From Contestation to Constraints
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From Contestation to Constraints Explaining Institutional Variation in the Post-Communist World Vilde Lunnan Djuve Department of Political Science UNIVERSITY OF OSLO May 2016 From Contestation to Constraints: Explaining Institutional Variation in the Post-Communist World ©Vilde Lunnan Djuve 2016 From Contestation to Constraints: Explaining Institutional Variation in the Post-Communist World Vilde Lunnan Djuve http://www.duo.uio.no/ Print: Reprosentralen, University of Oslo Word Count: 36 147 Abstract 25 years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Post-Communist region has displayed substantial diversity in terms of institutional choice. To explain institutional variation, a common assumption, for example articulated by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), Olson (1993), Svolik (2012) and Frye (1997), is that power-balanced institutions and constrained executives are the results of competition between elites. This competition leaves political power dispersed, thereby prohibiting autocratic consolidation. The aim of this thesis is to exploit historical data of non-regulated elite contestation operationalized as regime change to assess its proposed effect on modern power- balanced institutions. As an area, the Post-Communist world is interesting because of the diverse paths the countries have taken since the fall of the Soviet Union. Methodologically, it is useful because the region-specific sample reduces heterogeneity and susceptibility to omitted variable bias, again increasing the plausibility of causal interpretation of results. I find that my operationalization of non-regulated contestation performs exceedingly well as a predictor of constraints on the executive in a multitude of OLS and Tobit model specifications. The robustness of the predictor persists through an array of sub-regional controls, alternative explanatory and dependent variable specifications, and when trying to account for the proposed endogeneity of contestation. Hence, I establish empirical support for the effect of non- regulated contestation on constrained executives. v Acknowledgements First of all, I want to thank my supervisor and boss, Carl Henrik Knutsen. I am deeply grateful for being included so warmly in DEEPI and the Historical V-Dem team, for the challenges and trust I’ve been given, and for the encouragement, humour, and astounding wealth of knowledge you bring to supervising. It has all made such a difference. Thank you so much. Next, important thanks are due to the talented Karna Buggeland Sælebakke, and my extraordinary mother, Anne Britt Djuve, for reading and giving invaluable comments on the final draft. To both my parents, huge thanks also for all the interesting conversations you have surrounded me with and for your support throughout this degree. I also want to thank my prime study mate, Sofie Borgen, who has no doubt listened to, discussed and thereby contributed to almost every single aspect of this thesis, whilst simultaneously being an impeccable friend. Thanks to Karna also for your irreplaceable friendship and to Christian Osorio for always cheering me on. You three have made the process of completing a master’s programme, with all it entails, just so much more delightful. Some vital confidants should also be mentioned. Special thanks to Katrine Watz Thorsen for all the great conversations and for always looking after me, to Anniken Baklien for listening and laughing with me through life-long companionship, and to my house mates, Sophie Clamp and Jonas Lepperød, for all your heart and humour. Finally, I thank Jon. For challenging me, for correcting me when I’m wrong, and for always believing in me so relentlessly. I am for ever grateful. All flaws or mistakes remain my own. vi Contents Abstract v Acknowledgements vi 1 Introduction 1 1.1 The Post-Communist World as case and as sample . .3 1.2 Structure of the thesis . .4 2 Literature review 7 2.1 Cultural and economic approaches . .7 2.2 The electoral bargaining approach . .8 2.3 Contemporary approaches . 11 2.4 The gap to fill . 13 3 Theoretical framework 14 3.1 Explaining institutions . 14 3.2 Uncertainty as non-regulated contestation . 15 3.3 Endogeneity and the Soviet freeze . 18 3.4 Core argument and hypothesis . 21 4 The data 23 4.1 Measuring contestation . 23 4.1.1 The coding process . 24 4.1.2 What is a polity? . 24 4.1.3 What is classified as regime change? . 27 4.1.4 The validity of the independent variable . 29 4.1.5 Four varieties of operationalization . 30 4.2 Measuring institutions . 32 4.2.1 On index validity . 32 4.2.2 Specifications . 34 4.3 Control variables . 35 vii CONTENTS 4.3.1 Ethnic fractionalization . 35 4.3.2 Wealth . 36 4.3.3 Population size . 37 4.3.4 Regional dummies . 38 5 Design and tools 39 5.1 Causal inference . 39 5.2 Bias versus efficiency . 40 5.2.1 The sample . 42 5.3 A note on the temporal argument . 42 5.4 The statistical tools . 43 5.4.1 OLS and the BLUE assumptions . 43 5.4.2 Tobit: Possible violation of the constant linearity assumption . 45 6 The institutional effect of contestation 47 6.1 Descriptive main trend . 47 6.2 Baseline models: OLS and Tobit . 48 6.2.1 OLS Analysis . 49 6.2.2 Tobit Analysis . 51 6.3 Volatility to including sub-regional dummies . 52 6.3.1 OLS with regional dummies . 52 6.3.2 Tobit comparison . 55 6.3.3 Outlier influence . 56 6.4 Alternative operationalizations of RegimesCount .............. 57 6.4.1 Tobit comparison . 59 6.5 Summary . 59 7 Model fit and robustness 61 7.1 Linearity: OLS and Tobit fit . 61 7.1.1 Model diagnostics . 61 7.1.2 Model with RegimesCount squared . 62 7.1.3 Testing linearity and the Tobit threshold . 64 7.1.4 Adjusting for contestation with participation . 65 7.2 Alternative dependent variables . 66 7.2.1 Taking apart the LCEI . 66 7.2.2 LCEI measured in different years . 68 7.2.3 Judicial Constraints on the Executive . 69 7.3 Ensuring exogeneity . 71 7.4 Summary . 73 viii CONTENTS 8 Implications and limitations 74 8.1 Validity: From theory to measurement . 74 8.2 Some particularly interesting instances . 75 8.2.1 The democratic limitation: Czechoslovakia . 75 8.2.2 Deviant cases: Russia and Kyrgyzstan . 77 8.2.3 Bulgaria: An improbable influential case . 79 8.3 Can there be a causal interpretation? . 81 8.4 Further studies . 82 9 Conclusion 84 Bibliography 87 Appendices 95 A Excerpts from Hist V-Dem regimes data . 95 B Complementing regression tables . 103 C Robustness tests . 106 D Aggregate democracy measures . 109 ix List of Tables 4.1 Summary statistics, independent variable . 31 4.2 Summary statistics, dependent variable . 35 4.3 Summary statistics, control variables . 37 4.4 Distribution of countries per regional dummy . 38 6.1 Baseline Models: OLS and Tobit . 49 6.2 OLS with regional controls . 53 6.3 OLS with alternative operationalizations of RegimesCount ......... 58 7.1 Baseline OLS and Model with squared term . 63 7.2 Tobit threshold: RegimesCount dummy-set . 64 7.3 OLS without democratic observations . 66 7.4 Separate index indicators as dependent variables . 67 7.5 LCEI in years 2000, 2004 and 2008 . 69 7.6 OLS model with Judicial Constraints on the Executive Index . 70 7.7 Controlling for constraints in 1920 . 72 A.1 Regime variables explained (to assist reading of tables A.2-4) . 95 A.2 Data excerpt: Regimes in Bulgaria 1894-1923 . 96 A.3 Data excerpt: Regimes in Uzbekistan 1868-1991 . 97 A.4 Data excerpt: Regimes in Serbia 1878-1918 . 98 A.5 Complete list of regimes 1900-WWII . 99 B.1 OLS with Post-Soviet dummy minus Central Asia . 103 B.2 Tobit models with regional controls . 104 B.3 Tobit models with alternative operationalizations of RegimesCount .... 105 C.1 Comparison of Robust SEs: HC1, HC2, HC3 . 106 C.2 Centred versus non-centred independent variable . 107 C.3 Baseline OLS with controls measured in 1929 . 108 D.1 Democracy indices as dependent variables . 109 x List of Figures 3.1 Causal diagram of main argument . 22 4.1 Legislative Constraints on the Executive Index w/confidence intervals . 34 6.1 RegimesCount plotted against LCEI in 2010 . 48 6.2 Coefficient plot of RegimesCount across Tobit models w/regional controls 56 7.1 Squared fit of Regimes Count on the LCEI . 62 7.2 Correlation plot of LCEI Indicators . 68 7.3 Causal diagram of possible endogeneity . 71 xi Chapter 1 Introduction 25 years after the watershed of events that marked the fall of the Soviet Union, the now-independent countries of the Eastern European and Central Asian Post- Communist region appear strikingly different. In Central Asia, authoritarian rule has been largely consistent and consolidated throughout the Post-Soviet era, for example in Turkmenistan, one of the most repressive and least transparent states in the world (Hunter 1996). Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, made considerable efforts at democratization in the 1990s, contrary to the political development of its neighbours. In the former Yugoslavia, after a decade of disastrous war, the now separate states appear equally diverse. Croatia has entered the European Union, while neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina struggles with paralyzing legislative as well as electoral stagnation (Arapovic and Brljavac 2013). Close by, Bulgaria has achieved a surprising democratization without any history of notable democratic tradition (Fish and Brooks 2000). In the Baltics, some democratic stumbling persisted in Latvia over the lack of civil rights for the Russian minority, but institutional quality across the three small states of the Baltic littoral have by now been consolidated (McFaul 2002). Could there plausibly be some overarching explanation to account for this diversity? There are, of course, a wide array of posited arguments to explain the variation noted above.