The Influence of History on Modern Chinese Strategic Thinking
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THE INFLUENCE OF HISTORY ON MODERN CHINESE STRATEGIC THINKING By S. Elizabeth Speed, Ph.D. 106 - 1386 West 73rd Avenue, Vancouver, B.C., V6P 3E8. February '5'&5''&& PWGSC Contract Number: WW7714-15-6105 Contract Scientific Authority: Ben Lombardi – Strategic Analyst 7KHVFLHQWLILFRUWHFKQLFDOYDOLGLW\RIWKLV&RQWUDFW5HSRUWLVHQWLUHO\WKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\RIWKH&RQWUDFWRUDQGWKH FRQWHQWVGRQRWQHFHVVDULO\KDYHWKHDSSURYDORUHQGRUVHPHQWRI'HSDUWPHQWRI1DWLRQDO'HIHQFHRI&DQDGD +HU0DMHVW\WKH4XHHQLQ5LJKWRI&DQDGDDVUHSUHVHQWHGE\WKH0LQLVWHURI1DWLRQDO'HIHQFH7 6D0DMHVWpOD5HLQH HQGURLWGX&DQDGD WHOOHTXHUHSUpVHQWpHSDUOHPLQLVWUHGHOD'pIHQVHQDWLRQDOH7 1 Note to Readers This paper represents the first section of what was supposed to be a much larger study to examine the influence that history has on modern Chinese strategic thinking, including contemporary force development considerations. Unfortunately, the author, Elizabeth Speed, was unable to complete the project due to health concerns. Rather than toss aside the useful analysis that was already prepared when she had to withdraw, the decision was taken to publish the portion of the project that was completed. The focus of this project was always very ambitious. With a recorded history of nearly three millennia, any attempt to derive “lessons” from such a record would be extremely difficult. As Dr. Speed indicates in this paper, it would also likely fail. Nevertheless, it is probable that the enormity of China’s national history is why so many people have resorted to cherry-picking that record. At no time is this more evident than in our own age when, as China regains a leading position in global affairs, observers are actively endeavouring to understand what this might mean for the future. What can that country’s past tell us – many of whom are not Sinologists – about its likely actions in the future? It is a truism to assert that history influences the current generation of Chinese leaders. The questions are how and to what degree. Identification of analogous situations – linking past and present – can often be useful but they come with a caveat to those who would rely upon them. Analogies should not be viewed as decisive for any understanding of the contemporary behaviour of countries, particularly those (like China) with such a vast well of history to draw from. And, after all, we cannot be certain that the analogies we identify are the same ones that Chinese leaders would deem most relevant. We know, of course, that history forms the envelope in which regimes exist and leaders make policy. Awareness of that national history should, therefore, inform our analysis. In the Introduction, Dr. Speed explains her approach to the study of China and China’s interactions with the world-at-large, subjects to which she has devoted a great deal of study. She notes that only by seeking “a broad understanding of China’s long history” can we in the West make sense of what we sometimes are inclined these days to see as “unscrupulous, hyper-sensitive, incomprehensible or just plain wrong” policies by the country’s current regime. The pursuit of insights (not lessons) derived from the sort of deeply-rooted expertise that Dr. Speed advocates is very likely the best means of achieving that. This paper should be read in light of that perspective. It is narrative rather than conceptual, but in adopting this approach it tells a story of China’s past up to the establishment of the current regime in 1949 that might help us better understand how Beijing today views its place in the world. - Ben Lombardi 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Note to Readers ……………………………………………………………………….. 2 Introduction …………………………………………………………………………... 4 The Historical Narrative ……………………………………………………………… 10 Chapter One: Shang through Han (1570 BCE - 220 CE) ………………………………… 13 Chapter Two: Three Kingdoms through Northern Song (221 - 1127) ………………… 22 Chapter Three: Southern Song through Early Ming (1127-1435) ………………………… 28 Chapter Four: Middle Ming to the Founding of the Peoples' Republic (1435-1949) … 40 Meanings ………………………………………………………………………………… 61 Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………….. 63 3 Introduction China is at the heart of any contemporary Asian security assessment. It is frequently portrayed as the most likely potential or actual threat to regional security and the only state which has both the purported capacity and interest in altering the still US- dominated global security structure. For decades now, China has devoted considerable attention and resources to the development of modern naval weapon systems and platforms with greater reach, fourth generation fighters with advanced air and land attack weapons, and ballistic missiles capable of targeting throughout Asia (and North America), as well as a medium-range missile - the DF21D - which purportedly can hit an aircraft carrier at sea (or at least an immovable target such as Guam). China previously adopted an offshore defence strategy which has taken on new meaning. No longer is China content to put at risk those forces operating on, under and over regional seas, but is seeking to deny others - notably the United States - from deploying its forces with impunity throughout the Western Pacific. This begs four key questions: (1) What does China really want? (2) Does China pose a direct or indirect challenge to the Western-based international order? (3) Will its continuing so-called "peaceful rise" (Zhongguo heping juiqi) indeed be peaceful or will its quest for security and apparent suzerainty within Asia produce the kind of chaos and violence experienced with Germany in the first half of the twentieth century? (4) Is China set to become the predominant power in Asia and beyond or is it simply seeking to defend itself against intrusive powers - much as it has done for the past 150 years - within what China regards as its traditional sphere of influence? This paper cannot begin to answer these questions, but it can hopefully provide a framework for future research on the historical origins of many of China's fundamental strategic concerns - some real, some fictitious, the latter reflecting generations of "patriotic education" taught at all levels of the Chinese educational system. In broad terms, the modernization drive and accompanying reforms launched by paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in 1979 produced one of the most remarkable economic transformations in human history. Since the early 1990s, the Chinese government has sought to develop "comprehensive national power" (zhonghe guoli) such that the other great powers and neighbouring states will refrain form implementing any major policy contrary to China's declared interests. China's ongoing military modernization and offshore strategy have been designed to ensure Chinese access to and influence (if not control) over regional seas. China has thus re-emerged as a key great power and poses the only viable alternative to the US global pre-eminence at least through the medium term. China's self-professed "peaceful rise" has enormous potential repercussions for international economic and security relations. However, the trajectory for international economic and security development could be altered by its still problematical internal situation (socio-economic, political, environmental, etc.) and whether it will remain a "peaceful rise" depends to a large extent on how Sino-US relations are managed in the future. It is thus timely to consider China's role within the international system in more broadly historical terms. Despite more than 400 years of Western engagement with China, in broad terms the West's understanding of China still appears to be muddled and frequently wrong. Conceptions of China quite naturally focus on recent events - those 4 since China took off economically and/or events both before and since the Communist victory in 1949. Moreover, and given China's long history, and given the tendency of Chinese leaders to use aspects of that history to explain or defend China's positions or various issues with others, China's history has been used and distorted for political ends. Analysts have been equally guilty of using history to bolster some generalization about Chinese behaviour for similar ends. In both these cases it could be said that Chinese history has and continues to be used instrumentally. All too often, the contemporary conception of China is based on a misreading and/or use of history - where events are "cherry-picked" to reveal some purported cultural truth or historical precedents with application to the current period. China's written record goes back at least two and a half millennia, and there is an abundance of events and historical material. Indeed, there is so much history available that almost any generalization can have some evidential basis. However, most generalizations appear to be derived from the late Ming and Qing dynastic periods which witnessed direct contacts between Western states and China and the resulting imperial clashes culminating in the so-called "century of humiliation" (hainian guochi) which commenced in the mid- nineteenth century. There is, in short, a tendency to apply perspectives derived from more recent history (i.e., the late Qing and post-Imperial periods) to prior events as if China was part of some long historical continuum or of a recurrent pattern. Such generalizations have led to the traditional conception of China as a continentally-focused largely self-sufficient and inward looking state which shunned trade and foreign contacts, refused to modernize when confronted with Western power and frequently