SANCTIONS ON IRAQ: A VALID ANTI-AMERICAN GRIEVANCE? By Michael Rubin*
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, many academics and policymakers cite America’s support for United Nations sanctions on Iraq, and the oft-reported figure of one million resulting deaths, as a legitimate grievance against Washington’s foreign policy. However, the facts upon which these critics make their case do not hold up under close scrutiny. Not only does the one million dead figure and other statistics originate with Iraqi government (and not UN research as is so often cited), but portions of Iraq are actually doing better under sanctions than before their implementation. One UN study even reported nine years into sanctions that half the Iraqi population was overweight. Comparing the impact of sanctions between opposition-controlled Iraqi provinces and the portions of the country ruled by Saddam Hussein indicates that, while the deleterious impact of sanctions upon the Iraqi population has been grossly exaggerated, what problems do occur are a result of Baghdad’s political leadership.
In his taped broadcast following the undermine the Muslim nations, but also among beginning of U.S. military action against many U.S. academics, journalists, and Afghanistan in October 2001, Usama Bin policymakers who readily accept claims that the Laden blamed the United States for the U.S. is responsible for the deaths of more than a suffering of the Iraqi people. The claim that million Iraqis. For example, just two days after international sanctions have led to the death of Bin Laden’s video aired, Congressman Jim one million Iraqis is often accepted at face McDermott (D-WA) blamed sanctions for value by academics, activists, UN officials, and suffering in Iraq. The same day, the online even some policymakers. Tracing such claims political news magazine Slate declared (based to their origin, however, casts doubt not only on on the statement of UNICEF director Carol the numbers but also regarding the often- Bellamy) in an article about the alleged death of assumed linkage between sanctions and one million children in Iraq that “UNICEF's suffering in Iraq. data on Iraqi child mortality rates haven't been On October 7, as the U.S. military campaign disputed.”(2) Such claims have found a against in Afghanistan began, the Qatar-based receptive audience on college campuses. For television station al-Jazeera broadcast a tape example, in April 1999, the Yale College from Usama Bin Laden. In an effort to push government voted on behalf of the entire Yale populist buttons in the Middle East, Bin Laden University student body to condemn sanctions blamed America for suffering in Iraq, declaring, on Iraq. (3) “There are civilians, innocent children being The claim that sanctions have caused killed every day in Iraq without any guilt, and upwards of one million deaths in Iraq has been we never hear anybody.”(1) so often repeated, it is now accepted as Not only does Bin Laden’s claim have an unquestioned truth. Perennial opponents of audience in the Islamic world for those U.S. policy Noam Chomsky and Edward Said, believing that the United States seeks to among others, declare, “The sanctions [on Iraq]
100 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) Michael Rubin are weapons of mass destruction.”(4) The (35.8 percent), and between 1987 and 1997 American Friends Service Committee has been (35.1 percent).(9) very vocal in its opposition to U.S. sanctions So how did the claim of more than a million policy, arguing that, “During the past ten years, sanctions-related deaths in Iraq persist? In sanctions have led to an almost complete 1999, UNICEF released a glossy, detailed breakdown in economic, medical, social, and report that again concluded that sanctions had educational structures.”(5) When resigning contributed to the deaths of one million Iraqis. from his UN post, Denis Halliday, the former UNICEF did not complete the report United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in independently however, but rather co-authored Iraq, declared, “We are in the process of it with the Iraqi government’s health ministry destroying an entire society.”(6) (according to the report’s own front cover). It Even some practitioners of U.S. foreign is this report that is most often cited by activists policy have questioned sanctions. Richard and journalists, although seldom do they refer Haass, later appointed to head the State to it as a joint publication of Saddam’s Department Policy Planning Staff, and Meghan government. Both current and former UN O’Sullivan wrote in their comprehensive personnel admit this report to be problematic critique of sanctions, “Sanctions can be costly especially because its statistics come from the for innocent bystanders, particularly the poorest Iraqi government, which blocks independent in the target country and American businesses information gathering.(10) Former UN and commercial interests. In addition, officials related that many statistics are of sanctions often evoke unintended questionable veracity.(11) One troubling sign consequences, such as the strengthening of of lack of objectivity is a map on the first page obnoxious regimes.”(7) of the first chapter. While purporting to show But where does the claim of mass death or the region, the map omits Kuwait, and makes it even genocide in Iraq originate? appear that the country is actually part of In short, with the Iraqi government itself. Iraq.(12) The inclusion of the map raises issue Saddam Hussein’s government has since the of what compromises UNICEF made to mid-1990s claimed that United Nations complete the study. sanctions had resulted in more than a million Many academics as well as those in the deaths. Surprisingly, Baghdad also prevented activist and conflict resolution communities humanitarian organizations to conduct their nevertheless accept the UNICEF statistics at own fieldwork to verify the claims. Unable to face value. However, a careful examination conduct their own large-scale surveying, some shows that the reported results make no sense. humanitarian organizations adopted Iraqi According to data presented in the report, the government figures, thus amplifying the claim. mortality rate for children under five years old In 1995, for example, UNICEF estimated that and the infant mortality rate increased after the more than 1.2 million Iraqis had died as a result adoption of the oil-for-food program almost of sanctions, while the US-based International doubled caloric intake. For example, in 1995, Action Coalition claimed that by 1997, the the infant mortality rate allegedly was 98 deaths economic embargo upon Iraq had killed 1.4 per thousand while, in 1998, it was 103 deaths million people.(8) per thousand. Likewise, the under five years old Baghdad’s claims were spacious, though. mortality rate reportedly rose to 125 deaths per Iraq expert Amatzia Baram compared the thousand in 1998, from 117 in 1995.(13) country’s population growth rates over the last Ironically, the suspicious implication here is three censuses and found there to be almost no that the reduction of sanctions increases difference between in the rate of Iraq’s suffering in Iraq. population growth between 1977 and 1987 Further, according to the UNICEF study, child mortality rose in the portion of Iraq
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) 101 Sanctions on Iraq: A Valid Anti-American Grievance? controlled by Saddam Hussein from 56 per for-food income to benefit the population, but thousand before sanctions to 131 per thousand also used available discretionary tax revenues in 1999, a magnitude rise for which there is no for development and services, while Saddam evidence. Curiously, UNICEF (or perhaps the Hussein’s government consistently sought to Iraqi government) did not provide a breakdown undermine the oil-for-food program, while of the figures by quarters of Baghdad, where using its smuggling and tax revenues to support one-third of the Iraqi population lives. its military. Accordingly, no comparison among various In short, most of the evidence for claims of constituencies in the city is possible, to see if severe suffering under sanctions comes from food is getting, for example, to Arab Sunnis, the Iraqi government itself, whose record for but not to Arab Shi’i or Kurds.(14) veracity is not good and which has an obvious However, a comparison can be made within interest in exaggerating the deprivations of the report between those areas under Saddam’s sanctions in order to end them and to turn control and those areas administered by the international public opinion against its enemies. Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Further undercutting the 1999 UNICEF Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). In Iraqi report is an often ignored and independently Kurdistan, the figures dropped from 80 per produced September 2000 Food and thousand before sanctions, to 72 per thousand. Agriculture Report, written in collaboration The far higher original figures for the north with the World Health Organization, which show the traditional neglect of that area by the found half of the Iraqi adult population to be Baghdad government. overweight and one of the leading causes of At the same time, though, northern Iraq also mortality to be hypertension and diabetes, not faced both the same international sanctions as commonly diseases of the hungry.(16) did Baghdad, additional sanctions imposed by Dismissing the value of the UNICEF/Iraqi the Saddam Hussein government, and had government-authored survey does not indicate poorer medical facilities than the part of the that there is not suffering in Iraq—reports from country controlled by the Baghdad regime. The some (predominantly Shi’i) cities in southern difference between falling mortality rates in the Iraq indicate the situation is bad—but nowhere north and claims that these rates were rising near the extent suggested by anti-sanctions elsewhere may be due to the fact that outsiders activists and academics. Problems with the can measure statistics in the north. Thus, the UNICEF/Iraqi government report also highlight numbers for Iraqi Kurdistan, showing a decline the difficulty of balancing compromise with in child mortality, are more accurate than those access. for the part of the country ruled by the central Structural impediments on the ability of the government. The claim that child mortality UN to operate in Iraq outside of Baghdad’s increased by almost 250 percent is a fiction. control raises further questions about the Iraqi The increase in mortality in Iraqi government’s desire to hide the true situation so government areas is also curious given the it can make false claims about the humanitarian well-established food distribution system prior cost of sanctions. Under the terms of the 1996 to the oil-for-food implementation in the center Memorandum of Understanding, the Iraqi and south of the country, but not in the double- government controls visa issuance for UN embargoed and civil war-torn northern employees, giving it effective veto power over governorates.(15) Aside from the fact that the the hiring of consultants and specialists.(17) Iraqi statistics are themselves questionable, Since 1998, Iraq has banned British and even if they had some validity, why did the American citizens from UN jobs declaring them Kurdish autonomy area fare better than the rest spies. In September, Iraq expelled a number of of the Iraq? The other answer is that the Nigerian and Bosnian UN workers on similar, Kurdish administration not only budgeted oil- unsubstantiated charges.
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At the same time, however, officials in the what sanctions the UN imposed, and how they Kurdish autonomous area of northern Iraq have work contradicts many of the criticisms. no control over such personnel, though they One fundamental problem is that it is easy to complain that the World Health Organization, view sanctions as a blockade, an attempt to stop World Food Program, and UNICEF hire anything from getting in or out of Iraq. In fact, nationals from countries like Egypt, Jordan, the sanctions have three important special Yemen, and Sudan whose governments are features that make them into something quite increasingly sympathetic to the Iraqi different from a generalized blockade: government, and who are often selected based upon their home government connections(18) 1. The sanctions are selective, designed to In a 2001 UNICEF report of its activities in keep out weapons and not food or Iraq over the past decade, one senior UNICEF medicine. employee spoke of having to “go through the 2. The sanctions can be ended any time by a report with a red pen” to remove the biased data decision by the Iraqi government to and propaganda inserted by his predecessor, a cooperate. Such a choice would have let Jordanian Palestinian.(19) the regime stay in power and actually Whatever the case with anyone’s individual improved its political, diplomatic, and bias, the 1996 Memorandum of Understanding economic position—albeit at the cost of governing relief work creates a dynamic that accepting reduced military power. discourages UN workers in Iraq from straying 3. The sanctions took the form of directed from Baghdad’s official line. Because UN spending. Far from keeping the Iraqi workers must renew their Iraq visas every six government from spending money on food, months, Baghdad can encourage self- housing, medicine, health or education, the censorship by forcing anyone whose views it sanctions regime tried to force a reluctant doesn’t like to leave the country. One German Iraqi government to put a larger proportion UN worker commented that his colleagues from of its income into such social services. poorer countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Somalia, were “scared to death” they might do Hours after Iraq invaded Kuwait on August something that might antagonize Baghdad and 2, 1990, the UN Security Council condemned cause them to lose the best paying job they ever the invasion.(21) Iraq refused to withdrawal, so had. the Security Council adopted Resolution 661, Another problem is that local people make it which imposed comprehensive sanctions difficult to achieve accurate survey results prohibiting import or exports of goods with Iraq because of an understandable belief that (export for food and medicine) or investment in exaggerating will result in more help for that country.(22) This is an important point themselves.(20) One NGO working with since claims that sanctions are inflicting great disabled children, found three different families suffering on Iraqi civilians often seem claiming the same mentally retarded child as a predicated on a belief that they block food and dependent, figuring each would get aid medicine from reaching the people. payments. After an extended air campaign and a 100- hour ground war, the UN and Iraq agreed to a WHAT EXACTLY ARE THE SANCTIONS cease-fire in March 1991, outlined in ON IRAQ? Resolution 687, many terms of which Iraq International sanctions on Iraq have become continues to violate.(23) The Resolution a lightening rod for anti-American criticism, obligated Iraq to respect the inviolability of leading to calls for change even within the U.S. Kuwait’s borders (an obligation Iraq threatened government (or, at least, within the State in 1994, and which Saddam Hussein’s son Department). Yet an examination of exactly Uday dismissed in a prominent December 30,
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2000 article in the official Babil newspaper).(24) • To intimidate the UN by making Resolution 687 also provides the basis for threats and refusing to cooperate. Iraqi payment of war damage compensation and • To wear down its adversaries by for international inspections to locate and stretching out the need to maintain eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction sanctions over many years, when the programs. The resolution noted that, under issues could have been resolved in a Saddam Hussein’s government, Iraq was in much shorter time period. contravention to many commitments, including • To fool the UN by a superficial the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use pretense to cooperation at times and in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other by supplying misinformation. Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of • To undermine the coalition by Warfare; the 1989 Final Declaration of states offering various countries—notably party to the Geneva Convention in which Iraq China, France, and Russia— obligated itself to the objective of eliminating lucrative oil, arms, and other chemical and biological weapons; the 1972 contracts to be implemented when Convention on the Prohibition of the sanctions are removed. Development, Production, and Stockpiling of • To gain support from international Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin public opinion by depriving its own Weapons and their Destruction; and the 1968 citizens of their material needs, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.(25) exaggerate the suffering, and blame The Security Council also considered Iraq’s the problem on the United States. threats to use weapons of mass destruction. Portraying Iraq as a nation of hungry Accordingly, UNSCR 687 mandated that Iraq people and sick children became a “shall unconditionally accept” the destruction cynical propaganda tool. Blaming under international supervision of all biological foreigners for the regime’s decisions and chemical weapons, and ballistic missiles and mismanagement could also with a range greater than 150 kilometers. To increase domestic support for the verify this, the resolution authorized on-site UN government. inspections. This provided the basis for the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). However, On one level, this strategy has met with a Iraq consistently refused to cooperate. Swedish great deal of success. But at the same time this Ambassador and UNSCOM chief Rolf Ekeus strategy has also failed to destroy sanctions reported that Iraq did not unconditionally (though they have been eroded). In short, accept inspections. As UNSCOM began to Saddam Hussein has delayed Iraq’s return to a investigate Iraq’s methods of concealing its better international, economic, and even retained WMD capabilities, Iraq increased its military situation, but it has been his decision to resistance to inspections in direct contradiction do so. to its commitments.(26) The fact that the Iraqi government has once Why have sanctions—and any consequent again victimized its own citizens is clear on a suffering for Iraq’s people—lasted so long? The number of fronts. Consider two very telling Iraqi government has deliberately rejected examples. In both 1998 and 1999, Saddam meeting its commitments to eliminate WMD, Hussein repeatedly refused to order baby believing that international pressure will force formula for his population even though he had an end to sanctions without its having to make the funds to do so and was urged to take such any concessions. In order to force the UN to action by the UN.(27) In addition, while surrender, Baghdad has used five main claiming to face dire food shortages, Iraq strategies: actually exported food to other countries.(28)
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Perhaps the most important single case was had failed to grant visas to 280 UN officials that it was Saddam and not the United States or involved with the humanitarian program visas UN that delayed implementation of the oil-for- to do their jobs in Iraq.(35) One reason for this food program. Less than six months after the lack of cooperation may be to conceal end of hostilities, the Security Council adopted corruption. Supplies are taken and resold on the resolutions to allow Iraq to sell its oil in order market by Iraqi officials. The government turns to provide revenue for the purchase of essential a blind eye to such practices which, by humanitarian supplies.(29) However, the Iraqi benefiting loyalists, actually strengthen the government refused to accept the regime itself. resolution.(30) Once implemented, however, the oil-for- The UN again sought to deliver food and food program did provide a huge pool of funds humanitarian supplies to the people of Iraq. On for humanitarian programs. The program April 14, 1995, the UN Security Council passed initially allowed the Iraqi government to sell up Resolution 986, the “oil-for-food” program.(31) to $2 billion in oil every 180 days, the proceeds Declaring the need for the “equitable of which could be used to purchase food and distribution of humanitarian relief to all medicine, as well as to repair vital segments of the Iraqi population,” the infrastructure. In 1999, the UN eliminated the resolution created an escrow account for Iraqi cap on oil sales.(36) From the beginning of the oil proceeds. The UN in turn could use these program through August 2001, Iraq sold more proceeds to purchase supplies and monitor their than $46 billion in oil, an amount greater than distribution. Again, the Iraqi government initially anticipated because of the rise in world refused to accept the program.(32) oil prices.(37) International pressure mounted on Saddam’s Thus, the UN tried to ensure that the Iraqi government to allow relief, though he people would have adequate food and succumbed only after lack of hard currency medicine. The Iraqi government had the funds income caused the value of the Iraqi Dinar to to do so and had dictated the arrangements for plummet.(33). On May 20, 1996, the UN making such purchases. Yet it still did not Secretariat and the Iraqi government signed a fulfill these responsibilities. Indeed, the UN and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to the coalition have been more concerned about implement the oil-for-food program, almost the welfare of the Iraqi people than was the five years after the UN first offered such Iraqi government. assistance.(34) However, in order to get This statement is most clearly proven by Saddam to let it help the Iraqi people the UN comparing the priorities of the Iraqi compromise in accepting Iraq’s demands, government and the sanctioning authorities. setting up a system that made it easier for Before the invasion of Kuwait and imposition Baghdad to smuggle in military-related items. It of sanctions, the Iraqi government spent less allowed the Iraqi government to contract than 25 percent of its income on humanitarian directly with suppliers, and to be the sole body programs. However, under the sanctions allowed to request supplies. regime, Iraq was ordered to allocate 72 percent Moreover, in exchange, the Iraqi of its oil income for humanitarian projects.(38) government was supposed to “provide to Another 25 percent is allocated to the United Nations personnel the assistance compensation committee, while the UN applies required to facilitate the performance of their 3 percent to administrative expenses. To cite functions,” including “unrestricted freedom of only one example of what this oil-for-food movement.” It repeatedly violated this funding has achieved, throughout all of Iraq it commitment. According to Benon Sevon, has supported almost $2 billion in housing executive director of the Iraq Program at the contracts.(39) In short, Iraq’s real objection is UN, as of July 11, 2001, the Iraqi government that while there is plenty of money for meeting
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) 105 Sanctions on Iraq: A Valid Anti-American Grievance? the needs of the Iraqi people, there are causes suffering in Iraq. Such a comparison supposed to be no funds left over for obtaining creates a dilemma for the aid community, weapons. which must confront evidence that suffering in Iraq is not due to lack of access to food, money, THE CONTRAST IN IRAQI KURDISTAN or humanitarian supplies, but instead may be While Baghdad manages program intentional on the part of the Iraqi government. implementation in regions of its control, the UN This observation is shared not only by Kurds, implements the humanitarian programs in the but also by Arab Iraqis living under Saddam, Kurdish-controlled north, funded by 13 percent whom I met in the northern safe-haven. of the total oil-sale revenue, a figure (Perhaps because of this, the Iraqi government proportional to the northern governorates’ is now curtailing freedom of travel between its population.(40) The Kurds very much value area of control and the safe-haven).(43) the 13 percent allocation, fear that they will Everywhere in the safe-haven, blue signs lose the humanitarian guarantees if sanctions announcing UN oil-for food projects are are lifted. Barham Salih, prime minister of the omnipresent, even in the smallest villages. PUK’s half of the Kurdistan Regional According to Nasreen Mustafa Sideek, minister Government, recently called the oil-for-food of reconstruction and development in Iraqi program “truly revolutionary” in that “never Kurdistan: before in our history have we had a government obliged by international law to devote Iraq’s oil “Since the programs began, more revenues to the well being of the Iraqi than 20,000 families throughout Iraqi people.”(41) Kurdistan have been provided with Despite its faults, the 1999 UNICEF/Iraqi accommodation. Hundreds of schools government report highlighted the possible with thousands of classrooms have discrepancy between the situation in Kurdish- been constructed and many more are controlled northern Iraq and the portions of Iraq being planned. Hundreds of kilometers under Saddam Hussein’s rule. While the entire of village access roads have been country remains under why is it that a large completed along with water systems, portion of the country run by an alternative health centers, irrigation channels, administration is now healthier than before the veterinary centers, and other imposition of sanctions? The very success of works.”(44) northern Iraq is all the more impressive given the region’s desperate situation at the time The sheer scale of reconstruction is sanctions were first imposed in 1990. After all, impressive. In the Dahuk governorate, Saddam two years earlier, the Iraqi government had Hussein had destroyed 809 villages of an carried out its Anfal campaign, an ethnic original 1,123. Since 1991, the Kurdish cleansing operation in which 182,000 people administration, relying heavily on oil-for-food died, and hundreds of thousands more were income, rebuilt 470. In the Irbil governorate, displaced.(42) the Iraqi government razed 1,205 of an original Even though neither the Kurds nor the Iraqi 1,497 villages. Already, the Kurdish government have spent the full amount of government has been able rebuild 800. In the money allocated to them, Iraqi Kurdistan Sulaymaniyah governorate, where 1,992 of an thrives, while Baghdad complains that the same original 2,035 villages were laid to waste, the sanctions cause suffering. The fact that the Kurdish authorities have rebuilt 1,350. In the health and welfare of the northern governorates Dahuk and Irbil governorates alone, the oil-for- has increased since the implementation of the food program has spent $110 million so far on oil-for-food program indicates that it is housing units, $27 million on schools, and $9 Saddam’s governance, and not sanctions, which million on health centers, $37 million on water
106 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) Michael Rubin projects, and $7 million on sewage is difficult to be hungry when receiving oil-for- channels.(45) food rations. Each month, every man, woman, Qualitatively, it is hard to go anywhere in and child in Iraq receives 9 kilograms of wheat northern Iraq without seeing the fruits of the flour, 3 kilograms of rice, 2 kilograms of sugar, sanctions-related development. The town of 0.2 kilograms of tea, 1.5 kilograms of vitamin Sa’id Sadiq, razed by Saddam’s forces in 1988, A-fortified cooking oil, 3.6 kilograms of milk had been reconstructed. New schools dot dusty powder, an additional kilogram of dried whole villages near the Turkish border. milk and/or cheese, 0.8 kilograms of fortified Sulaymaniyah, Irbil, and Dahuk have new weaning cereal, 1.5 kilograms of pulses sewer systems, telephone networks, and diesel- (vegetable protein), and 0.15 kilograms of fueled 29-megawatt electrical generating plants. iodized salt. To ensure that every individual In contrast to the situation in the areas ruled receives the minimum stipulated rations, retail by the central government—which carefully agents are provided with an additional four escorts selected delegations and journalists— percent of flour, rice, and pulses, two percent the ability to travel freely in the north allows an sugar, oil, salt, and 0.5 percent tea above their observer to judge the situation more accurately. local needs. All told, rations support a diet of These achievements are even more relatively 2,472 kilocalories per day, double the food impressive since they have been attained intake in 1996, before the program’s despite the constant infighting and lack of implementation.(46) cooperation between the two ruling factions, As of June 31, 2001, the oil-for-food while the rest of the country supposedly enjoys program had bought more than $7 billion in the potential benefits of having a single, well- rations. Contrary to the complaints of some established government apparatus. The fact that anti-sanctions activists, the UN Security workers from non-UN humanitarian agencies Council had absolutely no food contracts on can help in the north, while being barred from hold. Importantly, the ration package does not Iraqi government areas, is another factor, albeit include fresh fruits and vegetables many Iraqis a marginal one, contributing to the people’s grow themselves, buy in the market, or for improved welfare (the budget of the 17 non-UN which they trade excess. Because the UN does international NGOs operating in Iraqi Kurdistan not buy local produce, the is miniscule, and is generally limited to a few fruits of local agriculture are also cheaper; housing projects, a handful of clinics, and a farmers are desperate for a market. small number of vocational centers. While still serving as the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, Hans Von Sponeck, NUTRITION: THREE MEALS A DAY: insinuated that the food basket supplied by the THE FRUIT OF SANCTIONS oil-for-food program could be enlarged if the Ironically, much of the international Iraqi government requested it—only Baghdad interpretation of sanctions, prompted by Iraqi repeatedly refused to order more food. In propaganda, is the exact opposite of the intent November 1999, the Secretary General of the and effort being made. While trying to pressure United Nations reported Iraqi government the Iraqi government to dispense with its WMD “under procurement” of food was a serious programs, the sanctions regime has also tried to problem. Indeed, for ten months in 1998 and force that same government to pay more 1999, despite adequate oil-for-food revenue, the attention to the needs of its own people. Iraqi government simply refused to order The health and welfare of those in Iraq has pulses, resulting in reduced rations though out increased tremendously, not only in northern the country.(47) Iraq, but also in Iraq proper, at least when the Indeed, Iraqis eat much better than those in Iraqi government does not interfere with the most neighboring and regional countries. Most implementation of the oil-for-food program. It Iraqis interviewed said they ate at least some
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) 107 Sanctions on Iraq: A Valid Anti-American Grievance? meat five times per week. In contrast, Iranians And of course problems and shortages of in Tehran said they often eat meat only once facilities remain. The doctor complained that on per month.(48) a single table per day, there could be three or Under the terms of the oil-for-food ration four deliveries, not leaving the staff adequate system, every resident of Iraq is entitled to a time for sterilizing instruments.(51) ration card. Registration centers compile lists of Generally, however, drugs and medical families and households that are then processed supplies are available, though doctors and at a computer center, copies of which then are medical administrators in the safe haven distributed to both the retail ration agent and the complain of Iraqi government obstructionism, local food distribution centers. However, and an indifferent, inefficient UN bureaucracy interviews with recently displaced persons that often is unresponsive and slow. The arriving in the northern safe-haven from Iraqi director of one general hospital, for example, government-controlled territory indicate that complained that endoscopy equipment ordered the Iraq government is regularly confiscating in Phase III of the oil-for-food program (each the UN ration cards of its own citizens. One phase refers to a six month cycle) still has not woman in Kalar complained that when she arrived. Of the 40 ultrasound monitors refused to divorce her husband, whom the Iraqi requested, only ten had arrived by January government accused of supporting the 2001. The hospital director complained that he opposition, the Iraqi government expelled her could get no one at the World Health four children from school and confiscated the Organization to explain the discrepancy or the family’s ration cards.(49) Many residents of status of the equipment order.(52) the internally-displaced persons camp, all Often, vaccinations and other oil-for-food ethnic Kurds or Turkmens expelled from their drug purchases fall short of needs.(53) An homes in or near Kirkuk by Saddam’s administrator at a northern Iraqi teaching government, reported that police first hospital said that in a single year he must spend confiscated their UN ration cards to force them approximately $50,000 for medicines outside to move.(50) the oil-for-food program. Ironically, Many Iraqis find it disturbing that pharmacists say that about 20 percent of drugs proponents of lifting sanctions on Iraq trust on street markets come from Iraqi UN Saddam Hussein to not use food as a weapon, employees siphoning off and selling medicine given not only his ongoing violations of from UN warehouses in Iraqi government- international law, but also the precedent of the controlled areas. Since the Iraqi government 1980’s, when he waged war not only upon Iran, determines which Iraqis can work for foreign but also upon his own people and UN organizations, such jobs often go to . Ba’th party loyalists (an issue which also raises HEALTHCARE UNDER SANCTIONS issues about the accuracy of UN reports).(54) The healthcare situation in the north has also Not only do Iraqi officials block the benefited under the oil-for-food program. distribution of food and medicine for their According to the director of one of northern “own” people but also attempt to sabotage Iraq’s maternity hospitals, fertility is increasing. supplies for the northern safehaven, attempting In 1990, there were 6,669 babies born in the to weaken the “rebel” government there. hospital, while a decade later the figure was For example, a high-level health ministry 11,455. The rise in fertility has not been steady. official in the north notes that despite having Indeed, in the early years of sanctions when the oil-for-food money and submitting orders Kurds also faced a blockade from Saddam, well ahead of schedule, the Iraqi government fertility decreased. It stayed below 1990 levels still systematically refused to order enough until 1998, when the hospital first felt the medicine for the northern governorates. On sustained benefits of the oil-for-food program. September 3, 2001, PUK Health Minister
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Yadgar Heshmet complained of problems in the war, when a greater flow of information obtaining such essentials as surgical gloves, existed. Nagy’s citations themselves are quite sutures, as well as oncology drugs and kidney selective. For example, one document not cited dialysis machines.(55) by Nagy concludes, “Restoration of Iraq's Certainly, the oil-for-food program does not public health services and shortages of major work perfectly, both PUK and KDP health medical materiel apparently are being ministry officials and hospital workers agreed emphatically exploited by Saddam Hussein in that the health care income generated because an effort to keep public opinion firmly against of the sanctions regime has saved lives and had the U.S. and its Coalition allies and to keep an overall positive benefit. Far from the images blame away from the Iraqi government.”(61) of overcrowded hospitals portrayed on official Nagy dismissed another document in the same Iraqi government television and escorted tours collection because it had “a distinct damage- for journalist and anti-sanctions activists, control feel to it,” even though in this case hospital pharmacies in Halabja, Sulaymaniyah, Nagy appears to apply the “damage control” Dahuk, Zakho, and Irbil were well-stocked with label because the document provides evidence supplies and no patients shared beds.(56) In that contradicts Nagy’s thesis.(62) The Dahuk, the hospital administrators showed document in question reads: newly-delivered Siemens CAT scan and “Disease incidence above pre-war levels is mammography units upon which staff were more attributable to the regime's inequitable training.(57) As of June 30, 2001, more than post-war restoration of public health services $1.3 billion in medical equipment had arrived rather than the effects of the war and United in Iraq under the oil-for-food program, with Nations (UN)-imposed sanctions. Although more than $500 million more approved and in current countrywide infectious disease the delivery pipeline.(58) incidence in Iraq is higher than it was before the Gulf War, it is not at the catastrophic levels SELECTIVE REPORTING: IS WATER that some groups predicted. The Iraqi regime TO BLAME? will continue to exploit disease incidence data Increasingly, anti-sanctions activists blame for its own political purposes.”(63) the quality of water for death and misery in Nagy concludes by arguing that the U.S. Iraq, and accuse the United States and Britain government is guilty of violating the Geneva of deliberately degrading Iraq’s water Convention. While the documentary evidence purification systems. In a cover story in the eviscerates Nagy’s conclusions, the case raises British monthly, The Progressive, George ethical questions as to how activists deal with Washington University instructor Thomas Nagy facts on the ground that may contradict political argued that, “the U.S. government intentionally ideology. This problem is heightened in the used sanctions against Iraq to degrade the case of Iraq, since access to the real feelings of country’s water supply after the Gulf War.”(59) ordinary Iraqis still living in the country He based his arguments on declassified U.S. remains so hard to obtain. Defense Intelligence Agency documents posted Water purity is a problem is some areas of on a Defense Department website dedicated to Iraq, much as it is in areas of southern Iran and information relating to Gulf War syndrome.(60) Bahrain, where it is heavily saline and not He concluded that the U.S. government sought potable. In northern Iraq, quality is extremely purposely to undermine Iraq’s potable water good: bottled water is not widely available in supply in order to increase pressure on Saddam Irbil or Sulaymaniyah, and most foreigners Hussein’s regime. drink the water without getting sick. Water is Nagy’s analysis is problematic. He relies on also of adequate quality in large government- documents more than ten years old, and controlled cities like Baghdad, Mosul, and systematically ignores documents written after Kirkuk, according to Iraqi travelers. However,
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) 109 Sanctions on Iraq: A Valid Anti-American Grievance? the quality of water declines in the percent of the oil-for-food revenue.(67) If predominantly Shi’i cities of Basra and accounted this way, then the north does receive Nasiriya. Nevertheless, the oil-for-food slightly more per capita than the rest of Iraq, program has already spent more than $1 billion but not nearly so much as some anti-sanctions in water and sanitation projects in Iraq.(64) activists claim. They argue that the north Baghdad estimates that providing adequate receives 22 percent of the total humanitarian sanitation and water resources would cost an income. Actually, the figure is closer to 14.5 additional $328 million. However, such an percent, when one includes the population of allocation is more than possible given the PUK-controlled towns such as Kalar, Kifri, and billions of dollars in oil revenue Baghdad Darbandikan in the Kirkuk (Ta’mim) receives each year under sanctions, and the governorate. additional $1 billion dollars per year it receives A former high official in the UN’s Office of from transport of smuggled oil on the Syrian the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq pipeline alone.(65) Indeed, if Saddam (UNOCHI) also noted that northern Iraq has Hussein’s government has managed to spend started from a lower baseline, because Saddam more than $2 billion for new presidential Hussein’s government had razed 4,006 out of palaces since the end of the Persian Gulf War, 4,655 villages, and forced northern Iraq to and offer to donate nearly $1 billion to support accommodate more than 800,000 internally- the Palestinian intifada, there is no reason to displaced persons, one-quarter of whom have blame sanctions for any degradation in water been expelled from their homes in portions of and sanitation systems.(66) Iraq governed by Saddam Hussein since the end of 1991.(68) HOW TO LIE WITH STATISTICS: However, even if Iraqi Kurdistan did receive TRYING TO IGNORE THE NORTH disproportionate income in the early years of Northern Iraq presents a problem for both the oil-for-food program, the combination of Saddam Hussein and human rights’ advocates the rise in world oil prices and the five percent like those from the American Friends Service increase in the allotment of revenue to go to Committee, Voices in the Wilderness, and the Baghdad means that the portion of Iraq Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq administered by Saddam should be doing at ideologically opposed to sanctions. After all, least as well as Iraqi Kurdistan had been. The northern Iraq suffered much more damage from per capita income available in Saddam’s Iraq is war—though ironically mostly at the hands of now far higher than it was in Iraqi Kurdistan, Iraq’s own army—than the rest of the country. and yet the Iraqi government continues to either Yet that area has been rebuilt due to the not spend the revenue available, or not spend it sanctions system. The comparison between wisely.(69) northern Iraq and the rest of the country puts Opponents of sanctions also sometimes the onus of responsibility for the humanitarian dismiss northern Iraq’s success under sanctions tragedy on Saddam, not sanctions. because of the so-called “cash component” Accordingly, many opponents of sanctions granted to northern Iraq by the United actively seek to undermine this comparison. Nations.(70) The United Nations pays the Some anti-sanctions campaigners argue that administrative costs to implement its programs the north receives disproportionate income. in northern Iraq, but the Iraqi government has The root of this complaint is that while the to pay the implementation costs in the portion northern governorates receive income of the country it administers. The reasoning proportional to their population, the rest of Iraq behind this is that the UN is administering the is shortchanged because of Iraqi payments to oil-for-food program in the northern Iraqi the compensation committee. Indeed, parts of governorates on behalf of the government of Iraq controlled by Saddam receive just 59 Iraq, and does not formally recognize the
110 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) Michael Rubin democratically elected administration in refusing to order goods. For example, as of northern Iraq. Further, the northern September 15, 2001, the Iraqi government had administration developed in a vacuum created failed to even allocate almost $2 billion dollars. by the unilateral withdrawal of Iraqi When the Iraqi government does proceed government administration in 1991. While the with contracting, it inexplicably delays center-south controlled by Saddam Hussein submitting the paperwork to the United enjoys basic governmental infrastructure, Nations. According to the latest report of the northern Iraq initially did not. Northern Iraq’s Secretary General of the United Nations, the success comes despite constant impediments Iraqi government tends to wait between a laid down by Baghdad which, under terms of month and a month and a half between signing the 1996 Memorandum of Understanding, has contracts and submitting relevant applications acquired the means to block visas for UN to United Nations committees.(73) workers and thus derail UN programs. The latest report by the Secretary-General of the UN CONCLUSIONS on Phase X of the oil-for-food program The success of northern Iraq under sanctions concluded, “the effective implementation of the poses a challenge to anti-sanctions activists, [oil-for-food] programme in the three northern who continue to cling to the hypothesis that it is governorates…has also been adversely affected sanctions and not Saddam Hussein causing by the inordinate delays in the granting of visas suffering in Iraq. However, rather than dismiss to United Nations personnel, as well as the such evidence (and harming ordinary Iraqis in difficulties encountered in the importation of the process), the human rights community esential equipment and supplies.”(71) Most should instead embrace the sanctions on Iraq as damning to arguments about disproportionate a tool to rebuild the society and protect basic funding in the north is that, according to oil-for- human rights for people living under an food coordinators in Irbil, northern Iraq has so uncaring dictatorship. In condemning the far only spent half the money actually allocated sanctions regime, the implicit argument is that to it. the benign Saddam Hussein government wants Often, the anti-sanctions crowd argues that to take care of its people and is being prevented the blame for any lack of recovery in Saddam’s from exercising its humanitarian intention by Iraq lies not with Saddam’s administration, but foreign imperialists who are the real war with the holds placed on goods at the behest of criminals. One can well doubt that the Iraqi the United States. It is true that some material people themselves accept this interpretation, is on hold. For example, after the chemical though they are unlikely to say so in public weapons attacks of the 1980s, the United precisely because they know the brutality of Nations does look suspiciously upon requests that government. The day after the “smart for crop dusters and aerial sprayers. However, sanctions” plan was announced, an Iraqi farmer only 13 percent of the total contracts (by value) near the Iranian border asked me, “Why do they are on hold, and many of these will be allowed talk about war crimes one day, and reward to proceed once the Iraqi government completes Saddam the next?”(74) missing paper work or elaborates on where and Relatively few non-military tools exist in how the goods will be used (72). peacetime to change the behavior of rogue It is true that the United Nations bureaucracy regimes, regardless of how one chooses to is slow, clumsy, and inefficient, but UN define them. Sanctions remain a powerful tool ineptitude remains constant over both northern that should not be abandoned. In the case of Iraq and those regions controlled by Saddam, Iraq, sanctions can be used to preserve basic and therefore cannot be considered a major rights. Lifting sanctions would allow Saddam reason for suffering. Rather, much of the Hussein to renew his aggressive policy and problem rests in the Iraqi government simply encourages others to behave the same way.
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Moreover, it would not benefit and might well 6. Robert Fisk. “Women fighting to stem even harm the Iraqi people. disaster in Iraq.” The Independent, 15 October Given the fact that Saddam prefers to have 1998, p. 15. sanctions rather than give up his WMD 7. Richard N. Haass and Meghan O’Sullivan, capacity, and that he has spent billions of eds. Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, dollars on presidential palaces and a special and Foreign Policy. (Washington: Brookings, amusement park for Baath Party officials, it is 2000). hard to argue that the triumph of human rights 8. Amatzia Baram. “The Effect of Iraqi and humanitarian considerations require Sanctions: Statistical Pitfalls and returning Iraqis to his total control.(75). Responsibility.” The Middle East Journal. Volume 54, No. 2, Spring 2000. Pg. 196. *Michael Rubin is an adjunct fellow of The 9. Ibid. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 10. See: UNICEF and Ministry of Health. currently resident in Jerusalem at Hebrew “Child and maternal mortality surveys 1999. University’s Leonard Davis Institute for Preliminary Report.” July 1999. Cover and International Relations. He lived nine months acknowledgements. during the academic year 2000-2001 as a
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Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, refused to cite 35. Benon V. Sevan. “Statement at the 221st specific officials, but acknowledged problems meeting of the Security Council Committee with some UN officials “going native.” established by Resolution 661 (1990). July 12, 19. Interview with an NGO director. Dahuk, 2001. Iraq, March 24, 2001.
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45. “Interview: Nasreen Mustafa Sideek.” 59. Thomas J. Nagy. “The Secret Behind the Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. Vol. 3, No. 7. Sanctions: How the U.S. Intentionally July/August 2001. Destroyed Iraq’s Water Supply.” The 46. “Distribution Plan for Phase X, Submitted Progressive, September 2001. by the Government of Iraq to the Secretary- 60. See: www.gulflink.osd.mil General in accordance with the Memorandum 61. Filename:0116pgv.00p. (Release date: of Understanding of 20 May 1996 and Security October 31, 1996). Council resolution 1360 (2001). Approved by 62. Thomas J. Nagy. “The Secret Behind the the Secretary General (S/2001/758). Sanctions: How the U.S. Intentionally
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69. Interview with Patrick Clawson, research 72. Ibid., Pg. 20. director, Washington Institute for Near East 73. Ibid., Pg. 3. Policy. November 6, 2001. 74. Interview with a farmer, near Mawat, Iraq. 70. Anthony Arnove, ed. Iraq Under Siege: The May 17, 2001. Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War, 75. Patrick Clawson. “A look at sanctioning (Cambridge: South End Press, 2000), p. 72. Iraq—The numbers don’t lie, Saddam does.” 71. “Report of the Secretary-General pursuant Washington Post, February 27, 2000, p. B3. to paragraph 5 of resolution 1360 (2001).” UN S/2001/919. Pg. 15.
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