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Europe Report, Nr. 102: Yugoslavia's Presidential Elections

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Europe Report, Nr. 102: Yugoslavia's Presidential Elections YUGOSLAVIA’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: THE SERBIAN PEOPLE’S MOMENT OF TRUTH 19 September 2000 ICG Balkans Report N°102 Washington/Brussels Table of Contents MAP OF YUGOSLAVIA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY…………………………………………………………………..i I. THE OPPOSITION’S RESURGENCE ........................................................ 1 A. Candidate and Coalition .................................................................. 1 1. Kostunica: “The Thinking Man’s Nationalist” ............................................ 1 2. Opposition Agenda ................................................................................ 5 3. Opposition Momentum........................................................................... 6 B. Fissures Within the Regime .......................................................... 10 1. Miscalculations and Desertions ..............................................................10 2. Revving up the Propaganda ..................................................................12 3. Stepping up Repression ........................................................................13 C. The Chilling Fear of Success.......................................................... 15 II. WHAT MILOSEVIC WILL DO................................................................ 16 A. Scenario I: Call the Whole Thing Off............................................ 16 B. Scenario II: The Big Steal ............................................................ 16 1. Pre-election Preparations ......................................................................16 2. Election Day.........................................................................................19 C. Scenario III: Play by the Democratic Rules .................................. 20 D. Scenario IV: “Fire Exit” ................................................................. 20 III. HOW THE OPPOSITION WILL REACT: THE MOMENT OF TRUTH......... 21 A. Scenario I: Take It Now ................................................................ 22 B. Scenario II: Build Legitimacy........................................................ 24 IV. HOW THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD RESPOND............ 24 APPENDICES A. About the International Crisis Group B. ICG Reports and Briefing Papers C. ICG Board Members YUGOSLAVIA’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: THE SERBIAN PEOPLE’S MOMENT OF TRUTH EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Since the International Crisis Group’s (ICG’s) last paper addressing the Serbian political scene, the situation on the ground inside Serbia has changed dramatically.1 Once Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic announced, on 27 July 2000, the 24 September date for simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and municipal elections in Serbia, the previously fractious opposition rapidly and unexpectedly united behind the nomination of Vojislav Kostunica, a constitutional lawyer and self-styled democratic nationalist with no ties to the regime or the West.2 Kostunica’s candidacy has fired the imagination of a surprising percentage of the Serbian people, whose renewed faith in themselves and their democratic cause has generated electoral momentum as they have come to believe that the upcoming polls could effect seismic change in their country and their future. It has also marginalised the heretofore important Serbian Renewal Party (SPO) and discredited its founder and longtime leader Vuk Draskovic, whose refusal to support the unified opposition’s choice of Kostunica has cost Draskovic and the SPO significant public support..3 At the time of ICG’s last writing, opinion polls were showing that 50 per cent of the electorate was undecided as to its choice for the Yugoslav presidency.4 We reported that the situation was extremely volatile and could change virtually overnight, and this is precisely what has happened. For the first time since Milosevic came to power in 1989,5 a candidate put forward by a largely unified opposition has developed a large popular following and opened a wide lead in opinion polls.6 Despite a regime crackdown and an 1 See ICG Balkans Report No. 99, Serbia: The Milosevic Regime on the Eve of September Elections, 17 August 2000. That report reflected research largely completed in June, and did not predict the opposition revival. For an earlier and slightly more optimistic assessment of the opposition’s chances, see ICG Balkans Report No. 94, Serbia’s Embattled Opposition, 30 May 2000. 2 The opposition joined forces behind Kostunica on 6 August 2000 in a coalition called the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), which includes 18 opposition parties and the independent trade union. 3 The consequences of Draskovic’s refusal to join ranks with the rest of the opposition and to run his own presidential candidate are discussed below in Section I. 4 See ICG Balkans Report No. 99, cited above. 5 As President of the Serbian Presidency, a collegial position akin to that represented by the Bosnian trilateral model, where there is also no single president. In 1990, after constitutional revisions, Milosevic was elected President of Serbia. 6 On 10 September Agence-France Presse reported the results of the Strategic Marketing Agency Poll (Belgrade), which was taken during the last week of August, and showed Kostunica beating Milosevic 45.1-38.3 per cent in a four- way, first round race; on 7 September VIP reported that, in a sample taken from 58 municipalities, in a four-way race Kostunica would beat Milosevic 43.2-24.6 per cent, and on 5 September Deutsche Presse Agentur reported a 43-21 Yugoslavia’s Presidential Election: The Serbian Peoples’ Moment of Truth ICG Balkans Report N°102, 19 September 2000 Page 2 aggressive anti-opposition propaganda campaign, Serbia’s sundry opposition forces have at last been galvanised and are optimistic about winning a majority of votes genuinely cast. The buoyancy and impressive focus of the new Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition have been accompanied by a loss of discipline within the regime. For the first time, stress fractures within the ruling coalition have been on public display, with one coalition partner, Vojislav Seselj’s Serbian Radical Party (SRS), running its own presidential candidate; spats between the parties of Milosevic (the Socialist Party of Serbia, or SPS) and his wife, Mirjana Markovic (the Yugoslav United Left, or JUL) over slots on party slates; the much- publicised resignation from the SPS of longtime party stalwart and president of the former Yugoslavia Zoran Lilic; the abduction in broad daylight of Ivan Stambolic, former Serbian president and Milosevic mentor, and the published expressions of remorse on the part of army officers about crimes they now acknowledge having committed in Kosovo. The visibility of these regime fissures reveals Milosevic’s vulnerability, to cover which he has predictably stepped up his repression of those forces which are most effective in exposing his weaknesses: the independent media; members of the opposition, in particular, the irreverent activist youth movement known as OTPOR, and more recently, the leaders of the small, liberal and non-nationalist Civic Alliance Party (GSS)7; and non-government organisations that attempt to monitor human and civil rights. Perhaps in response to this increased repression, which has been coupled with an aggressive, anti-opposition propaganda campaign, careful observers have perceived in recent days more anxiety than excitement among some opposition supporters. Opinion polls have shown some tapering off of the mounting enthusiasm for Kostunica as voters apparently worry whether an opposition victory would provoke an even more brutal crackdown by the regime.8 However the genuine vote count adds up, very few in Serbia believe that Milosevic, if defeated, will willingly hand over power.9 While it is difficult to predict the outcome of the polling — and there remains the possibility that Milosevic will pre-empt a humiliating defeat by staging a purported “terrorist attack,” simulated coup, or some other crisis that would justify his cancelling the vote and declaring a state of emergency — the more likely outcome is that Milosevic and the ruling coalition will attempt to “steal” the elections in the first per cent lead for Kostunica over Milosevic in a four-way race, according to a Center for Alternative Studies poll taken in 60 municipalities. Three National Democratic Institute (NDI) tracking polls taken between 18 August and 5 September showed Kostunica’s support in a four-way race increasing from 39 to 43 per cent, while Milosevic held steady at 25 per cent. (NDI Serbia Election Tracking Polls, 11 September 2000 [www.ndi.org].) 7 Among those detained was GSS head Goran Svilanovic, in what was the regime’s first attack on an opposition party leader (Associated Press, 15 September 2000). In its principled insistence on human rights and accountability, the GSS, which is part of the DOS coalition, probably has more in common with a Western-style democratic party than any other party in Serbia and has long enjoyed greater credibility in the West than in Belgrade. 8A number of voters recently told ICG that while they prefer Kostunica as a candidate, they fear that Milosevic might react to an opposition victory with a violent crackdown, and consequently they are not sure how they will cast their ballots. (ICG interviews, Belgrade, 7-11 September 2000.) 9 ICG interviews, mid-August until mid-September. A late August Institute of Social Sciences poll, which, like most others conducted at about that time, gave Kostunica
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