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International ResearchScape Journal

Volume 3 Article 4

2015

Populist Parties in , France, and the UK: Growing Support for a Radical Rejection of Globalization?

Linda Brandt Bowling Green State University, [email protected]

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Recommended Citation Brandt, Linda (2015) "Populist Parties in Germany, France, and the UK: Growing Support for a Radical Rejection of Globalization?," International ResearchScape Journal: Vol. 3 , Article 4. DOI: https://doi.org/10.25035/irj.03.01.04 Available at: https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/irj/vol3/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ScholarWorks@BGSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in International ResearchScape Journal by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@BGSU. Brandt: Populist Parties in Germany, France, and the UK Brandt 1

Populist Parties in Germany, France, and the UK: Growing Support for a Radical Rejection of Globalization?

Linda Brandt International Studies Major Faculty Mentor: Irina Stakhanova 2015

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Abstract

A mere look at electoral results on both the national and European level of many European countries shows that populist and right-wing parties’ support has been growing extensively. The French Front National (FN), which has made significant strides since took over the party’s leadership, is often seen as on the forefront of this movement, and is deemed to be a core part of the contemporary European extreme right. Although their individual agendas and rhetoric differ from that of the FN, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the für Deutschland (, AfD) are often placed in the same party family. Disregarding this hotly debated terminology, however, this paper seeks to identify specific differences and overlaps among the three parties. Examining specific agenda points, most prominently their anti- rhetoric and stance toward the EU, the party programs are used as a starting point to assess to what extent the three parties can justifiably be classified as part of an anti-globalization movement. Prior to examining the parties’ positions concerning specific issues, an influx in immigration, increased integration into the , resulting in a transfer of some national powers to the supranational level, as well as growing , , and anti-Americanism have sometimes been identified as consequences of globalization; negative attitudes toward this development, increased , and policy proposals designed to halt these effects were deemed as highly indicative of a radical rejection of globalization. Following a comparative analysis of the three parties’ positions, the discussion shows that the French “Front National” fulfills the given criteria to a much greater extent than the other two, and its ethnic-based, Francocentric rhetoric is much more extreme than that of its counterparts. Nevertheless, a future radicalization in the UK and Germany is conceivable, particularly since Islamophobia is especially pronounced in the three countries under investigation, and as refugee crises in the Mediterranean Sea are leading to an increased foreign presence in said countries, perhaps sparking similar ethnic intolerance as is propagated by the FN.

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Introduction & Rationale

The issue of increasing political support for right-wing parties in Europe is important because it

signals a distressing dissatisfaction with the current political system. It is especially important

that such a movement, primarily directed against the cultural elements of globalization, is

forming in Europe, where citizens of all member states benefit from freedom of movement and

numerous other advantages of . But clearly, national and regional identities

have not been superseded by a common European identity, and thus continue to play an

important role in national politics, especially in the language used by right-wing parties.

Additionally, overcrowding and other negative effects associated with immigration, as well as

the 2008 financial crisis, have further sown doubts about the European project. As a result, this

project seeks to analyze to what extent a select few parties could be considered a part of this

movement against globalization.

In general, -wing parties are continuing to cement their support in many European

democracies, with France’s aggressive Front National (FN) being on the forefront of the

discussion about this development. Up until recently, Germany was thought to be the exception

to Europe-wide radicalization with extreme right-wing parties’ limited electoral successes

contained to subnational levels and vocal anti-immigration and anti-EU positions less visible at

the national level. This changed in 2013, when the Alternative for Germany AfD, a newly

formed party, campaigned for a fundamental reorganization of the and has since made

headlines for expressing sympathy for supporters of the German movement. Likewise,

UKIP, vocal about drastically reducing immigration and known for its anti-EU rhetoric, has

made electoral advances in UK elections in the last few years.

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Undoubtedly, FN, UKIP and AfD differ significantly regarding their histories, political agendas

and party structures. In fact, FN is widely regarded as a right-wing party1, while UKIP’s and the

AfD’s membership in the far-right Populist Party family is more contested2. Nevertheless, they

share many similarities in that they have emerged as a strong opposition force to established

parties in the mainstream and consider themselves to be the true voice of the people. An in-depth

analysis of policy positions is thus necessary to assess to what extent these parties’ platforms can

be deemed a radical reaction to globalization. Indicators for such a response would primarily be

calls for far-reaching limits on immigration and Islamophobic rhetoric. Additionally, -

skepticism as an emerging ideology must also be examined in its varying appearances, with anti-

American sentiments examined as another possible manifestation of anti-globalization attitudes.

Methodology

The present study relies heavily on qualitative approaches, as its primary goal is to compare the

three parties’ positions on immigration, and to assess whether they can be deemed Islamophobic

or racist, whether Euro-skepticism is a pervasive characteristic, and whether anti-American

sentiment can be observed. Thus, in addition to secondary source material, the study draws from

the parties’ own websites and interviews with their leader to gain a better understanding of the

parties’ standpoints on said issues. Regarding the French Front National, there is more reliance

on interviews and secondary sources, as their website is not published in English. However,

quantitative data is also included in order to examine how the three countries’ public support for

said issues compares to the parties themselves, and whether anti-globalization sentiments are

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restricted to populist parties or more pervasively observable among the general public. This part

of the analysis draws from Eurobarometer surveys and other polling agencies’ data.

Literature Review

Much has been written about the French Front National (FN), while the UK Independence Party

(UKIP) has only lately received significant popularity, and the German Alternative for Germany

(Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) itself is only just over two years old. Taking these

developments into account, will attempt to provide a balanced summary and analysis of books

and journal articles addressing each one of the three parties and their connection to globalization.

Edward G. DeClair’s Politics on the Fringe: The People, Policies, and Organization of the

French National Front examines the party’s voter base and agenda in detail. Exploring the

Front’s agenda, the author argues that “the party has modified its political message to profit from

a growing sense of French anxiousness about the country’s political and economic future”3,

while asserting that reducing the party’s political agenda to the sole issue of immigration does

not hold up in light of “detailed, face-to-face interviews with the core leadership of the Front

(145).” DeClair not only explores which issues are important to the Front, but also analyzes to

what extent the party’s claim to “really say what all French men and women are actually

thinking” (117) holds true by contrasting important issues identified by the Front’s elite with the

French public’s views according to Euro-Barometer. Even though his chart shows that the

public’s view differs significantly from the Front’s on some issues, the author is correct to claim

that the Front’s assertion that it speaks on behalf of its countrymen and women is not too far-

fetched given that there is an alarming overlap in “divisive political issues such as immigration,

security and violence, and , issues that have in fact served as the Front’s philosophical and

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political core” (118). While DeClair’s analysis also showed that “the National Front is most out

of touch with the total French electorate when it comes to issues dealing with moral concerns”

(130), the public’s apparent shared concern for the aforementioned issues, which are essential to

the FN’s identity, is especially important for the purpose of this research project. DeClair’s

findings that immigration “was the leading political problem facing France” (134) according to

the Front’s leadership and supporters must then be analyzed within the framework of the FN’s

contemporary agenda. Thus, while DeClair’s conclusions concerning the party’s platform may

not be entirely applicable given the changes it underwent since Marine Le Pen has become the

party’s president, they provide a relevant historic overview of the party’s anti-globalization

sentiments. Simon Bornschier’s Politics and the Populist Right: The New Cultural

Conflict in Western Europe argues that European right-wing parties, particularly the FN in

France, have benefited greatly from a shifting emphasis away from economics and towards a

new cultural divide. Specifically, he refers to a new cultural cleavage having formed during the

1960s that “pits universalistic conceptions of community against traditional, nationalistic ones”4

and has strengthened right-wing parties’ ability to mobilize supporters regardless of their

socioeconomic status. Applying this framework of libertarian-universalistic vs traditionalist-

communitarian values, Bornschier finds that the FN has been “situated at the extreme of the

” “farthest away from cultural ” (40) with its opposition to

immigration as one of its defining features. Published prior to the AfD’s establishment in 2013,

Bornschier's study notes that “the [German] Union’s [CDU] location is similar to the location

occupied by the populist right in other countries and, in fact, appears to leave little room for

populist right parties (46).” While Bornschier’s emphasis on a cultural divide explains the FN’s

increased popularity in recent years, it does not appear to have foreseen the emergence of the

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AfD, a party whose platform Germany’s traditional political parties have criticized as populist

and nationalist,5 but which emphasizes its classical liberal policy proposals. Nevertheless,

Bornschier’s framework is useful for this research project, as anti-immigration sentiments and

Islamophobia have undoubtedly contributed to the Front National’s emergence as a serious

political contender in France, and to UKIP’s significant electoral successes in Great Britain.

Turning away from France and towards Germany, Arzheimer’s article, “The AfD: Finally a

Successful Right-Wing Party in Europe?,” takes a closer look at the AfD’s manifesto for its

participation in the 2014 elections for the . Specifically, Arzheimer analyses

frequently-used terms in the manifesto for their potential overlap with other German parties’

priorities and in order to gain a greater understanding of the party’s position along the

ideological spectrum. Compared to the eight other political parties’ top five words used,

Arzheimer finds that “the party’s manifesto places it firmly at the far right of the political

spectrum” (544). Against the backdrop of right-wing extremism and , however,

Arzheimer asserts that “the section on immigration and asylum also strikes a rather conciliatory

tone” (545), which along with its modest demands in other relevant areas prompt him to

conclude that the “AfD is therefore not a Radical Right, let alone an Extreme Right party” (546)

and that “there is nothing in the manifesto that would appear as particularly populist in that

sense” (546). Lastly, Arzheimer finds that “[r]emarkably, the AfD shows an unusual degree of

sympathy for Russia and distrust for the US (548).” Arzheimer’s analysis shows that the AfD’s

2014 manifesto is far more restrained than, for example, the much more aggressively nationalist

FN. Despite its comparably cautious positions on immigration, the statements made in last year’s

manifesto do not take into account the party’s expressed support for Pegida. A new assessment

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of the AfD’s policy positions as well as its leadership’s publicly communicated attitudes toward

the concept of “cultural differentialism,” which Bornschier defines as “not claiming the

superiority of any nationality or race but, instead, stressing of peoples to preserve their

distinctive traditions” (23) is thus in order.

1

Almost sandwiched in between the more restrained AfD and the radical FN, UKIP has become a

significant force in British politics. Although Britain is not known for the kinds of Europhile

attitudes expressed by mainstream parties in continental Europe, “UKIP is identified with the

current of ‘hard’ Euro-scepticism, also called ‘Euro-rejectionism’, which rejects both the

principle of ever closer union as well as the current state of the EU institutions”.6 In its

opposition to the EU as a force preventing the UK from engaging in “genuine free trade”7 and

whose membership “holds us back in the world” (7). UKIP clearly uses the language of

economic globalization to emphasize its positions. Despite the party’s espousal of classic free

trade positions, however, UKIP engages in an “exclusionary [rather than globalist] rhetoric”8

when it comes to immigration, painting the issue “as a threat to effective nationhood itself”

(193). Consequently, EU membership is linked to free movement and mass immigration, thereby

“flooding” the UK, whilst simultaneously shackling the UK economically. While the

advancement of nativist causes is clearly on UKIP’s agenda, existing literature has thus far not

suggested the party is blatantly racist or fascist, unlike the (BNP). In fact,

“the attitudes of UKIP voters in the 2009 European Parliament elections fell squarely between

the Conservatives and the BNP on core radical right issues: xenophobic hostility to immigrants;

populist hostility to elites; and racial prejudice against minorities,”9 making UKIP a more

11111

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moderate force than the radical right British National Party (BNP), but a more aggressively

xenophobic one than other established parties. According to Ford, UKIP-leader ’s

ability to “raise similar contentious questions about immigration, Islam and identity in

mainstream political forums” (Ford) without inviting comparisons to fascism are due to “his

roots in a more legitimate tradition of Eurosceptic politics” (Ford). Drawing support mainly from

the , “British-born and [those] that seem socially, culturally, economically, and

spatially distant from immigration hotspots such as London,”10 UKIP is further united with the

AfD and FN in its claim to speak on behalf of their fellow countrymen and women, cleverly

inserting language about elitism and the political establishment’s obliviousness to their people’s

needs.

Analysis

After reviewing existing literature on each of the three parties in question and loosely exploring

their connection to anti-globalization sentiments, this subsequent section examines and compares

specific policy positions. Findings are then discussed and ultimately assessed within the

framework of anti-globalization rhetoric.

Xenophobia and Islamophobia

As mentioned before, Germany is deemed a curious exception in Europe, with no strong right-

wing party with clearly xenophobic tendencies among established political parties. The AfD,

established only in 2013, has challenged that perception. While it has maintained that it would

not form alliances with European xenophobic parties ahead of the 2014 elections for European

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Parliament,11 its expression of sympathy for the Pegida movement, which opposes Muslim

immigration in an effort to prevent what they perceive as further Islamification of the West, is

indicative of general, if only mild antipathies held toward Muslim immigrants. In the wake of the

terrorist attacks on Charlie Hebdo, regional AfD-leader and one of the party’s co-founders

Alexander Gauland was quoted saying “This bloodbath proves that those who laughed at or

ignored the fears of so many people about a looming danger of Islamism were wrong,”12 thereby

providing further indication of the party’s xenophobic tendencies. Nevertheless, party leaders are

keen to distance themselves from the xenophobic elements within Pegida and their own party,

with the party’s deputy chairman expressing concerns that “it cannot be ruled out that [the

demonstrations] have a xenophobic or even racist aftertaste” (es ist “nicht auszuschließen“, dass

die Proteste einen „ausländerfeindlichen oder gar rassistischen Beigeschmack“ haben)13, which

undermines the protesters’ legitimate concerns. Given the fact that high-profile members

contradict one another concerning their views of Islam as an inherent threat to the West, it is

difficult to evaluate whether the party can be considered Islamophobic. However, in the AfD’s

official manifesto, there is no evidence of propagation of the idea of cultural differentialism,14 to

which dominant European right-wing parties subscribe. Only once does the AfD’s party program

for the election to the European Parliament in 2014 mention “the fundamental values of the

Christian West.”15 But despite this officially subdued rhetoric, some elements within the party

are distinctly more Islamophobic. As Arzheimer remarks,

But now, we’re apparently down to two “wings”: Lucke’s economic liberals (who are

also socially conservative), and those who want a tougher, more nationalist party.

Incidentally, this split seems to be reinforced by an East-West conflict within the AfD,

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with the electorally successful Eastern chapters more inclined to play the right-wing

populist card.16

In addition to the possibility of factionalization over issues related to xenophobia, a study

conducted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation also found that “the AfD’s followers harbour

above-average sympathies for nearly all facets of right-wing extremist ideology.”17 As the table

below shows (translated from the foundation’s report) AfD sympathizers’ xenophobic tendencies

were almost twice as pronounced as those of the conservative CDU’s supporters18. Thus, while

xenophobic elements are not visible in the party’s program, they have certainly shaped the

discussion, indicating that xenophobia may take up a greater role in the future.

CDU/CSU1 SPD2 FDP3 The Greens The NPD4 AFD5 (n=384) (n=352) (n=100) (n=238) Left (n=17) (n=68) (n=147) Support for 5 2 3.5 2.3 4.3 20.3 9.5 Chauvinism 14.1 11.9 15.1 1.5 3.2 56.2 41.2 Xenophobia 8.8 4.5 9.8 1.7 6 72.8 15.9 Anti-Semitism 4.7 1 0.8 0.8 3.7 30 9

Social 4.1 2.2 0 0 0 0 3.1 Darwinism Belittlement of 1.3 0.9 3.2 1.4 0 14 14.3 National

Legend: 1 Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, 2 Social Democratic Party of Germany, 3 Free Democratic Party, 4 National Democratic Party of Germany, 5 Alternative for Germany

Table 1: Right-Wing Attitudes among Survey Participants with different Party Associations. Numbers are percentages. http://www.fes-gegen-rechtsextremismus.de/pdf_14/FragileMitte-FeindseligeZustaende.pdf

In contrast to the AfD, the case of the French Front National is less ambiguous. Under Marine Le

Pen’s father Jean-Marie’s leadership, the party was more vehemently anti-Semitic, an image his

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daughter is now feverishly trying to repair, even if broad segments of the party’s electorate

display anti-Semitic views to a much greater extent than the French political mainstream.19 But

despite Le Pen’s current efforts to “to ‘de-demonize’ the FN by banishing outright racists from

the party and abandoning the scarcely coded anti-Semitic and Islam-baiting language of her

father,”20 the party’s political agenda clearly emphasizes Frenchness and seeks to exclude

foreign elements in their different manifestations, most prominently, however, by severely

restricting immigration and non-French citizens’ access to social services. It is especially the

focus on African immigrants that exposes the Front National’s xenophobic traits. But even legal

non-citizens already residing in France will be affected by the Front National’s nationalist

policies, as the party aims to require citizenship in order to qualify for services such as family

benefits, an essential component of the French social security system.21 In addition to

xenophobia in more general terms, the FN has also been closely associated with Islamophobia,

which has been on the rise in France, a country whose commitment to laïcité (secularism) is an

integral part of its self-understanding.22 Le Pen has addressed the matter, saying that Islam and

French values are principally compatible, if “all demands that aim to shatter secularism –

demands for different clothes, demands for special food, demands for prayer rooms [are

opposed]. Demands that create special rules that would allow Muslims to behave differently.”23

Hence, it is appropriate to apply Bornschier’s idea of cultural differentialism, since belonging to

the Muslim faith appears acceptable only if the de facto state religion of laïcité is adopted. Only

fully assimilated Muslims, or immigrants as a whole, can be considered French. Such radical

opposition to and the disregard of any possible benefits of foreign cultural

influences, clearly in line with the FN’s notion of French exceptionalism, can definitely be

interpreted as a manifestation of xenophobia.

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Like the Front National and the AfD, UKIP, too, has had to fight against claims that it is racist

and xenophobic. Even in its official party program, it notes “even our prime ministers have

labelled good, decent people ‘closet racists’ and ‘bigots.’”24 These allegations and the party’s

proposed limits on immigration have forced UKIP to state explicitly that “Immigration is not

about race; it is about space” (UKIP, 11) in their party program. Whether UKIP is indeed racist

remains a hotly debated topic in the UK, with a BBC article, for example, writing that “UKIP

would scrap much of the legislation designed to prevent racial discrimination in work”;25 a

statement that UKIP-leader Nigel Farage claims “had been ‘willfully misinterpreted’ (BBC

News). Nevertheless, UKIP faces similar allegations of racism as the AfD, a problem for the

party that has been exacerbated by the fact that the party’s image has continuously been tainted

by the emergence of party members’ racist or sexist comments, particularly on social media.26

Anti-Immigration Policies

Considering the three parties’ specific immigration reform proposals, there are both decisive

differences and clear overlaps. Clearly, the FN displays the most unreserved attitudes towards

enacting strict limits. Whereas the AfD, for example, uses more equivocal language to illustrate

its position on extra-European immigration, nevertheless expressing a fear that foreigners are

immigrating “into the German social systems,” the Front National’s views are, according to the

English language summary provided by France24, much more overtly protectionist. Unlike

UKIP and the AfD, which advocate for the continued immigration of highly-skilled persons, the

Front National seeks to restrict immigration to nominal amounts (10,000 per year) without a

clear regard for professional qualifications. The FN’s anti-EU sentiments are also evidenced by

its rejection of the Schengen Agreement which permits the free movement of persons across the

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EU.27 Reinstating national borders across the EU would also have consequences for immigration

and give France the ability to set its own policies regarding the issue autonomously. Particularly

controversial is the FN’s proposal to “Ban dual nationality for non-Europeans, which would

particularly affect citizens of former French colonies in Africa” (France24).

The party’s tough stance on immigration and indeed its specific proposals are extremely similar

to those of UKIP. For the British party, leaving the European Union is of principal importance

and emphasized throughout its manifesto; clearly, this intention also finds application in its

immigration reform proposals. Like the FN, UKIP seeks to cap immigration and highlights the

fact that it supports a non-discriminatory approach that no longer allows for preferential

treatment of European immigrants as part of Schengen.28 Distinctly different from the FN,

however, is the fact that UKIP considers immigration a vital necessity with clear benefits if

controlled, insisting, “Immigration is not about race: it is about space. Immigrants are not the

problem, it is the current immigration system that is broken” (UKIP, 10).

For the German AfD, immigration reform is an important part of their program, too, but its

proposals are markedly less strict than the others. The 2014 program acknowledges the need for

greater immigration given demographic developments within Germany. Like UKIP, which seeks

to ensure that “all new migrants to Britain will have to make tax and national insurance

contributions for five consecutive years before they will become eligible to claim UK benefits, or

[have] access to more than non-urgent NHS services (UKIP, 12), and even specifically identifies

“health tourism” as a significant enough problem (UKIP, 16), the AfD expresses concerns about

“immigration into the German social systems”.29 To combat this apparent development, the AfD

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proposes that in Germany, too, benefits should be given only to those who “have paid taxes or

made social security payments in Germany to a considerable extent, or if their parents have done

so” (AfD, 15). Another similarity between the British and German parties’ policy proposals is

their joint support for the adoption of an immigration law based on a point system on the

Canadian model and which equally takes into account German [or British, respectively] interests

and “the likelihood that the immigrants will be able to integrate successfully into our society”

(AfD, 15). Moreover, the AfD is also concerned about EU intrusion into German legislation

concerning immigration (15), but emphasizes solely the need for stricter extra-European

immigration controls, with intended limits on intra-European immigration not explicitly

mentioned.

Anti-Euro and/or Anti-EU Sentiments

According to its 2014 party manifesto, they AfD perceives the introduction of a uniform

monetary policy as a “disaster (4), alleging “the single currency euro destroys Europe’s

foundation. It generates strife and resurrects national prejudices. Welfare and peace among the

member states in the euro zone are endangered” (AfD, 4). As a solution, co-founder Lucke

proposes the exclusion of economically poorly performing Southern European countries, above

all , from the Eurozone, which would allow said states to emerge with more positive trade

balances, make them more competitive, and allow them to initiate their own financial reforms

independent of the EU.30 Not only would a smaller monetary union that excludes Greece and

other states benefit Germany and other economic powerhouses; an unwillingness to further

support bailout packages would, according to Lucke, lead to Greece’s voluntary, not forced,

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withdrawal from the Eurozone, freeing it from imposed measures and allowing greater

self-determination in establishing economic policies (Lucke and Snowen).

Lucke and his party’s demands for greater democratization of EU institutions and transparency,

too, are related to the perceived detrimental introduction of the euro in member-states who had

not met the Economic and Monetary Union’s (EMU) convergence criteria. The AfD’s

commitment to profound revisions of the European monetary union is evident throughout their

entire manifesto. Criticizing the European Union’s democratic deficit directly relates to its

imposition of austerity measures in southern European countries alongside the International

Monetary Fund and the European Bank. Warning about the emergence of a “United

States of Europe,” the AfD alleges that measures designed to rescue the euro at seemingly

whatever cost are “not subject to any significant parliamentary control. [European institutions]

are the large pillars undergirding the construction of a European economic regime, to erect a

centralistic, bureaucratic and technocratic European super state that is too remote from the

citizens and undemocratic.”31

Resonating with this language, FN leader Le Pen goes even further, speaking of a “European

Soviet Union.”32 The difference between the AfD’s and FN’s views concerning the EU are

nevertheless enormous. While the AfD’s manifesto indicates an understanding for other states

that have expressed a desire to leave “this EU,”33 it advocates for an expansion of citizen-led

initiatives based on the Swiss model as well as for reforms aimed at democratization and

increased transparency on the EU-level (AfD, 10). Le Pen, on the other hand, admits to

“want[ing] to destroy the EU.”34 While the AfD makes the euro and the disastrous effects of a

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uniform monetary policy responsible for cross-European conflict, Le Pen charges that “Europe is

war. Economic war. It is the increase of hostilities between the countries. . . That is not

brotherhood” (Rohr). These problems are so fundamental that they cannot be solved by a mere

reorganization of the Eurozone, only the introduction of a “Europe of nation-states” (Rohr) and

the complete dissolution of the European Union would accomplish these goals. In the party’s

manifesto, these radical ideas become pronounced in the FN’s commitment to “re-negotiate all

EU treaties in order to claw back national sovereignty”.35 Dedicated to rejecting EU-initiated

compromises to its national sovereignty and to restoring fully its autonomy within Europe, the

FN curiously seeks the establishment of “a Pan-European Union of Sovereign States, to include

Russia and Switzerland, but specifically not Turkey” (France24), a proposal that must be further

analyzed within the context of anti-Americanism below.

For UKIP, clearly, the present situation it seeks to change is notably different from that of

Germany and France, which have adopted the common European currency. Hence, its proposals

more closely resemble those of the FN than the euro-wary AfD. UKIP’s yearning for past times,

where Britain was a global political superpower, manifests itself in its political program for this

year’s British elections, UKIP Manifesto 2015. Specifically, it worries that “The longer we stay

in the European Union, the more we become like ‘little Englanders,’ an isolated, insignificant,

offshore province in a country called Europe. We become less and less like the ‘Great’ Britain

we really are”.36 For UKIP, EU membership is directly associated with uncontrolled immigration

resulting in higher unemployment rates, a sheer mass of environmental, occupational, and other

regulations whose “burden can be overwhelming for small firms” (UKIP, 44) and, particularly as

EU-membership was expanded to former Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, a

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decline in its political vote share.37 Additionally, it complains about the financial burden EU

membership poses to the UK as a net contributor, alleging that leaving the EU would allow the

country to “Save £9 billion a year” (UKIP, 8).

Anti-Americanism

Given a general association of the United States with globalization, particularly in the realms of

popular culture, technology, and economics, anti-American attitudes would be a good indicator

that the parties under examination are vehicles of anti-globalization. Conversely, however, UKIP

clearly expresses a desire to “foster closer ties with the Anglosphere” (UKIP, 67), which is

described as a “network of nations that share not merely our language but our common law,

democratic traditions and global trading interests (UKIP, 67). Nevertheless, UKIP is a staunch

supporter of increased national sovereignty, which it, like Le Pen, views as inherently

encroached upon by the EU. As a result, UKIP’s manifesto speaks very critically about military

endeavors conducted as part of the US-initiated “War on Terror.” Military excursions abroad are

understood as “a sign that our political leaders are willing to put our troops in harm’s way at the

behest of other countries’ political agendas (UKIP, 67). Clearly, improved American-British

relationships would be pursued by a UKIP-led government, even if this would mean that support

of American-led military actions may be more hesitant. Nevertheless, it deserves mention that

while it is committed to greater political, economic, and military autonomy, UKIP repeatedly

declares its continued support for NATO in its manifesto.

Likewise, the AfD professes its desire to maintain an intimate security relationship with the US,

stating “NATO is and remains the bond of a transatlantic security architecture whose crucial

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anchor is the alliance with the USA.”38 However, it also expresses a need for a closer

relationship with Russia to resolve problems in Eastern Europe. However, a resolution passed

that calls for an end to European sanctions imposed on Russia, and to abstain from further

measures designed to bind Ukraine and EU or Ukraine and Russia closer together, has led some

to charge the party with anti-Americanism.39 The debate about a more pro-American or pro-

Russian course appears to divide the AfD deeply, and opinions differ significantly among even

the party leadership, as a article reports.40 Despite this intra-party dispute, the AfD’s

official website expresses the importance of and its commitment to westward orientation. While

criticism regarding the NSA data collection scandal is not surprising, the party’s decision to

“reject a binding decision approving the free trade agreement with the USA,”41 which it deems

as clearly disadvantageous to Europe, alleging that it would “reduce consumer and

environmental protection, legal certainty, social standards and cultural policy” (AfD, 13), can

definitely be construed as evidence of anti-globalization strands within the party. More than

anything, however, the issue of the proposed free trade agreement between the EU and the US is

yet another highly contested matter that demonstrates the emergence of intra-party cleavages:

running counter to the party’s official program, Lucke has confirmed the party’s support for the

agreement42.

While UKIP is undeniably intent on further strengthening its relationship with the US, and the

AfD is at least officially committed to maintaining close ties with its biggest Atlantic ally, the

FN pursues a decidedly different course. “Aggressive promotion of the French language

internationally to restore French influence abroad” is one policy that is designed to curb

especially American influence across the globe; like UKIP, the FN appears to aim to reestablish

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its former glory as a global empire. Not only is Le Pen’s party vehemently opposed to the

spread of American culture, it is also wary of its political might, explaining that

The Americans are trying to expand their influence in the world, particularly in Europe.

They are defending their own interests, not ours. I am in favor of a multi-polar world in

which France once again takes its position as the leader of non-aligned states, not with

the US, not with Russia and not with Germany. One should strive to be neither slave nor

master.43

Given her open antipathy for the US and its influence, it comes as no surprise that Le Pen favors

France’s withdrawal from NATO, and has declared that the FN’s and Russia’s foreign policy

positions are in complete agreement.44

Discussion

Given each party’s established position on the four criteria selected for this paper, one can draw

conclusions about whether they could justifiably be labeled the political frontrunners of national

anti-globalization movements. Clearly, the French Front National is the most extreme of the

three, and its radical policy proposals diverge quite considerably from the country’s mainstream

parties. Unlike the FN, France’s biggest parties, the Socialists and UMP, are committed to EU

integration and have promoted the euro as a common currency. In other areas, however, the FN’s

positions, though radicalized, appear more in tune with general French attitudes. France is well-

known for its aggressive pursuit of laïcité that has already resulted in the ban of conspicuously

religious symbols in public schools, as well as an act prohibiting facial concealment in the

public, both of which were initiated by the conservative UMP and not the FN. These two laws

can be viewed as “illustrative examples of the tense public climate regarding religious diversity

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and Islam”.45 Hence, the FN’s aggressive policy positions, particularly on the immigration issue,

may resonate more broadly among the French public, making the party more mainstream than an

initial assessment may indicate. It is particularly the FN’s emphasis on Frenchness and French

cultural superiority, its proposals to curb government programs benefitting non-citizens, and its

anti-American stance that indicate a rejection of all forms of otherness, an idea that is clearly

associated with anti-globalization. Moreover, considering the electoral gains Le Pen’s party has

made under her new leadership, it is doubtful whether the FN’s nationalist attitudes can be

viewed as merely a development on the fringes of French society.

UKIP, similarly seeking greater national sovereignty and a restriction of immigration, could

potentially also qualify as a leader of the British anti-globalization movement. There are,

however, distinct differences that make such a designation seem erroneous and premature. A

brief look at FN’s domestic economic policies, although not specifically addressed in this paper,

shows that it seeks a much more protectionist approach than UKIP, which is politically and

economically more internationally oriented. Of great importance regarding the matter at hand is

also UKIP’s professed support for immigration in general, although under much stricter

guidelines. In its manifesto, the party specifically stresses that immigration is beneficial and

necessary for the UK, a striking difference to the French party’s adoption of what Bornschier

describes as cultural differentialism.46 It is precisely the FN’s rejection of the other that makes it

so distinctly anti-globalist. Because UKIP’s approach to these matters differs significantly, it

should not be classified as principally anti-globalist, even if it contains elements that are more in

line with the FN’s thinking.

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An analysis of the AfD’s official party program shows a more restrained approach to German

policy issues than the one pursued by the FN and even UKIP. A firm supporter of the

continuation of a European monetary union, albeit thoroughly modified, the German party does

not oppose the transfer of some national autonomy to the EU in principal. Moreover, its

proposed immigration policy ought to be viewed as a response to globalization and to the rise in

migrants across the world as a necessary consequence, and not inevitably as a negative and

hostile reply. After all, even Germany’s mainstream parties have declared their intent to reform

the country’s current policy on immigration and asylum given the rise in numbers. However,

considering the party’s increasing factionalization over agenda points outside of the agreed-upon

economic policy positions, it remains to be seen whether the AfD will lean further right in the

future, or completely split into two opposing camps.

Conclusion

As the analysis shows, only the FN’s policy positions can be classified as undoubtedly anti-

globalist, with UKIP and AfD displaying much more moderate tendencies on that issue. Hence,

the initial misgivings that the parties’ increasing popularity – with UKIP and the FN having

made formidable electoral successes – would be indicative of broader support for anti-globalist

movements cannot be affirmed. Nevertheless, studies have shown an increasing prevalence of

Islamophobia in Europe, with Kunst et al.’s study asserting that fear of Islamization and

Islamophobia in the media is especially pronounced in all three countries examined in this

paper.47 Consequently, a future radicalization and the adoption of dichotomous thinking,

distinguishing between “them” and “us” on an ethnic, religious, or cultural basis, is conceivable

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in the UK, and to a lesser extent even in Germany, a country which, since 1945, has tended to

avoid overtly patriotic gesture.

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Notes

1 The author had left Bowling Green State University at the time of uploading; we were not able to confirm the editorial changes (editors’ note).

See Simon Bornschier, Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe, (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2010), 48.

2 See, for example Alex Stevenson, “Is It Fair to Call Ukip A Far-Right Party?,” politics.co.uk, January 10, 2014, accessed April 22, 2015, http://www.politics.co.uk/blogs/2014/01/10/is-it-fair-to-call-ukip-a-far-right-party, and Kai, Arzheimer, “The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany?,” West European Politics 38, no. 3 (2015), 554.

3 Edward G. DeClair, Politics on the Fringe: The People, Policies, and Organization of the French National Front (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 115.

4 David Art, “Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe,” Political Science Quarterly (Academy Of Political Science) 126, no. 1 (2011): 170.

5 Alternative for Germany Party Calls for Abolition of Euro,” , last modified April 14, 2013, http://dw.de/p/18FZk 6 Daniel T. Dye, “Britain’s Nationalist Moment: The Claims-Making of the SNP and UKIP” (paper presented at the 2015 Political Studies Association Annual International Conference, , England, March 30 – April 1, 2015). 7 UKIP. UK Independence Party Manifesto, General Election Manifesto. London: UKIP, 2001. 8 “The Discourse of Globalization and British Party Politics,” PhD diss., American University, 2014, 194. 9 Robert Ford, “ Is Now a Powerful Force for the Radical Right – And UKIP Is Well Placed to Harness It,” London School of Economics, published June 21, 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/euroscepticism-radical-right-ford/

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10 Andrew Geddes, “The EU, UKIP and the Politics of Immigration in Britain,” The Political Quarterly 85, no.3 (2014): 294. 11 Sarah Marsh, “German Anti-Euro Party Says Won't Team Up With Xenophobes,” , February 13, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/13/us-eurozone-summit-afd- idUSBREA1C0FI20140213 12 Kate Connolly, Angelique Chrisafis, and Stephanie Kirchgaessner, “Muslims in Europe Fear Anti-Islamic Mood Will Intensify After Paris Attacks,” , last modified January 9, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/09/muslims-europe-fear- escalation-anti-islamism-paris-attacks 13 Justus Bender and Stefan Locke, „Kein Geheimnis mehr“ (No Secret Anymore), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 10, 2014, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/die-naehe-der-afd-zum-islamkritischen-pegida- buendnis-13314224.html. All translations are the author’s except where otherwise noted 14 Simon Bornschier defines the concept of “cultural differentialism” as “not claiming the superiority of any nationality or race but, instead, stressing the right of peoples to preserve their distinctive traditions.” See Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right, 23 15 Alternative für Deutschland, Courage to Stand Up for Germany. For European Diversity, : AfD, 2014, 2.

16 Kai Arzheimer, “Is Germany’s -Wing Party AfD Falling Apart?,” kai- arzheimer.com, last modified March 22, 2015, http://www.kai-arzheimer.com/afd-wings-fluegel- update/ 17 “AfD Supporters Lean towards Xenophobia and Fascism, Research Says,” EurActiv, last modified November 21, 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/afd- supporters-lean-towards-xenophobia-and-fascism-research-says 18 Andreas Zick and Anna Klein, Fragile – Feindselige Zustände: Rechtsextreme Einstellungen [Fragile Center - Hostile Conditions: Right-Wing Attitudes] (: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz, 2014), 48 19 Dominique Reynié, “Anti-Semitic Attitudes in France: New Insights,” trans. Shani Benoualid, Fondation pour L’Innovation Politique, 2014. 20 John Lichfield, “France's National Front: After a Series of Political Setbacks, it Seems Marine Le Pen Is Not So Mighty as All that,” , last modified January 23, 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/frances-national-front-after-a-series-of- political-setbacks-it-seems-marine-le-pen-is-not-so-mighty-as-all-that-9081199.html 21 “What does France’s National Front stand for?,” France24, last modified May 28, 2014, http://www.france24.com/en/20140528-france-national-front-policy-eu/

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22 See, for example, “France sees 'alarming' rise in Islamophobia,” France24, last modified November 21, 2011, http://www.france24.com/en/20121120-Islamophobia-france-increasing- alarmingly-national-front-anti-semitism 23 Jacky Rowland, “Q&A: Marine Le Pen on France and Islam,” Al Jazeera, last modified January 13, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2015/01/qa-marine-le-pen-france- islam-2015113123524709520.html 24 UKIP, UKIP Manifesto 2015 – Believe in Britain, London: UKIP, 2015, 11. 25 “Nigel Farage Would Axe 'Much of' Race Discrimination Law,” BBC News, last modified March 12, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31846453 26 See, for example, Michael Powell, and Simon Murphy, “Six top UKIP Candidates Have Links to Racist Groups,” The , last modified February 28, 2015, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2973998/Six-Ukip-candidates-links-racist-groups- Party-launches-probe-BNP-cartoon-stereotyping-minorities-posted-online.html 27 “What does France’s National Front stand for?” France24. 28 UKIP, UKIP Manifesto 2015 – Believe in Britain, 12. 29 Alternative für Deutschland, Courage to Stand Up for Germany, 15. 30 and Dennis Snower, interview by Rainer Hank and Winand von Petersdorff. Raus aus dem Euro? AfD will nicht zurück zur D-Mark [Out of the Euro? AfD does not want to return to the Deutsche Mark], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 18, 2013. 31 Alternative für Deutschland, Courage to Stand Up for Germany, 24. 32 Mathieu von Rohr, “Interview with Marine Le Pen: 'I Don't Want this European Soviet Union',” , last modified June 3, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/interview-with-french-front-national-leader-marine- le-pen-a-972925.html

33 Alternative für Deutschland, Courage to Stand Up for Germany, 2 34 Mathieu von Rohr, “Interview with Marine Le Pen: 'I Don’t Want this European Soviet Union'.” 35 “What does France’s National Front stand for?,” France24. 36 UKIP, UKIP Manifesto 2015 – Believe in Britain, 63. 37 UKIP does not take into account, or at least does not make public the fact that the UK as the most Eurosceptic member state, thus appealing many of the policies other states would like to see implemented. 38 Alternative für Deutschland, Courage to Stand Up for Germany, 11.

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39 “Torsten Heinrich verlässt AfD [Torsten Heinrich leaves the AfD],” blu-news.org, last modified March 24, 2014, http://www.blu-news.org/2014/03/24/torsten-heinrich-verlaesst-afd/ 40 Günther Lachmann, “AfD-Spitze zerlegt sich im Richtungsstreit [AfD leadership fractionalizes over argument about direction],” Die Welt, last modified October 31, 2014, http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article133860763/AfD-Spitze-zerlegt-sich-im- Richtungsstreit.html 41 Alternative für Deutschland, Courage to Stand Up for Germany, 13. 42 Philip Plickert, “Kontroverse um TTIP: AfD-Chef Lucke bekennt sich zum Freihandel mit Amerika [Controversy about TTIP: AfD boss Lucke avows himself to free trade with America],” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, last modified June 30, 2014, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/kontroverse-um-ttip-afd-chef-lucke- bekennt-sich-zum-freihandel-mit-amerika-13019104.html 43 Mathieu von Rohr, “Interview with Marine Le Pen: 'I Don’t Want this European Soviet Union'.” 44 Michaela Wiegel, “Mit Putin die christliche Zivilisation retten [Saving the Christian Civilization with Putin],” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, last modified May 22, 2014, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/front-national-mit-putin-die-christliche-zivilisation-retten- 12953533.html 45 Jonas R. Kunst, David L. Sam, and Pål Ulleberg, “Perceived Islamophobia: Scale Development and Validation,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations (2012), 11 46 Bornschier, Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right, 23. 47 Jonas R. Kunst, David L. Sam, and Pål Ulleberg, “Perceived Islamophobia: Scale

Development and Validation.”

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