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The Behavior Analyst 2012, 35, 265–273 No. 2 (Fall) On Books The Science of Values: The Moral Landscape by Sam Harris James W. Diller and Andrew E. Nuzzolilli Eastern Connecticut State University

In The Moral Landscape,Sam sality in the external environment Harris (2010) proposes that science and in the organism’s correlated can be used to identify values, which neurological states. The contempo- he defines as ‘‘facts that can be rary science of behavior analysis has scientifically understood: regarding and will continue to contribute to this positive and negative social emotions, discussion, originating with Skinner’s retributive impulses, the effects of seminal works Beyond Freedom and specific laws and social institutions Dignity (1971) and Walden Two on human relationships, the neuro- (1976). Neither book is explicitly a physiology of happiness and suffer- treatise on morality, but both are ing, etc.’’ (pp. 1–2). Harris argues that attempts to introduce behavioral sci- scientific principles are appropriately ence to a broader audience. The applied in this domain because ‘‘hu- behavior-analytic approach (which is man well-being entirely depends on largely compatible with Harris’s ef- events in the world and on states of forts in The Moral Landscape) sup- the human brain. Consequently, there ports the superiority of a scientific must be scientific truths known about approach to life, including ques- it’’ (p. 3). Although readers of this tions of morality. Skinner (1976), for journal would have few problems example, highlighted the importance with the assertion that behavior (here, of the experimenting culture to iden- reports of well-being and correlated tify practices that were effective (cf. responses) changes as a function of Baum, 2005).Tacit within behavior environmental events, the role of the analysis is the expectation that a neurophysiological correlates of these scientific worldview can and will responses has been a point of debate improve the quality of life. Consistent within the conceptual literature of with this view, Harris suggests that the behavior analysis (e.g., Elcoro, 2008; currently accepted determinants of Reese, 1996; Schaal, 2003). morality (e.g., religion, faith) are not The Moral Landscape represents an what society ought to espouse. In- important contribution to a scientific stead, he proposes that scientific discussion of morality. It explicates inquiry into morality as its own the determinants of moral behavior subject would enhance global levels for a popular audience, placing cau- of well-being. From a behavioral perspective, the study of morality is We thank Mirari Elcoro for her thought- necessarily the study of behavior, ful comments on a previous version of this including the contexts in which it manuscript. occurs and the environmental events Correspondence concerning this article should of which it is a function. Analysis in be addressed to James Diller, Department of Psychology, Eastern Connecticut State Univer- this framework may allow the suc- sity, 83 Windham Street, Willimantic, Connecti- cessful identification of the variables cut 06226 (e-mail: [email protected]). that control moral behavior, and,

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The Behavior Analyst bhan-35-02-13.3d 10/9/12 13:27:00 265 Cust # MS 12-101 266 JAMES W. DILLER & ANDREW E. NUZZOLILLI ultimately, the development of cultur- beneficial for behavior analysts to al practices to increase its occurrence. align themselves with and support the The Moral Landscape is a recent authors of these works, garnering contribution to a collection of books attention from the controversial cov- (e.g., Dawkins, 2006; Harris, 2005; erage from popular media outlets Hitchens, 2007; Sagan, 2006) that that writers such as Dawkins and subject the claims of religion to the Harris regularly elicit. Perhaps con- same standard of empirical rigor that troversial exposure is better than no other epistemologies (e.g., science) exposure at all, especially when be- must abide by. Dawkins (2006), for havior analysis can enable the devel- example, criticizes the appeal to super- opment of the hypothetical secular natural gods as explanatory agents and society that Harris, Dawkins, Hitch- takes issue with the privileged place of ens, and Sagan call for. Indeed, religion within societal discourse. Har- behavior analysis may be the only ris echoes and expands on these discipline that can identify and estab- concerns in The Moral Landscape. lish reinforcers to motivate prosocial, Collectively, these authors take so-called moral, human behavior in issue with the notion of nonoverlap- the absence of organized religion. ping magisteria (NOMA; Gould, It is noteworthy that no psycholo- 1999), which is the assertion that gist has tackled the problem of science and religion are both valid secular values alongside these authors systems of knowledge, and that nei- in spite of the contradictory facts that ther discipline can inform the other. religion presents about human na- Behavior analysts take issue with the ture, facts that take away from the notion that scientific behavior and value of our discipline. Indeed, much religious behavior are egalitarian (see of the rich ‘‘prescientific’’ vocabulary Galuska, 2003, for suggestions about that inhibits psychology from becom- successful navigation of NOMA by ing a natural science is either religious behavior analysts). Skinner (1987) or metaphysical in nature (Schlinger, commented, ‘‘Science, not religion, 2004). It is imperative for the valida- has taught me my most useful values, tion of the field of psychology, as well among them intellectual honesty. It is as behavior analysis by association, better to go without answers than to to be a part of this modern empiricist accept those that merely resolve movement championed by Harris. puzzlement’’ (p. 12). Although reli- Harris’s argument unfolds in an gion may be effective at inducing introduction and five subsequent behavioral change among its follow- chapters. In the introduction, he ers, it continues to have unintended defines his title concept of the moral effects that, to borrow Harris’s anal- landscape as a hypothetical space ogy, reach the depths of the moral representing human well-being, en- landscape. Hitchens (2007) makes a compassing all human experiences. subtitular claim that ‘‘religion poi- This space contains the well-being of sons everything,’’ supporting his the- members of all cultures and groups of sis with discussions of demonstrably individuals on the planet. The peaks negative outcomes associated with of this landscape are the heights of religious practice, discussing exam- prosperity, and the valleys represent ples of how religion leads to poorer the depths of human suffering. The states of human health and impedes goal of plotting the cartography of social progress. As an alternative, he this landscape is to maximize ‘‘the proposes a rational, scientific view of well-being of conscious creatures’’ the world, which Harris applies to the (i.e., humans) which ‘‘must translate study of morality. at some point into facts about brains Because they are members of a and their interactions with the world relatively small discipline, it may be at large’’ (p. 11). For Harris, the brain

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is the locus of interest. We believe that rect. Harris uses the term conscious it is possible to recast the argument creature extensively in formulating his into one about whole organisms— science of morality. Although he does with correlated neurological states, not provide an explicit definition of perhaps—interacting with their envi- consciousness, his use seems to be at ronment to determine behavior. This odds with the behavioral approach to scientific approach to human behav- this construct. For Harris, conscious- ior, with a goal of improving the ness seems to be a property of the welfare of living organisms, is consis- brain, discoverable by explorations in tent with the application of behavior neuroscience. In contrast, Skinner analysis to bring about societal change (1945) suggested that, when defining (e.g., Baer, Wolf, & Risley, 1968; psychological terms, it is useful to Skinner, 1971, 1978). identify the conditions under which In the subsequent chapters of his those terms are used, and the history book, Harris makes the case for of the verbal community that produc- applying scientific thinking to deter- es that usage. Consistent with this mine human values. Chapter 1 out- analysis, Schlinger (2008) proposed lines the knowable nature of moral that consciousness is best understood truths, suggesting that they are sub- with a focus on the behaviors that are ject to scientific (rather than religious) associated with the use of the word inquiry. In Chapter 2, Harris tackles consciousness (e.g., self-talk, private the topics of good and evil, suggesting behavior), rather than the study of the that these terms may be outmoded; reified thing itself. instead, the goal of both religion and Consciousness, defined as a set of science should be to determine ways verbal behavior, is a prerequisite for a to maximize human well-being. In the discussion of morality. Verbal behav- third chapter, Harris explores the ior is required for us to evaluate our neurological correlates of belief, trac- own subjective well-being in relation ing the complex sets of behavior back to the well-being of others, allowing to brain activity. In the fourth chap- us to identify the relative ‘‘goodness’’ ter, he examines the role of religious or ‘‘badness’’ of each; such an anal- faith in contemporary society, sug- ysis is necessarily dependent on verbal gesting that a scientific approach may behavior. Indeed, in other media (cf. lead to an increase in overall well- The Richard Dawkins Foundation, being. The final chapter outlines a 2011), Harris has suggested that a plan for future work, disentangling universe of rocks could not define science and philosophy, and offering a science of morality, because con- an optimistic picture about the use of sciousness (i.e., a verbal repertoire science to improve the human condi- about one’s own behavior) is required tion. In sum, Harris presents a cogent to discuss subjective experience. argument for the application of sci- When providing a definition for entific principles to identify moral the well-being that should be pro- principles and values. In what fol- moted, Harris likens this concept to lows, we describe his arguments and physical health, noting, some intersections with the behavioral approach to this topic. Indeed the difference between a healthy person and a dead one is about as clear and consequential a distinction as we ever make in DEFINING MORALITY science. The difference between the heights of human fulfillment and the depths of human The crux of Harris’s argument is misery are no less clear even if new frontiers that the well-being of conscious crea- await us in both directions. (p. 12) tures should be the paramount con- sideration when determining whether With this definition, it is possible to an action is morally correct or incor- cast a wide net and capture a multi-

The Behavior Analyst bhan-35-02-13.3d 10/9/12 13:27:10 267 Cust # MS 12-101 268 JAMES W. DILLER & ANDREW E. NUZZOLILLI tude of human behaviors and condi- foundly influence our collective fu- tions. Harris suggests that, much like ture’’ (p. 25). This theme can be found physical health, well-being eludes con- in the writings of Skinner (1971), who cise definition. Although the use of suggested that the scientific approach well-being is not precisely operation- to the world’s practical problems can alized, he does define morality as ‘‘the allow the development of solutions to principles of behavior that allow those problems. Although Harris’s people to flourish’’ (p. 19). This phras- argument is framed in the language ing is likely the closest to an opera- of neuroscience instead of Skinner’s tional definition of morality that is behavioral perspective, a similarly possible without undertaking the sci- pragmatic approach shows through. entific analysis that Harris proposes in The introduction of Harris’s book which fundamental principles to in- is wholly devoted to the qualification crease moral behavior could be dis- of values as scientific facts: verifiable covered. The use of flourishing human statements about organisms and the life as a criterion for morality may be environment around them. This ar- consistent with Skinner’s (1945) ap- gument, that utterances reflect or are proach to evaluating terms as a symbolic of environmental events, function of the conditions in which should be familiar to those who are they occur: Morality, for Harris, may familiar with Skinner’s conceptuali- be evident only when well-being zation of a verbal community. If we is enhanced. The next step of the are to accept that utterances about analysis would be to systematically ‘‘moral behavior,’’ ‘‘morality,’’ or identify the conditions that give rise ‘‘ethics’’ are not importantly different to that flourishing human life, explor- from other verbal behavior, then they ing the antecedents (e.g., having basic too can become a topic for scientific needs met, education, leisure time) inquiry. Such an analysis could eval- and the consequences thereof. Behav- uate the conditions under which this ioral technologies such as functional verbal behavior is emitted and the analysis (e.g., Iwata, Dorsey, Slifer, consequences thereof. With this un- Bauman, & Richman, 1982/1994) derstanding of the contingencies of may provide the tools required to reinforcement that promote and main- successfully carry out this work. tain these responses, it would be A major premise of Harris’s work possible to shape the moral behavior is that there is variability in the of individuals or groups. degree of ‘‘goodness’’ that individuals Harris posits that ‘‘science can, in experience in life, and this variability principle, help us understand what we can be accounted for by brain states should do and should want—and, and events in the external environ- therefore, what other people should ment. If one accepts the distinction do and should want in order to live between ‘‘the good life’’ and ‘‘the bad the best lives possible’’ (p. 28). This is life’’ and the idea that there are lawful congruent with Skinner’s acceptance patterns and factors that contribute of the value judgment (i.e., is or ought to each of these outcomes (i.e., a statements) as a tool to reveal the deterministic framework), it allows oftentimes subtle contingencies that the development of a scientific view of control social behavior. Harris de- morality. This scientific view, accord- scribes well-being as the conceptual ing to Harris, stands as an alternative basis for morality and values, stating, to traditional religious perspectives. ‘‘there must be a science of morality Harris writes, ‘‘There is simply no … because the well-being of conscious question that how we speak about creatures depends upon how the human values—and how we study or universe is, altogether’’ (p. 28). Bring- fail to study the relevant phenomena ing morality into the natural world at the level of the brain—will pro- makes it amenable to scientific study,

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and Harris’s book complements the example of a common belief that work that behavior analysts have impairs the progression of well-being. done with respect to questions of With respect to differences between morality. perspectives of different groups, Har- The behavior-analytic approach to ris writes, ‘‘those who do not share values and morals has its origin with our scientific goals have no influence Skinner, who suggested that things on scientific discourse whatsoever; that individuals call good are rein- but, for some reason, people who do forcing, and that ‘‘any list of values is a not share our moral goals render us list of reinforcers’’ (1953, p. 35). When incapable of even speaking about describing Skinner’s approach, Ruiz moral truth’’ (p. 34). Here, Harris is and Roche (2007) commented that ‘‘it suggesting that religious beliefs, which is important to provide translations of may be incorrect according to other value statements in functional terms in epistemological systems (e.g., science), order to reveal the relevant contingen- prevent other systems from declaring cies of reinforcement’’ (p. 4). Thus, as them to be incorrect. However, reli- with the discussion of consciousness gious belief systems do comment on above, the conditions under which the ‘‘truth’’ of empirical inquiries, a particular behaviors are morally cor- double standard with which Harris rect or incorrect must be considered. takes issue, and a concern that is This functional approach may expand expressed by other authors such as on Harris’s proposed science of values Dawkins (2006). The ability of science andmakeitmoreacceptabletoa to comment on affairs related to behavioral audience. religion and morality has the potential for the further advancement of human DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN well-being via the development of new PHILOSOPHICAL POSITIONS ideas and technologies. Without a ON MORALITY scientific response to these issues, progress seems less likely. A large portion of Harris’s book To determine the merits of given differentiates between the religious philosophical systems, one can adopt notions of values and morality and a relativistic position. Relativism is the scientific principles thereof. Harris the belief that points of view have no suggests that religious concerns about absolute truth. This tradition is large- morality are related to human well- ly a by-product of scientific skepti- being. In Chapter 1, he describes an cism, and can be just as harmful to a agenda of finding scientific truth about science of morality as any religious questions of morality. To deal with the doctrine. By Harris’s account, moral relative unpopularity of his approach relativism is endemic throughout the (Harris reportss that more people in scientific community. This is prob- contemporary American society be- lematic for the development of the lieve that morality should stem from theoretical moral landscape because religious than scientific inquiries), he historically science has ‘‘had no opin- asserts that consensus and truth are ion’’ on moral issues, which Harris not the same thing: ‘‘One person can ascribes to a fear of retribution by be right, and everyone else can be religious groups, political agendas, or wrong. Consensus is a guide to discov- intellectual laziness; he objects to the ering what is going on in the world, but continuance of this harmful tradition. that is all that it is. Its presence or Harris suggests that relativism is absence in no way constrains what accepted as an absolute position and may or may not be true’’ (p. 31). Harris is not subject to a contextual analysis reports that 57% of Americans believe (that relativism itself should require). that preventing homosexual marriage He points out that this absolute is a moral imperative (p. 53), a clear acceptance of a relativistic worldview

The Behavior Analyst bhan-35-02-13.3d 10/9/12 13:27:10 269 Cust # MS 12-101 270 JAMES W. DILLER & ANDREW E. NUZZOLILLI is fundamentally contradictory to the BELIEF principle of relativism itself. If we are After establishing that our beliefs to believe that the practices in ques- can, indeed, be incorrect or somehow tion (examples that Harris highlights inconsistent with reality, Harris qual- include female genital mutilation and ifies his argument. Citing research subjugation of women) are correct in conductedinhisownlaboratoryon the relevant cultural and historical the neuroscience of belief, he posits time period, this belief must also be that there is no difference between cast as relative and changeable, which what we deem to be ‘‘knowledge,’’ it generally is not. In addition, Harris ‘‘belief,’’ and ‘‘truth,’’ and these utter- suggests that relativistic positions ances can be attributed to functionally may lead to misguided beliefs about equivalent neurological correlates. In- how to improve human well-being. deed, the brain’s endogenous reward Perhaps at odds with Harris’s systems reinforce beliefs and utteranc- analysis, Skinner suggested that there es that we deem ‘‘true’’ with positive are multiple sets of values that may emotional valence. He writes, emerge across cultural settings: ‘‘Each culture has its own set of goods, and When we believe a proposition to be true, it is what is good in one culture may not as though we have taken it in hand as part of be good in another’’ (1971, p. 122). our extended self, we are saying in effect, The reinforcers (i.e., values) identified ‘‘This is mine. I can use this. This fits my view across cultures necessarily vary as a of the world.’’ (p. 121) function of the different physical and This evidence from neuroscience sup- cultural environments in which the ports the notion that values, knowl- moral systems develop. For Skinner, edge, belief, and truth belong to the the criterion by which to evaluate the same class of verbal behavior, but goodness of a cultural practice is the may not necessarily share discrimina- degree to which it promotes survival tive stimuli (Skinner, 1945). Taking of the society. Thus, although there this research to its logical conclusion, are potentially many different ways one can suggest that an individual’s for a culture to survive, there may be learning history would dictate which some that maximize the level of well- beliefs, truths, or bits of knowledge being of the individuals and the could fit into a person’s worldview. By group. Skinner’s position is pragmat- Harris’s account, we dislike informa- ic, but has garnered criticism from tion that contradicts our worldviews within the behavior-analytic commu- as much as we dislike being lied to. nity (e.g., Ruiz & Roche, 2007). With this bias established, it is easier Critiques of the cultural survivability to see precisely how maladaptive or criterion emphasize the impossibility harmful beliefs can be propagated. of determining which cultural practices will, in fact, enhance survivabil- ORGANISM–ENVIRONMENT ity without definite knowledge of the INTERACTIONS future. Ruiz and Roche (2007) called ‘‘for behavior analysts to consider In Chapter 2, Harris suggests that seriously where we as a community an understanding of the human brain stand on relativism and to discuss and its states will allow an under- openly and thoroughly the criteria we standing of forces that improve soci- will use in adopting ethical princi- ety (e.g., prosocial behavior). He ples’’ (p. 11). Harris’s position of writes, rejecting moral relativism in favor of As we better understand the brain, we will universal principles to promote well- increasingly understand all of the forces … being may help to inform the behav- that allow friends and strangers to collaborate ior-analytic discourse. successfully on the common projects of

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civilization. Understanding ourselves in this Taking this environment-based ap- way and using the knowledge to improve proach, Harris presents contemporary human life, will be among the most important challenges to science in the decades to come. research from neuroscience through- (pp. 55–56) out his book. After describing the neurological precursors and correlates Cooperation is one of the mecha- of behavior, he dismisses the notion of nisms through which values may free will, citing additional biological come about, and Harris contends that datatosuggestthatitisthebrain— ‘‘there may be nothing more impor- and not an agent of free will—that is tant than human cooperation’’ (p. 55). responsible for behavior. He makes a Conceptualizing the failures of coop- familiar argument for a deterministic eration as the everyday grievances of framework, in which the historical theft, deception, and violence, it is and contemporary environments (in- plain to see how failing to cooperate cluding neurological states) are re- can be an impediment to human well- sponsible for behavior. After disman- being and moral development. tling free will, Harris describes Harris emphasizes the role of ramifications for the justice system. consequences in the formation of With this knowledge, we can no values, suggesting that longer hold people accountable for their actions because they are deter- all questions of value depend upon the mined by historical and contemporary possibility of experiencing such value. Without events. This view negates a justice potential consequences at the level of experi- system based on punishment or retri- ence—happiness, suffering, joy, despair etc.— bution. Consistent with a behavioral all talk of value is empty … even within religion, therefore, consequences and con- position (e.g., Chiesa, 2003), Harris scious states remain the foundation of all suggests that, with increased knowl- values. (p. 62). edge about the brain (for which we may be able to substitute behavior In this quote, Harris suggests the without losing any meaning, because power of consequences to effect change the brain necessarily belongs to a in behavior. In so doing, Harris takes complete organism), reforms of the morality out of his context of neuro- justice system may be necessary. A logical events and places it into an reformed justice system would be environmental framework. Although more compassionate based on its he does acknowledge the behavior– more accurate understanding of caus- environment interaction as a cause for es of behavior (i.e., the environment moral responding, a behavior-analytic and biological states). Harris takes approach would go further, emphasiz- this position to an extreme, proposing ing the power of consequences to that it may even be immoral to fail to increase or decrease (i.e., reinforce or consider environmental and biologi- punish) the likelihood that moral cal factors within the context of the behavior would occur. It is the conse- justice system. Here, there is a funda- quences of behavior that make it more mental compatibility between the or less likely to occur in a selectionist approach that Harris is advocating framework (cf. Glenn & Madden, and a behavioral worldview. 1995), and those same consequences Indeed, the understanding of prox- seem to work similarly at the neuro- imate and ultimate causes that pre- logical level (e.g., Stein, Xue, & Bel- cede any event are essential to luzzi, 1994). Thus, it is the interaction making logically coherent arguments, between the environment and the not just from the perspective of the organism that leads to the develop- justice system but in understanding ment of any behavior, including moral the behavior of all organisms. The responses and those associated with ultimate cause of many reprehensible varying degrees of well-being. human behaviors lies in the distant

The Behavior Analyst bhan-35-02-13.3d 10/9/12 13:27:10 271 Cust # MS 12-101 272 JAMES W. DILLER & ANDREW E. NUZZOLILLI evolutionary past. Proximate causes break these commitments and to live can be shaped over the course of better lives’’ (p. 49). Behavior ana- single lifetimes and may covary with lysts have the conceptual framework environmental stimuli (Mayr, 1961; and behavior-change techniques to Skinner, 1981). For the purposes of potentially make meaningful contri- Harris’s argument, we will agree that butions to each of these goals. the nervous system and the brain are proximate causes of behavior, but CONCLUSIONS these were influenced by both the evolutionary history of the species In The Moral Landscape, Harris and the learning environment of the begins to develop a science of moral- individual (cf. Schlinger & Poling, ity that he believes could be used to 1998, pp. 39–41). A more thorough maximize the well-being of humans. discussion of ultimate cause may be a Although his approach to morality is better locus to develop the science of largely grounded in neuroscience moral behavior which he calls for. (rather than the study of the whole organism), he does present an envi- A PROGRAM FOR CHANGING ronment-based approach to morality MORAL BEHAVIOR to a wide readership, continuing in the tradition of other recent works If Harris’s claims that morality is that have espoused secular world- knowable through scientific processes views (e.g., Dawkins, 2006; Hitchens, are true (and, based on his arguments 2007). Harris’s approach to the de- in the book, we, at least, are con- velopment of the science of morality vinced), behavior analysis ought to is largely consistent with the behav- be at the forefront of the emerging ioral approach; for him, as for behav- science of morality. As a discipline, ior analysts, morality is behavior, and behavior analysis is uniquely posi- that behavior is subject to environ- tioned to deal with matters that span mental (and biological) manipulation. the continuum of well-being and As part of his work, Harris de- suffering (i.e., the peaks and valleys scribes the need to produce change in of Harris’s moral landscape). Behav- methods for producing change in ior analysis has a history of develop- moral behavior; the discipline of ing and using demonstrably effective behavior analysis is ideally suited to behavior-change procedures. Because contribute to this mission. The appli- Harris’s neurological correlates of cation of behavioral techniques to well-being are isomorphic with hu- socially significant problems has been man behavior, the methods of exper- a hallmark of behavior analysis ever imental and applied behavior analysis since Baer et al. (1968) laid the could be used to support the type of foundations of applied behavior anal- work that Harris proposes. ysis. Behavior change has been dem- In the first chapter of the book, onstrated from the level of the indi- Harris outlines three primary direc- vidual to the level of society, and these tions that work in the science of same principles could be applied to morality can take: (a) Explain why moral behavior, as described by Har- people engage in particular behavior ris, to promote universal well-being. ‘‘in the name of morality’’; (b) No other discipline matches behavior ‘‘determine which patterns of thought analysis in its scientific understanding and behavior we should follow in the of behavior or its tools to modify it. If name of ‘morality’’’; and (c) convince Harris is correct that science should people ‘‘who are committed to silly take an active role in determining and harmful patterns of thought and human values, behavior analysts must behavior in the name of ‘morality’ to beapartofthatconversation.

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