Competition, cooperation and security in the Red Sea Omar S Mahmood The Red Sea and its environs, which includes several countries in the Horn of Africa, are lately receiving increased global attention. Several geopolitical dynamics make it a unique space, often marked by division rather than unity. There are concerns that the shared space is not adequately managed and that new responses are needed to address this. This report assesses current developments, covering ongoing rivalries in the Red Sea and recommendations for future collaboration. EAST AFRICA REPORT 24 | AUGUST 2019 Key findings The Red Sea maritime space is a complex A number of organisations are taking on an geopolitical environment, marked by increased Red Sea mandate. Nonetheless, geographic vulnerability, diversity among its many of those present are geographically members, state-to-state rivalries and limited, have alternative focuses or suffer from external interest. other challenges, such as a lack of internal The recent increased attention paid to the consensus when it comes to the Red Sea and/ Red Sea space has been driven by concerns or maritime security. regarding a gap in maritime management, The establishment of maritime governance despite the existence of the status quo for mechanisms in other similarly complex decades. environments provides potential lessons for the A range of current threats exist within the Red Sea. Chief among these are the need to maritime space, primarily driven by insecure limit mistrust and competition, define clear areas environments and the emergence of non- of cooperation, start small and grow with time, state actors. Yet to date, major disruptions to sustain efforts as interest wanes and prioritise maritime traffic have not occurred. coordination to avoid duplication and overlap. Recommendations Including all relevant nations in future Considering flexible and creative mechanisms collaborative efforts around the Red Sea that avoid infringements on national ensures the greatest chance of success. sovereignty while balancing organisational efficacy, may ultimately increase participation. Resolving underlying political grievances and fault lines may ultimately help facilitate Avoiding overlap or duplication of efforts is greater cooperation, while lessening key. Cooperative mechanisms should take existing security threats. Generally, there stock of existing arrangements and determine is a need to overcome inherent tensions, clear lines of collaboration. In addition, existing rather than ignoring or embedding them organisations that are increasingly taking on a within new mechanisms. Red Sea mandate should clearly determine the extent of their capacity and responsibilities. Starting small around a limited mandate, and expanding over time as trust and Maintaining interest as political and security cooperation grows, may be useful. developments change is also pivotal. Sustained Outlining a common set of threats and engagement beyond a narrow frame will be provisions for information sharing can be pivotal to ensuring the long-term success of any an entry point to building confidence. Red Sea management framework. 2 COMPETITION, COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN THE RED SEA Introduction • What are the current sources of insecurity to maritime passageway in the Red Sea, and how much of a The Red Sea and its environs, a diverse area where threat do they pose? multiple sub-political zones converge (see maps on pages 14 and 15), has been the subject of increased • To what extent is there a gap in Red Sea maritime global attention in recent years. The region has also management, and does this imply the need to experienced sudden and fluctuating political and security develop new mechanisms? What roles do existing dynamics, which, combined with its diversity, make it a organisations play? complex area often marked by division rather than unity.1 • Finally, what lessons can be drawn from the Despite this complex geopolitical context, maritime establishment of similar maritime governance transport and the free and safe movement of shipping mechanisms in other complex environments? have largely gone undisrupted in recent years.2 This This report is based on desktop research and regional reflects the overwhelming interests of all state actors in discussions in the Horn of Africa, incorporating interviews upholding and ensuring the core principles of freedom of with selected key actors and resource personnel. The navigation and innocent passage for unimpeded maritime report covers issues relevant to both sides of the Red use of the Red Sea. The costs of disrupted or threatened Sea, but with a dominant Horn of Africa frame in mind. In shipping, firstly to the littoral countries of the Red Sea, addition, while the focus primarily revolves around the secondly to the nations of origin and destination of the geographic confines of the Red Sea, the discussion also traffic, and finally to all others involved in terms of port includes the adjacent Gulf of Aden where relevant. management or other interests, appear to have deterred 3 the disruption of maritime traffic in the space. Towards a Red Sea forum? On 12 December 2018, a meeting in Riyadh between Maritime transport and shipping representatives of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, have largely gone undisrupted in Djibouti, Somalia and Yemen took place. The discussions recent years centred around the creation of a new alliance or forum focused on the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden maritime Yet even with this history of unimpeded passage, zones, building off a similar December 2017 conference 4 augmented recent attention towards the Red Sea is of senior officials in Egypt. indicative of rising security concerns over the maritime Described as the initial phase of a longer process, few context, amid heightened tensions in an increasingly concrete or binding outcomes emerged from the crowded space. In other words, recent developments Riyadh meeting, but the parties agreed to continue reflect concerns that the hitherto relative safety of the with technical discussions. Since then, a series of Red Sea passageway should not be taken for granted, meetings in Cairo on 13–14 February and 11–12 March and may become vulnerable to unprecedented 2019, and in Riyadh on 21–22 April 2019 took place, disruption in the future. This has resulted in a search for but little clarity on the way forward had emerged at the new thinking and initiatives around the establishment of time of writing.5 cooperative mechanisms which can help manage the maritime context. A key question has revolved around the selection criterion of the participants, and the prospects for unity within the This report unpacks some of the contemporary dynamics Red Sea zone. Eritrea did not attend the initial meetings, present in the Red Sea, in order to further understand the while Israel, another nation with an outlet to the Red Sea, challenges of collaboratively ensuring security across this was not invited.6 Other regional actors without a Red Sea complex maritime space. Key questions underpinning the coastline but with specific interests or investments in the research include: space, such as Ethiopia or the United Arab Emirates (UAE), • What defining characteristics of the Red Sea context also have not been involved to date.7 In addition, a number underpin its unique geopolitical position? of countries on the western side of the Red Sea are EAST AFRICA REPORT 24 | AUGUST 2019 3 involved in multiple ongoing efforts (see the section below, Red Sea geopolitical context ‘A gap to be filled’), raising questions regarding overlap Despite the nascent attempts at cooperation, the Red Sea and/or the potential for conflicting outcomes between the space is marked by a history of complex geopolitical various initiatives.8 relations, combined with increasing external interest in the Officials knowledgeable about the process stress that the area. The following section briefly outlines some discussions thus far have been promising and a concrete overarching contemporary issues affecting the Red Sea outcome is imminent. Yet agreements on outstanding maritime space, with a particular emphasis on competitive issues such as the location of a secretariat, in addition to state-to-state dynamics. the ongoing transition in Sudan, have delayed matters. In Geographic vulnerability addition, others have noted that the engagement of non-littoral nations with Red Sea interests is an issue Geographically, the Red Sea became one of the most tabled for a later stage, after initial formation of the globally important maritime routes or Sea Lines of mechanism.9 Communication (SLOC) with the completion of the Suez Canal in the late 19th century. This cut the travel distance At the end of December 2018, the ‘Red Wave 1’ joint naval between Europe and Asia by approximately 4 000 miles.13 10 drills also occurred off the Saudi Arabian Red Sea coast. One indication of the utility of the Suez route is the fact that The five-day exercises, which included the same 4.8 million barrels of oil travelled through this passageway participants as the Riyadh meeting a few weeks earlier, per day in 2016, linking markets in Europe and North focused on enhancing maritime security, boosting America with production centres in the Persian Gulf.14 cooperation and exchanging experiences.11 Nonetheless, the Red Sea maritime route is bounded by Combined, the continuing discussions and naval drills two of the world’s most significant maritime chokepoints at symbolise the increasing attention paid to the