Appendix 4 Executive Summary from Report on Wandsworth Disturbances

1. This summary encompasses the timeline of events leading up to and including the disorder in on 8 August 2011, and the key findings of my report. 2. My report reflects the information that has come to me from the and Wandsworth Council and the views expressed in the 61 personal interviews, three public meetings and a number of other meetings I have held and in the 35 written responses I have received. This has not been a judicial inquiry nor an in-depth research project. The report is, however, informed by the experiences and the views of those who were directly affected by the disorder.

Timeline of Events 4th August Mark Duggan dies in Tottenham 6th August Demonstration in Tottenham is followed by riot 7th August Disorder and looting in: Waltham Forest: Chingford Mount, Walthamstow, Enfield: High Street, Ponders End, Kensington & Chelsea: Notting Hill, Wandsworth: , Lambeth: , Hackney: Kingsland shopping centre, E8, Westminster: Oxford Circus 8th August, Disorder and looting in: Hackney: Central Station/Mare Street from 4pm, Croydon: from 7pm, Greenwich: violence reported 7.40pm Newham: East Ham looting reported 8pm, Redbridge: Ilford reported 8.55pm Camden: High St./Chalk Farm Rd riots reported, Ealing: Broadway reported riots Southwark: Camberwell, Old Kent Rd, East Dulwich Wandsworth: Clapham Junction, Balham

8th August Clapham Junction area 17.00 Multi- agency GOLD meeting notes rumours of attacks planned on Putney, Tooting, Southside Shopping Centre and Clapham Junction amongst others. Information is described as scrappy and unreliable. and roads nearby 19.24 First report of small groups gathering. 19.40- 20.00 Larger groups form – reports vary between 60-100 at different times. They are armed with sticks, bricks etc. and attack vehicles and Police. 19.42 First violence - 50-60 youths throwing bottles at cars. 19.47 Level 2 officers on estate. All buses re-routed away. Dog vans requested. Smoke grenades being thrown. At 19.53 BTP assistance is requested.

1 19.54 Housing Department vehicle attacked at Plough Rd/Wynter Street. At 19.56 report of 100 youths at Plough Rd SW11. Police under attack there and withdraw and return to patrol. By 20.02 youths reported to have left the area heading to Park Road. 20.10 Police stand down from the estate Clapham Junction 20.00 Acting Borough Commander makes first request for additional Level 2 trained officers from Met. Police control center S60 stop and search procedure, initially authorised at 03.20hours, reviewed and adjusted 20.00- 20.39 Larger groups form at Clapham Junction (Falcon Rd, St. John’s Rd, junction). At 20.04, BTP report c35 youths outside the Falcon pub and in Falcon Rd, putting on masks. At 20.15, BTP report 50 Youths on Peabody Estate - all hooded and at least one armed with machete. 20.24 Youths reported at JD Sports 20.39- 21.08 Attacks begin on shops in St. Johns Rd. A small number of police there have some initial success but come under attack. Borough Commander becomes aware of a large group approaching from Lavender Hill and decides to withdraw Police from St. John’s Rd at 21.08 to a safer distance 20.39 Attack on TMobile shop in St. John’s Rd. 20.45 Attack starts on Debenham’s. At the same time, report of a group armed with bricks / stones heading towards Lavender Hill. 20.47 O2 store broken into 20.50-21.00 Police report they are being attacked. 20.56 Blacks leisure attacked 21.05 On CCTV, 8 police with shields outside Debenhams, the rest of St. John’s Rd appears clear of people 21.08 Police pull back along St. John’s Rd towards Northcote Rd. Approx 200 people coming down Lavender Hill round the corner from the officers who cannot see this developing situation 21.14- 22.37 No Police in St. John’s Rd. There is a large number of spectators as well as ordinary members of the public in the area whilst the looting continues 21.17 Curry’s attacked. Also Footlocker 21.22 Report of attack on Jamie Oliver shop. 21.24 Call from Pizza Express in Lavender Hill reporting attack. 21.25 ASDA attacked 21.30 In Lavender Hill near the party shop, barriers have been placed across the road by rioters. 21.44 3 phone shop in St. John’s Rd attacked. 21.56 JD Sports attacked 21.57 Further L2 officers arrive at Lavender Hill Station. Senior Level 2 officer takes charge 22.37- midnight With reinforcements, the Police move back into St. John’s Rd and the immediate vicinity and re-establish control

2 22.37 Three L2 vans with 75 trained officers arrive o/s Clapham Junction and up St John’s Rd. 22.40 L2 serials stop o/s Currys, disperse people and make arrests. 20-25 officers involved here. A couple of people throw things at them. By 22.48 most of crowd in St. John’s Rd has cleared. Traffic is still coming down Lavender Hill from Plough Rd 23.14 Lavender Hill described as “quietening” 23.58 Fire at the Party Shop starts. Call made to LFB by Police. Explosions. Police attempted to put out the fire with fire extinguishers. The fire was too fierce so officers commenced evacuation of the people in the flats above Midnight onwards. Activity in Lavender Hill 00.10 9 Aug Fire engine arrives. No heavy police escort but one police van arrives just after 00.13 Further up Lavender Hill, 7 armoured vehicles arrive form east along with 3 other police vehicles. A large number of people are still on the streets 01.00-03.00 Varying reports across Putney, Southside, Balham & Tooting of disorder, fires or looting. Units deployed to each area and no further disorder reported or observed. 03.20 Fire at Party Shop is out

3. The key findings of the report are: 1. The disorder in Clapham Junction, and other parts of Wandsworth, was part of a chain of events that began with the death of Mark Duggan in Tottenham on 4 August and the demonstration that turned into a riot in the same area on 6 August. 2. The primary motivation of those involved in the disorder was criminal opportunism, some of it organised, some disorganised and some involving people who were caught up in the moment. 3. A combination of the physical characteristics of the area and of the events of the day, including extensive social messaging, help to explain why it happened in Clapham Junction on 8 August. 4. A mix of more long-term underlying social and economic factors, some particular to the area, others of more general application, help to explain why some people became involved, and others did not. They do not excuse or justify what happened. 5. The total number of people involved in the disorder in Clapham Junction may have been 450. Early indications are that the proportion under 24 was 65% but only 24% were under 18. This was not a riot by the teenagers of Wandsworth. 6. The information available to the Police from social network sites and elsewhere about potential trouble in Clapham Junction at 5pm on 8 August was scrappy and unreliable. 7. The disorder began on the Winstanley estate at 7.40pm. By 9pm, there were 100-150 looters and potential looters on St. John’s Road, a further 200 on Lavender Hill. The Borough Commander had eight officers with Level 2 public order training and a total of sixty officers altogether.

3 8. The resources available to the Borough Commander were inadequate. That was the result of decisions taken earlier in the day by the Metropolitan Police Control Centre. 9. In the circumstances, the Borough Commander had no choice but to withdraw from St. John’s Road. The owners of the shops and businesses in the area feel that they were left abandoned and unprotected. There was, however, a serious risk that police confrontation with the looters risked much worse violence for them and the public. 10. A total of 109 shops and businesses were damaged in the course of the disorder in Wandsworth, 90 of them in Clapham Junction. 25 were seriously damaged, one gutted by fire. No-one was seriously hurt. 11. The Borough Commander first requested public order trained reinforcements at 8pm. By that point, there was serious disorder in many parts of . It took until 9.57pm for 75 trained reinforcements to arrive and until 10.38pm for them to begin clearing the streets, which they were able to do by 11.15pm. 12. A fire broke out at the Party Shop at 11.59pm. The Fire and Rescue service were on the scene within fifteen minutes. They received Police protection but they did not come under attack. 13. On 9 August, the main issues were the clear up of the looted area and the making secure of the damaged shops and businesses, and the anxiety that pervaded the community and the Council, that there would be further disorder that evening. 14. The Council organised the clear up and making secure of damaged shops and premises, with the help of a large number of volunteers, the ‘broom army’. The Council’s response is generally considered to have been well-organised and effective. 15. Many shops and restaurants closed early on 9 August. The Town Hall was closed to the public at 3pm and staff sent home at 6pm. There was no further disorder. 16. Many of the damaged shops and businesses reopened on 10 August, most by the weekend. The Council has offered assistance and support to the independent businesses affected both by damage during the disorder and by loss of trade thereafter. 17. The issue of an eviction notice to the family of a young man arrested following the disorder has been controversial. The Council’s position is that it was consistent with previous practice in relation to tenants or family members accused or convicted of crimes and anti-social behaviour. The announcement of the eviction notice was a political judgement, designed to show leadership in a crisis. 18. There have been welcome signs of a positive community response to the disorder, starting with the broom army and a Battersea Buzz event on 20 August, and of strengthened community spirit among the shops and businesses in the area.

4 4. My recommendations to the Police and the Council arising from this review are as follows:

Recommendation 1. I recommend that the Police should review their information and intelligence systems, in the light of the disorder on 6, 7 and 8 August, in particular, the use they make of social network sites and the way they handle large numbers of calls from the public about public order emergencies.

Recommendation 2. I recommend that senior officers should continue to spend as much time as they can with shop owners and mangers and other business people in Clapham Junction and discuss with them their plans for policing in the future.

Recommendation 3. I recommend that the Metropolitan Police review give urgent priority to a re- assessment of the numbers of police with public order training at levels 1 and 2, and to the ability of the police control system to respond immediately to requests for assistance, if and when disorder breaks out.

Recommendation 4. I recommend that the Police and Wandsworth Council, with the support of central Government, should develop a long-term programme of action both to bring to justice those responsible for criminal behaviour and to reduce the influence of the gangs on the areas where they operate.

Recommendation 5. I recommend that the Council gives its full support to the Family Recovery Project, and maintains that support beyond the initial year if it is successful. It is essential that the Government Departments concerned also give their practical support to the programme.

Recommendation 6. I recommend that the Council should commit itself to programmes of community engagement with the ethnic and religious communities in the Borough and to build on the enthusiasm and community spirit shown by the broom army on 9 August.

Recommendation 7. I recommend that the Council and its partners, in close consultation with the shops and businesses in Clapham Junction, should develop and implement a relaunch plan for the area, to celebrate its recovery from the disorder and its potential for the future, in time for Christmas.

5 Recommendation 8. I recommend that the Council establish a communications hub, to be activated in the event of future emergencies, to provide a focus for information to be channelled in from all Council departments and from the police and other agencies outside, and to provide a source of consistent information to those who need it. It should be developed as part of a review of the emergency plan.

Recommendation 9. I recommend that the Council should review its emergency plan in the light of the disorder and its aftermath, to ensure that flexibility should be built into the response systems and that front-line staff, whoever they may be, are given support and advice as soon as possible.

Neil Kinghan 29 September 2011

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