was not clear to what extent new Next Priorities Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga would emphasize this strategic vision. In for Japan’s fact, the question of Japan’s commit- ment to the FOIP has drawn much in- 5 FOIP Vision ternational attention from practition- The Quad, ASEAN, ers and foreign policy experts because and Institutional of Japan’s potential preoccupation Linkages in the Indo- with a number of domestic issues, ranging from COVID-19, economic re- Pacific covery, and the 2021 Tokyo Olympics.2 Dr. Kei Koga Indeed, Suga’s political priorities ap- pear to focus on domestic affairs, such as unemployment and revising the small and medium-sized enterprise basic law. The Prime Minister is also said to lack diplomatic experience, which was well illustrated by his statement during the campaign for President of the Liberal Democratic Party in September 2020, when Suga stated that he cannot emulate Shinzo Abe’s summit diplomacy and that he would consult with the Minister and Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as former Prime Minister Abe about Ja- pan’s diplomacy.3 As a result of this apparent inertia, diplomatic continuity has ensued. Since Suga was inaugurated on ne of Japan’s most important September 16, 2020, he empha- diplomatic agendas has be- sized the importance of Abe’s for- come the realization of a eign-policy agendas. The FOIP re- O mains Japan’s core strategic vi- “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP), which was launched by former Prime sion, with the US-Japan alliance 4 Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016 to main- playing a pivotal role. Japan tain and facilitate the existing rules- hosted the second Japan-Australia- based order in the region.1 And yet, it India-US Foreign Ministers’ Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 21 Koga meeting (the so-called “Quad”) on China’s increasing political influ- October 6 to further coordinate ence in the region, which is their policies to realize the FOIP thought to be detrimental to exist- region.5 Suga regards Southeast ing international rules and norms. Asia as the geographical center of Most notably, China’s rejection of the Indo-Pacific, and he made his the 2016 South China Sea Tribu- very first diplomatic trips to Vi- nal Award disrespected interna- etnam (2020 ASEAN chair) and In- tional laws, while China’s “Belt donesia (the largest Southeast and Road Initiative” has been re- Asian country) in October. Based sponsible for setting new interna- on these early moves, there ap- tional standards for development.7 pears to be no diplomatic upset: However, Japan’s strategy to pro- Suga seems likely to follow tect the FOIP principles was un- through on what Abe has envi- clear to begin with. Japan initially sioned for the FOIP. emphasized the importance of “fun- However, this diplomatic posture is damental rights” such as the rule not sustainable in the long-term. of law, human rights, and democ- Eventually, Japan needs to provide racy.8 Yet, because there are many a clear strategy to realize the FOIP non-democratic states in the re- in the context of the rapidly evolv- gion, such an emphasis soon disap- ing US-China great power rivalry. peared. Moreover, the FOIP vision There are three reasons for this. was initially called the “Free and The Need for Flexible Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” but Japan eliminated “strategy” from Adaptation the phraseology because some First, Japan’s FOIP vision is essen- ASEAN member states were con- tially evolutionary, which requires cerned about its diplomatic impli- conceptual updates over time. As cations—that FOIP aimed to coun- many have already pointed out, terbalance or contain China, for ex- 9 the concept of Japan’s FOIP has ample. As such, Japan flexibly been changing since its inception changed the FOIP concept in ac- in 2016. Initially, Japan aimed to cordance with reactions from other maintain and strengthen the rules- states. based international order in the Currently, Japan’s FOIP vision Indo-Pacific region, which has been consists of “three pillars”: (1) “pro- largely shaped by the United motion and establishment of the States in the post-Cold War era.6 rule of law, freedom of navigation, Japan’s interest has been to blunt free trade, etc.”; (2) “Pursuit of Indo-Pacific Perspective │22 Next Priorities for Japan’s FOIP Vision economic prosperity (improving approach toward China faces se- connectivity and strengthening vere criticism, and there are de- economic partnership including bates over a means to manage its EPA/FTAs and investment trea- relations with China. Neverthe- ties)”; and (3) “Commitment for less, Washington’s tough posture peace and stability (capacity build- toward China has garnered broad ing on maritime law enforcement, bipartisan support. America’s HA/DR cooperation, etc.).”10 These FOIP strategy is now part of an are all international rules and anti-China strategy, designed to norms that Japan has long sup- force Beijing to follow existing in- ported. Nevertheless, these pillars ternational rules and norms. This might change in the future, de- trend will not easily be reversed. pending on the development of the On the other hand, Japan still at- region’s strategic environment. tempts to engage China. Earlier Particularly, as power diffuses this year, Abe invited Xi Jinping to across the region, a renewed rules- Japan as a state visit in April and making mechanism may become attempted to draft the “fifth docu- necessary. The Suga administra- ment,” the fifth symbolic official tion must prepare for this chal- document after the Sino-Japanese lenge in the future. diplomatic normalization in 1972 Navigating Great Power that highlights the future vision of Rivalry Sino-Japanese relations.12 The visit was postponed because of the Second, Japan still seeks a balance COVID-19 pandemic, however, and in its diplomatic relations with rising tensions over the East China both the United State and China. Sea mean that both leaders seem Currently, Japan’s foremost ally, to have lost political traction for bi- the United States, has begun to lateral initiatives. take a much tougher stance on Suga recognizes the importance of China in terms of COVID-19, eco- Japan-China relations for national, nomics, and technological moderni- regional, and global stability. He zation. Many in Washington now has advocated the need for com- believe the past approach of “en- mon agendas.13 Even as he main- gagement” to have been a mistake. tains a firm stance on territorial The experience of the COVID-19 sovereignty and the rule of law, pandemic has exacerbated this then, Suga has shown interest in 11 trend. To be sure, the Trump ad- persuading China to follow inter- ministration’s confrontational national rules and norms by Indo-Pacific Perspective │23 Koga maintaining channels of communi- regions of the Indo-Pacific. Japan cation at various levels, including immediately supported the AOIP. 14 the summit level. In this sense, That said, it is still not clear what there is a divergence in diplomatic Japan and the Quad members ex- posture between Japan and the pect from ASEAN. If the Quad United States. Yet, since the US- members regard ASEAN’s utility Japan alliance is the core of the only as a dialogue convenor that FOIP vision, it will be necessary provides multilateral communica- for both states to coordinate how to tion channels, and if they attempt maintain consistency between Ja- to create “effective multilateral- pan’s softer and US tougher FOIP ism” that gets things done as the stance vis-à-vis China. US Secretary State Pompeo indi- Realigning Institutions cated, some ASEAN member states would likely view this as diplo- Third, Japan’s institutional strat- matic marginalization.18 To reas- egy in the Indo-Pacific has yet to sure ASEAN and garner its sup- be clearly articulated. In the initial port for their FOIP vision, Japan concept, Japan’s emphasis was on and the Quad members need to the Quad as a central framework clearly delineate ASEAN’s role in to realize FOIP.15 However, given the Indo-Pacific. diplomatic concerns raised by sev- eral ASEAN member states in The Future of FOIP 2018, Japan and the Quad mem- These three factors show that more bers began to emphasize the im- work needs to be done to realize portance of ASEAN unity and cen- Japan’s FOIP vision—constructing 16 trality. In response, with a strong a new regional rules-based order. push from Indonesia and a diplo- This is the work that the Abe ad- matic coordination by Thailand as ministration left out, and that the ASEAN chair, ASEAN issued its Suga administration needs to work “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pa- on. cific” (AOIP) statement in 2019, Two tasks should be prioritized. which emphasized the “inclusive- ness” of regional architecture and The first is to evolve the Quad into regional cooperation over “ri- the Quad-Plus as an Indo-Pacific valry.”17 ASEAN’s priority is thus institutional framework. While to neutralize great power rivalry agreeing the basic principles of the and its negative spill-over effect to FOIP, Quad-Plus member and Southeast Asia and other sub- partner states will have to under- stand that there are diverging Indo-Pacific Perspective │24 Next Priorities for Japan’s FOIP Vision national interests among them, ASEAN and intensify great power and that cooperation will not be rivalry with China. Without close possible in all issue areas. Rather, consultation, institutionalizing the an expanded Quad-plus could emu- Quad could exacerbate ASEAN’s late the division of labor modeled concerns and skepticism. Also, by the Japan-Australia-US “Trilat- given ASEAN’s consensus-based eral Partnership for infrastructure decision-making process, it is im- investment in the Indo-Pacific,” portant to reassure all member and the partnership between the states in this regard.