Meditations on First Philosophy
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(Men Of) Reason
Dispensing with (Men of) Reason. Stephen Hetherington The University of N~\NSouth Wales Many philosophers of feminism believe that Genevieve Lloyd, in her book The Man of Reas~n,~struck a significant blow against traditional analytic epis- tem~logy.~Supposedly, she did this by showing that the concepts of reason and rationality have, in the historical hands of Western philosophy, become genderized-in particular, masculinized. In this paper, I will not comment on whether other areas of philosophy are guilty of that charge; my present aim is simply to defend epistemology in particular against it.4 I will argue, first of all, that Lloyd's discussion in particular-whatever its other merits might be- poses no fundamental threat to epistemology:' Although her reasoning is his- toricist, it fails to establish the historical links it needs to establish; indeed, it unwittingly provides some confirmation of epistemology's enduring impor- tance. But I will also argue, more fundamentally and more generally, that no feminist argument for Lloyd's kind of conclusion could pose any real threat to epistemology: The sort of genderization which Lloyd and others believe that she has uncovered would be most clearly explicable as being a failing as such, only via some standard elements of epistemology-which is to say that what- ever shortcomings, if any, such feminist discussions could ever uncover can easily be absorbed within the scope of standard epistemological explanation. Epistemology's own metaphilosophical potential will thus be seen to confirm its own continuing significance, even in the face of feminist-historicist argu- ments like Lloyd's. -
'I Knew Jean-Paul Sartre': Philosophy of Education As Comedy
Edinburgh Research Explorer ‘I Knew Jean-Paul Sartre’ Citation for published version: Griffiths, M & Peters, MA 2012, '‘I Knew Jean-Paul Sartre’: Philosophy of education as comedy', Educational Philosophy and Theory. https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2012.721734 Digital Object Identifier (DOI): 10.1080/00131857.2012.721734 Link: Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer Document Version: Peer reviewed version Published In: Educational Philosophy and Theory Publisher Rights Statement: This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Educational Philosophy and Theory, 2012. Copyright Taylor & Francis, available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/ 10.1080/00131857.2012.721734 © Griffiths, M., & Peters, M. A. ‘I Knew Jean-Paul Sartre’: Philosophy of education as comedy. Educational Philosophy and Theory. General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 28. Sep. 2021 A serious and good philosophical work could be written consisting entirely of jokes. --Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value Let us ask ourselves: why do we feel a grammatical joke to be deep? (And that is what the depth of philosophy is.) (PI §111) -Ludwig Wittgenstein Dialogue. -
Philosophisches Seminar Kommentiertes
Philosophisches Seminar Kommentiertes Vorlesungsverzeichnis Sommersemester 2013 Stand: 05.03.2013 Inhalt: Übersicht 6 Vorlesungen 6, 17 Hauptseminare 7, 22 Propädeutikum 6, 21 Proseminare 10, 36 Hauptseminare 7, 47 Kolloquien 14, 49 Fachdidaktik 14, 50 Ethisch-Philosophisches Grundlagenstudium – EPG 15, 51 Kommentare 17 Hinweise und Abkürzungen 5 Dozenten: Aleksan, Gilbert EPG I: Einführung in die antike Ethik 51 Aleksan, Gilbert EPG I: Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft 52 Álvarez-Vázquez, Javier PS: Historisch-genetische Theorie der Kognition 36 Arnold, Florian EPG I: Fichtes Bestimmungen des Gelehrten 52 Arnold, Thomas PS: Edmund Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie 36 Corall, Niklas EPG I: Moralkritik von der Antike bis zur Neuzeit 53 Cürsgen, Dirk V: Kants praktische Philosophie 17 Dangel, Tobias HS: Phänomenologie des Geistes II 22 Dangel, Tobias PS: Platon, Sophistes 37 Diehl, Ulrich PS: Kants Konzeption der Würde. Interpretation und Dis- kussion 37 Dierig, Simon PS: Einführung in Descartes’ Philosophie 39 Dilcher, Roman EPG I: Platon, Gorgias 54 Dilcher, Roman PS: Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik 39 Enßlen, Michael EPG II: Das deutsche Atombombenprojekt 59 Flickinger, Brigitte EPG I: Soziale Gerechtigkeit – eine künstliche Tugend? 54 Franceschini, Stefano EPG II: Spinozas Reflexion über den Mensch 59 Freitag, Wolfgang HS: Grundlegende Texte zur philosophischen Semantik 40 Freitag, Wolfgang Kolloquium 49 Freitag, Wolfgang PS: Einführung in die (analytische) Philosophie der Zeit 22 Freitag, Wolfgang V: Sprachliche Bedeutung: -
Locke, God, and Materialism (Preprint)
Locke, God, and Materialism Stewart Duncan Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 1. INTRODUCTION Early modern philosophers discussed several versions of materialism. One distinction among them is that of scope. Should one be a materialist about animal minds, human minds, the whole of nature, or God? Hobbes eventually said ‘yes’ to all four questions, and Spinoza seemed to several of his readers to have done the same. Locke, however, gave different answers to the different questions. Though there is some debate about these matters, it appears that he thought materialism about God was mistaken, was agnostic about whether human minds were material, and was inclined to think that animal minds were material.1 In giving those answers, Locke famously suggested the possibility that God might have ‘superadded’ thought to the matter of our bodies, giving us the power of thought without immaterial thinking minds. He thus opened up the possibility of materialism about human minds, without adopting the sort of general materialist metaphysics that Hobbes, for example, had proposed. This paper investigates Locke’s views about materialism, by looking at the discussion in Essay IV.x. There Locke—after giving a cosmological argument for the existence of God— argues that God could not be material, and that matter alone could never produce thought.2 In 1 On Locke on animals’ minds, see Lisa Downing, ‘Locke’s Choice Between Materialism and Dualism’ [‘Locke’s Choice’], in Paul Lodge and Tom Stoneham (ed.), Locke and Leibniz on Substance (New York: Routledge, 2015), 128-45; Nicholas Jolley, Locke’s Touchy Subjects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 33-49; and Kathleen Squadrito, ‘Thoughtful Brutes: The Ascription of Mental Predicates to Animals in Locke’s Essay’, Diálogos 58 (1991), 63-73. -
Conflicts Between Science and Religion: Epistemology to the Rescue
Conflicts Between Science and Religion: Epistemology to the Rescue Moorad Alexanian Department of Physics and Physical Oceanography University of North Carolina Wilmington Wilmington, NC 28403-5606 (Dated: April 23, 2021) Both Albert Einstein and Erwin Schr¨odinger have defined what science is. Einstein includes not only physics, but also all natural sciences dealing with both organic and inorganic processes in his definition of science. According to Schr¨odinger, the present scientific worldview is based on the two basic attitudes of comprehensibility and objectivation. On the other hand, the notion of religion is quite equivocal and unless clearly defined will easily lead to all sorts of misunderstandings. Does science, as defined, encompass the whole of reality? More importantly, what is the whole of reality and how do we obtain data for it? The Christian worldview considers a human as body, mind, and spirit (soul), which is consistent with Cartesian ontology of only three elements: matter, mind, and God. Therefore, is it possible to give a precise definition of science showing that the conflicts are actually apparent and not real? I. INTRODUCTION In 1950, Albert Einstein gave a remarkable lecture to the International Congress of Surgeons in Cleveland, Ohio. Einstein argued that the 19th-century physicists’ simplistic view of Nature gave biologists the confidence to treat life as a purely physical phenomenon. This mechanistic picture of Nature was based on the casual laws of Newtonian mechanics and the Faraday-Maxwell theory of electromagnetism. These causal laws proved to be wanting, especially in atomistic phenomena, which brought about the advent of quantum mechanics in the 20th-century. -
Conciencia Y Paralelismo En Spinoza
Discusión Conciencia y paralelismo en Spinoza Luis Ángel García Muñoz Departamento de Filosofía Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes [email protected] En su obra más representativa, la Ethica ordine geometrico demostrata (específi camente en su segunda parte), Spinoza sugiere que todo individuo, sea humano, animal o un objeto extenso cualquiera, está animado en cierto grado (E IIP13s). Y por si fuera poco, que los indi- viduos inferiores como animales u objetos extensos tienen mente. Este asunto, potencialmente agresivo para el sentido común, es tratado por Edwin Curley, quien trata de ofrecer una distinción entre los hombres y los demás individuos con la fi nalidad de expli- car el sistema de Spinoza sin caer en sugerencias tan problemáticas. Esta distinción se encuentra en su libro Spinoza’s Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation publicado en 1969, en el que defi ende que, en Spinoza, todos los individuos que están en Dios tienen mente. Pero los hombres se distinguen de los demás individuos (rocas, animales, etc.) porque sólo los primeros, además de tener mente, tienen conciencia. Lo que caracteriza a la conciencia en Spinoza, se- gún Curley, es la posesión de ideas de ideas o bien de proposiciones de proposiciones.1 Así, aunque todos los individuos, en Spinoza tengan mente, los hombres se distinguen de los demás individuos porque sólo ellos poseen ideas de ideas o proposiciones de proposiciones. 1 Esta caracterización de la conciencia es adoptada por Curley al haber reinterpretado la teoría de las ideas en Spinoza y al haber encontrado en ellas ‘un elemento de afi rmación’ que permite equipararlas con las proposiciones. -
Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory Author(S): Virginia Held Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , Autumn, 1990, Vol
Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory Author(s): Virginia Held Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , Autumn, 1990, Vol. 50, Supplement (Autumn, 1990), pp. 321-344 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2108046 REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2108046?seq=1&cid=pdf- reference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy and Phenomenological Research This content downloaded from 132.174.250.211 on Sun, 03 Jan 2021 15:21:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. L, Supplement, Fall i990 Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory VIRGINIA HELD City University of New York, Graduate School and Hunter College The history of philosophy, including the history of ethics, has been con- structed from male points of view, and has been built on assumptions and concepts that are by no means gender-neutral.' Feminists characteristi- cally begin with different concerns and give different emphases to the issues we consider than do non-feminist approaches. -
De Beauvoir and the Second Sex: a Marxist Interpretation
THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL De Beauvoir and The Second Sex: A Marxist Interpretation being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of PhD in the University of Hull by Angela Shepherd, BA (hons) Philosophy, MA Philosophy of Mind and Body December 2015 1 ABSTRACT The Second Sex is Simone de Beauvoir’s seminal text. There have been numerous interpretations and critiques of this text since its inception in 1949. Most notable is the reading of her work as merely incorporating Sartrean existentialism and applying it to the social position of women. However recent theoretical discussion recognises her work as also an exploration of Marxism and this thesis follows that line of argument as, read in this context, the distinctiveness of her philosophical contribution can be made visible. Chapter one, endorses Marx’s historical materialism. Historically variable material conditions lead to historically variable human characteristics. De Beauvoir’s focus is with regard to women. Chapter two introduces the One and Other as a feature of human consciousness and a feature of women’s social oppression. Her account of why this structure explains women’s oppression is inspired by Marx’s historical materialism. Chapter three concerns the myths of femininity which also contribute to women’s oppression and are ideological in the Marxist sense of the word. Myths are productive, yet distorting and false, with the aim being to promote the interests of the powerful at the expense of those who are powerless. Chapter four expresses de Beauvoir’s views on the body insisting that the experience of biology as oppressive is a consequence of what culture makes of the body, again, utilising Marx’s historical materialism. -
Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects (2018)
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS This PDF is available at http://nap.edu/25196 SHARE Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects (2018) DETAILS 202 pages | 6 x 9 | PAPERBACK ISBN 978-0-309-47969-1 | DOI 10.17226/25196 CONTRIBUTORS GET THIS BOOK Emily Grumbling and Mark Horowitz, Editors; Committee on Technical Assessment of the Feasibility and Implications of Quantum Computing; Computer Science and Telecommunications Board; Intelligence Community Studies Board; Division on FIND RELATED TITLES Engineering and Physical Sciences; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine SUGGESTED CITATION National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018. Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/25196. Visit the National Academies Press at NAP.edu and login or register to get: – Access to free PDF downloads of thousands of scientific reports – 10% off the price of print titles – Email or social media notifications of new titles related to your interests – Special offers and discounts Distribution, posting, or copying of this PDF is strictly prohibited without written permission of the National Academies Press. (Request Permission) Unless otherwise indicated, all materials in this PDF are copyrighted by the National Academy of Sciences. Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects PREPUBLICATION COPY – SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects Emily Grumbling and Mark Horowitz, Editors Committee on Technical Assessment of the Feasibility and Implications of Quantum Computing Computer Science and Telecommunications Board Intelligence Community Studies Board Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences A Consensus Study Report of PREPUBLICATION COPY – SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION Copyright National Academy of Sciences. -
Consciousness, Ideas of Ideas and Animation in Spinoza's Ethics
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of Groningen University of Groningen Consciousness, ideas of ideas and animation in Spinoza’s Ethics Marrama, Oberto Published in: British Journal for the History of Philosophy DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2017.1322038 IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below. Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Publication date: 2017 Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database Citation for published version (APA): Marrama, O. (2017). Consciousness, ideas of ideas and animation in Spinoza’s Ethics. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 25(3), 506-525. https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2017.1322038 Copyright Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Take-down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum. Download date: 12-11-2019 British Journal for the History of Philosophy ISSN: 0960-8788 (Print) 1469-3526 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbjh20 Consciousness, ideas of ideas and animation in Spinoza’s Ethics Oberto Marrama To cite this article: Oberto Marrama (2017) Consciousness, ideas of ideas and animation in Spinoza’s Ethics, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 25:3, 506-525, DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2017.1322038 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2017.1322038 © 2017 The Author(s). -
Curriculum Vitae
October 2016 Matthew F. Stuart Curriculum Vitae Department of Philosophy 8400 College Station Bowdoin College Brunswick, Maine 04011 Education: Cornell University, Ph.D. in Philosophy, 1994. Cornell University, M.A. in Philosophy, 1991. University of Vermont, B.A. in Philosophy, 1988. Area of Specialization: Early Modern Philosophy Areas of Competence: Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ethics Teaching Positions: 2012- present Professor, Bowdoin College 1999 - 2012 Associate Professor, Bowdoin College 1994 - 1999 Assistant Professor, Bowdoin College 1993 Instructor, Bowdoin College Publications: BOOKS A Companion to Locke (Editor). Oxford: Wily-Blackwell Publishing Co., 2016. Locke’s Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2013. Reviewed by Benjamin Hill in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2014); Victor Nuovo in Locke Studies 14 (2014), 263-271; Michael Jacovides in Philosophical Review 124 (2015), 153-155; G. A. J. Rogers in British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (2015), 199-202. ARTICLES AND CHAPTERS “Locke’s Succeeding Ideas,” Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy VIII, D. Garber and D. Rutherford, eds., forthcoming. ARTICLES AND CHAPTERS (CONT.) “Locke on Attention,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, special issue: “Mental Powers in Early Modern Philosophy,” forthcoming. “John Locke and the Problem of Consciousness,” in Consciousness and the Great Philosophers, S. Leach and J. Tartaglia, eds., London: Routledge, 2017, 73-81. “The Correspondence with Stillingfleet,” in A Companion to Locke, M. Stuart ed., London: Wily-Blackwell Publishing Co., 2016, 354-369. “Revisiting People and Substances,” in The Key Debates of Modern Philosophy, S. Duncan and A. LoLordo, eds., Routledge, 2013, 186-196. “Locke,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, T. O’Connor & C. -
The Gaze in Theory
THE GAZE IN THEORY: THE CASES OF SARTRE AND LACAN Melinda Jill Storr Thesis submitted for DPhil degree University of York Centre for Women's Studies April 1994 ABSTRACT The topic of my research is the 'hierarchy of the senses' as it appears in mainstream Western thought, and specifically the privilege accorded to vision in twentieth century literary and theoretical writings. My aim is to investigate the allegation (as made by, for example, Evelyn Fox Keller and Christine Grontowski, and by Luce Irigaray) that the metaphor of vision is intimately connected with the construction of gender and sexual difference, and that the traditional privilege of vision acts to perpetuate the privilege of masculinity in modern writing practices. This allegation, captured in the thesis that masculinity 'looks' and femininity is 'looked-at' - that, as John Berger puts it, 'ben act and women appear" - has some degree of currency in contemporary writings an 'sexual difference', but has in itself received little critical attention. Taking the philosopher and novelist Jean-Paul Sartre and the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan as 'case studies', I investigate the plausibility of this allegation by means of a detailed analysis of the use of vision and its relation to gender in the respective works of each. This work represents a significant contribution to serious critical work an both Sartre and Lacan, and to the understanding of the relationship between gender and representation. 2 CONTENTS LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 8 AUTHOR'S DECLARATION 9 CHAPTER