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Home , Beiyang Fleet, Chinese cruiser Hai Chi, Cohong, Denis Twitchett, Eastern Zhou, Far West (Taixi)

THE INFLUENCE OF HISTORY ON MODERN CHINESE STRATEGIC THINKING

By

S. Elizabeth Speed, Ph.D.

106 - 1386 West 73rd Avenue, Vancouver, B.C., V6P 3E8.

February '5'&5''&&

PWGSC Contract Number: WW7714-15-6105

Contract Scientific Authority: Ben Lombardi – Strategic Analyst

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1 Note to Readers

This paper represents the first section of what was supposed to be a much larger study to examine the influence that history has on modern Chinese strategic thinking, including contemporary force development considerations. Unfortunately, the author, Elizabeth Speed, was unable to complete the project due to health concerns. Rather than toss aside the useful analysis that was already prepared when she had to withdraw, the decision was taken to publish the portion of the project that was completed.

The focus of this project was always very ambitious. With a of nearly three millennia, any attempt to derive “lessons” from such a record would be extremely difficult. As Dr. Speed indicates in this paper, it would also likely fail. Nevertheless, it is probable that the enormity of ’s national history is why so many people have resorted to cherry-picking that record. At no time is this more evident than in our own age when, as China regains a leading position in global affairs, observers are actively endeavouring to understand what this might mean for the future. What can that country’s past tell us – many of whom are not Sinologists – about its likely actions in the future? It is a truism to assert that history influences the current generation of Chinese leaders. The questions are how and to what degree. Identification of analogous situations – linking past and present – can often be useful but they come with a caveat to those who would rely upon them. Analogies should not be viewed as decisive for any understanding of the contemporary behaviour of countries, particularly those (like China) with such a vast well of history to draw from. And, after all, we cannot be certain that the analogies we identify are the same ones that Chinese leaders would deem most relevant.

We know, of course, that history forms the envelope in which regimes exist and leaders make policy. Awareness of that national history should, therefore, inform our analysis. In the Introduction, Dr. Speed explains her approach to the study of China and China’s interactions with the world-at-large, subjects to which she has devoted a great deal of study. She notes that only by seeking “a broad understanding of China’s long history” can we in the West make sense of what we sometimes are inclined these days to see as “unscrupulous, hyper-sensitive, incomprehensible or just plain wrong” policies by the country’s current regime. The pursuit of insights (not lessons) derived from the sort of deeply-rooted expertise that Dr. Speed advocates is very likely the best means of achieving that. This paper should be read in light of that perspective. It is narrative rather than conceptual, but in adopting this approach it tells a story of China’s past up to the establishment of the current regime in 1949 that might help us better understand how today views its place in the world.

- Ben Lombardi

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Note to Readers ……………………………………………………………………….. 2

Introduction …………………………………………………………………………... 4

The Historical Narrative ……………………………………………………………… 10

Chapter One:

Shang through (1570 BCE - 220 CE) ………………………………… 13

Chapter Two:

Three Kingdoms through Northern (221 - 1127) ………………… 22

Chapter Three:

Southern Song through Early Ming (1127-1435) ………………………… 28

Chapter Four:

Middle Ming to the Founding of the Peoples' Republic (1435-1949) … 40

Meanings ………………………………………………………………………………… 61

Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………….. 63

3 Introduction

China is at the heart of any contemporary Asian security assessment. It is frequently portrayed as the most likely potential or actual threat to regional security and the only state which has both the purported capacity and interest in altering the still US- dominated global security structure. For decades now, China has devoted considerable attention and resources to the development of modern naval weapon systems and platforms with greater reach, fourth generation fighters with advanced air and land attack weapons, and ballistic missiles capable of targeting throughout Asia (and North America), as well as a medium-range missile - the DF21D - which purportedly can hit an aircraft carrier at sea (or at least an immovable target such as Guam). China previously adopted an offshore defence strategy which has taken on new meaning. No longer is China content to put at risk those forces operating on, under and over regional seas, but is seeking to deny others - notably the United States - from deploying its forces with impunity throughout the Western Pacific.

This begs four key questions: (1) What does China really want? (2) Does China pose a direct or indirect challenge to the Western-based international order? (3) Will its continuing so-called "peaceful rise" (Zhongguo heping juiqi) indeed be peaceful or will its quest for security and apparent within Asia produce the kind of chaos and violence experienced with Germany in the first half of the twentieth century? (4) Is China set to become the predominant power in Asia and beyond or is it simply seeking to defend itself against intrusive powers - much as it has done for the past 150 years - within what China regards as its traditional sphere of influence? This paper cannot begin to answer these questions, but it can hopefully provide a framework for future research on the historical origins of many of China's fundamental strategic concerns - some real, some fictitious, the latter reflecting generations of "patriotic education" taught at all levels of the Chinese educational system.

In broad terms, the modernization drive and accompanying reforms launched by paramount leader Xiaoping in 1979 produced one of the most remarkable economic transformations in history. Since the early 1990s, the Chinese government has sought to develop "comprehensive national power" (zhonghe guoli) such that the other great powers and neighbouring states will refrain form implementing any major policy contrary to China's declared interests. China's ongoing military modernization and offshore strategy have been designed to ensure Chinese access to and influence (if not control) over regional seas. China has thus re-emerged as a key great power and poses the only viable alternative to the US global pre-eminence at least through the medium term. China's self-professed "peaceful rise" has enormous potential repercussions for international economic and security relations. However, the trajectory for international economic and security development could be altered by its still problematical internal situation (socio-economic, political, environmental, etc.) and whether it will remain a "peaceful rise" depends to a large extent on how Sino-US relations are managed in the future.

It is thus timely to consider China's role within the international system in more broadly historical terms. Despite more than 400 years of Western engagement with China, in broad terms the West's understanding of China still appears to be muddled and frequently wrong. Conceptions of China quite naturally focus on recent events - those

4 since China took off economically and/or events both before and since the Communist victory in 1949. Moreover, and given China's long history, and given the tendency of Chinese leaders to use aspects of that history to explain or defend China's positions or various issues with others, China's history has been used and distorted for political ends. Analysts have been equally guilty of using history to bolster some generalization about Chinese behaviour for similar ends. In both these cases it could be said that Chinese history has and continues to be used instrumentally.

All too often, the contemporary conception of China is based on a misreading and/or use of history - where events are "cherry-picked" to reveal some purported cultural truth or historical precedents with application to the current period. China's written record goes back at least two and a half millennia, and there is an abundance of events and historical material. Indeed, there is so much history available that almost any generalization can have some evidential basis. However, most generalizations appear to be derived from the late Ming and dynastic periods which witnessed direct contacts between Western states and China and the resulting imperial clashes culminating in the so-called "century of humiliation" (hainian guochi) which commenced in the mid- nineteenth century. There is, in short, a tendency to apply perspectives derived from more recent history (i.e., the late Qing and post-Imperial periods) to prior events as if China was part of some long historical continuum or of a recurrent pattern.

Such generalizations have led to the traditional conception of China as a continentally-focused largely self-sufficient and inward looking state which shunned trade and foreign contacts, refused to modernize when confronted with Western power and frequently turned its back to the sea and rarely considered the development and maintenance of a naval force to be of even peripheral importance to national security. Within such a conception, the current period of China's ongoing military and especially naval modernization could be viewed as indicating a marked break with the past, which is, in fact, not true. Similarly, the current fascination with the Chinese economy has also overlooked the simple fact that China, or at least portions of it, for centuries represented the world's leading economy, albeit despite strict prohibitions against trade.

An appropriate historical context of China's trade, diplomatic and military practices will glean what is unprecedented about the contemporary period and what reflects longstanding Chinese government responses to the material conditions that successive regimes confronted. This paper will remind us of what is truly unprecedented about contemporary China and what is not. It will also hopefully show the enormous diversity of China's historical experiences as a leading economic, political and military power. It will argue that throughout China's diverse history, successive Chinese states and national governments have responded to the material conditions they have confronted. It was, and is, a question of ranking priorities that required a military response.

What will also become apparent is that Chinese states did not always act in their best material interests. Cultural/philosophical influences sometimes predominated over the advice of generals and other advisers and court officials, all of whom may have been in competition with each other. In particular, the influence of Confucian scholars and ideas frequently held sway at court. This was especially so if an was young or particularly pious, or at times of great strife in the countryside. The Chinese government or state, revolving around an emperor, was never an amorphous unified whole, and different factors - political or philosophical - expressed their views and/or vied for control.

5 At times, the generals or advisors were in ascendancy; at others, Confucian scholars predominated. These and other issues will emerge during the narrative to follow, demonstrating that China, as per Dynastic Chronology almost any country at any time, could and has acted contrary to its (roughly 1570-1046 BCE) own acknowledged interests. Zhou (roughly 1045-256 BCE) The purpose of this paper x (1045-771) is to identify the influence of x (770-256) aspects of the country’s long x (770-476) x (475 to 221) history on contemporary Chinese strategic thinking. Any focus (221 to 207 BCE) limited to the period during and Han (206 BCE-220 CE) since the "century of humiliation" x Former (or Western) Han ( 206 BCE-24 CE) or even to the 400-odd years of x Xin (9-24) direct Western contact risks x Later (or Eastern) Han (25 to 220) misunderstanding the deeper roots of what is truly Chinese strategic (221 to 265 CE) x (221 to 265) culture, trade, diplomacy and x Han (221 to 263) military organization. It is, to my x (222 to 280) mind, how the Chinese interacted in the past amongst themselves - (265-420) the distant and more recent past - x Western Jin (265 to 316) often in the form of very bloody x Eastern Jin (317 to 420) civil and inter-state wars - and how x "" (304-439) they viewed, traded with and often Northern-Southern (420-589) absorbed each other and their (581-618) neighbours, where one will find statements or actions resonant Tang (618-907) with the calamitous events of the Five and Ten Kingdoms (907-960) twentieth century. Song (960-1279) The Chinese claim to have x Northern Song (960-1127) five thousand years of continuous x Southern Song (1127-1279) x Liao (916-1125) civilization, at least through the x Xixia (990-1127) dynastic record. The continuous x Jin (1115-1234) can be debated, but certainly the can claim that record Yuan (1279-1368) having peacefully or otherwise Ming (1368-1644) absorbed neighbouring or indigenous kingdoms. At the very Qing (1644-1911) least there are two and a half Republic of China (1912-1949) millennia of recorded history, plus People’s Republic of China (1949-present) an equal time span which dissolves into the , , written fragments, other archaeological evidence in China and elsewhere, and oral and written legends familiar to many contemporary Chinese. The complexity of this situation is such that defining the scope and approach to an assessment of the role of "history" in Chinese thinking is fraught with many potential pitfalls.

6 It is always important to note that history is always subjective,1 and nowhere more so than in China. Successive dynastic scholars - hundreds, perhaps thousands of them, produced the dynastic histories of the previous losers. It cannot be believed that inherent biases did not creep in. I, myself, cannot be completely bias-free, being much more interested in nautical pursuits, but every effort has been made to be as objective as possible, and when not possible, to note it accordingly

It is also important to note that China has taken on many forms over the past two and a half millennia. What we now know as China exists because of the imperial expansion of the alien Qing in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The comprised only a small portion of eastern China south of the Yellow , and even the first unification of China under Qin Shihuangdi in 221 BCE only essentially unified China in the grain belt between the Yellow, Huai and parts of the Yangzi River valleys (i.e., the Central Plain). By the turn of the millennia (1,000 CE), Han and Tang China had expanded south, east and west, absorbing or destroying indigenous peoples as they went (for instance the Bai , or Hundred Yue, an austronesian-speaking people who had lived in the region between , and for at least a millennia). As the narrative unfolds, maps will demonstrate this Han Chinese expansion as well as the peripheral or "" people beyond Han control.

At various times, these peripheral peoples included groups as varied as the Tibetans, , Uighurs, Tanguts, Turks, , Yue, , Manchurians, Annamese and Chams. Some were established kingdoms, while others were at least semi-sedentary, depending on the climate and their means of livelihood, but many were horse-bound grazers living in and beyond the deserts of the north and west. Challenges to Han Chinese centrality came from most at one point or another, as did Chinese military campaigns to eradicate them. Problems often revolved around trading privileges.

In terms of Han Chinese centrality, it was frequently contested. Indeed, during the Song period (960-1279), the dynasty simultaneously paid tribute to two alien dynasties occupying large tracts of northern China: the Tangut Xixia (990-1127) and the Qidan Liao (907-1125), the latter ultimately replaced by the Tungusic Ruzhen (Jurchen) (1115-1234). When finally driven south of the Yangzi, the Southern Song continued this practice and was little more than a rump state on the southeast coast by the time the Mongols took to the sea. At many other points in history, China effectively ceased to exist as a state entity, being divided among upwards of fifteen kingdoms, some of surprising durability: the "Sixteen Kingdoms" period (304-439 CE); the Northern and Southern period (420-589 CE); and the period known as the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms (907-960 CE). What is important to note is that while China ceased to exist as a unified entity, multiple Chinas did, some following traditional Han Chinese precepts; others alien in form, rejecting the or adopting Chinese modes to increase their legitimacy.

Despite the disunity and bloodshed, China's continuous civilization may be true only to the extent that Han Chinese rulers, large or small, felt themselves to be part of a

1 History is written by individuals, or groups of individuals, often years after an event and perhaps with biases formed, however unintentionally, from their later age. As Benedetto Croce once said, "All history is contemporary history." AZ Quotes at http://www.azquotes.com/author/28922-Benedetto_Croce [accessed 2 November 2016].

7 collective culture, with the language, customs, protocols and learning that went with it. The fact that the four classics exist to the extent they do - the teachings of , and Mencius2 - not to mention the military classics of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States period3, is testimony to a collective sense of self as Han.

China's relations with the steppe tribes will figure prominently, if for no other reason than that it is among these groups that two came to rule all of China - the Mongols and Manchurians. Border security went hand in hand with border expansion, as subsequent sections will demonstrate. China's wall building was not always defensive in nature and security can be defined in many ways. There is no doubt that for long periods China was continentally-focused, given the host of threats and opportunities it faced beyond the Gate and beyond the Ordos (the great fertile loop of the ), but it also faced threats and opportunities along its maritime frontiers. Despite state prohibitions, the south-east coast of China - the land south of the Yangzi - was the engine of the Chinese economy. It is there that the rice, , and were produced - all goods essential in northern capitals. They were also highly desirable as trade goods. In many respects, it was the south that permitted the north to wage its wars. These issues - north-south, maritime-continental - will form an important element of the narrative and will be discussed in the following chapters.

This paper will attempt to provide a broad, historical narrative, highlighting both positive and negative developments, mostly at the strategic level, but in particular what could be termed crisis points at which China's leaders made critical and lasting decisions for themselves and for their peoples. Historians may complain that this is not historiographically accurate or legitimate while political scientists will search in vain for the grand theoretical statement. Both will be disappointed. To the extent possible as well, the maritime, coastal peoples - frequently lost in the broader continental, inward- looking narrative - will be given voice. Times change and interests change, but fishing, trading (and smuggling) endure.

The importance of China's use of history can be no more clearly seen in the status of and its claims to virtually all of the . China's sense of security is also reflected in its offshore naval strategy and its gradually building the capabilities to enforce it. This and other events harkens back to the "Century of Humiliation."

There is also now a burgeoning literature, both in Chinese and English re- introducing terms not heard in generations. The very naming of Confucian Institutes as Confucian Institutes at universities around the world could not be imagined even twenty years ago (and surely Mao is spinning in his mausoleum in Tiananmen Square). In terms of the literature itself, references to the four classics and the have seen a revival as has the concept of "All under Heaven," a philosophical alternative to the anarchy inherent in the current states system. Tianxia, in its

2 The four great masterworks - the four great classics - are Dejing (Laozi); the of ; the (Confucius); and Dao Deqing, the writings of . All wrote between the sixth and fifth centuries BCE. The best new translation of all four in one book is by David Hinton, trans. The Four (Berkeley CA: Counterpoint, 2013). 3 The military classics written during these periods were: (Taigong), Six Secret Teachings; The Methods of ; Sunzi, ; Wu , ; the writings of Wei Liaozi; Three Strategies of Shigong; and Questions and Replies between Tang Taicong and Weigong. See, Ralph D. Sawyer, trans. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1993).

8 metaphysical/ philosophical form is benign, but if in a more realist/legalist conception it may point to a China clearly seeking a form of predominance in the world. Putting all of these ideas together - the revival of the classics, Tianxia, personal insecurity within the leadership group, China's expansive territorial claims and other issues may give insights into how China's leaders are thinking and how they may act in the future.

This study is not, and does not make any claim to be, conclusive. More work – research and analysis – needs to be done. After readers finish this paper, to continue the story that is begun here they might look about for some discussion of Chinese strategic thinking since Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” (gaige ) which began in 1979. That is, however, for another study and alongside the existing literature would be a very useful one. Ultimately, we are seeking to understand China’s historical experiences to provide us with insights into that country’s international behaviour today. Only a broad understanding of China's long history will enable us to make sense of what may in the West appear unscrupulous, hyper-sensitive, incomprehensible or just plain wrong. This paper will hopefully help dispel some of these misperceptions.

9

The Historical Narrative

Empires wax and wane; states cleave asunder and coalesce.

[First line of the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, possibly written by the playwright in the fourteenth century.]

10 Many Chinese like to claim that China is a peace-loving country, and emphasize China's victimhood first during the so-called "century of humiliation" (1842-1949) as well as at the hands of the Japanese (1931-1945).4 All of this may be true, but it is hard to find an example of empire building anywhere in the world that did not involve warfare, forced assimilation and outright murder and bloodshed. China's current borders reflect more than two thousand years of empire building. China's current emphasis on its victimhood belies the humiliations they inflicted on their indigenous populations and their neighbours. In the creation of empire, the Chinese were no less ruthless than the Romans, the Europeans or the Japanese, among others.5

The Chinese people also know that China is a great power and that, at various times, it was the greatest power in the world. Through all forms of media, most notably long-running television programs, Chinese get to see palace intrigues of various dynasties, sages from the past, ancient legends and great rulers. It is hard to square victimhood with greatness, but the Chinese try.

As the noted historian Gungwu rightly points out, this is not China's first rise to great power status. Using a culturalist approach, he believes it is China's fourth rise. In addition to the current period, he describes three: the Qin-Han unification (3rd century BCE-3rd century CE) which produced the first bureaucratic empire: the Sui-Tang reunification (6th-10th centuries CE) which greatly expanded the empire in the west and north, welcomed foreign influences (including the ascendancy of ) and produced a cultural effervescence; and the Ming-Qing period (notably the 15th-18th centuries) when the Confucian traditions was reconstructed and reinforced as a new orthodoxy, the concentration on physical defences and the restoration of the great institutions of the Han and Tang.6

A more strategic periodization would look somewhat different. I propose to divide Chinese history into four periods. The first deals with the period between the and the end of the , roughly 1570 BCE to 220 CE. It was during this period that the bureaucratic administrative structure began to take shape, the frequent wars among many states - Han and non-Han alike - ultimately led to the unification of the Chinese heartland under the , and the Han began a rapid expansion down the Chinese coast essentially eliminating the indigenous Yue peoples. The second period, from the Three Kingdoms period through the Northern Song (roughly 220 to 1127 CE), marks a period of almost utter preoccupation with the security of China's northern frontiers, including a major expansion of Chinese under the Sui and Tang dynasties, but also periodic openness to trade and foreign influences, particularly under the . The third period, from the Southern Song to the early Ming (roughly 1127 to 1435) marks the highpoint of maritime activity in Chinese history. Although dismissed by some historians as an aberration, Chinese seafaring, including the great voyages of He, and maritime technology exceeded that of any other nation in the world at that time, and although tightly controlled, foreign trade flourished. The final period, from the middle Ming through the founding of the People's Republic of China

4 In 1995, in commemoration of events related to the Second World War, three monumental museums were constructed or significantly expanded - in , Beijing and - commemorating the 1937 Nanjing Massacre, the 1937 Bridge Incident and the 1931 Japanese invasion of respectively. 5 Warren I. Cohen, "China's Rise in Historical Perspective," The Journal of Strategic Studies 30:4-5 (August- October 2007), 683. 6 , "The Fourth Rise of China: Cultural Implications," China: An International Journal 2:2 (September 2004), 311-317.

11 (roughly 1435-1949), marks the period of extensive and violent contact with the West and Japan. It also marks, under the in the eighteenth century the extension of China's borders to what we would recognize today. It was a period of both strength and ultimate weakness, rigidity and pragmatism. Ultimately, the Qing could not control the forces at play within China and abroad and the dynasty collapsed. The Republicans fared little better and eventually the Communists gained control of China, with the exception of and a few tiny offshore islands.

12

Chapter One

Shang through Han (1570 BCE - 220 CE)

This period marks the emergence of written records in China: first the Oracle Bones of the Shang (1570-1045 BCE) and the often magnificent bronzes of the Western Zhou (1045-771 BCE). Oracle inscriptions have been found only for the last nine Shang kings, essentially marking the Figure 1: Shang Dynasty start of recorded history somewhere around the end of the eleventh century BCE.7 From a strategic perspective, what is notable about the Shang was the extent of its influence and periodic presence far from its core area at Xiaotun, located near the Huan River near . (See Figure 1.8) Shang influence extended well into , and , reflecting the need to build alliances and periodically fight its enemies at distances from its heartland. Gradually, however, the Shang was hemmed in by former dependencies and allies. One of those - the Zhou - defeated and supplanted the Shang at the in 1045 BCE.9 Also important for China's future was the establishment of a patrimonial system of succession, elaborate rituals associated with royal ancestors, and the use of a pictographic script so important to state administration.

7 The Shang period provides some of the earliest evidence of Chinese knowledge of or interest in nautics. The Oracle Bones contain references to boats and the character meaning "to caulk the seams of the boat." In addition, a inscription from the tenth century BCE mentions the word hai (ᾏ) in its meaning as the "sea." Moreover, cowrie shells, from south of the Yangzi estuary, were used as a medium of exchange. G.R.G. Worcester, Sail and Sweep in China (: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1996), 2-3; , and Civilisation in China, Vol. 1, Introductory Orientations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), 83-84; Angela Schottenhammer, "The "China Seas" in World History: A General Outline of the Role of Chinese and East Asian Maritime Space from its Origins to c. 1800," Journal of Marine and Island Cultures Vol. 1 (2012), 67. During this period, the indigenous Yue peoples occupied the coastal areas of southeast China. Archaeological evidence indicates that Yue boat technology included use of primitive sales, rudders and outriggers. William Meacham, "Origins and Development of Yüeh Coastal : A Microcosm of Cultural Change on the Mainland of East Asia," in , ed., The Origin of Chinese Civilization (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), 153-155. 8 “Map of Shang Dynasty” by Yu Ninjie [accessed on 22 February 2017 at https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=333887]. 9 A very interesting discussion of the Shang can be found at David N. Keightley, "The Shang: China's First Historical Dynasty," in and Edward L. Shaughnessy, eds., The Cambridge History of Ancient China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 232-291.

13 In many respects, the replacement of the Shang by the Western Zhou was a pretty limited affair. At the height of both dynasties' influence, geographically they were limited to a small portion of the Central Plain along the Yellow River valley, and including alliance relationships with states to the east, including the , and to the south bank of the Yangzi River. Both dynasties had influence far out of proportion to their rather limited geographic size. It is also important to note that what is now north China was populated by a wide variety of small states and tribes, both nomadic and sedentary. It was a fluid period, ethnically, culturally and geographically.10

The Western Zhou's importance lies in its establishment of the canons of governmental propriety, poetic expression and, after some debate, Figure 2: Western Zhou recognition that the "" was given to the king rather than the Zhou people.11 Strategically, the Western Zhou, having defeated the Shang and thus with a greatly enlarged territory requiring extended defence, are notable for their establishment of , led by royal members, at strategic points east of the Zhou heartland adjacent to the Jing and Wei , of the Yellow River. (See Figure 2.12) Fanning out along the two main geographic of north China - the Yellow River and the Taihang Mountains - these military colonies were established at strategic points with Chengzhou (present-day ) serving as the east capital.13 As the generations passed, however, these colonies became progressively autonomous, multiethnic and multicultural.

It was also during this time that the nomadic peoples of the north began their periodic raids which were to occupy the military forces of the Western Zhou and succeeding dynasties for centuries.14 However, most Zhou colonies, now virtually autonomous states, progressively became less and less willing to come to the defence of the dynasty. The last Western Zhou leader, King You, was killed in 771 BCE by a joint force of former vassal states and a non-Zhou tribe, the Rong. Ultimately, You's son, King , moved the court to Chengzhou where it survived as the Eastern Zhou until 256 BCE as nominal head of the Zhou states.

10 See, for instance, Nicola Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 44-69. 11 For an interesting overview of the Western Zhou, see Edward L. Shaughnessy, "Western Zhou History," in Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy, eds., The Cambridge History of Ancient China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 292-351. 12 “Map of Western Zhou” by Yu Ninjie [accessed on 22 February 2017 at https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/ index.php?curid=353812 ]. 13 Shaughnessy, "Western Zhou History," 311-313. 14 Needham, Introductory Orientations, 90-91.

14 The Spring and Autumn Period (770-481 BCE) was highly significant. In the words of Cho-yun Hsu:

It covers the transition from a Zhou feudal system to a multistate system; from the expansion of the Zhou into the Yellow River drainage to the ancient China that spanned the Yellow and Yangzi Rivers and the highlands to the north and west; from an economy based on manorial management to a market economy; and from a family-based society to one based upon great social mobility. The most significant development of this period was a major breakthrough in the intellectual sphere, in which the moral values of Confucius provided an innovative reinterpretation of feudal ethics.15

Over the course of the Spring and Autumn period, smaller states were Figure 3: Spring and Autumn Period absorbed by their larger neighbours. Eventually there were fifteen states, three of which - , Wu and Yue - were non-Zhou (non- or non-Han Chinese).16 Most non-Zhou tribal groups, including the Yi, Rong and Di, lived in the open spaces between Zhou vassal states in today's , Shanxi, and Shandong provinces, were gradually absorbed into larger Zhou states.17 By the sixth century BCE, ancient China was dominated by four major powers - Jin, Chu, Qi and Qin - each with a sphere of domination while the status of the Zhou king diminished further. By the beginning of the fifth century, however, structural changes occurred when Wu defeated Chu, bringing it to the edge of collapse, but then Yue defeated Wu in 473 BCE.18 Yue temporarily became the strongest power of the time, but instead of completing the destruction of the weakened Chu, Yue turned its attention northward against the lesser states of what is now Shandong province, including the state of Song.19 By the end of

15 Cho-yun Hsu, "The Spring and Autumn Period," in Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy, eds., The Cambridge History of Ancient China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 545. This period also saw the formation of the Daoist school, as embodied by the writings of Laozi. 16 Chu, regarded as part of the Man tribal group, was located in the middle Yangzi River valley, while Wu and Yue were located near the mouth of the Yangzi River in modern-day Zhejiang Province. 17 Hsu, "Spring and Autumn," 549-550. "Gradually absorbed" did not necessarily mean that this process was peaceful, as it frequently was not. 18 King Gou of Yue had been captured earlier by Wu. After his release, legend has it that he "slept on brambles and tasted gall bladder juice" so as never to forget the shame of his captivity and servitude in Wu. After ten years or marshalling Yue strength, he attacked Wu and ultimately defeated it. Eric Henry, "The Submerged History of the Yue," Sino-Platonic Papers No. 176 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, May 2007), 1. 19 The earliest recorded sea trade between north and south China dates from the sixth and fifth centuries BCE, when the state of Qi (in Hebei and Shandong provinces), traded bronze, and silk with Wu and Yue. As a result of this trade, all three states became prosperous and more powerful. Wang Gungwu, "The Nanhai Trade: A Study of the Early History of the China Trade in the South China Sea," Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 32: Part 2 (June 1959), 3-4. In addition to trade, sea-based military activity was frequent with close to twenty-five naval or amphibious operations known to have taken

15 this period, the multistate system was firmly entrenched and conflict within and among those states was endemic. (See Figure 3.20)

And thus the Warring States (Zhan ) period (475-221 BCE) had begun. 21 By the end of the fifth century, there were seven major states22 - , , Wei, Qi, Qin, Han and Chu23 - and seven lesser states who were either Figure 4: Warring States Period absorbed/defeated by their larger neighbours or served the role of a buffer between them. (See Figure 4.24) Throughout, the period was characterized by diplomatic manoeuvring and periodic but large- scale, violent military clashes and campaigns. The non-Hua peoples were caught in the middle of this conflagration, being sometimes allies, sometimes buffers, and often the victims of the aggressive expansion of the Zhou states, particularly Qin.25

Following protracted civil war, Jin broke into three successor states in 403 BCE - Wei, Zhao and Han. Initially, the three acted in common and expanded in all directions. Under General , Wei pushed Qin back to a defensive line on the and occupied the Xihe region to the west of the great loop of the Yellow River. However, fearful of Wei's increasing power and having gained little from the years of territorial expansion, Zhao established a new walled capital at and launched an offensive against , situated to Zhao's southeast, in 383. Wey sought help from Wei, which attacked Zhao's place between 549 and 476 BCE. The most important of these was Yue's invasion of Wu in 482. Lincoln Paine, The Sea and Civilization: A Maritime History of the World (New York: Vintage Books/Random House, 2015), 173. 20 “Map of Spring and Autumn Period” by Yu Ninjie [accessed on 22 February 2017 at CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=353825]. 21 For a comprehensive history of the Warring States period, see Mark Edward Lewis, "Warring States Political History," in Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy, eds., The Cambridge History of Ancient China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 587-650. 22 Eric Henry would argue instead that there were eight major states, that the state of Yue, centred on northern Zhejiang, was active throughout this period, posing a continuous threat to Chu and was even worrisome to Qin. It was the second to last state to be overrun by Qin; only Qi survived longer. After the conquest, Yue elements broke away and set up a quasi-state in the Shanyin area; and in 221, Qin armies were sent south to subdue Yue kingdoms in what is now southern Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong and , but failed. Henry, "Submerged History," 15-16. 23 Jin, previously the most powerful state at the end of the Spring and Autumn period broke up into three states in 403 BCE - Wei, Zhao and Han. 24 “Map of Warring States of China” by Philg88 - Own work, [accessed on 23 February 2017 at CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=11900403]. 25 Di Cosmo, Ancient China and its Enemies, 101-116. Qin expanded primarily at the expense of non-Hua peoples. To the north, it engaged in a series of wars against the Rong whom it gradually subjugated. More significantly, in 441 BCE Qin began its southwestward expansion into Shu and , in modern . This fertile region became a major source of Qin economic and military power, and it proved a crucial base for launching expeditions against Chu. This conquest was to require most of a century, and Qin played no major role in the inter-state politics until the 360s BCE. Lewis, "Warring States," 616-617.

16 western frontier. Zhao then sought help from Chu, which in 380 used the diversion of Wei's incursion into Zhao to reoccupy up to the Yellow River. Zhao then used the diversion provided by Chu to counterattack and occupy much of Wei territory. As such, there emerged the interplay of alliances in which each sided with whatever ally proved useful.26

The decade following 380 witnessed an increase in the pace and scale of warfare among the newly hostile Jin successor states and a resurgent Chu, but then in 366 Qin achieved a major victory over the combined armies of Han and Wei. Up to this point, Qin had been a minor player, suffering repeated defeats at the hands of Wei and losing its territory along the Yellow River. It had compensated for this in part by occupying non-Hua territory. Reforms initiated in 384 BCE had by 366 contributed to the victory over Han and Wei, followed by a decisive defeat of Wei in 364. Wei was only saved by the intervention of Zhao, but in 362 Qin again defeated Wei armies, captured its chief minister and returned in force to the region east of the loop of the Yellow River.

By the middle of the fourth century BCE, all of the leading states had, or were in the midst of introducing, important reforms, and all but a handful of lesser states had been destroyed. This process culminated in the assumption of the royal title of wang (king) by all of the rulers of the remaining states in 323.27 Stretched along the Yellow River valley, Qi, Zhao, Han, Wei and Qin dominated the scene, with Chu in the south still a threat and Yan in the northeast emerging as a minor power.28

The defining change of the Warring States was the shift toward reliance on massed infantry.29 This was a gradual shift that emerged during the Spring and Autumn period principally in the struggles that emerged within lineages within a state. As peasants from rural areas were drawn into military service, the command of these new- style warriors became the key to power.30 In 307 BCE, moreover, King Wuling of Zhao pressed for the adoption of and mounted archers, rather than carrying noblemen. This was to be an offensive striking force to be used against neighbouring states as well as the Hu - the term then used for the various nomadic tribes and groups in the north. While the decision to adopt mounted warfare was controversial, the measure was adopted. Di Cosmo has argued that cavalry was not used to repel attacks by nomads, as conventional wisdom asserts, but rather to subdue the nomads and conquer the state of Shan.31

26 Lewis, "Warring States," 617. 27 By this action, power in all the states was thereby concentrated in the person of the ruler and thus essentially rejected the Zhou king's nominal status as the Son of Heaven. 28 Lewis, "Warring States," 619. 29 As a result, the size of armies increased. Before that time, armies never seemed to have exceeded 100,000 men. During the campaigns in the third century, however, armies on all sides exceeded several hundred thousand. This growth was matched by significant increases in the scale of combat, with campaigns often lasting a year or more, rather than previous seasonal limits, and armies divided into independent forces operating at great distances from each other. Lewis, "Warring States," 627-628. 30 Infantry of this period wore armour and helmets made of iron and carried, depending on their function, , bronze swords, halberds, lances or dagger-axes. Lewis, "Warring States," 622 and 624. 31 Part of the objection to cavalry was that it would oblige riders to wear a short jacket rather than the long gown which was obligatory for a man of status. H.G. Creel, "The Role of the Horse in Chinese History," The American Historical Review 70:3 (April 1965), 649-651; Di Cosmo, Ancient China, 134-137. Creel also asserts that during the fourth century, emphasis was laid upon the strategic importance of controlling horses and importing horses from the frontier regions and from the nomadic Hu (656).

17 Similarly, while wall-building for primarily defensive purposes originated during the Spring and Autumn period, the process accelerated during the Warring States period among Hua and non-Hua states alike. These walls initiated a new type of defensive system, possibly as a consequence of the creation of infantry armies whose manoeuvrability required greater control over natural features. The walls also appear to have been strategic aimed at asserting a state's political and military control over a given area.32 In the north, by around the turn of the third century BCE, the states of Qin, Yan and Zhao built a series of walls, not as a defensive measure against nomadic incursion, but as an offensive measure aimed at seizing territory previously occupied by nomadic and semi-sedentary peoples of the Inner Asian steppe.33 As a result of those advances, Chinese states came to border directly on and within territory of the Hu, later known during Han times as the Xiongnu. Thus, the walls Figure 5: Qin Dynasty were built to repel or contain the nomads, but only after these states drove deep into alien lands.

By the mid-fourth century, the most powerful and ambitious state was Wei, controlling the central Yellow River valley and several key transit points. However, a series of several military defeats soon eclipsed Wei power, and the steady rise to dominance of the western state of Qin. (See Figure 5.34) Qin's ascent was opposed successively by Wei, Qi and Zhao, each of which ultimately succumbed. This left Qin totally dominant by the middle of the third century BCE. Even as Qin began to project its power into the Central Plain, in 316 it completed the conquest of its non-Hua neighbours (Shu and Ba) in the southwest. Qi and Chu followed in 279 and 278 respectively as a result of a combined assault by Qin, Han, Zhao and Wei. In 269, Zhao was decisively defeated by two Qin armies, and in 260 it lost its main fighting force, a disaster from which it never recovered. From this point,

32 Di Cosmo, Ancient China, 139. 33 Under the reign of King Zhao-xiang (306-251 BCE), Qin began to build walls on its northwest frontier. After conquering the non-Hua Yichu Jong, Qin also expanded to the north into the territory within the great loop of the Yellow River (the Ordos). In this way Qin acquired three northern commanderies, and then built a wall to guard against the Hu. Qin's defence line thus ran from northeast to southwest, extending from the eastern Ordos to the southern part of . Yan expanded primarily in the northeast and occupied both the region north of the Liaodong Gulf and , including to the west a large part of what is now Hebei province. During the reign of King Zhao (311-279 BCE), Yan launched a surprise attack at the Eastern Hu and then built extended fortifications and five commanderies in order to resist the nomads. The state of Zhao built the northernmost line of walls under King Wu-ling. After the conquest of Zhong Shan in 295 BCE, Zhao continued its drive north, advancing into today's Inner and building a series of fortifications to the north of the loop of the Yellow River where it encircles the Ordos steppe in a wide loop, thus creating the most advanced Chinese fortified front deep into nomadic territory. Di Cosmo, Ancient China, 142-143. 34 “Map of Qin Dynasty” by Yu Ninjie [accessed on 22 February 2017 at CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=305427] .

18 Qin was unchallenged. All that remained was the steady Qin expansion and the sequential destruction of the remaining states between 230 and 221 BCE.

Although frequently portrayed in Chinese texts as semi-barbarian or alien (i.e., non-Hua), archaeological evidence indicates that culturally Qin was one of the Central States throughout much of its history. It was only in the fourth century that Qin pursued a different course after adopting Legalist reforms that broke up the aristocracy and replaced its power with an increasingly deified ruler.35 With the founding of the Qin dynasty (221-207 BCE), Zheng, known to history as Qin Shihuangdi36, established his capital at (near modern 'an) and broke with tradition by choosing not to establish his relatives to oversee the more distant kingdoms on his behalf and instead funnelled all power through himself.

Unification of China was a task that could only be achieved through extreme ruthlessness.37 The chief task of Shihuangdi's reign was to consolidate the empire. He relocated the leading families of the heretofore independent states to the vicinity of his capital. This reportedly involved some 120,000 families and their households, no doubt resulting in massive construction works in and around Xianyang. He also immediately set about extending Chinese control further to the south. In 221 BCE, a great military expedition was sent to conquer the southern peoples of the Yue. The main strength of this riverine force consisted of soldiers based upon war-boats with deck .38 This force bogged down in difficult terrain where it was harassed by an elusive foe and suffered from inadequate supplies. By 214 BCE, Qin controlled sections of the coasts of southern Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi and northern .39 The motive for

35 The Legalist tradition had its origins in Qin, and its formative doctrines are purportedly laid out in the Book of Lord Shang. Legalism placed emphasis on the kind of militaristic values that one would expect an ambitious dictator to hold. It also stressed as compared to other economic activities, as well as the doctrine of mutual responsibility, whereby families and communities police themselves for fear that all would suffer punishment for any crime committed by a member of the group. Ethical and old-fashioned cultural values were attacked, and the rule of law was meant to prevail over Confucian and family values. However, while closely aligned to the Legalist course, a series of inscriptions dated between 219 and 210 BCE tell of Shihaungdi's righteousness, humanity and wisdom. These were explicitly inspired by Confucian tradition, and they balance his martial valour with his concern for the people. Sima : Selections from the Historical Records, trans. by Raymond Dawson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Chapter Five, "The Annals of Qin," 65-72. 36 Ying Zheng was born Prince Zichu in 259 BCE and came to the throne in 246, reigning as king of Qin until he unified China 25 years later. When he reached adulthood in 238 he began to wield power. In 210, while in his fiftieth year, he died suddenly while on tour. In the circumstances, no true account of his life has survived. 37 One event that has remained notorious occurred in 213 BCE - the so-called "burning of the books." The purpose of this destruction was to monopolize learning for the benefit of the court by causing sensitive material to be available only to the Qin court academicians, leaving only works of practical value at the disposal of a wider readership. The imperial library was subsequently burned during the tumult at the end of Qin rule, destroying much of what had survived in 213. 38 Needham, Nautics, 441. During the Qin and Han periods, the regions that lay beyond the Ling mountains and on the eastern seaboard were still relatively unknown to the Chinese. By this time, the Yue comprised two main groups: the of the south, who lived mainly in the area of Guangdong, Guangxi and Vietnam; and the , centred on the in modern Fujian. Yü Ying-shih, “Han Foreign Relations,” in Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe, eds., The Cambridge , Vol. 1, The Ch’in and Han , 221 BC-AD 220 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 451. 39 This was accomplished in part by the construction of a five kilometre canal link across the mountains that joined the southern of the Yangzi and a northern tributary of the Xi (West) River. This facilitated the transport of supplies from the Yangzi south through and via the to modern . Derk Bodde, “The State and Empire of Ch’in,” in Twitchett and Loewe, eds., The Ch’in and Han Empires, 64-65.

19 this southern expansion was primarily economic – the value of the fertile deltas of southeast China and .40 The campaign lasted ten years.

Another important task was wall-building. As discussed previously, the northern states had built walls, some deep inside nomadic lands. The Qin were driven by the logic of this situation to link up these walls, while also destroying interior walls erected during the Warring States period. In 215 BCE, Shihuangdi sent Meng to occupy all territory south of the Yellow River - that is, the loop known as the Ordos, where the nomadic Hu, including the Xiongnu, had their pasturelands. It was at this point that Qin expanded its territory deep into nomadic lands and built new walls and fortified positions to secure its gains and linked up and strengthened the pre-existing Zhao walls to the east. Di Cosmo believes that Meng's expedition drove the Xiongnu out of the Ordos region, thereby creating a shortage of pastureland which upset the balance of power existing in the steppe regions of the north. Figure 6: Han Dynasty Ultimately, and after a violent internal power struggle and civil war that erupted with the fall of Qin, the Xiongnu emerged as a centralized, elite military confederation dominant throughout eastern . They were also able to recover the lands taken by Meng Tian.41

With the death of Shihuangdi in 210 BCE, revolts against Qin rule became widespread, and the dynasty was toppled.42 Bang and his supporters ultimately set up a regime that inherited and largely adopted the institutions by which Qin had ruled. However, unlike the Qin, the stability of the Han dynasty (202 BC-230 CE) rested in part on the relations the emperor maintained with his immediate blood relatives and civil war allies - the kings. (See Figure 6.43) The revolt raised by seven of these in 154 BCE was perhaps the most dangerous moment in Western Han, and suppression of the revolt led to countermeasures to reduce the effective power that any of the kings might wield.44

The first conflict between the Han and Xiongnu occurred in 201-200. It began with a Xiongnu attack on the border city of Maiyi where , a civil war ally of the Emperor Gaozu, was enfeoffed as king. He defected with his troops to the Xiongnu. While still in the process of consolidating his regime, Gaozu could not allow this

40 Wang, “Nanhai Trade,” p. 8; Needham, Introductory Orientations, 101. 41 Di Cosmo, Ancient China, 187. 42 For a discussion of the factors which may have contributed to Qin collapse, see Bodde, “State and Empire,” 85-90. Bodde places greatest weight on the effects of the rapid transition of Qin from state to empire and, consequently, the over-extension of its resources. 43 “Map of Han Dynasty By Ian Kiu - Own work” [accessed on 22 February 2017 at CC BY 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=3082881]. 44 Michael Loewe, The Government of the Qin and Han Empires 221 BCE - 220 CE (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2006), 180.

20 defection to go unpunished, but the campaign was an utter failure, with Chinese forces unfamiliar with the terrain and ways of steppe warfare. It culminated at Pingcheng with Gaozu and his vanguard troops surrounded by the Xiongnu cavalry. After seven days, they were allowed to escape south.45

The establishment of formal relations between the Han and Xiongnu began after Gaozu's defeat. The emperor sent envoys to negotiate peace and establish the hejin ("peace through kinship relations") policy which was, in effect, a policy of . In exchange for ceasing to raid, the Xiongnu received fixed annual payments of silk, wine, grain and other foodstuffs; a Han princess given in marriage to the (the Xiongnu leader); the Xiongnu and Han would be ranked as co-equal states; and the walls would represent the official boundary between the two sides. By raiding or threatening to raid, the chanyu was able to extract further concessions in the form of ever greater payments of gifts (tribute).46

By the time of Emperor Wu (r. 140-87 BCE), China had long recovered from the turbulence of regime consolidation and accommodation with the Xiongnu had re- emerged as a political issue. After two years of intensive debate, in 133 Wudi sided with the war faction and over the next forty years China made an immense effort to destroy the Xiongnu.47 The Han strategy sought to push the frontier back to Qin's borders and in some places beyond them, and to move Han troops into the with the aim of preventing the Xiongnu from linking up with the tribesmen of the Tibetan borderlands and stopping the flow of revenue the Xiongnu received from the city-states of Turkestan. In addition, and most importantly, Wudi mounted huge punitive expeditions aimed at destroying the Xiongnu on the steppe itself. 48 It took ten years before the Han court could claim any significant victories. In 124 BCE Han forces reoccupied the Ordos, Dai and Yan regions, and in 119 an expedition to northern Mongolia inflicted such severe losses on the Xiongnu confederation that it was effectively out of action for roughly a decade. As a result, the Xiongnu were forced to retreat far into the northern steppe and forests, abandoning not only the region south of the Yellow River but also the areas south of the Gobi Desert. In 102, Han forces conquered , putting most of eastern Turkestan under Han control.49

The Han dynasty expanded territorially far beyond the borders held by the Zhou states, but all of these campaigns, including the seizure of northern in 108 BCE, cost the Han heavily in terms of revenue, supplies, men and horses. This made the revenues of maritime trade vitally important. Throughout Wudi’s reign, a succession of campaigns were undertaken to quell Yue rebellions along the southeast coast. Han authority was finally confirmed in 110 BCE. For twenty years before Wudi’s death, the trade of the southern coastal areas was supervised by officials of the central government

45 Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, 221 BC to AD 1757 (Cambridge : Blackwell, 1989), 35-36; Di Cosmo, Ancient China, 190-192. 46 Barfield, Perilous Frontier, 45-48; Di Cosmo, Ancient China, 192-197. 47 For a discussion of this debate and the dramatic shift in policy, see Di Cosmo, Ancient China, 210-217. 48 Barfield, Perilous Frontier, 54. 49 Di Cosmo, Ancient China, 236-247; Yü, "Han Foreign Relations," 383-405, 448-449; and Michael Loewe, "The Campaigns of Han Wu-ti," in Frank A. Kierman and John K. Fairbank, eds., Chinese Ways in Warfare (Cambridge MA: Press, 1974), 67-122.

21 and contributed to imperial revenues. Following his death, a strong reaction against trading led to the abandonment of these measures in 81 BCE.50

Following their defeat in 119 BCE, the Xiongnu requested a resumption of the old peace treaty based on the hejin policy. The Han court informed them that peace was only possible if the chanyu sent a hostage to China, paid homage to the emperor and offered him tribute. The chanyu rejected these demands. It was only in 54 BCE, long after the abandonment of Wudi's aggressive policies, that the Xiongnu finally accepted China's terms. This policy approached remained virtually unchanged until the of (r. 9-23 CE).51

Wang Mang was an imperial in-law who came to control the government and then established his own short-lived . A strict Confucianist, Wang disapproved of the compromises that allowed the Xiongnu to become tributaries without acknowledging Chinese sovereignty. He therefore sought to revise the treaty and redefine bilateral relations more in China's favour. To accomplish this, he demanded changes from the Xiongnu while bribing them lavishly. When the Xiongnu accepted the gifts but rejected the demand, Wang undertook an offensive policy of raising troops and appointing his own chanyu to break the Xiongnu confederation. He shifted his approach roughly every five years to keep the Xiongnu off balance. This policy continued until he was killed by rebels in 23 CE, and China once again slipped into violent civil war.

Upon inaugurating the Later Han, Emperor Guangwu (r. 25-57) faced all but constant raids by the Xiongnu, forcing him to abandon many frontier regions and create a new series of defences. For their part, the Xiongnu simply looted the border and expanded south. However, at the height of their power and with China on the defensive, a succession crisis in 88 CE led to a civil war that left the Xiongnu permanently divided into northern and southern confederations. In 89, the southern chanyu convinced the Han court to launch an expedition against the northern Xiongnu. In that year a Han force, together with Xianbi and Xiongnu nomads, routed the northern Xiongnu and forced its chanyu to flee to the north. Many of his followers simply declared themselves Xianbi. The end result was a fragmented steppe.52

During the Later Han, at least limited trading relations were conducted between China and the countries of the south and west, including and especially the sea trade between Annam and the mouth of the Yangzi.53 The importance of this sea trade increased in importance after 119 CE with the loss of control over the northern route along the Taklamakan Desert. There also existed considerable naval activity along China’s southern coasts. In 43 CE, led a great naval expedition against Annam (northern Vietnam) in a fleet of 2,000 vessels54 With Chinese occupation of Annam, the Han empire became embroiled in the incessant wars between the states of Southeast

50 Han officials were concerned that the increasingly wealthy and influential nobles and merchants, who directed the trade in luxury goods, would endanger the peace and unity of the empire. Often expressed in Confucian terms, officials noted the relative values to the state and society of agriculture and commerce, and extolled the virtues of the "enlightened ruler" – one who despised "jade and " (wealth and excesses). Wang, “Nanhai Trade,” 16-17; Yü, “Han Foreign Relations,” 456. 51 Barfield, Perilous Frontier, 59-60, 62. 52 Ibid, 67-80. 53 Wang, “Nanhai Trade,” 27 & 29. There is archaeological evidence of Former Han pottery in Sumatra, and Borneo. More than likely, this trade had been built up by the Yue during the Warring States period. Needham, Nautics, 442-443. 54 Needham, Nautics, p. 442.

22 Asia, and many naval battles occurred between the Chinese and the Champa people of the kingdom (southern Vietnam).55 Moreover, between 100 and 184 CE, there were no less than seven rebellions in Nanyue which led to Han intervention.

Towards the end of Later Han, continuing pressure by nomadic groups, combined with frequent revolts and disturbances, led to an agrarian crisis and peasant rebellion in 184 CE. In its final decades, the Han dynasty was under the effective rule of General Cao, who tried but failed to maintain the integrity of the empire. The deciding moment came at the battle of the Red Cliffs, fought on the middle Yangzi near modern Wulin in December 208. The battle pitted , with a fleet of river and reportedly 100,000 soldiers, against the combined forces of Quan and Liu - the future rulers of the kingdoms of Wu and respectively. Cao Cao was defeated. A dozen years later, the Han empire collapsed into civil war.

55 J..G. Mills, “Notes on Early Chinese Voyages,” The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Part 1 (April 1951), 5.

23

Chapter Two

Three Kingdoms through Northern Song (221 - 1127)

With the collapse of an effective central government, China was essentially divided into three kingdoms (the San Guo period, 221-280 CE) which were in a condition of permanent hostility with one another. (See 56 Figure 7. ) Wei occupied the north and Figure 7: Three Kingdoms northwest centred on the Yellow River valley; Shu was based in Sichuan and controlled and part of ; and Wu controlled the south and southeast, including the Yangzi delta, Guangdong and Guangxi. Since the southern kingdom of Wu was barred from the approaches to the Central Asian trade routes, its rulers expanded Wu’s maritime enterprises and trade with the south.57 In about 260, the Wu Emperor dispatched an embassy which travelled to the kingdoms of Southeast Asia.58 In light of this and other embassies, the Wu court received frequent tribute missions from the states of Southeast Asia (likewise, the kingdom of Wei maintained relations with Japan and Korea). Perhaps more importantly, Wu encouraged Figure 8: Western Jin sinicization south of the Yangzi, thereby initiating a centuries-long process that paved the way for the massive influx of northern Chinese forced south during the turbulent fifth and sixth centuries.

In the north, Wei attempted to keep the frontier secure by employing a policy of over tribal peoples settled inside its borders, and provided generous subsidies and access to trade for those nomads living beyond them. This relative peace enabled Wei to focus on its neighbouring states. However, in the year following its defeat of Shu, the Wei dynasty was overthrown by one

56 “Map of Three Kingdoms” prepared by Yu Ninjie, [accessed on 22 February 2017 at CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=87881]. 57 Paul Wheatley, “Geographical Notes on Some Commodities Involved in Sung Maritime Trade,” Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 32:Part 2 (June 1959), 19. 58 Hsü Yün-ts’iao, “The Revamping of Ocean-Going Sea Routes Made in the Yuan and Ming Dynasties and Repercussions in Southeast Asian History,” 19:3 (September 1978), 50.

24 of its generals, Sima Yan, who founded the (Western 265-317, Eastern 317- 420).59 (See Figure 8.60) In 280, following its defeat of Wu and Chinese reunification, Jin attempted to disband much of its military. Restless unemployed soldiers linked up with the nomads and the network of Jin princes in the provinces refused to disband their personal armies. Central control began to break down into fratricidal warfare. Rather than support one of the , the Xiongnu revolted in 304 and established their own state. In 311, the Xiongnu captured Luoyang and executed the Jin emperor. In 316, the Xiongnu captured Chang'an and executed another Jin emperor. With this, remnants of the Jin court and much of the elite fled south of the Yangzi and established the Eastern Jin dynasty. In the north, the Xiongnu ruled as the Zhao dynasty and controlled all of northern China with the exception of the state in the northwest and the Xianbi states in the northeast.

Between 304 and 589, the so-called Northern and Southern period, no less than seventeen dynasties contended with each other in the north, marking the first time that foreign peoples founded dynasties in northern China.61 The Zhao state shattered in 349, to be replaced by the Yan state under the leadership of the Mujung Xuanbi tribe. The Mujung never attempted to adopt the Chinese court structure, but did develop a centralized bureaucracy. In 353, the Mujung leader declared himself Figure 9: Northern and Southern Period emperor and spent the next few years putting down small-scale rebellions and bringing eastern China under his control. During this same period, western China was controlled by Qian, an ethnic Tibetan who had served the Zhao court, as the state of Qin. In 370, the Yan collapsed amid an invasion by Qin. In 383, Qin mounted a large campaign against the south, but its defeat led to widespread revolts. In 385, the last Qin king was strangled by the rival Di clan. (See Figure 9.62)

Out of the anarchy following Qin collapse emerged a new power - the Dai. In 396, Tuoba declared himself emperor of the new Wei dynasty. For a foreign dynasty, the Wei proved long-lived.63 Wei gained control of the Central Plain with the capture of Luoyang in 423

59 Needham, Introductory Orientations, p. 112. 60 “Northern and Southern Dynasties in 560 CE” by Ian Kiu - own work, CC BY 3.0 [accessed on 22 February 2017 at https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=2944503]. 61 The longest lasting was (386-535), centred on Shanxi, which came to control all of the north except Shandong. The Northern Wei split into eastern and western parts, each of which was taken over after 550 by Chinese successor states – the and respectively. 62 “Map of Western Jin”, CC BY-SA 3 [accessed on 23 February 2017 at https://commons.wikimedia.org/ w/index.php?curid=4719].1 63 By about 410, Gui controlled virtually all of . Within a generation, breaking the power of subsidiary chieftains, tribesmen became registered subjects and were organized as military units in state

25 and the northern steppe during major campaigns in 425 and 429. In 430, the Wei captured Chang'an, leading to the destruction of the Xia (a short-lived Xiongnu state). The last remaining border state - the Northern Liang - fell in 439, bringing all of north China under Wei control. However, over time the Wei court became increasingly sinicized, and moved the capital to Luoyang, and thus more distant from the frontier. In 528, a tribal leader marched on Luoyang and murdered the entire Wei court. Luoyang was soon deserted and the Wei split into western and eastern components (Zhou and Qi respectively). Eventually, the pushed them back into Manchuria.64

In the south, meanwhile, Jin was replaced by the Liu Song in 420, which, in 479, gave way to three successive dynasties of some forty years duration each. During this unsettled period, an independent southern China lost access to the Central Asian trade routes. As a result, sea-going trade took on heightened importance. Moreover, given the presence of foreign dynasties in the north, there was a steady stream of Chinese migrating to the south, and southern China grew populous and wealthy. This in turn increased the demand for luxury goods which came mainly by sea. With the cessation of Cham raids against Annam by 450,65 a peaceful and profitable trade developed. However, the combination of revolts in Annam (541-548) and a series of wars in the Yangzi valley (548-557) limited the trading opportunities along the China coast.66

In 581, Jian, known Figure 10: Sui Dynasty by his Wendi, usurped the Zhou throne and founded the Sui dynasty (581- 618). (See Figure 10.67) In 589 he simultaneously launched an invasion of the northern Korean kingdom of Kogoryu, on both land and sea, and crossed the Yangzi and destroyed the . With Nanjing’s seizure, he reunified China. Given his northern origins, Wendi looked to the north and viewed the south as a distraction. As such, he tried to restrict maritime commerce by prohibiting the construction of large ships. However, under the second emperor, Yangdi, China began to explore more systematically the lands to the south. In 605, he service. Nomadism was prohibited and the tribesmen were allocated land and forced to settle on it as garrison units. 64 Barfield, Perilous Frontier, chapter 3. 65 For instance, in 431 a Cham fleet of over 100 ships attacked the coast of Annam. Later that year, an Annamese/Chinese fleet defeated the Chams in a naval battle. Mills, “Early Chinese Voyages,” 5-6. 66 Besides luxury goods, much of the Nanhai trade was in items related to Buddhist rituals, including , ivory, sandalwood and glass vessels. The Chinese exported , brocades and porcelain. Wang, “Nanhai Trade,” 47-53. 67 “Map of Sui Dynasty” prepared by Ian Kiu - Own work, CC BY 3.0, [accessed on 22 February 2017 at https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=3082893].

26 moved the capital to Luoyang, and rebuilt the canal network to that capital, and in 607 he sent a mission to the Nanhai to encourage the sea trade.68 Yangdi, a devout Buddhist, had his Confucian critics who objected to his construction projects as extravagances. Nevertheless, his rebuilding of the internal canal network strengthened the internal ties of the country, linking Chang'an to the area around Beijing in the north to in the south.

During the rebellions that erupted in the , one of the rebel leaders, a former Sui frontier official named Li Yuan, of Tang, gained control of the capital in 617 and declared the founding of the Tang dynasty (618-907) the following year. (See Figure 11.69) Li, better known by his temple name Gaozu (r. 618-626), gradually consolidated power in a series of battles against Sui forces and other loyalists, many who fled north to the Turks. Gaozu restored political and economic stability to the empire by improving education, reinstating the examination system for government officials, minting a uniform coinage and enacting new, less punitive laws. By the end of the seventh century, peace was restored throughout China, while Tang armies defeated the Eastern and Western Turks to extend Chinese influence from Mongolia to the Amu Darya Figure 11: Tang Dynasty in modern Turkmenistan. Reviving the capital at Chang'an, the city of some one million people became very cosmopolitan, attracting envoys and monks from Japan and Korea, Southeast Asia, , the and the . As a result, the Tang were able to enlarge the boundaries of China’s influence and territorial control to an extent not reached since the Han.70

By the eighth century, Chinese maritime activity reached high levels and Tang trade with overseas countries increased enormously.71 At some time before 714, the position of shiposhi (superintendent of the shipping trade) was established at Guangzhou, and intendancies were subsequently established at Quanzhou and what is now .72 Nonetheless, Arab, Persian and Sinhalese merchants continued to dominate the China

68 Besides luxury goods for the Sui court, China’s main interest was in Buddhist relics and emblems. Wang, “Nanhai Trade,” pp. 62-70; Wheatley, “Geographical Notes,” 20. 69 “Map of Tang Dynasty 700 AD” by Ian Kiu, derived from "The T'ang Dynasty, 618-906 A.D.-Boundaries of 700 A.D." Original source: Albert Herrmann, History and Commercial Atlas of China (Harvard University Press, 1935), CC BY-SA 3.0, [accessed on 22 February 2017 at https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/ index.php?curid=4641484] . 70 By 648, the Turkic invaders had been beaten back and they had accepted the sovereignty of the Chinese emperor. By 660, practically the whole of Korea and Manchuria had been brought under Tang rule, and Chinese suzerainty over was achieved. Needham, Introductory Orientations, 124-125. 71 Tang imports included both luxury goods and religious articles. In addition, the importation of articles for more widespread use increased, notably medicines and spices such as aloe, indigo, rose-water, cloves, mace and nutmeg. Chinese exports were principally silks and porcelain. Wang, “Nanhai Trade,” 108-112. 72 Ts’ao Yung-ho, “Pepper Trade in East Asia,” T’oung Pao 68:4-5 (1982), 225.

27 trade.73 After 650, when the Tang court re-opened official relations with the various states of , trade and contacts increased enormously. In 670, the Tang court received an embassy from Ceylon, the first since 527. At the same time, the Chinese began to collect information about foreign countries, particularly those with which they had commercial relations.74 The Tang court also made periodic use of its fleets. During the reign of Gaozong, in 663 a Chinese fleet defeated a Japanese flotilla during the Chinese conquest of Korea. In 767, the Chinese governor of Annam repelled an attack by Malay and Javanese pirates who had travelled up the to . In 809, a naval battle occurred when the Chinese governor of Annam invaded Champa and defeated the Cham and their allies.75

The maximum extent of Tang influence and control was reached by about 750. Although the Tang never attempted to close off their Inner Asian frontier, the government used military, diplomatic and administrative means to regulate the border areas to its own advantage. Repeating the strategy used by the Han and Sui, the Tang used a number of inducements to attract loyalty from among the nomadic tribes, In practice, their allegiance was contingent upon imperial favour and rewards, and if disgruntled, they would simply retreat into the steppe.76 In 755, , a military governor in eastern Manchuria, rebelled and drove south to the Yellow River where he took Kaifeng and seized control of the . He went on to capture Luoyang and Chang'an in 756 and forced the Tang court to flee. In 757, Tang asked for and received assistance from the Uighurs, then the dominant power in what is now Mongolia. The Uighurs helped in the battles for China's two main cities in that year, and in 762 its cavalry played a decisive role in finally driving the rebels from Luoyang.77

The permanently weakened centralized dynastic authority, and a combination of the loss of tax records during the rebellion, widespread redistribution of land and southward migration to more tranquil provinces, destroyed the old financial structure. The government attempted to introduce reforms but could not administer the system effectively. A slow but steady decline and contraction set in. During the 870s, a rebel leader, Huang , seized control of Fujian and demanded to be made protector-general of Annam. Tang officials opposed this because of the importance of the Nanhai trade to the revenues of the imperial court. As a consequence, Huang marched south to Guangzhou which capitulated following a year-long . Huang's forces thereupon massacred the city's Arab, Jewish, Christian and Persian merchants. Huang subsequently captured Luoyang and Chang’an, forcing the Emperor

73 See, George F. Hourani, Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951, revised 1995). Despite foreign domination of the China trade, during the eighth century Chinese shipping carried large amounts of grain and other commodities from the south to northern Chinese ports. Wang, “Nanhai Trade,” 107; Mills, “Early Chinese Voyages,” 8. 74 In 801, the Tang geographer Dan, Duke of Wei, presented his Gujing Junguo Dao Si. This work incorporated the seven most important trade routes to China, the last of which was the sea route from Guangzhou to South and Southeast Asia. Wheatley, “Geographical Notes,” 20-21. 75 Mills, “Early Chinese Voyages,” 8. 76 Jonathan Karam Skaff, "Survival in the Frontier Zone: Comparative Perspectives on Identity and Political Allegiance in China's Inner Asian Borderlands during the Sui-Tang Dynastic Transition," Journal of World History 15:2 (2004), 136-137. 77 The Uighurs had engaged in pillage after the 757 campaign, but their behaviour in 762 was far worse. Reportedly, in order to escape the plunder, many Luoyang residents sought refuge in the stupas of two Buddhist temples. The Uighurs set fire to the stupas, killing an estimated 10,000 people. Colin Mackerras, "Uygur-Tang Relations, 744-840," Central Asian Survey 19:2 (2000), 224. In 840, the Uighur state was overthrown by the Khirgiz following a year of famine, pestilence and heavy rainfalls. The main body of Uighurs fled to the west.

28 Xizong to flee. With canal transportation Figure 12: Five Dynasties and Ten at a standstill and food unavailable, the Kingdoms inhabitants of Chang'an were reduced to cannibalism. While the Tang government ultimately defeated Huang, the dynasty never recovered form the damage done to its finances, prestige and administration.

Following the rebellion, power devolved on a number of military commanders, one of whom forced the last Tang emperor to abdicate in 907. China thereafter lapsed into an interregnum known as the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period (907-960). (See Figure 12.78) During this period, China was essentially divided into five kingdoms in the north and as many as ten in the south. When the last Han emperor in the north died unexpectedly leaving a seven year-old heir, his generals chose one of their own to assume the throne. Emperor Song Taizu managed to bring most of the remaining splinter states back into the empire. However, it confronted two powerful neighbouring dynasties - the Khitan (Mongol) Liao (907-1125) and the Tangut Xixia (990-1127) - which imperilled the security of Song borders in the north and northwest. In 1005, the Song court was forced to acknowledge the Liao conquest of the northern prefecture centred on modern Beijing. Through two treaties in 1005 and 1042, the Song accepted inferior Figure 13: Northern Song status and paid annual tribute to the Liao to secure peace. A similar arrangement was made with Xixia in 1044. (See Figure 13.79)

Given these difficult strategic circumstances, the Song court sought to consolidate and expand its power. One of the most readily available means at its disposal was the revenue from maritime trade. Maritime commerce, which had prospered under Tang, received official patronage under the Song. This trade became so important that it was made a government monopoly; after 977, the government purchased imported goods directly from foreign merchants and monopolized their resale.80 To promote the expansion of maritime commerce, in 987 the Taizong Emperor sent four missions to

78 “Map of Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms” by Ian Kiu (own work), [accessed on 22 February 2017 at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Dynasties_and_Ten Kingdoms_period]. 79 LiDaobing Yu Ninjie - Qixiang (ed.), Zhongguo lishi ditu (୰ᅜ⌮⎚⛘⚦普; 1982). Released under the GNU FDL., CC BY-SA 3.0 [accessed on 22 February at https://commons.wikimedia.org/w /index.php?curid=47146] (public domain). 80 The most important group of Chinese imports comprised aromatics and drugs, including frankincense, gardenia flowers, cloves, nutmeg, sandalwood and rhinoceros horn. China also imported damask and satin

29 Southeast Asia to invite merchants to come to China. Trade with Japan also flourished. A variety of public works projects were instituted, including the construction of new harbours and warehouses and the dredging of canals. Additional ports were opened to foreign trade. Maritime trade superintendencies were established at Quanzhou, Hangzhou, Huading (modern ) and Ningbo, although Guangzhou was still the most prosperous of the Chinese ports.81 Chinese merchant shipping was increasingly active in foreign trade, although the Nanhai trade was still controlled largely by Arab interests.82 Finally, naval fleets were formed under provincial control expressly for the purpose of suppressing piracy.

In light of the ’s encouragement of maritime commerce, it is perhaps not surprising that the six southern provinces were the wealthiest in the empire. These coastal provinces not only possessed the great Chinese port cities, but also the rapidly expanding manufacturing enterprises producing export products such as silks, brocades, porcelain and ware. Although they comprised only about one-tenth of Song territory, they supported more than one-half of the total population.83

Despite the importance of maritime trade during the early Song period, the development and employment of naval power was neither continuous nor consistent. Initially, the important role of naval power was recognized and encouraged. Indeed, the creation of the Song navy pre-dated the establishment of the dynasty by three years.84 However, following the campaigns against Wu Yue and an unsuccessful expedition against Annam, the Song court seemingly lost interest in its naval forces. By 987 the navy was little more than an ornamental arm of the government.85 In 1077, the Song again launched an abortive campaign against Annam, the failure being partly due to the lack of sea-going ships to sustain and support the operations. Consequently, the government launched a large-scale building program.86 While this represented the first step in building up the fleet, it was not until the loss of northern China in 1127 that there was a determined effort to build an effective fighting force. fabrics, steel, swords, asbestos, borax, slaves, rugs, glassware, tortoise-shell, peacock feathers and ebony. China exported silks, metals (bullion and coinage), lacquer ware and porcelain. Wheatley, “Geographical Notes,” 31-40. 81 Lo Jung-, “The Emergence of China as a Sea Power during the Late Sung and Early Yüan Periods,” Far Eastern Quarterly 14:4 (August 1955), p. 64; Mills, “Early Chinese Voyages,” 8. 82 By the twelfth century, Chinese nautical technology had made significant advances. A typical sea-going junk would likely have been 70 to 100 feet in length, its hull constructed with watertight bulkheads, and fitted with three or more masts and a deeply-slung, median or balanced rudder. The ’s crew would work fore- and-aft lug sails, which were effective in beating to windward, and the captain would navigate with the aid of a magnetic compass. Needham, Nautics, 463; Worcester, Sail and Sweep, 7-53. 83 Lo Jung-pang, “Maritime Commerce and its Relation to the Sung Navy,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 12: Part 1 (January 1969), p. 496. 84 In 957, the emperor Shizong ordered the construction of several hundred warships and employed southern Chinese to train his men for his campaign against Southern Tang. In 960, Zhou Kuangyin, an officer of the Later Zhou army, seized power and was proclaimed the first Song emperor Taizu. He continued the Later Zhou naval focus and paid special attention to warship construction and training. The Song navy subsequently played an important role in the wars against the states of Shu and Southern Tang. Lo, “Maritime Commerce,” 77. 85 It is possible that, having served their purpose in helping to consolidate Song rule at the end of the Five Dynasties period, there appeared to be no compelling rationale for a national navy. Lo Jung-pang reported that naval exercises became water sports for the entertainment of the court. Lo, “Maritime Commerce,” 78. 86 For example, in 1090 orders were placed for 600 ships. Lo, “Maritime Commerce,” 78. Renewed Song naval interest was also influenced by the efforts of the Liao state to improve its naval capabilities. In 1048, Liao ordered the construction of 130 transports to carry horses and soldiers. These proved quite effective as landing craft in operations along the Yellow River. Needham, Nautics, 463.

30

In 1125, the was driven into the far west by the Tungusic Jurchen, a nomadic people of Manchuria. The Liao state was thus supplanted by the Jin dynasty (1115-1234). Jin-Song relations were acrimonious from the outset and near continuous hostilities ensued. Jin invaded Song territory in 1126. The Song were forced to abandon the capital at Kaifeng and, by extension, all of north China in 1127.87 The remnants of the Song court fled southward and established their new capital in the south at Hangzhou.

87 By this time, the combination of financial mismanagement, crop failures, floods, droughts and famine had contributed to widespread disenchantment and banditry. As such, the Song dynasty was already destabilized by the early years of the twelfth century.

31

Chapter Three

Southern Song through Early Ming (1127-1435)

The loss of north China, coupled with the war devastation of the Yangzi valley, disrupted the political and economic life of Song China. In order to consolidate dynastic rule, the Southern Song (1127-1279) extended the sphere of monopolistic activities and increased taxes. In this chaotic environment, the only reliable source of state income came from maritime trade and the only effective military means with which to counter the Jin were the provincial navies. The loss of the north and the continuous challenge first from the Jin and then the Mongols dominated the Southern Song period. In 1142, the Southern Song signed a treaty with Jin, ceding north China down to the and recognizing Jin suzerainty.88 With the Mongol conquest of Jin in 1234, the Song faced an even more dangerous and powerful opponent, and one which ultimately defeated the Song, but only after creating a navy of its own and wearing down the Song fleets in a protracted war of attrition. It is this military-strategic setting during the Southern Song which provides the context for the rapid development of Song naval power and the expansion of state-administered maritime commercial activities.

With the presence of hostile alien Figure 14: Southern Song regimes in the north and northwest, Song China was cut off from the land routes to Central Asia. (See Figure 14.89) Out of necessity, therefore, the Southern Song were forced to look to the sea. Before 1127, 35 percent of the tributary-trade missions to the Song court came to China by land and 65 percent by sea. After the loss of north China, all of them came by sea.90 By the early years of Southern Song, maritime commerce provided roughly one-fifth of the total revenues of the state.

88 Nonetheless, the Jin court continued to prepare for campaigns against Southern Song. In 1161, a massive Jin invasion force failed to conquer the south; equally, the Song counter-offensive of 1206-08 was ill- conceived and counter-productive. For a discussion of Jin-Song relations, see Herbert Franke, “The Chin Dynasty,” in Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, eds., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 6 Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 214-320. 89 “Map of Southern Song” by Yu Ninjie (uploaded on Commons by LiDaobing) - (ed.), Zhongguo lishi ditu (୰ᅜ⌮⎚⛘⚦普; 1982). Released under the GNU FDL., CC BY-SA 3.0, [accessed on 22 February 2017 at https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=47147] (public domain). 90 Lo, “Emergence of China as a Sea Power,” p. 497. Imported goods included ivory, coral, rhinoceros horn, tortoise-shell, spices, drugs, incense, cotton textiles and steel. Chinese exports were primarily silks, porcelain and coinage. Ts’ao, “Pepper Trade,” 226. Ts’ao noted that the highly profitable trade in Javanese pepper was paid for in coins. The Song court forbade the illicit trade with Java in order to halt the drain of coinage, but such prohibitions were ineffective (227).

32 Given the grave setbacks the Song empire faced as it was pushed further to the south, it is not without some irony that the Southern Song court immediately took steps to limit trade. In reaction to the dramatic social and political disruption that shook China, many Confucian-trained officials advocated economic autarky as the correct path for the stabilization and security of the empire.91 In 1127, the Gaozong Emperor proclaimed that most foreign goods were unnecessary luxuries and barred the importation of drugs and aromatics. Nonetheless, tribute-trade continued and the Song court’s revenues were greatly enhanced by it, thus contributing needed resources for economic recovery. By 1137, the court’s dependence on the profits of maritime trade had wholly undermined the policy of autarky.92 The emperor issued an edict in that year which included the following passage: “The profit from maritime trade is very great and, if properly managed, would amount to millions of strings of cash. Would it not be preferable to promote this trade rather than to tax the people?”93

Considerable government effort was expended to attract merchants to Chinese ports. Maritime trade superintendencies were established in most southern ports and several new harbours were constructed. The Song government also undertook a variety of public works projects to improve both Chinese port facilities and the coastal sea routes.94 In light of all of these measures, foreign trade increased enormously and there were greater contacts with the states of Southeast Asia and beyond.95 Despite the influence of Confucian scholars and officials, the government participated actively in trade and industry, and many officials and members of the court held shares in shipping and manufacturing companies. Although the merchant class and trade were not highly esteemed, the Southern Song economic system depended ultimately on a growing number of entrepreneurs, based largely in the southern ports and manufacturing centres of the interior. By 1150, Chinese merchants had gained control of the maritime trade routes to the southeast - Chinese ships sailed to the emporiums of Southeast Asia and India, bringing back trade goods and tributary missions.96 Consequently, after nearly a

91 As a matter of principle, Confucian-trained officials opposed trade and foreign contacts. The Confucian view held that agriculture was the source of China’s wealth, that trade was parasitic, and that frugality was the prime imperial virtue. For a concise discussion of the rise and influence of under the Song, see John K. Fairbank, China: A New History (Cambridge MA and London: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1992), 96-107. For a sweeping examination of Song rule, see Dieter Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule: The Song Transformation of China (Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009). 92 A tax on ocean-going ships was used to pay for military expenses. In addition, a duty was levied on all imports. The profits from maritime trade were derived from the purchase and resale of imports (including tribute articles) for domestic consumption and for re-export to the foreign states of the north. Wheatley, “Geographical Notes,” 22-23. 93 Yue , 3, Song Huiyao, as quoted in Wheatley, “Geographical Notes,” 30. 94 Such measures included clearing submerged rocks, improving existing harbours, excavating channels, widening rivers and building beacons and light houses. Wheatley, “Geographical Notes,” 24-27; Lo, “Maritime Commerce,” 69-72. 95 For the first time in Chinese history, the revenues from foreign trade and customs exceeded the land revenue. Fitzgerald, Southern Expansion, 15. Although Southern Song did not have formal diplomatic relations with Japan, a brisk trade was conducted. In particular, the Japanese desired copper coins, which became the primary circulating currency in Japan after 1226. The net effect on the Song economy was a scarcity of money, which in turn forced the adoption of stringent regulations to curtail the outflow of coinage. Shoji Kawazoe, “Japan and East Asia,” in Kozo Yamamura (ed), The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 3, Medieval Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 408-409. 96 A late-thirteenth century Southern Song shipwreck has been excavated near Quanzhou. The ship was an ocean-going merchantman, roughly 34 meters long, 11 meters wide and displaced 380 tons. Its main cargo consisted of fragrant wood, plus spices and other goods. Jeremy Green, “The Song Dynasty Shipwreck at Quanzhou, Fujian Province, People’s Republic of China,” The International Journal of Nautical and Underwater Exploration 12:3 (August 1983), 253-261.

33 millennium of foreign control of the China trade, the Chinese finally dominated the freight and passenger business. 97

In light of the continuing threat of invasion from Jin, the Song court developed defensive counter-measures. Huge networks of canals and ditches were dug for transportation and between the Huai and Yangzi Rivers. This water network also served as a defensive belt which hampered the effectiveness of the Jin cavalry. In the winter of 1129, the efficacy of naval power was demonstrated when an invading Jin army penetrated as far south as Hangzhou, pursuing the Song emperor out to sea. When they later withdrew, they were held up by a Chinese fleet on the Yangzi for three months. This limited naval success, in contrast with the poor showing of the army, enhanced government support for the naval program.98 A major policy debate emerged at court between those advocating a counter-offensive to recover the lost northern lands and those favouring consolidating control in the south. This became, in effect, a debate over the priorities of military spending between the army and the navy. The end result was the adoption of a defensive strategy, primarily reliant on naval forces. However, the court never entirely freed itself from the desire to recapture the north.

In 1132, the Southern Song established the first overall naval command in Chinese history, the Yanhai zhizhi shisi (Imperial Commissioner’s Office for the Control and Organization of the Coastal Areas). The Song navy saw a great deal of action. In October 1161, the Jin launched a major assault when its main force crossed the Huai River and advanced on the Yangzi.99 Song forces proved unable to stop this advance so the main defences were concentrated on the southern banks of the river. In November, Jin forces were defeated when they attempted to cross the Yangzi at Ma’anshan in province. At the same time, a Jin armada of 600 ships (carrying 70,000 men) was sent south to attack the Song capital at Hangzhou. In a battle fought south of , a Song fleet of 120 ships destroyed the Jin forces. The Jin emperor was assassinated in December and the new ruler withdrew Jin forces from the Yangzi front and normal relations were resumed.100 From this point through to the middle of the thirteenth century, the Song navy was unchallenged in the East China Sea. As Wu Qian noted in a memorial: "The area of control of our navy extends westward to Hsü- [Xupu, ],

97 The growing wealth of the cities and increasing trade attracted pirates. In order to encourage foreign commerce, it was necessary for the Song court to defend the coastal cities and protect merchant ships from piracy. Indeed, countering the threat posed by pirates was one of the principal rationales for the creation of a permanent naval establishment. In 1131, a fleet of ocean-going ships was ordered to patrol the shipping lanes off Qidong and succeeded in clearing pirates from the mouth of the Yangzi. The success of this and other operations prompted the Song court to adopt permanent measures for the suppression of piracy. Naval squadrons were ordered to patrol regularly along the coast of Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang and southern . However, one of the serious dilemmas confronting the government was that while it was necessary to suppress piracy to protect its commerce and coastal regions, the court also depended upon the pirate fleets to help counter Jin incursions. As a result, beginning in the 1130s, the court sought to induce pirates to submit by offers of official ranks. Many pirate fleets were thereby incorporated into the Song navy. Moreover, when war broke out in 1161, the majority of pirate chiefs offered resistance against the Jin. When the war ended, however, many pirate fleets simply resumed their previous occupation. Lo, “Emergence of China as a Sea Power,” 74-76. 98 Lo, “Maritime Commerce,” 82. 99 Beginning in the 1150s, the Jin emperor ordered the construction of a large fleet of ocean-going ships and Song defectors were employed to train his men in . The Jin also registered 30,000 sailors and confiscated a large number of barges to serve as transports. In light of these activities, the Song court halted trade with the north, pirates were recruited, retired officers and men brought back into active service and major efforts undertaken. Lo, “Maritime Commerce,” 85; Franke, “Chin Dynasty,” 241. 100 Lo, “Maritime Commerce,” 86; Franke, “Chin Dynasty,” 241-243.

34 southward to Fukien [Fujian], northward to Korea and eastward to Japan, an area of over 10,000 li. The navy is used for scouting, the navy is used for patrolling, and the navy is used for the defence of strategic points."101

However, the thirteenth century was a difficult time for the Southern Song navy. In 1204, the Song court weakened coastal defences by transferring naval units from the southeast provinces to the Yangzi in preparation for the abortive offensive of 1206-08.102 After unsuccessful Song attempts to breach the Jin defences, in the autumn of 1206 Jin forces counter-attacked, penetrated deep into Song territory and laid siege to many towns. There were no military engagements after April 1207 and a treaty was signed and formally accepted by the Song court in November 1208.103 Following the conclusion of hostilities, the naval units sent north to the Yangzi were not redeployed south, presumably so as to avoid weakening the northern defences. The consequences of this decision for the southeast coast were severe, since the coastal cities and commercial shipping were left vulnerable to piracy.

Following the Mongol conquest of Jin in 1234, the Song court again feared a seaborne invasion. In 1243, the navy was reorganized, merchant shipping was mobilized along the southeast coast and a new naval fleet was established at . However, vigilance gradually waned. In 1256, the Mongols invaded Yunnan and Annam and penetrated the upper reaches of the Yangzi. By this time, as the Song navy was handicapped by shortages of ships and low morale, the Song court responded by pressuring ship owners to contribute more ships.104 Serious internal political and economic difficulties made effective action difficult. Rising military expenditures, coupled with corruption at court and inefficient administration, led to a fiscal crisis in the 1260s. The end result was a court bitterly divided over the issue of fiscal reform at precisely the time when the confrontation with the Mongols intensified.105

In 1260 and again in 1261, envoys from Khubilai Khan had proposed a Song acknowledgement of Khubilai as the Son of Heaven in exchange for virtual self-rule and expanded trade opportunities with northern China. The proposal was rejected. Consequently, the Mongol campaign to conquer southern China began in 1268 with the siege of , which ultimately surrendered in March 1273.106 In the protracted

101 Wu Qian, Xuguo Kong zouyi (Memorials of the Duke of ). Shiwan juanlou zongshu, 4:9 as quoted in Lo, “Emergence of China as a Sea Power,” 491. A li roughly equals a kilometre. 102 There had been a gradual escalation of hostilities along the Huai River. By June 1206, Song forces were concentrated along the Huai, but they were poorly organized and provisioned. Moreover, most northern Chinese appear to have accepted Jin rule and did not rise up in support of the Song armies, as some Southern Song officials expected. 103 The Song agreed to increase the annual payments made to the Jin court as the successor state to the Liao. Franke, “Chin Dynasty,” 247-249. 104 This led many ship owners to flee or go bankrupt. Many defected to the Mongols who were taking steps to win the support of merchants. Lo, “Maritime Commerce,” 91-104. 105 The chancellor attempted to initiate reforms and to curb profiteering eunuchs, imperial relatives and bureaucrats. Naturally, they resisted such measures. Morris Rossabi, “The Reign of Khubilai Khan,” in Franke and Twitchett, eds., Cambridge History of China, Vol. 6, 430-431. 106 The battle of Xiangyang (1268-1273) was the longest and most critical campaign of the war. Xiangyang, guarding the , was the last stronghold en route to the central basin of the Yangzi. The Mongols finally achieved supremacy on the river in early 1272, which enabled them to prevent the resupply and reinforcement of the Song defences. In addition to the critical role played by riverine naval power, the Mongols adopted sophisticated siege warfare techniques, employing and capable of hurling huge rocks at the city. With overwhelming support, Mongol forces were able to storm the city defences. Rossabi, “Khubilai Khan,” 433.

35 campaign that followed, Mongol forces battled down the Han and Yangzi Rivers, all the while being harried by Song riverine units. In January 1275, Mongol forces crossed the Yangzi at Hankou at the confluence of the Han and Yangzi Rivers in province. In the fierce naval and land battle that ensued, the Song were forced to retreat, losing 3,000 vessels in the process. In March 1275, Song forces were routed at Dingjiazhou and 2,000 more vessels were lost. This effectively concluded the river phase of the invasion.107

In January 1276, the dowager empress acknowledged that the Song emperor was a subject of Khubilai and gave up the dynasty . A month later, Song loyalists escaped to Fuzhou and enthroned the emperor’s half-brother. For the next two years, the Mongol fleet pursued the Song court down the Chinese coast.108 By May 1278, the Song court (with another half-brother on the throne) was based on the island of Naozhou, off the eastern coast of the . Mongol attacks forced them to flee to the island of Yaishan, across the waters from Guangzhou. In March 1279, the Song fleet attempted to break the blockade. In the ensuing battle the emperor drowned and Song resistance was brought to an end. No less than 800 Song warships were captured.109

Figure 15: Khubilai Khan, grandson of Chinggis Khan, reigned as chief of the Mongol world from 1260 to 1294. In 1279, he became and founded the Yuan dynasty (1279-1368). (See Figure 15.110) Throughout his life, he attempted to establish hegemony over the countries of Asia. Chinese suzerainty had a broader meaning during Khubilai’s reign than was previously the case.111 Khubilai demanded that foreign rulers pay personal homage and leave family members in the capital as hostages; a population census was to be taken and taxes paid; and military forces were to be provided in the service of the Yuan.112 Those states which refused faced the prospect of punitive military campaigns. Although many Mongol campaigns failed, the employment of naval

107 Rossabi, “Khubilai Khan,” 434. In July 1275, the Song launched an abortive counter-attack at Guazhou, upstream from Shanghai, leading to the Mongol capture of 780 ocean-going ships. At Shanghai, the Mongols seized an additional 300 merchant ships. The defection of Qing and Xuan, former pirates and smugglers, contributed a fleet of 500 vessels and several thousand sailors. Hence, in a very short space of time the Mongols acquired a sizeable ocean-going fleet. Lo, “Maritime Commerce,” 97. 108 Early in 1277, a Song flotilla carried the imperial court to Quanzhou. However, the Quanzhou trade superintendent transferred his loyalty to the Mongols, turning over his fleet of warships and merchant vessels. The Song court fled first to Huizhou and then to Guangzhou. 109 Rossabi, “Khubilai Khan,” 434-34; Needham, Nautics, 477. 110 “Map of Yuan Dynasty” by Ian Kiu (Own work), CC BY 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons [accessed on 22 February 2017 at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yuan_Dynasty_1294.png]. 111 For a more detailed discussion of Khubilai's life and world view, see Morris Rossabi, Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), especially chapters 4,5 and 8. 112 Previously, Chinese diplomacy had required tribute missions and acknowledgement of suzerainty, not personal homage. From the Yuan shi, 209:1b-19b, in Wang Gungwu, “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay,” in John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 48.

36 power extended Chinese maritime influence in Asia into the South China Sea and beyond.

With the disappearance of political borders between northern and southern China, intra-Chinese commercial interactions expanded dramatically, as did the demand for foreign goods.113 To an extent, the court simply adopted the policies of the Song, favouring monopolistic enterprises and encouraging the entrepreneurial initiatives of the merchant class. Private trading was prohibited with heavy penalties but, as in previous and subsequent eras, this prohibition was far from successful. Arguably, the merchant class benefited the most from Yuan policies. Most Chinese dynasties had imposed numerous restrictions on merchants largely because Confucian-trained scholar-officials disapproved of trade. The Mongols, however, did not share this bias and accorded merchants high status.114 To facilitate trade, Khubilai instituted the use of paper currency on a wide scale. The court’s willingness to accept taxes in paper money instilled trust in the new currency which, in turn, helped foster trade. Improvements to the transport system also helped trade.115 This included the extension of the Grand Canal to the new capital at Dadu (modern Beijing), which was completed in 1289, the construction of roads and the establishment of an efficient postal relay system.

From the time when the Yuan secured control over southern China, the court used its fleets for diplomatic and trade purposes.116 The Yuan court had commercial treaties with many states of the Indian subcontinent, with the result that there was a steady stream of ships between Hormuz, Quilon (on the Malabar coast of southwest India) and Quanzhou. Chinese ships frequented the ports of Southeast Asia and also called regularly at ports along the east and west coasts of India and Ceylon.117 Great naval activity also marked Khubilai’s reign. The rapid development of Yuan naval power was due in part to the wholesale acquisition of the fleets of Southern Song and Korea.118 In addition, the Yuan court under Khubilai made a concerted effort to enlarge its ocean- going fleet.119 New ships were built in Jiangsu and Zhejiang shipyards and ships were seized from or contributed by private merchants and pirates.

While still engaged against the Southern Song, the Yuan court began its series of campaigns aimed at hegemony in Asia. Between 1268 and 1272, three embassies were sent to demand the submission of Japan. The Japanese ignored these demands, prompting an ultimately unsuccessful punitive expedition in 1274.120 Yuan envoys were

113 The principal Chinese exports were silks, porcelain, lacquer ware and copper coinage. Imported goods included precious stones, pearls, corals, tortoise-shell, ivory, rhinoceros horn, medicinal products, incense, sandalwood, pepper and spices, sugar, fabrics, glassware and . 114 The principal group whose interests were undercut by the Mongols were the landed elite from whose ranks most scholar-officials were drawn. The Mongols displaced this group and discontinued the civil service examination system, although it was partially restored late in the Yuan period. 115 Rossabi, “Khubilai Khan,” 449. 116 Indeed, in 1284 the government attempted to increase its profit from foreign trade by creating its own trading firms. It constructed, organized and financed ships and sent them abroad to trade. The government took seventy percent of the profits. 117 Mills, “Early Chinese Voyages,” 11-12. 118 Korea had been pacified by 1273 and the kingdom of Koryo accepted vassal status. Rossabi, “Khubilai Khan,” 436-437. 119 The largest warships had four decks, divided into watertight compartments, a complement of 1,000 men (including 400 men-at-arms), four-to-six masts and possibly as many as twelve sails. 120 A force of some 28,000 men embarked in 900 ships conquered the islands of Tsushima and Iki and landed on eastern Kyushu. Having underestimated Japanese resistance and encountering gale-force winds, the invasion force took to their ships, many of which were lost in the storm. The remnants of the fleet

37 again sent in 1275, but they were executed by the shogun. In 1281, a massive punitive expedition was organized, comprising 115,000 men embarked in approximately 4,000 ships. On 15 August, a typhoon struck Kyushu and almost half of the Mongol force was lost. A third expedition was planned for 1283 but Khubilai desisted in the face of public unrest in the coastal regions.121

Khubilai also launched a number of campaigns against various states in Southeast Asia. In 1281, following the refusal of the Cham king to accompany a tributary mission, the Yuan court launched a punitive expedition comprising 100 ships and 5,000 men. The force succeeded in capturing the Cham capital of Chaban, but Cham guerrillas later compelled the expeditionary force to withdraw. In 1285, Mongol forces were defeated at Siming on the Annamese border with Yunnan. The following year, Khubilai launched a full-scale assault upon Annam, including the deployment of a Mongol army by sea to Champa in order to attack the Annamese rear. Although the expedition succeeded in reaching Hanoi, it was forced to withdraw in 1287 due, in part, to losses suffered by the supporting fleet. Following this campaign, both Champa and Annam sent tribute and the Mongol expeditions against them ceased. In 1289, a Yuan embassy had been sent to Java. The king responded by branding the face of the envoy. In 1293, a Chinese armada of 1,000 ships and 20,000 men departed Quanzhou for Java. Initial success was followed by forced withdrawal following the destruction of a large Mongolian force.122

The Yuan dynasty was radically transformed by the death of Khubilai Khan in 1294. His grandson Temür (1294-1307) immediately cancelled the planned campaign against Annam and instead accepted Annam as a tributary state. Moreover, in 1298 he rejected recommendations to renew the invasion of Japan. Indeed, the only major campaign of his reign, against Burma (1300-01), ended in failure. For Temür and his successors, the major military preoccupation shifted to the north, to the defence of Inner Asia against the khans of Ogodei and Chaghadai.123 For the remaining years of the Yuan dynasty, succession struggles challenged regime stability. The court became encumbered by an inefficient bureaucracy, uncontrollable inflation and fiscal shortages.124 From the middle of the fourteenth century, the Yuan court faced continuous

thereupon returned home. Given the ongoing campaign against the Song, the Mongols could not immediately act upon this setback. 121 The burden of the overseas campaigns was borne in the coastal regions where the men, wealth and ships were located, as well as by the Koreans. Needham, Nautics, 477; Rossabi, “Khubilai Khan,” 482-484. For a discussion of Yuan-Japanese relations, see Kawazoe, “Japan and East Asia,” 411-421. 122 Rossabi, “Khubilai Khan,” 485-487; Lo, “Emergence of China as a Sea Power,” 493; Needham, Nautics, 477. In addition, in 1291-92 a Chinese expedition was sent to subdue the Ryukyu Islands. Besides the overseas campaigning during Khubilai’s reign, an important naval function was to organize and guard the grain convoys coming from the southern provinces to the new northern capital. Until the Grand Canal could be enlarged to cope with new transport requirements, the court depended upon the ability of the maritime transportation service to move grain along the coast. The canal opened in 1325, but it proved too narrow and shallow for large vessels. In 1329, the highest annual shipment of grain via the sea route was achieved at some 247,000 tons. The tonnage gradually declined due to the increased use of canals, official abuses, rising prices, losses in storms and predation by pirates. Lo Jung-pang, “The Controversy over Grain Conveyance during the Reign of Qubilai Qaqan, 1260-94,” Far Eastern Quarterly 13:3 (May 1954), 281-285. 123 Ch’i-ch’ing Hsiao, “Mid-Yüan Politics,” in Franke and Twitchett, eds., Cambridge History of China, Vol. 6, Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 501. 124 For a discussion of the political and economic situation in the middle and late Yuan periods, see Hsaio, “Mid-Yüan Politics,” pp. 490-560; and John Dardess, “Shun-ti and the End of Yüan Rule in China,” in Franke and Twitchett, eds., Cambridge History of China, Vol. 6, 561-586.

38 revolt amongst its Chinese subjects.125 Rebel armies became active throughout the Huai and Yangzi regions. Finally, the Yuan court lost control of the south when Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of the (1368-1644), achieved control over the food producing provinces of the lower Yangzi. As a result, the economy of the Yuan empire collapsed and a rival state emerged in southeast China. (See Figure 16.126)

In 1360, Zhu Yuanzhang invaded Zhejiang province. Three years later, his forces deadlocked with the rival rebel states of Han and Wu for control of the Yangzi delta. The turning point came in a series of large inland naval battles fought between Ming and Han fleets on and near Boyang Lake. As a result of Zhu’s victory over the Han, Ming forces were able to conquer and consolidate control over the middle and lower Yangzi regions, ending with the capture of Shantou in 1367.127

Zhu Yuanzhang’s reign as the (r. 1368-1398) began with the establishment of the capital at Nanjing and the continuation of the campaign to drive the Mongols from China. Naval power played an important role in the Ming conquests. Besides contributing to the consolidation of control in the Yangzi region, Ming fleets were active in the campaigns to conquer Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong provinces in 1371.128 During the course of the campaign to drive the Mongols from northern China, Hongwu burnt the Mongol capital at Karakorum and drove the Mongol forces as far north as Siberia. Similarly, Manchuria was annexed and systematic Chinese Figure 16: Ming Dynasty colonization began for the first time.129 Yuan rule in China finally ended in 1382 with the Ming conquest of Yunnan province.

The reign of Hongwu is very important for understanding the subsequent development of Chinese foreign policy. It was during his reign that foreign trade became fully merged with the tributary system. Likewise, his preoccupation with internal security and the security of China’s northern frontiers contributed to the insular policies that reached their peak during the later Ming and Qing periods. Hongwu continued to

125 The peasant rebellions of the 1350s were due primarily to the Yuan failure to cope with widespread famine. The Yuan succeeded in quelling the rebellion on the China Plain and in the central Yangzi region. However, the surviving rebel leaders became regional warlords in the lower Yangzi region after 1353. 126 “Map of Ming Dynasty” by ěíše Ming.png: Michal Klajban (Hikingisgood.com) derivative work: Jann - This file was derived froměíše Ming.png:, CC BY-SA 3.0 cz [accessed on 22 February 2017 at https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=34923107]. 127 See, for instance, Edward L. Dreyer, “The Poyang Campaign, 1363: Inland Naval Warfare in the Founding of the Ming Dynasty,” in Kierman and Fairbank, eds., Chinese Ways in Warfare, 202-242. 128 For a discussion of the campaigns leading to the military consolidation of the Ming state, see Edward L. Dreyer, “Military Origins of Ming China,” in Frederick W. Mote and Dennis Twitchett, eds., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 7, The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Part 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 58-106. 129 Needham, Introductory Orientations, 143-144.

39 develop Chinese naval power, but exclusively for the protection China’s coastal areas. Upon becoming enthroned, Hongwu re-established the tribute system according to traditional practices. He therefore dispatched embassies to foreign countries to announce his succession, beginning with Japan and the Coromandel coast of India in 1368. Two years later, envoys were again sent to Japan and Coromandel, and in 1372 to the Ryukyu Islands. As a result of these missions, Hongwu received tributary embassies from Korea, Japan, the Ryukyus, Annam, Champa, Cambodia, Siam, Brunei, Java, Palembang, Semudera and the Coromandel. However, this outward-looking approach was limited to official channels and circumscribed by the strategic outlook which governed Hongwu’s reign.

Aware of China’s central location and predominant position in Asia, the Hongwu Emperor believed that world peace depended on the political stability and security of China. For instance, in 1373 he declared, "From ancient times it has been necessary to stress frontier defence. When the frontier regions are secure, China is untroubled and can keep the of the four quarters under control."130 In this regard, defence against the nomadic tribes of the north and northwest was the central preoccupation. In contrast, Hongwu adopted a non-interventionist policy toward the states to the east and south, the rationale being that it was only the "northern barbarians" which potentially threatened China’s existence.131 Thus, all those states were considered equal to one another but less than equal to China, and the Ming court would not attack them unless compelled to do so for defence. In an overall sense, then, foreign relations with the maritime states of Asia were of relatively little significance, unless they directly threatened Chinese security. With the exception of the threat posed by pirates, this was unlikely to occur. Therefore, it is not altogether surprising that in 1395 Hongwu took steps to constrain China’s foreign relations by limiting tributary relations to only three states – the Ryukyus, Cambodia and Siam.132

Although both the Song and Yuan dynasties had monopolistic trade tendencies, the trade-tribute system under Hongwu was far more comprehensive and far-reaching. In February 1372, the Ming court adopted a policy of prohibition relating to all aspects of maritime trade: Chinese vessels were prevented from going abroad and Chinese who had settled abroad were ordered to return to China; private maritime trade was outlawed; and only the foreign ships of official tributary missions were permitted in Chinese ports.133 The effect of these prohibitions was immediately felt in coastal areas. The support given to maritime trade under the Song and Yuan had contributed to the development of great commercial centres on the southeast coast and the livelihood of

130 Tan Xisi, Ming Dazheng Zuanyao, 6.25a, as quoted in Lo Jung-pang, “Policy Formulation and Decision- Making on Issues Respecting Peace and War,” in Charles O. Hucker, ed., Chinese Government in Ming Times (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969), 53. 131 In 1372, Hungwu declared: “The eastern barbarians [Japanese] are not, like the northerners, a danger to our heart and stomach. They are no more than mosquitoes and scorpions.” Yan Congjian, Shuyu Zhouzilu, 2.2b, as quoted in Lo, “Policy Formulation,” 53. It is interesting to note, however, that Korea, frequently cited as the "model" tributary state, refused Hongwu's repeated requests to sell horses to the Ming army. Chinese concerns about the security of Liaodong were matched by Korean concerns about China's interest in Manchuria. Chinese penetration of Jurchen lands in Manchuria threatened Korea's sphere of influence there that the Koryo then Chosun dynasties viewed as vital to Korean security. In 1388, Korea launched a surprise attack against Ming forces in Manchuria in the belief that an attack against Korea was being planned. 132 Langlois, “Hung-wu,” 168. 133 Port officials would verify the authorizations of tribute missions, inspect their cargoes and approve the transhipment of tributary articles. Any additional private goods would be taxed and their trade and sale supervised. Langlois, “Hung-wu,” 169.

40 the coastal citizenry depended on maritime trade. The prohibitions drove many merchants into covert activity - smuggling and piracy - which in turn compelled Hongwu and his successors to issue repeated edicts strictly prohibiting private overseas trade and ordering the repatriation of Chinese subjects. However, the unrealistic nature of many of these edicts made enforcement difficult, if not impossible.

Throughout his reign, Hongwu was preoccupied with the consolidation of dynastic rule. Having defeated his fellow rebel warlords and driven the Mongols far to the north, he nonetheless continued to confront pockets of resistance in Zhejiang, Jiangsu and elsewhere, not to mention intrigues within his own court.134 Given these challenges to his authority, a primary objective was to prevent internal challengers from linking up with foreign powers and thus creating a domestic political crisis. In such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Hongwu demonstrated virtually no interest in the free flow of goods and ideas from overseas.

Likewise, the growth of Chinese naval power under Hongwu was cast within this defensive attitude towards the outside world. Although naval power had proved invaluable in the Ming conquest, Hongwu developed his navy as a defensive tool for coastal security rather than as the offensive weapon of his rise to power. In 1370, he created 24 naval garrisons along the coast, each with 50 vessels. In 1372, in order to strengthen defences against pirate attacks, he ordered the garrisons of Zhejiang and Fujian to construct 660 ocean-going warships and organized annual spring and summer patrols along the coast. However, these moves were only elements in a defensive strategy that gave priority to the construction of land fortifications against the pirates.135

Unlike Hongwu, the (1402-1426) had a positive attitude towards the outside world. When Yongle usurped the throne from his nephew in 1402, he dispatched numerous embassies to notify states of his accession and to request that tributary missions be sent to the Chinese court. He also restored tributary relations with Japan and Korea and annexed Annam.136 Nonetheless, Yongle continued the restrictive trade policies of his father, and thus the twin problems of piracy and smuggling continued at high levels.

The Yongle Emperor inherited a strong navy from his father and strengthened it further. Shipbuilding accelerated in the first two decades of the fifteenth century, primarily as a result of the decision to launch a series of great maritime expeditions to the Indian Ocean. At its height in 1420, the Ming navy consisted of more than 3,800 ships in all: coastal defence ships attached to guard stations or offshore island bases; a main fleet of 400 large warships stationed near Nanjing; and 400 armed transports of the grain transportation fleet. In addition, there were more than 250 long-distance "treasure ships" (baochuan).

134 For instance, in 1380 Hongwu alleged that his prime minister, Hu Weiyong, in league with disaffected court officials and Japanese nobles, had been plotting against him. Hongwu had him beheaded, along with every member of his family and those connected with him. The number executed may have reached 40,000. For an examination of Hongwu’s character and reign, see Fairbank, New History, 128-33. 135 Langlois, “Hung-wu,” 168. 136 Between 1402 and 1424, in addition to those to and from Annam, the Ming court sent 62 missions to various Southeast Asian states and received 95 missions in return. As a result, most of Southeast Asia was brought into the Ming political sphere. Chan Hok-lam, “The Chien-wen, Yung-lo, Hung-hsi, and Hsüan-te Reigns, 1399-1435,” in Mote and Twitchett, eds., Cambridge History of China, Vol. 7, Part 1, 260. Official Sino-Japanese relations were again severed in 1411 with the emergence of a new isolationist shogun. Private trade nonetheless continued (268-270).

41

The primary mission of Yongle’s navy was to protect the Chinese coast, and thus the annual spring and summer patrols were continued. Warships of coastal guard stations cruised far out to sea to shield the coast from enemy raids. In 1406, a Ming fleet pursued Japanese pirates (Ch. , Jp. wako) to Korea. In addition, the Ming navy served as an offensive arm in Southeast Asia. The Ming navy sealed off an Annamese fleet besieging the capital of Champa in 1403, and four years later, during the Chinese invasion of Annam, the navy scored successive victories in the Red River delta.137 The possession and application of naval power not only facilitated the re-conquest of Annam, but also enabled the Ming state to extend its influence into the Indian Ocean. The great maritime voyages undertaken between 1405 and 1433 demonstrated that China was a formidable naval power whose shipbuilding techniques, weapons innovations and navigational abilities were unmatched by any other nation at that time.138 The year 1421 marked the high point of Ming long-distance maritime activity, with four separate fleets travelling in the Indian Ocean at the same time.139

Without doubt, the seven Figure 17: 's 7th Expedition great maritime expeditions, led by the Grand Eunuch Zheng He140, were the most important and far-reaching. Zheng He commanded extraordinarily large forces of great ships. During most voyages, his fleets separated into a number of squadrons with particular missions, and used a variety of overseas ports as bases, including , Calicut and Aden. The first six expeditions were launched between 1405 and 1422 during the reign of Yongle. During the course of these voyages, Zheng He’s fleets visited most of the major kingdoms of Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region.141 The fifth expedition (1417-1419) is noteworthy since, for the first time, a Chinese fleet visited the east coast of Africa.142 During most of these

137 Lo, “Early Ming Navy,” 150-151. 138 The Chinese achievement of the fifteenth century reflected the evolutionary development of Chinese nautical technology over the preceding centuries. The most obvious difference was the greater size of Chinese ships, many of which were over 1,500 tons, and some much more than that. Needham, Nautics, 508-509. 139 In 1421, the eunuch Zhou travelled to Aden; two different missions under the eunuchs Yang Qing and Bao were dispatched to the Western Ocean; and Zheng He was then on his sixth voyage. Mills, “Early Chinese Voyages,” 13-14. 140 Zheng He (1371-1433) was born in the southwest province of Yunnan. His original name was Ma He whose ancestors came from Bokhara and served the Mongol khans. Zheng's father was killed resisting the Ming conquest. Zheng was taken prisoner and castrated for service as a eunuch. Soon afterward he was sent to join the household of the Prince of Yan (later the Yongle Emperor), then governor of the northeast provinces centred on Beijing. Edward L. Dreyer, Zheng He: China and the Oceans in the Early Ming Dynasty, 1403-1433 (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), 11-12. 141 The kingdoms visited by Zheng He’s fleets included Champa, Siam, Kelantan, Pahan, Java, Palembang, Malacca, Semudera, Lambri, Ceylon, the Maldive Islands, Cochin, Quilon, Calicut, Hormuz, and Aden, as well as the African ports of Mogadishu, Brava and Malindi.

42 expeditions, the Chinese envoys presented gifts and titles, and returned with tributary presents and ambassadors. In addition, the fleets occasionally fought the navies of hostile rulers, suppressed piracy and settled disputes between rival warlords. The seventh expedition (1431-33) was dispatched by the (1426-1435) to reinvigorate the tributary relations promoted by Yongle.143 The fleet travelled the familiar routes to the Arabian peninsula and northeast Africa, returning with envoys from fifteen kingdoms bearing tribute. In 1434, Wang Jinghong sailed to Sumatra and Java, but that proved to be the last great Ming maritime expedition. (See Figure 17.144)

During the years in which Zheng He led his first six voyages, Yongle spent increasing amounts of time in the north. Yongle promoted the rebuilding and expansion of Beijing (then Beiping), designating it the primary imperial capital in 1421. To supply grain to the capital, and to support his military campaigns against the Mongols (in 1410, 1414, 1422, 1423 and 1424), the Grand Canal was reopened fully in 1415. Yongle also restructured and strengthened the line of defensive walls, including the wall immediate to the north of Beijing. All of these projects, together with the voyages and an invasion of Vietnam, were expensive and required the mobilization of enormous resources. By the time of his death during the fifth Mongol campaign, Yongle seems to have decided that waging war in Mongolia was more important than further voyages.145

Nevertheless, such large, well-organized expeditions were unprecedented, and for this reason alone they are highly significant events in Chinese maritime history. A number of reasons could explain why the voyages were initiated. They may have been sent simply to satisfy Yongle’s vanity, as well as to make use of his eunuch staff.146 Most directly, the initial voyage announced Yongle’s accession to the throne and that and subsequent voyages served to stimulate tributary embassies from other countries. The voyages had the desirable effect of impressing China’s neighbours with the power and prosperity of the Ming court, while at the same time expanding China’s knowledge of the outside world.147 If the voyages were launched to extend the emperor’s influence, to demonstrate Chinese military power, to expand Chinese knowledge of the world and to bring new states into the tribute system, their objectives were realized.148 While many writers, both Chinese and Western, have accentuated the commercial and generally pacific nature of the expeditions, especially in comparison to the Europeans in subsequent centuries, the military aspect of the expeditions was not insignificant. Zheng

142 The Chinese sought elephant tusks, rhinoceros horns, pearls, aromatic substances and incense, which they exchanged for iron, sabres, musk, porcelain, saddles, silk, cottons, aloes, peppers, spices and coins. Chinese trading influence reached the African coast as far south as the Zambezi before the appearance of European ships. Needham, Nautics, 494-498. 143 Xuande restored relations with Japan in 1433 and maintained contact with the states of South and Southeast Asia through the tributary system. He continued the prohibition against overseas voyages by Chinese for settlement or trade. Chan, “Chien-wen,” 302-304. 144 “Zheng He’s 7th Expedition” by Vmenkov, based on the blank map File:Asie.svg (ver. 1) by User: Historicair - Own work, CC BY 1.0 [accessed on 22 February 2017 at https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/ index.php?curid=11266748]. 145 Dreyer, Zheng He, 25. 146 The expeditions were organized by the court eunuchs who conducted foreign affairs. The expense of these expeditions were borne by the imperial court, as well as the coastal provinces. Chan, “Chien-wen,” 232. 147 In the search for knowledge of the outside world, the voyages arguably reassured the Ming court by confirming that China had no real enemies who could threaten China by sea. This meant Yongle could confidently move the capital north and concentrate on the real threat to the empire – the Mongols. 148 Chan, “Chien-wen,” 236.

43 He’s fleets demonstrated the power of China and achieved recognition of Chinese suzerainty, albeit fleeting.149

Two years after the return of Zheng He’s fleet in 1433, the Xuande Emperor died and Chinese naval supremacy was abandoned. The voyages were an enormous economic burden, and the re-emergence of the Mongol threat called for measures to reinforce the northern border, including deploying sailors from the imperial navy. Later Ming emperors chose to consolidate imperial administration, and maritime activities were reduced to the minimum needed to protect the coasts and shipping from attacks by Japanese pirates.150

149 On his first voyage, Zheng defeated a band of several thousand pirates led by a Chinese renegade based in Palembang, Sumatra. During his third voyage, Zheng defeated the Sinhalese kingdom centred at Kotte (near modern Colombo, ). During the return leg of his fourth voyage, Zheng captured a pretender to the throne of Samudra, northern Sumatra. 150 Chan, “Chien-wen,” p. 276. With regard to the cost of the voyages, it bears noting that most of the more than 1,800 ocean-going ships built during Yongle’s reign were constructed in the first six years. At the same time, however, government expenses increased sharply due to the transfer of the capital to the north, as well as the costly wars against the Mongols. Lo, “Early Ming Navy,” 164-165.

44

Chapter Four

Middle Ming to the Founding of the Peoples' Republic (1435-1949)

Court attitudes towards naval power, maritime trade and foreign relations during the middle and later Ming periods were governed by a strategic outlook reminiscent of Hongwu. Naturally enough, the prime objectives were the stability and security of China, and the principal threat remained the border peoples of the north, and especially the Mongol cavalry. Under Yongle’s successors, the border peoples became increasingly restive and intensified their raids into China. The revival of this challenge culminated with the Mongol invasion of 1449. At the Battle of Tumu, a large Chinese army was destroyed and the Zhengtong Emperor captured.151 Thereupon Mongol forces moved south, besieged Beijing and occupied the Yellow River region. By 1459, intermittent fighting broke out along the entire length of the Ming walls from Gangsu to Liaodong. This sequence of events only served to intensify the desire to avenge these humiliating defeats and to regain lost territory. This northern preoccupation dominated the Ming court and shaped strategic policy for the balance of Ming rule.152

At the same time that the northern focus was hardening, the coastal areas were relatively quiescent. The Japanese pirate threat remained, although strategically it constituted little more than a nuisance. Moreover, the Japanese became involved in their own civil wars (1466-1515) and the menace to the Chinese coast declined sharply. The only serious challenge to the stability of China’s southern frontiers occurred with the Annamese invasion and occupation of Champa in 1470. Given ongoing problems with the Jurchen and Mongols, the Ming court decided that the Annamese expansion was tolerable so as to avoid the risk of war along two distinct frontiers.

Consequently, during the second half of the fifteenth century, the continuing threat from the north, coupled with the relative tranquillity in the east and south, shaped Ming maritime policies. In essence, the Ming turned away from the sea and from maritime endeavours. This shift was aided and abetted by the increasing influence of neo-Confucian thinking. The belief in the cultural and political superiority and economic self-sufficiency of China ran counter to the desire for foreign trade and the acceptance of goods and ideas from abroad; the emphasis on agriculture supplanted commerce and industry; and science and military pursuits were disdained.153 In such an environment, the coastal areas became peripheral regions. Maritime trade prohibitions remained in

151 For an account of this abortive expedition and its strategic implications, see Frederick W. Mote, “The T’u- mu Incident of 1449,” in Kierman and Fairbank, eds., Chinese Ways in Warfare, 63-89. 152 In 1617, the Wubei Zhi, rated foreigners in terms of the danger they posed to China. At the top of the list were the northern "barbarians," then the Japanese, the tribes of Xinjiang, the European "barbarians," the Annamese and finally the Koreans. Mao Yuanyi, ed., Wubei Zhi (Treatise on Military Preparations), 1617, 223:1b, in Lo, “Policy Formulation,” 53. 153 Lo, “Early Ming Navy,” 166-167.

45 effect, the decay of the naval establishment went unchecked and the seafaring- commercial life of the coastal provinces was disregarded.154

The prohibitions on private maritime trade continued, but such measures remained ineffective. The growth of manufacturing in the southeastern coastal provinces (such as silk, cotton, porcelain and iron ware) had stimulated mercantile activities directed specifically at large-scale maritime trade. That trade remained illegal and merchants ignored the government ban. By the end of the fifteenth century, the trade directed overseas by Chinese merchants exceeded the volume of goods carried to and from China under the guise of tribute embassies. Moreover, government efforts to enforce its laws merely encouraged merchant-smugglers to arm themselves, thus becoming pirates.155

At the same time, the Ming court lost interest in official contact with overseas countries and gradually limited the tributary trade.156 After 1455, Japanese embassies were permitted to visit only once every ten years, while the Ryukyuans were authorized to visit every other year. Gradually, the tributary trade gave way to private trade, which ultimately came to be dominated by Europeans. Ironically, the interregnum between the withdrawal of the official Chinese presence in the Nanhai and the arrival of the Europeans in large numbers saw the dominance of the Chinese in private Asian trade, despite the ban on overseas travel for trade and emigration.157 This private trade was wholly illegal, and thus smuggling was rampant in the Ming years.

During the 1520s and 1530s, piracy increased as small bands of pirates raided the southeast coast from Zhejiang to Guangdong. During this period, much of local society was connected in some capacity to the illicit trade. Discipline in coastal areas had grown lax and large numbers of military officials participated in the trade, thereby undermining coastal defence measures.158 This situation intensified in 1523, following a dispute between rival Japanese "tributary missions" which came to blows in Ningbo and led to violence and looting.159 Ming authorities responded by imposing a total ban on trade with Japan. Thereafter, the Japanese began to develop private contacts along the Chinese coast and Chinese merchants set up offshore trading centres to accommodate them. In 1525, the court issued an edict authorizing coastal officials to destroy all ocean-

154 Fairbank, “Maritime and Continental,” 16; Lo, “Early Ming Navy,” 162. 155 Jurgis Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity: Japan’s Relations with China and Korea,” in John Whitney Hall, ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 4, Early Modern Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 237-238. 156 The lack of Chinese engagement in Southeast Asia (i.e., its failure to act in response to the Annamese occupation of Champa in 1470) made acknowledgement of Chinese suzerainty less compelling. At the same time, private commerce increased, thus removing one of the prime incentives for tributary relations. Ts’ao, “Pepper Trade,” 243. 157 The production of many industries, particularly silks, cottons, porcelain and iron products, greatly increased. Ts’ao, “Pepper Trade,” 243. The junk routes from China to Java and Malacca were dominated by the Chinese long after the arrival of the Portuguese in Malacca in 1511. Indeed, Chinese junks retained the largest share of shipping in the South China Sea region until the introduction of European steamships in the nineteenth century. Hall, “Trade and Statecraft,” 23-24. 158 Local gentry provided capital for ships and merchandise, military officials acted as brokers, and common people worked in the merchant fleets. James Geiss, “The Chia-ching Reign, 1522-1566,” in Mote and Twitchett, eds., Cambridge History of China, Vol. 7, Part 1, 490. 159 This dispute was between the Hosokawa and Ouchi houses over who would be permitted to engage in tributary trade. The Ouchi group bribed the Ningbo trade officials. The Hosokawa group then attacked the Ouchi party, looted Ningbo, seized a number of ships and left for Japan, fighting off a pursuing Chinese squadron.

46 going junks and arrest their crews. Local interests refused to cooperate and subsequent edicts were ignored.160

In 1567, following nearly four decades of escalating pirate activity, the newly- enthroned (r. 1567-72) approved the re-opening of ports for overseas trade.161 The new policy was still limited in scope. Chinese civilians were permitted to trade overseas under official supervision, but foreigners were forbidden from trading freely in China and remained restricted to the tributary-trade framework. Moreover, Chinese emigration was prohibited despite the legalization of overseas trading.162 Nonetheless, the 1567 policy was a significant reversal of two centuries of complete maritime prohibition. The immediate effect was to legalize ongoing Chinese commercial activity and remove some of the pressure that had led to the rise of the pirate threat. However, the prohibitions against trade with Japan remained in effect.163

The narrow strategic outlook of the middle and later Ming periods, coupled with distrust of coastal populations and restrictive maritime trade policies, were likewise reflected in attitudes towards, and the commitment of resources to, the Ming navy. The Ming court viewed the navy as a mere adjunct to the army within the strategic framework of jianbi qingye (literally, "to strengthen defence works, evacuate non-combatants and hide provisions and livestock") applied to coastal areas. The principal defence strategy along the coast was to fortify the coastline and to enclose the population within walled cities. Therefore, the navy adopted a strategy of inshore defence. Under such conditions, an ocean-going navy was redundant.

160 In 1539, Japanese merchants again tried to trade through "tribute" but were refused. Thus, bilateral trade switched entirely to private channels and the size of fleets to and from Japan grew each year. Geiss, “Chia- ching,” 492-493. Nevertheless, it bears recalling that during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Japan was a major supplier of silver, perhaps in the region of 40,000 kg per annum. When Japanese were prevented from trading at Chinese ports, Chinese merchants came to Japan or traded via Korean intermediaries. See, A. Kobata, "The Production and Uses of Gold and Silver in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth- Century Japan," Economic History Review 18:2 (August 1965), 245-266; William S. Atwell, "International Bullion Flows and the Chinese Economy circa 1530-1650," Past and Present No. 95 (May 1982), 68-90; and Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, "Cycles of Silver: Global Economic Unity through the Mid-Eighteenth Century," Journal of World History 13:2 (Fall 2002), 391-427. 161 The pirate threat led many officials to view the prohibitions as undermining coastal security. It was argued that maritime trade was beneficial and when prohibited, led first to smuggling and then to piracy. The enforcement of prohibitions also hindered the return of those Chinese who had left China, many of whom in turn plundered the Chinese coast. In addition, officials began to recognise the important role of maritime trade in relieving unemployment. Consequently, officials deemed it necessary for the state to let people make a living by overseas trading. Chang Pin-tsun, “The Evolution of Chinese Thought on Maritime Foreign Trade from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century,” International Journal of Maritime History 1:1 (June 1989), 54-55, 60. 162 From the Ming Law in 1374 through to at least the end of the eighteenth century, the Chinese government consistently opposed any form of migration, regardless of the legal status of private maritime trade. The concern was the loss of control over Chinese who emigrated and the damage these migrants and foreigners might inflict jointly upon the coastal areas. Chang, “Chinese Thought,” 62-63; John E. Wills, “Maritime Asia, 1500-1800: The Interactive Emergence of European Domination,” American Historical Review 98:1 (February 1993), 102. 163 Elisonas, “Inseparable Trinity,” 261-62. Maritime policy was debated periodically. In the early 1590s, during the Japanese invasion of Korea, some officials wanted to restore prohibitions to seal off contacts with Japan. Again in the 1630s, a similar debate emerged when the government was losing control of many parts of China, including the southeast coast where overseas trade was flourishing. In neither instance were prohibitions reinstated, both because they were unenforceable and because they were insufficiently urgent to a state facing more imminent threats along other frontiers. Chang, “Chinese Thought,” 56.

47 According to Needham, the disregard for the naval establishment that grew during the second half of the fifteenth century was symbolized by the destruction of the records of the Ming voyages. During the reign of the Chenghua Emperor (1465-87), the state archives were searched for documents relating to Zheng He’s expeditions. Liu , vice-president of the War Office, took them and burnt them, considering their contents “...deceitful exaggerations of bizarre things far removed from the testimony of people’s eyes and ears.”164 However, the logs of Zheng He's voyages survive in part in the sailing directions found in and the Mingshi (history of the Ming dynasty published in 1739). It is therefore not entirely clear what documents were deliberately destroyed and, according to Dreyer, such evidence as exists point to anti-eunuch rather than anti-maritime thinking.165

The timing of naval decline corresponded with the rise of piracy along the southeast coast and the arrival of Europeans via the sea.166 One major implication of European expansion into Asia, beyond an increased demand for trade, was the introduction of advanced naval warships and weaponry. From a position of naval supremacy at the start of the fifteenth century, Chinese technological progress had become stagnant. One century later, Chinese ship design and weaponry were unchanged and consequently obsolete. Moreover, only half-hearted measures were taken to rectify these deficiencies. As early as 1522, the Chinese were producing indigenous versions of Portuguese guns and had hired Jesuits as instructors in the art of gunnery and -casting.167 However, by the turn of the seventeenth century, technological progress remained slow and Chinese-made guns were substantially inferior to European ones. The disadvantage with regard to artillery was felt most intensely at sea, where it was impossible for Chinese warships to cope with European vessels. Under such circumstances, the Ming court was increasingly unable to limit European penetration of Chinese waters. Although it was suggested that Europeans should be prevented entry in Chinese ports and permitted to trade only from the high seas, it was determined that the best course was to provide access to a limited number of ports where their actions could be monitored and China’s numerical military superiority brought to bear.

Despite the general neglect of the navy in the later Ming period, it was fully occupied in trying to provide a degree of security along the Chinese coast. Throughout much of this period, the principal threat along the coast came in the form of Japanese- affiliated pirate fleets. Without regular patrols, the initiative lay with the pirates and Chinese squadrons only deployed in response to incursions to drive the fleets from Chinese waters. Consequently, for more than forty years, from the late 1520s to the 1570s, the coasts of China were harassed by pirates who were overcome only with great difficulty, including the effective evacuation of a wide coastal strip.168 Nonetheless, there

164 Needham, Nautics, 525. 165 Dreyer, Zheng He, 171-172. 166 The Portuguese arrived in Chinese waters by 1517 and established settlements at (1535) and (1544). The Spanish occupied the Philippines in 1565 and established trade relations with China shortly thereafter. The Dutch arrived in Chinese waters in 1622 and the British in 1637. In 1567 and again in 1619, the Russians tried unsuccessfully to open relations from Siberia. 167 Carlo M. Cipolla, Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of European Expansion 1400-1700 (London: Collins, 1965), 114; Joanna Waley-Cohen, "China and Western Technology in the Late Eighteenth Century," The American Historical Review 98:5 (December 1993),1525-1544, especially 1529-1534. 168 These costly and harsh measures contributed to the decline in piratical acts, but more important were the lifting of the maritime prohibitions in 1567 and the rise of Tokugawa Ieyasu (1568-1603) and the

48 were naval successes. For instance, in 1563 a Ming fleet routed Fujianese pirates, and in 1574 a Ming fleet pursued a pirate force all the way to the Philippines. However, it was only relatively late in the period of pirate incursions that the Ming court came to recognize that the decline of the navy had left a power vacuum which the pirates fleets had filled. The consequent strengthening of the naval forces proved adequate to deal with the remaining pirates over the course of the 1570s.169 This increase in naval strength also proved valuable during the Japanese invasion of Korea (1592-98) when squadrons from Shandong, Fujian and Guangdong fought under the command of the Korean admiral Yi Sun-shin, successfully repelling Japan’s fleets.170

By the 1620s, Ming control began to break down. The combination of factionalism, corruption, incompetence and fiscal bankruptcy meant that the government was unable to respond effectively to military challenges along the coast and elsewhere.171 The court concentrated its efforts against the threat posed by the growing Manchu cavalry armies, thereby reducing the forces available to maintain control elsewhere. This facilitated the re-emergence of well-funded merchant-smugglers who maintained large, heavily-armed fleets. At the same time, the Dutch appeared suddenly in 1622, attacked Macau and then occupied the Penghu (Pescadore) Islands. For the next two years, company ships attacked coastal settlements and shipping. Finally, in 1624 the Ming government assembled a large fleet which surrounded the Dutch fort in the Penghus. The Dutch were forced to agree to withdraw to Taiwan, where Chinese traders would come to them, but nonetheless continued to attack junks sailing the trade routes to Southeast Asia.172

In 1636, as China was rapidly slipping into chaos, a new state was formed in Manchuria under the leader Nurhachi. In 1644, the rebel leader Li Zicheng appeared outside Beijing and was admitted through the treachery of a court eunuch. The last Ming emperor thereupon committed suicide. The Chinese general Wu Sangui, unwilling to support the usurper, called in Nurhachi’s forces to help expel Li. The Manchus advanced on Beijing, occupied northern China and founded the Qing dynasty (1644-1912).173 Over the next year, they battled south and seized control of Nanjing in 1645. The coastal

establishment of an authoritarian, inward-looking government in Japan. Fitzgerald, Southern Expansion, 108. 169 Wills, “Maritime China,” 213-214. 170 A series of naval engagements prevented the Japanese expansion into northwest Korea. These actions prevented the resupply of Japanese land forces and denied the means to communicate with them. Moreover, the joint fleets interrupted supplies coming from Japan which eventually led to the Japanese decision to withdraw. The Imjin War (1592-1598) involved hundreds of thousands of combatants from Japan, Korea and China. Kenneth Swope has called this the "First Great East Asian War," perhaps rather grandly claiming it as a struggle for hegemony over East Asia between Ming China and the Japanese shogun Hideyoshi Toyotomi. See, Kenneth M. Swope, A 's Head and a Serpent's Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War (Norman OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009); and Stephen Turnbull, Samurai Invasion: Japan's Korea War (New York: Cassel, 2002). For the next twenty years the Ming navy was preoccupied with the potential threat posed by Japan. Japanese-based pirates occupied Taiwanese harbours on several occasions and were driven out by a Ming expedition in 1603, and in 1609 a Japanese expedition invaded and occupied the Ryukyus. Wills, “Maritime China,” 214; Stephen Turnbull, The Samurai Capture a King: Okinawa 1609 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2009). 171 Taxation had become extremely heavy and many abuses emerged, notably the creation of great domains by members of the imperial court which drove large numbers of peasants off their land. As a result, brigandage increased and the country drifted into a state of civil war. 172 Wills, “Maritime China,” 216. 173 Needham, Introductory Orientations, 148.

49 provinces quickly became a major focus of resistance as various Ming princes escaped advancing Qing forces by putting out to sea. (See Figure 18.174)

During the Ming-Qing Figure 18: Qing Dynasty transition (1644-1661), resistance was dominated by a succession of Chinese pirate leaders. The most famous of these was Zheng Chenggong () who operated from a stronghold on Xiamen. Beginning in 1651, Zheng marshalled growing naval strength and launched periodic raids against mainland garrisons and harried Qing fleets. By 1655, the remnants of the Ming court were increasingly isolated in the far southwest of China. In that year, the Qing court promulgated general prohibitions against maritime activities, including enforced coastal evacuation. In May 1656, Qing forces assaulted Jinmen (Quemoy) Island. In the ensuing battle, Zheng destroyed the attacking Qing fleet. After a long period of unsuccessful negotiations, Zheng launched a campaign into Zhejiang in August 1659. His force consisted of 2,000 vessels carrying approximately 200,000 troops. This fleet sailed up the coast, entered the Yangzi and besieged Nanjing. In September, his army was defeated by a superior Qing force. However, his navy was unscathed and the main body withdrew downstream. Although ultimately unsuccessful, Zheng’s siege of Nanjing profoundly alarmed the Qing court in Beijing.175

In June 1660, Qing fleets attacked Xiamen and Jinmen. While the Qing fleets were defeated, its land forces in Fujian were reinforced. Zheng therefore decided to relocate his main base to Taiwan. After a protracted siege of Casteel Zeelandia (near modern Tainan), the Dutch defenders finally surrendered in February 1662. At the same time, Qing forces blockaded Taiwan, thus preventing reinforcements and resupply from Xiamen. Zheng Chenggong died in June 1662. In 1683, a Qing expedition finally conquered Taiwan - the final stage in the consolidation of Qing rule.176

The Qing dynasty shared the continental, anti-seafaring attitudes of the Ming dynasty, but the strategic rationale was somewhat different. Although the Manchus periodically imposed highly restrictive maritime policies, the Qing dynasty also demonstrated considerable tolerance of maritime activities as a means to pacify the coastal regions and thereby provide some measure of coastal security. Throughout, however, the coastal regions and the maritime world beyond were of relatively little

174 “Map of Qing Dynasty” by CIA (Background map), Derivate work: User: Soewinhan - Originally from CIA [accessed on 22 February 2017 at https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=15099574] (public domain). 175 Lynn A. Struve, “The , 1644-1662,” in Mote and Twitchett, eds., Cambridge History of China, Vol. 7, Part 1, 720-721; Wills, “Maritime China,” 226. 176 Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 721-725; Wills, “Maritime China,” 227-228; and John E. Wills, Jr., “Ch’ing Relations with the Dutch, 1662-1690,” in Fairbank, ed., Chinese World Order, 225-256.

50 interest to the Qing government. As such, those naval forces that were maintained were done so purely for defensive purposes and were configured for coastal and inshore operations. The lack of concerted attention to the development of the navy meant that government fleets were frequently outmatched by pirate-smugglers who periodically raided the southeast coast.

The strategic outlook of the Qing differed from its Ming predecessor.177 It focused less on traditional frontiers, but rather sought to conquer and integrate both Inner Asia and China into one expanded, unified state. And this is precisely what the Manchus did. In a series of massive expeditions in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Qing empire expanded both north and west, defeating Zungharia (an empire straddling the western Gobi Desert, the , the Tarim Basin and Lakes Balkash and Zaisan in the north) and containing Russian influence in the north and northwest in its drive eastward. In the end, the Qing seized control of what is now Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet. With the exception of the independent Mongolian state, the Qing borders are those of the current People's Republic of China.178

To fund this program, revenue had to be extracted from the rice-producing heartland of the lower Yangzi valley. Since the conditions in the coastal areas bore directly on the security of the lower Yangzi region, the court recognized that the ability to tap the resources of the region depended on internal security in coastal regions, and that the successful long-term pacification of the coast depended on continued development of the coastal economy around maritime trade.179 Consequently, the Qing court relied on relatively autonomous local authorities, based on the belief that economic self-interest would guarantee order and stability in coastal regions. At the same time, however, efforts were made to neutralize and isolate the coast from disruptive influences that might create disturbances. Although strategically unimportant, the Qing concern for internal security led to the of Taiwan in 1684 to keep it free from foreigners and rebels; the periodic imposition of controls on emigration and overseas travel; prohibitions on foreign (i.e., Roman Catholic) evangelizing; and the restriction of Western traders to a limited number of ports. For the most part, this pattern of benign neglect and local administration remained in place. Imperial intervention, when it occurred, was to safeguard those interests and to mute conditions that might create disorder.180

When resistance on Taiwan was finally ended, the (r. 1661- 1722) rebuilt the Grand Canal transport system and the coastal economy. Very quickly, the junk trade was legalized, coastal ports were reopened and coastal districts (those which had experienced forced evacuation) were resettled. In addition to tribute trade, the Qing policies permitted Chinese citizens to trade overseas and foreigners to trade at Guangzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo and Shanghai (in 1757, Westerners were restricted to

177 Unlike the Ming, the Qing distinction was not between Chinese and non-Chinese, since they themselves were foreign. Rather, the perspective was one of a Manchu-dominated China surrounded by two crescents: the northwest crescent of Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet, areas where the socio-economic structure resembled Manchu society; and the southeast crescent of Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia, areas which resembled the intensive agriculture of China. The Manchu world therefore comprised two parts: China and its surrounding crescents, which formed a closed socio-economic system; and the world beyond. Mark Mancall, “The Ch’ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay,” in Fairbank, ed., Chinese World Order, 73-74. 178 For a masterful account of this imperial expansion, see Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2005). 179 Jane Kate Leonard, “Geopolitical Reality and the Disappearance of the Maritime Frontier in Qing Times,” The American Neptune 48:4 (Fall 1988), 230-234. 180 Leonard, “Geopolitical Reality,” 234-236.

51 Guangzhou only). The responsibility for port management was given to local customs and port officials, the administration of which varied from port to port without interference from higher authorities.181 However, Kangxi’s death marked the end of these pragmatic approaches.

In 1727, the (r. 1722-36) issued an edict ordering strict control and, if possible, outright prohibition of Chinese emigration abroad and the return of emigrants to their home provinces. In general, the policy turned to strict Confucian attitudes towards commerce, while continuing worries about the unruly coastal populations undoubtedly contributed to the decision. However, the reimposition of restrictions exacerbated the problems of maintaining control over coastal areas which in turn reinforced the Qing tendency to see the maritime world as a centre of subversion. The Yongzheng and early Qianlong (r. 1736-96) periods therefore saw increasingly restrictive measures to control Chinese overseas trade and to limit European trade to Guangzhou. There were no formal diplomatic relations between China and any European state, and those political relationships that existed were, at least theoretically, conducted solely through the auspices of the tributary system.182 By the end of the eighteenth century, trade was expanding, although much of it was outside legal channels, and piracy was again on the rise.183

Although there were intermittent periods of naval interest and activity, overall the Qing period was one of insularity and reactivity. The emphasis was one of fortifying the coasts to limit foreign and pirate influences rather than establishing a strong naval presence to prevent such incursions. Most Qing era warships were short-range vessels designed to police estuaries and harbours and no ocean-going vessels were constructed. Thus, although the Qing empire remained a formidable land power until the end of the eighteenth century, it was ineffective at sea.

Prior to the War, the most serious threat to stability and control along the southeast coast was the re-emergence of a serious pirate threat in Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang between 1790 and 1810. The situation was further complicated when Annam’s navy raided the Chinese coast throughout the 1790s until 1802.184 This period of pirate activity became protracted because of lack of central government attention to the escalating problem and the inability of provincial administrators to take concerted and coordinated measures before the situation reached crisis proportions. During the 1790s, the Qing government was preoccupied with the anti-Manchu (1796-1804), centred in the provinces of Hubei, Sichuan and Shaanxi, which threatened Qing control in the region north of the Yangzi gorges and the upper waters of the Han River. As a consequence, central authorities paid little attention to events in the coastal areas. Moreover, local authorities, charged with suppressing the pirate threat,

181 Leonard, “Geopolitical Reality,” 234. 182 The Qing tribute system was more flexible than that of the Ming. While trade followed upon presentation of tribute to the emperor, trade also took place along the frontier without the presentation of tribute. Hence, tribute was not a prerequisite for commercial exchange, but did serve to sanction commercial activity in the eyes of the court. Without tributary relations, there could be no formal diplomatic relations. Mancall, “Ch’ing Tribute System,” 75-77, 81-82. 183 Wills, “Maritime China,” 233; Fairbank, “Maritime and Continental,” 19-20. 184 After a period of civil war, the Nguyen usurper seized the Annamese throne in 1788. To protect his political position, the new king needed to strengthen his military. He supplemented his income by raiding the Chinese coast. Nguyen rule lasted until 1802.

52 frequently colluded with the pirates, while provincial naval commanders were reluctant to challenge the pirate fleets.185

As such, the pirate threat continued to escalate and it reached crisis proportions in Guangdong in 1804.186 By 1805, a pirate confederation of 70,000 men and 2,000 vessels controlled Guangdong’s coastal trade and fishing industry, and its repeated occupation of the delta disrupted trade.187 As in previous periods of heightened piracy attacks, the provincial authorities responded defensively. Officials registered all residents, formed local militias, removed citizens to garrison towns, meted out severe punishments to those caught supplying the pirates, and offered rewards for pirates who voluntarily surrendered.188 In addition, as the gravity of the situation along the coast become apparent, authorization was granted to take steps to modernize the provincial fleets in the affected provinces.

After the effective elimination of the piracy threat, Qing authorities again became complacent, believing that control of the coast was secure. In reality, thereafter the Qing government was never able to regain full authority over the southeast coast as foreigners linked up with Triad members to smuggle opium. The Chinese fleets of the early nineteenth century were not substantially different from what existed during the Ming period. The difference was that in the nineteenth century, the Chinese confronted the maritime power of European states.

Early in the century, China had a positive trade balance, but by the late 1820s this had shifted in favour of the West, due largely to opium consumption.189 The Qing government became alarmed by ubiquitous opium use, official corruption surrounding

185 For instance, Qian, the most celebrated pirate leader in the East China Sea at the time, was in a weakened position in 1803. Nevertheless, he succeeded in bribing a Fujianese shipbuilder to supply him with ships (which were constructed under the noses of the officials) and was able to escape with them to Taiwan. Wei Peh T’i, “Internal Security and Coastal Control: Juan Yuan and Pirate Suppression in Chekiang, 1799-1809,” Ch’ing-shih wen-t’i [Late Imperial China] 4:2 (December 1979), 92-93. 186 Given the negative effect on Western shipping, the Portuguese had tried to cooperate with the Guangdong provincial navy to eradicate the pirate threat. In April 1804, the Chinese allowed two Portuguese ships to accompany a fleet of 20 war-junks on a piracy patrol. However, the Chinese were unwilling to engage the pirates. Again in September, a Chinese fleet cornered 200 pirate junks in port to the west of Guangzhou. According to the Portuguese, the Chinese commander refused to attack but instead provisioned the pirates. Dian Murray, “Commerce, Crisis, Coercion: The Role of Piracy in Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century Sino-Western Relations,” The American Neptune 48:4 (Summer 1990), 238- 239. 187 Although the Guangdong provincial navy had proven unwilling or unable to suppress the pirate threat at sea, local officials refused to acknowledge the seriousness of the problem and were reluctant to solicit assistance from the European powers. On the few occasions when Chinese officials permitted Western participation, the pirate threat diminished markedly. For instance, in a two-week period towards the end of 1809, the British ship Mercury sailed with a Guangdong fleet. The appearance of the British ship, and its employment of grapeshot, forced the pirates to withdraw. Murray, “Commerce, Crisis,” 237 & 241. 188 Residents caught supplying pirates with rice and saltpetre (potassium nitrate) were executed. Wei, “Internal Security,” 86-93. 189 Between 1800 and 1818, opium imports totalled roughly 4,000 chests per year (1 chest = 63.5 kilos). After 1819, a sudden drop in the price of opium stimulated consumption. In 1820, the Guangdong authorities cracked down on the traffic through Macau, which then shifted to the island of Lintin. In 1832, the British trader Jardine began sending his ships north to sell opium directly along the coasts of Fujian and Zhejiang. This created new markets and pushed opium sales higher. By 1836, approximately 1,800 tonnes of opium entered China every year and foreign traders estimated that there were some 12.5 million Chinese opium smokers. Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “The Canton Trade and the Opium War,” in John K. Fairbank, ed., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 10, Late Ch’ing 1800-1911, Part 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 171-173.

53 the trade and the drain of bulk silver out of China. As a result, the (1821-50) appointed Zexu as Imperial Commissioner to compel the foreign traders to stop bringing opium to China. The imperial edict for his appointment read in part:

After Lin Tse-hsü [Zexu] reaches Kwangtung [Guangdong], he must reverently obey Our order to exert all his strength to resolve this matter by clearing up the source of this fraud. This does not only refer to the province’s opium brokers and fast crabs [ xie – the small vessels which transported opium], or its opium houses, warehouses, divans and other glaring aspects of corruption. It also means that he must, according to the place and circumstances, radically sever the trunk from the roots.190

In March 1839, some 20,000 opium chests were surrendered, and Lin demanded that traders sign bonds agreeing not to trade in opium. Fearing arrest, the British community evacuated to Macau. In August, Lin blockaded Macau and the British took to their ships and anchored across the bay near modern , whereupon Chinese naval militia cordoned the shoreline to keep the British from landing for provisions. Later that month, the British superintendent of trade took a fleet to Kowloon and ordered the Qing commander to hand over provisions. The commander refused, the British opened fire and routed a Chinese squadron. In November, the first major skirmish occurred when the British dispersed a squadron of 29 war-junks, destroying four.191 Consequently, in 1840 Britain went to war with China to recover the value of confiscated, albeit illegal, property.192

Between June 1840, with the arrival of a British fleet off Guangzhou, and August 1842, when the Chinese agreed to negotiate terms, a series of naval and land engagements exposed Chinese military weakness along the coast from Tianjin to Guangdong.193 On 11 August 1842, the day of the planned attack on Nanjing, emissaries arrived from the imperial court to negotiate terms. Eighteen days later the Treaty of Nanjing was signed.194 The decisive Chinese defeat in the Opium War was owed almost entirely to China’s naval weakness. In hindsight, it is ironic that Chinese officials went into the conflict so optimistic. This can only be explained by a complete failure to appreciate the overwhelming superiority of the British in terms of technology, training and leadership. Tactically, the Chinese consistently occupied coastal fortresses with artillery riveted in place to face massed frontal attacks. Time and again, the British

190 Lin was appointed Imperial Commissioner for Frontier Defence, which also gave him control of all the naval forces in Guangdong. Chouban yiwu shi (A Complete Account of the Management of Barbarian Affairs), Daoguang period, 5.17, as quoted in Wakeman, “Canton Trade,” 184-185. 191 The emperor was told of the battle, but not of the defeat. He therefore ordered the complete expulsion of the British from China. Wakeman, “Canton Trade,” 188-192; Peter Ward Fay, The Opium War 1840-1842 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 230. 192 In a larger sense, the Opium War was fought to abolish barriers to British commerce. In 1833, the British parliament created the position of British superintendent of trade in Guangzhou and appointed Lord Napier. In July 1834, he attempted to present a letter of announcement to the governor-general of the region. The letter was rejected since direct contact between Chinese officials and foreigners was prohibited. Fay, Opium War, 67-79. 193 For an overview of the progress of the Opium War, see Gerald S. Graham, The China Station: War and Diplomacy 1830-1860 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), especially Ch. 4-8, 85-229; Fay, Opium War. 194 Treaty provisions included payment of an indemnity; the opening of Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo and Shanghai, with British consuls at each treaty port; communications to be in the form used among equals; the abolition of the Cohong monopoly (i.e., non-supervised trade); a fair and regular tariff on imports and exports; and the ceding of Hong Kong in perpetuity.

54 simply landed under supporting naval fire and attacked from the flanks to seize the emplacements. The Daoguang Emperor summed up the situation in an 1842 edict:

...[in] the invasion by the rebellious barbarians, they depended upon their strong ships and effective guns to commit outrageous acts on the seas and harm our people, largely because the native war-junks are too small to match them. For this reason I, the Emperor, repeatedly ordered our generals to resist on land and not to fight on seas...In my opinion what the rebellious barbarians rely upon is the fact that Chinese war-junks are incapable of going out to sea to fight them.195

The shock of the Opium War was that it disrupted the long-standing assumptions of Chinese foreign policy: China’s superiority in warfare; her skill in "civilizing" foreigners; and her possession of precious trading goods to bring foreigners to accept tributary status. The defeat compelled China to open its market to the outside world. The were opened in 1843-44 and trade treaties were signed with France and the United States in 1844. Through the bilateral treaties, the Qing policy was to attempt to pacify the foreigners at the treaty ports.196 The treaties represented a defeat of the Qing, even if the officials termed it "pacifying" the barbarians or "bringing them under control." At the same time, the Qing began a program of military reconstruction along the coast, including the installation of new batteries and garrisons. However, the impetus to acquire Western arms diminished, given the success of the "pacification" program, and no great effort was made to build Chinese military power on modern lines.

The defeat also weakened the Qing government, diminishing Chinese prestige and authority. From this point, Qing dynastic rule began to disintegrate, at least in the coastal areas, as traditional Chinese society was disrupted by foreign influences. The pseudo-Christian (1850-64) was the largest and most serious revolt against the government. Simultaneous with Muslim revolts in the northwest, the Taipings and triad societies undermined Qing authority in a wide stretch of Chinese territory from Guangzhou to Beijing.197 Moreover, the rise of the triads and other gangsters led to renewed incidences of piracy as these groups vied for control of the trade in both opium and coolies. In such a confused setting, and distracted by internal challenges, the government acquiesced to foreign dominance in the treaty ports.198 In 1854, new

195 Quoted in Carlo M. Cipolla, Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of European Expansion 1400-1700 (London: Collins, 1965), 139. 196 John Fairbank argued that the treaties were only the latest phase in the traditional "management" of barbarian affairs. In short, from the Chinese point of view, the treaty system was little more than a refurbishing of the traditional tribute system. John K. Fairbank, “The Early Treaty System in the Chinese World Order,” in John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 257-275. 197 In 1853, the Taipings captured Nanjing. For much of the next eleven years they controlled large tracts of territory from Guangxi to Jiangsu, but were ultimately defeated by superior government forces in July 1864. For a comprehensive account of the Taiping Rebellion, see Jonathan D. Spence, God’s Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan (New York & London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1996). For a discussion of the rebellion and the other internal disorders of this period, see Jack Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to the 1980s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 52-76; and Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991), 165-178, 184-193. 198 In 1850, the British consul in Xiamen estimated that there were 3,000 Chinese pirates active along the Fujian coast. As a result, British naval units began to conduct anti-piracy patrols. John K. Fairbank, “The Creation of the Treaty System,” in John K. Fairbank, ed., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 10, Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 235-36. For a discussion of the British role both during and after the Taiping Rebellion, see Malcolm H. Murfett, “An Old Fashioned Form of

55 institutions were created in an attempt to impose a modicum of order in coastal areas. One key measure was the establishment of foreign inspectorates of customs, whereby the Qing hired Westerners into the Chinese civil service to ensure that foreign merchants obeyed the tariff and trade regulations. Over time, the customs service became an efficient means by which to collect tariffs.199

During the so-called Arrow War (1856-1860)200, the Qing government was no better prepared to offer naval resistance than it had been during the Opium War. In the naval battles at Guangzhou and Dagu, Chinese defences were essentially unchanged. The Dagu forts, at the mouth of the , were taken by British-French forces in August 1860. The conflict culminated with the Anglo-French occupation of Beijing and the burning of the in the autumn of that year. The settlement that followed extended foreign administrative control of concession areas in the treaty ports, gave Kowloon to Britain, led to the opening of eleven more treaty ports and established consular jurisdiction over treaty power nationals. In addition, the Western powers were permitted to station warships and troops in China and foreign shipping could compete in China’s coastal and riverine trade.

China’s defeat in two wars and the Anglo-French occupation of Beijing shocked the more pragmatic Qing officials into a realization that a new international situation had set in and that the Westerners were fundamentally different from the barbarians China had encountered in the past. These officials believed that it was imperative for China to accept this reality, to modernize her diplomatic practices, to create Western-style industry and enterprises and to employ foreigners to help manage the new situation.201 As a result, by 1863 ziqiang, the "self-strengthening" movement, emerged as the dominant policy direction of the government. Self-strengthening was part of a Qing foreign policy that emphasized conciliation with the European powers and acceptance of the treaty system. While the major emphasis was on peace with the foreign powers, a build-up of China’s financial and military strength was deemed important for the preservation of that peace.

China’s interests in modernization and reform were essentially conservative. The goal was to preserve Confucian institutions by the limited use of foreign military techniques - to acquire the technology, which the Chinese regarded as the basis of Western military power, in preparation for future confrontation with the foreign powers.202

Protectionism: The Role Played by British Naval Power in China from 1860-1941,” The American Neptune 50:3 (Summer 1990), 178-180. 199 Fairbank, “Creation of the Treaty System,” 241-242. In addition, opium was legalized in 1858. 200 Fairbank, “Creation of the Treaty System,” 259-60. Moreover, took advantage of China’s vulnerability and annexed the region in 1858 and the coastal provinces of northeast Manchuria in1860, thereby cutting off China from the Sea of Japan. Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China’s Quest for Seapower (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982), 75. 201 Immanuel C.Y. Hsü, “Late Ch’ing Foreign Relations, 1866-1905,” in Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank, eds., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 11, Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 70. 202 Four stages have been identified in the responses of both China and Japan to the Western "impact": recognition of Western military superiority; recognition of Western scientific technology as the basis of military superiority; recognition of the need to train personnel in Western ; and recognition that scientific technology in the military sphere was merely part of Western science and technology in general, and that in order to develop it, the pure science and general learning of the West had to be introduced. These phases unfolded relatively slowly in China, while in Japan they occurred almost simultaneously. Richard J. Smith, “Reflections on the Comparative Study of Modernisation in China and Japan: Military Aspects,” Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 16 (1976), 13.

56 Self-strengthening was embodied in the slogan zhongxue weiti, xixue weiyong ("Chinese learning for the fundamentals, Western learning for practical application").203 Thus, Chinese reforms were largely the selection of certain technologies and practices while preserving the essential features of Chinese institutions and culture.204

In 1874, a major policy debate erupted over the relative importance of coastal and frontier defence. In 1862, a Muslim rebellion in Shaanxi had quickly spread to Gansu and Xinjiang. Consequently, much of the northwest was in revolt. Nearly all of Xinjiang had fallen to the Khokandi leader, Yakub Beg, and the Valley was occupied by Russia in 1871. Between 1868-73, the Governor-General of Shaanxi and Gansu led a campaign which finally cleared these provinces of Muslim rebels, at incredible expense to the imperial court.205 At the moment when preparations were set for a military campaign into Xinjiang, Japan invaded Taiwan. China’s inability to defend Taiwan led to the decision to buy off rather than fight the aggressor.206 While Taiwan was reinforced by 10,000 troops, the question in 1874 was whether China could support a naval program to strengthen coastal defences while simultaneously conducting a major campaign in Xinjiang.

The maritime advocates argued that border defence was not as urgent given Beijing’s proximity to the coast and Xinjiang’s distance from the capital. Financial exigency and the uncertainty of victory also compelled re-examination of the Xinjiang campaign policy. Moreover, Xinjiang was deemed of little practical use and was not worth the cost of maintaining it, and it was surrounded by strong neighbours and could not be defended effectively except at exorbitant cost. In effect, to postpone the recovery of Xinjiang was a sensible way to preserve China’s strength for the future. While most officials acknowledged the importance of the naval program, they argued that it should not be undertaken at the expense of defending the frontiers. Officials argued that Xinjiang was the first line of defence in the northwest, protecting Mongolia and Beijing. In addition, they noted that there was no immediate danger of invasion from Western nations which were primarily interested in trade. Therefore, there was no pressing requirement to shift resources to the navy.207 The court was ultimately convinced that any interruption in the Xinjiang campaign would only hamper frontier defence without benefiting coastal defence.

Although the steppe-oriented strategic focus was reconfirmed, maritime defence was not totally disregarded. However, because of the unexpectedly high expenses

203 This phrase was probably coined by Feng Guifen, an advisor to , who was instrumental in establishing a school of Western languages and in Shanghai in 1863. See his essays, “On the Adoption of Western Knowledge,” and “On the Manufacture of Foreign Weapons,” Jiaobinlu kangyi (Personal protests from the study of Jiaobin), in and Fairbank, China’s Response to the West, 51-54. 204 For a discussion of the "self-strengthening" movement and Chinese attempts to adapt Western technology to China’s traditional political-military system, see Kuo Ting-Yee, “Self-Strengthening: The Pursuit of Western Technology,” in Fairbank, ed., Cambridge History of China, Vol. 10, Part 1, 490-542. 205 For a discussion of the Muslim revolts and the Chinese campaigns in the northwest, see Liu Kwang- Ching, “The Military Challenge: The North-West and the Coast,” in Twitchett and Fairbank, eds, Cambridge History of China, Vol. 11, Part 2, 211-243. 206 Japan invaded Taiwan on the pretext of punishing local inhabitants for killing shipwrecked Ryukyuan sailors three years before. In effect, Japan was claiming suzerainty over the Ryukyus. When Japan threatened further action, the Qing government decided to pay an indemnity and to refrain from condemning the Japanese action. This, in turn, implied recognition of Japanese sovereignty over the Ryukyus. Japanese forces thereupon withdrew. 207 Immanuel C.Y. Hsü, “The Great Policy Debate in China, 1874: Maritime Defence vs. Frontier Defence,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 25 (1964-65), 218, 222-223.

57 associated with the Xinjiang campaign, not to mention excesses at court, only minimal revenue was provided for naval modernization. In 1874, amid the Taiwan crisis, Wen Xiang, the veteran (Foreign Ministry) official, bluntly memorialized the court:

It is humbly hoped that imperial orders will be sent to the Ministry of Revenue and the Imperial Household Department to raise plenty of the necessary supplies, to cut off lavish expenditures, to stop public works which are not urgent, and to plan for the most needed coastal defence...When Your Majesty is concerned to work diligently and alertly, then your ministers within and without the capital will be stimulated in spirit and not dare to follow their traditional dawdling habits. Otherwise they will remain accustomed to taking things complacently and will never think of reforms, in which case, I fear that internally and externally the country will fall apart, the people’s confidence will be shaken, and the disaster will be unspeakable.208

Moreover, the navy remained poorly organized. The lack of strong central leadership and the increasingly decentralized and strained political structure nurtured competition between China’s regional and provincial leaders.209 By 1882, the Chinese navy had acquired some 50 steam warships, roughly one-half of them Chinese built. However, they were dispersed among four distinct fleets which were not standardized within, let alone between, units.

In the Sino-French War (1884-85), the Guangzhou and (North Sea) Fleets were hardly involved. The southern commissioner, controlling the (South Sea) Fleet, and presumably responsible for a naval war fought along the southern coast, participated only grudgingly and late.210 This war was the first external of China’s modernization program and China did not fare well. In two years of sporadic fighting on land and at sea, the Chinese suffered heavy losses. In the end, China lost its traditional claim of suzerainty over Vietnam and had to allow French commercial penetration into China’s southern interior provinces.

The emerged from the conflict unscathed and Li Hongzhang, the governor-general in the north, in a strengthened position at court.211 The growth of the Beiyang Fleet was substantial, and in 1881 it took delivery of two from Britain, in recognition of the need for larger, offensively-capable warships which could operate away from the coast (following threatening moves by a Russian flotilla off the northern coast in August 1880). This purchase was followed in 1884 by the delivery of two battleships, one and a number of torpedo boats from Germany. Finally, in 1887, the fleet took delivery of two more cruisers from Britain. All of this was part of Li’s plan to purchase a navy, as well as to create bases and arsenals to support his growing fleet.

208 Wen Xiang, Wen Wenzhonggong Shilüe, 1874, in Teng and Fairbank, China’s response to the West, 90. 209 In the spring of 1875, Beijing established the Haifang, or Sea Defence Fund, to be one-half of the forty percent remissions from the maritime customs receipts. In theory at least, it was to be divided equally between the northern and southern commissioners. 210 In 1859, the French sent troops into Saigon to punish anti-missionary actions. In 1862, a treaty gave France the right to trade, control of Vietnam’s foreign relations and the cession of three southern provinces (Cochin China). A revised treaty in 1874 reduced Vietnam to a virtual . China took no action but refused to recognize the treaty. By 1880, French troops were stationed in Hanoi and Haiphong. As a result, Vietnam strengthened its ties with China. By 1883, regular Chinese troops were active in northern Vietnam. Hsü, “Late Ch’ing,” 96-97. 211 More than eighty percent of all Qing government projects undertaken in the name of self-strengthening between 1872 and 1885 were launched under Li Hongzhang’s aegis. Liu, “Military Challenge,” 243.

58 By the turn of the decade, the Beiyang Fleet was by far the most formidable naval force in China, and was, arguably, in technological terms a match for Western flotillas deployed in and around China, and the rapidly modernizing Japanese navy.212

In 1885, the necessity of naval structural reform was recognized and a Haijun Yamen (Admiralty) was formed under Prince Chun, the father of the (1889-1908). Although the Haijun Yamen made gestures towards reform, it was utilized largely to compel the provinces to deliver more funds for the naval program.213 Despite this change, numerous problems remained unresolved. China’s fleets continued to be under regional or provincial command, with the consequent absence of coordination. Warships and weaponry were procured from a wide variety of sources, and there was no standardization within or between fleets, or in the gun types used in coastal fortifications within or between localities. Moreover, the traditional concern with fixed coastal fortifications remained, drawing resources away from ship construction and fleet readiness. Despite the funds devoted to warship acquisition and infrastructure, little attention was paid to training, fleet tactics and logistical support. The navy continued to rely on foreign advisors, but there was minimal interest in training, especially gunnery.214 Additionally, there was no strategic concept governing naval operations; even within the Beiyang Fleet, there was no clear sense of what roles the navy could and should undertake in time of war. Finally, there was neither coherent planning or centralized control, and as such the Chinese navy was unable to come together as a single fighting force. All of these problems went unresolved with disastrous effect in 1894.

The Tianjin Convention (1885) made Korea a joint protectorate of China and Japan.215 By July 1894, both Japan and China had troops in Korea, but Japan refused to withdraw following suppression of the Tongshak Rebellion and demanded Chinese

212 In 1882, Li obtained the services of Capt William Long, RN who served as chief inspector of the fleet for two years, with the task of training Beiyang personnel. Lang returned to China in 1886, and in 1888 he set about reorganizing the Tianjin Naval Academy and professionalizing fleet operations. However, resentment among senior naval officers, as well as the ambiguity of his status in the fleet, led to his resignation in 1890. 213 The Guangxu Emperor reached the age of majority in 1886. However, the Dowager Empress Cixi extended her regency by three years so that Prince Chun could keep his post (and the dowager empress could keep the reins of power). Against a backdrop of formalized, official corruption, modernization projects were used as a source of revenue by officials at all levels. The most famous example was the use of millions of taels of silver, intended for the navy, which were diverted to the construction of the Summer Palace. As one British observer noted, “Li [Hongzhang], undoubtedly, was unwilling or unable to stop this corruption among his subordinates; that he himself took ample advantage of his opportunities is strongly asserted, and it is quite certain that everyone else concerned in the purchase and provision of war materiel feathered his nest handsomely, and not the least so those of Li’s own household.” Maj. A.E.J. Cavendish, “The Armed Strength (?) of China,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 42 (June 1898), 721. 214 Liu, “Military Challenge,” 253-257; John L. Rawlinson, China’s Struggle for Seapower (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982), 131-151. In July 1891, the Beiyang Fleet visited Yokohama, where Admiral hosted Admiral Togo aboard the flagship Ding Yuan. Ding was astonished that Togo did not praise the ship. To Togo, then commander of the Yokohama naval base, the crew lacked discipline, the guns were not clean and were, moreover, festooned with laundry. 215 Japan renewed its interest in Korea following the Meiji Restoration of 1868. In 1876, although remaining a Chinese tributary state, Korea entered into treaty relations with Japan. In December 1884, a pro-Japanese group attempted a coup d’état in Korea. A pro-Chinese group overwhelmed the rebels and rescued the king. Japan thereupon dispatched a military expedition and emissary to demand compensation and an apology for the destruction of their legation. Sino-Japanese tensions were resolved with the signing of the Tianjin Convention. Through the agreement, both countries agreed to withdraw their troops within four months; neither country was to train Korean troops; and each agreed to notify the other before dispatching troops to Korea. In March 1894, the pro-Japanese leader Kim Ok-kyuko was assassinated by another Korean in Shanghai. Many in Japan took this as a direct affront, leading to growing agitation for war. With the outbreak of the Tongshak Rebellion, both China and Japan sent troops to Korea. Hsü, “Late Ch’ing,” 104.

59 cooperation to reorganize the Korean government. The Qing government refused, choosing instead to send in more troops. Prior to any declaration of war, on 25 July a Japanese cruiser intercepted the troop carrier Gaoxing, which refused to surrender and was sunk.216 Chinese forces were quickly defeated in a series of battles around Seoul and Pyongyang and in October, the Japanese crossed the into Qing territory. The most decisive naval battle occurred on 17 September 1894, near the mouth of the Yalu River. The Beiyang Fleet escaped total destruction only because the Japanese broke off the engagement at dusk. In all, only four Chinese ships stayed or survived the battle. The Japanese suffered light casualties and lost no ships.

The remnants of the Beiyang Fleet were repaired at Port Arthur where they remained a fleet-in-being. In light of the unopposed Japanese landings above Port Arthur, and fearing an overland strike against the rear of the port, Admiral Ding decided to move the fleet to on the Shandong Peninsula. By the end of November, the fleet was behind defensive mines, booms and sunken junks in Weihai. From late January 1895, Japanese forces landed east of Weihai and its navy blockaded the harbour entrances. The battleship Ding Yuan was sunk on 5 February and the Zhen Yuan was destroyed four days later while trying to break the blockade. On 11 February, Admiral Ding committed suicide and the following day the Beiyang Fleet surrendered.217 Shortly thereafter China sued for peace.

The result of the war was Chinese defeat both on land and at sea. In the (1895), China was forced to recognize Korean independence and the termination of tributary relations. In addition, the government was forced to cede Taiwan, the Penghu (Pescadore) Islands and the Liaodong Peninsula, including Port Arthur, the opening of seven more ports to trade, and a large monetary payment for war damages.

The conduct of the war and the treaty provisions were a blow to Qing prestige. Arguably, this demonstration of Chinese weakness also encouraged further Japanese aggression in the first half of the twentieth century. More immediately, Chinese weakness was exploited by the treaty powers in the ensuing scramble for concessions. In 1897, Germany seized Qingdao and secured mining and railway rights in the surrounding countryside. In December of that year, Russia seized control of the Liaodong Peninsula, which had been restored to China in 1895, and compelled the Chinese government to agree to the construction of the South Manchurian Railway. Britain secured Weihaiwei for 25 years, the "New Territories" for 99 years and a promise that China would not transfer the Yangzi to any other power (Japan secured a similar commitment with regards to Fujian province). Finally, France leased Guangzhou Bay for 99 years and claimed special rights in the southern provinces of Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong, and on the island of (where it took possession of Zhanjiang). Thus, before the turn of the century, China lost control of most of its major ports to various Western powers and Japan.218 (See Figure 19.219)

216 This incident is particularly notorious. The Gaoxing was an unarmed merchantman flying the British . It was transporting approximately 1,200 Chinese troops to Korea when it was stopped by Japanese warships. After sinking the Gaoxing, the Japanese cruiser Naniwa machine-gunned the survivors struggling in the water. No effort was made to rescue the Chinese. Only the British captain, three other Europeans and 41 Chinese survived. W. Laird Clowes, “The Naval War Between China and Japan,” in T.A. (Lord) Brassey, ed., The Naval Annual 1895 (Portsmouth: J. Griffith & Co., 1895), 92-96. 217 For a contemporary account of the naval aspects of the Sino-Japanese War, see Clowes, “Naval War,” 90-143; Rawlinson, China’s Struggle, 174-190. 218 Hsü, “Late Ch’ing,” 111-113; Spence, Search for Modern China, 230-231.

60

China’s defeat in its war with Japan was confirmation of the failed efforts at "Western-style" modernization. That it had been defeated by a smaller neighbour, who had begun modernizing at roughly the same time, was the most humiliating blow. At its most basic level, China’s failure was due to the partial and incomplete institutional reform of the military, including the navy. There was a lack of consensus and coherent planning at the national level, which left the priority between self-strengthening and foreign purchases unresolved, and which left local leaders free, within their financial limitations, to buy what they wanted and from whom they wanted without any regard for standardization. A handful of individual reformers undertook Figure 19: Foreign Spheres of Influence a series of modernizing programs aimed at building up China’s power, but their efforts only succeeded in a limited way due to the hindrances of official opposition and bureaucratic inertia.220 The Qing dynasty refused to sponsor basic institutional change, fearful of upsetting the system of checks and balances that had preserved its rule for more than 200 years. This, in turn, left China’s rulers more concerned with the maintenance of internal control than with the problem of external defence. Consequently, they had little incentive to go beyond the Map commissioned by Japan-America Society of New limited military changes that Hampshire for Portsmouth Peace Treaty website at had enabled them to suppress portsmouthpeacetreaty.com the major rebellions of the Map Design © (copyright symbol) MapWorks 2005, 1860s and 1870s.221 [email protected]

219 www.portsmouthpeacetreaty.com/processes/causes/causes2.html 220 The failure of the modernization program can be attributed largely to the anti-foreign conservatism of the Chinese ruling class, and to the selfishness of certain high officials in particular. China’s failure to reform its military institutions in the nineteenth century prevented the emergence of a modern, Western-trained Chinese officer corps. Lacking sufficient numbers of competent Chinese officers, individual officials found it necessary to continue employing foreigners not only to instruct and drill Chinese forces, but also, occasionally, to them. The presence of foreigners often exacerbated anti-foreign feelings, encouraged foreign interference and created security problems. Whenever a new project based on a Western example was proposed, opposition would be voiced, mostly on ideological rather than factual grounds. Such outcries often influenced the decision of the court against a proposal and, in some cases, put a stop to programs already started. Smith, “Reflections on the Comparative Study,” 15. 221 As a British observer noted in an 1898 article, “It seems a libel on the human race to say that out of the manhood of 300 millions of Chinese a body of good soldiers cannot be made…But China herself cannot do it; the very best human material and the most elaborate instruction would be wasted under the existing native official, who steadily resists all reform in his maladministration.” Cavendish, “Armed Strength,” 723.

61 In the aftermath of the Boxer Uprising (1899-1900),222 Russia sent 200,000 troops into Manchuria, virtually pre-empting Chinese rule there, and became increasingly involved in a rivalry with Japan over control of Manchuria and Korea. One immediate result was the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, which was designed to forestall Russian activities, but which further undermined China’s strategic position. In effect, Chinese territory had become the object in the great power competition in Northeast Asia. While China was not militarily involved in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, the war was fought in the northeast provinces on Chinese territory. Following Russia’s defeat, the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905) returned Manchuria to China, except for the leased territory of Liaodong and the southern section of the Manchurian railway. Japan, in effect, replaced Russia in Manchuria (see Figure 19).

With the outbreak of the revolution in in October 1911 and its rapid spread across China, the loyalty of the navy quickly came into doubt. Admiral Sa Zhenping223 ordered the bombardment of the revolutionaries at Wuhan, but his forces mutinied and he sought refuge in the British consulate in Shanghai. On 12 February 1912, an edict of abdication was issued on behalf of Puyi, the Xuantong Emperor, and dynastic rule in China came to an end.

Following the establishment of republican rule in 1912, political and military disputes plagued China. By August 1917, there were rival regimes in Beijing and Guangzhou, and local military governors or dujun (warlords), gained facto control over large tracts of territory. Although the government in Beijing was recognized internationally, it possessed little real power in an increasingly fractured Chinese political structure. As the north-south divide deepened, foreign naval forces assumed greater responsibility for policing operations.224

The First World War, together with China's internal disunity, gave Japan the opportunity to displace the other colonial powers in China. At the outset of the war, Japan seized the German concessions in Shandong. In May 1915, it issued the infamous "Twenty-One Demands," aimed at securing long-term Japanese rights in Shandong and Manchuria. President Yuan Shikai was forced to acquiesce, and Japan did not return the Shandong concessions until 1922. The "Twenty-One Demands" were not dissimilar to the type of agreements forced upon the Qing in the 1890s. The difference was that in 1915, the imperial scramble had long since ended and China was ostensibly a democratic state fighting on the side of the Western allies. Chinese weakness was further demonstrated by the refusal of the major power at Versailles in 1919 to return the German concessions to China. (Japan only returned them after the 1921-22 Washington Naval Conference.)

222 The Boxer Uprising was aimed primarily at foreigners and Chinese Christians. In October 1900, the Qing court was forced to flee to Xi’an as the foreign expedition advanced on Beijing. Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions, 136-40; Hsü, “Late Ch’ing,” 125-128. An interesting study of this period is Joseph W. Esherick, The Origins of the Boxer Uprising (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987). 223 Admiral Sa’s career was eventful. Between the time that he entered naval service in 1873 and his death in 1951, he served in the imperial, republican and communist navies. 224 By mid-1920, on the Yangzi River alone the Royal Navy had four major warships, including a cruiser, and fifteen modern gunboats. Murfett, “Old Fashioned Form of Protectionism,” 186. In the early 1920s, US and British gunboats on the upper Yangzi coordinated their operations and jointly protected shipping. Tolley, Patrol, 89-90.

62 of the "Twenty-One Demands" generated a mass boycott of Japanese goods and helped spur the emergence of the in 1919, when Chinese students protested against the decision at Versailles to give Shandong to Japan. China had after all joined the war on the condition that previous German concessions would be returned to China. When the war ended, China further requested cancellation of the "Twenty-One Demands" and abolition of all "special rights" in China. These aims were not realised. Versailles was, as a result, viewed as a betrayal by Chinese nationalists, and was thus a seminal event not only for the May Fourth Movement, but of a more radicalized Chinese nationalism.225

As China’s internal struggle intensified, Chinese xenophobia re-emerged as a serious concern in the treaty ports.226 The rising violence associated with anti-foreign activities among leftist and moderate Guomindang (Nationalist Party) members, led the British to restore to China their concessions at Hankou (across the river from Wuhan) and in January 1927. The Nationalists then made threatening noises about the International Settlement at Shanghai, and the foreign powers responded with a show of strength. Although the Guomindang suspended plans for actions in Shanghai, matters intensified upriver in Nanjing. In March, in response to escalating looting and mob actions, British and US warships bombarded the city and then evacuated their nationals. By the end of March, 47 foreign warships were concentrated at Shanghai.227 The Nationalists gradually became more pragmatic and less confrontational in their relations with the Western powers. However, it was not until 1928, with the conclusion of the final phase of the Nationalist's northern expedition that a nominally national government was established.

Foreign powers, especially Japan, continued however to directly influence Chinese domestic political developments. The Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931- 1932 and the intensification of the Nationalist struggle against the Communists in , culminated in the Communist "Long March" to Shaanxi province (1934-1935). And, as early as November 1932, the Nationalist government had debated contingency strategies in the event of war with Japan. The strategy eventually adopted was one of attrition warfare, whereby Chinese forces would dissipate, over-extend and wear down the enemy.228 That war ostensibly began following the Lugouqiao (Marco Polo Bridge)

225 See, Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New York and Toronto: Random House, 2000), especially pages 327-343. 226 The rise of nationalism and the nationalistic appeals of the Guomindang were major contributing factors. The continuation of extra-territoriality and the unequal treaties led to widespread anti-British strikes and boycotts in Hong Kong, Guangzhou and elsewhere. 227 The US had four cruisers, four destroyers, an oiler, a transport, a minesweeper and a gunboat. The British had five cruisers, an aircraft carrier (operating in the mouth of the Yangzi), a destroyer and two gunboats. Japan had six cruisers, seven destroyers and three gunboats. Italy had two cruisers, a sloop and a gunboat. France had two cruisers and a sloop. Spain and Holland each had a cruiser, and Portugal had a sloop. There were eight admirals – three American, three British, one French and one Japanese. Tolley, Yangtze Patrol, 165-166. 228 In November 1932, Chiang Kai-shek argued, “The powerful nation should place her national defence on the border and adopt the offensive, but the weak nation should understand defence in depth and adopt measures accordingly.” In a speech in August 1935, he stated that, “...even if we would lose fifteen provinces of the eighteen provinces of , with Szechwan [Sichuan], Kweichow [Guizhou], and Yunnan provinces in our control, we definitely will beat any enemy, and recover all the lost territory...” Quoted in Wu Hsiang-hsiang, “Total Strategy Used by China and Some Major Engagements in the Sino- Japanese War of 1937-1945,” in Paul K.T. Sih, ed., Nationalist China During the Sino-Japanese War, 1937- 1945 (Hicksville NY: Exposition Press, 1977), 45 and 48.

63 Incident in July 1937. By the end of the month, Japanese forces had consolidated control over the entire Beijing-Tianjin area.

In a major gamble, Chiang Kai-shek attempted to deflect the Japanese campaign in northern China by launching an attack on the Japanese settlement in Shanghai. When fighting began on 13 August, the Chinese had overwhelming numerical superiority, but failed to break the Japanese defensive perimeter. Through September and October, Chinese forces fought with great heroism in the face of heavy bombardment from Japanese warships anchored in the Yangzi and Huangpu Rivers and from Japanese bombers based in Taiwan. Unwilling to retreat, the Nanjing government continued to reinforce its defensive salient around Shanghai.229 In a manner reminiscent of traditional practices, the Chinese navy established a blockade line below the fortifications at Jiangying and many of the older cruisers were sunk as blockships. On 1 November, Japanese forces made an amphibious landing in Hangzhou Bay, to the southwest of Shanghai, and attacked the Chinese right flank. Within a week, these forces threatened the Shanghai defences from the rear. As a result, on 12 November, the Chinese began to withdraw in disorder towards Nanjing and failed to secure and hold prepared defensive positions at . Despite continual bombardment by Japanese aircraft, the blockade line was not broken until December 1937. By then, most of the Chinese vessels were sunk or knocked out of commission. Nanjing fell to the Japanese on 13 December.230

The sacrifices at Shanghai and Nanjing bought the Nationalist government time to complete its withdrawal up the Yangzi to Wuhan and then to .231 By October 1938, the Japanese controlled much of northern China, as far west as the Shaanxi-Shanxi border and all of the coast as far south as Ningbo.232 With the loss of all major ports in 1938, the navy ceased to exist except for those light vessels in the upper reaches of the Yangzi. The survivors, a flotilla of approximately 18 vessels, established another blockade line near Ma’anshan in Anhui province. This flotilla continued to fight and hold portions of the upper Yangzi until 1940, when the remaining ships were scuttled at in central Hubei province.

229 During three months of fighting, more than 250,000 Chinese troops, almost 60 percent of China’s most modern army units, were killed or wounded; Japanese losses were over 40,000. 230 War History Bureau, Ministry of National Defence, Republic of China, Military Campaigns in China: 1924- 1950, translation by LCol W.W. Whitson et al (Taipei: Ministry of National Defence, 1966), 54-55; Spence, Search for Modern China, 446-448; Lloyd Eastman, “Nationalist China During the Sino-Japanese War 1937- 1945,” in John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, eds., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 13, Republican China 1912-1949, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 551-552. In the aftermath of the fall of Nanjing, Japanese troops looted and burned the city, and systematically raped, tortured and murdered an estimated 300,000 Chinese civilians. See, Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (New York: Viking, 1998). 231 Immediately following the Luguoqio Incident, the Nationalist government began removing key industrial enterprises to the interior, and especially those arsenals and assembly plants essential to the war effort. The government also encouraged private enterprises to relocate and organized the removal of the population, government and educational institutions from the coastal provinces to the interior. Eastman, “Nationalist China,” 562-563. 232 In early June 1938, Japanese forces moving toward Kaifeng were halted by the flooding of the Yellow River, whose dikes were blown by Chinese engineers. Although this action stalled the Japanese advance for three months, it also destroyed more than 4,000 Chinese villages, left millions homeless and changed the course of the river so that it emptied into the sea south of the Shandong Peninsula. Eastman, “Nationalist China,” 555; War History Bureau, Military Campaigns, 56-60.

64 Despite the widening of the conflict into Southeast Asia in 1941-42, Japanese forces were unable to move further to the west toward Chongqing.233 With the effective occupation of Southeast Asia, a major Japanese objective was to isolate Chongqing and Nationalist forces in the southwest. Although effective in limiting Chinese contacts with the outside world, the widening of the war ultimately transformed the Sino-Japanese conflict into a secondary theatre. Following the Japanese retreat from Guadalcanal in February 1943, the commitment of Japanese forces began to shift from China to other theatres. As such, the primary role played by Nationalist forces during the course of the Pacific War was to tie down Japanese forces that might otherwise be committed to the south-central Pacific.234 Perhaps the most visible symbol of China’s marginal position in the Allied cause was the Yalta Agreement, in which the status of Manchuria was determined without consultation with the Nationalist government.235

Figure 20:

233 For accounts of the conduct of the Sino-Japanese War, see Alvin D. Coox, “Recourse to Arms: The Sino- Japanese Conflict, 1937-1945,” in Alvin D. Coox and Hilary Conroy, eds., China and Japan: Search for Balance Since World War I (Santa Barbara & Oxford: Clio Books, 1978), 295-321; War History Bureau, Military Campaigns; Eastman, “Nationalist China,” 547-608. 234 Akira Iriye argued that virtually from the beginning of the Pacific War, the Nationalist government knew that the fate of China would be determined in the Pacific theatre. This, naturally enough, coloured Chinese perceptions of the necessity to conduct the war of resistance with aggressiveness. Akira Iriye, “Japanese Aggression and China’s International Position 1931-1949,” in Fairbank and Feuerwerker, eds, Cambridge History of China, Vol. 13, Part 2, 531. 235 Iriye, “Japanese Aggression,” 538. In exchange for Stalin’s promise to enter the war against Japan, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to Soviet control over Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, the lease of the Port Arthur naval base, a predominant Soviet position in (which was to be internationalized), and retention of preponderant interests in the railways in Manchuria over which a joint Sino-Soviet agency would be established.

65 With the surrender of Japan in August 1945, the situation in China rapidly reverted to a struggle between Guomindang and Communist forces. By the end of 1945, the Nationalist government had moved approximately one-half million men to northern China and Manchuria in an attempt to prevent the establishment of Communist control in those areas. During the first year of the civil war (July 1946-June 1947), Nationalist forces captured virtually all the cities and towns in the northeast. However, in the summer of 1947 the Communists launched a major counter-offensive, and by late August, Communist forces had pushed south into Nationalist-controlled central China and opened up a new theatre of operations between the Yellow and Yangzi Rivers. By the end of the year, Communist forces controlled much of and all of Shanxi and Hubei, and were positioned to seize control of Shandong and northern Jiangsu. By the end of 1948, successive defeats had eliminated much of the fighting strength of the Nationalist government.236 In April 1949, Communist forces crossed the Yangzi along a 500 kilometre front, capturing Nanjing, Hangzhou, and Shanghai in quick succession. From July to October, the march south was temporarily blocked by determined resistance in southern Hunan, quickly followed by the capture of Guangzhou and . In April 1950, the last major pockets of resistance were eliminated in Guangxi and on Hainan Island.237 (See Figure 20.238)

The most significant Nationalist naval operation of the civil war period was the ferrying of Guomindang forces and government officials from the mainland to Taiwan. During 1948-49, the Nationalist navy evacuated more than 600,000 military personnel and two million civilians.239 This action enabled Nationalist resistance to Communist rule to continue on the island of Taiwan. Meanwhile, on 1 October 1949 the People’s Republic of China was formally established in Beijing.

236 In a series of campaigns between September 1948 and January 1949, the major concentrations of Nationalist forces in the northeast were destroyed. The Mukden campaign (September-November 1948) ended in the complete defeat of Nationalist forces in Manchuria; the Beijing-Tianjin campaign (November 1948-January 1949) removed the last major obstacle to a Communist march southward to the Yangzi. 237 For an account of the civil war campaigns and a discussion of the causes of the Nationalist failure and Communist success, see Suzanne Pepper, “The KMT-CCP Conflict 1945-1949,” in Fairbank and Feuerwerker, eds., Cambridge History of China, Vol. 13, Part 2, 723-88. 238 United States Army, “Republican China in 1945” [accessed on 22 February 2017 at http://www.usma.edu/history/sitepages/chinese%20civil%20war.aspx], (public domain). 239 Almost the entire government gold reserve, much of the equipment shipped from the US, a large concentration of the Nationalist army, navy and air force were redeployed to Taiwan. In April 1949, the acting president, Li Zongren (Chiang Kai-shek had resigned in January), sought to establish a Nationalist stronghold in Guangdong, Guangxi and the southwest. Chiang refused to commit the forces under his control. As F.F. Liu noted, the victory of the communists was in part due to the default of Nationalist military power. F.F. Liu, A of Modern China 1924-1949 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 264-270.

66

Meanings

If it is possible to glean a recurrent theme across this broad spectrum of Chinese history, it is that China's traditional focus and preoccupation has been continental. China’s Inner Asian frontier, extending from Tibet and Xinjiang to Mongolia and Manchuria, was populated by nomadic tribes, skilled in mounted warfare, which periodically united to invade China and sometimes overthrew Chinese dynasties. From the tenth century through to the early twentieth century, alien dynasties controlled all or part of China for more than half of that time. Consequently, China’s land frontiers have presented a fundamental challenge to every Chinese government’s efforts to maintain an adequate defence against external attack.

Despite China’s geographical vulnerability, the world in which China operated was largely one centred on its culture, resources and political power. Throughout most of its history, the Chinese state confronted no peer competitors in Asia, and other states were normally expected to acknowledge the superior position of the Chinese emperor in what was a hierarchical, sinocentric world order.240 China’s geopolitical centrality was strengthened by its sheer size relative to its neighbours, the high level of economic self- sufficiency and abundance of resources, and the resulting significant level of economic influence China exerted over its smaller neighbours.241 China was, therefore, very much the "prize" in Asia – the pre-eminent economic, cultural and political entity around which the region was oriented, at least from China's perspective.242

Generally speaking, China was a self-sufficient, agrarian-based society in which Confucian tenets reinforced China's psychological insularity and placed little or no value on foreign trade or contacts. This generalization, of course, did not apply as strongly to the coastal provinces. Nevertheless, despite the fact that China's rulers sat upon an empire which maintained thriving economic relations with neighbouring and more distant states through land- and sea-based trade, this activity was rarely regarded as an important activity, and successive dynasties sought to curb it to the degree possible.

This attitude shaped the central government's approach to developments in coastal areas, to the defence of those regions and the importance it attached to the development of naval power and its functions in the defence of the empire. Moreover, in contrast to the critical military-strategic vulnerability of its land frontiers, China’s extensive coastal rim was frequently characterized by rebellion and lawlessness, but until the nineteenth century no major invasion of China came by sea. Japan and states located in modern-day Vietnam at times posed security threats to imperial China, but never threatened to overthrow dynastic rule over the Chinese heartland. In the modern

240 John E. Wills, Jr., “Ch’ing Relations with the Dutch, 1662-1690,” in John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 252. 241 Wang Gungwu, “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay,” in Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order, pp. 36-51. 242 Wills, “Ch’ing Relations,” pp. 253-254. While Chinese officials now stress the need for China to attain the status, respect and influence of a major power – to attain equality with other major powers – the notion persists that China should enjoy a pre-eminent place among neighbouring Asian states. Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present and Future, MR-1121-AF (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), p. 15; W.J.F. Jenner, The Tyranny of History: The Roots of China’s Crisis (London: Penguin Books, 1994), pp. 92-93.

67 era, major threats or security concerns were posed by imperialist powers such as Great Britain, France, Japan and Russia, only the latter of which came via the land.

The coastal regions were peripheral to the fundamental interests of most dynasties in geographical as well as psychological terms. Despite the scope of tributary trade coming via the sea, there was a pervasive lack of interest in any widening of that trade. The low status of merchants only reinforced the lack of interest in trade. In general, therefore, given their close association with foreign trade and in light of frequent, albeit mostly unsuccessful, efforts to curb that trade, the coastal regions were regarded as dangerous and disruptive areas. Periodically, the coastal regions took on heightened importance but this was typically only when lawlessness, which was an outgrowth of periodic efforts to impose restrictive trade policies, threatened the tranquility of the empire. Nevertheless, such coastal "threats" were never a direct challenge to the central government, and local officials were mostly left to deal with those problems (i.e., to curb foreign influences and piracy, and to impose order).

The abrupt termination of the Ming voyages reflected tensions within the court - between an expansive approach to foreign relations and a mistrust of the implications of that expansiveness to the security and cohesiveness of the Chinese empire. As traditional approaches reasserted themselves, later emperors chose to consolidate imperial administration and maritime activities were reduced to the minimum needed to protect the coasts and shipping from attacks by pirates. It was only the catastrophic events of the nineteenth century that forced the government to begin to address its naval requirements, but it was never able to overcome its cultural predisposition to downplay the importance of its coastal littoral and the threats emanating from the maritime realm.

Looking across the span of Chinese history, there were eight unifications of what we now think of China - Qin, Han, Western Jin, Sui, Tang, Ming, Qing and the People's Republic of China. Two occurred under alien dynasties - the Mongolian Yuan and the Manchurian Qing. Yuri Pines has argued that the futile search for a viable multi-state system during the Spring and Autumn period led Warring States thinkers of most schools of thought to advocate "stability through unity."243 However, they differed over the means to achieve da yitong ("The Great Unity"), especially the advocacy of the use of force by the Legalists that contributed to the first unification under the Qin dynasty. Nevertheless, despite periods of internal turmoil and foreign conquest, the sense persisted of belonging to a common economic, military and cultural realm.244 This is reflected in the term tianxia ("all under heaven"). This quest for unity persists today.

It is perhaps ironic that China's present borders are the result of Qing conquests in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, including the incorporation of Xinjiang, Tibet, Mongolia, Manchuria and Taiwan. The Communist regime is, to date, a relatively short-lived "dynasty" compared to the Han, Tang, Ming and Qing dynasties. The regime's preoccupation with internal stability and security, reunification with Taiwan, diplomatic inflexibility with regard to land and maritime territorial claims, and apparent willingness to use force in defence of those interests, reflects the da yitong and tianxia paradigms, particularly as reflected in the Legalist tradition. This is a subject worthy of further study.

243 Yuri Pines, ""The One that Pervades All" in Ancient Chinese Political Thought: The Origins of "The Great Unity" Paradigm," T'oung Pao 86:4/5 (2000), 301-315. 244 Ibid, 300.

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