Differences Between British and Chinese Views of Law Forebode Uncertainties for Hong Kong's People After the 1997 Transfer
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UCLA UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal Title Differences between British and Chinese Views of Law Forebode Uncertainties for Hong Kong's People after the 1997 Transfer Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/89n151f5 Journal UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal, 15(1) Author Chan, Steven L. Publication Date 1996 DOI 10.5070/P8151022091 Peer reviewed eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BRITISH AND CHINESE VIEWS OF LAW FOREBODE UNCERTAINTIES FOR HONG KONG'S PEOPLE AFTER THE 1997 TRANSFER Steven L. Chant I. INTRODUCTION In 1984, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ("Britain") formally agreed to re- turn its dependent territory of Hong Kong to the People's Re- public of China ("China") under the terms of a bilateral Joint Declaration.1 In this declaration, Britain relinquished sover- eignty over Hong Kong in exchange for China's commitment to adhere to various international human rights standards and to refrain from implementing socialist policies or systems in Hong Kong for at least fifty years from the 1997 transfer date.2 Be- cause of the tremendous number of differences between Hong Kong and China, the ramifications for this unprecedented return t Associate at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy in the Capital Markets Group. Boston College Law School (J.D. 1995); University of California at Berke- ley (A.B. 1990 with honors); member of the New York, New Jersey and Massachu- setts Bars. For taking the time to review earlier drafts and for providing helpful comments and guidance, I am grateful to Professor Robert C. Berring, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); Associate Professor Robert Chu, Rutgers University School of Law - Newark; and Associate Professor Thomas B. Gold, University of California at Berkeley, Sociology Department. 1. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Brit- ain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, December 19, 1984, 1985 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26 (Cmnd 9543) [hereinafter Joint Declaration]. The bilaterally negotiated Joint Declaration became effective on May 27, 1985. The document was initialed by China and Britain on September 26, 1984, formally signed by both nations on December 19, 1984, rati- fied by the British Parliament in March 1985 and ratified by China's National Peo- ple's Congress on April 10, 1985. See Patricia Homan Palumbo, Comment, Analysis of the Sino-British Joint Declarationand the Basic Law of Hong Kong: What do They Guarantee the People of Hong Kong After 1997?, 6 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 667, 674 (1991). 2. See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, Annex I, parts. I, XIII. 1996] UNCERTAINTIES FOR HONG KONG'S 1997 TRANSFER 139 are enormous. 3 These differences begin at the government level where the ruling Chinese Communist Party (the "CCP") has in many instances committed human rights abuses in order to affirm Socialism and to perpetuate its rule.4 In comparison, while the British government in Hong Kong is authoritarian, unrepresenta- tive and undemocratic, it appears that the British administrators have treated its residents fairly.5 Britain's difference from China in governing stems from a sharply different view on democracy and elections prompting Britain's Parliament and an independ- ent judiciary to ensure that the colonial government did not abuse its authority.6 Another tangible difference is the apparent disparity in levels of income between Hong Kong and China. In 3. Generally, decolonization efforts are encouraged and applauded by activists throughout the world. However, the return of Hong Kong is unprecedented in that never before has a colony been returned to another country that claims it as their territory. Typically, decolonization is a gradual evolution from undiluted autocratic rule, typically by a governor, towards self-government, whereupon the colony is eventually granted its independence from the rule of another sovereign nation. See generally Norman Miners, The Normal Pattern of Decolonisation of British Depen- dent Territories,in THE BASIC LAW AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE 44 (Peter Wesley- Smith & Albert H.Y. Chen eds., 1988) (comparing the typical pattern of decoloniza- tion with events in Hong Kong). "This is the first time in modern history that you have an entire people who will be delivered to the sovereignty of a state which is not a signatory of the ICCPR ... and not a democracy as we know it," said Daniel Fung, a prominent human rights attorney. Denise Young, Fears Mount Over Human Rights in Hong Kong After 1997, REUTERS, Mar. 31, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. 4. The CCP's ongoing abuses include the use of re-education camps, forced labor, detentions and approximately one thousand executions per year for assorted offenses. See Hong Kong's Liberties, ECONOMIST, June 15, 1991, at 18 (U.K. Edi- tion). For a firsthand account of life inside Chinese forced labor camps by a political prisoner, see HARRY WU & CAROLYN WAKEMAN, BITTER WINDS: A MEMOIR OF MY YEARS IN CHINA'S GULAG (1994). Although never formerly tried or charged with a crime, Wu was accused of being a counter-revolutionary rightist who had a bad "attitude." See id. at 33. Deemed a counter-revolutionary rightist, Wu was sen- tenced to re-education through labor and forced to sign an arrest warrant. See id. at 45-46. Wu remained in prison for the next 19 years, never certain of his release date. See id. 5. See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, COUNTDOWN TO 1997, RE- PORT OF THE MISSION TO HONG KONG 6 (1992). The International Commission of Jurists is an international organization of legal professionals which organized a mis- sion to investigate the human rights ramifications of the July 1, 1997 transfer of Hong Kong from Britain to China. This mission was sent to Hong Kong in June 1991 and met with members of the Hong Kong government, British representa- tives on the Joint Liaison Group (described more fully in note 104 and accompany- ing text), representatives of the legal profession, the press, the business community, human rights organizations, political parties and other groups. See id. at 3. Despite repeated requests by the mission, there was no cooperation or response from any direct or indirect representatives of China. See id. The Commission issued a report discussing the human rights situation in Hong Kong as governed by Britain and raised concerns for future rule by China. See id. 6. See generally KEVIN RAFFERTY, CITY ON THE ROCKS: HONG KONG's UN- CERTAIN FUTURE (1989); Hong Kong's Liberties, supra note 4, at 18. PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:138 1994, the estimated gross domestic product per person in Hong while in China estimates have Kong was approximately $22,000,7 ranged from $454 to $2,660. This Article will focus on the ultimate irony of the transfer of Hong Kong; namely, the fact that in post-1997 Hong Kong, China's official view on Hong Kong governance and sovereignty- based claims to Hong Kong all seem to be more legitimate and representative of the Hong Kong people than the equivalent British claims. Yet in reality, the people of Hong Kong will prob- ably have less rights and freedoms under China than under Brit- ain. Both the British government8 and the Chinese government espouse similar patronizing attitudes towards Hong Kong, with each respective government claiming that they know what is in the best interest of the people of Hong Kong. While both gov- ernments cite the health and well-being of Hong Kong's six mil- lion residents as a primary concern, it is the health and well-being of Hong Kong's business community that both governments seem to be most concerned about. China takes the moral and sovereignty-based high ground, emphasizing not its economic in- terest in Hong Kong, but rather the issues of gangren zhigang,9 7. See Michio Katsumata, China Bracing for Profound Changes: Post-Deng Era Holds Many Uncertainties, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Dec. 25, 1995, at 7, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Global Indicators: Population and Gross Do- mestic Product Part II, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT CROSSBORDER MONITOR, Aug. 28, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. In 1989, the gross domestic product per person in Hong Kong was only $10,900 and it has progressively risen to the point where it is now ranked thirteenth in the world, second in Asia only to Japan and exceeds that of its colonial master, Britain. See James Allan, Analysis, A Bill of Rights for Hong Kong, PUB. L. 175, 176 (1991); Global Indicators, supra. In comparison, the gross domestic product per person in China has grown from $375 in 1979 to between $454 and $2,660 in 1994. See Katsumata, supra; Global Indicators, supra. The wide range of estimates of China's per capita gross domestic product can be attributed to the difficulty in obtaining accurate economic data in China. This difficulty results from the strong divergence in wealth and development between the inland and coastal provinces, the increasing decentralization of authority from the central government, the existence of enormous and inefficient state-run industries, and the fact that 80 percent of the country's 1.2 billion people still remain in agrarian occupations in rural regions. See generally China Calls for Halt to Bullying of Farm- ers, REUTERS ASIA-PAC. Bus. REP., Oct. 27, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Li- brary, Curnws File (reporting that 80 percent of China's population works in agrarian occupations). 8. See infra note 77-92 and accompanying text for a summary of Britain's "three legged stool" concept that included representation of the Hong Kong people as one leg of the "stool." 9.