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Bibliography UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) Three essays on banking Vlahu, R.E. Publication date 2011 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Vlahu, R. E. (2011). Three essays on banking. Thela Thesis. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl) Download date:25 Sep 2021 Bibliography [1] Acharya, Viral V. (2002), Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper Series. [2] Acharya, Viral V., Lasse Heje Pedersen, Thomas Philippon, and Matthew Richardson (2010), Measuring Systemic Risk, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleve- land Working Paper. [3] Acharya, Viral V. and Matthew Richardson (2009), Restoring Financial Sta- bility: How to Repair a Failed System?, An Independent View from New York University Stern School of Business, John Wiley & Sons. [4] Acharya, Viral V. and Tanju Yorulmazer (2006), Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Resolution of Bank Failures, London Business School, Mimeo- graph. 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