Redalyc.Government Coalitions in Brazilian Democracy
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Brazilian Political Science Review E-ISSN: 1981-3821 [email protected] Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política Brasil Cheibub Figueiredo, Argelina Government Coalitions in Brazilian Democracy Brazilian Political Science Review, vol. 1, núm. 2, 2007, pp. 182-216 Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política São Paulo, Brasil Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=394341991006 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative brazilianpoliticalsciencereview R E S E AR C H N OT E S Government Coalitions in Brazilian Democracy Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo IUPERJ, Brazil Introduction* he online encyclopaedia Wikipedia defines “government coalition” as “a cabinet Tof a parliamentary government in which several parties cooperate. The usual reason given for this arrangement is that no party on its own can achieve a majority in the parliament.” (Emphasis added.) This commonsense view predominated until very recently in academic circles. Studies of government coalitions were limited to countries with parliamentary systems and the comparative literature assumed that presidents, because they have fixed terms that are independent from the legislature, would not have incentives to form coalitions. The assumption that coalition governments are peculiar to parliamentary systems has, however, been demolished, both theoretically and empirically.1 Coalition governments occur in 53.6% of the situations in which the president’s party does not obtain a sufficient number of seats to govern alone (Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh 2004, 574). In other words, presidents also seek to form governments that increase their support in the legislature and the reasons leading them to do so are not much different from those that motivate prime ministers. 1 * I thank José Antônio Cheibub who helped me with many suggestions and much advice; Marcus Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi for their last-minute reading and comments; Sérgio Abranches for his reading of a previous version and the information on some ministers of the 1946-64 period; Daniel Heller and Andrezza Ribeiro for their participation in gathering and organizing data. The research that gave rise to this text had the support of CNPq, Fapesp and Faperj. 12 bpsr Government Coalitions in Brazilian Democracy The literature on presidential coalition governments is small, though growing. Furthermore, its trajectory has been very different from that of studies on parliamentary coalitions. In 1990, in a book that aimed at consolidating the knowledge built up in the field, Laver and Schofield (1990, 7-11) pointed out the existence of a solid European tradition of empirical studies that, as well as containing important case studies, had also advanced in terms of comparisons between countries. Due to the greater availability of information and also because they benefit from the study of and models applied to parliamentary systems, comparative studies of government coalitions in presidential systems already display important results. However, individual case studies or comparative analyses of a few cases may still make an important contribution to our knowledge of the process of formation, functioning and performance of government coalitions in presidential systems. But not even nowadays is the study of parliamentary governments able to do without case studies. On the contrary: recently, theoretically oriented studies have sought to organize, in as systematic a way as possible, aspects of coalition politics that would be very difficult to examine without a detailed examination of individual countries.2 This research note, which is part of a broader study on the performance of coalition governments in Brazilian democracy, aims to identify the governments formed under the last two democratic constitutions and to analyse their main characteristics. The first period begins with the promulgation of the 1946 Constitution and ends on 31 March 1964, with a military coup. The period beginning in October 1988, with the promulgation of the new constitution, is examined until the end of the 52nd Congress on 31 January 2007, thus including the first month of President Lula’s second term, during which he made no changes to his ministry. This note also aims to contribute towards new studies and, who knows, to serve as an example, so that researchers from other countries may make similar efforts with regards to their own countries. In this way, it may contribute towards a more general objective, beyond the research project within which it is placed: the production of comparative studies based on more detailed and reliable information. The formation of coalition governments: criteria and positions considered The criteria used here to demarcate the end and the start of governments are the same defined by Müller and Strom for parliamentary systems: “1) any changes in the set of parties holding cabinet membership; 2) any change in the identity of the prime minister; and 3) any general election, whether mandated by the end of the constitutional inter- election period, or precipitated by a premature dissolution of parliament” (2000:12). These criteria are sufficiently general for them to be applicable to the formation of and changes 2 (2007) 1 (2) 182 - 216 1 bpsr Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo in governments in the presidential system, with slight alterations that do not affect the comparability with parliamentary countries. Presidents not only form government coalitions but alter them over the course of their terms, seeking to build a support base in the legislature. The constitutional rule that gives presidents the prerogative of choosing cabinet members does not grant them full autonomy in forming their government. If we take for granted the fact that their objective is obtaining support in the legislature, there is no reason to believe that the choice of future members of the government will not take into account the strength of parties in the legislature. For Müller and Strom, cabinet members are “only those parties that have designated representatives with cabinet voting rights” (ibid.12), which excludes parties that support the government but do not hold cabinet posts. The point that must be emphasized is the difference between government coalitions and legislative coalitions. The formation of legislative coalitions results from ad hoc negotiations or simply from an identity of preferences. Government coalitions, on the other hand, imply access to jobs, to positions of power, in return for legislative support. Criteria (2) and (3) are easily applied to the study of the formation of government coalitions in presidential systems. Changes in president, the head of the government, correspond exactly to changes in the identity of the prime minister in parliamentary systems. As for elections, although in presidential systems they cannot be brought forward, the regular ones already on the electoral calendar alter the correlation of forces in the government all the same. Thus the resulting changes in the number of seats must be taken into consideration in defining changes in government coalitions.3 However, certain peculiarities in the formation of a government in the presidential system make the identification of a government’s party composition a little more complex, though not affecting the applicability of the first criterion. In the parliamentary system, the leader of the party that obtains the most votes, in general is the person who becomes prime minister and takes on the role of forming a government, which emerges after a period of negotiation when the parties invited to be part of the government express their agreement in filling cabinet posts. The government is only considered to have been formed when the parties’ position is defined and — even where there is no formal vote of or official taking of office — the government is approved by the legislature. At this moment, the government’s party makeup is also given. In the presidential system, negotiations between the president and the parties invited by her/him to participate occur in similar fashion. However, since the last word is the president’s, the appointment of ministers affiliated to parties that did not offer a definitive position, or even that refused to support the government, can occur. In the presidential system, major party leaders often take up ministerial posts without the formal agreement of their party. 3 (2007) 1 (2) 182 - 216 1 bpsr Government Coalitions in Brazilian Democracy Studies on coalition governments in presidential systems generally determine the party composition of governments by means of ministers’ party affiliation, even if they lack their party’s endorsement. In studies comparing a large number of countries there is no alternative to this, at least for now. The information on the stance taken by parties is not available. However, case studies not only can but should check whether the minister participates in the government on behalf of her/his party; in other words, whether the participation is of a party nature or of an individual nature. If we take as our starting point the fact that the presidents seek to form alliances with a view to gaining legislative support, the strategy of co-opting members of parties that do not accept taking part in the government cannot be considered the most efficient. Even