AlGRA 111/1111111 QUARTERLY MAGAZINE OF THE CULTURAL COUNCILOF AFGHANISTAN RESISTANCE VOLUME 1, No. 4 (April-June, 1988) ';404 01'4 * " , di B 10. * , * " ''*"4 -k* , 4 " 416 ,A04444e' r * 41r ' itihr 14' ntrIftitlif 4 ,P ,114111,, 'The capture of the Barikot Cantonment in Kunar province was the first major mujaheddin victory after the Russians began withdrawing their troops from Afghanistan May 15. Mujaheddin flag is on the right top of the building. PER COPY: Rs. 30/ MOO Contents LITICAL ANALYSIS, MILÌTARY REPORT, Grams, table of Afghan warcasualties (A ril -June, 1988) Afghans. and the Geneva accord on Afgh MAJORDOCLTTS: Sabahuddin . Kushkak3. tional goverent;`(2) exi of Geneva accord on Afghan- April=.Ture3.98£3. iatan; (3} IUAM anà the Geneva accord; (4) Muja- SUBSCRIPTION headin offer general amnesty, (5) IUAM Presidant urges trial for P1ú'A high brase; (6) Biographies Per Annual o cabinet; (7) Biographies of '. three IITAK leaders; . (8) Charters of the IUAM pakistau organisations; (9) Annual report of Amnesty In- (Rs.) btJ L4Q ternational on Afghanistan 2 3p 1. Islamabad Conter zce on Afghan future . Karachi Islamic .meeting Paris `ConferencesAfghan Agriculture dey on health in Afghan re s97 CATALOGUE OF MUJAHEDDIN PRESS 99 '103 (?iOGY OF Aií TS 168 ;AP&IL-Jt)NE 1g:a } AirHAhT ISSUES COVERAGE: 31$ Bÿ Radio: Kabul, Radio Moscow (Äpa^3]Tute* 1988) 319-320 2: April..June, 1988 AM MAO Vo l.1, No.4. Editorial IN THE WE OF GOD, MOST GRACICUS, MOST HEROIN AFTER GENEVA Now that the Russian troops are on their way out from Af lanistan the focus on the Afghanistan issue is on two subjects: the nature of government in Kabul and finding a channel for the huge humanitarian assistance which the international community has indicated will provide to the war,ravaged Afghan- istan after the Soviet troops withdrawal. There are no indications so far how these two issues are going to be tackled. The puppet government in Kabul con- siders itself as the legal government of Afghanistan and says it is ready to embrace what it calls the opposition within a coalition, a posture flatly re- jected by the mujaheddin. The mujaheddin position has been that their jehad had actually begun against the Kabul atheist regime which had captured power at Soviet instigation in 1978 and it was a result of a national jehad for the toppling of this very government that the Russians invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Not only did they invade Afghanistan but the government which is now in power in Kabul was installed by the occupation forces. The Najib government is a successor of that very government. Therefore this government should also be dismantled along with the withdrawal of Soviet forces. As regards the distribution of the economic assistance to the people of Afghanistan, one should say that, before tackling that problem, the situa- tion should be made conducive for the five million refugees from neighbouring countries and another two million from the Afghan cities to return. The refu- gees are not going to return to the 'country until there is a peaceful atmos- phere and a government of their choice is installed. The Afghan mujaheddin have vowed not to stop war until they dismantle the Kabul puppet regime. Therefore, there is not going to be peace in Afghanistan in the immediate future and no refugees will return. This vicious circle would only end if re- alism and tactfulness is heeded. This realism and tactfulness will also lead to a just and honorable solution of the Afghanistan problem. The Russians April- J une,1988 1111 VOL. 1,No.4 have to come to the point to realize that the government installed by them in Kabul is not supported by the overwhelming majority of the people of Afghan- istan and this' will not lead to a situation which the Kremlin is claiming to be trying to achieve, i.e. a peaceful, independent and non-aligned Afghanis- tan, friendly to Moscow. The mujaheddin have also to make some hard choices. They have either to seek a peaceful solution accepting some kind of compromise governmentor work a decisive strategy - - entailing the speedy fall of the Kabul regime with a minimum of casualties. The kind of scenario projected by the UN mediator on Afghanistan Diego, Cordovez in which Various Afghan factions--includingthe PUPA - are to share power is not only not practical and-will not lead topeace but is rejected by all other Afghan groups including the forces thatare considered in the Afghan scene as "liberals." The very idea ofa coalition with the communists - - those who are to the overwhelming majority of our people traitors - - is not only repugnant to use but sucha government will not be practical as well. The most urgent question in the mindof the Russians ought to be the emergence of a system in Afghanistan which will livewith it in peace and har- mony. If it tries to sustain a Marxist regime-- no matter under what guise - - it contradicts the very claim itmakes. For a communist regimewill not be able to maintain peace in' the country but it will further theAfghan anti- Russian sentiments. The Afghanistan mujaheddin,represented in the framework of the IUAM, had proposed a government comprised of the mujaheddin themselves,the Afghan refugees and the Afghan Muslims who now live inside the country.Although only recently the IUAM came out witha list of twelve cabinet members for its in- terim government, the Afghan nation expects it to really move fast andcome out with a complete government list showing that it has broadenedits bases. Although, according toa mujaheddin new plan, electionsare to Ve held until mid-October to convene a council to also ratify the interimgovernment, the fact is that this interim government has to be formed in itsentirety and ought to be assigned with specific tasks. In case there is a peaceful solutionof the remaining of the Afghanistan issue- - i.e. there is au agreement on the establishment.of a mujaheddin supported government in Kabul- - this govern-. April-June, 1988 NGWIN MAO VOL. 1,No.4 ment ought to tackle four main issues: (1) maintain law and order; (2)pave the way for the return and repatriation of the refugees; (3)rebuild some of the essential infrastructure of the economy and(4) hold general elections to be . held in a peaceful Afghanistan throughout the country and drafta constitution to be approved by the first elected parliament convened on the basis ofa na- tionr -wide elections in a peaceful Afghanistan. The mujaheddin proposed interim government, in addition to being closely associated with the commanders inside the country, ought to be very much in a position to tackle the immediate problems of economic revival of the country at least to the point of pre -1978. The second scenario calls for a master military plan which will require coordination of all military forces of the mujaheddin.The biggest stumbling block in the implementation of an shout military plan, after the Soviet withdrawal and in case the mujaheddin are determined to embark upon a war of the cities, is the fear about civilian casualties. In order to minimize civilian casualties, the Kabul regime has to be dismantled both from the outside and from the within. Dis- mantling it from the outside would require coordinated, united and joint military action. And dismantling it from the within requires utmost resort to psychological warfare prompting the civilian population to also bring about the fall of the regime by any method, fall short of wasting innocent lives. These are trying times for the Afghan nation. The socalled Geneva peace accord has proved to be no more than a mockery, for through it the Russians are now been left free to achieve what they failed to get on the battle front: the establishment of a puppet regime in Kabul suceptible to Kremlin dictates. The Afghans are resolved not to allow the Russians to get away with this. But the Afghans, in order to undo and frustrate this Kremlin strategy, should do a lot of homework. We should move fast but" prudently. We should not hestitate in imple- menting our plans just because it might deprive this or that interest from a share in the power. For as long as we are stead -fastly moving towards our ulti- mate goal - - the establishment of the government of God in Afghanistan - - we are safe. In summary we should demonstrate clearly and in black and white terms that we have gone as far as Islam - - the religion of peace, justice and fairness - - has allowed us to seek a peaceful and honorable settlement of the remaining of the Afghanistan issue. But if the other side does not heed, we have to inflict decisive blows to it to bring a fall of the regime at the earliest. J uneI 19 88 MOHAN RAO V1.1I No.4. Political Dimensions TOPPLING KABULREGIME, RESETTLEMENT, TOPAFGHAN EVENTS Drive for Capturing Courtryside Accelerates After the signing of the Geneva accord 14 Apriltthe pace of international developments in regard to solving another crucial aspect of the Afghanistan - - the formation of an interim govern- ment - - issue slowed down. The Russians began their troops pullout from Afghanistan 15 May as envisaged in the accord and the UN monitoring teams went to Afghanistan and Pakistan to observe primarily the troops withdrawal from Afghanistan and non -interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Russians officially made it known that they lost more than13,500 of their men in the Afghan war since their invasion December 27, 1979. They had more than 35,000 in- jured and more than 300 un-accounted for.