Disinforming Democracy: the Manifested Power of Manipulation
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Disinforming Democracy: The Manifested Power of Manipulation Cosmin Timofte 29.03.2021 1 INSTYTUT NOWEJ EUROPY | www.ine.org.pl | [email protected] Main Points: - A group of pro-Trump protesters stormed the US Capitol on January 6th, 2021. This occurrence is a result of persistent disinformation where conspiracy theories became a reality for the protesters, who were enabled to take action against a securitized threat. - Individuals responsible for pushing conspiracy theories have had their voices amplified through authoritative media outlets and high-ranking officials, including Donald Trump. - The dynamics focused on spreading, legitimizing and exploiting disinformation create a novel and escalating security risk of formidable potential at a global scale. - Actions like censoring will result in merely pushing relevant groups into more distant corners of the Internet, showcasing an equally formidable versatility in response. Preface: Controlling One’s Own Reality On January 6th 2021, the US Capitol building was breached for the first time in over 200 years, this time not by the British, but by angry protesters that sought to prevent the certification of Joseph R. Biden as the 46th President of the United States.1 Among the outcomes of this riot, seven people died (5 in the riot, 2 by suicide),2 many US officials were put in danger, including then-Vice President Mike Pence,3 and Nancy Pelosi’s laptop was allegedly at risk of being sold to Russia.4 This riot was preceded by a rally held at the White House by Donald Trump, where visual descriptions of resistance were vocalized towards the attendees, including notions that without fighting, there “would not be a country [for them] anymore”.5 The damage and location of the riots emphasize that disinformation can harm national security regardless of its location or strength. 1 Holpuch A. (2021), “US Capitol’s Last Breach Was More Than 200 Years Ago”, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jan/06/us-capitol-building-washington-history-breach 2 Emma C., Ferris S. (2021), “Second Police Officer Died by Suicide following Capitol Attack”, available at: https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/27/second-officer-suicide-following-capitol-riot-463123 3 Pramuk J. (2021), “Graphic New Footage Shows Mob Breaking into Capitol, Pence and Romney Rushing from Danger”, available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/10/trump-impeachment-new-video-shows-capitol-riot- romney-and-pence-evacuating.html 4 Associated Press (2021), “Woman Accused of Helping Steal Pelosi Laptop, Plotting Sale to Russia, Freed from Jail”, available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/woman-accused-helping-steal-pelosi-laptop- plotting-sale-russia-freed-n1255153 5 Savage C. (2021), “Incitement to Riot? What Trump Told Supporters Before Mob Stormed Capitol”, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/10/us/trump-speech-riot.html 2 INSTYTUT NOWEJ EUROPY | www.ine.org.pl | [email protected] To explore this ability, an understanding of how disinformation is accepted is essential. Psychologically, in times of great uncertainty, the mind seeks to find solace in clarity and justification of the situation it finds itself in. People would seek out information to make sense of their circumstances, led by a “drive to casual understanding” that focuses not only on the “cause” of an event, but also on the “reasons” it happened to create a sense of control over their lives.6 The COVID-19 pandemic and the related phenomenon of relying more on social media to stay in touch with other people have created perfect conditions for instilling uncertainty.7 Because of this, more people risk being exposed to disinformation on social media, which results in conspiracy theories being accepted due to this need to keep perceived control over one’s own lives. Social media is particularly equipped for spreading disinformation, as observed in the example of the misidentification by 4chan users of the perpetrator of Charleston’s 2017 car attack, which relied on visual content to spread their theory before official identification contradicted their claims.8 Disinformation is not limited to the obscure corners of the Internet. On the contrary, it can be used by various bigger or even mainstream media outlets which have an interest in sharing so-called “clickbait” to compete for large number of views, with the extent of such shares being occasionally on a par with “professional news”: a concept called “trading up the chain”.9 As visual content is prone to less criticism than text,10 disinformation can appear as a decisive solution to people’s subconscious need to seek simple, reason-focused explanations for the world around them. The US Capitol rioters have been subjected to large amounts of audiovisual and text-based disinformation, appearing particularly credible if shared from a source they perceive as trustful, such as then-President Donald Trump. Taking as an example the campaign to overturn the 2020 election alone, Trump spearheaded the campaign that sought to claim that Joe Biden “stole the election” from the nation since 6 Ichino A. (2018), “Superstitious Confabulations”, Topoi 39, p. 203-217, available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9620-y 7 Koeze E., Popper N. (2020), “The Virus Changed the Way We Internet”, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/07/technology/coronavirus-internet-use.html 8 Krafft M. P., Donovan J. (2020), “Disinformation by Design: The Use of Evidence Collages and Platform”, Political Communication (37:2), available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2019.1686094 9 Freelon C., Wells C. (2020), “Disinformation as Political Communication”, Political Communication (37:2), p. 145-156, available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2020.1723755 10 Hameleers M. et al. (2020), “A Picture Paints a Thousand Lies? The Effects and Mechanisms of Multimodal Disinformation and Rebuttals Disseminated via Social Media”, Political Communication (37:2), p. 281-301, available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2019.1674979 3 INSTYTUT NOWEJ EUROPY | www.ine.org.pl | [email protected] November 4th 2020, using the advantage he had before the mail-in ballots arrived as one of the many arguments for his claims.11 For Trump’s supporters, this may as well have been the working justification to the uncertainty they felt after he lost. While this narrative was supported by voters, politicians and some news outlets, within the scope of this paper, QAnon will be a subject of a case study and as such will be analyzed through the lenses of how disinformation can be spread and inflict damage. The Dynamics of Disinformation: QAnon and Spreading Conspiracy Theories Online The ability of QAnon followers to spread their theories online, via text or audio-visual content, as well as their ability to be shared by other media qualify them as a phenomenon notable enough to be a facilitator for understanding the damage of disinformation. The online spread of their theories has led a large group of people to encounter their content at least once, thus amplifying their impact and reach across the Internet. Yet, while their involvement in the US Capitol riot will be explored, it must be noted that not all those who support Trump are part of QAnon, with the movement being perceived only as a section of his supporters overall. QAnon is a movement based on a shared belief in the conspiracy theory (and its variations) that the world is led by a cabal of Satan-worshipping pedophiles and that Donald Trump is secretly waging a war against it.12 Donald Trump, in response, did not acknowledge the theory but praised its believers’ appreciation for him,13 and defended them on occasions, calling them “people who love [the US]”.14 QAnon’s relation to Trump, as well as its theories, became a recurring pattern that led its followers to participate in the US Capitol riots.15 Furthermore, not only did their participation, ability to contribute to the process of pre- 11 Buchanan L. et al. (2021), “Lie After Lie: Listen to How Trump Built His Alternate Reality”, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/02/09/us/trump-voter-fraud-election.html 12 Wendling M. (2021), “QAnon: What Is It and Where Did It Come From?”, available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/53498434 13 Associated Press (2020), “Trump Praises QAnon Conspiracists, Who ‘Like Me Very Much’”, available at: https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-08-20/trump-praises-qanon-conspiracists-appreciates-support 14 Miller Z. et al. (2020), “‘These Are People Who Love Our Country’: Trump Praises QAnon Conspiracists”, available at: https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/politics/president-trump/these-are-people-who-love-our- country-trump-praises-qanon-conspiracists/2576603/ 15 Rubin O. et al. (2021), “QAnon Emerges as Recurring Theme of Criminal Cases Tied to US Capitol Siege”, available at: https://abcnews.go.com/US/qanon-emerges-recurring-theme-criminal-cases-tied- us/story?id=75347445 4 INSTYTUT NOWEJ EUROPY | www.ine.org.pl | [email protected] planning or make calls to action16 secure them greater media exposure, but also put the spotlight on their potential to cause harm to state institutions if left unchecked. However, controlling or countering its spread of disinformation is easier said than done. For example, QAnon has echoed Trump’s narrative that there were “illegal” mail-in ballots in key state Georgia — a theory that was debunked.17 Equally, their leading theory about a military takeover in the US or mass arrests against the satanic cabal was disproven.18 Yet,