SANCTIONS on IRAQ: a VALID ANTI-AMERICAN GRIEVANCE? by Michael Rubin*

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SANCTIONS on IRAQ: a VALID ANTI-AMERICAN GRIEVANCE? by Michael Rubin* SANCTIONS ON IRAQ: A VALID ANTI-AMERICAN GRIEVANCE? By Michael Rubin* In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, many academics and policymakers cite America’s support for United Nations sanctions on Iraq, and the oft-reported figure of one million resulting deaths, as a legitimate grievance against Washington’s foreign policy. However, the facts upon which these critics make their case do not hold up under close scrutiny. Not only does the one million dead figure and other statistics originate with Iraqi government (and not UN research as is so often cited), but portions of Iraq are actually doing better under sanctions than before their implementation. One UN study even reported nine years into sanctions that half the Iraqi population was overweight. Comparing the impact of sanctions between opposition-controlled Iraqi provinces and the portions of the country ruled by Saddam Hussein indicates that, while the deleterious impact of sanctions upon the Iraqi population has been grossly exaggerated, what problems do occur are a result of Baghdad’s political leadership. In his taped broadcast following the undermine the Muslim nations, but also among beginning of U.S. military action against many U.S. academics, journalists, and Afghanistan in October 2001, Usama Bin policymakers who readily accept claims that the Laden blamed the United States for the U.S. is responsible for the deaths of more than a suffering of the Iraqi people. The claim that million Iraqis. For example, just two days after international sanctions have led to the death of Bin Laden’s video aired, Congressman Jim one million Iraqis is often accepted at face McDermott (D-WA) blamed sanctions for value by academics, activists, UN officials, and suffering in Iraq. The same day, the online even some policymakers. Tracing such claims political news magazine Slate declared (based to their origin, however, casts doubt not only on on the statement of UNICEF director Carol the numbers but also regarding the often- Bellamy) in an article about the alleged death of assumed linkage between sanctions and one million children in Iraq that “UNICEF's suffering in Iraq. data on Iraqi child mortality rates haven't been On October 7, as the U.S. military campaign disputed.”(2) Such claims have found a against in Afghanistan began, the Qatar-based receptive audience on college campuses. For television station al-Jazeera broadcast a tape example, in April 1999, the Yale College from Usama Bin Laden. In an effort to push government voted on behalf of the entire Yale populist buttons in the Middle East, Bin Laden University student body to condemn sanctions blamed America for suffering in Iraq, declaring, on Iraq. (3) “There are civilians, innocent children being The claim that sanctions have caused killed every day in Iraq without any guilt, and upwards of one million deaths in Iraq has been we never hear anybody.”(1) so often repeated, it is now accepted as Not only does Bin Laden’s claim have an unquestioned truth. Perennial opponents of audience in the Islamic world for those U.S. policy Noam Chomsky and Edward Said, believing that the United States seeks to among others, declare, “The sanctions [on Iraq] 100 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) Michael Rubin are weapons of mass destruction.”(4) The (35.8 percent), and between 1987 and 1997 American Friends Service Committee has been (35.1 percent).(9) very vocal in its opposition to U.S. sanctions So how did the claim of more than a million policy, arguing that, “During the past ten years, sanctions-related deaths in Iraq persist? In sanctions have led to an almost complete 1999, UNICEF released a glossy, detailed breakdown in economic, medical, social, and report that again concluded that sanctions had educational structures.”(5) When resigning contributed to the deaths of one million Iraqis. from his UN post, Denis Halliday, the former UNICEF did not complete the report United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in independently however, but rather co-authored Iraq, declared, “We are in the process of it with the Iraqi government’s health ministry destroying an entire society.”(6) (according to the report’s own front cover). It Even some practitioners of U.S. foreign is this report that is most often cited by activists policy have questioned sanctions. Richard and journalists, although seldom do they refer Haass, later appointed to head the State to it as a joint publication of Saddam’s Department Policy Planning Staff, and Meghan government. Both current and former UN O’Sullivan wrote in their comprehensive personnel admit this report to be problematic critique of sanctions, “Sanctions can be costly especially because its statistics come from the for innocent bystanders, particularly the poorest Iraqi government, which blocks independent in the target country and American businesses information gathering.(10) Former UN and commercial interests. In addition, officials related that many statistics are of sanctions often evoke unintended questionable veracity.(11) One troubling sign consequences, such as the strengthening of of lack of objectivity is a map on the first page obnoxious regimes.”(7) of the first chapter. While purporting to show But where does the claim of mass death or the region, the map omits Kuwait, and makes it even genocide in Iraq originate? appear that the country is actually part of In short, with the Iraqi government itself. Iraq.(12) The inclusion of the map raises issue Saddam Hussein’s government has since the of what compromises UNICEF made to mid-1990s claimed that United Nations complete the study. sanctions had resulted in more than a million Many academics as well as those in the deaths. Surprisingly, Baghdad also prevented activist and conflict resolution communities humanitarian organizations to conduct their nevertheless accept the UNICEF statistics at own fieldwork to verify the claims. Unable to face value. However, a careful examination conduct their own large-scale surveying, some shows that the reported results make no sense. humanitarian organizations adopted Iraqi According to data presented in the report, the government figures, thus amplifying the claim. mortality rate for children under five years old In 1995, for example, UNICEF estimated that and the infant mortality rate increased after the more than 1.2 million Iraqis had died as a result adoption of the oil-for-food program almost of sanctions, while the US-based International doubled caloric intake. For example, in 1995, Action Coalition claimed that by 1997, the the infant mortality rate allegedly was 98 deaths economic embargo upon Iraq had killed 1.4 per thousand while, in 1998, it was 103 deaths million people.(8) per thousand. Likewise, the under five years old Baghdad’s claims were spacious, though. mortality rate reportedly rose to 125 deaths per Iraq expert Amatzia Baram compared the thousand in 1998, from 117 in 1995.(13) country’s population growth rates over the last Ironically, the suspicious implication here is three censuses and found there to be almost no that the reduction of sanctions increases difference between in the rate of Iraq’s suffering in Iraq. population growth between 1977 and 1987 Further, according to the UNICEF study, child mortality rose in the portion of Iraq Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) 101 Sanctions on Iraq: A Valid Anti-American Grievance? controlled by Saddam Hussein from 56 per for-food income to benefit the population, but thousand before sanctions to 131 per thousand also used available discretionary tax revenues in 1999, a magnitude rise for which there is no for development and services, while Saddam evidence. Curiously, UNICEF (or perhaps the Hussein’s government consistently sought to Iraqi government) did not provide a breakdown undermine the oil-for-food program, while of the figures by quarters of Baghdad, where using its smuggling and tax revenues to support one-third of the Iraqi population lives. its military. Accordingly, no comparison among various In short, most of the evidence for claims of constituencies in the city is possible, to see if severe suffering under sanctions comes from food is getting, for example, to Arab Sunnis, the Iraqi government itself, whose record for but not to Arab Shi’i or Kurds.(14) veracity is not good and which has an obvious However, a comparison can be made within interest in exaggerating the deprivations of the report between those areas under Saddam’s sanctions in order to end them and to turn control and those areas administered by the international public opinion against its enemies. Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Further undercutting the 1999 UNICEF Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). In Iraqi report is an often ignored and independently Kurdistan, the figures dropped from 80 per produced September 2000 Food and thousand before sanctions, to 72 per thousand. Agriculture Report, written in collaboration The far higher original figures for the north with the World Health Organization, which show the traditional neglect of that area by the found half of the Iraqi adult population to be Baghdad government. overweight and one of the leading causes of At the same time, though, northern Iraq also mortality to be hypertension and diabetes, not faced both the same international sanctions as commonly diseases of the hungry.(16) did Baghdad, additional sanctions imposed by Dismissing the value of the UNICEF/Iraqi the Saddam Hussein government, and had government-authored survey does not indicate poorer medical facilities than the part of the that there is not suffering in Iraq—reports from country controlled by the Baghdad regime. The some (predominantly Shi’i) cities in southern difference between falling mortality rates in the Iraq indicate the situation is bad—but nowhere north and claims that these rates were rising near the extent suggested by anti-sanctions elsewhere may be due to the fact that outsiders activists and academics.
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