The Crusaders' Sultan: Reinterpreting the Battle
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
THE CRUSADERS’ SULTAN: REINTERPRETING THE BATTLE OF TELL BASHIR AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TWELFTH-CENTURY FRANCO-TURKISH POLITICAL RELATIONS IN NORTHERN SYRIA ____________________________________ A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of California State University, Fullerton ____________________________________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in History ____________________________________ By Andrew Bolinger Thesis Committee Approval: Professor Jochen Burgtorf, Chair Professor Maged Mikhail, Department of History Professor Stephen O’Connor, Department of History Spring, 2016 ABSTRACT This thesis focuses on the political backdrop to the battle of Tell Bashir in 1108. This battle marks an interesting change of alliances wherein Frankish and Turkish armies fought on both sides of the battle only a decade after the First Crusade had arrived in Syria. Historians have relied heavily on western sources to explain the odd political divisions and the ramifications for the crusader states. The result is a mess, few things are asserted strongly, and the narrative that does come through is deeply problematic. Ibn al- Athir, a thirteenth century Arab chronicler, gives a thoroughly different account from either the Latin sources or those maintained by modern historians. Following the battle of Harran (1104), Count Baldwin II of Edessa had been left imprisoned in Mosul while a series of intra-Turkish wars ravaged the region. Baldwin II’s release at the hands of Jawuli Saqao—the then Emir of Mosul—came at the price of giving assistance to Jawuli who was making an attempt to overthrow Sultan Muhammad in favor of an oft forgotten Saljuq prince, Baktash ibn Tutush. An alliance between Tancred, the prince of Antioch, and Ridwan ibn Tutush, the Prince of Aleppo, resisted Jawuli, leading to the battle of Tell Bashir. This battle was about imperial Saljuq politics, and the crusader lords of Antioch and Edessa were aligned on opposite sides for reasons separate from their personal conflicts. This is a major departure from traditional views that hold that the battle was fought to determine which crusader lord was to rule Edessa. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................... ii LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................... v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................. vi Chapter 1. PROBLEMS FOR THE BATTLE OF TELL BASHIR ....................................... 1 1.1 Using Wax to Hide Flaws: The General Problem .......................................... 5 1.2 Why Would You Do a Thing Like That: Motive Problems ........................... 9 2. ROOT OF THE PROBLEM: PRIMARY SOURCES FOR THE BATTLE OF TELL BASHIR ..................................................................................................... 17 2.1. Selling a Cause: the Latin Sources ................................................................ 18 2.2. Pastoring the Flocks: Eastern Christian Sources ........................................... 22 2.3. Blinded by the Polis: Arabic Sources ............................................................ 25 3. RECONSTRUCTING THE PROCESS: METHODOLOGICAL . CONCERNS ......................................................................................................... 30 4. THE ACCOUNT OF IBN AL-ATHIR ................................................................ 38 4.1. Reclaiming Their Father’s Legacy: The Sons of Tutush ............................... 42 4.2. Reestablishing Order: Sultan Muhammad’s War on Emirs........................... 46 4.3. Jawuli the Cunning: The Man at the Center of the Intrigue .......................... 53 4.4. Edessan Interlude: The Fight over Lordship in the North ............................. 58 4.5. The Battle ....................................................................................................... 61 5. SHIFTING DEBATES: THE IMPACT OF IBN AL-ATHIR’S ACCOUNT OF TELL BASHIR ..................................................................................................... 69 5.1. Changing the Basic Story: Synoptic Accounts .............................................. 69 5.2. The Crusaders’ Sultan: Diplomatic History................................................... 71 5.3. Finishing the Job: Effects on the “Counter-Crusade” .................................... 74 iii BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................... 79 A. Primary Sources ............................................................................................... 79 B. Secondary Sources ........................................................................................... 80 LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1. Modern Accounts ................................................................................................. 3 2. Multi-Account Authors ........................................................................................ 6 3. Primary Sources ................................................................................................... 19 4. Saljuq Family Tree............................................................................................... 40 5. Iraq and Syria 1104-1107 .................................................................................... 49 6. Edessa, Tell Bashir, and Harran ........................................................................... 68 v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thanks to my thesis committee for their guidance and support while I pursued my M.A. at CSUF. These three gentlemen provided the bulk of my education while I pursued my graduate degree. Dr. Maged Mikhail has made me a much better writer and has helped form my understanding of both early and medieval Islam. Dr. Stephen O’Connor prompted me to get started on this project a year ago and helped me through early drafts of this argument. Finally, the chair of my committee, Dr. Jochen Burgtorf, who has helped me revise this paper numerous times and has guided me through Crusades historiography. Most important, thanks to my wife, Renee, who has helped me with my work while also pursuing her doctorate in philosophy. She has had the inglorious task of looking over—very rough—first drafts, helping me with basic grammar and spelling questions, and pointing out the hostile tone that comes out when I write while grumpy. Without her, this paper would have been a disaster. vi 1 CHAPTER 1 PROBLEMS FOR THE BATTLE OF TELL BASHIR A decade after the First Crusade had arrived in Syria (1108), an odd battle took place between Christian and Muslim armies near the castle of Tell Bashir (approximately ten miles southeast of modern Gaziantep, Turkey).1 Not unusual in tactics or strategy, the battle was odd because of who fought on each side. A crusader, Count Baldwin II of Edessa, and a Turkish Emir, Jawuli Saqao of Mosul, led one army opposite the forces of Tancred, the regent of Antioch, and the Turkish prince, Ridwan of Aleppo. The roots of this conflict lay four years earlier in the first major defeat of the crusader forces at the battle of Harran. At that battle, Turks had shattered the armies of Antioch and Edessa. Both Edessan leaders, Baldwin II and his cousin Joscelin of Tell Bashir, were captured while the Antiochene leaders, Bohemond I and his nephew Tancred, scrambled to contain the fallout from the defeat. It took four years for the captured lords to return to their lands, and their release sparked events leading to Tell Bashir. Thomas Asbridge’s Crusades provides a brief synopsis of the battle: When Baldwin sought to reclaim Edessa in the summer of 1108, a tense standoff ensued. Having enjoyed access to the wealth and resources of the county for four 1 Tell Bashir is also known as Turbessel or Tell Baschir. When at all possible, proper nouns will reflect the usage in Donald Richards’s translations of Ibn al-Athir, see, Ibn al- Athir, “al-Kamil fi’l-Ta’rikh,” in The Annals of the Saljuq Turks: Selections from al- Kamil fi’l-Ta’rikh of ‘Izz al-Din Ibn al-Athir, trans. Donald Richards (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002) and in The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir for the Crusading Period from al-Kamil fi’l-Ta’rikh. Part 1: The Years 491-541/1097-1146: The Coming of the Franks and the Muslim Response, trans. Donald Richards (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005). 2 years, Tancred had no intention of simply handing over a territory which he had saved from conquest, and he now sought to pressure Baldwin into taking an oath of subservience [. .] The count refused, not least because he had already sworn allegiance to [Baldwin I of Jerusalem] in 1100. With neither side willing to give ground, conflict seemed inevitable. In early September both men raised armies [. .] More shocking still was the fact that Baldwin marched forth to this struggle alongside his new ally, [Jawuli] of Mosul, and some 7,000 Muslim troops. When battle was joined, probably near Tell Bashir, Tancred, although outnumbered, managed to hold the field. But with some 2,000 Christian dead on both sides, Patriarch Bernard, the ecclesiastical overlord of both Antioch and Edessa, stepped in to calm frayed tempers and adjudicate. When witnesses publicly attested that Tancred had actually promised Bohemond in 1104 that he would relinquish control of Edessa upon Baldwin’s release, the Antiochene ruler was forced grudgingly to back down.2 Asbridge’s