN NDRF, KOLKATA Sh Nishith Upadhyay Commandant Mob No. 9434742836 & 8017166658 - Email ID: Control Room, 2 Bn NDRF 9474061104, 9474116775 [email protected]

SPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA Sports Authority of India Netaji Subhas Eastern Center Sector- III, Salt Lake City Kolkata - 700 098 Ph no: 033 2335 1722 Fax: 033 2335 0526 Email Id: Important Contact Numbers Mr. S. Harmilapi (Director) 033 2335 1722 Mr. P. C. Ghosh (Assistant Director, NC/OPS) 033 2569 2003 Mr. S. R. Bakshi (Assistant Director, Admin.) 033 2569 2004 Mr. R. N. Samanta (Assistant Director, Coaching) 033 2569 2002

Police Stations Area Phone POLICE 100 Police: Lalbazar Control Room 2214 3230/3024 Traffic Control Room 2214 3644/5000/5096 Police Commissioner’s Office 22256060 West Bengal Police 22215415, 22215486

CID 24792042 Airport 25118292 Baguihati 25598799 Phulbagan Fire Stations Area Phone Head Quarter 2244 0101/0163/0170/6164 Baisnabghata 24360685 Salt Lake 23575293 Tollygunge 24115393, 24712393 Misc. Kolkata Municipality 1600333375 Calcutta Electric Supply 2237 3161-64 Water 2237 3161-64 North/Central 2241 5363/5787/5579 Gas leaks (LPG emergency service ) South 2411 8718/3792 Telephone Office 2220 0877 Telephone Office – complaint Dial exchange code and 2198 All India Radio 22489131 Doordarshan Kendra 24737441 Police Control Room 100 Fire service 101 Airport (General Inquiry) 140 Airport (Reservation Inquiry) 141 Airport (Flight Arrival) 142 Airport (Flight Departure) 143 Lalbazar Control Room 22155000-01, 22350230 West Bengal Police 22215486, 22215415 KOLKATA HOSPITAL INFORMATION Calcutta Medical College: 22414904, 22414901 S.S.K.M. Hospital (P.G.) 22236026, 22236242 R.G. Kar Medical College & Hospital: 25557656, 25557676 Medicare Clinic Pvt Ltd: 26381778, 26389237 Wellesley Clinic 22174991 Peerless Hospital 24622462, 24622394 R.K.M. Seva Pratisthan (Sishu Mangal): 24753638, 24753636 Woodland 24567076, 24567079 Calcutta Hospital and Medical Research: 24791805, 24567700 Belle View Nursing Home 22472321, 22477473 Kothari Medical Centre & Research Institute 24792561, 24567050 B.M.Birla Heart Research Centre 24567001, 24567005 N.R.S. Medical College and Hospital: 22443217, 22443212 Kolkata Blood Bank: Central Blood bank 23510619 Emergency Ambulances Dhanwantary 24495594

Healthcare 24150600 Lifecare Medical Services 24754628 The Relief Medical services 24754169 Power Control Room CESC Fault reporting 22373161 CESC South Kolkata 24663161 CESC North Kolkata 25568606 WBSEB Control Room 23591896

LOC FIFA UNDER 17 WORLD CUP INDIA VENUE TEAM KOLKATA Sr. No. Name Designation Phone No. 1. Sunando Dhar LOC Venue Director 9650531155 2. Clive Jaglal Operations Venue Manager 8700295923 3. Amit Dharap Venue Coordination Manager 9764443205 4. Sujata Sarkar Venue Training Sites Manager 9830071332 5. Major Mohammed Venue Security Manager 9748969136 Ataulla Khan 6. Rozel Arora Safety and Security Coordinator 9836043520 7. Abhishek Sanyal Venue Transport Manager 9874842532 8. Pratim Ghosh Venue Overlays Officer 8017933412 9. Chetan Verma ACR Venue Coordinator 9999646728 10. Debajyoti Mukerjee Venue Coordination Officer 9051396149 11. Khila Bahadur Venue Admin Officers 9007467659 12. Uday Basak Venue F&B and VIK Officer 9874138442 13. Ushnish Ghosh Dastidar Venue Team Services Officer 9903566636 14. Achinta Ghosh Venue ACR Assistant 8743803926 15. Sourish Saha Venue ACR Assistant 8697008449 16. Nishad Nargolkar Venue Ticketing Officer 9833118883 17. Uddhav Welinkar Venue Protocol & Hospitality 9890000007 Officer 18. Amrit Gupta Hospitality Assistant 8100280220 19. Vishal Sharma Venue IT Officer 8745007790 20. Proma Sanyal Venue Press Assistant 9051053687 21. Aakriti Mehrotra Venue Press Officer 9971748147 22. Annujj Palaye Venue Press Officer 9619451632 23. Anisha Dalmia Venue Volunteer Officer 9007803803 24. Piyali Khandikar Venue Volunteer Coordinator 8334961414 25. Sompriya Dalui Venue OVL Assistant 8697919624 26. Gourab Ghosh Venue OVL Assistant 8334847774 27. Aritra Mitra Venue OVL Intern 9804670359 28. Nikhil Wadhyana Venue Logistic Assistant 9674259396 29. Insan Ali Venue Airport Assistant 9002499514 30. Dr. Subhojit Dutta Venue Medical Officer 9804000412 9681505291 31. Dr. Nishit Chowdhury Venue Doping Control Officer 9830060167

32. Samanway Banerjee Venue Press Assistant 7998012802 33. Mayuri Purkasyastha Venue TSG Intern 8337054359 34. Santanu Banerjee Venue Team Services Intern 7980935460 35. Gourav Das Venue Team Services Intern 8668350184 36. Ankit Walia Venue Referee Liaison Intern 7550995069 37. Somaditya Sen Venue Transport Assistant 9717565374 38. Imran Khan Venue Airport Manager 9831809139 39. Rahul Maji Venue Office Boy 8240178837

5. STADIUM MANAGEMENT The VYBK stadium has been already handed over to the Local Organising Committee (LOC) of FIFA and the installation of certain utilities is in progress.

JAVIER CEPPI TOURNAMENT DIRECTOR Fifa loc u-17 india

Ms. ROMA KHANNA HEAD – VENUE OPERATIONS

AMIT DHARAP VENUE COORDN. MANAGER

6. PHASE I: INFRASTRUCTURE: COMMAND AND CONTROL The issues relating to crowd management and arrangement with respect to capacity planning have already been taken care off and the seating capacity has already been reduced with the introduction of bucket seats and stewarding to ensure that full evacuation of the entire stadium can be completed within 8(eight) minutes flat2. Risk analysis and preparedness, safety and security measures and execution of the Disaster Management Plan by implementing the Incident Response System (IRS) as per the National Disaster Management Authority guidelines given for ‘Managing Crowds at Events and Mass Gatherings’3 are essential components of this Disaster Management Plan. Mock drills will be conducted as per the guidelines of the NDMA4 given in the Training Manual for conducting emergency exercises. The office of the Bidhannagar Police Commissionerate is also with the VYBK Stadium premises on the east side and the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) is also located therein. 6.1 INTERNAL INFRASTRUCTURE OVERALL INCIDENT COMMANDER: Shri Gyanwant SINGH, IPS, COMMISSIONER BIDHANNAGAR POLICE Match Day Overall DM Deputy Fire & Medical SDRF/ NDRF Evacuation Schedule Duty Incident Emergency Services Disaster Response Leader Duration Comdr & Services & First Management Leader Hrs Security Leader AID Group Start End Leader Leader Leader 08th Oct 14:00 23:00 Mr. Mr. Mr. Nishit Mr. th Santosh Tarun Upadhyay, Santosh 11 Oct 14:00 23:00 Pandey, Sinha, CO 2nd Pandey, th 14 Oct 14:00 23:00 IPS, DC Director Bn., NDRF IPS, DC 17th Oct 17:00 23:00 HQ, in- HQ, 22nd Oct 17:00 23:00 Bidhanagar charge Bidhanagar th Police Police 28 Oct 14:00 23:00

6.2 EXTERNAL INFRASTRUCTURE Disaster Management 1070 W Bengal Police 100 Fire Services 101 Ambulance Services Power Pollution Control Board

6.3 SERVICE PROVIDERS Sl. Department Name of the Company Contact Mobile No. person (vendor)

2 Sports Grounds Safety Authority assessment used by FIFA based on http://www.safetyatsportsgrounds.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/green-guide.pdf 3 http://ndma.gov.in/images/pdf/managingcrowdsguide.pdf 4 http://www.ndma.gov.in/images/guidelines/training%20manual-EMEx.pdf

Sl. Department Name of the Company Contact Mobile No. person (vendor) 1. Overlays Expro Events & Arpit Lodha 9958091707 Exhibitions 2. IT(ISP) Satellite TV System Khanderkar 9831237063 3. IT BSNL Raj Kumar 8902000116 4. IT (TSP) Vodafone 5. PA R.A.A. Khand enterprise Akhand 9831734005 6. Housekeeping R.A.A. Khand Enterprise Akhand 9831734005 7. Furniture R.A.A. Khand Enterprise Akhand 9831734005 8. Marketing (Branding) Arun Sign Rosy Das 9051283444 9. F&B (Concession) The Sweet & Caterer Rahul Kumar 9830861153 Pvt. Ltd. Shaw 10. LED Screen Techfront Dibankush 8013371722 11. Pitch SystemRex Sonowal 8638078249 12. Hospitality food The Stadel Ayan MItra 9874765000 13. Genset Perenial Milind 8888880085 Jamadar 14. Waste Management Swatch Bharat

7. PHASE 2: RISK ASSESSMENT

GENERAL RISKS (INNER & OUTER PERIMETER)

1. Stampede 2. Food poisoning 3. Hail/Thunder/Cyclone storms 4. Electrical failure 5. Extreme heat and humid weather causing dehydration 6. Epidemics 7. Overcrowding 8. Traffic congestion 9. Unattended package/bomb 10. Chemical and biological threats 11. Vandalism 12. Structural collapse 13. Fire

8. PHASE 3: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. Service level agreements with service providers 2. Strong security measures 3. Form of vehicle and owner tagging system for entry and exit 4. Clear and unobstructed walkway, Marshals and assembly points 5. Media to warn people of weather patterns 6. To record all cases and prepare for such cases and send out warnings via media 7. To monitor closely and turn away people before they reach the venue 8. Police to monitor spectator behavior and apprehend if necessary 9. CCTV monitoring on a 24 hr basis in the precinct 10. Police to maintain traffic control outside the stadium

PROBABLE THREATS STAKE HOLDERS Fire Fire fighters Terrorist attack a)Bomb threat WBP, NSG, DMG WBP, CD b)Actual bomb attack NSG, SIB,WBP, DMG WBP,CD and NDRF in case of mix with CBRN threat c) Suspect package NSG, SIB,WBP, DMG WBP,CD and NDRF in case of mix with CBRN threat d) Shooting Police, NSG e) Airborne attack including Micro UAVs Police and NSG with Payloads(Drones): f) Suicide bombing NSG, SIB,WBP, DMG WBP,CD and NDRF in case of mix with CBRN Threat g) CBRN attacks NDRF will respond as per Incidence Response System, Fire services, CD

PROBABLE THREATS STAKE HOLDERS Building and services 1) Damage to Structures NDRF . Other stake holders are PWD, Police, Earth Movers and line depts. of State Govt (Elec., Transport, Traffic, CD & DMG WBP etc. 2) Gas leak and Hazardous materials NDRF, Fire services, CD & DMG WBP Incident 3) Safety equipment failure LOC Crowd Control Police and FIFA security team, stewards Emergency Evacuation Police, CD and FIFA security management team Severe adverse weather ( such as lightning NDRF ,Police, FIFA security management team, strikes, Flash floods, high winds, Health Dept, CPWD and other line depts. (Elec., Hurricanes) Transport, Traffic etc) Natural Disasters ( Earthquakes) NDRF ,Police, FIFA security management team, CD & DMG WBP, Health dept, PWD and other line depts ( Elec., Transport, Traffic etc)

SITE PLAN of SALT LAKE STADIUM/VYKB

9. PHASE 4: TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

The Disaster Management Teams under the State Government will be trained for all the events and will conduct atleast two mock drills.

The stewards and the security staff of the LOC has been trained on all evacuation procedures.

10. PHASE 5: MONITORING AND EVALUATION The implementation of the DM plan will be monitored and the feedback of the stakeholders will be incorporated into fine-tuning the DM plan.

11. STADIUM FACTS The stadium has 9 entry gates and 30 ramps for the spectators to reach the viewing blocks. The nine gates include the VIP gate. The Gates 1 and 2 are on Kadapara road, Gate no.3, 3A, 4, 4A and 4B are on the side of Broadway; Gate no 5 and the VIP gate are on the side of EM By pass. The ramps are inside the stadium and link the inner ring road to the different levels of the stadium complex. There are three levels for seating. There are four wide cutouts named: AB, AD, BC and CD leading into four plazas for evacuation and 170 gates from the ground level to the synthetic track which can also be used for evacuation.

11.1 Stadium Capacity STADIUM RAMP STAND LEVEL CATEGORY GROSS NET GATE NO. CAPACITY CAPACITY NO. 1 1 West 2 1 2786 2323 1 2 West 1 3 3058 2323 1 3 North 1 4 2808 2358 1 4 North 2 4 2119 2119 1 5 North 3 4 2626 2399 2 6 North 1 4 2510 2110 2 7 North 1 4 2280 1920 2 8 North 2 4 2097 2097 2 9 North 2 4 2099 2099 2 10 North 2 4 2056 2056 3 11 East 2 2 2537 2537 3 12 East 2 2 2587 2587 3 13 East 2 2 2134 2002 3 14 East 2 2 1783 1783 3 15 East 2 2 1856 1856 3A 16 East 3 3 1848 1848 3A 17 East 3 3 2361 1748 3A 18 East 1 3 3088 2616 3A 19 East 1 3 2993 2541

STADIUM RAMP STAND LEVEL CATEGORY GROSS NET GATE NO. CAPACITY CAPACITY NO. 3A 20 East 1 3 2708 2304 4 21 South 1 4 2666 2236 4 22 South 2 4 2747 2747 4 23 South 2 4 2660 2660 4 24 South 2 4 2761 2761 4 25 South 1 4 1470 1230 5 26 South 3 4 2613 2613 5 27 South 1 4 1476 1236 5 28 South 1 4 1767 1487 5 29 West 2 1 2768 2323 5 30 West 1 3 3379 2323 72641 65242

11.2 ABSTRACT CATEGORY SEATS

1 4646 2 10765 3 15703 4 34128 VIP 936 Kolkata VIP FIFA 302 Media 174 Tribune Stadium Media 104 Centre

12. FACILITIES

The Salt Lake/VYBK stadium has been rated very highly previously and with the improvements made for the FIFA U-17 World Cup, it would to be one of the top 10 stadiums in the World with facilities that are of the best international standards and quality. Recently the following additions and improvements have been introduced at the stadium:  The football pitch has been converted from Astroturf to natural grass.  Synthetic track has been renewed.  The roof of the stadium has been replaced to a great extent.  Two new practice grounds have been created.  Nine peripheral gates have been redone to handle the entry and exit smoothly.  VIP entry approach has been dramatically changed and VIP parking lot created

 The Ring Road surrounding the stadium has been relayed with mastic coat.  Spectator seating has been completely converted into bucket seating.  State of the Art Venue Operation Centre, Stadium Media Centre and FIFA Technical area.  Seating arrangements for VIP lounge, VIP Tribune, VVIP Tribune and Media Tribune.  Improved signage throughout the stadium.  Revamped toilet blocks in each of the three tiers

12.1 MOBILITY IMPAIRED FACILITIES

The stadium is friendly to differently-abled persons. Though no separate earmarked seating arrangement for the differently-abled persons has been made but the last row of seats in each level is easily accessible to them.

12.2 STEWARDING

As per FIFA requirements for the safety management arrangement of the venue the deployment of stewards to provide spectators and participants with a safe, secure and welcoming environment has been made mandatory. Well trained and suitably equipped safety and security personnel drawn from the Bidhannagar Police Commissionerate have been deployed. They along with the Police would play an important role in the evacuation procedure.

12.3 MEDICAL SERVICES Provision of on-site medical services has been organised for the players/LOC/officials and for the spectators by the State Health & Family Welfare Department. Nearest emergency hospital for the players/LOC/officials would be the Apollo Hospital and for the spectators, it would be the Bidhannagar Sub-Divisional Hospital. The following infrastructure would be provided at the stadium. Male & 1 Female Doctor Paramedic & 2 Stretcher Bearer Equipment's – • Oxygen with appropriate mask / Oral airway • Medical Bed • Splints (Spinal injuries) • Stretchers preferable hard board • Suction Machine • I/V drip sets with emergency injections & Medication. • Minor Surgery supplies and equipment.

• Automated External Defibrillator • Any other emergency equipment necessary

Eight Medical kiosks would be provided in the Stadium with the following: • 5 Doctors to monitor the 8 kiosks – 2 on Level 1, 2 on Level 2 & 1 on Level 3. There will be seven (7) medical teams available at the stadium to deal with any medical contingency. Each team will consists of two (2) medical officers, one (1) nursing staff and one (1) group D staff. One medical team will be dedicated for VVIP & VIPs. All the teams except dedicated for VIP will be stationed at the Emergency Response Command Centre (ERCC) Motor Transport (MT) ground near CD cutout at the stadium. • Each team will have lifesaving and emergency medicines and equipment. They will be available from 1400 hrs till the end of the game on match days. • Ambulance Services: Four (4) ambulances of which two are trauma care ambulances will be available at the stadium. One trauma care ambulance will be dedicated to VVIP & VIPs. • Referral Services: Salt Lake Sub Divisional Hospital is earmarked as the referral hospital and for secondary care. Complicated cases will be referred to a) NRS Medical College & Hospital at Sealdah b) Calcutta National Medical College & Hospital at Park Circus c) SSKM Hospital near Ravindra Sadan (via Ma Flyover). • The authorities of i) AMRI Hospital at Salt Lake ii) Columbia Asia hospital opposite to salt lake stadium will provide assistance by providing Ambulances, para medical staff and emergency medicines on the days of matches. They will also provide emergency beds if required. • The nodal officer for medical services is: Dr. Partha Pratim Guha, CMOH, Bidhannagar Sub Divisional Hospital

(033) 2359-9909, 2337-3953, mobile no: 9038174243

13. STADIUM SAFETY AND SECURITY It is of utmost importance that the Stadium be a safe and secure environment for its visitors. Measures are continuously taken to ensure that the spectators, players and officials can enjoy a safe and entertaing atmosphere without concerns about safety.

13.1 STADIUM/VENUE OPERATIONS CENTRE (VOC) The Stadium Operations Rook will be the centre of activity to monitor, control, and direct event and essential life systems in the stadium before, during and after a match. The stadium will have uninterrupted power supply during match hours through 2X750 KVA generators for the general stadium power and for 2X500 KVA generators for pitch lighting. The VOC has a state-of- the-art integrated operations systems which will integrate the Public Address and Sound System, Fire Alarm Monitoring Panel, Pitch LIghting Control Panel, Giant Screen Control

System, CCTV Surveillance Monitors and the Uninterruptible Power Supply.

VENUE OPERATION CENTRE (VOC)

Purpose and design a) as per the FIFA regulations, the stadium must have a venue operation centre (VOC), which is the room from which those persons responsible for safety and security operations at the stadium can monitor, control, and direct resources in response to any given situation before, during, and after a match. Its main functions include: i) To allow the stadium safety and security management team to monitor the safety and security of people attending the stadium and in its immediate vicinity. ii) To coordinate responses to specific incidents. iii) To provide, if required, a monitoring facility for the emergency services. iv) To monitor public order. v) To assist the stadium management in staging the match. b) The VOC should be located in a secure area of the stadium and have an overall view of the inside of the stadium. The size, configuration, and furnishings of the VOC should be designed to accommodate all equipment and personnel necessary to manage stadium safety and security efficiently. When designing a VOC, the stadium authority should consult with local police, fire and other relevant civil authorities. c) The VOC and all safety and security equipment must have an uninterruptible power supply. 2. Staffing a) the exact staffing of the VOC will vary depending on local factors such as the structures of civil authorities and the police. As a minimum requirement, the following posts must be provided for: i) Stadium security officer. ii) Police commander responsible for all police activity at the stadium and in its vicinity (more than one police commander may be needed, depending on the structure). iii) A representative of the medical services. iv) Fire service commander responsible for all fire-fighting capabilities at the stadium and in its vicinity. v) Chief Steward. vi) CCTV operators. vii) Communications operators and log keepers. viii) Ticketing coordinator.

b) If any of the above-listed commanders are not positioned in the VOC for any reason, a suitable deputy must be present who has direct contact with the commander at all times.

c) The VOC must be fully operational and fully staffed prior to the gates being opened to the public and must remain operational until the stadium has been cleared and returned to normal non-match operations. 3. Stadium plans, maps and paperwork Copies of the following will be made available in the VOC: a) All contingency plans. b) Emergency plans. c) Steward deployment plans. d) Security personnel deployment plans. e) Medical plans. f) Egress and ingress plans. g) Large-scale stadium maps, including detailed stadium plans (showing key facilities) as well as maps of the surrounding areas. h) CCTV camera positions. i) Stadium code of conduct. j) All relevant regulations and legislation in place. k) Contact details of all stakeholders.

VOC systems: The following systems are fully integrated into the VOC: 1. Public address system override: Although the public address announcer should not be located in the VOC, he should be situated close by to allow safety and security messages to be passed across the system. The VOC should have a PA override facility to allow safety and security staff to use the PA system in an emergency that has priority control over that of other operators.

2. Fire alarm control panel: The fire alarm control panel is an electronic panel that is the controlling component of the stadium’s fire alarm detection and monitoring system. This equipment will need to be staffed by an appropriately trained and qualified person, with direct communication to the commander of the fire services. 3. Pitch lighting control panel: The lighting control panel controls pitch lighting. If the pitch lighting unexpectedly loses power, the control panel allows the VOC to remotely toggle power (on-off) to restore the pitch lighting.

4. Electronic video screen (giant screen) control system (where installed): The giant screen control system consists of a control panel and monitoring screens that allow a user to manage the time, score, video replays and other entertainment functions on the giant screen. It should also be able to display written messages in case of an emergency, so that instructions and information can be provided to spectators and stadium staff. As with the public address announcer, the main operator of the giant screen should not be located in the VOC but in a separate room near it, so that messages can be passed from the VOC to the operator. Management should consider having an override facility in the VOC to allow safety and security staff to use the giant screen for sending messages when required.

5. CCTV monitors: 215 CCTVs and 4 panorama CCTVs have been installed. CCTV surveillance monitors and control systems installed in the VOC will undertake proactive and reactive surveillance monitoring and control of the cameras. Furthermore, the system shall contain digital video recorders (DVRs) of sufficient capacity to record and

store images for a minimum of 60 days.

6. Communications: There shall be a robust and comprehensive communications system for all aspects of stadium safety and security. Standard commercial mobile phone networks often become overloaded during an incident and therefore cannot be relied upon as a means of communication for the purposes of safety and security. As such, the following systems shall be in place in the VOC: a) External fixed landline, direct dial (i.e. not through a switchboard) b) Intercom or internal fixed landlines between key locations around the stadium and the VOC to include: i) PA system announcer ii) Giant screen operator iii) Entry points iv) First aid rooms v) Police detention rooms vi) Team and referees’ dressing rooms vii) FIFA General Coordinator’s office. c) Radio network for all safety and security functions. d) Internet/data facilities

Experience has shown that when using radios at a stadium, earpieces are required to counteract the noise levels during a match and to ensure that messages can be effectively transmitted.

Senior police officers and all nodal officers will be at the VOC to coordinate their efforts for effective functioning of all systems particularly during a crisis. Deputy Commissioner of Police (Head Quarters), Bidhannagar Police will be the police officer commanding the police and the other agencies.

13.2 ENTRANCES AND EXIT POINTS

The VYBK stadium can be accessed externally through nine peripheral main gates to the main roads outside which have been re-modelled. Once inside the spectators would pass through the turnstiles and undergo searching and screening checks of the person as well as their baggage if any. Exit points on to the track through the fence is available through over 170 gates kept under lock and key by the Police. For evacuation, the four cutouts and the stairs reaching the four plazas from the three levels will ensure that the evacuation would be completed within the expected eight minutes.

14 EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLAN As per the FIFA regulations, a ‘Maximum Safe capacity’ is worked out for the stadium considering the entry capacity, exit capacity and emergency evacuation capacity. A total of 66,687 spectators are allowed after working out the capacity based on the structure of the stadium, entry gates, exit gates and time of less than 10 minutes required to evacuate the stadium in case of any eventuality. As per FIFA regulations,

1. The emergency evacuation time is a calculation which, together with the appropriate rate of passage, is used to determine the capacity of the emergency exit system from the viewing accommodation to a place of safety or reasonable safety, during an emergency.

2. The fire risk assessment should take into account the availability and location of one or more places of safety or reasonable safety.

3. A place of safety may be a road, walkway or open space adjacent to, or even within, the boundaries of the stadium.

4. Within a large stadium, there may also be a need to designate a place or places of “reasonable safety”, where people can be safe from the effects of fire for 30 minutes or more (unless otherwise stated by the host nation’s laws and legislation), thus allowing extra time for them to move directly to a place of safety. A place of reasonable safety may include: a) an exit route that is protected throughout its length by a construction having a fi re resistance of 30 minutes, unless otherwise stated by the host nation’s laws and legislation. b) A stairway that is in the open air and protected from fi re breaking out onto or below it. c) The field of play.

5. Emergency evacuation routes, one inside and one outside of the stadium, must be agreed upon with the police, stewards, fire service, first aid and emergency services. The external evacuation route shall have two lanes and be negotiable by vehicle and must be kept unobstructed at all times.

6. The field of play within the stadium must be accessible by at least one vehicle entry point.

7. If it is determined that the field of play is to be used as a place of reasonable safety, there must be a method of subsequently moving evacuated spectators from the field of play to a place of safety outside the stadium.

8. Emergency evacuations of spectators with disabilities Contingency plans for emergency evacuation must take into account the special needs of spectators with disabilities.

The FIFA regulations for the players and referees on the ground: All emergency gates must be able to be opened quickly and easily towards the field of play. They should be positioned directly in line with the stairways in the respective spectator areas. The emergency evacuation routes to the field of play must not be obstructed by advertising boards or any other objects. Advertising boards must be designed in such a way as to avoid creating an obstacle. The emergency exit gates shall have one door and be at least two metres wide. They shall be a different colour from their surroundings and easily identifiable. When spectators are in the stadium, all emergency exits shall be staffed at all times and not secured by locks. If there is a

remote-controlled opening mechanism on the gates, each gate must also have a manual override facility so that it can be opened by hand in an emergency. On entering and leaving the field of play, including during the match, players and officials must be protected from spectators.

Emergency evacuation plan: If at any time the authorities feel the need to evacuate the situation in an emergency, the followings steps would be taken: i) All the gates of the stadium, gates at the ramps, staircase gates, field play gates & emergency exits will be opened for evacuation. ii) The spectators will be addressed on a Public address system to move out of their blocks through the gates either outside or to an earmarked safe location. They will be asked to move without causing commotion and will be regulated by the police and the stewards. iii) The details of the gates and emergency exits will be displayed at prominent places to avoid confusion. The same will be repeatedly announced on the public address system to guide the spectators and organizers to come outside the stadium. iv) Civil Defence teams will be used for emergency for search and rescue after the evacuation in case of crisis. Four (4) teams of Civil Defence under a nodal officer consisting of 80 volunteers, two vehicles (one big and one small equipped with rescue equipments will be deployed. They will rescue the people in distress and hand over them to the medical team after extraction (as communicated by ADG & Director of Civil Defence, West Bengal vide memo no. 553/DCD dated 08.09.2017 ). They will be stationed at the Emergency Response Command Centre (ERCC) Motor Transport (MT) ground near CD cutout at the stadium.

SALT LAKE/ VYBK STADIUM MAPS

UPPER BOWL SPECTATOR SEATING

MIDDLE BOWL SPECTATOR SEATING

LOWER BOWL SPECTATOR SEATING EAST STAND

ARTIFICIAL GRASS SERVICE SERVICE TUNNEL TUNNEL

LED

OR OR BOARDS

SPEC

SPEC TA

SOUTH S

MIDDLE BOWL BOWL MIDDLE

LOWER BOWL LOWER BOWL TING

TA A

T AND

OR SE OR SE T

VIDEO BOARD OR SE OR

PLATFORM T FIELD OF PLAY VIDEO BOARD

TA MIDDLESPEC

AND

TING PLATFORM

TING

LOWER BOWL LOWER TING

A SPEC

NORTH S NORTH SE WARM UP WARM UP AREA AREA

TV/ FIRE AMBULANCE/ 10M ENGINE PHOTOGRAPHERS’ TUNNEL TUNNEL PLAYERS TUNNEL

WEST STAND POLICE SEATING

VIP TRIBUNE

VVIP TRIBUNE MEDIA TRIBUNE

ENCLOSED MEDIA TRIBUNE

Seating Plan

LOC, FIFA U-17 WORLD CUP, VYBK STADIUM, KOLKATA, WEST BENGAL INDIA 2017

AMBULANCE/ PHOTOGRAPHERS’ TV/ FIRE ENGINE TUNNEL TUNNEL

ROOM

ROOM PLAYERS’ ROOM

TUNNEL ROOM LED STORAGE ROOM ROOM

ROOM ROOM VIP ROOM GODOWN GODOWN ROOM

TDR-3 BROADCAST ROOM CONTROL ROOM MEDICAL ROOM VIK ROOM

OFFICE TOILET ROOM OFFICE ROOM TDR-2 TDR-4 GC ROOM TDR-1 ROOM YOUTH PROGRAM

PRESS ROOM REFEREE’S CONFERENCE REFEREE’S OFF. ROOM-2 ROOM ROOM-1 ROOM DOPING GENTS TOI. TOI. LADIES OFFICE CONTROL POLICE TOILET TOILET ROOM CAMP ROOM VVIP ROOM ROOM

LIFTS

ROOM

ROOM ROOM

ROOM ROOM ROOM SHOP

MAIN ENTRANCE

ROOM ROOM

ROOM ROOM MIXED VVIP PLAYERS ROOM ZONE ENTRY/EXIT ENTRY/EXIT

ROOM ROOM ROOM ROOM

SPECTATOR

RAMP-02 SPECTATOR RAMP-29 SPECTATOR SPECTATOR ENTRY ENTRY SPECTATOR MEDIA VIP VIP SERVICE SPECTATOR RAMP-01 ENTRY ENTRY ENTRY ENTRY RAMP-30

Toilet/shower

WEST STAND Competition Areas Organization Services Media Areas Spectator & Public Ground Floor VIP/VVIP Areas Broadcast Marketing Safety & Security PA- Infotainment 2

LOC, FIFA U-17 WORLD CUP, VYBK STADIUM, KOLKATA, WEST BENGAL INDIA 2017

POLICE SEATS SPECTATOR ENTRY SPECTATOR VOC ENTRY

SPECTATOR

ENTRY SPECTATOR

ENTRY

MEDIA

SPECTATOR STAIRCASE VIP SERVICE VIP STAIRCASE ENTRY STAIRCASE STAIRCASE SPECTATOR ENTRY

MEDIA VIP VIP SERVICE ENTRY ENTRY ENTRY ENTRY

WEST STAND Competition Areas Organization Services Media Areas Spectator & Public First Floor VIP/VVIP Areas Broadcast Marketing Safety & Security PA- Infotainment 3

LOC, FIFA U-17 WORLD CUP, VYBK STADIUM, KOLKATA, WEST BENGAL INDIA 2017

VIP TRIBUNE

VVIP TRIBUNE

VIP LOUNGE

TOILET MEDIA STAIRCASE VIP VVIP PROTOCOL SERVICE TOILET VIP STAIRCASE LIFTS ROOM STAIRCASE STAIRCASE SPECTATOR ENTRY SPECTATOR ENTRY

WEST STAND Competition Areas Organization Services Media Areas Spectator & Public Second Floor VIP/VVIP Areas Broadcast Marketing Safety & Security PA- Infotainment 4

LOC, FIFA U-17 WORLD CUP, VYBK STADIUM, KOLKATA, WEST BENGAL INDIA 2017

VIP TRIBUNE

VVIP TRIBUNE

VVIP VVIP VVIP BOX-3 BOX-1 BOX-2

MEDIA STAIRCASE VIP VVIP VIP SERVICE STAIRCASE LOUNGE STAIRCASE STAIRCASE

WEST STAND Competition Areas Organization Services Media Areas Spectator & Public Mezzanine Floor VIP/VVIP Areas Broadcast Marketing Safety & Security PA- Infotainment 5

LOC, FIFA U-17 WORLD CUP, VYBK STADIUM, KOLKATA, WEST BENGAL INDIA 2017

VIP TRIBUNE

VVIP TRIBUNE

MEDIA TRIBUNE

LADIES-

TOI. GENTS- MEDIA STADIUM TOI. STAIRCASE VIP VIP SERVICE MEDIA CENTER STAIRCASE STAIRCASE STAIRCASE

WEST STAND Competition Areas Organization Services Media Areas Spectator & Public Third Floor VIP/VVIP Areas Broadcast Marketing Safety & Security PA- Infotainment 6

LOC, FIFA U-17 WORLD CUP, VYBK STADIUM, KOLKATA, WEST BENGAL INDIA 2017

LOWER BOWL LOWER BOWL SPECTATOR SEATING SPECTATOR SEATING

VOC

MIDDLE BOWL MIDDLE BOWL SPECTATOR SEATING VIP TRIBUNE SPECTATOR SEATING

VVIP TRIBUNE UPPER BOWL SPECTATOR SEATING MEDIA UPPER BOWL TRIBUNE SPECTATOR SEATING

CLOSED MEDIA TRIBUNE

WEST STAND Competition Areas Organization Services Media Areas Spectator & Public Bowl Plan VIP/VVIP Areas Broadcast Marketing Safety & Security PA- Infotainment 7

LOC, FIFA U-17 WORLD CUP, VYBK STADIUM, KOLKATA, WEST BENGAL INDIA 2017

FIRE RESPONSE PLAN Fire Tender 1

Ground Floor B-C cut-out

o r

–

u l

Fire Tender 2 i e

Ground Floor A-D cut-out d

v a

t Le S

Location in the Stadium

Fire Tender 1 Ground Floor B-C cut-out

Location in the Stadium

Fire Tender 2 Ground Floor A-D cut-out

MEDICAL RESPONSE PLAN

Location in the Stadium

Spectator Medical Room North East Stand – Between Ramp # 10 & 11

Stadium Layout – First Floor

Location in the Stadium Spectator Medical Kiosk South Stand First Floor - #1

Location in the Stadium Spectator Medical Kiosk West Stand First Floor - #2

Location in the Stadium Spectator Medical Kiosk North Stand First Floor - #3

Stadium Layout – Second Floor

Location in the Stadium

Spectator Medical Kiosk South Stand Second Floor #1

Location in the Stadium

Spectator Medical Kiosk West Stand Second Floor#2

Location in the Stadium

Spectator Medical Kiosk North Stand Second Floor#3

Stadium Layout – Third Floor Location in the Stadium

Spectator Medical Kiosk South West Stand Third Floor#1

Location in the Stadium

Spectator Medical Kiosk North West Stand Third Floor#2

Location in the Stadium

Spectator Ambulance Positions

Outer Concourse

EMERGENCY SUPPORT RESPONSE OF EACH PROVIDER

FIRE & EMERGENCY SERVICES

A robust fire fighting mechanism is placed at the stadium to handle any outbreak of fire at the stadium. The FIFA has laid regulations regarding preparedness for a fire outbreak viz.

1) Minimizing fire risk :

I. Safety signs: As per FIFA regulations safety signs will be placed at various locations of the stadium. The signs include prohibitory signs such as “No Smoking”, firefighting equipment signs such as hose reels, extinguishers and the Emergency signs: for example, escape routes/ emergency exit or first aid stations.

II. The following measures and practices should be considered when seeking to minimise the fire risk:

a) Sources of ignition: The fire risk assessment should identify all potential sources of ignition at the stadium. Where possible, those sources should be removed or replaced. Where this cannot be done, the ignition source should be kept well away from combustible materials, be adequately guarded or made the subject of management controls. Ignition sources may include: i) Cooking appliances ii) Central heating boilers iii) Room heaters. iv) Light fittings. v) Certain electrical apparatus, especially if not maintained. vi) Smoking areas.

b) Smoking: i) The stadium safety and security management team must ensure that if smoking is permitted inside the stadium perimeter, it does not increase the risk of fire. This can be achieved by designating smoking areas at controlled points that are equipped with suitable ashtrays and extinguishers.

ii) The stadium safety and security management team should adopt and enforce a clear policy on smoking for both staff and spectators. The policy should be supported by suitable signs and use of the public address system to inform spectators.

iii) In areas which are constructed of, or contain, combustible or flammable items or materials, smoking should be strictly prohibited in that vicinity.

c) Flares and fireworks: i) The stadium safety and security management team must adopt and enforce a clear policy prohibiting spectators from bringing flares, fi reworks or other forms of pyrotechnics into the stadium. This should be clearly stated in the stadium code of conduct.

ii) Any event activities which include pyrotechnic displays must be included in the fire risk assessment and a formal plan prepared, which must be approved by the fire services and local authorities. d) Voids: Voids under seating areas, or under the flooring itself, are often used for the unauthorised storage of combustible materials. They may also accumulate waste or litter. All voids should be inspected prior to an event as part of the risk assessment and made safe. e) Waste and litter: The accumulation of waste and litter (such as programmes and food and drink packaging) should be avoided. Sufficient waste and litter bins must be provided throughout the stadium and arrangements made for their frequent emptying throughout the match. f) High-risk fire areas: High-risk fire areas should be separated from any other parts of spectator accommodation by a construction having a fi re resistance of at least 30 minutes. Such areas may include: i) Kitchens. ii) Catering outlets. iii) Hospitality areas. iv) Boiler rooms, oil fuel stores and general stores. v) Enclosed or underground car parks. Adequate firefighting equipment must be positioned in these areas, taking into consideration the types of extinguisher required, such as CO², water, etc. g) Catering facilities: Wherever possible, all catering facilities should be located in permanent structures. Any temporary or mobile catering facility must be included in the fire risk assessment. h) Fuel or power supply: Special care should be taken to ensure that any fuel or power supply used for cooking or heating, in particular liquefi ed petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders, is stored safely. i) Hazardous materials: If it is necessary to utilise hazardous materials, such as fuels (whether in containers or within fuel tanks and machinery), fertilisers, weed killers, paints or gas cylinders used for medical purposes, they should, if held within or near to spectator facilities, be stored in fi re-resistant facilities that have appropriate access control. j) Temporary structures and ancillary activities: Any temporary accommodation or facility must be included within the fi re safety risk assessment. Any ancillary activity

not included in the overall fire safety risk assessment must be the subject of a site- specific risk assessment.

2) Fire warning and detection systems

1. Consideration should be given to the installation of an automatic fi re detection (AFD) system in all high-risk fire areas and also in any unoccupied areas that contain a normal fire risk.

This system should: a) Give an automatic indication of the fire warning and its location. b) If the fire warning panel is located in a part of the stadium other than the VOC, there should be a repeater panel sited in the VOC. c) Be designed, installed, commissioned, maintained and tested by professionally competent persons.

2. Whichever warning or detection system is in place, the fire services must be informed immediately of any warning. 3. The procedures for notifying the fire services must form part of the stadium’s contingency plans and staff must be trained accordingly. All stadiums must be provided with adequate firefighting equipment. Advice on the type, level of provision and positioning of firefighting equipment should be sought from the fire services or authority responsible for enforcing fire legislation.

When providing such equipment, the following should be considered: a) Where appropriate, hose reels should provide adequate protection to the whole floor area and be installed in a suitable position by entrances, exits and stairways. b) Where hose reels are not provided, sufficient portable fi re extinguishers should be installed to give adequate cover. The number and type will depend upon the structure’s size, layout, fire separation and risk. c) Fire blankets and appropriate fire extinguishers should be provided in all catering facilities and outlets. d) Portable firefighting equipment should be located so that it cannot be vandalized but is readily accessible to staff when needed. e) All firefighting equipment must be regularly inspected to ensure that it is in full working order.

3) Fire fighting mechanism: i) The first step of fighting major fire break is to smoothly evacuate the spectators and staff from the area. A detailed evacuation plan is laid out at the end.

ii) Responsibilities of the Concerned Divisions in case of deployment of Fire Appliances, Gears and man power:

North 24-Parganas Division

 Bronto Skylift (68 mtr.) under Officer will be placed at the Emergency Response Command Centre (ERCC) Motor Transport (MT) ground near CD cutout at the stadium.  One Water Carrier (W.C) with full crew under Officer will be placed at Emergency Response Command Centre (ERCC) Motor Transport (MT) ground near CD cutout at the stadium.  One Water Carrier (W.C) with full crew under Officer will be deployed at the Karunamoyee Road Junction.  Ten Extinguishers with ten Operators under a Leader will be placed inside the different location of the galleries of the stadium.

North Kolkata Division

 Two Motor Cycles with back pack under two Operators (each) will patrol on the ring road of the stadium.  4 nos. extinguishers with four Operators under a Leader.

South Kolkata Division

 One Bronto (42 mtr.) will be provided with manning.  One Water Carrier (W.C) with full crew under Officer from Pragati Maidan Fire Station will be provided at the Emergency Response Command Centre (ERCC) Motor Transport (MT) ground near CD cutout at the stadium.  Two motor cycles with back pack with two Operators (each) from Head Quarter & Kalighat Fire Station will patrol on the ring road, surrounded the stadium.  Six extinguishers with six Operators under a Leader at the different locations of the gallery of the Stadium.

CI Institute of Fire Service, Behala

 One Bronto (42 mtr.) will be provided with Officer iii) Deployment of fire fighting & special appliances

 Two nos. Bronto Skylift.  Two nos. Water Carrier (W.C).  Four nos. Enfield Motor Cycle with back pack.  Twenty Operators with Extinguishers

Schematic Disposition of Extinguisher Operators

Schematic Disposition of Bronto SkyLift (Special Appliance), Water Tenders & Motor Cycles with back pack

iv) Name & Contact of the Nodal Officer: Sri Tarun Kumar Sinha, Director-in-Charge, West Bengal Fire & Emergency Services Mob No: 9434736044

Name & Contact of the other responsible Senior Officers: Sri Milan Nag. Divisional Fire Officer, North 24 Parganas Division West Bengal Fire & Emergency Services. Mob No: 9836968077

Sri Kamal Kumar Nandy. Divisional Fire Officer, North Kolkata Division West Bengal Fire & Emergency Services. Mob No: 9830334398

Sri Tarun Kumar Sinha. Divisional Fire Officer, South Kolkata Division West Bengal Fire & Emergency Services. Mob No: 9434736044

Name & contact of other concerned Officer: Sri Sudipta Mukherjee, Station Officer Bidhannagar Fire Station, North 24 Parganas Division, Mob No: 9674050033

Contact details of respective Fire Station: Directorate Control Room: (033) 2252-3170, 2252-6164, 2227-6666

North 24 Parganas Divisional Control Room: (033) 2593-9735, 2593-5900

North Kolkata Divisional Control Room: (033) 2241-4545, 2241-4646

South Kolkata Divisional Control Room: (033) 2252-3170

Bidhannagar Fire Station (North 24 Pgs Division): (033) 2357-5293

Maniktala Fire Station (North Kolkata Division): (033) 2320-7489, 2866-2302

Pragati Maidan Fire Station (South Kolkata Division): (033) 2325-7000

TERRORIST ATTACK

1) Minimizing the risk: As per FIFA regulations the following regulations are suggested:

All counter-terrorism matters should be addressed by the relevant national authorities as part of an overall national security strategy, and specific advice relating to terrorist threats must be obtained from the relevant national authorities prior to the start of any FIFA event. Counter-terrorism measures should be integrated into stadium contingency plans wherever possible. As a basic measure, the stadium safety and security management team should establish low-level search and awareness policies.

The vigilance of all staff (including cleaning, maintenance and ground staff and contract staff) is an essential means of deterrence and detection. As they know their own work areas, stadium staff should be encouraged to be alert to unusual behaviour or items that are out of place. Basic searches of the stadium should be conducted as part of a daily routine, especially on match days.

As a guideline, stadium searches should be conducted on the following occasions: a) Prior to a stadium being handed over for a FIFA event and accreditation being enforced. b) Prior to any official training taking place at the stadium. c) Prior to any match. Detailed searches utilising professional resources should be conducted in response to any specific threat or on the discovery of a suspicious item.

All staff must have the confidence to report anything suspicious in the knowledge that reports, including false alarms, will be taken seriously and regarded as a contribution to the safety and security of the event. Under the direction of the senior national security advisor, training and briefings should be conducted at all stadiums for all staff, not only safety and security employees. Staff should be briefed to look out for packages, bags or other items in odd places, carefully placed (rather than dropped) items in rubbish bins and unusual interest shown by strangers. If there is an increased risk of terrorist activity at a particular stadium or across the whole event, it may be necessary to conduct more thorough searches of people and vehicles entering the stadium. This may require additional resources on the approaches to the turnstiles or entry points, which in turn may reduce the rate at which spectators can enter on match days. If this is the case, it may be necessary to inform spectators in advance and open the gates earlier than usual to compensate for the time it will take spectators to pass through security.

Search plans: The stadium security officer and the local police commander are responsible for developing a stadium search plan. a) Search plans should be prepared in advance of the event and all staff should receive training and perform rehearsals for them.

b) The overall objective of the plan is to make sure that the entire stadium area is searched in a systematic and thorough manner so that no part is left unchecked. c) Those best placed to search a stadium are those who work there on a regular basis. Police and other agencies can conduct searches, but they may not be familiar with the layout or be aware of what should be there or is out of place, and as such cannot search as quickly or as thoroughly as stadium staff d) The member(s) of staff nominated to carry out the search do not need to have expertise in explosives or other types of device, but they must be familiar with the place they are searching. They are looking for any items that should not be there, that cannot be accounted for or are out of place. e) Ideally, those conducting searches should do so in pairs. Recommended action Consider dividing the stadium into sections that are of a manageable size and easily understood. The search plan should have a written checklist, to be signed when completed by the stadium security officer. A copy should be held in the VOC. Remember to include any stairs, fire escapes, corridors, toilets and lifts in the search plan, as well as car parks, service yards and other areas outside that fall within the outer perimeter of the stadium. f) If evacuation is considered or implemented, then a search of the assembly areas, the routes to them and the surrounding area should also be made prior to evacuation. Consider the most effective method of initiating the search, for example by sending a message to the search teams over a public address system (the messages should be coded to avoid unnecessary disruption and alarm to the public).

Search plans should incorporate the following key instructions: a) Do not touch or attempt to move any suspect items. b) Move everyone away to a safe distance and out of line of sight. c) Notify the VOC immediately. d) Prevent others from approaching the suspect item. e) Communicate safely and calmly to staff, officials, players, VIPs/VVIPs and spectators who are in the area. f) Only use hand-held radios or mobile phones away from the immediate vicinity of a suspect item, remaining out of line of sight and behind hard cover. g) Ensure that whoever found the item or witnessed the incident remains on hand to brief the police. Searching of persons entering a venue Subject to the threat assessment, once a stadium search is complete all persons entering the stadium should be subjected to a search regime.

Consider the following: a) Anyone refusing to be searched will not be permitted access into the stadium.

b) The search regime is for everyone entering the stadium, including all staff, goods deliverers, volunteers and members of the public. c) Consider advising spectators that searches will be carried out. They should arrive early and be encouraged not to bring bags. This can be achieved via tickets, websites or pre-event advertising. A list of banned items should also be included in the information. d) Ensure that the search staff are properly briefed and trained on their powers and what they are searching for. e) If detection equipment such as metal detectors and scanners is used, ensure that those operating the equipment fully understand how they work and their limitations. f) Ensure that the search areas have sufficient space. g) Ensure that there is sufficient staff to carry out the searches. h) Ensure that there are sufficient search facilities to handle the expected attendance within the available time. i) If there is a car park within the outer perimeter of the stadium being used, all cars entering the car park must be searched. j) The vehicles of VIPs/VVIPs, players and officials should be searched daily and, where possible, guarded to prevent any interference. When transporting VIPs/VVIPs, players and officials to the stadium, vehicles should be fully searched prior to passengers alighting from the vehicle and escorted to the stadium by police so as to avoid them having to be searched on entry to the stadium.

2) Counter terrorism mechanism: i) The first step of fighting major terrorist attack is to smoothly evacuate the spectators and staff from the area. A detailed evacuation plan is laid out at the end. Search will be conducted as per the search plans mentioned above. ii) The Bidhannagar police will deploy two (2) Quick Reaction Teams (QRT) to deal with terrorists. They will be stationed at VIP gate and near Gate no 3 of the stadium. iii) A team of Rapid Action Force (RAF) will also augment their efforts in segregating and handling crowd from the terrorist threat. iv) A team of National Disaster Relief force with Chemical Biological, Radiological & Nuclear (CBRN) equipments will also be at the stadium to monitor and mitigate the CBRN threat (as communicated by Commandant 2nd Battalion NDRF vide letter no. ops/215/2 bn NDRF/2017/8372 dated 12.09.2017). they will be stationed at the Emergency Response Command Centre (ERCC) Motor Transport (MT) ground near CD cutout at the stadium. v) The CCTV cameras and its control room will be effectively used to monitor counter terrorism operations. vi) All efforts will be coordinated by the police officer deputed at the Venue Operation Centre (VOC).

vii) National Security Guard (NSG) is involved in making security arrangements and will be called in case of Hostage situation.

BUILDING COLLAPSE AND/OR STRUCTURAL DAMAGE

1) Minimizing the risk: i) The PWD will issue a stadium safety certificate/ fitness certificate for using the stadium. ii) The spectators will be given free spaces for movement and will be divided to prevent large congregation ot any part of the structure. iii) All the equipment and installations will be kept at places avoiding excessive load on any structure. iv) A team from the Public Works Department will be available for maintenance and repair as and when required.

2) Handling the situation: 1) One team of NDRF headed by one gazetted officer will be deployed in the stadium complex with Collapsed Structure Search and Rescue (CSSR) equipments to mitigate the collapsed structure threat. (as communicated by Commandant 2nd Battalion NDRF vide letter no. ops/215/2 bn NDRF/2017/8372 dated 12.09.2017). They will be stationed at the Emergency Response Command Centre (ERCC) Motor Transport (MT) ground near CD cutout at the stadium. 1) The Nodal officer is Commandant 2nd Battalion NDRF, Haringhata, near RRI, Mohanpur, Nadia. Phone number: 9474116775, 9474061104, fax : 033- 25875032. 2) The spectators and organisers will be evacuated as per the emergency evacuation plan before the operation.

DISASTER RESPONSE- NDRF -CBRN EMERGENCIES One CBRN team will be kept standby within the stadium periphery near assembly area during the event to monitor & mitigate the CBRN threat at Vivekananda Yuba Bharati Krirangan, Salt Lake City stadium (Proposed Venue). The primary task of NDRF teams in case of any CBRN emergency will be to assist the Kolkata State Administration in rescue of victims. NDRF teams will perform the following sequential actions in CBRN emergency- a. NDRF teams will wear appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) while responding to CBRN emergencies. b. Medical triage of victims for prioritising victims. c. Cordoning of CBRN incident site as per emerging threat scenario and contamination levels. d. Establishment of decontamination centre at exit point. e. Evacuation of Victims and handing them over to Kolkata Police. f. Victims who are very serious will be handed over to Kolkata Police immediately without decontamination for sending them to designated CBRN hospitals which have special isolated CBRN wards with quarantine facility. Kolkata Police will document all such victims and monitor them for long term CBRN effects. A copy of such documents will be provided to NDRF teams. g. All other victims who are evacuated by NDRF teams will be handed over to Kolkata Police after Decontamination and with copy of proper documentation. They will be further monitored by Kolkata Police for long term CBRN effects

Mock Exercise and its detail steps incase of any CBRN Emergency – in specific to Radiological emergency As a responder the NDRF team will carried out its Disaster Response in the following manner under IRS 1. CBRN team functions as per the team hierarchy chart 2. Resource team shall arrange all the items required for the exercise and check the healthiness of the instruments before proceeding to the affected area. Make a checklist for the items to be taken in case of a radiological emergency.

3. On receipt of the information, all the teams shall proceed to the affected area 4. Depending upon the situation, radiological detection team ( detection team) and medical team( rescue team) with minimum personal protective equipment (PPEs) and dosimeters shall rescue the affected persons. 5. Radiological assessor team shall measure the radiation field close to the body of the affected persons and check for personnel contamination depending upon the physical status of the affected person. 6. The affected persons shall be taken to a nearby Hospital in an Ambulance. They shall be covered in a polythene sheet if required to avoid spread of contamination. Accompany 7. Radiological detection team shall measure the dose rate and air activity around the affected site and advice the resource team to cordon the affected area where the dose rate is 100 uSv/h (10 mR/h) – INNER CORDON. 8. Shoe barrier shall be erected around the inner cordon for controlled entry in the upwind direction. 9. Outer cordon (Security cover) shall be made around the inner cordon 30 m 300 m 1000 m 10. Entry to outer cordon area shall be restricted 11. Decontamination material and other teams shall be placed within the outer cordon. 12. All the persons leaving the inner cordon area shall be thoroughly checked for contamination and their exposures as per DRD readings shall be noted. 13. Personnel should be rotated such that individual exposures of all the personnel are nearly the same. 14. After decontamination operation and radiological assessment, the area may be cleared.

S.No Event/Activity Agency

1.Communication of Incident

1.1 Incident site –brief Emergency detail will be communicated to concerned agency 1.2 (i) From FIFA security staff to Police (ii) From Police to NDRF (iii) Police to DM,DAE-CMG (iv) DAE-CMG to DAE-ERD, DAE-ERC/ AERB (v) DM (RO) to MHA/NDMA/SDRF 2.At the incident site 2.1 The players and VIPs will be evacuated to Designated FIFA security “Reasonable safe area” by FIFA security and Police – Police barricade the area by police as directed by IC - Police to evacuate injured /affected people to

designated “safe area” outside the stadium - Police to control mob and clear exit route to avoid stampede 2.2 First Responders ---- arrive at site, measure radiation level. NDRF

2.3 Radiation level confirmed , participate in emergency DAE-ERC management

2.4 All Stake Holders on Alert-Impending Radiological RESPONSIBLE OFFICER/ Emergency INCIDENT COMMANDER

3. Declaration of Radiation Emergency

3.1 Site Report to RO through first responders, IC RESPONSIBLE OFFICER/ INCIDENT COMMANDER

3.2 RO to cross check with DAE-ERC, DAE-CMG- Initiate RESPONSIBLE OFFICER/ Radiological Emergency Measures INCIDENT COMMANDER

3.3 Assess the severity of the event RESPONSIBLE OFFICER/ INCIDENT COMMANDER

3.4 Instruct Police, NDRF, Fire, Medical Agency – to take INCIDENT COMMANDER positions at Incident site

4. Incident Location

4.1 Management of the incident site-prepare strategy FIFA security NDRF DAE-ERC

4.2 Recovery of all radioisotopes under the guidance of DAE-

ERC Police 4.3 Detailed radiation survey

4.4 Contamination check of the area

4.5 Barricading and demarcation of the areas

5. Triaging and Medical Assistance

5.1 Conduct triage of all victims .Check all the affected NDRF persons for radiological exposures and contamination – DAE-ERC based on personal interviews and measurements. Medical Segregate the affected persons as per standard procedure. Record in standard forms.

5.2 Identify area for decontamination

5.3 Shift serious patients to the designated medical facilities Civil Administration as per procedure

5.4 Shift the patients with external contamination to the Civil Administration decontamination area (Male/Female-Separate)

5.5 Shift patients with suspected internal contamination for Civil Administration WBC and other examination after external decontamination

6.Mopping up operation

6.1 Affected site should be thoroughly surveyed DAE-ERC - All contaminated items to be collected - Floor at the site- to be checked and appropriate measures taken - Collect any debris, - Contaminated waste.

6.2 Inform DDMA/NDMA/MHA as per the situation RESPONSIBLE OFFICER/ significance INCIDENT COMMANDER - Follow up measures - Collect all records - Dispose rad waste - based on the recommendations of DAE

7. Normalization/ Termination

7.1 Confirm all locations are properly decontaminated DAE- CMG - All affected persons cleared/sent to medical facility

7.2 Rad-waste collected in containers and clear instructions given for management -Patients receiving proper medical/HP care and their facilities informed. Psychosocial care for needy.

7.3 Terminate emergency in phased manner in consultation INCIDENT COMMANDER with ERD/CMG and gradually handover the areas to the RESPONSIBLE OFFICER concerned agencies (FIFA security). Decision regarding DAE-CMG contaminated (disposable) items to be taken after due consultation. 7.4 Collect and record every detail RESPONSIBLE OFFICER

8. Media Briefing

8.1 By the authorized person Officer

9.Event Analysis/Investigation

9.1 Analyse the event RESPONSIBLE OFFICER 9.2 Investigation Police

DISASTER RESPONSE- NDRF -CSSR EMERGENCIES Two CSSR teams will be kept standby inside the main stadium in two different places (will be suggested by FIFA Officials/Incident Comdr) during the event to mitigate the CSSR threat at Vivekananda Yuba Bharati Krirangan, Salt Lake City stadium (Proposed Venue). DISASTER RESPONSE –NDRF -CSSR OPS In case of CSSR ops/ Building Collapse, as a responder the NDRF team will carried out its Disaster Response in the following manner under IRS 1. Compiling/ verifying information once at the scene, consulting with stakeholders present, gathering data and conduct a needs analysis. Planning on the lay out plan of collapsed structure. 2. Securing of scene (disaster site). 3. Planning for General access to the disaster site 4. Total area will be divided into sectors for assigning task to different teams 5. Obtaining Police representative/ FIFA security for each sectors to account and keep log of all recoveries and live Rescues 6. Allocating resources and personnel 7. Assign tasks to rescue squads. 8. Erect inflatable lighting tower if required. 9. Initial shallow search , technical search, detail search and followed by manual search 10. Established contact with trapped victim by inserting VLCs. 11. Gain Access to the victim Remove rubble, break and breach materials and create a passageway to access the void space where a live victim is believed to be located.

12. Recovery of victims. 13. Triage of victims if required. 14. Medical first response to the victims. 15. Stabilizing the patient. 16. Performing basic life support on-site before extricating the patient in order to improve later chances of survival. You will hand off the patient to more advanced medical care after extrication. 17. Extricating the patient Remove rubble surrounding the patient, ensuring no further injury. Shore loads as needed. Ensure no additional pressure is applied to any trapped portions of the body. 18. Hand over the victims to the authorized medical services. 19. Make a record of the victims and their location to the respective medical services.

Assist FIFA officials, local administration to normalized the situation.