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1 Introduction 2 the Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy Notes 1 Introduction 1. Kozyrev [1994c, p. 62] claimed that the world needed Russia 'as a strong member in the family of free, law-based, democratic states and not as a "sick man" of Europe and Asia'. 2. Light [1996, p. 35] claimed that, following an initial phase characterized by polarized views over the extent to which Russia should become Westernized or follow its own path, an elite consensus emerged as to the country's proper role in the world and the correct approach towards international relations. This was embodied by a 'pragmatic nationalism', in which a reassertion of Russia's sense of 'great power-ness' (derzhavnost) was combined with a prag­ matic attitude towards cooperation with the West. At the broadly conceptual level, it involved Russia forging and asserting a separate identity, being neither specifically East nor West, but rather pursuing 'diversification' - a 'balanced' policy towards both on the basis of Russia's 'national interests'. 3. Although Chechen incursions into the neighbouring autonomous republic of Dagestan provided Moscow with good reasons to intervene militarily, the most critical factor was undoubtedly a series of bombings against civilian targets in September 1999. In particular, two especially bloody attacks in south Moscow were instrumental in rallying public opinion - which had strongly opposed the first Chechen war (1994-96) -in favour of a punitive approach towards the rebel province. Notwithstanding the lack of definitive proof linking the bombings to Chechen groups, elite and public opinion was virtually unani­ mous in assuming these were to blame. 2 The Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy 1. Yeltsin [199Sb, p. 1] asserted that such ideas were 'a thing of the past'. Significantly, during the Kosovo crisis - surely the greatest provocation to pan-Slavism since the outbreak of the First World War - Moscow did nothing concrete in support of the Milosevic regime. Despite threats/promises to pro­ vide military assistance to Belgrade and withdraw from UN sanctions regimes, its retaliation was limited to the temporary suspension of military links with NATO. The Kremlin was even more lukewarm towards the Yugoslav presi­ dent's proposal for an expanded Slavic Union [Gornostaev, 1999b, p. 3]. Yeltsin [2001, p. 264] later described the initiative as 'absolutely politicized, aggressive, and unrealistic'. 2. Chinese illegal migration stood out as an issue where there was considerably more heat (and prejudice) than light. This was reflected in the enormous vari­ ation in estimates of its extent. When I visited Vladivostok and Khabarovsk in September 1996, some 'experts' were claiming figures as high as 2-3 million; this, at a time when the total population in the Russian Far East was less than 177 178 Notes 7 million. The reality was that no-one knew. Significantly, in two visits to the Primorye Goskomstat office- in September 1996 and then again in April 1999 - its Chairman gave me two wildly different estimates: 300,000 and 35,000 respectively. The first estimate came at a time when Primorye Governor Yevgenii Nazdratenko was playing up the issue to reinforce objections to terri­ torial concessions to China in the krai. By the spring of 1999, Nazdratenko's priorities had changed. With Beijing giving up its claims in the Tumenkang area, and with Primorye desperately needing outside trade and investment, the emphasis turned to increasing interregional cooperation with the adjoining Chinese provinces. In these circumstances, it clearly made no sense to beat up the 'illegal migration' issue. 3. Alexei Pushkov made this point to me in March 2000. 4. During my posting in Moscow I was struck that my liberal friends, virtually without exception, found the idea of union arrangements with Belarus repug­ nant on moral as much as intellectual grounds. 5. A military attache at one of the Visegrad embassies in Moscow complained to me in 1997 that Moscow had consistently ignored the candidate NATO member-states in discussions on enlargement. 6. Although opinion polls during the 1990s consistently showed that most Russians were opposed to giving up the disputed islands to Japan, there is no evidence indicating that these views materially influenced policy-makers. 7. In a survey of 210 members of the Russian foreign policy establishment (including Duma deputies and staffers, members of the Federation Council, officials, academics and think-tankers) conducted in April 2001, fewer than 10 per cent of respondents believed that the major Duma committees or the Duma as a whole had been a dominant influence on Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet period. This compared poorly to the much higher ratings for other actors, such as the President (91 per cent), Foreign Minister and his deputies (52.4), Presidential Administration (47.6), oil and gas complex (36.7) and a number of others ['Vneshnepoliticheskii kurs ... ', 2001, p. 11]. 8. Yeltsin was due to visit Tokyo on 13 September 1992. On 10 September, how­ ever, the President's Press Service announced that, '[i]n view of all the circum­ stances and an exchange of opinions with the leadership of the government, the Supreme Soviet and the Security Council, the President of the Russian Federation has decided to postpone his official visits to Japan and the Republic of Korea' [Rossiiskaya gazeta, 10 September 1992, p. 1]. Although many contemporary observers saw the postponement as the result primarily of strong domestic political opposition to a territorial deal, other factors were critical as well: disappointment at the perceived meagreness of Japanese aid and investment; annoyance with Tokyo's fixation on the islands question at the expense of other bilateral issues (effectively holding these hostage to a terri­ torial settlement); rising 'negative' nationalism in Russia following a series of 'defeats' /concessions at home and abroad- withdrawal from Eastern Europe, demise of the Soviet Union, continuing political and socioeconomic crisis; and, not least, presidential indecision in the face of conflicting advice from different policy-making bodies. 9. A Duma advisor claimed to me that in the lead-up to the START-2 ratification vote in late 1998 the going rate for a deputy in Zhirinovsky's LDPR was US$5000. Notes 179 10. The most spectacular illustration of the MFA's exclusion from decision-making processes was the seizure of Slatina airport outside Pristina on 4 June 1999 by 200 Russian peacekeepers led by Lieutenant-General Viktor Zavarzin. Not only was Foreign Minister Ivanov not consulted, but he was left completely in the dark - as evidenced by his comment to CNN that 'the mistake will be cor­ rected' [see Kalashnikova and Smirnov, 1999, p. 1]. 11. In a conversation shortly after the November 1997 Yeltsin-Hashimoto 'no ties' summit in Krasnoyarsk, a senior Russian foreign ministry official told me that the MFA was very concerned that 'unrealistic' expectations had been raised by the Yeltsin proposal, and lamented in this connection that Yastrzhembsky and not Primakov had been by Yeltsin's side. 12. Brief mention should be made of the considerably overrated influence of the regions. It has been suggested that the foreign policy interests of this group were 'quite distinct' from those of Moscow [Malcolm and Pravda, 1996, p. 2], and that these agendas sometimes competed with one another [Trenin, 1999, p. 34]. The example commonly cited in this context is the Russian Far East, where the erratic behaviour of Primorye governor Nazdratenko appeared at times to complicate the broader Sino-Russian relationship. However, many of these differences were superficial and temporary. Although Nazdratenko and Moscow occasionally disagreed on specifics - in particular, the exact demar­ cation of the common border - each sought to develop closer political and especially economic ties with China. In other words, the strategic objectives of regional and central authorities remained the same. Similarly, in the terri­ torial dispute with Japan the views of the local Sakhalin administration were of marginal interest only. They happened to coincide with majority opinion in Moscow, but there are no grounds for imagining that the latter took them into serious account. 13. Primakov has enjoyed a long and varied career as a journalist, academic, bureaucrat, policy advisor and senior minister. Particular highlights include: eight years as Pravda's 'special correspondent' in the Middle East (1962-70); stints as Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies (1977-85) and of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO - 1985-89); Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet (1989-90); Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (1991-96); Foreign Minister (1996-98); and Prime Minister (1998-99). 14. This was a group whose composition was somewhat amorphous. Generally speaking, its nucleus was commonly understood to include, in addition to Berezovsky: Valentin Yumashev, the President's press spokesman and later chief of the Presidential Administration; Tatyana Dyachenko, Yeltsin's younger daughter and 'image consultant'; and Aleksandr Voloshin, who succeeded Yumashev as head of the Presidential Administration [see Yeltsin, 2001, p. 295]. 15. A well-known TV commentator volunteered this comment to me in autumn 1997. 16. Unsurprisingly, Prikhodko [1997, p. 3] denied suggestions that either he or Yastrzhembsky enjoyed better access than Primakov to the President. But see note 11 above. 17. Leonid Ivashov, Head of the MOD's Department of International Military Cooperation and the senior military member of Chernomyrdin's negotiat­ ing team, criticized the peace plan as containing 'a number of dangerous 180 Notes aspects', such as Russia's dependence on NATO's goodwill and the threat to Yugoslav sovereignty [in Sysoev, 1999b, p. 1]. 3 Recasting the Ideological Debate 1. Ideology here is understood as a 'predispositional influence' on policy-mak­ ers [Pravda, 1988, p. 239]. 2. It was a common assumption of many Russians (particularly those of a lib­ eral bent), as well as of foreign diplomats and journalists in Moscow, that Primakov had served as a career intelligence officer while working as a Pravda correspondent in the Middle East (1962-70).
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