602 41 21 23 23 3 9 2 26 6 . .2

r. SECRET S E C R E T HEADQt«J?TERS 1ST TAIK DESTROYER BRIGADE Auth: CO, 1st TD Brig Office of the Brigade Corintjider Inlt! i//ACB/jOU/d ^ • Datei^L lloroh 1945..

•APO 403,-United States Amy 1 March .1945

.TAJIK DESTROYER IIIFOHI.I/'.TIOH )

LETTER ilUIIBER 5 )

SECTION I CWIUL/vTIVE REPORT OF TAIfK DESTROYER WIITS SECTIOM II TANi: DESTROYERS II: COflBAT SECTIOH III TANK DESTROYER TACTICS SECTION IV IKTELLIGEIICE NOTES SECTIOU V TECHiilCAL NOTES SECTION VI CK/iHGES IN TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT SECTION VII • COUBAT TIPS SECTION VIII TAirK DESTROYER TiJOOP LIST

SECTIOH I

CU!,IULAT1TO REPORT OF TANi: DESTROYER UNITS TO 28 FEBRUARY

TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL .TOTAL * ROUNDS • ROUNDS * TTALIOK TA!TKS SP GUNS ARTY k AT GUNS • ROUNDS FIRED FIRED DESTROYED • DESTROYED DESTROYED FIRED DIRECT INDIRECT

602 38 8 41 8276 4757 3519 603 58 21 13407 6323 7084 607 58 23 23 61316 7967 53349 609 22 3 9 14597 1041 13656 610 91 2 26 8100 . 4327 •3773 .631 (1) 691 6 . .2 - 1 11192 1968 9224 704 55 • • 16' ' • .. 1581 937 644 705 . 43 •' • "S' - 2 21398 6398 . 15000 773 109 17 46 11668 8500 3168 774 5 1 11 30010 7763 • 22247 803 19 12 15 13010 2862 .• 10148 808 6 ' 8 35375 3958 31417 811 34 5 5 7456 2090 5366 GIB 33 5 14 21437 3093 ^ 18344 Others *+ 115 15 90252 30429 59823

In addition to the tanlrs and self-propelled, anti-tank, and artillery guns destroyed as shown above. Third Arny Tank Destroyers have also destroyed 384 machine guns, 600 pillboxes, and 915 other targets, including artillery prime movers, GP vehicles. Ops, AAA guns, troop trains, ammunition dumps, airplanes, etc.

(1) Not yet in action. •

• » Reports on rounds fired ounulative to 18 February.

•* Destroyed by tank destroyer battalions formerly in Third Array, but nmY assigned to ether armies.

SECRET' , • TANK DSSTSOYE^S iir COISAT •.....„:.;,.>: 4:,..,

'SOSM' V.p:_ DESTROYBR BATTALION (ll-lb) i ' • : ' " .. ' '

A tigar tank was hit between the sponson and track about'the middle of the tank v/ith an HE round T-106 fused.' A penetration v;as obtained and the explosion •of the tank's Iffi completely destroyod the vehicle. The tanl: destroyer commander had called for ARC but in his excitement the loader loaded the wrong round. The range v.-as 150 yards. (Commanding Officer, 60Srd Tank Destroyer Battalion).

610TH TANK DEgTRO.YEE,.3i'>TTiaiO:! (?l-3;0:

a. On 6th Fnbruary, 2nd and o'd platoons of Company D supported the In• fantry Regimant/s, attack in oapt-ari:ig 3.''AIiDS""..'.SID (9881), hisavily fortified town in the SlEOFRIEfi Ll/ffi,' fired <^0 rounds ATC cad £2 rounds Iffi (7 T-105 fuses) neutra• lizing 19 pillboxes and destroying 1 Hark Y trnl:. In addition they fired 1000 rounds of .50 calibor machine gun airmiunition in aiding the infantry in successfully repqlling an enenj' counterattack that follcnr.'oc' the occupation of tho tovm. Captain Duchossois, B COTipany's Commander, cocr.iented on tho attack as follows: . '-./, '..

"At 0730, the foot troops fought for tiia lino of departure to capture tvro pillboxes which could not be fired upon by t)io tank destroyers or tan!:3, and could not be by-passed because of the limited routes of approach. ' "After tho capture of thoso pillboxes, tho tank destroyers and tanks movod.out, ono ^platoon of tank dostroyors and one platoon of tanks supporting, each of tho two assault companies. • "7.'o movod across tho lino of departure as a tank dostroyor, tank, infan• try tccja — infantry, a tank, and a tanl: destroyer followed by more infantry, another tank, and tank dostroyor. T7c used this formation bocauso of tho poor . visibility, tho limited routes of approach and uncertainty of the dofinito loca• tion of all fortifications. "The infantry advanced um;il they v/ora hold up by a fortification. V.'hon this'happened, tho tankers 'olosod-up' tho npc/turo v/ith machino gun fire followed by tho tank destroyers firing sevjral rounds of 90mn. "Usually the Jorri9S v/ould put some v.'hito article out of the ombrasuro, • but thoy v/ould not cono out' to surr-Tider until tho infantry moved in and brought thon out. ' •• • "TTe did not have to destroy tho fortification to make tho Jerries surron^ d;ir. It v;as only necessary to sho-.v thin that unloss thoy did, thoy would all \)0 killed. • . "Tfa used this procedure on all the pillboxes in tho tovm, and by 1730 thb town was taken and thoro v;aro only a fev,- Jerries still holding out., • "During .the entire attack, foot roconnaissanoo v:as made difficult by hor.vy onomy small arms and artillery fire. Although tho gun ooimandors could not , always loavo the tank destroyer, they all had a jood idea of v.'hat tho town looked liko, v;hore to e:icounter nost of tho fortificatiorj, and what routes should bo uaod This knowlodg..! was made possible through a study of a drav.dng of the tovm, and f. thorough briefing by tho platoon leader. ' • "V,fo found thL.t vra had to keep a tank destroyer right behind the lead tank booauso our routes of approach were such that unless a tank destroyer \;as up thoro inicially, it would bo impossible for other tarn: d.;stroyers to pass tho tanks in order co fire oii the pillbox. As a result, th'- loading tank destroyer and tank did the majority of the firing. "It is absolutely necessary to have ocrr-.ur.ic at ions v.-ith not only tho in- ,fantry, tut tho tankers also. One of tho simplest v.'ays to accomplish this is to have leth taik destroyer and tanl: platoon leaders equipped v:ith 300 SCR radio sot JT t'.'.o irifautry frequency."

b. On the i.iorning of February 8, 1945, the 3rd platoon, Conpany C, commcaidod by Pir-i-c .'.^..outcnunt John S- rfamnes, moved into a snail v.'oods on the crest of a hill "".hi ya-ds eaac oi tho tcv/ri of NIEDEPJCSIIEN. The missicn of the unit was to support .;he r.d/ar.eo of Cempaiuy K, f _^Infantry Regiment, noving up free tho southeast to capture th- tmn.i. By prcno-ui recorinaissanco, prir.rj-y firing positions iK.d boon s.-lected for ono section to moyo through the v.'oods to its outer edgo and firo • .ithtr at the tcvn itself or the approf.ches from the north :sA v.est. About 0930 'lours, iji enemy "lark V tank was observed approaching the toY.-n along the road '.•unnin- c:.3t-i/cs.-; out of tmm. Tho ruigo at tino ef first observation v/as approxl- .-ictaly ;>.i0n yai . Tho first gui:, first section, oom-.and-d by Sergnant Ed Flahorty., •.''th Ca:-pe-ar. Zd:-in I-, Ailjy,, gunner. Toe 5 Leonard Rosano, driver,'Pfo John Lr.ndcru. lead, r, „r.O f.'c Cha;^io3 Devucqua, radio operator, iraediatoly novod into • 6JL0JI! T/.riC DESTROYER BATTiJJO!; (H-3G_) (Cont-d) ' •:.

position and prepared to fire on the onem;.' v^liirl,- Fire was hold until tho tarJc , was 800 yi-.rdJ from Sorgo,-.nt Flah-:rty'a po3itio'.i> ...t n/hioh time Corporal Ailoy j fired four rounds A-RC.. l:it-iing tho -ifohicl^ i'li ti left sponson, directly belov; > tho turret, with th, fourth round. Tho tcjik imi..".diatcly burst into fleiies, male- Ing it impossible for'any of tb,j cro\.' to o-scape. - - i

The unit rom:-'.ii;od in tiiis .positiou vn^til tho'.opnr:ia:iding officer of a supporting infijitry coni-ai-i^- o;; t'.'io ri^j'at flej.k co:;taotod-'th:- pl.'itoon leader and informed him tliat thro'- euom" t::.-ak.<; had movjc into position and were cutting units of tho 1st Dattalioa Ii'if Jit'ry, oi:-. our loft flan!: te ribbons., v/ith oachiao'gun , , i . , and tank cannon f ire i Plaoia;-; foe 'r.:A sootio:. i;-. ccnmand cf Sttff Se-go'.nt Eldrod o fC^ Cunninghcjn, the uni-i; lor.dor i.iovod :;hc Ist 3;:ctioi:, into'positien to fire on thoso K;:. -vohicles. One' vohiolo. due to muddy conditions, bogged da\-.'n and vras unable te . mo-ve into n position v/horo it ooi.;ld ef;^ootively fire.. Tao' second vehicle, 1st .'. section, comnandou by .Surg-;e.nt Bort Corbiu a-.;d ere-..' ir.jmbers Oorpo:'al Robert Van- ^ derhovon, gunner., Tec" 5 Jcs.iph Fyrto, driver, T-.iC 5 Vlaite'i- Burnotc, loedor, end ; K'V.- Pfc Carl S'taoho\-;ski. radio opcrito;-,. moved -into position in a $r,\ 11 section of ^:-i--.. woods and opened fii'o at 2500 yard.^ on a Mar'r V p.nr.ther. The first shot sot tho ] VGhicle on fire and all members of the orov; porishod in tho flames. Tho othor ] p;^;;. - tT.-o vehicles i.'rrnodlately disappeared over thj o;-oHt of tho hill, moving av,'a_y from ' tho infantry positions. ' • . • ;

^^•-•: - ' • - • -. ' • 5 oV. -In'both oircui.istanoos, the closo cooporation betv.eon tl-io infantry and y/. ' tanl: destroyer unit loaders enabled tho gun crov;s to. bring effoctivo firo on the ] -'&•'••' enemy tanks, vjitii a r.ininu:-:! of time and mover.ieut. (Comianding Ofiic-)r, GlOth Tank '] .|;'.;;: Destroyer Battalion). • _ ', • '\

I'k SgiST TAIJi: DSSTROVS'? RATL^LIOir (VoY/od): _

.V.'/, • . T.'hilo in position t.ear the to,,n of TILLET, Dolgiim, th-;; 1st section, 2nd ' j platoon of Company C got in some good profitabl.-- shooting. IV/o oneny soldiers T/ere obsori'cd loavi;ig a SNIE.ll building and entering a large liaystack. Sergeant "ir. T. Hazlov/ood, section sergeant, ordered a round cf 1{E into the stack at a '• rt'Jigo of 2.,0&'J y;-j-d3. After tlv:.- round v.-as fired, 4 enony soldi-;rs v/oro soon running from the haystack an-J e;-itoriug a snail finger of-Woods about GO yards from • the haystack. Fire v.-as laid f.ll alon,;; tiie strip of v/oods and good tree burst ; offect was noted. The platoon loader. Lieutenant George Gushing, inforr.iod the • Battalion 3-2 of tho action. Tho f.-liovfing ;.\or:iing the S-2, -v.itli th-.: 2nd platoon ' of reconnaissj-jice, und--r tho leadership of Lieutenant Hartia '-tricklen, checked - . : on tho results of t)i.j firing. .Total •.-:neny,,killed was IJ. vihioh .included 1 Second ' Liouton;.nt, 1 Toclinical 'ijrgoa!;t and 15 lov,er r.arJcing non-ooi.iraissioned officers. . Ons of tho m-en had "O-.-JU kill.;ri 'D-/ the round firjd iiite tho liaystack. Investiga- tion led to th-. conclusiori t'nat the Ui'iit iu.d boon r. strong combat patrol. (Cpm- ^ mending Officer, 691st T-Jik Dos tr eye; r "Ba.tti-. lion). ',

773P.D T/.l'n< DESTROYS]; gATT/.LIOlT (H-10):

- E Ccmpr.ny -- The 2r.d platoon ccnu.it-.ndoa by Lieutenant V'oed in pesition at 657592: one gun at the crosnr.ads i:; tho :-,ortheast cdjo ef to\.Ti r.nd two guns in tho southeast' edge or tuvr.i iuet behind the infantry in positic;-n on thn !:noll there, rcpujsou a ceunterr-.tt'.ek at O'^OO hours. £.t 0900 h'-urs four eneny tanl:s aavanftac! from th- n:jrt:Taaet to-v/ard tOTm. Linitonant 'i-'ood spi/cted then in the distance., ordered liis gune ti.firo and ('.iep;rjod the attack. 'At 1300 hours, the cnomy attacked again fr"P. the northeast in force v.dth ton to twelve tan):3 and -iupporting ihiY.ntry preeedcd by ill. artillery barrage-. Lieutenant V.'co;' advanced on Lno'c thrt:-ugh ai'tillery, riertar and enall arms fire f-.nd loci one ti.nk destroyer I into pesition to firo on the- onconing ta:i!:s . He iiiountoc" tho deck -if t!\ dostroyor. and c'iroocod its Xire^ Thr-.o enemy tL-j-i!:s vfer.^ dostroy.?d. Ho t'lon rar. to nearby infiii-try pesitiur'.s and oi-roctoc; a;.;', placed tho iuf'.v.try iu bettor iiositions to rofo.i. the advancing Gor.-.au iiif.,ntry. At approxii.iatoly 1350 h'-)urs, throe oneny toriVH vore ro,iortoj a.t tho tail]: doe-jroy^ro' roi.r. ' Liout'uiant "ocd and Staff Ser- gr.a-.-.t ."^i.tclier crrv/lcd -jp -clio L'an:; en -cho oast sic'c of the ro.ad and spo-tted the 0:-r„ir.r. tan::-posit.ioiu. > C.v,.\;lin- br.el:, thoy each l-,;d u tanl: rtcstreyor forv.-ard and epearci firo or: those tarcj tr.rks. '.A.n taiJ:s v.'oro dostroyod but one -tank dostroyor w..a 'i.-.-.otkoa out by the tliira tanko-..')-.ic-h began to circlQ around and ontor tho town ^.•c-J. the southoa.-it. Tlio \riundou mer. vrare helped back to the other tanl: destroyer

^' , . • < SECRET -.y-.v' " ' • in position next to the house. Tho enony to.nl:'continued to firo r.t this tcnk dostroyor, hitting tho building rind setting it on fire. Unc.blo to knock out tho ronaining tc.nk, surround.od on throo sidos by eneuy infsjitry. Lieutenant YTood ordered tho t^J^k dostroyor destroyed before v.itkdrav.'ing back to tovm. By this tino a section of the 3rd platoon cane to the e.ia of tho 2nd pi..toon. Lieutenant Phillips placed his two tank destroyers in p-sitivn and knocked out the third cncTiiy tank. Ton oneny ta:xks v;oro !nicc;:ed cut and thoso wore tontati-roly id.'nti- fiod as four Mark Vjc and six Mark Vs; al.so ono halftrack and general purpose vohiclo. T!u plato.jr. lost throo ta.!il: aostroyors in this action. Lieutenant Phillips, Sorgoant Tonazovvski am'. Tec 5 Court novod dovm tlie ra^/ino on south sido of tov.-n undor intense oneny firo to pick up tho v:oundod. The v.-oundcd v/ero placed on tiic .dock of tho tanl: destroy.-.r of 3rd platoon, i.xx\s thoy movod back into tovm, S.-irgcant Tonazoy/s!:i \:^.c. picked off by on or.eny sniper. (Coiraanding Officer, 773rd Tank Dostroyor Battf.lion).

B03RS TAI7K DESTRO'rER B/yTTALIOK (l.I-lO); -

a. Quo gun (self-propelled) of 3rd platoon of Company A, in the vicinity cf Ei;PELDAl!GE (Pti34416), pushed its gun tlirougli a wondcv; cf a house and flushed out- 27 Prisoners of Vfar v.'ithout firing.

b. 1st platoon cf Comprjiy B firod 14 r-'unds AP and 24 rounds HE direct firo, k-noc!:ing out 1 Ha.rk V tanl: vicinity (P055524), 1 armored car at (P846527), and firod at a houso vicinity of (P844527) killing an ostiriiated 15 enony. 2nd platoon of Company B fired 11 rounds HE and 1 round AP direct firo, knocking out either a Mark IV or Vtank at (P842528)» also killing an ostinatod 30 enony personnel. 1st platoon of Cor.ipany C fired 205 rounds KE cjid 45 rounds AP direct fire knocking out 2 Mark V,tanks, 3 halftracks, and 2 anti-tank guns. An estimated 90 enemy per• sonnel vroro killed. Forty-five rouut'.s KE and 35 rounds AP direct fire v/as firod intotho tovm of HESCHEID (pyi3509) at dug-in tanks and machine gun nests. Ro• connaissanoo Company continued to contact units on .ur loft and right getting in• formation and positions of ct.her tank destroyer units. 1st platoon of Company C, vicinity of GR/ilKGEiI, Luxonbourg (P027499), cbsorvod a platoon of oneny personnel on foot, approximately 2000 yards f*;ay, noving devm a road, north fron ISSCilEID. Four guns 3-inch HE oponod upon then killing seine and dispcirsing tlio rost. Vlhat was loft of tho platoon triod to get av;ay by ono nan moving cut at a tino', but oach tino a r:u.in v;ould get up to run, ono noro round v/ould bo firod at hi:.i. Bono got vxiv.y. Battalion expended 285 rounds HE and 95 rciunds AP during tho poriod. Six Prisoners of V.'ar taken. All of this in or^ day, (Comanding Officer, 803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion).

SECTIOi: III I.. ^ • • ' ' • ' ^ • TANK DESTROYER TACTICS

1. .RESULTS OF HOLDIHC- TO Bf.SIC PRINCIPLES;

a. Since initial ccmmitment on 2b July 1944 in Normandy, this battalion hae lost a total of 7 M-18 tank destroyers to enemy action against 53 tanks and 15 self-propelled assault guns destroyed. Our -/ehicles were destroyed by the follow• ing means: .. 1 —:Enemy tank fire 1 — Enemy artillery 5 — Enemy anti-tank guns

Six of these vehicles v/ere burned completely. Tho vehicle destroyed by artillery was recovered and stripped. Other vehicles have been hit by artillery, bazookas, mortars and anti-tank guns,.^but have cori\ out of action undor thoir ovm povrer and wore repaired for further fighting. . . ,

b. Tho enemy 75i,im PAK anti-tank gun has bean the most difficult woapon wo havt f'ioed. 'Bie low silhouot'to^and groat mobility of the weapon mukos it oxtromoly hare to detect and destroy'. ' ,\ •,!>.':'.'•:•.• •

c. Our oxtromoly low loss to onomy tank fire is attributed to tho basic tac- ,ticE taught at Tank Destroyer Contor. Tho enemy tanl: can bo easily out-mane uvorod, and ir, extremely suscoptiblo to tT/o-way. attack. Tin policy of dismounted rocon• naissanoo for targets by gun commundors .aid platoon loaders hus paid big dividends. Luok cf this roconnaissunco hue caused our vjorst cunuultius. (Commanding Officpr, GOSrd Tank Dostroyor li^ttalion).

- 4 -

iJHiiii'irir 'r'i" iii '4 ii'''irt-V''rl'itfii V , KJ 2. USS DISnOUlTSD ?oCOn:nJSo^;JE;

a. This Unit Did;

At 1300 hours, 'tl\ 1st.platoon v,cs ord:jri..d to novc up \:n v\\e high ground southoast of ;iIED:-;ir."i^U!?ACH and '.vr.s, givon only 4'j--iiiinutos to get ready, aJ.theugh thoy had their guns stripped down for oleahing.' Since tho tarJ: dostroyor' wore not roady to mov.; with tho infantry., a guide was loft Xo load then up. li.'hon tho guido showed sono hesitancy at a crossroads, Lieut nrait yargo found that tho guide had never boon up then before. Li ;utmant Vurgo thon prooo-^ded to his destina• tion, although the roads had not bjjn sv/jpt as proaised . Lioutontint Vargo and Lioutcnant Hapior v/ent out on a foot rocoiiiiaissanco into tho underbrush on the oast side and tho south side of the hill. Tlioy continued thuir rooonnaicsanco until oneny outposts were contacted, "o friendly troops wore found. Hoturning to his dostroyor. Lieutenant Vargo contacted his company commander over the radio and T/as r.d'/isod to return to HIEDEffi.'AliPACa. Upon arrivi.l thoro, it was learned that tho infantry cr)nr.i-.nder whoso battalion ho v/as .supporting had callc^d off the attacl: and had failed to notify the tanl: destroyers. (Commanding Officer, 773rd Tank Destroyo.r B..ttalion).

b. .-This Unit Didnt:

A section of ll-lQz v.-.s to t:J:o up positions at night in the edge of a woods that was supposed to have bo jn cleared by the infantry'- An infantry guide lod the dostroyors to the v/oods. On thci way the tt.ri dostroyors noticed through the darkness throe G-:'ru:n tanks off to ono flarJ:. The soction sergeant was assured by the guide th..t tho tanks had been knocked out by the jafaivbry tho day bofore; tho sergeant mada no invostig:.tion cjid put his gujis in position.' At day• light an oneny tarJ: approached the section position from the front and was taken undor firo. Scarcely had tho l!-18s firod at this tank v*en tho three "knockod- out" tanks opjnec fire on the Il-lbs and destroyed them.

3. ROVIITO C-Ui:: • ••••'.•

In dcfensi-.-c pesitiens v;e have employ ;d a roving gun against the oneray. ' Tho gun must be EOVOO into position at night, prefcrc.bly with a small tnount of artillery fire in tlic sector to hide the noise. It is necessary to stray, from normal tactics in this V/pe of enploi-n.-at, therefore tho rcv/ards must be great. After findir^g a tejget and destroying it, tho gun nust be immodiatoly pulled out and sent te aneth-r part of the sector the next night. (Commanding Officer, 803rd Tank Destroyer Batt.-.lion).

4. ATTACH:;5:"7T vs• Se??ORT! ' -

... Viey/s .of Tf.nk D:;strcy:.r C-roup;

1. The. op .rations of th: Corps euri::g the period 22 December. 1944 - 28 January 1945 (ag..inst the J-S-D1ZT'::Z brer-lrthrcugh) prosent::. an excolloat oppor• tunity to observe aad u.ie a cene:.rativ. study ef th: pclici.:.s of:

'a. •• Sub-attaching tanl: .destrey.;r ecnpi^nies .and platoorjj v.lthin c. division, and b. Placing tank destroyer ccr.panies in .:irect support of infantry elomonts.

Z. As a result of daily cc—an:! and st'.ff liaison T.'ivh t:.nk dostroyor ' units in tho Corps by this headquarters (t:.=:: destroyer group), the fellrv.ing facts v/.jro dotorr.iined:

a. t'hon tan!-: destroy jr ccnp:.ni-->s , p.l..tooi:s. a::d sccticns i.'ore sub-attach- od: . ' . (1) I.os.e of tactical unity precluded pr.-jpar:.tion of any feasible tank dertroyor p?.an3 to combat enei.iy armor in stren.::th. In ono instance, early in the . operation against tho ARDSIU'SS bulge. Corps, at the i.vstig:.tion of this hoad- quar-t.ors, ord.^.'od each ci^/ision to prcpr.re pirns to rally on) (l) tf-nk d.-'Stroyer oi/r.p .ny fo.' di'-ision on Corps crarr- This v/as cen."::e'ered r.ocesfr.ry dun to paucity of t.rk I'ccstroyor- ..'d serious enomj- ar-iore-d J^roct-. It v/::s necossr.ry for ono (1) infMitry division to conpletoly :'ea;lju.st its tank l.strcyir dispcs itions in order to coT.:ply.- The a;-r.\orod division repcrtec ,it w::3 physically inpossible to r..lly cno '!) t:;n!: destroyer company.

- 0 - SECICET 4, ATTACmiEliT VS SUPPC'ffi 'Con-J.-d) ' ' .

. . • (2) Tho TOluRl'e -i.i fiinir.g and experience of the battalion connander and staff v;as not utilized.'

(3) Attaclinert ef a highly specialized tanl: dostroyor ooinpany to an infantry regiment encouraged,, and in fact, resulted in sub-attachment of tank destroyer platoons to infantry battalions, thereby nullifying the control of the ocmpany commander and yffi.sting his training and experience.

(4) As a direct result of (3), the platoon, nover designed to operate separately, v;as required to assuLio liaison respoi.sibilitios and was exposed to improper employment.

(5) In several instances, tank destroyer sections were attached - separately (onco to tho division rocon.iaiss&nco troop) ^ Tho difficulties of liaison and control mentioiiod in (4) becpj.ie multiplied for tho tank destroyer Section-sergeant.

(6) On many ocoasions thoro wtis a dofinito tendency to employ the chassis of the vehicle rathor than tho gun- Infantry comir.anders kept the tank destroyers v/ell forward ac a nornlo factor. As a rosult_. tank destroyers were often unable to occupy positions to engage enony armor from tho flank.

(7) . Sub-attachnents provontod rcT;atior of platoons vrithin the com• pany or companies v.itliin the battalion As a result it was impossible to rest personnel or porforn necessary maintonanco on d.'iuipmcnto

(8) Each time- tho Corps artillery cor.mandor dosirod to employ tank dostroyors on indirect missions, it v.as physically impossible to do so, since it would have meant a complete revision of attachments and dispositions.

b. V.'hen tanl: destroyer oompanios v/ore onployod one (l) company in direct support of oach combat teai.;., ono (1) company in general support!

(1) Tactical unity and unit 'integrity wore naintainod.

(2) Battalion commander advised, division commanding general on om- ploynent and v;as able to prepare feasible plans for massing his unit.

(3) Control roraaining v/ith battalion oomnandor precluded misonploy- mont.

(4) Companies were rotated to rost and rofit mon and equipment.

(5) Units wore always onployod in accordance with accepted doctrines v/hich had a definite influence on morale.

3. Conclusior.s:

a. Tho tank destroyer battalion is a highly specialized unit, and to gain tho best fron it, control must remain with tho commanding officer and his trained staff.,

b. Tho military balance of throe; tv/o in diropt support and ono in gon- oral support, has boon proven in conbat and is ospociuliy applicable in ti unit that is oxpoctod to mass its guns at a single point, quickly lind smoothly.

c. Tho'chain of command v/ithin tho batt<{lion must bo preservod and ro- spoctod. • •

d. Tank destroyers must bo riivon "mission-type" orders and thoir dooi- .•lion as to hov/ to boot accomplish tho\mission bo regarded as one based on train• ing and oxporionco and, as such., roapootod.

o. "Soiling"' the di-/lsion on t^io principlo of "direct support" nay pre• heat dlTieultJon.. on sono occasions, for the battalion commander. This head- SECRET

4. ATTACmttlirr vs SUPPORT: fCmfd) quarter* (tank destroyer grovp) has found it advijable to olleviato the diffi• culty hy command liaison vdth Corps and personal contact with tho division cor.- mandinc general and chief of staff. In every ir.stanoe, the division has been oxtronely receptive and adopted the suggestions at onco.

f.. The average division is interested only in results. A.ny intelligent plan, properly presented, will ordinarily ba approved. The ability of a tari destroyer battalion to furnish superior anti-tank defense within a division icno by the "direct support" method is easily demonstrated and quickly pro-.-oc. (Com• manding Officer, Tanlc Dostroyor Group).

• SECTIOH IV .

IlITELLIGEIICE NOTES

1, ElIEin' EQUIRIEiri:

a, Gorman Froquonoy Induction Igniter. (Source: Sixth US Arm-,- Group Tookly Intelligence Sui.imary lie. 15, 27 January 1945).

Tho, ignitor is usod to detor^to S-!Iinos. One igniter is placed for every ton S-lIinos. Tho purpose of tho ignitor is to provont tho use of electric nir^e dotootors.,. It functions on tho sono wavo Ipngth, and when the detector apprcaches tho ignitor, tho v;avos are picked up by u. coil antonna, thus firing the mines by moans of oloctric dotohators. The sensitivity of the ignitor-is such that it will bo detonated by any strong vfuvo sent out in its' vicinity. Although this ignitor has not yot boon onployod on the T.'ostern Front, it .is essential that troops re• main alort- for its omploynont and report all now information on the subjoct to highor headquarters without delay.

- b. Tank and-Anti-Tanl: Guns-of Panzer Divisions. (SKASF Intelligence ifotos Ho. 44, 13 January TS'ib).

A conparativo tabulation of tank end of anti-tank battalions belonging to Panzer di'viisions in'tho ARDEMIFES cbuntbr-offensiTO is givon be-low. They ropre- sont the strongth of thoso units at tho timo of commitnont as givon by prisoners of vfor and captured docunonts. Totals include 5 Panthers in Rc-gir.ental Ecad- quartors. • - --.

Tk Regt(Div)i I Bn II 3n Total Eonarks

1 SS (1 SS) 1, 2, 3, 4 cos, oa 17 I.Ik!5, 6, 7, 8 cos, oa 17 |78 !!k V I Plus ono or V, plus 5 in Dn Ilq ilDc IV, plus 5 Ilk IV in 73 'Jk r/ i-*wo ongr iDnHq ; cos. • Suoeortod Actual 1,, 2 cos, oach 17 I.ik V; 6, 7 cos, oach 17 Mk 30 ly: r; i by"501 SS IV, plus 5 Ilk V in Bn Kq 39 li V i Hv Tiger 3n j (45 VI)

2 SS (2 SS); 1, 2, 3, 4 cos, on 17 :.!k 5,6,7 cos, oa 14 :G: JVilS 'Sc V Flsik panzers • V^/lO |,y, plus 5 in Bn Hq 8 50, 14 assault guns,[55 It IV nay form an plus 5 1.&-IV in 3n Hq 114 AIs additional CO or nay Actual 11, 2, 3, 4 cos, each 14 5,6,7 cos, oa 14 !& I\;|SS ITk V bo in Bn and ink V, plus 5 i.D: V in Bn ' 8 00.14 assault guns |47 I3c IV Regtl Hq • . ' IKq plus 5 :!k IV in Bn Hq j 14 AGs Cos .

S SS (9 SS)U. 2, 3, 4 COS, each" 17. 5,6 cos, each 17 15: 78 V ; Evidenod T.'E/rO . lUk V, plus 5 111: V in Bn IV; 7, 8 cos, each 14 39 in.: IV i is very iHq , AGs, plus 5 I!k IV in 28 AGs scanty Bn Hq

Actual 1, 2, 3, 4 COS, oach 12 .5,6 COS, each 14 iJk 58 ID: V I.Ik V, plus 5 Ilk V in Bn ,'iy;,„7,, 8,003 , each 14 33 IQc IV Hq AGs, plus 5 Ilk rv in 28 AGs BnJ{q._., .

- 7 - SECRET Tk Rest (Div) I 3r II Tetf.l Remarks

130 (Pz Lohr) Iloto! Jlot ••.'i.-.c.r v.'hotr:or ;>'full v.T/VO v.'i.s ovor T.'E/rO ae:-i:-.u;';y i.utond.a{i. ' " -

Actual !.:i.-ced Bn The old TY;.T COS. each 15 ."Ik V organiza- ti..r..Mo in- TMO COS , each 1-5 IV dicstfvon . plu.3 5 M': V? in Bn Hq - tha^ it has : b-itin raised 3 (2 Pz) 1,2,3: 4 r-os; noch 17 5,,G 0 0? , each AG's; i. 78 :;k V Vffi/TO IJl: V. pl'ir 5 ;n:.V in 7,3 c.v, f.'e.-ih- Xi I2c 1 53 !Ik ivi Bn Hq ly'. plus 5 13: IV in Bnl 28 AG's '\ Hq , .. .. :..

Actual : 1,2/5 4 COS; oaoh 15 5,5 cos, each.14 AG's; 70 iD: V i lik v..plu s 5 Ifk V in 7,8 cos . each 15 Ilk IV, 35 Mk IV ! Bn Ha plus 5 !ik IV.in.Bn Hq 28 AG's

16 (116 Pz) 1,2,3 4 JOS oach 17 5,5,'' .6 cos , each 17 70 Mk V I -ft ;Ik v, nl'.'.s 5 lit V in Ilk IV, j:iu3 5 Mk IV 73 Ilk Ivi Bn Ho in Bn Hq .A

Actual ^3 in: V ir ha 22 IDc IT in Bn 43 ID: V U5 lOcV ro- 22 Mk IVJceivod on 8tr3rv;ths by Captured Document |21 Dec. Dated.lu Dec.44. Distribution to ..ompanios not t.iov/n.

AT • 1 Co 2 Co 3 Co Remarks' Bn (biv) J

130 (Pz Lohr) 14 7,.5ci:i AG's 12 7.5cni towed 12 7,.5c!n tovrad This givon for Div whan initi-ally committed. Cwront strength not knovra.

50 (9 Pz) 12 7,oom AG'S 12 7-Sen AG's 12 •7r5cra ta//ed [

.228 (113 P?) 10 7.5on y,G .-. 1.0 7 5cn AG'S A2 7.5cm tnwGd •'

. One of the intivesting features is that none 6f the SS divisions' unti- tanJ: tatt<\lnri.=! e j.'lontifxod but thoy cannot yet be ruled out. As for tanks, the evidence iL net yet ea.ipjpt6, and .some of the fig-ore.'! g-lvon above are based cn o.ily^ -Jrii or two pi-ijcriti.'; cf war of limi-t-td ITI0'."1 edgo . TTr-^z seons definitely t.'.'ur.. howiivor , is i-hat.-P'-.nzor divieions vn.ll. almost never have thoir full com-- pl^na.-/: of ta-iki?,. a'-tli-v.-.g), -^h.-y may .^tLi:. cling to tbo old VT-'/TC - If thoy were not'•>ei- to neoj-j.izj '.ho I'ul". conpoi-'enl. fo,- bl-.e AT-.Ta!!;.'!'-' offensive, it sne.'ns dcaV-f^il -ch-.it ^]vv_; 1 be at.^.e i.o in fut'o.rf - A fair t E-;,ina-',;o for a reformed or v-.o i.l.., ;3toa d-ivi.- • o,-^ ':j'.-iir.g .into the Ine would .loen to no bt;t\-;oen 60 and 100, v;ith Y;. c-; ^/a.^^.-icr.s '.'rem d.'.v;-.i.'.o-) \ Jj v.^ si.o.-.. Tdor.t.'.fi'jMtions -.iro ton scanty \o f.-.r r.-.-.y ^er.o: •il.j.i-.nt-i.on'r oa th'-' a-.\tl -iar)- l.-.ivt^xl 1 ?-ae. but tho Gorrams seen ^--i ''O at-.o.-.z-.t'..ig t'.o two u.':5av.lT;-.g.m coi.-.t a-.-.y and o.io tcn'jod oom.pany "I.'E/TO.

c. P: K'n"w Vi !'.'id?.',s:I and J (SWiP Intelli'gohco Kotos IIo. 46, 27 January 1940) "

.\ - . : ."t V17S t-.>;0'.i,~:-.f thnt tho; nrcuu.-tion ef the Pz Kpfw IV v;ould decline and pcsriblv e-'-oii C^V/M, du/iar, 19ii- This . ho-.-K'vov, -ioyj pot appear to have boon tho rcr.i', the t-T-.!: i? atiXx f.iuad pluy.ing a iaiiJ.y impor-i.ont iolo in Gorman araorod i-t gim-..a-i,a : . , , . -

T.ho two models v/'-ich aro being mnt aro I'.edol II and I'.odol J. Modol J ofpoari t

ones have snail nosh v;irs apron platos protacting tho hull, instead of tho nild stool plutos. Tho nain difforonoes aro nodi float ions inside tho tank. In both nodols tlio main armamont consists of ono 7.5cm Kvf 40, 40 calibres long, v;ith a oo-ojcial nr.ohino gun in tlie turret and a liull ruLC'-.ino gun by tho v.lroloss oporator.

Tlic armor for thoso two models differs from tho previous Pz Kpfw IV and oven the earlier Models K that vrare prod'.iCod. Tho main difference has boon a thickening of the frontaljannori tho nose and front vertical platos have boon lnoroa,S3d to 85 mm. The forvrard sloping section of the turrot roof has boon in• creased fron 10 nr.i to 15 mia, and tho roar horizontal section to 30 nn. To com• pensate for this increase, othor plates have boon made thinner; tho glacis plate is ncTi' 20 mm compared with 25 mm, and tho undercut lovrar noso plato 30 mm as ' , against 50 mn. Tho engine dock is only 10 mi thick. v. Tho turret is of tho sono design as on Model F^; this disponsos with a number of vision ports. The driver is provided only with direct vision. This oonfoms to tho general tendency in Gorman tank design of disponsing with as many aporturos in tho anaor plato as possiblo, oven though it nakos tho tank noro blind.:

•2. E!!E;rY TACTICS:

*\ a. Sadio Disoiplino • (Sourco: First US Amy G-2 Periodic Report Ho. 239, ,4 February 1945j.

Prisoners of war froquently report that infomation on Allied strongth, ,, location, and intentions, gained by intercepting radio communications, proves './particularly helpful as air observation by Gi»F pianos' is ofton lacking. T.ank ,:radio operators intercept Allied cemuidcations v.'ithout difficulty^ Slang ex- . prcssions, rapid speaking, and lack of repeats tend to nako understanding diffi• cult, but enough can be gathered fron ''a lot of unnecessary talk". E'/on whon not understood, radio copnunication reveals tho presence of rooonnaissonco oars or taris oquipped with shortwave transmitters.

b. Patrols and Agents. (Third US Amy G-2 Periodic Report #250, 15 Fo'bruary 1945)

Units nust be constantly alort for onomy soldiers' infiltrating through front linns and posing as Americans in order to catch our troops off guard- A fi-vo-nan enony patrol, taking advantage of intense darkness and rain, recently approached an outpost position from the roar and oapturod all its personnel with• out firing a shot. Tho Gornans. frequently use v/onon and children as agents to obtain military infomation. IJo stronger, hov/evor innocent in appearance, should be pornittad tc pass o'ur positions or observe our activities-

US IrXantry Division ropor-ted rocont capture of 2 German non-commission• ed officers wearing civilian clothes. Doth told the sane false background story, and intended to pass as civilian refugees r It is importan-t th-.\ all troops bo alort and apprehend line-crossers in ci-vilian clothes. Any person crossing our linos is a suspect and should be turned oTOr immodiatoly to rU-: C'iZ- Preliriinary interrogations of such for.";one should be avoided as thi". allows tho svspoct to gain information and build up hir- eto.'-y. . -

o. Gornan Tfj.k Tactics. (.3h/0s? Intell Lgonoo "etos l-[o: 47, o Fobrua-.-y :945)

Two items' of ir...r,oi.-:-1: ro.-:a'-d'i.:.'i;-; t'le •-.''.oo.-y a.o.d p':.-ac';.ice ef G'lrn'.n tanl: tactics have rocorb.'iy boo,n no-l-ed -:7ho fi-s-c l,-; th^ .re;-'...-•..;--.-.p .xt,-act from a captured ordoi' oi" Supro..-:o Corrrr.ndo! . Ar:T.- Gvo-'p '\'-r , datca" J J.vn'i.ary ?.9.:..5'.

• . /' (1) SUE.IECT: ' Ccnmi-nmont of "ranks. .A3,-au':t Z\ir.'- and To.-;-: Dostroyers.

Sharp neasu-.-or hn-io to jyj_taVen t,:_i,l;:h'j tho •r..:-iidnr.cv p.'-ovailing in tlie_ infantry •:'c'ji':i'''^t up jâiu'F'iuK "!i IriM'^T ar'a''''î:'f;'ArfVaVr)':"' pGS':?c/eJ' Cofi;;!;,!'! ~.^'{a;-6 I'ci •/"s'.:Z.l''i"si'ûp;.. in i\?i~r"v~ o'ata'rn'jreirrvry^rii'Tall pTaoc;, Sl'oocse'ie eti.ly .ch\ v'^d'>y V'v'i;.\it-:iirK I!!''c'U^ ' olfor'i, ot Ica-^t 'in troop or eon.p'j.'iy r-.-ng'':!-./

' If'tenJ:?, assau.Lt ,..;r.MS .•>;« tai'ik deftrcyo,-."!,. due to oneny action or nochanioal dofocto, loso Lh'eir .<"ull mobil:'.ty, thoy must undor '.lo eireumstanco.s be retained in I'ino moroly i;o utili,".o •*.bo.:r Y;eay.'or!i. ^ "

.. 9 - SECRET L i o; Gornan Tonk Taotios (Cont'd) i>- , " = " ' ',• '.. f 4

y;..; '• Tho fuol and spa'ro parts situation do. 3 not pomit ono notor of un- •, •• , ' noeossary travel* li: is~i'o~«iOrpj and divisions";'; dooidq on and to suporvisc tho shifting, routing, and tining of tanks and assault gun units. I horov.-ith . order:

1. Tho ahoTO nontionod vroapona v.'ill b.o ocnrdttod at least in ccnpany :» ~' or troop strongth.

2. If in a oanpany or troop the nr.nlior of weapons roady for ocrjnit- mont drops to less than 5; tho unit will only be co::nittod in conjunction with , •:' othor tank or assault gun units until itr T/'E can be ropjonished. , "| 'I . : , ' 3. I prchDoifc the piooenoal cor..iib-.io:it of tanks, assault guns or -. ^ tarJ; destroyers. .

4. Di'/i.-^ions w;hich have tank, assault gun, or tank dontroyer units • -; assigned to thon will always koop a rosprvo of --.r.eso troi-pcn.^ in roaJiness, pro- forably in company stron;:t;i. After a ooroi'innnt this rij.sei'vo wixl bo reformed ". ? ;, as quickly as possiblor fho vraapons will., for soourity rouscns, HOT remain in ' • ,.t tho main lino of rosistai^co. "= 7

Signodj STUD"1!T, General. 'V

(2) Tho sooond iton,, from tho intorrogation of a v;oll.-infomod and oapublo prisoner of v;ar, roitorntos and reinforoos sovoral knoi-ra tenonts of Gor- ;; man tank'doctrine und sha.,"-, the di£UStto-j.s results of certain imprcr.ptu v^.ria- . •'- tions on thon. AE or.piâj.ncd by tho prisoner ef war, the primary ni.itiien of tho ' '-'-» Gornan tank is to provide th') hoaw uobilo punr.h- That i.s the reason v.'hy tho '.'•; Germans havo gone to suoh gj'oat loag'-ihs 1:0 i.i.vreaso tho cu^îbor ûid mu:",le volo- • city of thoir tan); gun.; Tho bot-cor tho gur.. tlie bottci tac 'ccxk, occording to , Gornan thinking. .'laohino gun'ipliy 0. secondary role, and aro .•!0'nparati'"oly littlo ' . .-.-.''.'I usod. Fujjthcr.. tho Gormar.' Jia-ro huilt thoir -:e,-,n-c tanks or. tho theory that-the . '' /^•p'i enony will at all Lim-s be t'upoi iev in noc;ha!'ii.:at.i.on and mobile v/oapons of vmr. Thoroforo, a liard-^.itting, st jol-eru.shing tarij- is noeos.'ajy to clear t.he v/ay so '•',''; j. that tho panzer 0-onadi:r an.'.ou:.'od im'antry olcTiicr.t can i:\o\-o up v/ith its autqna- • )i tic v/capons. Confo:n-.ug to thp.s tactical doot:.'ino, the l-an-nhor has a super-long ' -•'."• I 75in.n gvm.. Tho prisoner of v/!..- i;ec.:.n.:od thoy wore trained to en.^rage a Sherman ' f' tanL at a rango of 2000 tc 2200 netois wit.hout h.osjtotion. Tho p:/ofcrabAe range . '. j; of dOO-9.00 motors v/ill ii.iprcvo accuracy but not add much te tl.c punch. Tho gun " • ' t has an optical sight v/hich 'ooa:-.

3. "' GEHLfj; lilTELLIGErCE.

a. Capt.iued 1^" Report. (Souroo: Third US Army 0-2 periodic Report) '.'-i'ayS

" 'A doc-jDOnt wa^ found in irJHRIGEN which proved to bo a Geman IF?/ report !^ of-the. .2''7th.7olks (Jronadior Di'/iar.ou. ,' /-"^ It cloiirly ll''.v;£Tra.';o.., the .-'.ocO£_s l.;.^ f:r_ continuous ehcckinf- to soo that personnel " .^t.- •'de>;tia ""r-Tos , "'j.eotoivJJ\ra''at'coV\-rjTr^^ "oF?.'-"l-';?i'-''('.Tll:r~aTI'~''.Vcn-T;~t~u£t - "''-V^ ; b£Ji~~:'rJol!r.'4;d_;ocja:ol_-.o "oi>.i;)tu»""o~o!-oy'givo~ ••'-.^ ^;JlEV^L'^^.^v/.^.:.t•.;•l•rA.^l•lU;h^^^^^^ 0;LY.'''Jli3''tranriiitior. of"v;hJ"doVvJn^

277 Volks Oron Div . Div CP, 27 January 1945 "G-2 Section ' ' ,

..• ' . Interrogation of Hf #-996 - 1001 r .. • ' ' ~" '>\ ~ .' .' ". ly Tho G prisoners of war v/ore .oapturod cn 23 January 1545, at 0530A near tho 'hill EISTCRi by ncnbors cf 990.Gronadior Rogimont.'. '.

'x'di-.r.tlficr.tions ; Although tho .prisoners of v/a:' initially refused to give any in- ""^'fll' Tcrnc-H'ion "concoVning tlioir idontif icntiono, thoir unit oould bo dotonninod oasily v/jjB thru -uho addrossos of letters found on tlicm. Thoy bolongod to Ist Platoon, "G" 'liZ Conpanj' Infantry ( US Infantry Division). . 'I 3. GmiAII i\nZlLl((^ IE (Cont^d) llistorj' of US Ir.fantr/ Di-z-isjcn: A booklet found on ona of the prisoners of v/ar gives a detailoi',' TiluTUreBeA history of the Infantry Division up to September 1944. AfterYfcrds Ji'.fantry Division enetrated into Geraan-territory south of ROfiTGElI cn 13 Sopti~'.oVr l'i44 . Infantry vvas first Allied regiment v/hich broke thru the "niest k'.alli and 'Inlantry fought in the inJRTGEK forest. Ilotes in tha diary cf pvTr~->ner CfTmr ffi. gave detailed information about the further employment of Infantry Division and the replacement situation. According to it, prisono;.- 'ot v.ar^s transport loft ;iE17 YORK on 17 September, dock• ed in EHGLAIID on 25 Soptembor- stayed there until 10 October and then crossed from SOUTHAMPTOn to OMAHA Bsach. B;/ truck they wont to'LEJtJIS (14 October). On 20 October they arrived at the iteplacement Battalion in DELGIUIII. On 21 October they wore in EUPER at the Division CaTT.and Post of Infantry Division. On the next day prisoner of I'-tv #? {.rri-ved at the front. One.^ day later his division was relieved by Infantry Division and v/ent into a reserve position near MOUSClL'iU. On 5 Kovember trae.sferrfd te a voservo position near PRUM where Infantry Divi• sion was relieved . Five dayv later they relieved Division and again appeared ^n the area ELSEMBOHli •liOlISGH.'iU-. On 5 December by truck to HOLLAND. On 10 and 11 Decorabor fighting at, D EORP, SCHLICK and MSIIRODE-. Aftor the beginning of the Ger• man offensive back to ELSEilBOHN^ On 13 December and 16 January the diary is mark• ed "back to roar areas''.

Roplaooments: Among tlie prisoners of war there were two men older than 30 years. A letter found on- ono of tho prisoners of v/ar proved how short of replacements the Americans aro. "l assume that you fellov/s in the foxholes are satisfied v/ith the rocont drafting of all men betv/oen 26 and 37 unless they are in an essential industry". Prisoners of v/ar #3 and jfi joined their company only after the be• ginning of the Gorman offensive. Prisoner of v/ar -^6 v/as in a hospital at LISOII for four v/eeks and returned from there only 2 days ago, ' Significant is that prisoner of war #2 has only been drafted in April and already has the rank of sergeant. Ho had his basic training at Camp l.Tioolor, Georgia.

Codes; Tljo following oodo v;as found; Ammo—Paper; Rations—Oil; Tank—Cracker Box; AT—Cracker Box Sr.; House—Mayfair; Main Road—Scotch; Attack—Kill;, Counter attack-^-Kill Moro; Mortar—Dark Onos; Artillery—oombie; no information oould be obtained whether or not tho code was still -valid.

Signed for the (f/S - Illegible, Capt.

4. SU?1MARY OF Emr/ ARJiORED SITUATION Oil THB VESTSRII FROUT:

During the last v/eok of January and throughout tho month of February tho enemy shifted the major portion of his armored strongth from the Third US Army's lono to the Eastern Front and to othor sectors of the T.'ostern Front. The 116 and 130 Panzer and 15 Panzer Grenadier Divisions moved north to tho First Canadian Army zone. Tho 9 Panzer and elomonts of 11 Panzer Divisions ha-vo been in contact on the Ninth US Array front, and tho 3 Panzer Grenadier Division has been in con• tact on tho First US Army front. The 1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, 12 SS, and 21^Panzer Divisions, and 25 Panzer Grenadier Division were reliably reported to have rvoved to tho Eastern Fronts The 10 SS Panzer Division was also reported to bo movir^g to the Eastern Front but rocont indications tend to place this division scmcwhere in the COLOG!TE-DUr.E!-! aroa., Tho 17 SS Panzer Gronadior Division repAlnod in con• tact on tho Seventh US Anr.y front.

At tho oloso of tho month the 2 Panzer Division and elements of 11 panzer DivL^ion v/ei-e tho only major annorod units in contact on tho Third US Army front. Tho 11 pa'nzor Divi?io/: war; roportod to havo movod north but tho recent identifi• cations of elomonts cf tho division in thb TRIER aroa indicate the novonent was net completed, due largely, according to prisoner of war statement, to our con• stant air attacks. (S-2, 1st Tank Dostroyor Brigade).

£SCTI0N_7

TECHirtCAI. MOTES

1. HVAP AiniUmTIOlT:

a, CO^-id T'ir.k Dostroyor Battalion; Tho 3 enemy Mark V tanks reported des• troyed in report of 19 February 194-5 v/oro conf irm-od as 2 !-ark V tanks and 1 Mark V assault gun. Tho fron-cal armor of tho Mark V tanks v/as piercod at 1000 yards by 3-ineh HVAP arnunition-

. . - II - SECRET 1. m'AP Air.UlIITIO!J: (Cont'd)

b. 300 rounds of OChn HVAP camunition aro oxpoctod for Third Army tank des- troj'ors by tho end of Haroh;.eaoh month thereafter- the allotmont will, bo about 1500 rou:ids por month*

Approximately 1500 rounds of each 3-inch and 76nim HVAP will bo allotted Third lirny for Harcli and for oach r.ionth thereafter.

Z. FUZE SEnitIG D-\TA iVR VAZ FUZS:

Tho 610th Tank Dostroyor Battalion expanded tho FT 9QA.'-.-B-3, C-4, data on tho m3 fuzo as follows:

ITCE, tind, noehanibal. l!43A.2,,!«3A3, ir43A4 or :M3A5 ' ' ,

Range Fuzo sotting Displacement of burst for Probable error in graie burst change of 0,2 seconds (1) height of burst. in fuze setting

Height • Range

yd. ceo nils ft. .yd . mils ft

0 ^0.1 (2) 1.2 180 ..5 0

1000 1.3 (2) 1.2 4 164 .5 0 1250 1.6 1500 • 1.9 1750 2.2

2000 2.5 7 148 . .5 3 2250 2.0 - ,2500 3.1 • 2750 3.5

5000 3.9 1.3 12 134 • .5 _ 5 • 3250 4.3 3500 4.7 3750 5.1 ,.

4000 5.5 . 1.3 16 . .120 .5 • 7 4250 5.9 4500 6.3 4750 6.8

5000 7.3 1.4 22 , 106 •6 9

Each destroyer has been furnished a copy of the above. When enemy personnel or installations are encountorod behind an obstacle that resists direct firo, on air-burst round above or to ono sido of tho obstacle has proven a successful . method of attack.

3. 1I36B1; , •

, During February the 803rd, 808th and SlBth T&nk Destroyer Battalions wore converted tc I,:-3e units. Sccio of, tho n-36s received were the JI3uBl. The !!36Bl has tho standard l.:-36 turret and 9Chim gun on the 1,;4A3 tank chassis. Major points of diffaronoe botvroen tho I,i-56 and the M36D1 are:

a. The M4A3 tanlc hull of the Bl presents a different silhouette.

b. Tho 31 has the M4^tank's hoavy hull amor and the sponson .30 caliber machine gun. ' \

c. Tho Bl has oquilibrtitors to relievo the elevating nochanism of shock when tho destroyer is moving v/ith tho gun pointing to the front.

• d. Tho Bl has u cable rool as u part of the intorphono system which allows the gun oommundor to novo 50 foot uway frctn tlio destroyer v/hon it is noccsaary to "spot" targots fr'or. outsido tho dostroyor.

- 12 - J .1 t

ttr The Scroon Vent Fuel Tijrik on tho gasolina tank of the M-SS tdnlc destroyer will not permit the filling of gae tanks in a minimum arwunt of tino. The tine required to install five (5) gallons of gasoline is two minutes and twonty-fivo seconds •

•V , . •• }>. A 1/4" hole drlllodthiru tho soreon vont, e.a per diagram below, permits tho filling of gas tanks in a minimum amount of timo. 'i Tha timo now required to install flvo (5) gallons of gusolino ia one minute and;fi70 seconds. (Motor • Officer, 607th Tank Dostroyor Battalion) V ^EEN VENT, FUEL TANK

l/)/' holo

KX)1

SIDE

;6. SUBSTITUTE RECOIL inscHAtnstt F6R !i!ite\lM6; r The recoil system of tho TSram tank gun wili function on the M-18 76imn gun, ' ixlthough not as well as tl» organic rpcpil. (Commanding Of floor, 603rd Tank Des• troyer Battalion).

8. AUXILIARY GEHER/iTORS t

Twelfth Arriy Group has rooormohdod to, JiTOUSA that edoh H-IO and each );-20 in tdnk destroyer units bo provided with an auxiliary generator. Thoro is as yet 116 informtition as to whotjwr tho rooomnohdation Iwis boon npprovod. (S-4, 1st Tank ilostroyor Brigade).

SECTIOH VI

CHAitGES' Itt i/o AND E

Sinoo tho 'M-24 light tank is rqplacing tho M5A1 light tank in araorod unit*, this hcadquartors has roquostod that tho I55A1 light tank roglaeo th3 cor, ornorod, 'light, H-8 in Third Army tanJ: dostroyor rocorjiaissanoo platoons: Although there ijiay bo insufficiont light tanlas to roplarc all n-Ba at onco, it is believed that a partial oonvorsion will ta!:o placo during the coining month. (S-4, 1st Tank Dostroyor Brigade).

SECTIOH VII

COimAT TIPS

Lack of Socurity in Towns

Rooontly many small units havti suffered hoavy lossos while billotlng in, or dofonding towns., poo.' planning and tochniquo havo boon two chief causes for thoso incidents. Some specific faults ha-ro boom

- 13 - SECRET Lack of Security in Tovms (Cont'd)

a. Failure to poet and maintain an all-around alert socurity, thus allowing tho onomy to infiltrate. ' •

b. failure to maintain tactical unity, duo to dispersing elements throughout tho town to obtain sleeping quarters.

c. Failure to make r.dvanood plans for firos, including artillery, anti-tank, and mortars, to break up enemy attacks.

d. Pailuro to establish adequate communication to alort units for action. (Sourco: XVIII US Airborne Corps).

SECTIOH VIII

TAIX DESTROYER TROOP LIST.

The-latest available list of Tank Dostroyor Brigade, Groups, and BattaliorJ, v/ith thoir commanders, is furnished for your information below.

BRIGADE

1ST TAl-IK DESTROYER BRIGADE ~ Colonel LOGAN C. BERRY

GROUPS

1st TD Group Colonel STEVENS 8th TD Group Colonel LfJ?THR 2d TD Group Lt Col BELL 9th TD Group Lt Col DARLING 3d TD Group Lt Col HAYS 12th TD Group Colonel DErRY 4th TD Group Colonel BRCP.'.'iaNG 14th TD Group, Colonel I'ATDOX 5th TD Group Colonel JfXOBY 16th TD Group Colonel TTHEATON 6th TD Group Colonel SEARCY - 20th TD Group Colonel aJj;.3SNT 7th TD Group Lt Col mianm 23d TD Group Colonel MARTIN

BATTALIONS

601 TD Bn Lt Col TARDY 704 TD Bn Lt Col BIDTELL 602 TD Bn - Major CONLIN 705 TD Bn Lt Col TE-'IPLSTON 603 TD Bn - Lt Col McCURRY 771 TD Bn Lt Col SMITE 605 TD Bn - Lt Col BUCffi.'ALD 772 TD Bn Lt Col McCLELLAN 607 TD Bn - Lt Col SUIIDT 773 TD Bn Lt Col SFIESS 609 TD Bn Major SHOTOLA 774 TD Bn Lt Ccl STURGES 610 TD Bn - Lt Col JERGSTROM 776 TD Bn Lt Col MOOREHEAD 612 TD Bn Lt Col D3ELSY 801 TD Bn Lt Col HOSSFiLL 614 TD Bn - Lt Col PRITCHARD 802 TD Bn Lt Col !'0!rGj!!EET 628 TD Bn - Lt Col GAU.AGER 805 TD Bn Lt Col GOOITIN 629 TD 3n - Lt Col COLE 807 TD Bn Lt Col SilTE 630 TD Bn - Major ^J!:i.S 806 TD Bn Lt Col MorOILUD 631 TD Bn - Lt Col CADEIIHEAD 809 TD Bn Lt Col u.rso:i 634 TD Bn - Lt Col Oi.\1SSON 811 TD Bn Lt Col hRynTzsm 635 TD Bn - Lt Col SMITIi 8J.3 TD Bn Major McCbTCHiOH 63o TD Bn - Lt Cel. TTILBUR 814 TD Bn Lt Col joirrs 638 TD Bn - Lt Col DAVIS 817 TD Bn Lt Col P/JSES 643 TO Bn Lt Col .F;J?R 018 TD 3n Lt Col EAIL 644 TD Bn - Lt Ccl GRA.IL'JI 820 TD 3n Lt Col rJi.7P.lCK 645 rr Bn - Lt Col AU.nTIH 021 TD Bn Lt Col ARiUHY 648 Tr Bn Lt Col :iAYO 822 TD Bn Lt Col MAiyS - 65-i ?j Bn Lt Cel MIHTON 823 TD Bn Lt Col rr.^^ER 656 TD Bn - Lt Col >t-'ArOR 82-i TD Bn Lt Col .31iirE - Lt Col Mivt.LSR 661 TD Bn 825 TD Bn Lt Col !:?;J:I:;G 679 TD Bn Lt Col MciGR.Vyiifi' .827 TD 3n It Col,'-.ilOERSTTEEP 691 TD Bn - ISajor FiNLEY 893 TD Bn Major C>4UJ:N • ' sscRsr ^ Tank Destroyer Troc^yist (Cont'd)

' * BA.TTAUONS (Cont'd)

692 TD Bn - Lt Col MORSE 899 TD Bn - Lt Col TIHCHER 702 TD Bn - Lt Col BEALL RBRl * TD Bn - Lt Col UAGGIAR 703 TD Bn - Lt Col SIEOTALTER

* Regiment Blindee Fusiloers Marines.

L0C5/.n,C. BERRY ColonelJ Cavalry Commanding

DISTRIBOTIOII;

No. of Copies >

1 - CO, Third Yvrmy 1 - CO, First Army 1 - CG, Seventh yirmy 1 - CG, Ninth Army 1 - CG, Fifteenth Army 1 - AT 0, Fifth /u-my \ G-3, Third ij-ray 1 - G-2, Third Army 1 - Arty 0, Third Army 1 - Historical Section, Third Army \ 1 - AT 0, III Corps 1 - AT 0, VIII Corps 1 - AT 0, XII Corps 1 - AT 0, XX Corps 1 - Each Div G-3 2 - Each TD Gp, Third ij-my 6 - Each TD Bn, Third Army 5 - 5th TD Gp 5 - 6th TD Gp - 6 - 630 TD Bn 6 - 654 TD Bn 6 - 807 TD Bn .. 6- - 802 TD Bn 1 - CG, TD School 1 - Pros, TD Board 1 - CG, TD Center 1 - G-3,' SH/JIF 1 - Col Clyburn, G-3, Observers Board, Hq ETOUSA 9 - Pros, ^TD Observers Board, c/o G-3 Section, Hq ETOUSA, APO 887.

NOTE: Ploase send your contributions in early for April issue.

- 15 - SECRET