Operating Systems – Linux Standard Base Common Definitions
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Security Assurance Requirements for Linux Application Container Deployments
NISTIR 8176 Security Assurance Requirements for Linux Application Container Deployments Ramaswamy Chandramouli This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8176 NISTIR 8176 Security Assurance Requirements for Linux Application Container Deployments Ramaswamy Chandramouli Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8176 October 2017 U.S. Department of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Secretary National Institute of Standards and Technology Walter Copan, NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology NISTIR 8176 SECURITY ASSURANCE FOR LINUX CONTAINERS National Institute of Standards and Technology Internal Report 8176 37 pages (October 2017) This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8176 Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. This p There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by NIST in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, including concepts and methodologies, may be used by federal agencies even before the completion of such companion publications. Thus, until each ublication is available free of charge from: http publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning and transition purposes, federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new publications by NIST. -
Report Received March 2006
2005 was a busy year for me as of POSIX was published (the the USENIX standards represen- Shell and Utilities volume), and tative. There are three major it became a second ISO standard. NICHOLAS M. STOUGHTON standards that I watch carefully: Amendments to these standards I POSIX, which also incorpo- were also under development, USENIX rates the Single UNIX Specifi- and led to the addition of real- cation time interfaces, including Standards I ISO-C pthreads, to the core system call I The Linux Standard Base (LSB) set. Many of the other projects Activities died away as the people involved In order to do that, USENIX lost interest or hit political road- funds my participation in the blocks (most of which were Nick is the USENIX Standards committees that develop and reported in ;login: at the time). Liaison and represents the maintain these standards. Association in the POSIX, ISO C, Throughout 2005, the Free Until the end of the twentieth and LSB working groups. He is century, POSIX was developed the ISO organizational repre- Standards Group (FSG) also sentative to the Austin Group, helped fund these activities. For and maintained by IEEE exclu- a member of INCITS commit- each of these, let’s look at the his- sively. At the same time, the tees J11 and CT22, and the Open Group (also known as Specification Authority sub- tory of the standards, then at group leader for the LSB. what has happened over the past X/Open) had an entirely separate but 100% overlapping standard, [email protected] 12 months or so, and, finally, what is on the agenda for this known as the Single UNIX year. -
Writing Kernel Exploits
Writing kernel exploits Keegan McAllister January 27, 2012 Keegan McAllister Writing kernel exploits Why attack the kernel? Total control of the system Huge attack surface Subtle code with potential for fun bugs Keegan McAllister Writing kernel exploits Kernel security Kernel and user code coexist in memory Kernel integrity depends on a few processor features: Separate CPU modes for kernel and user code Well-defined transitions between these modes Kernel-only instructions and memory Keegan McAllister Writing kernel exploits User vs. kernel exploits Typical userspace exploit: Manipulate someone's buggy program, locally or remotely Payload runs in the context of that user Typical kernel exploit: Manipulate the local kernel using system calls Payload runs in kernel mode Goal: get root! Remote kernel exploits exist, but are much harder to write Keegan McAllister Writing kernel exploits Scope We'll focus on the Linux kernel and 32-bit x86 hardware. Most ideas will generalize. References are on the last slides. Keegan McAllister Writing kernel exploits Let's see some exploits! We'll look at Two toy examples Two real exploits in detail Some others in brief How to harden your kernel Keegan McAllister Writing kernel exploits NULL dereference Keegan McAllister Writing kernel exploits A simple kernel module Consider a simple Linux kernel module. It creates a file /proc/bug1. It defines what happens when someone writes to that file. Keegan McAllister Writing kernel exploits bug1.c void (*my_funptr)(void); int bug1_write(struct file *file, const char *buf, unsigned long len) { my_funptr(); return len; } int init_module(void){ create_proc_entry("bug1", 0666, 0) ->write_proc = bug1_write; return 0; } Keegan McAllister Writing kernel exploits The bug $ echo foo > /proc/bug1 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Pid: 1316, comm: bash EIP is at 0x0 Call Trace : [<f81ad009>] ? bug1_write+0x9/0x10 [bug1] [<c10e90e5>] ? proc_file_write+0x50/0x62 .. -
IT Acronyms.Docx
List of computing and IT abbreviations /.—Slashdot 1GL—First-Generation Programming Language 1NF—First Normal Form 10B2—10BASE-2 10B5—10BASE-5 10B-F—10BASE-F 10B-FB—10BASE-FB 10B-FL—10BASE-FL 10B-FP—10BASE-FP 10B-T—10BASE-T 100B-FX—100BASE-FX 100B-T—100BASE-T 100B-TX—100BASE-TX 100BVG—100BASE-VG 286—Intel 80286 processor 2B1Q—2 Binary 1 Quaternary 2GL—Second-Generation Programming Language 2NF—Second Normal Form 3GL—Third-Generation Programming Language 3NF—Third Normal Form 386—Intel 80386 processor 1 486—Intel 80486 processor 4B5BLF—4 Byte 5 Byte Local Fiber 4GL—Fourth-Generation Programming Language 4NF—Fourth Normal Form 5GL—Fifth-Generation Programming Language 5NF—Fifth Normal Form 6NF—Sixth Normal Form 8B10BLF—8 Byte 10 Byte Local Fiber A AAT—Average Access Time AA—Anti-Aliasing AAA—Authentication Authorization, Accounting AABB—Axis Aligned Bounding Box AAC—Advanced Audio Coding AAL—ATM Adaptation Layer AALC—ATM Adaptation Layer Connection AARP—AppleTalk Address Resolution Protocol ABCL—Actor-Based Concurrent Language ABI—Application Binary Interface ABM—Asynchronous Balanced Mode ABR—Area Border Router ABR—Auto Baud-Rate detection ABR—Available Bitrate 2 ABR—Average Bitrate AC—Acoustic Coupler AC—Alternating Current ACD—Automatic Call Distributor ACE—Advanced Computing Environment ACF NCP—Advanced Communications Function—Network Control Program ACID—Atomicity Consistency Isolation Durability ACK—ACKnowledgement ACK—Amsterdam Compiler Kit ACL—Access Control List ACL—Active Current -
Linux Standard Base Development Kit for Application Building/Porting
Linux Standard Base Development Kit for application building/porting Rajesh Banginwar Nilesh Jain Intel Corporation Intel Corporation [email protected] [email protected] Abstract validating binaries and RPM packages for LSB conformance. We conclude with a couple of case studies that demonstrate usage of the build The Linux Standard Base (LSB) specifies the environment as well as the associated tools de- binary interface between an application and a scribed in the paper. runtime environment. This paper discusses the LSB Development Kit (LDK) consisting of a build environment and associated tools to assist software developers in building/porting their applications to the LSB interface. Developers 1 Linux Standard Base Overview will be able to use the build environment on their development machines, catching the LSB porting issues early in the development cycle The Linux* Standard Base (LSB)[1] specifies and reducing overall LSB conformance testing the binary interface between an application and time and cost. Associated tools include appli- a runtime environment. The LSB Specifica- cation and package checkers to test for LSB tion consists of a generic portion, gLSB, and conformance of application binaries and RPM an architecture-specific portion, archLSB. As packages. the names suggest, gLSB contains everything that is common across all architectures, and This paper starts with the discussion of ad- archLSBs contain the things that are specific vantages the build environment provides by to each processor architecture, such as the ma- showing how it simplifies application develop- chine instruction set and C library symbol ver- ment/porting for LSB conformance. With the sions. availability of this additional build environment from LSB working group, the application de- As much as possible, the LSB builds on ex- velopers will find the task of porting applica- isting standards, including the Single UNIX tions to LSB much easier. -
Application Binary Interface for the ARM Architecture
ABI for the ARM Architecture (Base Standard) Application Binary Interface for the ARM® Architecture The Base Standard Document number: ARM IHI 0036B, current through ABI release 2.10 Date of Issue: 10th October 2008, reissued 24th November 2015 Abstract This document describes the structure of the Application Binary Interface (ABI) for the ARM architecture, and links to the documents that define the base standard for the ABI for the ARM Architecture. The base standard governs inter-operation between independently generated binary files and sets standards common to ARM- based execution environments. Keywords ABI for the ARM architecture, ABI base standard, embedded ABI How to find the latest release of this specification or report a defect in it Please check the ARM Information Center (http://infocenter.arm.com/) for a later release if your copy is more than one year old (navigate to the ARM Software development tools section, ABI for the ARM Architecture subsection). Please report defects in this specification to arm dot eabi at arm dot com. Licence THE TERMS OF YOUR ROYALTY FREE LIMITED LICENCE TO USE THIS ABI SPECIFICATION ARE GIVEN IN SECTION 1.4, Your licence to use this specification (ARM contract reference LEC-ELA-00081 V2.0). PLEASE READ THEM CAREFULLY. BY DOWNLOADING OR OTHERWISE USING THIS SPECIFICATION, YOU AGREE TO BE BOUND BY ALL OF ITS TERMS. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THIS, DO NOT DOWNLOAD OR USE THIS SPECIFICATION. THIS ABI SPECIFICATION IS PROVIDED “AS IS” WITH NO WARRANTIES (SEE SECTION 1.4 FOR DETAILS). Proprietary notice ARM, Thumb, RealView, ARM7TDMI and ARM9TDMI are registered trademarks of ARM Limited. -
Eb-2015-00549 Document Date: 08/27/2015 To: INCITS Members
InterNational Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS) Secretariat: Information Technology Industry Council (ITI) 1101 K Street NW, Suite 610, Washington, DC 20005 www.INCITS.org eb-2015-00549 Document Date: 08/27/2015 To: INCITS Members Reply To: Deborah J. Spittle Subject: Public Review and Comments Register for the Reaffirmations of: Due Date: The public review is from August 28, 2015 to October 27, 2015. The InterNational Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS) announces Action: that the subject-referenced document(s) is being circulated for a 60-day public review and comment period. Comments received during this period will be considered and answered. Commenters who have objections/suggestions to this document should so indicate and include their reasons. All comments should be forwarded not later than the date noted above to the following address: INCITS Secretariat/ITI 1101 K Street NW - Suite 610 Washington DC 20005-3922 Email: [email protected] (preferred) This public review also serves as a call for patents and any other pertinent issues (copyrights, trademarks). Correspondence regarding intellectual property rights may be emailed to the INCITS Secretariat at [email protected]. INCITS/ISO/IEC 14443- Identification cards - Contactless Integrated Circuit Cards (CICCs) - Proximity integrated circuit9s0 1:2008[2010] cards Part 1: physical characteristics INCITS/ISO/IEC 19785- Information technology - Common Biometric Exchange File Formats Framework (CBEFF) - Part 3: 3:2007/AM 1:2010[2010] -
ISO/IEC JTC 1 N8426 2006-11-28 Replaces
ISO/IEC JTC 1 N8426 2006-11-28 Replaces: ISO/IEC JTC 1 Information Technology Document Type: Resolutions Document Title: Final Resolutions Adopted at the 21st Meeting of ISO/IEC JTC 1 13-17 November 2006 in South Africa Document Source: JTC 1 Secretary Project Number: Document Status: This document is circulated to JTC 1 National Bodies for information. Action ID: FYI Due Date: Distribution: Medium: No. of Pages: 20 Secretariat, ISO/IEC JTC 1, American National Standards Institute, 25 West 43rd Street, New York, NY 10036; Telephone: 1 212 642 4932; Facsimile: 1 212 840 2298; Email: [email protected] FINAL Resolutions Adopted at the 21st Meeting of ISO/IEC JTC 1 13-17 November 2006 in South Africa Resolution 1 - JTC 1 Business Plan JTC 1 approves document JTC 1 N 8352, as the current JTC 1 Business Plan. Unanimous Resolution 2 – JTC 1 Long Term Business Plan and Long Term Business Plan Implementation Plan JTC 1 approves document JTC 1 N 7974 as the Long Term Business Plan and document JTC 1 N 7975 as the Long Term Business Plan Implementation Plan. JTC 1 further instructs the JTC 1 Chairman to review these documents and to submit proposals for change to the plans to keep them current. Unanimous Resolution 3 – Approved Criteria for Free Availability of JTC 1 Standards JTC 1 instructs its Secretariat to redistribute the Approved Criteria for Free Availability of JTC 1 Standards (JTC 1 N 7604) to its National Bodies and Subcommittees in order to remind them of what ISO Council and IEC Council Board have agreed. -
New Security Enhancements in Red Hat Enterprise Linux V.3, Update 3
New Security Enhancements in Red Hat Enterprise Linux v.3, update 3 By Arjan van de Ven Abstract This whitepaper describes the new security features that have been added to update 3 of Red Hat Enterprise Linux v.3: ExecShield and support for NX technology. August 2004 Table of Contents Introduction 2 Types of Security Holes 2 Buffer Overflows 3 Countering Buffer Overflows 4 Randomization 6 Remaining Randomization: PIE Binaries 7 Compatibility 8 How Well Does it Work? 9 Future Work 10 ¢¡¤£¦¥¨§ © ¤ ¦ ¨¢ ¨ ! ¨! "¨ $#!© ¨%¦&¨¦ ¨! ¤' ¨¡(*)+¤-, ¡ ¡¤.!+ !£§ ¡¤%/ 01, © 02 ".§ + § ¨.)+.§ 3¦01¡.§4§ .© 02 .§ + § ¨.)+.§ 3¦01¡54¢! . !! !© 6¢'7.!"¡ .§.8¡.%¨¦ § © ¨0 #© %8&9© 0:§ ¨ ¨© 02 .§ ¨+ § ¨.)+¤§ 3;¡!54#!© %!0;<=¡.§ >!¨, ¨0 ¦?@BA$¨C.6B'ED8F ! Introduction The world of computer security has changed dramatically in the last few years. Network security used to be about one dedicated hacker trying to get into one government computer, but now it is often about automated mass attacks. The SQL Slammer and Code Red worms were the first wide-scale computer security incidents to get mainstream press coverage. Linux has had similar, less-invasive worms in the past, such as the Slapper worm of 2002. Another relatively new phenomenon is that compromised computers are primarily being used for other purposes, including sending spam or participating in Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks. A contributing factor to the mass-compromise problem is that a large portion1 of users and system administrators generally do not apply the security fixes that are provided by the operating system vendor. This leaves a significant number of vulnerable machines connected to the Internet at all times. Providing security updates after the fact, however, is not sufficient. -
Linux Standard Base Core Specification for IA32 4.1
Linux Standard Base Core Specification for IA32 4.1 Linux Standard Base Core Specification for IA32 4.1 ISO/IEC 23360 Part 2:2010(E) Copyright © 2010 Linux Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.1; with no Invariant Sections, with no Front-Cover Texts, and with no Back- Cover Texts. A copy of the license is included in the section entitled "GNU Free Documentation License". Portions of the text may be copyrighted by the following parties: • The Regents of the University of California • Free Software Foundation • Ian F. Darwin • Paul Vixie • BSDI (now Wind River) • Andrew G Morgan • Jean-loup Gailly and Mark Adler • Massachusetts Institute of Technology • Apple Inc. • Easy Software Products • artofcode LLC • Till Kamppeter • Manfred Wassman • Python Software Foundation These excerpts are being used in accordance with their respective licenses. Linux is the registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the U.S. and other countries. UNIX is a registered trademark of The Open Group. LSB is a trademark of the Linux Foundation in the United States and other countries. AMD is a trademark of Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. Intel and Itanium are registered trademarks and Intel386 is a trademark of Intel Corporation. PowerPC is a registered trademark and PowerPC Architecture is a trademark of the IBM Corporation. S/390 is a registered trademark of the IBM Corporation. OpenGL is a registered trademark of Silicon Graphics, Inc. ISO/IEC 23360 Part 2:2010(E) -
Integrity Checking for Process Hardening
Integrity Checking For Process Hardening by Kyung-suk Lhee B.A. Korea University, 1991 Graduate Diploma, Griffith University, 1993 M.A. Boston University, 1995 DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer and Information Science in the Graduate School of Syracuse University May 2005 Advisor: Professor Steve J. Chapin Abstract Computer intrusions can occur in various ways. Many of them occur by exploiting program flaws and system configuration errors. Existing solutions that detects specific kinds of flaws are substantially different from each other, so aggregate use of them may be incompatible and require substantial changes in the current system and computing practice. Intrusion detection systems may not be the answer either, because they are inherently inaccurate and susceptible to false positives/negatives. This dissertation presents a taxonomy of security flaws that classifies program vulnerabilities into finite number of error categories, and presents a security mechanism that can produce accurate solutions for many of these error categories in a modular fashion. To be accurate, a solution should closely match the characteristic of the target error category. To ensure this, we focus only on error categories whose characteristics can be defined in terms of a violation of process integrity. The thesis of this work is that the proposed approach produces accurate solutions for many error categories. To prove the accuracy of produced solutions, we define the process integrity checking approach and analyze its properties. To prove that this approach can cover many error categories, we develop a classification of program security flaws and find error characteristics (in terms of a process integrity) from many of these categories. -
Linux Standard Base Core Specification 2.0.1
Linux Standard Base Core Specification 2.0 .1 Linux Standard Base Core Specification 2.0 .1 Copyright © 2004 Free Standards Group Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.1; with no Invariant Sections, with no Front-Cover Texts, and with no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the license is included in the section entitled "GNU Free Documentation License". Portions of the text are copyrighted by the following parties: • The Regents of the University of California • Free Software Foundation • Ian F. Darwin • Paul Vixie • BSDI (now Wind River) • Andrew G Morgan • Jean-loup Gailly and Mark Adler • Massachusetts Institute of Technology These excerpts are being used in accordance with their respective licenses. Linux is a trademark of Linus Torvalds. UNIX a registered trademark of the Open Group in the United States and other countries. LSB is a trademark of the Free Standards Group in the USA and other countries. AMD is a trademark of Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. Intel and Itanium are registered trademarks and Intel386 is a trademarks of Intel Corporation. OpenGL is a registered trademark of Silicon Graphics, Inc. Specification Introduction Specification Introduction Table of Contents Foreword .......................................................................................................................................................................i Introduction ...............................................................................................................................................................