DOCSLIB.ORG

Ordinary Virtue Susan Stark Bates College

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Ordinary Virtue Susan Stark Bates College Ordinary Virtue Susan Stark Bates College Ethics should not be merely an analysis of ordinary mediocre conduct, it should be a hypothesis about good conduct and about how this can be achieved. How can we make ourselves better? Is a question moral philosophers should attempt to answer.1 Iris Murdoch, “The Sovereignty of Good over Other Concepts” 1. Morality is a set of ordinary skills, involving feeling the right emotions, doing the right actions, perceiving the moral world accurately, making sound moral Judgments. Because morality involves this set of skills, it takes practice to get them Just right. In this way, morality is very much akin to other everyday skills: reading a book, driving a car, riding a bicycle, playing tennis. To be sure, the skills involved in morality may be more complex and far-reaching than those involved in reading a book or playing tennis. But in all these domains, we acquire the expertise involved in these skills through old-fashioned practice. 1 Iris Murdoch, “The Sovereignty of Good,” The Sovereignty of Good over Other Concepts, London, Routledge, 1971, p. 76. 1 It can be tempting to see morality, not as a set of skills, but as a series of dilemmas. On this understanding, morality involves exciting problems, hard cases, tragic choices – trolley problems, torture to extract life saving information, questions of Just war, the morality of abortion, euthanasia, and the death penalty. Certainly all of these hard cases are morally important: I do not mean to suggest that these are not properly thought of as moral problems. They are. And it is important to figure out what to say about them. I suspect, however, that there is a cost to thinking of these sorts of matters as paradigmatic of the moral domain. When we see these exciting cases as the paradigm of moral questions, we overlook the ordinary, everyday nature of morality and the important questions of how to cultivate the moral emotions, how to nurture the ability to perceive moral situations accurately, how to foster good moral Judgment, how to ensure that we act correctly both in the ordinary case and in the rare case of a tragic moral dilemma. The view of morality as a skill is right at home with the virtue theorist’s moral outlook. Indeed, many virtue theorists, following Aristotle and to some extent Plato, see morality precisely in this way. As such, the skill-based moral theorist and the virtue theorist both emphasize that cultivating moral skills involves cultivating character traits. And the process of moral development, on this view, involves cultivating emotions, patterns of seeing, habits of responding, in short, developing traits of character. But an impressive and growing body of psychological data casts doubt on the very idea of traits of character. Numerous psychological studies have examined human moral behavior. Consider Just a tiny fraction of their findings: Stanley Milgram’s now-famous experiment on obedience finds that two-thirds of subJects fully obey an experimenter’s requests to administer 2 debilitating and potentially lethal electric shocks to an unwilling victim;2 Isen and Levin find that finding a dime in a pay phone coin return appears to the be the determinant of whether someone helps a person in need;3 Darley and Batson find that being in a hurry, in some cases, determines whether someone helps another person in need;4 and finally, the presence of other people who either help or do not help is a significant determinant of whether a naïve subJect helps someone in need.5 On the basis of these studies and many others, some conclude that it is the situation and its unique set of psychological pressures that determine the individual’s action. This view, often called situationism, offers a way to make sense of how ordinary individuals can commit horrific acts of cruelty: these individuals are not cruel people. Rather, they are ordinary individuals who are overcome by their situations. On the basis of this data, some philosophers have concluded that there are no enduring character traits that determine an individual’s actions. John Doris, one of situationism’s most notable proponents, has argued that character traits are local: individuals are compassionate only when they find a dime, helpful when not in a hurry or when others around them help.6 This view appears to undercut our ordinary conception of the individual as the generator of actions, as responsible for those actions and as subJect to praise and blame. But it is not moral responsibility in general that is the target of the situationist philosopher. Rather, the 2 Stanley Milgram, “A Behavioral Study of Obedience,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67: 371-378. 3 Isen, A.M., and Levin, P.F., “Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and Kindness,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 21: 1972, 384-388. 4 Darley, J.M. and Batson, C.D., “From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27: 100-108, 1973. 5 Latane, B., and Rodin, J, “A Lady in Distress: Inhibiting Effects of Friends and Strangers on Bystander Intervention,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 5: 189-202, 1969; and Latane, B., and Darley, J.M., The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn’t He Help? New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970. 66 John Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 3 situationist argues that moral theories emphasizing character are most vulnerable to this line of attack. Thus, Doris argues that virtue theory ought to be reJected because it relies on an empirically unsupported view of character. These studies together appear to show that there are no enduring character traits, that is, no character traits of the sort the virtue theorist requires. I argue, however, that this conclusion is mistaken. The virtue theorist has a ready answer to the situationist’s obJection. Moreover, the response to the situationist will help elucidate the ordinary, everyday process of moral development, including questions about the role of rules in moral Justification and moral development, the latter being a process that has been historically underemphasized in philosophy. This under-emphasis on moral development has been encouraged by our proclivity to see morality as constituted by moral dilemmas, requiring responses that anyone can instantly access, rather than constituted by everyday problems and skills that must be cultivated over time. A related problem for the virtue theorist arises when we consider a different situationist problem: the impressive cross-cultural variety of conceptions of the good life and of the related virtues or excellences.7 A quick glance at any two cultures separated by time or geography will reveal very different virtues and pictures of the human good. If the good is used to derive precisely what the virtues are, and if different cultures have different conceptions of the good, then the virtue theorist risks a naïve and culturally biased view in defending any one conception of the good. If this obJection holds, it is not merely the virtue theorists’ view of character that is 7 Jesse Prinz, “The Normativity Challenge: Cultural Psychology Provides the Real Threat to Virtue Ethics,” Journal of Ethics, (2009) 13: 117-144. 4 empirically unsupported, but the very normative grounding of virtue theory, the answer to the question, why are the virtues good? But we will see that cultural variety need not lead us to a relativistic conclusion. To be sure, some cultural conceptions of the good and some corresponding “virtues” will turn out not to be good for human beings. But even more important, we will see that Aristotle’s view of the human function is sufficiently general that it can allow that different cultures might implement or develop human flourishing (and the related virtues) in somewhat different ways. Granting this needn’t lead us to a relativistic conclusion; rather we can hold, as Aristotle does, that the human good is partly constituted by the good of the social context that we occupy. In other words, it is compatible with an Aristotelian view that there might be several different instantiations of the good and related virtues. So it will turn out, in the end, that the situationist makes an important point, namely, that the situations in which we find ourselves have a substantial bearing on our ability to be morally good and on our ability to flourish (in short, on our ability to live excellently). This insight is one we ought to accept. But doing so does not undermine the argument of the virtue theorist because, in short, human beings are well able to be sensitive to the situations in which they find themselves. Situational sensitivity is one of the moral skills we can, and must, cultivate in our process of moral development. Because the virtue theorist can tell a compelling story of moral development, the virtue theorist is uniquely well placed to answer both the situationist challenge and the normativity challenge. 2. Situationists have mounted an impressive challenge for virtue theory. They have argued that empirical psychology conclusively demonstrates that there are no robust traits, no 5 traits in the virtue theorist’s sense. A robust character trait is one possessed by an individual across a range of trait-relevant situations, is consistently revealed through the individual’s actions, and is positively correlated with the possession of other, similar, traits. So courage is a robust trait if individuals act courageously across a whole range of situations pertaining to courage (in battle, in public speaking, in conveying difficult news, etc), if individuals consistently act in a courageous way in similar sorts of situations (different situations of battle), and if the possession of courage makes it more likely that individuals will possess other positive traits (honesty, for instance).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Adopting a Posthumanist Ethics to Inform Value Sensitive Design
    philosophies Article The Ecological Turn in Design: Adopting a Posthumanist Ethics to Inform Value Sensitive Design Steven Umbrello Institute of Ethics and Emerging Technologies (IEET), University of Turin, 10124 Turin, Italy; [email protected] Abstract: Design for Values (DfV) philosophies are a series of design approaches that aim to incorpo- rate human values into the early phases of technological design to direct innovation into beneficial outcomes. The difficulty and necessity of directing advantageous futures for transformative technolo- gies through the application and adoption of value-based design approaches are apparent. However, questions of whose values to design are of critical importance. DfV philosophies typically aim to enrol the stakeholders who may be affected by the emergence of such a technology. However, regardless of which design approach is adopted, all enrolled stakeholders are human ones who propose human values. Contemporary scholarship on metahumanisms, particularly those on posthumanism, have decentred the human from its traditionally privileged position among other forms of life. Arguments that the humanist position is not (and has never been) tenable are persuasive. As such, scholarship has begun to provide a more encompassing ontology for the investigation of nonhuman values. Given the potentially transformative nature of future technologies as relates to the earth and its many assemblages, it is clear that the value investigations of these design approaches fail to account for all relevant stakeholders (i.e., nonhuman animals). This paper has two primary objectives: (1) to argue for the cogency of a posthuman ethics in the design of technologies; and (2) to describe how existing DfV approaches can begin to envision principled and methodological ways of incorporating Citation: Umbrello, S.
    [Show full text]
  • Survival Ethics Theory: to Be Good Is First to Be
    AUTHOR: CHARLES C. VERHAREN/DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY/ HOWARD UNIVERSITY EXCERPT FROM AUTHORS’ ACCEPTED VERSION OF “INTRODUCING SURVIVAL ETHICS INTO ENGINEERING EDUCATION AND PRACTICE,” SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS. AUTHORS: VERHAREN, CHARLES C; THARAKAN, JOHN; MIDDENDORF, GEORGE; CASTRO-SITIRICHE, MARCEL; KADODA, GADA. DOI 10.1007/s11948-011-9332-9, RECEIVED: 22 JUNE 2011 / ACCEPTED: 24 NOVEMBER 2011 SURVIVAL ETHICS THEORY: TO BE GOOD IS FIRST TO BE Ethical systems specify life’s basic values and appropriate means to achieve them. Haidt (2007) claimed that although ethical systems vary culturally, they all include a set of basic values: fairness, loyalty, respect for authority and spiritual purity. While agreeing on the importance of these values, we suggest an alternative approach that recognizes a more fundamental set of values justified by their direct survival utility. Renowned thinkers have singled out these values, and cultures through the ages have exhibited dependence on them. Principles like Haidt’s fairness and loyalty may be derived from this foundational set. There are two basic values in this survival ethics system. The first is survival itself: To be good is first to be—both for individuals and the communities to which they belong. All other values follow from this first principle because no other values exist in the absence of life itself. The second value is flourishing, inasmuch as survival is better achieved when life flourishes. Values such as rationality, community bonding, pleasure, freedom, and introspection or meditation define flourishing. The fact that survival is the pre-condition for all other values does not mean that survival of self is the most important value.
    [Show full text]
  • PDF Download the Moral Landscape Kindle
    THE MORAL LANDSCAPE PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Sam Harris | 384 pages | 04 Dec 2012 | Transworld Publishers Ltd | 9780552776387 | English | London, United Kingdom The Moral Landscape PDF Book By Marilynne Robinson. Some morals may be consistent in some form across times and cultures. Since it's possible that human well-being and moral goodness are not identical, it follows necessarily that human well-being and moral goodness are not the same, as Harris has asserted. Horgan, "Be wary of the righteous rationalist: We should reject Sam Harris's claim that science can be a moral guidepost" , Scientific American blog, Oct. I don't think, though, that the failure of this claim is fatal to the rest of Sam's claims. Immorality is knowing what is right and wrong but acting wrongly anyway. But would a life spent popping MDMA, although presumably full of "good feelings", be a peak in his moral landscape? For example, he says that there are objectively good and bad moves in chess Moral Landscape , 8. A rustic-style deck, for example, will look much better attached to a log cabin than to an ultra-modern contemporary. Morals in the US. It seems to me that morality, particularly when it is promoted for the good of the general public, ought to emphasise concern with the latter harms committed against others , if it even concerns the former "harms" committed against oneself at all. Nuzzolilli wrote a generally favorable review in a journal of the Association for Behavior Analysis International :. Now, Sam's notion that a society of equally-matched sadists and masochists would could be morally equivalent to a world of conventionally wired people is harder to defuse given his premises, but let's look at it a little critically: in fact, it doesn't take much to immediately question whether the experience of a masochist is genuinely one of equal well-being with that of a normally-adjusted individual.
    [Show full text]
  • Organizational Ethical Integrity: Good and Bad Illusions
    ARTICLE DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0044-x OPEN Organizational ethical integrity: good and bad illusions PawełŁukasz Polowczyk1 ABSTRACT Integrity has always been an ambiguous or vague concept. Integrity as a general concept seems to be too problematic in philosophical or scientific language. This paper will aim to improve and preserve the specific notion of integrity—the concept of moral — 1234567890 integrity as a virtue and as a moral purpose, and its opposite the concept of counterfeit moral integrity or false moral integrity. It stresses a strong relationship between the concepts of morality and the concept of moral integrity: if moralities are diverse, moral integrity has many forms too, and the forms are only as good as the morality behind them. The paper emphasizes their organizational dimensions because any organizational impact—due to its scale—can be especially beneficial or detrimental to society. The first objective is to introduce a preliminary conceptual order by means of definitions and typologies to support clearer (language analysis) and more critical (Critical Theory) thinking on organizational moral integrity: establishing definitions of moral and ethical integrity, new definitions of material and formal moral integrity, descriptions of irrational and rational moral integrit, and individual and organizational moral integrity. The definitions and typologies are designed to be proto- types of false integrity “detectors”. The second objective is to outline an ideal of a total and rational moral commitment for every organization: organizational material ethical integrity (OMEI). The ideal of OMEI points out that most self-proclaimed ethical organizations are probably not ethically committed. The third objective is to justify the theses that (1) moral integrity can be good or bad, not simply good, and that (2) false moral integrity can be good.
    [Show full text]
  • On Books the Science of Values: the Moral Landscape by Sam Harris James W
    The Behavior Analyst 2012, 35, 265–273 No. 2 (Fall) On Books The Science of Values: The Moral Landscape by Sam Harris James W. Diller and Andrew E. Nuzzolilli Eastern Connecticut State University In The Moral Landscape,Sam sality in the external environment Harris (2010) proposes that science and in the organism’s correlated can be used to identify values, which neurological states. The contempo- he defines as ‘‘facts that can be rary science of behavior analysis has scientifically understood: regarding and will continue to contribute to this positive and negative social emotions, discussion, originating with Skinner’s retributive impulses, the effects of seminal works Beyond Freedom and specific laws and social institutions Dignity (1971) and Walden Two on human relationships, the neuro- (1976). Neither book is explicitly a physiology of happiness and suffer- treatise on morality, but both are ing, etc.’’ (pp. 1–2). Harris argues that attempts to introduce behavioral sci- scientific principles are appropriately ence to a broader audience. The applied in this domain because ‘‘hu- behavior-analytic approach (which is man well-being entirely depends on largely compatible with Harris’s ef- events in the world and on states of forts in The Moral Landscape) sup- the human brain. Consequently, there ports the superiority of a scientific must be scientific truths known about approach to life, including ques- it’’ (p. 3). Although readers of this tions of morality. Skinner (1976), for journal would have few problems example, highlighted the importance with the assertion that behavior (here, of the experimenting culture to iden- reports of well-being and correlated tify practices that were effective (cf.
    [Show full text]
  • The Empty Landscape: a Critical Analysis of the Moral Landscape, in Light of the Requirements of Systems Science
    July/August 2011 ARTICLE The Empty Landscape: A Critical Analysis of The Moral Landscape, in Light of the Requirements of Systems Science Michael Hoga .................................................................................................................................... Micheal Hogan is a lecturer at the School of Psychology at the National University of Ireland, Galway. Correspondence regarding this article should to directed to the author at [email protected] ......................................................................................................................................... Morality – principles concerning the distinction Harris’s Science and Morality between right and wrong or good and bad Unlike David Hume (Hume, 1740), who argued that there is a behaviour; a system of values and moral clear conceptual distinction between facts and values with only facts – and not values – being open to rational investigation, principles. Harris argues that values can be uncovered by science, because Oxford English Dictionary values are reducible to facts in relation to the wellbeing of conscious creatures. We can make “good” or “bad” moral In his new book, The Moral Landscape: How Science can decisions; decisions that impact positively or negatively on our Determine Human Values, Sam Harris (2010, p. 62) makes a wellbeing. This sounds like a reasonable claim. Harris points to bold claim: an analogy: just as it is possible for individuals and groups to be wrong about how best to maintain their physical health, it I believe that we will increasingly understand is also possible for them to be wrong about how to maximise good and evil, right and wrong, in scientific their personal and social wellbeing. However, because Harris terms, because moral concerns translate into facts offers no substantive review of the empirical literature on about how our thoughts and behaviors affect the wellbeing (Keyes & Haidt, 2003; Ryff & Keyes, 1995), and no wellbeing of conscious creatures like ourselves.
    [Show full text]
  • John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism on Naturalism
    Eleutheria Volume 4 Issue 2 Article 4 December 2015 An Incongruent Amalgamation: John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism on Naturalism Jeffrey M. Robinson Liberty University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/eleu Part of the Biblical Studies Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, History of Philosophy Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons Recommended Citation Robinson, Jeffrey M.. 2015. "An Incongruent Amalgamation: John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism on Naturalism." Eleutheria 4, (2). https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/eleu/vol4/iss2/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Divinity at Scholars Crossing. It has been accepted for inclusion in Eleutheria by an authorized editor of Scholars Crossing. For more information, please contact [email protected]. An Incongruent Amalgamation: John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism on Naturalism Abstract John Stuart Mill's utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, often surfaces in cultural debates in the contemporary West over the extent and foundations of moral duties. Given the drift from its historical Judeo-Christian moorings, naturalism now provides much of the epistemic grounding in Western culture in relation to moral duties. The amalgamation of Mill’s utilitarianism and naturalism has resulted in a cultural and epistemic disconnect. Naturalism is hard-pressed to provide consistent epistemic support for Mill’s utilitarian principle. This essay provides a number of suggestions as to why Mill’s utilitarianism may be inconsistent on naturalism. Keywords Utilitarianism, Naturalism, Philosophy, Ethics, Apologetics, John Stuart Mill Cover Page Footnote PhD Apologetics (currently pursuing, expected graduation date 2017) Jeffrey Robinson holds an Advanced Masters of Divinity, Apologetics from Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary and is currently pursuing a PhD in Theology and Apologetics.
    [Show full text]
  • From Goodness to God: Why Religion Makes Sense of Our Moral Commitments
    From Goodness to God: Why Religion Makes Sense of our Moral Commitments Angus Ritchie “A philosophically acute and convincing response to some extreme atheistic claims.” Keith Ward Theos Friends’ Programme Theos is a religion and society think tank which seeks to inform and influence public opinion about the role of faith and belief in society. We were launched in November 2006 with the support of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams and the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O’Connor. We provide • high-quality research, reports and publications; • an events programme; • news, information and analysis to media companies, parliamentarians and other opinion formers. We can only do this with your help! Theos Friends receive complimentary copies of all Theos publications, invitations to selected events and monthly email bulletins. Theos Associates receive all the benefits of Friends and in addition are invited to attend an exclusive annual dinner with the Theos Director and team. If you would like to become a Friend or an Associate, please visit www.theosthinktank.co.uk or detach or photocopy the form below, and send it with a cheque to Theos for the relevant amount. Thank you. Yes, I would like to help change public opinion! I enclose a cheque payable to Theos for: £60 (Friend) £300 (Associate) Please send me information on how to give by standing order/direct debit Name Address Postcode Email Tel Data Protection Theos will use your personal data to inform you of its activities. If you prefer not to receive this information please tick here. By completing you are consenting to receiving communications by telephone and email.
    [Show full text]
  • ETS Sam Harris Moral Landscape Final
    The Morass of Sam Harris's Moral Landscape Gregg Strawbridge, Ph.D.1 Presented at the Eastern Regional Conference of the Evangelical Theological Society March 2, 2012 The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values by Sam Harris, a best-selling atheist, argues for an objective ethics consistent with his materialist outlook.2 Written in an engaging style with many concrete examples of ethically charged behavior, Harris conveys his case passionately. He argues that moral truths exist, can be scientifically understood and we determine such ethical values through the consequences of actions.3 It is surprising to find a ringing diatribe against ethical relativism from an atheist. Most of his examples of unethical actions are indeed repulsive, e.g., the Taliban’s treatment of women,4 forcing such women to wear burqas,5 the genital mutilation of girls 6 and child molestation.7 He blasts the Taliban and scrapes at the open wound of the Roman Catholic Church child sexual abuse scandal.8 The range of child abuse offenses “terminates in absolute evil.”9 In light of these examples, ethical relativism blushes or hides. Another strength of this book is a well-informed, copiously annotated discussion of his thesis in relation to neuroscience, a field in which Harris holds a Ph.D. from UCLA. This along with his rhetorical force through lurid and sometimes sickening examples makes this book a compelling read in many respects. It will be persuasive to some, no doubt. On the anxious bench of atheism, 1 Gregg Strawbridge is the 2011-2012 president of the Evangelical Theological Societyʼs Eastern Region and pastor of All Saints Church - a reformational and covenantal congregation in the Lancaster, PA area.
    [Show full text]
  • A View of Sam Harris' the Moral Landscape
    A Review of Sam Harris' "The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values” by Ian Kluge In The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values, Sam Harris endeavors to demonstrate that science is sufficient to build a system of ethics and values both for individuals and societies. His ultimate goal is actually two-fold. He wants to establish science as the only rational and self-sufficient basis of ethics and he wants to eliminate religion and ‘supernaturalism’ from all ethical discourse. In doing so, he takes six radical steps. First, he rejects the distinction between facts and values.[1] Next, he asserts that “questions about values . are really questions about the well-being of conscious creatures”[2] and that “Values . translate into facts which can de scientifically understood.”[3] Third, he professes “moral realism,”[4] the position that there are definitive right and wrong answers to ethical question, at least in principle. Fourth, he advocates consequentialism as the only viable moral theory[5] and fifth, on the basis of neuroscience, he rejects free will[6] as commonly understood both in the past and present. Finally, he posits an irreconcilable “clash between faith and reason.”[7] Of course, he also promotes his one-sided views about the disastrous personal and social impact of religion but this is secondary to his main goal of replacing religion with science as the foundation of ethical thought and action. Harris’ argument is highly problematic, often unclear and flawed in conception and explanation. Much of the problem lies in the oversimplification of the subject matter and the issues involved and the failure to think them through carefully.
    [Show full text]
  • A Critique of the Moral Optimism of Sam Harris. Polemical Comments
    Studia Religiologica 47 (4) 2014, s. 321–329 doi:10.4467/20844077SR.14.024.3125 www.ejournals.eu/Studia-Religiologica A Critique of the Moral Optimism of Sam Harris. Polemical Comments Konrad Szocik Wyższa Szkoła Informatyki i Zarządzania w Rzeszowie Abstract Sam Harris, one of the new atheists, believes that science is an authority in moral issues. Science can help us understand what our moral duties are, and what is right and wrong in a moral sense. However, the cultural and historical diversity of human behaviours, especially the history of wars and conflicts, suggests that it is difficult to show one, common and universal kind of morality. Here we show that Harris’s moral theory is a particular project which could not be “scientifically” justifi- able. Słowa kluczowe: nowy ateizm, moralność, etyka, wartości, konwencjonalizm Keywords: New Atheism, Morality, Ethics, Values, Conventionalism Science, especially biology, on the one hand offers important materials for philosophi- cal reflections about morality, ethics and religion. On the other hand, it provides new tools for their study (neurobiology, evolution). Sam Harris, one of the new atheists, believes that science explains all moral topics. However, scientific research referring to morality may be interpreted ambiguously. Look at two cases. In the 17 October 2014 issue of Science, Sarah F. Brosnan and Frans B.M. de Waal showed that “the sense of fairness did not evolve for the sake of fairness per se but in order to reap the benefits of continued cooperation.”1 In the next issue of the journal (24 October 2014), we can read that “in the course of evolution, some animals have overcome the fear and stress they feel when encountering humans or unfamiliar members of their own species and become less aggressive.”2 In this article I show that the moral optimism characteristic 1 S.F.
    [Show full text]
  • A Materialist Response to Hunter and Nedelisky's Science and the Good
    Science and the Good | 99 ESSAY A Materialist Response to Hunter and Nedelisky’s Science and the Good David Wiebe, Canada Science and the Good: The Tragic Quest for the Foundations of Morality (2018) is a collaboration between sociologist James Davison Hunter and philosopher Paul Nedelisky, both of the University of Virginia. Formerly a student under Peter Berger, Hunter is now the LaBrosse-Levinson Distinguished Professor of Religion, Culture and Social Theory. He has written widely, including nine books, all concerned in some way with how morality has affected political and cultural change in America. His works have won national acclaim and numerous awards. This is Nedelisky’s first book, although he has written numerous articles, also on much the same topic. His concern that science has overtaken much of philosophy’s former authority on discussions surrounding the meaning and purpose of life is shared with many other philosophers. The argument Hunter and Nedelisky advance is that the “good” is essentially incompatible with science. Sciences such as psychology and neurochemistry may be able to investigate certain aspects of morality by describing how morality functions, but they cannot provide us with a prescriptive morality that tells us how to act going forward. The authors’ idealistic Platonic view of morality clashes with the more empirical utilitarian view held by those whom they call “ethical naturalists” (10). As I read their treatise, I constantly found myself asking why the authors do not seem to comprehend that the “good” cannot be in a totally separate realm from science. In some very fundamental way, science must be able to impact values if we want to avoid living in a totally subjective world.
    [Show full text]