was not clear to what extent new Next Priorities Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga would emphasize this strategic vision. In for ’s fact, the question of Japan’s commit- ment to the FOIP has drawn much in- 5 FOIP Vision ternational attention from practition- The Quad, ASEAN, ers and foreign policy experts because and Institutional of Japan’s potential preoccupation Linkages in the Indo- with a number of domestic issues, ranging from COVID-19, economic re- Pacific covery, and the 2021 Olympics.2 Dr. Kei Koga Indeed, Suga’s political priorities ap- pear to focus on domestic affairs, such as unemployment and revising the small and medium-sized enterprise basic law. The Prime Minister is also said to lack diplomatic experience, which was well illustrated by his statement during the campaign for President of the Liberal Democratic Party in September 2020, when Suga stated that he cannot emulate Shinzo Abe’s summit diplomacy and that he would consult with the Minister and Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as former Prime Minister Abe about Ja- pan’s diplomacy.3 As a result of this apparent inertia, diplomatic continuity has ensued. Since Suga was inaugurated on ne of Japan’s most important September 16, 2020, he empha- diplomatic agendas has be- sized the importance of Abe’s for- come the realization of a eign-policy agendas. The FOIP re- O mains Japan’s core strategic vi- “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP), which was launched by former Prime sion, with the US-Japan alliance 4 Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016 to main- playing a pivotal role. Japan tain and facilitate the existing rules- hosted the second Japan-Australia- based order in the region.1 And yet, it India-US Foreign Ministers’ Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 21

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meeting (the so-called “Quad”) on ’s increasing political influ- October 6 to further coordinate ence in the region, which is their policies to realize the FOIP thought to be detrimental to exist- region.5 Suga regards Southeast ing international rules and norms. Asia as the geographical center of Most notably, China’s rejection of the Indo-Pacific, and he made his the 2016 South China Sea Tribu- very first diplomatic trips to Vi- nal Award disrespected interna- etnam (2020 ASEAN chair) and In- tional laws, while China’s “Belt donesia (the largest Southeast and Road Initiative” has been re- Asian country) in October. Based sponsible for setting new interna- on these early moves, there ap- tional standards for development.7 pears to be no diplomatic upset: However, Japan’s strategy to pro- Suga seems likely to follow tect the FOIP principles was un- through on what Abe has envi- clear to begin with. Japan initially sioned for the FOIP. emphasized the importance of “fun- However, this diplomatic posture is damental rights” such as the rule not sustainable in the long-term. of law, human rights, and democ- Eventually, Japan needs to provide racy.8 Yet, because there are many a clear strategy to realize the FOIP non-democratic states in the re- in the context of the rapidly evolv- gion, such an emphasis soon disap- ing US-China great power rivalry. peared. Moreover, the FOIP vision There are three reasons for this. was initially called the “Free and The Need for Flexible Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” but Japan eliminated “strategy” from Adaptation the phraseology because some First, Japan’s FOIP vision is essen- ASEAN member states were con- tially evolutionary, which requires cerned about its diplomatic impli- conceptual updates over time. As cations—that FOIP aimed to coun- many have already pointed out, terbalance or contain China, for ex- 9 the concept of Japan’s FOIP has ample. As such, Japan flexibly been changing since its inception changed the FOIP concept in ac- in 2016. Initially, Japan aimed to cordance with reactions from other maintain and strengthen the rules- states. based international order in the Currently, Japan’s FOIP vision Indo-Pacific region, which has been consists of “three pillars”: (1) “pro- largely shaped by the United motion and establishment of the States in the post-Cold War era.6 rule of law, freedom of navigation, Japan’s interest has been to blunt free trade, etc.”; (2) “Pursuit of Indo-Pacific Perspective │22

Next Priorities for Japan’s FOIP Vision

economic prosperity (improving approach toward China faces se- connectivity and strengthening vere criticism, and there are de- economic partnership including bates over a means to manage its EPA/FTAs and investment trea- relations with China. Neverthe- ties)”; and (3) “Commitment for less, Washington’s tough posture peace and stability (capacity build- toward China has garnered broad ing on maritime law enforcement, bipartisan support. America’s HA/DR cooperation, etc.).”10 These FOIP strategy is now part of an are all international rules and anti-China strategy, designed to norms that Japan has long sup- force Beijing to follow existing in- ported. Nevertheless, these pillars ternational rules and norms. This might change in the future, de- trend will not easily be reversed. pending on the development of the On the other hand, Japan still at- region’s strategic environment. tempts to engage China. Earlier Particularly, as power diffuses this year, Abe invited to across the region, a renewed rules- Japan as a state visit in April and making mechanism may become attempted to draft the “fifth docu- necessary. The Suga administra- ment,” the fifth symbolic official tion must prepare for this chal- document after the Sino-Japanese lenge in the future. diplomatic normalization in 1972 Navigating Great Power that highlights the future vision of Rivalry Sino-Japanese relations.12 The visit was postponed because of the Second, Japan still seeks a balance COVID-19 pandemic, however, and in its diplomatic relations with rising tensions over the East China both the United State and China. Sea mean that both leaders seem Currently, Japan’s foremost ally, to have lost political traction for bi- the , has begun to lateral initiatives. take a much tougher stance on Suga recognizes the importance of China in terms of COVID-19, eco- Japan-China relations for national, nomics, and technological moderni- regional, and global stability. He zation. Many in Washington now has advocated the need for com- believe the past approach of “en- mon agendas.13 Even as he main- gagement” to have been a mistake. tains a firm stance on territorial The experience of the COVID-19 sovereignty and the rule of law, pandemic has exacerbated this then, Suga has shown interest in 11 trend. To be sure, the Trump ad- persuading China to follow inter- ministration’s confrontational national rules and norms by Indo-Pacific Perspective │23

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maintaining channels of communi- regions of the Indo-Pacific. Japan cation at various levels, including immediately supported the AOIP. 14 the summit level. In this sense, That said, it is still not clear what there is a divergence in diplomatic Japan and the Quad members ex- posture between Japan and the pect from ASEAN. If the Quad United States. Yet, since the US- members regard ASEAN’s utility Japan alliance is the core of the only as a dialogue convenor that FOIP vision, it will be necessary provides multilateral communica- for both states to coordinate how to tion channels, and if they attempt maintain consistency between Ja- to create “effective multilateral- pan’s softer and US tougher FOIP ism” that gets things done as the stance vis-à-vis China. US Secretary State Pompeo indi- Realigning Institutions cated, some ASEAN member states would likely view this as diplo- Third, Japan’s institutional strat- matic marginalization.18 To reas- egy in the Indo-Pacific has yet to sure ASEAN and garner its sup- be clearly articulated. In the initial port for their FOIP vision, Japan concept, Japan’s emphasis was on and the Quad members need to the Quad as a central framework clearly delineate ASEAN’s role in to realize FOIP.15 However, given the Indo-Pacific. diplomatic concerns raised by sev- eral ASEAN member states in The Future of FOIP 2018, Japan and the Quad mem- These three factors show that more bers began to emphasize the im- work needs to be done to realize portance of ASEAN unity and cen- Japan’s FOIP vision—constructing 16 trality. In response, with a strong a new regional rules-based order. push from and a diplo- This is the work that the Abe ad- matic coordination by Thailand as ministration left out, and that the ASEAN chair, ASEAN issued its Suga administration needs to work “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pa- on. cific” (AOIP) statement in 2019, Two tasks should be prioritized. which emphasized the “inclusive- ness” of regional architecture and The first is to evolve the Quad into regional cooperation over “ri- the Quad-Plus as an Indo-Pacific valry.”17 ASEAN’s priority is thus institutional framework. While to neutralize great power rivalry agreeing the basic principles of the and its negative spill-over effect to FOIP, Quad-Plus member and Southeast Asia and other sub- partner states will have to under- stand that there are diverging Indo-Pacific Perspective │24

Next Priorities for Japan’s FOIP Vision national interests among them, ASEAN and intensify great power and that cooperation will not be rivalry with China. Without close possible in all issue areas. Rather, consultation, institutionalizing the an expanded Quad-plus could emu- Quad could exacerbate ASEAN’s late the division of labor modeled concerns and skepticism. Also, by the Japan-Australia-US “Trilat- given ASEAN’s consensus-based eral Partnership for infrastructure decision-making process, it is im- investment in the Indo-Pacific,” portant to reassure all member and the partnership between the states in this regard. Therefore, United States and Japan on en- Japan should propose to enhance ergy, infrastructure, and digital ASEAN’s role in the Indo-Pacific connectivity.19 In short, the Quad(- by forming “webs” of regional insti- Plus) can function best as a forum tutions. The starting point might to flexibly coordinate policies that be to create a Quad-ASEAN Track- advance the FOIP vision where II dialogue, as well as to link the possible. This means that the Quad Quad and ASEAN-X formula. The can also expand its membership to Quad’s strength is its flexibility: it any states that agree with the should actively engage ASEAN and FOIP principles. Accordingly, it is its individual member state, offer- in Japan’s interests to ensure that ing reassurance and building part- the Quad-Plus formula it utilized nerships. At the same time, in or- to include more regional states, der to enable regional states to en- such as and Indonesia, as gage in deeper multilateral, strate- well as European states, such as gic discussions and prevent great the United Kingdom, France, and powers from irreversible political Germany, to buttress the provision and economic decoupling, Japan of international public goods such should encourage ASEAN to fur- as knowledge-transfer rules, infra- ther institutionalize the East Asia structure development, and man- Summit, such as strengthening its agement of non-traditional security secretariat functions and conduct- issues. ing more frequent Senior-Official The second task is to strike a bal- level exchanges. ance between ASEAN and the Japan’s FOIP vision under the Quad. As mentioned above, some Suga administration aims to avoid ASEAN member states are skepti- an intensive confrontation between cal about the development of the the United States and China by de- Quad framework, which threatens veloping regional rules and norms to diplomatically marginalize that are based on the existing

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international order. This will be a EAS, and creating the linkages be- difficult task given that the consol- tween them — all of these are idation of rules and norms will re- goals worth trying for. ■ quire a regional consensus. If the attempt fails, it will result in ex- posing intraregional divides. How- Dr. Kei Koga ever, such a window of opportunity Dr. Koga is an Assistant Professor has not been closed yet. Japan is in at the Public Policy and Global Af- a good strategic position to bridge fairs Programme, School of Social the various regional powers. Proac- Sciences, Nanyang Technological tively taking a normative leader- University, Singapore. ship role in the Indo-Pacific by evolving the Quad, encouraging ASEAN to further institutionalize

Notes August 27, 2016, https://www.mofa.go.jp/. 7 Kei Koga, “Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ Question: Counter- ing China or Shaping a New Regional Order?” Inter- 1 Kei Koga, “Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ national Affairs 96, no. 1 (2020): 49–73. Strategy: Tokyo’s Tactical Hedging and the Implica- 8 MOFA, “State Minister for Foreign Affairs Kishi’s tions for ASEAN,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 41, Speech at the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) no. 2 (2019): 286-313; Yuichi Hosoya, “FOIP 2.0: The Summit,” March 8 2017, https://www.mofa.go.jp/ ; Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific and MOFA. “Japan-U.S. Working Lunch and Japan- Strategy,” Asia-Pacific Review 26, no. 1 (2019): 18– U.S. Summit Meeting,” November 6, 2017, 28. https://www.mofa.go.jp/ . 2 See, for example, Zack Cooper and Jeffrey Hor- 9 “Indo taiheiyo, kieta ‘senryaku’ seifu ga ‘koso’ ni nung, “The US-Japan alliance after Abe,” Los Angeles shusei” [Indo-Pacific: Disappeared ‘Strategy’: The Times, September 8, 2020, https://www.aei.org/. Japanese Government Altered It to ‘Vision’]. Nikkei 3 “Jiminto sosaisen no kokai toronkai—Ishiba, Suga, Shimbun, November 13, 2018. Kishida-shi no hatsugen Yoshi” [Public Debated for 10 MOFA, “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” n.d., the LDP Presidential Election—summary of state- https://www.mofa.go.jp/ . ments by Ishiba, Suga, and Kishida]. Nihon Keizai 11 Matthew Lee, “At Nixon library, Pompeo declares Shimbun, September 12, 2020, https://www.nik- China engagement a failure,” , kei.com/. July 24, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/; and 4 Prime Minister’s Office of Japan. “Dai nihyakusan Alice Su and Tracy Wilkinson, “New Analysis: How kai kokkai ni okeru suganaikakusouridaijin shoshin bad could U.S.-China relations get?” Los Angeles hyomei enzetsu” [203th Diet Session: The Suga ad- Times, July 26, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/. ministration’s Policy Speech], October 26, 2020, 12 “Japan, China to craft new political document for https://www.kantei.go.jp/. Xi’s state visit,” Kyodo News Service, January 9, 5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), “The 2020, https://english.kyodonews.net/. Second Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Foreign Minis- 13 Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, “Dai nihyakusan ters’ Meeting,” October 6, 2020, kai.” https://www.mofa.go.jp/. MOFA, “Japan-China Summit Telephone Talk,” 6 MOFA, “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at 14 September 25, 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/. the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International MOFA, “Priority Policy for Development Conference on African Development (TICAD VI),” 15 Indo-Pacific Perspective │26

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and White House, “U.S.-Japan Joint Statement on Cooperation FY 2017,” 9, https://www.mofa.go.jp/. Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific through En- 16 Charissa Yong, “Singapore will not join Indo-Pa- ergy, Infrastructure and Digital Connectivity Cooper- cific bloc for now: Vivian,” The Straits Times, May 15, ation,” November 13, 2018, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/; and MOFA. “Ja- https://www.whitehouse.gov/. pan-Australia-India-U.S. Consultations,” June 7, 2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/. Disclaimer 17 ASEAN Secretariat. “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo- The views and opinions expressed or implied in Pacific.” June 23, 2019, https://asean.org/. JIPA are those of the authors and should not be 18 US Department of State, “Briefing with Senior construed as carrying the official sanction of the State Department Officials on Secretary Pompeo’s Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education Visit to Japan,” October 6, 2020. and Training Command, Air University, or other https://www.state.gov/. agencies or departments of the US government 19 Prime Minister of Australia, “Joint Statement of or their international equivalents. the Governments of Australia, Japan and the United States,” November 17, 2018. https://www.pm.gov.au/;

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