Cultures of Coping: Adaptation to Hazard and Living with Disaster in the Philippines

Greg Bankoff

All of us are probably familiar with the are natural, disasters are not. Social folk tale of the three pigs; how each systems generate unequal exposure to pig built a house in a different way, risk by making some people more the lazy one out of straw, the not so prone to disaster than others and that lazy one out of wood, and the these inequalities are largely a function industrious one out of brick. And then of the power relations (class, age, along came the big, bad wolf that blew gender and ethnicity among others) down the straw and wooden houses operative in every society. Critical to and left only the brick structure discerning the nature of disasters was standing. Implied in this story is a novel appreciation of the ways in another message about what is which human systems place people at considered best practice when it risk in relation to each other and comes to risk management and to their environment, a causal disaster preparedness. The emphasis relationship that is best understood in is all about applying the appropriate terms of an individual’s, household’s, technology (a brick house) to community’s or society’s vulnerability withstand the perceived hazard (strong (Hewitt 1983, Wisner 1993, Blaikie et winds) that has come to constitute the al. 1994, Cannon 1994, Hewitt 1995, dominant way in which disasters are and Lewis 1999). Employing conceived of and prepared for in vulnerability as a conceptual western imaginings and policy. It is framework in this manner, disasters assumed that people are put ‘at risk’ often appear more as the consequence from hazards because they are in the of misconceived developmental wrong spot at the wrong time; the problems rather than natural events, proper response is to apply the as the product of the deficient necessary technological solution to relation between the physical and predict or prevent the threat and so organizational structures of a society reduce the risk. rather than as a break with its ‘normal’ lineal expansion (Ferguson 1999: 236- The fact, however, that disasters 241). As a consequence of this impact on some people more than change in thinking, the dominance others persuaded a group of scholars previously accorded technical in the 1980s to reconceptualize interventions that stress predicting disasters as more properly the result hazard or modifying its impact has of human actions; that while hazards increasingly been called into question

1 by an alternative approach that seeks two former occasions when there was to combine the risk which people and extensive flooding (after hurricanes in communities are exposed to with their 1947 and 1965) is to raise the abilities to cope with its embankments higher than their consequences. present four meters. Each time the levees are heightened, of course, the Assessing the relative vulnerability magnitude of the next breach is also of communities applies equally to raised accordingly. Just like the pig all societies but attention has snug in his brick home, those who put been particularly focused on their trust only in technology feel developing countries whose poverty, secure in the thought that they have “undisciplined” populations, and got it right and if there is anything to poor governance are largely held do it is only to build a still bigger brick responsible for magnifying both the house or dike. frequency and magnitude of disasters. Hurricane Katrina, then, that This physical and conceptual over- devastated 233,000 km 2 of the dependence on technology is just as southern U.S.A. in August 2005 is a much a form of vulnerability and as timely reminder that it is not just the potentially devastating for disaster- ‘poor’ who are vulnerable but that the prone societies like the Philippines. ‘rich’ are, too, even if their exposure There is little consideration given to is of a different order. Moreover, the alternative strategies that are less extensive media coverage that this reliant on technology and lay greater hurricane received has graphically stress on community-based disaster demonstrated to the rest of the management. For most people in such world that no one country has an societies, hazards and disasters are exclusive monopoly on poor people, “frequent life experiences” or simply opportunistic looters, or ineffectual accepted aspects of daily life. They officials. While these points have are not perceived as abnormal largely found voice in one way or occurrences the way western social another, commentary on the nature of scientists looking through different the failed levee system protecting New epistemological lenses depict them, Orleans from Lake Pontchartrain has but as normal everyday events been more muted. The storm surge (Bankoff 2003: 179-183). So common associated with the hurricane that in fact, that even the histories of these breached the artificial embankments societies are largely shaped by the and caused most of the city to flood interrelationship of the natural to the is seen as a failure of the appropriate human, of the physical to the social.1 technology and not as the application Moreover, such societies are rarely in of an inappropriate one. That is, the a position to pursue the option of a 350 miles of levees were built to technological solution to risk withstand a category three storm but management as they lack the financial not one of intensity four or five. The resources to do so. Instead, the answer now as it has been on at least emphasis is more on flexible use of

2 technology and on enlisting people’s against the frequency of typhoons in participation as an essential element the islands (Blolong 1996, Cayabyab in disaster management through the and de Guzman 1998). formation or encouragement of Spanish architects, on the other grassroots organizations and hand, appear to have been initially community level preparedness. either unaware of or blithely indifferent to local conditions. The Manila that FLEXIBLE USE OF TECHNOLOGY was built on the wealth of the trade bonanza across the Pacific during the Historical records provide evidence early seventeenth century was of cultural adaptation to the constancy constructed in the style and manner of environmental threat that most of a Hispanic city anywhere else. As readily conforms to accepted notions a result, the devastating earthquake of substantiation. In particular, of 30 November 1645 eventually architecture offers a unique means of reduced the city to ruins. Subsequent examining the human-environment colonial architecture shed its utter interchange. The form that structures disregard for seismic activity, and took and the method and fabric of their consequently lost much of its grace construction are indicative of the of line and form that usually degree to which known seismic characterize Spanish architecture. and meteorological hazards were Public construction techniques, so considered or whether the building evident in the use of extensive proceeded largely according to buttresses, massive body structures, external codes of competency and and the squat bell towers found in functionality. The simple nipa and provincial churches, were designed to palm hut, in all its local manifestations, minimize such damage. The style even is a case in point. This type of dwelling became known, rather suggestively, quite clearly serves as a much more as ‘earthquake baroque’ (Rantucci suitable basis from which to develop 1994:64). Domestic architecture, construction techniques appropriate to too, underwent a similar radical local conditions. It has also proven transformation. Fixed foundational extraordinarily resilient in historical posts gave way to the greater use of terms despite its repeated vilification bamboo and the employment of other by successive colonial and national techniques designed to increase governments, who have alternately flexibility and to compensate for a branded it as “primitive”, “fire-hazard” certain amount of earth movement. or “squatter settlement” and banished Solid upper storeys were replaced by or removed it whenever possible. ones constructed from lighter These indigenous architectural forms materials. In fact, the style usually are often closely adapted to referred to as ‘Spanish’ was in reality environmental conditions. Thus more of a syncretic adaptation of traditional house styles in the Batanes Hispanic and indigenous building had low ceilings as a precaution techniques.

3 While modern building materials losses and averting the likelihood of and techniques cannot be said to be disaster, especially famine, rather than particularly well-adapted to local that of efficiency and yield by which conditions or have their origins in they are normally assessed. Crop indigenous cultures, modifications in diversification as an adaptive strategy the design and construction of much is a common feature of traditional informal housing exhibits interesting farming methods as a means of adjustments to living in low-lying areas providing access to a secure food where flood is a constant threat or a source in times of climatic adversity recurring presence for many months (Lim 1994: 257). Indeed, there is even of the year. The building of a second evidence that high yield varieties of storey where the ‘living rooms’ are genetically altered rice (HIVs) may be situated and the concomitant use of incorporated into such a farming the ‘downstairs’ in such a manner that strategy, not on account of their its sudden and regular abandonment greater productivity, but for their involves negligible damage to property shorter growing cycles that are seen and its long-term inundation minimal as an asset against drought in years inconvenience to the daily running of of poor rainfall.2 the household, has many parallels to Again, the case of the Ivatan also the manner in which traditional houses raises some intriguing questions about had been raised above ground level on the way in which ‘outside experts’ molave poles known as harigues for may need to reassess their notions of much the same purposes. There are minifundia or land fragmentation in sound architectural reasons for the developing societies. Held to be the “rediscovery” and incorporation of unfortunate consequence of equal such building techniques into design- inheritance among siblings, the built modern structures as well as division of land among all heirs is informal ones that prompted the recent generally regarded as an almost adoption of modern building “feudal” relic of an unreformed land regulations on Tuvalu that require the system that restricts output, hinders floors of new houses to be raised economies of scale and obstructs the above ground level as a precaution efficient deployment of labor. Such against the increased incidence of views may start from the erroneous flooding due to global warming and assumption that the desired norm rising sea levels. In fact, the measure is larger fields that customary is a return to a more traditional form practices have somehow unwittingly of architecture (Lewis 1990: 245). undermined. On the contrary, land The flexible use of technology is fragmentation among the Ivatan is also very much present in the form of regarded as an important mechanism local agricultural systems whose for ensuring food security. Planting practices demand re-evaluation from in widely scattered parcels minimizes the perspective of providing an the likelihood that an entire harvest effective mechanism for reducing crop may be lost to hazard and increases

4 the chances of some food sources of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991, some of even in the worst of circumstances whom went abroad as overseas (Blolong 1996: 17). In societies contractual workers (Mula 1999: 126- exposed to the constant threat of 130). hazard, such farming strategies make good sense from the perspective of local farmers who are mainly engaged GRASSROOTS COMMUNITY in minimizing risk rather than LEVEL PREPAREDNESS maximizing surplus (Scott 1976). Communities in the Philippines Unfortunately, the increased have largely been left to their commercialization of agriculture and own capabilities to deal with hazard; the reliance on cash-crops have the recent ‘nationalization’ of adversely affected these types of disaster management is part of the adaptive strategies (Alexander 1997: centralization program of the modern 299). state. Societies in the archipelago A final form of expertise employed have a rich tradition of community to manage hazards often resorted to associations traceable back to at least when other adaptive strategies had the early seventeenth century in failed was for the survivors to migrate contrast to a popular and scholarly and relocate their settlement in a safer literature that mainly regards location. In this way, the people of the formation of nongovernment Lipa abandoned the beachside site of organizations (NGOs) as a modern their town in 1756 and moved to phenomena that owe their origin to the another location inland. Similarly, political radicalization of the survivors from the town of Guinobatan martial law years (Lubi 1992: 22, destroyed by the eruption of Mt. Constantino-David 1997: 26-27, Mayon in 1814 moved first to Mauraro Constantino-David 1998, and Luna and then to Panganiran in search of a 2001: 216). There is also a long safer place further removed from the history at the local level of formal and activity of the volcano (AMO Box 13- informal networks and associations 2/4). Other ethnographic literature committed to individual and extra- reports similar movement of residence familial welfare that enhance people’s and migration as strategies that were capacity to withstand the magnitude adopted by communities to minimize and frequency of daily misfortune and risks or reduce mounting losses (Torry natural hazard as experienced in 1978: 175 and 1979: 519-520). In the archipelago. Many of these particular, James Spillus notes how developments have gone largely historically migration was one of the unnoticed. Seeking to uncover more principal strategies adopted to cope single-purpose associations in relation with typhoons on Tikopia, a small to community welfare according to island in the Solomons (1957). their own criteria of what such Migration was also a noted feature in organizations should comprise, communities following the eruption western social scientists often fail to

5 recognize the existence of other more describing them as early as 1663 multipurpose ones that do not share (Hollnsteiner 1968: 28). the same outward form but fulfill many There is also evidence that this of the same functions. form of community labor was resorted The first evidence of mutual aid to in confronting natural hazards. In a associations is the religious fraternities report initiated in 1914, Harvey known as cofradías that date from at Hostetter observed the custom of least 1594 (Barrion 1961 and Ikehata building a special house “which might 1990: 111-112). While these be occupied by anyone whose associations were primarily religious, residence would be destroyed by a they also had important charitable typhoon” and how after a furious functions: the care and succour of the typhoon “the destroyed houses…were sick and dying (AAM 40.A.1 Folder rebuilt quickly as soon as the storm 8), providing funds in the case of was over because the owners could illness and bereavement (AAM 40.A.1 help each other by turn in spite of their Folder 9), and generally enjoining its lack of funds”. The communal affiliates ‘to engage in social and construction of dams to protect barrios charitable enterprises and to aid the from floods was also apparently unfortunate and needy people in common practice, while the purpose general’ (AAM 40.A.1 Folder 11). In of cooperative associations was to fact, the evidence suggest that these assist people with burial services, cofradías were more than simply a suggesting a distinct commonality means of expressing religious faith and with the cofradías (Balmaceda 1927: acted in the way of mutual support 386, 387, 394 and 401). There are and benefit associations on behalf of rarely rigid epistemological divisions in their members in times of misfortune Filipino cultures that separate the or distress. Less formal but more spiritual from the human constructions prevalent than the cofradías was the of nature (Bankoff 2004). manner in which extra-familial work The close association between the was organized. All across the ideational and the practical remains archipelago, cooperative arrangements very much a feature of the existed that shared certain basic organizations associated with the characteristics linked to the revolutionary period and the early mobilization of labor (Balmaceda years of U.S. colonial administration. 1927). Aid was rendered on the The Katipunan, the secret society that expectation that it would be returned instigated the revolt of 1896 against in kind. Need or sometimes lot the Spanish was also a multipurpose determined the order in which help organization being simultaneously a was received; the notion of succession mutual assistance association, a suggested by the Tagalog term of religious brotherhood, and a political turnuhan meaning “a turn”. An grouping.3 As such it had much in intriguing question is the temporal common with other mutual-assistance origin of these practices with Fr. Colin

6 societies, many of which were also with regional or even local variations, secretive, being organized in a quasi- the basic structure of the system was military form and developing elaborate much the same and recalled the rituals similar to those of the turnuhans of the previous century Freemasons (Wurfel 1959: 584). The (HDP Santa Cruz, Albay Reel 1: 141; emphasis on mutual assistance and HDP Santicon, Albay Roll 1: 266; HDP cooperative venture also remained an Maniango, Pampanga Roll 36: 27; important feature of more “modern” and HDP Cabugbugan, Tarlac Roll 72: organizations such as trade unions 17). More attention also needs to be (Bankoff 2005: 72-76).4 The new paid to the role and function of local colonial authorities, moreover, were Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) as keen to instill the virtues of these soon became the most visible Jeffersonian democracy in Filipinos barrio organizations after their and enacted a Rural Credit Law in foundation in 1926 (Rivera and 1915 to organize small farmers into McMillan 1952: 167). The ostensible self-help cooperative societies. A focus of their activities was schools report compiled in 1918 showed the but they seem to have provided a existence of a remarkable number of much wider range of services and civic and recreational associations often acted as the focal point for (Census 1921: volume 4, part 1, 16, communal endeavours (HDP La 37). Rather than the fruits of colonial Purisima, Albay Reel 1: 257 and HDF policy, these numerous registrations Dela Paz, Pampanga Reel 36). Much more aptly reflect the already existing as earlier barrio organizations had mutual benefit associations obtaining cloaked their activities in a religious official approval for their activities guise as cofradías under Spanish under such a rubric just as cofradías colonialism, so now they sought in the past had sought religious official approval as PTAs given the sanction for the same purposes. More emphasis placed by American success can be attributed to the authorities on educational attainments. Americans’ attempt to create Nor has the dual nature of these agricultural credit cooperative organizations completely disappeared associations (Balmaceda 1924: 18- in rural areas of the Philippines where 19). Again, however, the question they are now sometimes known remains whether such associations as Parent Teacher Community were simply superimposed upon Associations (Atienza 2002). already existing networks or As conditions in rural areas began turnuhans. to deteriorate during the 1920s Apart from these formal and 1930s, organizations that organizations, reciprocal exchanges of complemented their social activities a more informal nature continued to with more overtly political aims be practiced in rural areas. Called by appeared. Many of these organizations various names (more especially such as the Kapatiran Magsasaka tagnawa or pinta) and undoubtedly exhibited similar features of reciprocity

7 and mutual assistance. A militant anti- of other forms of organizations landlord peasant union in Central associated with social as opposed to Luzon, it shared many of the features financial savings (Pal 1956: 408 and common to mutual benefit societies Lewis 1971: 147-150). As certain but also reorganized reciprocal farm newly radicalized sectors of the labor on a morally euphoric and more population began to organize militarized basis (Connolly 1992: 94- themselves to oppose the dictatorship 96). The Japanese Occupation (1942- of Ferdinand Marcos, the first 1945) and the immediate post-war progressive or development-oriented years seem to have further encouraged NGOs began to emerge in the early communities faced by adversity to 1970s and to proliferate with the help themselves. Though mutual restoration of democratic government assistance and millenarianism after 1986 (Clark 1998: 70-71). The remained significant aspects of these increasing visibility of their activities, movements, increasingly many rural however, draws attention away associations fell under communist or from the local community-based socialist influence (Romani 1956: 236, associations or people’s organizations Po 1980: 31-32, Clarke 1998: 58). (POs) on whose behalf they ostensibly operate. It is these latter associations The immediate independence and networks that are the modern day period was dominated by events manifestations of the cofradías, connected to the Huk Rebellion and turnuhans, early unions, civic clubs, the military operations involved in and PTAs of former years. If the its suppression from 1946-1954 relationship between NGOs and POs (Kervliet 1979). At the village level, creates a degree of ambiguity between though, formal and informal the two, the growing emphasis placed associations continued to provide on community-based disaster communities with their only reliable management in recent decades is only form of security against hazard and a recognition of the essential nature misfortune. Fieldwork studies and form that mutual assistance has conducted in the 1950s and 1960s historically played at the community show the presence of these reciprocal level (Delica 1997: 34-50, and labor arrangements (Hart 1955: 431- Heijmans and Victoria 2001: 13-18). 433, Hollnsteiner 1968, and Lewis 1971: 128-138). In parts of Luzon, Communities in the Philippines, small neighborhood associations called then, can be said to enjoy a form of puroks concerned themselves with ‘social capital’ if the evident range and over-all municipal improvements which extent of formal and informal were often accomplished in co- associations and networks that operation with local PTAs (Rivera and provide succour and assistance in McMillan 1952, Romani and Thomas troubled times are accepted as 1954 and Romani 1956: 235). Equally indicators of its existence. There is interesting is the evidence of rotating evidence, too, that as Putnam et al. credit associations and the existence argue, social capital is inherited if the

8 persistence of such forms of civic CONCLUSION engagement through the centuries can be taken as a measure of its ability to Too often our approach towards transcend the generations (Putnam, disaster management mirrors the Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993). Of wider divisions and cleavages between course, the nature of such associations and within societies. Consider again and networks has not remained static the cultural assumptions behind the but has evolved both to suit the tale of the three pigs: how the ‘lazy’ changing political climate (primarily and ‘not quite so lazy’ pigs who built church-based during the Spanish in straw and wood exposed period, more educationally-related themselves to hazard and only found during the American administration, safety by seeking shelter with their and increasingly politicised since brother who evidently had both the independence) and to meet the forethought and industry to apply the contingencies of place and occasion appropriate technology to meet the (agriculture, irrigation, house hazard. Low and medium developed construction, artisanship etc.). Much countries are continually being of the criticism levelled at the encouraged to adopt large-scale extension of the term social capital technologically-based solutions to from the individual or family to the hazards that they can ill-afford, that community and the society has are of dubious efficacy, and that often focused on the “logical circularity” of impact negatively on already the argument: that evidence of its disadvantaged local residents. But the existence leads to positive outcomes hazards that beset states like the which, in turn, are proof that it exists Philippines also engender societies (Portes 1998: 19). According to whose very vulnerabilities have Michael Woolcock, however, fostered particular forms of resilience definitions should rather “focus to adversity and misfortune primarily on its sources rather than its that express themselves at the 6 consequences since long-term neighborhood or community level. benefits…are the result of a Recognition of the importance of such combination of different…types of coping practices affects not only the social relations…[that] shift over time” way in which affected populations are (Woolcock 1998). While no single “perceived” but also the manner in factor can suffice to explain why which disasters should be “managed”. circumstances were so conducive to Emphasis is placed on enlisting the formation of social capital in the people’s participation, more fully Philippines, perhaps the important role integrating their capabilities and hazard has played in the daily life of applying low-level technology in a its peoples encourages forms of manner that is better suited to local mutual dependence and cooperative conditions and limited financial resources. Such an approach, activity (Bankoff forthcoming ).5 moreover, contributes to better understanding the roots of people’s

9 vulnerabilities and the structures or the application of academic conditions that generate them. conventions has not been rigorously enforced as it seemed often The point that expertise in disaster inappropriate to the particular context management comes in different forms and yet another form of “foreign” and is not the exclusive preserve of imposed expertise. Some articles are external (normally “western”) nations “documents” in their own right. is brought very much to the fore in Interestingly, though there are no this special issue of the PSR. The dissenting voices about the ensuing discussion on community- importance of greater community based disaster management is involvement in disaster management envisaged more in the way of a and the need to recognize local dialogue between those principally capabilities: all advocate the same engaged in its practice in government outcome though not always (Arnel Capili), NGOs (Zenaida Delica- necessarily for the same reason. There Willison, Lorna Victoria, Eugene is also a progression in the order in Orejas, Kaloy Anasarias and Celso which the articles appear that gives Dulce), academe (Kelvin Rodolfo and added weight to the overall argument his colleagues, Kathleen Crittenden though of course each contribution and her co-authors, Emmanuel Luna can be gainfully read in its own right. and Jean-Christophe Gaillard), and, If Hurricane Katrina can be said to have most importantly, in the communities a ‘lesson’ for any of us, it is to suggest themselves (Manuel “Ka Noli” that western developed countries may Abinales). Not all, alas, are have as much to learn about disaster represented in equal measure due to preparedness, management, and the chosen medium (and language) of recovery from nonwestern developing exchange that favors some voices over countries as the latter do from the others. And since the contributors former. come from such varied backgrounds,

NOTES 1 Susanna Hoffman and Anthony Oliver-Smith refer to this human- environmental interaction in terms of ‘mutuality’ and argue that disasters occur where there is a lack of it (Hoffman and Oliver-Smith 1999: 6). 2 Private Communication with Annelies Heijmans, Center for Disaster Preparedness Foundation, Manila, 14 December 2000 3 See Rey Ileto on the role of the Katipunan (1979).

10 4 A mutual aid association existed among shipyard workers at Cavite from 1851 where the first recorded strike occurred in 1872 (Runes 1983-5: 66- 67). Worker associations existed in the late nineteenth century based around craftsmen belonging to a particular shop or neighborhood and the first attempts at organizing a trade union movement occurred in 1902 with the creation of the Uníon Obrera Democrática. 5 It is interesting to note that one of the other societies that exhibit many of the same attributes as the Philippines is Bangladesh, a country also noted for the frequency and magnitude of its hazards (Zaman 1999). 6 In the Philippines, these more culturally specific forms of coping practices are often talked about in terms of concepts such as bayanihan, pakikipagkapwa, and pakikisama. While these terms are often used interchangeably to denote forms of common association and shared identity, the emphasis is subtly different in each case (Jocano 1999 and Bankoff 2004).

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15 Rivera, G. and R. McMillan 1952 The Rural Philippines. Manila: Office for Information, Mutual Security Agency. Romani, J. 1956 “The Philippine Barrio.” The Far Eastern Quarterly 15 (2) : 229-237. Romani, J. and M. L. Thomas 1954 A Survey of Local Government in the Philippines. Manila: Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines. Runes, I. 1983 “Toward a Militant Trade Unionism.” Philippine Journal of Industrial Relations 5 (1-2) : 65-76. Scott, J. 1976 The Moral Economy of the Peasant Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press. Spillus, J. 1957 “Natural Disaster and Political Crisis in a Polynesian Society.” Human Relations 10: 3-27, 113-124. Torry, W. 1978 “Natural Disasters, Social Structure and Change in Traditional Societies.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 13 (3-4), 167-183. 1979 “Anthropological Studies in Hazardous Environments: Past Trends and New Horizons.” Current Anthropology 20 (3), 517-540. Wisner, B. 1993 “Disaster Vulnerability: Scale, Power and Daily Life.” GeoJournal 30 (2): 127-140. Woolcock, M. 1998 “Social Capital and Economic Development: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework.” Theory and Society 27 (2): 151- 228. Wurfel, D. 1959 “Trade Union Development and Labor Relations Policy in the Philippines.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 12 (4): 582-608. Zaman, M. 1999 “Vulnerability, Disaster, and Survival in Bangladesh: Three Case Studies.” In A. Oliver-Smith and S. Hoffman (eds.) The Angry Earth Disaster in Anthropological Perspective. New York and London: Routledge, 192-212.

16 Worsening Floods around Northern Manila Bay, Philippines: Research-Based Analysis from Physical and Social Science Perspectives

K.S. Rodolfo, F.P. Siringan, C.T. Remotigue and C.B. Lamug

Paradoxically, flooding continues to worsen on the heavily populated and highly cultivated deltaic coastal plains around Manila Bay, even during the current period of reduced rainfall. In Pampanga Province, volcanic sediments from the 1991 Pinatubo eruption have clearly enhanced flooding by clogging stream channels, but long before 1991 this area was already experiencing increasing flood frequency, magnitude and duration. Furthermore, the adjacent areas of Bulacan Province and the Metro Manila’s coastal KAMANAVA suburbs received little Pinatubo debris, but are also increasingly flood-prone. Urbanization and deforestation are important causes of the worsening floods but, in the long-term, rising local sea level is the primary factor. This is not the 2 mm/y rise induced by global warming, for regional subsidence is much more rapid. Deltaic muds naturally “autocompact” after deposition: under their own accumulating weight, water is squeezed out, they thin, and the surface subsides slowly. Dewatering and subsidence are greatly accelerated by heavy extraction of groundwater for fishponds, farms, and the rapidly growing population. Annual subsidence of several centimeters measured at many Pampanga well-sites has been independently confirmed by recent geodetic resurveys. Social research refines and enriches our physical dataset by tapping and quantifying the regional population’s long-term experience of both storm and tidal flooding. Sociological data regarding floods and tides from 53 sites indicate regional subsidence of 3-8 cm/y since 1991. Hidden underground and slow, subsidence escapes attention and allows gradual, short-time fixes for worsening floods. Perhaps only a worst-case deluge from simultaneous high tides, storm surges and rains will educate the people and bring about proper mitigation. Government efforts favor short-term political contingency over efficacy. Local politicians build wells to court votes; most national leaders are unaware of subsidence, and foreign engineering consultants ignore, deny or minimize the importance of subsidence. Expensive, ineffective dredging and diking projects, funded with foreign loans that stipulate the use of foreign expertise and ignore Filipino scientists, are vulnerable to corruption. People whose only assets are ancestral homes and lots are reluctant to recognize that their own wells are a major cause of flooding. They demand engineering solutions, but make them even more ineffectual by refusing rights-of-way. Flooding can be ameliorated in the short-term by restoring channel widths and modifying aquaculture. Reforestation would increase infiltration and decrease erosion and siltation. Rapid subsidence will persist if groundwater use is not considerably augmented by surface sources. Even so, flooding from both natural compaction and global sea level rise will continue. Adaptive solutions must be implemented, either ad hoc or by enlightened land-use.

17 INTRODUCTION increased runoff due to expanding pavement; encroachment of channels Manila Bay is bordered to the north by informal settlers and fishponds and northeast by the deltaic plains of (Nippon Koei 2001); and choking of many rivers that drain Bataan, streams by improper garbage disposal Pampanga, Bulacan, and the northern (Orejas 2000). Upland deforestation Manila suburban area called also contributes, by increasing runoff, KAMANAVA, an acronym derived slope erosion, and channel filling. from the names of the Kaloocan, Malabon, Navotas and Valenzuela (Fig. Only recently (Tacio 1999a, 1). The region’s highly developed agri- 1999b) have the Philippine public and and aquaculture make it both a “rice decision makers begun to recognize and sugar basket” and “fish basket.” that global warming is causing Except for Metro Manila, which also worldwide sea level rise to rise about relies heavily on surface sources, 2mm/y (Turekian 1996, Mimura 1998, artesian springs and groundwater from Pirazzoli 1998, Mimura and Harasawa shallow and deep wells are the main 2000). They have yet to accept that source of fresh water for domestic, northern Manila Bay is subsiding more recreational and industrial uses, than ten times faster, like deltaic areas fishponds, and, to a lesser extent, rice are all over the world where water is fields. being pumped too quickly out of the ground. Planned and proposed flood- Worsening floods in this region mitigation measures, which include have been drawing much attention multi-billion-peso dredging and diking over the past decade. Since the 1991 projects, ignore or minimize the Pinatubo eruption, flooding has been subsidence phenomenon, and thus enhanced in southwestern Pampanga, could well be futile. where channels have been choked with great amounts of eruption debris Our study of the role of the brought down by lahars (flowing different factors that contribute to slurries of volcanic debris) and more worsening floods and subsidence dilute runoff. Long before 1991, began in the Pampanga portion of the however, the area was already coastal plain in 1998, funded by the notoriously flood-prone and was Center for Integrative and already experiencing increasing flood Developmental Studies of the frequency, magnitude and duration. University of the Philippines (Siringan Furthermore, coastal Bataan, Bulacan and Rodolfo 2001:1-5). Our continuing and KAMANAVA, which received research on the entire bayhead region virtually no Pinatubo sediment, are integrates physical and social also suffering from aggravated approaches and has been funded since flooding. Clearly, factors independent 2001 by the Department of Agriculture of Pinatubo are more important. The (Siringan and Rodolfo 2002a). The more widely cited of these include the humanitarian organization Oxfam various effects of unchecked Great Britain—Philippines has provided urbanization: decreased infiltration and funding for supplementary research

18 and for disseminating our findings level translate to large encroachments to local governments and non- of the sea. Marshy and cut by governmental organizations (Siringan numerous tidal inlets, the more and Rodolfo 2002b). This report seaward flats are almost entirely summarizes our physical findings and converted to fishponds that continue our social data. We examine trends to encroach northward and occupy in population growth insofar as they larger portions of channels. Areas still might reflect how the communities on above tidal influence are planted to the plains might be responding to two annual rice crops. Paddies are enhanced flooding. Lastly, we discuss converted to fishponds with the the physical and anthropogenic factors progress of saltwater intrusion, which that worsen the flooding, propose already extends more than 20 km avenues for continuing research, and inland in some places. suggest several measures that could Manila Bay tides are predominantly mitigate the problem. diurnal, with a vertical range of 1.25 meters. The highest spring tide of Geology, geography, and climate record, 1.93 meters, was set on July The flood-prone coastal lowlands 4, 2000 (Nippon Koie 2001), during a constitute almost 3,000 km2 of the period of sustained monsoonal winds southern central valley of Luzon Island, (unpublished NAMRIA records). By an from the Pampanga communities of unfortunate combination of coastal Angeles City and Arayat town in the configuration and seasonal winds, the north, to the coast that stretches same southerly and westerly airflows eastward and southward from that deliver the annual rains also pile northeastern Bataan to KAMANAVA up seawater at the western coasts, (Fig. 1). To the west, the area is temporarily raising sea level and bounded by volcanic rocks of the hindering storm runoff from draining eastern Zambales Mountains, including seaward. Empirical data regarding the Mount Pinatubo and its two dormant extent of wave setup and storm surge sisters, Mts. Natib and Mariveles, are very few – a great lack; however, which form the Bataan peninsula. To surge can easily raise tide heights by the east, the plains abut the Sierra 80 percent (Siringan and Ringor 1998), Madre Mountains. Geophysical data and twice, during typhoons in 1972 and exploratory boreholes show that and 1976, waves superimposed on deltaic and shallow-marine sediments storm surge lifted and drove sea-going and sedimentary rocks more than 7 cargo vessels aground on the km thick have accumulated over the breakwaters of Manila’s Roxas last 24 million years (Bureau of Energy Boulevard (Brand et al. 1979). Development 1986). Rainfall is distinctly seasonal, The coastal plains are so flat and about 70 percent arriving during the close to sea level that the 1 meter rainiest months of June through elevation extends 10-20 km inland, September, when southwesterly and so even small rises in relative sea monsoonal winds bring in maritime

19 Figure 1. Location Map of the Area Around Northern Manila Bay

20 equatorial air from the South China forms the Pampanga Bay. Since 1991, Sea. The most intense precipitation is this part of the shore has been brought directly by three or four annual receiving great quantities of volcanic typhoons, and by southwesterly sediment, but the nearshore bay floor airflow enhanced by more distal has not shoaled appreciably since typhoons, about 17 of which enter 1961 (Siringan and Ringor 1998). Philippine space every year. Typhoons Clearly, sedimentation is being offset and typhoon-enhanced monsoonal by local subsidence. flow is responsible for about half of all the rainfall (Umbal and Rodolfo 1996). Annual precipitation varies METHODS greatly in the region, depending upon whether or not an area lies in the lee Physical of the Zambales Mountains and Bataan peninsula. Thus, San Fernando City Siringan and Rodolfo (in press) receives only about 1,900 mm, have described the physical aspects, whereas Manila receives more than methods and findings of our research twice as much, typically in excess of in detail. A time-series analysis of 4,000 mm (unpublished NAMRIA selected bandwidths sensitive to the records). presence of water in satellite images (Balboa 2002) has revealed subtle but It is a great pity that such an valuable documentation of how the abundance of rain is so seasonal, and distribution of waterlogged areas has that surface reservoirs are too small evolved between 1989 and 2001. to store enough water for the Using global positioning systems agriculture, fishponds, and domestic (GPS), we have gathered precise needs of the regional population, elevation data at 19 stations, which which must rely far too heavily are expected to yield subsidence data on groundwater. Two serious when reoccupied in several years. consequences are rapid ground Sediment cores from 32 stations as subsidence and enhanced storm and long as 10.2 meters are being analyzed tidal floods, the central topics of this for evidence of changing environment. report. Several regional lineaments defined by drastic contrasts in false-color satellite North and northeastern Manila Bay images are yet to be tested as possible receives approximately 1.2 x 1011 m3 faults using microseismic records and of water from the Pampanga and ground-truthing that will include numerous other rivers. Even before ground-penetrating radar surveys. the 1991 Pinatubo eruption, the greatest source of bay sediment, about 1.2 x 106 tonnes annually (JICA 1982) Sociological was Pinatubo and adjacent portions We augment our physical of the Zambales mountains, and yet, approaches with social research curiously, the receiving northwestern methods. Information is gathered from shoreline, instead of bulging seaward, area residents in three ways: indepth

21 interviews of key informants from barangays information regarding the each barangay (village), social surveys, following: and meetings and discussion fora at Emerging well pipes as indicators which we present and validate our • of ground subsidence; saltwater analyses and findings, as well as elicit intrusion; information on wells, reactions and responses. including depth, when constructed A key informant from each and/or modified, who constructed barangay provides community-level them, and the sizes of the information such as locations of population they serve. emerging water-wells, changes in land Siltation of river channels use, severity of flooding, and heights • and extents of maximum tides. The • Flooding histories of the areas, 1991 Pinatubo eruption was such a including their heights, durations, dramatic event that it serves well as and recurrence intervals. a historical benchmark with which to gauge changes in flood and maximal • Changes in inland tidal levels and tide heights. Each informant is a surface saltwater incursion and longtime resident of the barangay with attendant changes in vegetation good recall of events, preferably a especially along coastal towns. leader from government, civic, • Agriculture and aquaculture religious, or other nongovernment histories of the areas. organizations. Beginning in Pampanga, muni- Our survey questionnaires were cipalities were selected to identify and initially designed, tested and used in map the spatial variations of the Pampanga (Siringan et al. 2002: 58- factors contributing to relative sea 59), and then modified and applied in level change in the region. Of the 22 Bulacan and KAMANAVA. These Pampanga municipalities, 11 were instruments were developed from a selected and classified according to: preliminary list of initial questions that location in noncoastal areas less prone was pretested in Sta. Rita, a barangay to flooding; flood-prone noncoastal in Minalin municipality that is flooded areas; and coastal areas highly for more than six months of the year. susceptible to flooding, these last two The results were used to refine the being assigned the highest priority. survey questionnaire and to develop a Susceptibility to flooding is fairly guide with which to interview key uniform in each municipality, and so informants. That guide in turn was pre- only two of its barangays were tested in San Rafael Baruya, Lubao, selected to represent it. From each Pampanga, which always is flooded of these barangays, three households by high tides, and in San Vicente, and one key informant were Bacolor, a barangay previously interviewed. This methodology affected by floods and lahars. continues to be refined, and is being The survey instrument solicits from applied to three barangays in Bataan, individual households of selected 15 barangays in five coastal Bulacan

22 municipalities, and four KAMANAVA waterlogged areas, by enlarging its barangays. In all, we have interviewed alluvial fan on the deltaic flats, and by 208 people from 53 barangays. The constructing a cuspate delta about 5 questionnaire data are still being km. long with an area of about 1 km2 analyzed using the Statistical Package (Balboa and Siringan, in prep.). The for Social Sciences (SPSS). Most of Pampanga River, diked after the the data are nominal, thus, only eruption, has also lengthened its delta statistics such as frequencies and to a similar degree. Lahars that have percentages were generated. descended along the Pasig-Potrero River since the eruption and buried the Some of our most important data town of Bacolor to maximal depths of are yielded by changes in water wells. 9 meters have built up a new swath Since 1998, in an area of more than of dry ground about 2 km. wide and 100 km2 north of Pampanga Bay, local 10 km. long. New waterlogged people have reported numerous wells locations, each a few km2 in area, have that are rising out of the surrounding also appeared in Pampanga. Most ground. We inform them that it is the notably, the area east of the lower land subsiding instead. Many wells are Pampanga River, which was freed indoors; others are provided with box- from Pinatubo sedimentation by dikes like enclosures. At such sites, portions built after the eruption, is now of floors or enclosure walls attached waterlogged. to the pipes buckle or shear vertically away from the rest of the structure Water-well and road-raising data during subsidence. If homeowners or neighbors can provide the construction Respondents report well depths in dates, it is easy to calculate the rates lengths and half-lengths of 20-foot of subsidence. Other significant pipe. No wells less than 36.6 meters information documents subsidence (120 ft) deep display effects of rates from historical changes in subsidence, but 27 wells seated more flooding and tidal invasion. than 36.6 meters deep have yielded subsidence rates, typically several millimeters or centimeters every year, RESULTS averaging about 2.5 cm/y. These rates are consistent with the estimates Satellite data based on accounts that some areas that stood above tide levels 30 years The analysis of 1989 and 2001 ago are now frequently flooded almost satellite images by Balboa (2002) a meter deep during high tide. shows that the coastal wetlands are Subsidence rates we gathered from now more sharply confined by emergent wells have been fishpond dikes that have been raised independently verified in 2001 by against rising relative sea level. In geodetic engineers of the Department northwestern Pampanga, volcanic of Public Works and Highways sediment carried down from Pinatubo (DPWH), who reoccupied six by the Pasig-Potrero river has reduced benchmarks, five of which were

23 established in the 1950s and one in almost always cause flooding. High- 1999 (Nippon Koei 2001). We were tide floods already were common 12 skeptical about anecdotal reports that years ago in coastal Pampanga, but roads have to be raised about 0.5 since the eruption, owing to the meter annually at the coastal Barangay choking of waterways by lahars, (village) Batang Segundo in Lubao, prolonged flooding has transformed Pampanga, until a benchmark that Pampanga’s inland municipalities into DPWH established there in 1999 virtual wetlands. Guagua and parts confirmed a 0.46 cm/y subsidence rate of Sasmuan and Lubao are flooded for when it was reoccupied in 2001. 6 months, Minalin usually for almost 9 months, Macabebe for 3 weeks to Respondents have reported that one month. roads have been frequently raised in order to keep them navigable during Floods have similarly become more the rains. We need to point out that, frequent and longer-lasting in Bulacan unless care is taken to provide the and KAMANAVA. Closer to Manila, roads with culverts, one unintentional most coastal barangays of Malolos, result is to hinder the seaward flow of Obando and Hagonoy floodwaters take floodwaters and enhance flooding. from a half to an entire day to subside. Furthermore, most houses and lots In coastal barangays further north, along the roads are not raised also, floods take from 2 or 3 days to as and are seriously flooded even if the much as a week to recede. Inhabitants road stands above the water. attribute the worsening floods to siltation and encroachment of Enhanced flood and high tide levels channels by fishponds. Pariahan, a reported by informants small sitio (hamlet) in Bulacan municipality just a few hundred meters Over the 12 years since the 1991 from Manila Bay, is now permanently Pinatubo eruption, Bulacan and flooded by seawater because its KAMANAVA residents report, the seawalls were damaged by typhoons. worst annual floods have increased in height by 0.2-1 meter. Bataan and Response of the flooding victims Pampanga informants reported equivalent increases of 0.3-1 meter. We have presented our findings to These values yield subsidence rates numerous gatherings of local ranging from 1.7 to 8.3 cm/y. More government and nongovernmental typical values are between 2.5 and 5 organizations since 1999, and have cm/y. In coastal communities, learned how difficult it is to convince typhoons and southwest monsoons the local people of the role of used to trigger floods that typically subsidence in aggravating the flooding. lasted only about 2 hours, peaking People are deeply attached to places during high tides. Now, tidal flooding and communities where they have sometimes takes an entire day to lived for generations. For many, their subside. In the more inland ancestral homes and lots are their only municipalities, even moderate rains assets. The government is too poor

24 to resettle them elsewhere, and is scenario would involve simultaneous already committed to expensive record tides raised by long-lasting engineering solutions — which, storm surges and waves and sustained although probably ineffective and even rains like those that caused Luzon’s dangerous, the desperate flood victims record floods in 1972. In KAMANAVA are eager to believe will work. alone, more than two million Filipinos are at risk. Understandably, some people are reluctant to recognize that their own Population change 1990 to 2000 excessive, even prodigal use of groundwater contributes to From 1990 to 2000 the Philippine subsidence and the consequent population grew 26 percent, to 76.5 flooding. Part of the difficulty lies in million, but the five-year rate of the fact that the process is hidden increase slowed from 13 percent in underground. It is much easier to 1995 to 11.5 percent in 2000 assign all blame to the many visible (POPCOM 2000). The 4.2 percent causes at the surface, like encroaching annual growth rate is exceeded in East fishponds and slum housing, water Asia only by Singapore’s 4.3 percent hyacinths (“water lilies”), and garbage. and those of Brunei and Cambodia, Many do understand the each 2.4 percent. consequences of excessive groundwater use but having been Philippine coastal plains are home denied of alternative sources, they to 63 percent of the country’s have resigned themselves to the population, and are also where farming worsening situation. Many and aquaculture are most extensive. acknowledge that free-flowing wells Preeminent among these is the must aggravate the subsidence, but coastal-estuarine region that surrounds fear that a well might not flow again, northern Manila Bay, which increased or might yield dirty water after it is in population much more rapidly than temporarily closed. Others would like the nation as a whole, by 39 percent to take action, but do not know to from 4,907,519 in 1990 to 5,690,861 whom they can turn. in 2000 (POPCOM 1990, 1995, 2000). Much of this growth is related Unlike an earthquake or volcanic to proximity to Metro Manila; of the eruption, the worsening floods are three provinces, Bataan is the farthest gradual, and permit temporary, stop- and has the smallest coastal gap solutions. Optimism is rampant population, only 202,310 in 2000 during the few flood-free months, and after growing 28 percent since 1990 people want to forget the wet and (Table 1). discomfort. We can only fervently hope that it will take less than a Pampanga’s coastal and estuarine catastrophic deluge to educate the population grew from 903,757 in people and bring about proper 1990 to 1,082,892 in 2000, an mitigation of this continuing “slow- increase of 20 percent. Although large, motion catastrophe”. A worst-case this rate was only about half that of

25 Table 1. Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 in Communities of the Coastal Plains Surrounding Northern Manila Bay

26 the entire region, probably due in large Proximity of Bulacan to Manila is part to the 1991 Pinatubo eruption and largely responsible for the extremely its aftermath. The most dramatic rapid growth of its coastal population: decline was experienced by Bacolor 48.4 percent from 1990 to 2000, and municipality, the one most damaged 25.4 percent from 1995 to 2000. by lahars, which descended down the Strikingly, the notoriously flood-prone Pasig-Potrero River. After burial of the and tidally invaded town of Obando town proper to an average depth of lagged far behind all other Bulacan 6.5 meters by lahars of 1991, 1994 municipalities, growing only 14.2 and 1995 (Crittenden and Rodolfo percent from 1990 to 2000, and only 2001), Bacolor had lost over 80 2.8 percent over the last five years of percent of its inhabitants, and, despite that period. Other especially flood- subsequent returnees, by 2000 had prone Bulacan municipalities growing suffered an overall decadal decline of at below-average rates include 76 percent. Santo Tomas municipality, Hagonoy, Paombong, Bocaue, farther downstream from Bacolor, Bulacan, and Meycauayan. suffered from heavy volcanic siltation KAMANAVA is officially part of and lost 11 percent of its population Metro Manila, but lagged in growth by 1995, but had recovered most behind Bulacan, mainly because of this loss by 2000, presumably Malabon shrank by 2.5 percent, and because many evacuees returned. Navotas grew only 0.6 percent. It is Nevertheless, Santo Tomas also probably no coincidence that those experienced a small decadal population two metropolitan municipalities are the decline, -1.5 percent. most flooded by rainstorms and high It is notable that many of the most tides. Between 1995 and 2000, flood-prone Pampanga municipalities Malabon actually lost population, experienced the slowest decadal Navotas had negligible growth, and population growth, and declined even both Kalookan and Valenzuela more during the post-lahar period 1995 experienced sharp declines in growth to 2000; for example, the Santo rates. Tomas growth of 10.4 percent was anemic by regional standards, and may reflect enhanced flooding. Even more DISCUSSION flood-prone are the towns of Minalin, Our research involved both natural Sasmuan, Guagua, and Masantol, and social science methods. If either which between 1990 and 2000 approach had been used alone, we respectively grew at rates of only 1.0, would not have attained our most 10.5, 10.6, and 14.0 percent. valuable results. Furthermore, the populations of all these towns, together with those of Bacolor and Santo Tomas, experienced Groundwater, subsidence, and slowing growths between 1995 and relative sea level 2000. Coastal floods are increasingly bothersome occurrences everywhere

27 in the world where cities satisfy the weight over each mud layer squeezes water needs of rapidly growing water out of it, compressing it, and populations by pumping too much causing the surface to slowly but water out of the ground, causing the continuously subside, at rates of no land to subside. Tokyo, Osaka, more than a few millimeters per year. Shanghai, Bangkok, Hanoi and Jakarta Autocompaction rates around Manila are other metropolises on East Asian Bay should be comparable to those deltaic and coastal plains that have observed on the Po delta of Italy (0.75 experienced this serious problem mm/y — Carminati and Di Donato (Table 2). An excellent correlation has 1999), and the Mississippi delta in been established between the the United States (0.9-3.7 mm/y — apparent rise in sea level and Kuecher et al., 1993; average 1.8 mm/ increasing groundwater usage in Metro y — Penland et al. 1988). Such rates Manila since the 1960s (Siringan and are only of the magnitude of global Ringor 1998:29-40, Siringan and sea level rise. Rodolfo, in press). The sandy and gravelly layers How intensive groundwater encased in the thick delta muds are extraction causes land to subside has called “aquifers” – Latin for “water been understood for a long time (e.g., bearers” — because rainwater that cf. Lofgren 1965, Poland 1984). Most percolates into the ground is stored in deltaic river sediment is mud, with pores between their grains, which are lesser layers of sand and gravel. Even relatively large, and thus easy for without human activity, deltas subside water to flow through and for wells naturally as these sediments to tap. Mud contains much more continually accumulate. They water than gravel or sand, but its pores “autocompact” the accumulating are so much finer that water cannot

Table 2. Subsidence of East Asian Cities due to Groundwater Withdrawal

SUBSIDENCE LOCATION PERIOD meters cm/y Reference

Tokyo, Japan 1900-1976 4.6 2.7 Yamamoto, 1984 Osaka, Japan 1934-1968 2.8 8.2 Yamamoto, 1984 Shanghai, China 1921-1965 2.63 6.0 Shi and Bao, 1984 Hanoi, Vietnam 1988-1993 0.1-0.3 2-6 Nguyen, 2001 Manila Bay, Philippines 1991-2003 0.2-1.0 1.7-8.3 This paper 0.3-0.6 2.5-5.0* 1962-2002 average 3.0 Bangkok, Thailand 1980-1990 0.5-1.0 5-10 Anonymous, 2001 2001 1.5-2.2** Jakarta, Indonesia 1991-1999 0.3-0.8 4-10 Abidin et al., 2001 * More typical values **After raising taxes on groundwater

28 flow through them very easily. If, replaced with great quantities of however, water is pumped out of an groundwater. Many fishponds have aquifer faster than it can be been illegally enlarged by encroaching replenished by natural percolation, the into tidal channels and are guarded by pressure is reduced in the aquifer, heavily armed private armies, and so which forcibly sucks water out of the we cannot measure the pumped surrounding mud to refill its pores. In volumes. To be assessed and effect, over-usage of groundwater can regulated, this usage would require speed up natural compaction and government action, backed by court subsidence by an order of magnitude. injunctions and troops, if necessary. It is important to note that dewatering In the meantime, we can only of clays and resulting subsidence are speculate that fishpond pumps may irreversible. Water-well data from cause as much land subsidence as it Pampanga document that subsidence does in the Yun-Lin area of Taiwan, rates over the past 30 years commonly where extensive fishponds use so exceeded 3 cm/year. If subsidence much groundwater that they have from groundwater withdrawal is the caused the land to subside 0.66 meter only significant mechanism that from 1989 to1997 (Liu et al. 2001), caused the rise in relative sea level causing an 8.2 cm/y subsidence rate. since 1991 indicated by our Either coincidentally or significantly, sociological data, it has accelerated to that rate is virtually equal to the as fast as 8.3 cm/y. maximum 8.3 cm/y our sociological data yield for Bulacan. It is important to recognize that groundwater use by individual families Large volumes of groundwater also may not be the greatest producer of are used for the recreational purposes land subsidence. People complain that of the well-to-do. Golf courses and their domestic artesian wells stop swimming pools are maintained by flowing when large-volume pumps groundwater during the dry seasons, start up to irrigate large plantations or and regulations of these activities are when fishponds are flushed and also not enforced. refilled. As our work has expanded from Pampanga eastward into Bulacan Government response and KAMANAVA, we have become aware of the great quantities of Our research has obvious groundwater that are extracted for relevance for the Department of fishponds. A current aquacultural Agriculture, which seeks to anticipate practice is to provide the fish with too and adjust to rising regional sea level much feed. What is not eaten is with timely and efficient land-use consumed by bacteria, which use up planning. Other government responses the oxygen dissolved in the water. at both the national and local levels Effectively poisoned, the water is have been disappointing. Indeed, to flushed into the sea – deteriorating the woo and reward voters, local environment of free-living species to politicians actually enhance the the detriment of Bay fishers – and subsidence by needlessly proliferating

29 wells. Driven by the three- and six- (Cervantes 2001, Orejas 2001a) and year electoral cycles, government angry legislators (Orejas 2001b). efforts seem to favor short-term Armed citizens may even confront field political contingencies over efficacy, engineers. A political settlement may and largely consist of “palliative” be arrived at (Orejas 2002), but only measures — soothing the anxious at the expense of the ability of the public by displaying measures that project to accomplish its physical actually accomplish little. purpose. Rights-of-way owners are least reluctant to lose land if it has An excellent case in point is the already been devalued by flooding and “Third River” flood-control channel in tidal invasion. Pampanga (Nippon Koei 2001: 1-1- 8- 1). Designed to alleviate the chronic The project must go on, however, flooding in Guagua, Lubao and because interests other than those of Sasmuan towns, the channel was hazard mitigation come into play. positioned in an area known by the While still in office, President Joseph Japanese and other foreign Estrada, a foremost authority on consultants to be flooded during Philippine corruption, reported at a maximum tide. Worse, it follows very conference in Seoul that government closely the locus of fastest subsidence projects routinely lose 20 percent to that these consultants measured and graft and corruption (Marfil 1999). mapped for DPWH (Siringan and That figure is over and above the 10 Rodolfo 2002). The project was percent that Philippine law allows approved and initiated long before project proponents in congress to Filipino scientists outside of DPWH claim as finders’ fees. The money learned of such details. appropriated for the Third River project was about a billion pesos (Orejas The most benign interpretation 2002, Roxas 2002). of why the channel was thus situated precisely where it would be least The history of how the effective could well be the correct one: government built and maintains dikes that this inappropriate site is the only to contain the lahars that rains one the landowners will permit. Local continue to trigger 12 years after the authorities often complain that the 1991 Pinatubo eruption is instructive national government planners do (Rodolfo 1995: 203, 291, 299, 302- not consult them sufficiently (Rodolfo 304). Initially, little effort was 1995: 262), and is frequently remiss expended to determine the properties in remunerating the owners of the and behaviors of lahars in order to property that it expropriates by power engineer properly against them. of eminent domain (e.g, cf. , Lacuarta Instead, what appeared to guide the 1993). Owners resist, and political plans was how much money the pressures come to bear. The Third legislature might be willing to disburse. River project has encountered Dikes thus restricted in expense and public demonstrations, news- quality were built, failed, and were paper accounts of outraged citizenry rebuilt, either in original form or with

30 token improvements in design, only to equipped with flood-control gates, and fail again. Nevertheless, funds pumps. The project is being funded continue to be appropriated for their with Japanese loans that burgeoned repair (Orejas 2003b). from P2.15 billion in 1998 to 3.9 billion in 2002 (Cruz 2002) to P5 billion in Containing floods by confining a 2003 (Nocum 2003), a growth that channel with dikes is a nineteenth likely reflects ad hoc planning, and century approach that in the new could well project even higher ultimate millennium is being questioned and costs. successfully opposed in developed countries. Decision makers in The designers plan to pump out developing countries have not yet floodwaters during low tides, but learned that the practice ultimately is sustained southernly winds can raise counterproductive in two ways. First, sea level significantly for days, it at best can only postpone floods. It rendering the structure not only traps sediments that raise the channel ineffective, but quite possibly bed, thus requiring that the dikes be enhancing the hazard by giving to the raised again and again. This can go endangered an undeserved sense on only so long; at some point, if they of security and complacency. have been raised to the limit, or if Furthermore, plans for another ongoing funds for repair are lacking, a hundred- DPWH project produced by the same year flood will top and breach them, consulting firm (Nippon Koei 2001: 2- releasing floods of catastrophic 6 – 2-8, T-1) report that Manila can magnitude, like the 1993 Mississippi experience southerly wind speeds Valley disaster in the United States. exceeding 220 km/h (34 m/s), and Second, the sediments trapped in the waves 3.7 m high have been recorded channel are denied to the floodplains at Manila’s port. Typhoon winds and that are intrinsic, vital parts of the waves historically have been so severe river’s domain and ecology. If not in Manila Bay that the U. S. Navy tampered with, deltas slowly build declared it an unsafe haven during seaward because the sediment that typhoons: floods normally deposit on the floodplains more than compensates for During [typhoon] Patsy, which passed over Manila [in 1970], high winds and the loss of elevation from seas sank 21 fishing boats near the autocompaction and subsidence. North Harbor. Larger vessels dragged Ironically, building dikes to prevent anchor or broke loose. Six of them flooding arrests this natural were driven aground or smashed compensative process, and thus in the against Roxas Boulevard ... [Typhoon] long run contributes to flooding. Ora repeated this tragedy a few years later [in 1972], when another six Another expensive project of oceangoing vessels were swept into doubtful efficacy is the project the breakwater (Brand et al. 1979: designed to protect KAMANAVA both 297). from storm and tidal flooding, a complex of polder dikes, river walls

31 For the KAMANAVA project, the Kansai International Airport may help Japanese consultants released a “Final counteract an unfortunate Filipino Report” on 28 August 1998 tendency to accept foreign expertise (Konekahara 1998), an “Interim too uncritically. The airport was built Report” almost four years later (Kin 4 on an artificial island in Osaka Bay at May 2001), and a “Sectoral Report” a cost of 17 billion U.S. dollars and dealing principally with soil mechanics opened in 1994. The planners dated August 2001. None of these projected it to sink about 11.6 meters documents mention the energies and in 50 years. It took only six years to durations of typhoon winds, the sizes, do so (Yamaguchi 2000). energies, and durations of the surges We must point out that subsidence and storm waves they generate, or the and aggravated flooding from construction details that give the groundwater use share the root cause structures a chance of containing, or of so many other Philippine problems. even surviving, such conditions. Along with increasing deforestation, To protect the northern soil erosion and lethal landslides, KAMANAVA area that is already at or garbage disposal, over-crowded below mean sea level, the plans classrooms, joblessness, and, to the include a polder dike 8.6 km. long, detriment of the Filipino family, the composed only of earth, standing only increasing economic reliance of the 2.1 meters above mean sea level. country on overseas workers, it stems Even discounting storm waves, surges from rapid population growth. Given driven by typhoon winds can raise the national fondness for children and sea level temporarily to overtop lack of political will to limit population this height. The 2001 Sectoral Report size, all such problems can only be acknowledged 2.57 cm/y of expected to worsen inexorably. subsidence resulting from Regional population statistics groundwater use. Even though that (Table 1) may already be reflecting the figure probably is already too low, a environmental deterioration of the rate of only 0.65 cm/y was region. Overall five-year Metro Manila incorporated into the design to growth has slowed down from 18.5 minimize the role of continuing percent in 1995 to 5.1 percent in subsidence and its implications for 2000, and it is widely felt that the future maintenance costs. Responding quality of life there, particularly in to criticism (Orejas 2003a), a DPWH coastal areas, is being worsened by official and a consultant denied the flooding. The most flood-prone contents and omissions of their own communities that display sharply reports and insisted that their designs declining or even negative growth had taken storms and waves into include Malabon and Navotas in account (Nocum 2003, Philippine Star KAMANAVA and the towns of Orani 2003). in Bataan, Obando in Bulacan, and Learning about mistakes the Minalin, Sasmuan and Guagua in Japanese made in building their own Pampanga.

32 SOME RECOMMENDATIONS that permanently poisons the freshwater aquifers. The Water Code Reducing groundwater usage requires that free-flowing groundwater be conserved with valves, and even Abuse of our groundwater is the specifies how far apart wells can be most serious cause of increased spaced depending on how much water flooding and demands our most urgent is drawn from them. One change attention. Barring a successful would be necessary, for the code campaign to reduce population exempts wells shallower than 10 growth, the only remedy is to meters. The topmost sediment layer drastically curtail its use. Two usually is the most waterlogged and approaches are indicated: First, land the most easily dewatered and subsidence would be slowed to compacted, and shallow wells are whatever extent groundwater is great in number. replaced with surface sources. The region is entirely bordered by To be successfully implemented, mountains, on which small dams could the code must limit wells to a be built to store water, both in surface reasonably small, enforceable number, reservoirs as well as underground. On properly run and regulated by local the family level in other places in the governments. People would have to world such as Bermuda, the roof of pay for water piped from such sources, every house is built to funnel all but appropriate payment for this rainwater into cisterns. fundamental resource would engender respect for it, and its conservation. Second, if groundwater is to Bangkok was able to reduce its continue to be a major source of water, subsidence from 5-10 cm/y to about it must be protected by proper, 2 cm/y because the principal wells regulated use. A good Water Code were industrial. The politico-economic and Implementing Rules and solution was to raise taxes on wells Regulations were promulgated by the until it became cheaper to import National Water Resources Council surface water (Government of decades ago (NWRCP 1979), but its Thailand 2001: 46). requirements are virtually ignored, beginning with the first one: drilling In a just world, efficient regulation permits. They dictate that pump users properly would begin with the most must consider the possibility of prolific and wasteful users, but “mining” and its other bad fishpond owners, and those who enjoy consequences besides land the use of resorts and golf courses, subsidence. Mining – drawing out are wealthy and influential. more water than the environment can Before successful regulation, replace — sucks progressively deeper education; people should not only be wells dry as it lowers the water table. encouraged and exhorted to conserve In coastal areas, it causes “saltwater groundwater, but also empowered to intrusion” — it draws in salty do so. For example, there is some groundwater from beneath the ocean

33 justification for the fear that turning lies in provinces not affected by the artesian wells off and on may soil the flooding, for example, those with water, or permanently divert the flow deforested slopes. to other wells. New wells can be The greater part of the Philippine equipped with gravel packs to avoid population, residing on coastal plains, those problems (Driscoll 1986: 438- is squeezed, figuratively, between the 427), and research is needed to two jaws of a vise: its own rapid determine if existing wells can be growth, and the subsidence and retrofitted with such devices. flooding generated by its own use of groundwater. Other coastal areas that Other long-term flood- could be experiencing the same mitigating measures phenomena include Lingayen Gulf, For the better known causes of Davao, and Agusan. flooding, the answers are also well We may take bleak comfort in understood, easily stated, but difficult realizing that subsidence from to implement. The nation must stop groundwater over-usage is a process using waterways as garbage dumps that is self-enhancing at present, but and housing sites. Original channels must be self-limiting in the future, even widths must be restored where illegally without proper regulation. As the widened fishponds have been choking growing population continues to them. Floodwaters should be allowed extract excess amounts of to occupy larger floodplain areas, as groundwater, subsidence, and nature has intended. attendant tidal incursion and storm Reforestation is very important in flooding can only get worse. the long term. Upland forests reduce Eventually, however, either or both of and delay runoff by increasing two consequences will force the infiltration, which also replenishes the exorbitant use of groundwater to slow groundwater. By protecting the soil, down. First, the groundwater may be they reduce erosion and siltation in so depleted, or so contaminated by lowland channels; further, if the runoff saltwater intrusion that its use will from the uplands are carrying less have to stop. Secondly, subsidence sediment than they are capable of and attendant tidal and storm flooding transporting as they arrive at the may render portions of the coastal coastal plains, they will erode and plains no longer habitable, which unclog the waterways during floods. would also result in reduced pumping. If any of these measures are to be In the end, though, whatever effective, they cannot be performed subsidence has happened will be town by town or even province by permanent, because the dewatering province. Nationally coordinated and compaction of clays is an efforts are needed because part of the irreversible process. flood problem in the coastal lowlands

34 REFERENCES Abidin, H.Z., Djaja R. Darmawan, D. Hadi, S. Akbar, A. Rajiyowiryono, H. Sudibyo, Y. Meilano, I. Kasuma, MA. Kahar, and J. Subarya 2001 “Land Subsidence of Jakarta (Indonesia) and its Geodetic Monitoring System.” Natural Hazards 23(2-3):365-387. Allen, J.R.L. 1997 “Geological Impacts on Coastal Wetland Landscape: Some General Effects of Sediment Autocompaction in the Holocene of Northwest Europe.” The Holocene 9:1-12. Balboa, Vicente Jose S. 2002 Quantifying Spatial Variations in Waterlogged Areas of the Pampanga Delta Region. Masters thesis, Environmental Science Program, College of Science, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City:1-70. Bloom, A.L. 1964 “Peat Accumulation and Compaction in a Connecticut Coastal Marsh.” Journal of Sedimentary Petrology 34:599-603. Brand, Samson, John A. Douglas, and Dick de Angelis 1979 “Manila as a Typhoon Haven.” Mariners Weather Log 213(5):297- 305. Bureau of Energy Development 1986 Sedimentary Basins of the Philippines: Their Geology and Hydrocarbon Potential. Vol. II-A: Basins of Luzon and Volume VII: Well Summary Charts. Metro Manila: Bureau of Energy Development. Carminati, E., and G. Di Donato 1999 “Separating Natural and Anthropogenic Vertical Movements in Fast Subsiding Areas: The Po Plain (N. Italy) Case.” Geophysical Research Letters 26:2291-2294. Cervantes, Ding 2001 “Pampanga Townsfolk Oppose Third ‘Erap River.’” Philippine Star. 13 December. Commission on Population (POPCOM) 1990 State of the Philippine Population: 1990. 1995 State of the Philippine Population: 1995 2000 State of the Philippine Population Report (SPPR): http:// www.popcom.gov.ph/sppr. Cruz, Neal H. 2002 “P3.9-B Megadike will Stop the Floods.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. 12 July.

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36 Marfil, Martin P. 1999 “Estrada: ‘20% of Project Funds Lost to Grafters’”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 19 June 19. Mimura, N. 1998 Vulnerability of Island Countries in the South Pacific to Sea Level Rise and Climate Change. In N. Mimura (ed.) Climate Change Impacts and Responses: Proceedings, 1998 Conference on National Assessment Results of Climate Change, Costa Rica, Japan Environment, Agency and Overseas Environmental Cooperation Center:501-511. Mimura, N. and H. Harasawa (eds.) 2000 Data Book of Sea-Level Rise 2000. Center for Global Environmental Research, National Institute for Environmental Studies, Environmental Agency of Japan, 128pp. National Water Resources Council of the Philippines (NWRCP) 1979 Water Code and the Implementing Rules and Regulations. National Water Resources Council of the Philippines. Nguyen, Viet 2001 “Land Subsidence Due to Groundwater Extraction and its Effects on Pile Foundations.” Paper presented at the University of Sydney Civil Engineering Postgraduate Seminar Series 2000, 22 November. Nippon Koei Co., Ltd 2001 Interim Report: Monitoring and Planning of Flood Control Works on the Pasac Delta (Including Porac-Gumain River) and Third River Channel. Manila: Department of Public Works and Highways,1-1 – F-70. Nocum, Armand 2003 “Geologist Warned on Airing Camanava Dike Projections.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. 13 March. Orejas, Tonette 2000 “Flood Caused by Garbage, Says Governor.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. 10 July. 2001a “’Erap River’ Construction to Dislocate 1,000 Families.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. 13 December. 2001b “Solon Vows to Stop Eviction Due to Channel Construction.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. 17 December. 2002 “DPWH Heeds Clamor for New Floodwater Channel Design.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. 15 January.

37 2003a “Camanava Dike Design is Dangerous, Says Geologist.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. 8 March. 2003b “Continuous Rains Threaten 3 Dikes in Central Luzon.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. 6 June. Penland, S., K. E. Ramsey, R. A. McBride, J. T. Mestayer, and K. A. Westphal 1988 “Relative Sea Level Rise and Delta-plain Development in the Terrebonne Parish Region.” Coastal Geology Technical Report No. 4, Louisiana Geol. Surv. 121 p. Phienwej, N., P. H. Giao, and P. Nutalaya 1998 “Field Experiment of Artificial Recharge through a Well with Reference to Land Subsidence Control.” Engineering Geology 50 (1-2):187-201. Philippine Star 2003 “No Design Flaw in Camanava Dike, Says Expert.” Philippine Star. 18 March. Pirazzoli, P.A. 1998 Sea-level Changes: The Last 20,000 Years. London: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd. Pizzutto, J. E., and Schwendt, A.E. 1998 “Mathematical Modeling of Autocompaction of a Holocene Transgressive Valley Fill Deposit.” Wolfe Glande, Delaware. Geology, 25:57-60. Poland J. F. (ed.) 1984 Guidebook to Studies of Land Subsidence due to Groundwater Withdrawal. Paris: UNESCO. Rodolfo, Kelvin S. 1995 Pinatubo and the Politics of Lahar. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press. Roxas, Fred 1999 “P260 M Released for River Desilting.” Manila Bulletin. 16 August. 2002 “P1.3-B Pampanga River Project Finally gets off the Ground.” Manila Bulletin. 15 January. Shi Luxiang and Bao Manfang 1984 “Case History No. 9.2. Shanghai, China.” In J.E. Poland (ed.) Guidebook to Studies of Land Subsidence due to Groundwater Withdrawal. Paris:UNESCO:155-160. Siringan, F. P. and C. L. Ringor 1998 “Changes in Bathymetry and their Implications for Sediment Dispersal and Rates of Sedimentation in Manila Bay.” Science Diliman 9: 29- 40. 38 Siringan, F. P. and K. S. Rodolfo 2001 “Net Sea level Changes in the Pampanga Delta region: Causes and Consequences.” Final Report submitted to Center for Integrative and Developmental Studies. University of the Philippines:1-5. 2002a “Net Sea Level Change in the Pampanga Delta Region: Causes and Consequences.” First Year Project Report to Bureau of Agricultural Research, Department of Agriculture. 1-22. 2002b “Net Sea Level Change in the Pampanga Delta and Changes in Shoreline Position.” Final Report submitted to Oxfam Great Britain – Philippines, 17 December .1-26. In press “Relative Sealevel Changes and Worsening Floods in the Western Pampanga Delta: Causes and Some Possible Mitigation Measures.” Science Diliman. Tacio, Henrylito U. 1999a “Global Warming: A One-meter Rise in Sea Level will Submerge many RP Islands.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. 26 July. 1999b “Changes are Global and Irreversible.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. 9 August. Thu, T. M. and D.G. Fredlund 1999 “Modeling Subsidence in the Hanoi City Area, Vietnam.” Canadian Geotechnical Journal 37(3):621-637. Turekian, K.K. 1996 “Sea Level.” Global Environmental Change: Past, Present, and Future New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Chapter 6:103-122. Umbal, J. V., and K. S. Rodolfo 1996 “The 1991 Lahars of Southwestern Mount Pinatubo, Philippines, and the Evolution of a Lahar-dammed Lake.” In C. G. Newhall and R. S. Punongbayan (eds.) Fire and Mud: Eruption and Lahars of Mount Pinatubo, Philippines. Seatlle: University of Washington Press. 951- 970. Yamaguchi, Mari 2000 “Built on Artificial Island, Japanese Airport is Sinking.” Chicago Sun- Times. 23 October. Yamamoto, Soki 1984a “Case History No. 9.4. Tokyo, Japan.” In J.E. Poland (ed.) Guidebook to Studies of Land Subsidence due to Groundwater Withdrawal. Paris:UNESCO:175-184. 1984b “Case History No. 9.5. Osaka, Japan.“ In J. E. Poland (ed.) Guidebook to Studies of Land Subsidence due to Groundwater Withdrawal. Paris:UNESCO:185-194.

39 Zhang, A. Gen Sr., Huawen Chen, Jr., Zi Xin Wei, and Zheng Fang 2002 “Groundwater Resource Management in Order to Control Land Subsidence in Shanghai.” Proceedings Denver Annual Meeting.

40 How should Disasters be Managed? The Government’s View on Community-Based Disaster Management

Arnel Capili

While a disaster can strike an entire available locally, it can facilitiate a nation, its impact is felt most at the timely response which, in turn, can community level. It may strike one or spell a difference in saving lives and several communities at once. It is mitigating the loss of property. The these communities which constitute process of organizing also enhances what Carter refers to as ‘disaster the openness of those involved fronts’ (1991: 40). Despite the fact towards voluntarism, enabling the that they are hardest hit, communities community to reduce its dependence have the capacity to respond to on either the local or national threats. They are not passive government in times of disaster. recipients of aid. In fact, they have the capacity to support themselves. Wenger, writing about community A HIGHLY CENTRALIZED DISASTER response to disasters, submits that MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ‘[c]ommunities can be viewed as problem-solving entities’ (1978: 18). The Philippine Disaster It is for this reason that communities Management System is large and should be involved in managing the complex. It is fashioned after the risks that may threaten the welfare of military command structure, which is their members. characterized by top-down and logistics-centered responses. The Community, according to Hess and system is highly bureaucratic and Adams, is a ‘group of people, who frequently operates under explicit or create relations based on trust and implicit political constraints that mutuality, within the idea of shared impinge adversely on the effective responsibility for well-being’ (2001: delivery of emergency services. 24). ‘Shared responsibility’ connotes collective action towards achieving a This is ironic considering common goal. In the context of that Presidential Decree 1566 disaster management, the idea of (Strengthening the Philippine Disaster community participation is taken to Control Capability and Establishing the mean a group of people looking after National Program on Community their most vulnerable members. Disaster Preparedness) provides for a decentralized approach towards An organized community certainly disaster management. Laigo (1996) has its advantages. By using what is contends that the way policies laid out

41 in PD 1566 regarding disaster strategy should veer away from preparedness, sustaining the reliance on outside intervention capacibility for organizing, and because it is not always efficient and permeating the government set-up tends to encourage dependency with a developmental disaster (Anderson and Woodrow 1989, management philosophy, are Gledhill 2001, US OFDA 1998, implemented accounts for its Quarantelli 1997). Efficiency as weakness. oppose to effectiveness is more concerned with the process. PD 1566 explicitly states a policy Quarantelli differentiates efficiency of self-help and self-reliance during and effectiveness, the former “requires times of emergencies. It is also quite that the results be obtained in the best clear that “each political and possible way” while effectiveness administrative subdivision of the ‘means that a desired and intended country shall utilize all available result has been produced’ (1997: 43). resources in the area before asking for For example, a response operation by assistance from neighboring entities or the military may have effectively higher authority.” However, local evacuated a sizable number of victims disaster management systems are still from an endangered area but it may dependent on the national government not have been efficient in its use of because some, if not most, local resources, the time consumed or the governments do not have the capacity problems generated. or the resources to manage the threat themselves. Take for example the conduct of THE NDCC AND CBDM immediate lifesaving measures. Local The National Disaster Coordinating governments do not have the Council (NDCC), the highest policy- capability to effectively carry-out these making body in disaster management operations either because of the in the country is aware of the need to absence of a trained personnel or develop a more sustainable approach inadequate resources. More often than to managing disasters. One of the not, both constraints hamper effective approaches it has considered to ensure rescue operations at the local level. sustainability, efficiency and Hence, the conduct of such operations effectiveness in disaster management has become the purview of the Armed is the use of a community-based Forces of the Philippines, the national disaster management (CBDM) government agency with trained approach. personnel and the necessary equipment for immediate mobilization. This desire by the NDCC to adopt CBDM was articulated during the “First Is the present centralized set-up National Conference on Community- efficient? Commentators in the field based Disaster Management in the disaster management suggest that an Philippines.” From January 28-30, effective disaster management 2003, the NDCC and the Philippine

42 Disaster Management Forum jointly position to articulate their needs and organized a three-day conference decide on what is best for their workshop convened to provide a forum community. for disaster managers and These premises lie at the heart of stakeholders from government, the CBDM’s plea for community nongovernment organizations and the participation. Through this approach, private sector to share experiences the people’s capacity to respond to and good practices as well as emergencies is increased by providing address urgent challenges in the them more access and control over implementation of CBDM. resources and basic social services. By building confidence in the community CBDM principles through people’s involvement in other This Conference clarified the development initiatives, the approach principles behind CBDM. At the heart encourage individuals in communities of the approach is the concept of to work together, increase their social participation. Most of the conference capital, and achieve high levels of delegates agreed that communities cohesion and cooperation. In so doing should not be treated as passive the CBDM empowers communities to recipients of aid but rather as problem- confidently rely on themselves for solvers. By encouraging participation, disaster preparedness and mitigation people’s capacities are used and measures. developed. OCD: Towards a more participative So why CBDM? Quite disaster management approach understandably, it is the people at the community level who have more to The Office of Civil Defense (OCD), lose because they are the ones directly a bureau under the Department of hit by disasters, whether these be National Defense, has been tasked to major or minor calamities. They are serve as the operating arm of the among the most vulnerable to the NDCC. It’s primary mission is to effects of disasters. Long before coordinate, at the national level, the outside help arrives, they are the first activities and functions of various to respond to the emergency. Under agencies and instrumentalities of the the circumstances, the best way to national government, private help communities is to make them institutions, and civic organizations better prepared to cope with devoted to public welfare. This is emergencies. necessary to ensure that the facilities and resources of the entire nation is Focusing on CBDM is also utilized to the maximum for the important because the people and protection of the civilian populace and groups in the communities have a property in times of calamities. deeper understanding of the nuances of their geography and history. They The OCD is mandated to perform intimately know the ins and outs of the following functions: their locality. Thus, they are in the best

43 • establish and administer a to plans developed and implemented comprehensive national civil by higher levels of authority. Second, defense and civil assistance it promotes dependency, making the program; community incapable of dealing with the uncertainty and complexity of formulate plans and policies for the • disaster-related decision-making. protection and welfare of civilian Third, the ambiguous delineation of populations in times of war or other roles among government agencies national emergencies; involved in disaster management • estimate the material, manpower results in an wasteful overlap in and fiscal requirements of carrying functions. out the civil defense program; and It is important to note, however. • allocate to provinces, cities and that while CBDP is a correct approach, municipalities such aid and mobilizing local communities poses a facilities, materials and funds as challenge. People themselves do not may be made available from the recognize the importance of their national government. involvement in planning and decision- making process, not to mentiojn the dependency that is sometimes THE PARADIGM SHIFT encouraged by outside agencies that support communities. As mentioned earlier, the OCD as part of the national defense Cognizant of the growing evidence establishment replicates a military of inequities fostered by centralized command structure. Its orga- disaster management interventions, nization reflects a command and the unsustainability of top-down control approach towards disaster programs and their irrelevance to the management. This approach according specific local needs of vulnerable to Heijmans and Victoria is typical of communities, a paradigm shift is a “traditional” or “dominant” approach apparent. The OCD is shifting more where attention to the disaster attention to community-based response is focused on the hazard and approaches to disaster management. the disaster event itself (2001: 4). The corresponding disaster management strategy is to provide immediate relief INSTITUTIONALIZING CBDM through government aid and assistance. Strengthening the barangays The overarching and central role Participants of the ‘First National assigned to government is not an ideal Conference on Community-based response as it amplifies the Disaster Management’ agreed that a weaknesses of communities. First, barangay, the smallest political there is lack of flexibility because the subdivision in the Philippines is a power of local communities is limited typical community. One way of

44 institutionalizing CBDM is through the and relief supplies as well as receives strengthening of Barangay Disaster advisory and reports situation from and Coordinating Councils (BDCC). to the City/NDCC. Chaired by the Barangay Chair with The Chair of the BDCC has the members composed of leading following functions: personalities, the BDCC is tasked to develop and implement preparedness a) select and train sufficient and mitigation measures for the “emergency operations” members; community. More specifically, the BDCC ought to establish and b) convene the BDCC as often as implement policies and guidelines needed to effectively implement drawn from the experiences of the disaster preparedness planning city, municipal and National Disaster especially during disaster Coordinating Councils. It is also situations; expected to determine priorities in c) assess the extent of damage to life fund allocation, services, equipment, and property;

Case 1: Barangay BF Homes: Barangay Calamities and Disaster Preparedness Plan Barangay BF Homes of Parańaque City has developed its own Disaster Preparedness Plan to avoid panic and unnecessary actions during natural or human-induced disasters. The aim of the “Calamity and Disaster Preparedness Plan” is to create a synergy of efforts among barangay officials, team members, constituents assisted by government agencies and other organizations in the prevention and/or actual rescue/ evacuation scenario. This serves as an accepted procedure not only for an actual disaster or calamity occurrence but also as a plan to prevent much greater loss of life or damage. BF Homes is a residential area in Paranaque. It has formed its own BDCC composed of several teams, all having their own responsibilities and tasks based on their capabilities. These teams include the: Communication/Information and Warning Team; Security Team; Supply Team; Transportation Team; Rescue Team; Evacuation and Disaster Relief Team; First Aid and Medical Team; Fire Fighting Team; and Damage Control Team. The Barangay Calamities and Disaster Preparedness Plan’s Implementing Guidelines consists of pre-, during and post-disaster phases. The Pre-Disaster Phase specifies the following actions: the BDCC over-all Chairman shall automatically convene the BC leaders and members for last minute instructions; the Communication Team shall provide all families with warning and information on the kind of dangers to be expected within the next few hours or days as the case may be; the Supply Team carries out an inventory to determine what supplies are needed considering the expected extent of the damages and the duration of the disaster, the Evacuation and Disaster Relief Team identifies and maintains strategic evacuation sites in flood-prone areas, and the Rescue and Medical Teams are on 24-hour stand-by duty during typhoons and heavy rains.

45 d) assess if there is a need for prepared for impending disasters and assistance from other government more resilient in the future. At the end agencies, private corporations and of the day, addressing people’s the business sector; and vulnerabilities and their root causes is key to reducing the negative impact e) maintain inter-local coordination of disasters. with neighboring barangays. The NDCC through the OCD must realize the need to focus not only on ENHANCING THE VOLUNTEER providing immediate relief but also on NETWORK reducing people’s vulnerabilities to future disasters. While it is important Another strategy for harnessing to provide immediate relief, the community participation and affected population must be given the institutionalizing CBDM is to chance as well to cope should another strengthening volunteer networks. The disaster strike the community. United Nations Volunteers describe Imparting skills and strategies to volunteer action as ‘an expression of community members for them to people’s willingness and capacity to better cope with hazard will go a long freely help others and improve society’ way towards effective disaster (UNV 2000). Everywhere, volunteer management. groups are emerging to provide a wide range of services to the community. It is important to note, however, They can be viewed either as partners that communities cannot be expected of the government in the delivery of to reduce vulnerabilities on their own. services or they can be viewed as While they possess local knowledge parallel organizations to government and coping mechanisms built through that fill in where there is inadequacy. years of experience with disasters, their efforts must be complemented by inputs from multiple-stakeholders. CONCLUSION In this regard, the NDCC, as the highest policy-making body for The number of natural disasters disaster preparedness, can play a more and emergencies in the Philippines facilitative role in ensuring the remains almost the same. However, participation of community members the people’s ability to cope with their at the local disaster coordinating adverse effects seems to be eroded council level. with time. The CBDM approach, if adopted as It is precisely this situation which a national policy, will have a distinct makes community in disaster effect in reducing the collective management necessary. Individuals vulnerability and insecurity of people and their communities should be better affected by disasters.

46 Case 2: The Barangay Emergency Response Teams-Organized Community Operations Units of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte

The Municipality of Labo is the biggest among the 12 municipalities of the Province of Camarines Norte. It has 52 barangays of which ten are classified as urban and the rest as rural barangays. Labo is a first class town because of its strategic location in the center of the province and is considered the most populous town. However, it has its fair share of natural hazards that may impinge on its potential for growth and development. Situated in Labo are three inactive volcanoes namely: Mt. Labo, Mt. Bagacay and Mt. Cadig. There are also two major thrust panel lines (faults and earthquake zones) which threaten the northwest portion of the municipality. It is also prone to flooding because of the frequent overflowing of the Labo River. In fact, historians contend that the name Labo did not come from any legal decree but rather from a misunderstanding. A native was said to have been asked by a Spanish Sergeant: “Que pueblo eso este?” (What town is this?) Thinking that the sergeant was referring to the flooding in the area, the native replied, “Labo po ang tubig!” (The water is murky!). And the word stuck ever since, giving a name to the place that resonates with its flood-prone nature. In response to these threats, the municipality organized a village level emergency response team, the Barangay Emeregency Response Teams-Organized Community Operations Units or BERTs-OCOu. The acronym BERTs-OCOu is actually an attempt to associate the name to the local chief executive, a common practice in the Philippines. This imaginative approach to giving names has both its strong and weak points. On one hand, it ensures that the local chief executive assumes ownership of the project which is a good strategy to ensure that it is funded throughout his term of office. Conversely, as its name is attached to a particular politician, the sustainability of the project often depends really on the person sitting at the helm. This is its weak point. BERTs-OCOu is a community- based volunteer group organized and trained as a quick response mechanism of the barangay before, during and after the occurrence of a disaster. In fact, BERTs-OCOu serves as the response arm of the BDCC. It is specifically tasked to assist the BDCC in warning and evacuating threatened communities. Moreover, the BERTs-OCOu helps the BDCC in hazard mapping and contingency planning. The volunteer group is organized at the purok and is composed of one team leader and 12 members from each purok or block. Each team is monitored by a Barangay council member assigned to that block by the BDCC. Volunteers of BERTs-OCOu are given training on disaster management concepts, first aid techniques, water and fire safety, vulnerability and hazards mapping and contingency planning. Through this program, the municipality has become aware of the willingness of its constituents to participate in any disaster preparedness or mitigation activitiy provided that they are given proper orientation on the importance and relevance of the program to their daily lives and their collective future.

47 REFERENCES Anderson, M.B. and P.J. Woodrow 1989 Rising from the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times of Disasters. Boulder and San Francisco: Westview Press. Carter, W.N. 1991 Disaster Management: A Disaster Manager’s Handbook. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Gledhill, J. 2002 “Sustaining Volunteerism in the Emergency Services: Funding.” Paper presented by the Australasian Fire Authorities Council for the National Summit on Volunteers in Emergency Management, Canberra, 11-12 October 2001. Heijmans, Annelies and Lorna Victoria 2001 Citizenry-Based & Development Oriented Disaster Response: Experiences and Practices in Disaster Management of the Citizen’s Disaster Response Network in the Philippines. Quezon City: Center for Disaster Preparedness Foundation, Inc. Hess, M. and D. Adams 2001 “Community in Public Policy: Fad or Foundation?” Australian Journal of Public Administration 60(2):13-23. Laigo 1996 “GO Disaster Preparedness and Response: Strengths and Problems.” In The Philippine Reader on Disaster Management. Manila, Philippines: CDRC, 48-63. Quarantelli, E.L. 1997 “Ten Criteria for Evaluating the Management of Community Disasters.” Disasters 21(1):39-56. United Nations Volunteers (UNV) 2000 “Roundtable on Voluntarism and Social Development.” The Hague, Netherlands, 29-30 November. United States Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (US OFDA) 1998 Mitigation Practitioner’s Handbook. United States Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance. Wenger, D.E. 1978 “Community Response to Disaster: Functional and Structural Alterations.” In E.L. Quarantelli (ed.) Disasters: Theory and Research. London and California: Sage Publications.

48 Community-Based Disaster Risk Management: Gaining Ground in Hazard-Prone Communities in Asia

Zenaida Delica-Willison

Amidst vulnerable conditions, it is the communities’ natural tendency to protect themselves from the harm and danger posed by various types of hazards, be they natural or human sourced or a combination of both, that can spell the difference. If only there were ways to go back in history and rebuild communities away from natural and technological hazard areas- seismic, coastal, mountain slopes, urban centers- and plan the use of land better, then there would be a big chance of ensuring public safety and healthy socioeconomic life. But the reality is that most poor communities in Asia are located in these vulnerable areas. Therefore it is imperative that hazard-prone communities strengthen themselves and become robust so that they are not only “disaster resilient” but “disaster resistant” communities as well. The purpose of this article is to examine how some communities have managed risks by developing their internal social capital and collaborating with external resource to strengthen themselves. How do these communities introduce and sustain measures for reducing their vulnerability to natural and technological hazards? What are the good practices and lessons learned that could be replicated in equally hazard-prone areas in other developing countries that have many vulnerabilities?

INTRODUCTION The last decade showed the growing Experience highlights the recognition of the need for shifting importance of local communities as it paradigms from emergency is an acknowledged fact that whatever management to disaster risk the scale of hazards, big or small, it is management. This involved the the local community that either suffers change of focus from emergency the brunt of or survives from hazards’ response to planned activities that devastating effects. Since the would mitigate or prevent disasters. population at the local community is At the national and state level, this the one affected, it inevitably becomes approach necessitated political will and the first responder to manages the the formulation of new policies and emergencies at the household and resource allocation measures to community levels. By managing institutional mechanisms that support emergencies well, communities risk management activities. It is at prevent their escalation into full-blown the local level, however, where disasters. But more than this, local development planning and communities have the potential power implementation of specific disaster risk to take risk management measures management activities takes place. long before hazards strike. In this light,

49 disaster risk management is most In this case, facilitators need to rethink appropriate and relevant at the what tools are appropriate for community level. particular communities. Though communities may have In general, though, the experience many commonalities, no two on CBDRM of hazard-prone communities are alike. However, communities, in collaboration with lessons from one community may be NGOs and local government units studied and applied to other (LGUs) proves that it has gained community settings. Some lessons in ground in some developing countries Cambodia cited in this paper such as in Asia. While there are significant “not underestimating local gains in this respect, the practice is knowledge”, “using existing not yet widespread. Lessons in community groups”, “tapping external CBDRM practice need to be studied resources but not letting money drive and examined for possible application. proposals”, cooperation, coordination, The commitment and support of the networking, linking solutions with the national government to encourage and community needs and priorities are empower all LGUs and communities mostly a reiteration of the best to undertake CBDRM is still a big practices found in other parts of Asia. challenge for the CBDRM advocates. Similarly, the Lao experience The task is daunting. of developing and promoting environmentally sound and socially acceptable warning systems while DISASTER DEFINITION: addressing food insecurity is worth A REVIEW looking into for possible application in other equally flood-prone communities. It is important to review the Partnership between NGOs and the definition of disaster to put the aim of national government in assisting CBDRM in context. There are many communities in Laos is a good example definitions of disasters, but for this of working collaboration that should purpose let us use the Asian Disaster be emulated elsewhere. India, too, is Preparedness Center’s (ADPC) a good model for other state definition. “Disaster is the serious governments. Here, the government disruption of the functioning of initiated Community-based Disaster society, causing widespread human, Risk Management (CBDRM) and acted material or environmental losses, as a facilitator in organizing disaster which exceed the ability of the management committees and in the affected people and the community to formulation of community contingency cope using their own resources” plans. On the other hand, there are (ADPC 1999-2003). This means that also new developments such as the when a hazard strikes a community, “use of hazard mapping” in risk the normal life of the residents is assessment that have proven useful disrupted, which subsequently results for organizers but as yet have been of in a crisis or emergency situation. If little value to community members. a community or local government is

50 able to manage the crisis or emergency “ability to recover from depression” without the need for external or “adjust, spring back easily from assistance from other communities or misfortune or change” (Oxford and higher order government agencies, the Webster Dictionary). Like the bamboo, situation remains an emergency and resilient communities “withstand even does not become a disaster. Only the strongest typhoons as it sways when a community is unable to with storm winds. It is the manage the crisis on its own and characteristics of resiliency that has requires outside help, would a made us survive three waves of situation be labeled a disaster. colonization. It is the same resiliency that makes us rise from the ashes of There are two levels here: Pinatubo and Mayon, and rebuild our managing the disaster risk before a lives from the devastating effects of hazard strikes or the crisis event when disasters1” (Delica-Willison 1997). the hazard does strikes so that it will This means that communities that are not lead to disaster (disaster resistant); hit by a hazard (which develop into and managing disaster-events with disasters) are able to spring back, outside assistance so that people will resume their original form and readily cope, adjust and recover easily from recover on account of their disaster the event (disaster resilient). CBDRM preparedness planning. addresses both levels. Apart from building disaster resilient communities, CBDRM also AIMS OF COMMUNITY-BASED aims to promote disaster resistant DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT communities. Such communities are able to prevent hazards from reaching The increasing human and property disastrous proportions because their losses from earthquakes, cyclones, mitigation and preventive measures flooding and other hazards call are embedded in a comprehensive plan attention to proper development that takes every aspect of community planning that would ensure the existence into consideration—public designing and building of communities safety, good health and robust socio- in safe areas in the future. However, economic life. A disaster resistant since it is nearly impossible to rebuild community is akin to a healthy person housing facilities and relocate who has the immunity to resist Severe communities to safe areas, what do Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) we do? The answer is to improve the or some other life-threatening viral traditional disaster risk management disease. program and planning in communities– mitigation, preparedness, response This is easier said than done. It and recovery—to make them disaster requires political will on the part of resilient. government leaders to decisively formulate appropriate strategies and Disaster resilient communities are provide tactical guidance to lead “flexible and elastic”. They have the planners in hazardous areas. An all-

51 inclusive approach is imperative, • Recognized role of the local participatory (bottom up) and directive government in development (top down). A top down approach planning; may also be necessary to enforce laws Respect for the uniqueness and and regulations, for example in the • diversity of communities and area of environmental protection. To bottoms-up participatory aim for a disaster resistant community governance approaches; is to address the vulnerability question, both the structural and nonstructural • Availability and provision of aspects of society. information regarding effective risk reduction measures; The goal of disaster resistant communities is to maintain public • Prioritization of disaster risk safety and safeguard development management and the availaibility gains. Disaster resistant communities of environmental, social and economic are difficult to attain by individual opportunities to motivate and communities alone. It would entail empower communities to implement involving local governments, that, in disaster preparedness and mitigation turn, would enlist the support of all measures; stakeholders. Donald Geis (Natural Hazards Review 2000) suggests ten • Recognition of the basic human inherent principles as core guide in right of communities to live as safe attaining a Disaster Resistant as possible from natural hazards; Community. • The reduction of costs related to The need for a holistic and natural hazards through the integrated approach, communities that creation of a Disaster Resistant are supported by physical and Community; and organizational structures and • Minimization of human, property concerned with the overall workings and environmental losses, along – functioning, relationship, service, with the social and economic capacity, scale – of all its systems and disruption associated with extreme components. hazards. The redevelopment of existing Currently, communities that are communities in consideration of the involved in CBDRM are in the process natural and built environment of attaining resiliency. A thorough (transportation and communication, study should be undertaken to social facilities, commercial examine how far the CBDRM development, etc.). proponents have gone in initiating • Consideration of the overall disaster resistant communities. context of a larger and integrated process of creating sustainable quality life communities;

52 CBDRM EXPERIENCES Together (PACT), Cambodian Red Cross (CRC) and the International Why are there so many hazard- Federation of Red Cross and Red prone communities in developing Crescent Societies (IFRC and RCS), countries? First, communities are National Society of Earthquake physically situated in hazard prone and Technology (NSET), Center for vulnerable areas: seismic, coastal, Disaster Preparedness Center- mountain slopes, watersheds and Philippines (CDP), Orissa State urban centers. Second, there is Disaster Mitigation Authority something wrong with the way (OSDMA), World Vision Laos (WV), communities are designed and built in and the National Disaster Management these hazard prone areas. This is Committee of Laos (NDMC). In evident in many communities in the addition, this article is supplemented Katmandu Valley, Nepal (seismic, by the author’s own reflection on most urban); in Kandal, Prey Veng and of the cases. Kampong Cham, Cambodia (watershed); in Orissa, India (coastal); Empowering communities to mitigate in Tongi and Gaibanda, Bangladesh flood risk: The Cambodian experience (urban); and in Champasak, Laos (lowland). Most vulnerable The primary natural hazards communities in the Philippines are affecting Cambodia are floods, located in both rural and urban hazard droughts and fires. Due to its location, areas. Cambodia, one of the poorest countries in Asia, is susceptible to Currently, the planning of the flooding along two major watersheds, above communities are geared the Mekong River and Tonle Sap. towards attaining resiliency and Cambodia’s traditions of solidarity and aspiring to become disaster trust have been negatively affected by resistant communities. They need the three decades of internal upheaval comprehensive support from all and warfare. During disasters, families direction to attain the latter. feel that they can not rely on other families and that they are responsible Case stories only for themselves. What follows are a collation of PACT, the Cambodian Red Cross experiences drawn from selected and the International Federation of Red NGOs and local governments working Cross and Red Crescent Societies, either with communities that have with the support of the Asian Disaster suffered from past hazards or are Preparedness Center (ADPC) jointly prone to hazards due to their implemented the Cambodian geographical location and vulnerable Community Based Flood Mitigation conditions. The cases presented in and Preparedness Program (CBFMP). this paper present the experiences of the following ADPC partner agencies: In Cambodia, people expect Private Agencies Collaborating government and NGOs to provide

53 emergency response during major to prevent contamination of water calamities. To address this during such events and the building dependence on external agencies, the of safe areas for families. The people CBFMP introduced the disaster in each village are proud of what has preparedness concept by organizing been attained and acknowledge the and mobilizing volunteers. Chosen ownership of the project’s outcomes. from flood prone communities, these They also realized that the benefits are volunteers are trained in participatory not limited to times of disaster. For risk assessment. They are made to example, the raising of roads and the organize meetings and facilitate the construction of bridges provided a identification and implementation of reliable transportation route and community level disaster management increased accessibility, allowing activities related to flooding such as children to travel to school and traders repair of dams and dikes; cleaning to transport their agricultural produce irrigation ditches, culverts, and water to local markets. New, enlarged or gates; and raising road levels or rebuilt culverts increased the constructing small bridges. This community’s control over the water approach to flood risk management flow, enabling them to increase their challenges the communities to act rice crop yield, and, for some concertedly. The program initially communities, even harvest a second covered 5,496 households in 23 of the crop. The community-based effort also most hazard-prone villages in three enhanced community cohesion. “As flood-prone districts within three we completed our project, our provinces.2 community becomes closer. This is something, I have not seen for a long The program, while raising the time” (Mr. Peng Eourn, a 63-year old community’s awareness of floods, villager from ADPC 2002b). also dealt with livelihood options and making local people understand These communities have the community dynamics through potential to become disaster resistant participatory methodologies. The communities, if given more support in over-all result was to remarkably their efforts to address major flood increase the capacity of local risks. However, the cooperation of the communities to withstand the Mekong River Commission and other onslaught of the 2001 flood. For stakeholders in the major watershed example, the raised road project in areas of the Mekong Delta and Tonle Bang Sang Lech Village in Kampong Sap and the involvement of local Cham District reduced the speed of governments in those areas are flood onset to the houses further necessary to actualize this potential. inland, provided elevated ground for The imperatives drawn from the the safety of the villagers and their Cambodian project include the livestock and provided road access. following: Their experience of the flood in 2001 prompted the community members to 1. Do not underestimate local plan the construction of higher wells capacity. During the risk

54 assessment, the people offered an resources for their flood array of ideas, resources, and local preparedness through networking. knowledge that resulted in 4. Sustainability requires the ownership of the results. cooperation of all stakeholders. Identifying solutions to their Traditional community structures problems by themselves, they were devastated during many became dedicated to the years of civil strife, thus implementation of these solutions communities need assurance from with minimal assistance from other actors. A disaster risk outside. management program should bring 2. Use existing community groups to government and interested non- assess the organizational government and community-based structures currently operating in organizations to the table early in communities. These local the project and work with the organizations, be they traditional, community to develop long-term civic, homeowners, religious offer relationships with them. There viable structures to handle disaster is a bigger probability that risk management activities. If they the community will pursue can take on the added preparedness measures when responsibilities of managing more stakeholders are involved and disaster risks, then, they should be when other people are willing to part of and incorporated into the assist the community in developing project design. In this regard, it is new activities that may need important to be inclusive of external support. Gain the support different organizations so as to of local authorities and respected ensure the broad base participation individuals within and beyond the of the community. community. In this respect, it is important to make activities 3. Communities may tap external credible. funding, but they should not allow money-driven proposals. The 5. There is a need to focus on linking most common problems for solutions with the needs and community-based solutions are priorities of community members. financial constraints. Where flood Solutions identified to mitigate preparedness demands are greater floods resulted in many benefits. than the financial resources While they may have been available, it is necessary to train intended to reduce vulnerability to and mobilize local agents to seek floods, they also improved funding from outside the livelihood, enhanced safety and community with their counterpart eased access to important facilities in the form of labor or local and resources. materials. The program has 6. Disaster risk management should allowed communities to generate be promoted. The promotion of

55 preparedness activities within the Over 11,000 people died from community for awareness raising earthquake-related disasters in the and internal support and to twentieth century alone. Despite its neighboring communities for history, the rapidly urbanizing replication is important. Use Kathmandu valley, with its community festivals and other uncontrolled population growth and events to promote activities. unplanned development and constructions continues to violate 7. While risk mapping is a valuable building codes that take earthquake tool, it is not the panacea to all risks into account. This makes the problems of hazard identification. Valley highly vulnerable to the hazard. Hazard mapping, conducted during The 1934 Bihar-Nepal earthquake the project provided more value to damaged 40 percent of the buildings the organizers/facilitators than to including many historic sites. (UNCRD the community. The community 2003) To date, the country is ill members found the mapping a prepared to face the consequences of waste of their precious time since an earthquake because of the “many they knew the areas most prone other urgent matters experts worry to flooding based on historical about.3” knowledge and therefore did not need the mapping exercise to As a response to this situation, determine those areas. However, the ADPC through its Asian Urban hazard mapping can serve as Disaster Mitigation Programme and in necessary information for outsiders cooperation with its national partner, who desire to assist the NSET, launched the Kathmandu Valley community. It is also a tool to Earthquake Risk Management Project mobilize and sensitize the (KVERMP). This is a three-tiered community and preserve its initiative: local community, national collective memory of the past and international. The program events. conducted training and media campaign about disaster pre- 8. Project implementation should be paredness. A newspaper article that sensitive to timing. It is crucial to featured joint training by international ensure sensitivity to work patterns, and national organizations (Lutheran religious rites, and festivals in the World Federation, United Mission to communities. Community calendar Nepal and NSET) in a community of activities and events can help. (Ward 10) led another community (Ward 34) to take action. This interest Pioneering initiatives in managing guided Ward 34 to a six day disaster earthquake risk: The Nepal risk management workshop, experience participated in by community residents Nepal is located in a tectonically and Committee members, local active region of the Himalayas and has government officials, CBOs and 4 a history of destructive earthquakes. NGOs. This workshop was a major breakthrough in a society where many

56 people adopt a fatalistic view of the poor conditions of roads in its disasters. vicinity that impeded quick response to emergencies; the, improper disposal KVERMP also initiated a school of waste; poor drainage that induce safety program after a detailed flooding, as well as poor sanitation and vulnerability assessment of 643 public health systems that increase peoples’ schools in Kathmandu. The use of health vulnerability in the aftermath of participatory methodologies led to the floods. Furthermore, the DMC growing interest of communities and removed a dangerous pole erected in the support of school and government the middle of a narrow street in the officials. Ward. Its DMC has also conducted As regards the strategy of Ward disaster awareness sessions in 34, the workshop led to the formation schools. With positive outcomes from of the Ward 34 Disaster Management the project, Ward 34 received requests Committee (DMC), the setting up of a from other neighboring Wards for Disaster Management Fund to receive assistance in hazard mapping and in voluntary contributions and to the conduct of workshops. At present, community planning. The DMC Ward 34 dreams of establishing a conducted a household vulnerability resource center with information, survey and provided further training research and training components. to ward residents and students. CBOs Meanwhile, it is raising money to prepared hazard maps, with technical promote awareness of CBDRM among guidance from NSET. The hazard maps 4000 students, the construction of and other outputs were useful in embankments along the Bagmati raising awareness, identifying other River, and the reconstruction and problems aside from earthquake such retrofitting of earthquake resistant as flood, fire and environmental buildings – Ward Office, schools and degradation. Maps also served as good hospitals in Kathmandu Valley. input to planning structural mitigation. The process of strengthening The school earthquake safety school buildings has developed into an program employed community integrated program resulting in a participation as an essential training curriculum for masons, component in assessing schools, guidelines for community disaster raising awareness and in selecting preparedness and planning for schools for piloting earthquake teachers, parents and students. The resistant buildings. The program retrofitting and reconstruction strengthened selected school buildings process, in turn, stimulated awareness against seismic hazards for raising activities. demonstration purposes. As for the lessons identified, the The pioneering initiative in Ward following are worth noting: 34 integrated disaster risk 1. Create ownership of the management into over-all planning. It community-based risk manage- included the community’s concerns for ment project as early as possible;

57 make effective use of community people manage risks, prompting the events; involve key people Government of Orissa to form an with high credibility; set up autonomous organization called Orissa an advisory committee to State Disaster Mitigation Authority increase transparency, credibility (OSDMA). This organization was and outreach; and including tasked to look after the reconstruction awareness-raising in every activity. work and to develop a mitigation and From the very start, the officers preparedness strategy that would and residents of Ward 34 owned minimize future losses and destruction. the idea of establishing a DMC. The OSDMA recognized the primary This ownership led to commitment, role of the communities in confronting complemented by demand from and responding immediately to any the community. emergency. Hence, the OSDMA worked with communities to build their 2. Second, it is also important to capacity and enhance their skills and promote sustainability by building traditional coping mechanisms. With capacity and media outreach. The support from the United Nations ownership of the project and Development Programme (UNDP) and demand for involvement in it in turn Department for International was met by capacity building in Development (DFID), the OSDMA risk assessment, implementing conceptualized the Orissa Disaster mitigation measures, raising funds, Mitigation Programme (ODMP). The etc. program though mainly initiated at the State level, focused on strengthening Rising from the ravage of a super communities to combine disaster cyclone: A state initiative on preparedness and mitigation work with CBDRM – Orissa, India development planning. The program Poverty coupled with recurrent targeted 1,100 villages within ten natural hazards makes the State of selected blocks in seven coastal 5 Orissa one of the most vulnerable in districts. India. While the coastal districts are Intended to address the gaps in prone to floods and cyclones, the preparedness and disaster response western districts experience frequent that were evident duringt the 1999 and severe drought. It is also prone cyclone, the programme focuses on to earthquake. The 1999 super reducing social, economic and physical cyclone that hit the coastal areas left vulnerabilities through disaster in its wake 10,000 deaths and preparedness of all local stakeholders. damaged houses, livestock, crops Its key components include the infrastructure and to the environment preparation of multihazard disaster (UNCRD 2003). management plans at the Block, Gram The experience from this Panchayat (GP) and village levels, disastrous event resulted in a drastic formation of different groups to change in the way the government and respond to hazards, capacity building of stakeholders in disaster

58 management at all levels, and measures include construction of vulnerability reduction through schools, which can also be used as linkages with existing development cyclone shelters, repair or installation programs. of tube wells, strengthening of weak embankments, the construction of Following participatory assess- facilities for storing nets and dry fish, ment and hazard mapping, community and identification of appropriate contingency plans in 1,603 villages technologies for safer but affordable in 205 GPs in 10 Blocks were building construction. Non-structural developed. Disaster Management measures undertaken were public Committees (DMC) at the Block, GP awareness campaigns, training and and village level were formed and registration of high risk groups. trained to organize and systematize disaster response at the local levels. The program has met the basic Various Task Forces were also requisites for organized and organized and trained to manage early coordinated CBDRM from the Block to warning, search and rescue the GP to the village level. With the operations, first aid, relief, medical and end of the program in November housing needs, damage assessment, 2002, the local structures are and psychosocial counseling. The expected to institutionalize the program was successful in putting implementation and update of disaster risk management on the community plans agenda of the local government by The principal lessons from the integrating it into the development CBDRM include the following: planning process and systems at the Block and GP levels. 1. Government can initiate CBDRM and act as facilitators in organizing Interestingly, the organizational DMCs and the formulation of mechanism and preparedness plans Community Contingency Plans. have stood the test in actual While in most cases, CBDRM emergencies wrought by the June is initiated by NGOs and their 2001 floods and November 2002 partner CBOs, it was the State cyclone threat. As a result of the Government that instigated the positive experience of village program in Orissa. With resolute residents, the demand for replication commitment to safeguard lives, of the mitigation and preparedness livelihood and property in the event activities in other Blocks and Districts of hydro metrological hazards, the of Orissa has increased (ADPC 2003). state took pains to understanding How did the program integrate how to work with communities and CBDRM into the development planning with other organizations. It system? It sensitized local government followed a participatory hazard personnel to risk management and mapping at the village level with included mitigation measures identified the formulation of a community in the process of formulating contingency plan with the community contingency plans. These community.

59 2. The allocation of resources by the few years. The Western half, on the government and international other hand, experiences drought and donors demonstrated the flash flooding. The worsening determination of the State to environmental condition aggravates undertake and support the CBDRM the effects of flooding and constantly process. Mobilization of resources, threatens food security. The flow of including volunteers helped the relief assistance, while alleviating program cover many villages wihin people’s immediate needs, have a short time. In less than two through the years encouraged a dole- years, it was able to cover 1,603 out mentality among the affected villages. Time, however, will prove population (ADPC Midterm Evaluation the effectiveness (or non Report 2003). effectiveness) of the DMCs. World Vision Laos (WVL) has been 3. The integration of disaster working on a community development management into development project in Champasak since 1998. planning is easier when the WVL saw the need for a CBDRM to government is involved at the very challenge the relief culture and beginning of the program. The introduce a more proactive approach government itself is the chief in dealing with the hydro metrological advocate of the integration related problems. In partnership with process. a government agency, the National Committee on Disaster Management 4. The basic ingredients for Laos (NCDM) launched a two sustainability were present in the year project entitled Champasak project such as the formation of Community Based Disaster Manage- DMCs and Task Forces, the ment Project (CBDM). initiation of mitigation activities, and the increased capacity to plan, The CBDM project is about prepare and respond in the working with people to learn to live establishment of the structures for with floods by mitigating their negative coordination. While this was the and maximizing their positive effects. case, there is still a need to To attain this, the project sought to comprehensively assess the develop and promote environmentally CBDRM to identify areas for further and socially appropriate warning improvement. systems and community awareness of disaster risks and response options. Living with floods and drought: To address the food insecurity issues, A new approach in reducing risk in on the other hand, the project Champasak district, Lao Peoples’ promoted agricultural production Democratic Republic practices that are more appropriate to the local environment. Due to its proximity to the Mekong Delta, the eastern part of Champasak Considering the results, it is experiences destructive flooding every important to remember that CBDM is relatively new in Laos. It became

60 evident to WVL that two years was crops would contribute significantly to insufficient to effect necessary disaster mitigation in flood areas changes and achieve the sustainability through reduced dependency on rice of project outputs and outcomes. production for livelihood. Furthermore, However, there are already major development NGOs (in this case, WVL) accomplishments to cite: hazard could not ignore the need for disaster mapping, training and public mitigation and preparedness since their awareness activities had been project staff interact with survivors of undertaken in 27 villages. Village disasters on a daily basis. Disaster Protection Units (VDPUs) were established, and are now helping Forum for promoting CBDRM for communities formulate disaster risk safer communities: The Philippines management plans. Community Based First Aiders have been trained in 92 Consistent with its advocacy role, communities while more than 220 ADPC launched the Partnership in farmers were trained in fruit tree Disaster Reduction for South East Asia cultivation with many families in 2001 with support from DIPECHO. receiving saplings and seeds to Through this project, ADPC conducted address the problem of drought and meetings, training and reflection food security,. About 120 hectares workshops on CBDRM. One of the have been converted to vegetable sustainable national mechanism production. resulting from this initiative was the formation of the Philippine Disaster By employing the training of Management Forum (PDMF), which trainers approach, the project helps has emerged from the February 2002 develop local capacity for Reflection Workshop on CBDRM held sustainability and the efficient use of in the Philippines and participated in resources. Training materials are by government and non government translated into the local language for organizations. sharing with other government organizations. Moreover, the active Due to its geographic location, the involvement in the project design and Philippines experiences all kinds of implementation also constituted hazards, some of which result into hands-on training for the project team disasters. As a response, concerned and the communities. individuals organized the Citizens Disaster Response Center (CDRC) in As to the lessons learned, 1984 to assist the organization of the project’s benefits clearly Community Based Disaster Response demonstrate the inextricable link Organizations throughout the country. between disaster mitigation and This is the basic tenet of CDRC – an sustainable development. The farmers organized approach to disasters. Its who took part in the dry season crop experiences have been shared with production are already enjoying the other countries through forums and economic benefits from their efforts. local and international organizations. Increased production of dry season In 1999, the Center for Disaster

61 Preparedness (CDP) was organized factors in the implementation of by former CDRC board and staff to CBDRM. Among them are, the spirit help promote CBDRM through training of volunteerism, strong partnership and education activities. and cooperation among the external agencies and the community, local In line with its thrust, CDP sought mobilization of resources, the the support of the National Disaster existence of indigenous knowledge Coordinating Council (NDCC) in relevant to hazards, capacity building sponsoring a nationwide conference programs and community training, on CBDRM, primarily to exchange with strong NGOs and church support, both government and NGOs and organized communities, the examine the factors that facilitated or community and development workers’ constrained CBDRM.implementation. ability to reflect on past mistake and Between 28 and 30 January 2003, the draw lessons from them; and the PDMF, with support from the NDCC, funding support of partner held the first national conference on international NGOs. In fine, the CBDRM. This was a very important representatives emphasized the sense event in the life of CBDRM in the of accountability to the people, Philippines as it was the first time working with local communities and local, national and international NGOs, empowering them rather than working community based organizations for them as a key ingredient to (CBOs), local and national government success. agencies, academics and business- initiated NGOs came together to learn On the one hand, they blamed the from each other and address urgent lack of coordination and proper challenges confronting CBDRM. The consultation, low levels of awareness, conference was attended by 82 inadequate funds and bad leadership delegates from various parts of Luzon, as constraints. Despite these negative the Visayas and Mindanao. factors, however, the Confrence participants resolved to move forward The conference discussed the local by taking CBDRM to the level of and the national situation and assessed policy advocacy. They listed the level of CBDM. Cases of recommendations that they will bring communities surviving natural hazards to the attention of policy and decision and violent conflicts by supporting makers so that CBDRM practice can each other were presented. It also take off. Another conference tackled the different frameworks, organized for NGOs was held models, tools and approaches that the subsequently to plan the advocacy represented organizations utilize. agenda of the PDMF. Policies and institutional mechanisms to support CBDM were also addressed. Certainly the lessons from the Lastly, the conference talked about experiences of the pioneers on CBDM ways to advance the cause of CBDRM. in Nepal, Cambodia, Laos, India and the Philippines can further strengthen The NGOs and local government the goals of CBDM. representatives narrated positive

62 CONCLUSION providing support mechanisms to upscale it. Moreover, particular top- No two disasters are the same. down solutions need not be Neither will two communities exhibit inconsistent with community-based the same characteristics. However, approach depending. lessons learned from one community may be tried and adapted to other At the local level, particular cases communities provided that those doing reveal the need to seal community so are sensistive to the nuances of the and local government partnership locality to which new ideas are applied. through broad based social mobilization and coordination. The experiences of the different Investing in the communities’ social countries presented in this paper show capital, incorporating participatory that a top-down approach to disaster disaster risk management into local management is wanting. Community state development planning and participation is essential for effective building appropriate management disaster preparedness and response. structures are key to the successful However, facilitation, organization and implementation of CBDRM. In the final mobilization should be managed and analysis, however, the overall success supported by organizational structures indicators of CBDRM point to the at various levels—from the grassroots resiliency of communities during to the national level, to ensure calamities and their ability to resist sustainability. Afterall, decision and disasters as the most important policy makers at the national level can considerations. enhance the impact of CBDRM by

NOTES 1 It was Jose Rizal, the Philippine national hero who originally compared Filipinos to bamboo in his early writings. 2 These 23 villages are dispersed in the Districts of Kang Meas, Kien Svay and Peam Ro in the Provinces of Kampoong Cham, Kandal and Prey Veng respectively. 3 Roger Bilham of University of Colorado, USA confirmed that a big earthquake should have struck Nepal around 1984, fifty years from the last big one.” ADPC, Safer Cities 1, January 2002. 4 Ward 34 is one of the 35 Wards of the Kathmandu Metropolitan City, located in Thimi-Madhyapur Municipality. 5 A block is composed of several Gram Panchayat, and Gram Panchayat is composed of several villages/communities.

63 REFERENCES Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) 1999 ATraining and Education Materials/Handouts for Community-Based Disaster Risk Management Courses (1999-2003). 2002a “Midterm Evaluation Report to World Vision and NDMO-Laos.” Safer Cities 1, January 2002b “Midterm Evaluation Report to World Vision and NDMO-Laos.” Safer Cities 2, June. 2002c “Midterm Evaluation Report to World Vision and NDMO-Laos.” Safer Cities 3, July. 2002d “Midterm Evaluation Report to World Vision and NDMO-Laos.” Safer Cities 4, January 2003 2002e ADPC Report. Proceedings of the Regional Workshop on Best Practices in Disaster Mitigation, Bali, Indonesia in November. 2003 ADPC Report. “Impact Assessment Study of the Orissa Disaster Management Project.” (Report submitted by Lorna Victoria on behalf of ADPC to the Impact Assessment Study Team). January. Delica-Willison, Zenaida 1997 “Citizenry-Based Development-oriented Disaster Response.” Dissertation presented at the Center for Development Practice, Oxford Brookes University, November, p.13. Geis, Donald 2002 “By Design: The Disaster Resistant and Quality of Life Communities.” Natural Disaster Review 1 (3): 151-159. Orissa State Disaster Mitigation Authority-United Nations Development Programme-Department for International Development (OSDMA-UNDP-DFID) 2002 Community-Based Disaster Preparedness Programme Project Completion Report. September. Orissa State Disaster Mitigation Authority-United Nations Development and United Nations (OSDMA-UNDP-UN) n.d. Community Contingency Plan for Floods and Cyclones. Orissa. United Nations Centre for Regional Development (UNCRD) 2003 Sustainability in Grassroots Initiatives Focus on Community Based Disaster Management. Kobe, April, p. 44; p. 58.

64 Community-Based Disaster Management in the Philippines: Making a Difference in People’s Lives

Lorna P. Victoria

INTRODUCTION Over the last decade, parallel recognition that CBDM does work in organizations engaged in mitigating the the country and is an effective adverse impact of disasters on human approach for reducing disaster life and property have called for a frequency and loss. The practices paradigm shift. Working in different associated with community parts of the world, they advocate a involvement in disaster management change in approach from the prevailing now form part of a rich body of CBDM emergency management framework to knowledge and practice here and disaster risk management. In contrast abroad. to a reactive, top-down mode of handling disasters that focus on structural and technological solutions, THE PHILIPPINES AMONG THE the new approach highlights proactive MOST DISASTER-PRONE activities involving local communities COUNTRIES that usually bear the brunt of disasters. In this approach, the onus of disaster The Philippines shares with several mitigation lies in the communities. It Asian countries the unwelcome capitalizes on local resources and distinction of being among the world’s capacities to reduce people’s most disaster-prone societies. The vulnerabilities (Maskrey 1994, Center for Research and Epidemiology Maskrey and Jegillos 1997, ADPC of Disasters in Belgium recorded a total 2000, UNISDR 2002). of 701 disaster incidents from 1900 - 1991, or almost 8 disasters a year. The Philippines is not new For the period 1987 to 2000, the to community-based disaster National Disaster Coordinating Council management (CBDM). Its experience (NDCC) recorded 523 disasters or with recurring disasters and a long an average of some 37 disasters history of self-help efforts at the annually (OCD 2001)1 with damages grassroots facilitated the adoption of amounting to a high Php150.071 CBDM. After many years of billion. implementation, there is now general

65 Documentation by nongovernment response and preparedness strategies organizations (NGOs) also reveals local (CDRC 1990). disasters that do not land in national With successive “mega-disasters” dailies. Aside from such unreported in the last decade and positive case natural disasters, the figures obtained stories of community participation by NGOs are higher than those of the in disaster preparedness and NDCC because they include human- mitigation, more communities, induced disasters like development people’s organizations, NGOs, aggression (development projects government agencies and local which are undertaken against the will government units have adopted of local communities), fire, labor CBDM. The Philippine National Red repression, other industry- related Cross, for instance, has implemented events, armed conflict, and toxic its Integrated Community Disaster waste contamination. The cumulative Planning Program since 1994. It is now documented population affected by in the course of expanding program disasters from 1991 to 2000 is coverage beyond the five provinces. 96,907,837 individuals, which Other agencies such as the World indicates that many Filipinos are Vision Development Foundation Inc., repeatedly hit by disasters (CDRC Caritas-Manila, and the Philippine 2000 and 2001). Relief and Development Services have also now integrated CBDM into their existing emergency services. In the TAKING ON AN ALTERNATIVE government sector, the Department of APPROACH IN DISASTER Social Welfare and Development MANAGEMENT through its Bureau Emergency Successive disasters and the most Assistance promotes Family and severe economic crises since the end Community Disaster Preparedness of World War II in the eighteenth year in local government units. Among of the Marcos dictatorship revealed the local government units, the inadequacy of Philippine government municipality of Guagua and the response to disasters and the province of Albay are recognized for limitations of their technical and excelling in local and community level reactive stance. This compelled disaster management. NGOs and people’s organizations The Philippines held its First to promote and develop an alternative National Conference on Community- approach that highlighted the need based Disaster Management on 18-20 to mobilize communities to help January 2003. Jointly organized by 2 themselves and others. The Citizens the National Disaster Coordinating Disaster Response Center/Network Council-Office of Civil Defense, the (CDRC/N) was thus born in 1984 to National Defense College, and the carry out citizenry-based and Philippine Disaster Management development-oriented disaster Forum, its aim was to share

66 experiences and good practices and that they directly benefit from address urgent challenges. 3 The disaster management and Conference called for the widespread development. replication of CBDM beyond the 2. Priority for the most vulnerable piloting stage (OCD 2003). groups, families, and people in the community. While the participation of all sectors in society is needed FEATURES AND PRINCIPLES OF for disaster risk reduction, priority COMMUNITY-BASED DISASTER in CBDM is given to the most MANAGEMENT vulnerable groups. In urban areas, Whether a disaster is major or the most vulnerable sectors are minor or of national or local generally the urban poor and significance, people in communities informal sector while those in rural are the ones adversely affected. To areas include subsistence farmers, mitigate the impact of a disaster, they fisherfolk and indigenous people. use coping and survival strategies that Special attention is given to the enable them to respond to the situation needs and concerns of children and even before outside help from NGOs women (because of their care- or the government arrives. Having giving and social function roles), experienced damage and loss, they are the elderly, and the differently- interested to protect themselves and abled, are, therefore, open to community- 3. Risk reduction measures are based disaster preparedness and community-specific. CBDM takes mitigation (AUDMP 2002). into consideration the particular In its report on the activities of the context of the community. First National Conference on CBDM, Appropriate risk reduction the Office of Civil Defense noted that measures are identified after an at present there are diverse CBDM analysis of the community’s practices among various actors and disaster risk (hazard exposure, stakeholders such as government and vulnerabilities, and capacities). NGOs (OCD 2003). The following key Various participatory tools are used features, which distinguish CBDM to consider people’s varying from the top-down and traditional aid perceptions of disaster risk and approaches to disaster management, solutions to community problems are based on current practices and and risk reduction. experiences: 4. Existing coping mechanisms and 1. People’s participation. In CBDM, capacities are recognized. CBDM the community members are the builds upon and strengthens main actors. They substantiate the existing coping strategies and disaster risk reduction process and capacities. Although lacking in pursue disaster management material assets, Filipinos can rely activities. It is important to note on social organizations, shared

67 values and coping mechanisms Closely related to these such as bayanihan (cooperative distinguishing features are the endeavor), damayan (sharing one principles and qualities of CBDM another’s burden), close family programs and activities. They are ties, the presence of community/ participatory, responsive, integrated, people’s organizations and NGOs, proactive, comprehensive, multi- and local knowledge and sectoral and multidisciplinary, resources. A persevering spirit, empowering, and developmental. being madiskarte (or resourceful), These features also serve as overall and wit and humor are individual targets to work for as well as and collective attributes which performance indicators to keep track steer the Filipinos through times of of in developing and implementing crisis. CBDM. Both the process and content of people’s participation is important. 5. Disaster risk reduction is linked The process involves community with development. Simply put, the members, particularly the most aim of CBDM is to reduce vulnerable sectors and groups in vulnerabilities by strengthening the risk assessment, identification capacities of individuals, families of mitigation and preparedness and communities. CBDM seeks to measures, decision making, and address conditions, factors, implementation. Participatory tools, processes and causes of mostly adapted from participatory rural vulnerabilities brought about by appraisal methods are used. The poverty, social inequality, and community directly benefits from the environmental resource depletion risk reduction and development and degradation. CBDM subscribes process. Because of the participation to people-centered development as of community members, CBDM well as equitable and sustainable activities and programs are responsive development. The goal of CBDM to their felt and urgent needs. is to build safer, disaster resilient, Consideration of the community’s and developed communities. perception and prioritization of disaster 6. Outsiders have supporting and risk and risk reduction solutions, in facilitating role. With the turn, leads to ownership. community as the main actor in Although the stress is on proactive CBDM, the role of NGOs is measures of prevention, mitigation and supportive, facilitative and preparedness, emergency and catalytic. The government’s role, recovery interventions are also planned on the other hand, is integral to and implemented for an integrated the institutionalization of the disaster response. Communities are CBDM process. Partnerships with linked with other communities, less vulnerable groups and other organizations, and government units communities are forged for disaster or agencies at various levels of the risk reduction. disaster management system,

68 Box 1. Vulnerability Reduction in the Citizen’s Disaster Response Network Experience

The Citizens’ Disaster Response Center/Network (CDRC/N) is generally recognized as having pioneered in CBDM in the Philippines. Since its establishment in 1984, the features of its particular brand of CBDM—the citizenry-based development-oriented disaster response, have found applications in other CBDM programs. Taking the position that CBDM should address the roots of vulnerabilities and contribute to transforming or removing structures generating inequity and underdevelopment, CDRC/N puts a premium on people’s participation and building the organizational capacity of vulnerable communities through the formation of grassroots disaster response organizations. CDRC/N’s preparedness and mitigation measures are mostly non- structural in nature and directed to capability building such as disaster management orientation, disaster preparedness training, public awareness, community organizing, food security, nutrition improvement, and advocacy. CDRN’s Food Security and Improvement Program (FSNIP) enhances the capacity of vulnerable communities to withstand the effects of disasters through food and income sources diversification, increasing access to food supply, and improvement in nutritional status of beneficiaries, especially children. The village of Ag-agma, an indigenous community in the Cordilleras, Northern Luzon regularly experiences typhoons, drought, pest infestation, and earthquakes. Disaster events have become windows of opportunity for preparing and strengthening community capacities for future disasters. After the conduct of the Ag-agama community profiling workshop using Participatory Rapid Appraisal tools, a two-year community development plan was formulated as part of the FSNIP. Diversification of food and income sources included dispersal of vegetable seeds, fruit seedlings and farm implements, sustainable agriculture training, construction of waterworks, rehabilitation of the community irrigation system, livestock and fish production, and dispersal of draft animals and veterinary medicines. Aside from increasing access to food supply, health and nutrition-related activities included de-worming of children, sanitation campaigns, latrine construction, establishment of village pharmacy and herbal gardens, and medical missions. Training and education activities covered disaster management, functional literacy campaigns, and organizational development support (Morillo 2001 and MRRS 2001). An evaluation of the effectiveness of CDRC/N’s CBDM work by its Core Donors in 1999 concluded: “The key (to effectiveness) is increased self-confidence (of vulnerable communities) through meaningful participation, one of the central elements of the CBDO-DR approach. As a rule, not only the organized members of the community benefit from counter disaster planning, but also the unorganized”(Delica, Marcelino & van der Veen 1999:15).

69 especially for vulnerabilities that the to poverty, social inequity and community cannot address on its own. environmental resources depletion and A comprehensive mix of structural degradation. (hard, physical) and nonstructural (soft, health, literacy, public awareness, education and training, PROCESS TO TRANSFORM AT-RISK livelihood, community organizing, COMMUNITIES TO DISASTER advocacy, reforestation and RESILIENT COMMUNITIES environmental protection, etc.) preparedness and mitigation In general, the goal of CBDM is to measures are undertaken. Risk transform vulnerable or at-risk reduction plans involve short-, communities to disaster resilient ones. medium- and long-term measures to While resilience is a new term used in address vulnerabilities. CBDM in the Philippines, community members easily grasp the concept While upholding the basic interest when the metaphor of the bamboo of the most vulnerable sectors and swaying with strong winds yet groups, CBDM considers the roles and remaining firmly rooted is used. participation of all stakeholders in the community who come from various Although the steps may vary with sectors and disciplines. The risk different community contexts and reduction planning and implementation organizational mandates, the process process combines indigenous or local for local disaster risk reduction can be knowledge and resources on the one generalized as follows (ADPC 2001): hand, and science and technology and • Initiating the process - community outside support, on the other. CBDM or outsiders may initiate the is an empowering framework which process. This involves linkage and increases people’s options and building rapport with external capacities. Vulnerable groups and facilitators; communities gain more access to and control of resources and basic social • Community profiling - initial services through their concerted understanding of disaster situation action. They enjoy more meaningful and orientation on CBDM; participation in making decisions that • Community risk assessment - affect their lives and give them control participatory assessment of over their natural and physical hazards, vulnerabilities, capacities, environment. Participation in CBDM and people’s perception of risks; develops the confidence of community members to participate in other • Formulation of initial disaster development endeavors. CBDM, risk reduction plan - also called particularly in disaster preparedness, community counter disaster, mitigation and prevention, thus disaster management, development contributes to achieving development plan or action plan, and involves the goals by reducing vulnerabilities due identification of appropriate mitigation and preparedness

70 Box 2. The Philippine National Red Cross’ Social Mobilization for CBDM

Better known for its blood banking and emergency response programs, the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) has pursued a proactive and community-based approach to disaster management since 1994 with its Integrated Community Disaster Planning Program (ICDPP). Piloted in Bgy. Bacun, Benguet, Mountain Province, ICDPP now covers five provinces and is in the process of being replicated in other areas. Its approach involves the formation of a Barangay Disaster Action Team (BDAT) whose members are elected by the community assembly from among sectoral organizations. Usually, the Barangay Captain is also the Chair of the BDAT. The ICDPP provides intensive training for the BDAT who later on conducts the risk assessment and local disaster action planning with community members. In its preparation of hazard and resource maps, the ICDPP uses GPS together with other participatory tools. The BDAT leads the community in preparing the hazard and resource maps and three-dimensional models, but the digitized maps are finalized in the PNRC central office. The technical outputs of the ICDPP are turned- over to the municipal government to help land use planning. The BDAT members also use many popular public awareness materials such as posters and comics on disaster preparedness for problem identification and ranking solutions. In Bgy. Maasin, Quezon in the island province of Palawan, the BDAT mobilized the community members to solve community problems such as isolation from the town center during the rainy season, lack of health care services, and environmental degradation. The community constructed a hanging bridge and health center and protected the mangrove areas from being converted into commercial fishponds. The community provided the labor while the Red Cross supplied the materials for the construction projects. Technical help in engineering design was given by the municipal government. Since the community identified the project as urgent and its members worked hard to see the completion of the construction project, they continue to manage and sustain them. The hanging bridge took five months to construct and is now used during floods for access to the village center and for children to continue schooling. The village health center has been nominated in provincial and regional competitions for its excellence in service (PNRC 2002 and 2003, CDP 2002b).

71 measures, including public local and community preparedness awareness, training and education and mitigation. activities; • Formation of community disaster BENEFITS OF COMMUNITY management organization - community organizing and PARTICIPATION IN CBDM mobilization, capability building in In recommending the widespread preparedness and mitigation, replication of CBDM in the Philippines, organizational development and the First National Conference strengthening; on CBDM in January 2003 underscored key benefits derived from • Implementation of short-, its implementation – enhanced medium-, and long-term risk community preparedness, zero reduction measures, activities, casualty, effective response, projects, programs and strategies; self-reliance/self-help, optimum and utilization of resources, solidarity/ • Monitoring and evaluation - bayanihan, strengthened community continuous improvement of organizations, and enhanced community preparedness and coordination and networking. mitigation, identification of factors During the Regional Workshop on facilitating and constraining Best Practices in Disaster Mitigation success; and documentation of in September 2002, similar benefits good practices for possible such as building confidence, pride in replication. being able to make a difference, Within this process, the formation enhanced capabilities to pursue and strengthening of a community disaster preparedness, mitigation as disaster management organization are well as bigger development crucial to mobilizing communities for responsibilities at the local level were sustainable disaster risk reduction. The cited. In addition, individual and community volunteers, disaster community ownership, commitment management committee, and disaster and concerted actions in CBDM, response organization are the including resource mobilization have necessary channels for outsiders such produced a wide range of appropriate, as NGOs or government agencies to innovative and doable preparedness assist the community. Community and mitigation solutions which are groups and organizations are essential cost-effective, self-help and to meet the intended aims and targets sustainable. These have led to in CBDM. While NGOs have been empowerment at the individual, instrumental in initiating and household and community levels. With facilitating the CBDM process, case stories that show and tell that people’s/community organizations and CBDM works, there is now an even local government units are now increased demand to replicate CBDM involved in enhancing capabilities for (AUDMP 2002).

72 Box 3. Buklod Tao Assists other Communities in CBDM

Buklod Tao is an environmental people’s organization based in Dońa Pepeng Subdivision and North and South Libis, Brgy. Banaba, San Mateo. After a one-day Disaster Management and Preparedness Seminar in June 1997, Buklod Tao formed a Disaster Response Committee (DRC) composed of 33 members and formulated a Counter Disaster Plan to protect the community from damages due to regular flooding. Three disaster management teams were organized and emergency rescue and evacuation plans were detailed (including fabrication of 3 fiberglass boats using local expertise and labor and practice rescue maneuvers in the river). From the Barangay Council, Buklod Tao was able to secure one life jacket. From other sources, the organization secured funds (around Php 30,000) to purchase flashlights, ropes, megaphones, first aid kits and materials to build three rescue boats. Two months after the seminar, a typhoon hit the community. Although several houses were swept away by the waters, no one was killed and many people were able to save their belongings. Since then, when typhoons hit the area everybody can be brought to safety because of flood-level monitoring, early warning, evacuation, rescue operations, and relief assistance activities of the DRC and Buklod Tao. Word of Buklod’s activities and the benefits of CBDM circulated. Before long, neighboring communities began asking for help in conducting their own training activities and in forming their own DRC. Among the next adherents of CBDM are Brgy. Banaba Extension, Brgy. Ampid, Riverside Libis, R. Dulo, R. Bungad and Pulang Lupa in Brgy. Sto. Nińo. The communities all decided to hold disaster management orientations and disaster preparedness training (DPT) in their respective barangays and to eventually form DRCs. Buklod Tao also assisted in the formation of a DRC in the far-flung rural community in Brgy. Calawis, Antipolo City. After the 2-day DPT, the Calawis Community-based Disaster Group was formed. Its initial activities include mobilizing resources to finance and equip disaster preparedness requirements. Even small benefits and gains from undertaking CBDM motivate the community to sustain the CBDM activities and replicate the CBDM process in other vulnerable communities. Case stories such as the experience of Buklod Tao increase demand for CBDM, with assistance from NGOs, government, and communities themselves (Abinales 2002, Heijmans and Victoria 2001).

73 SOME WAYS AHEAD FOR CBDM particular prevention, preparedness, IN THE PHILIPPINES and mitigation measures to undertake, and specific skills in relevant disaster The experiences of CBDM in the management responses. Among Philippines point to five interrelated less vulnerable groups including requisites for the institution, government and NGO policy makers sustainability and replicability of and implementers, capability building CBDM at the local and community should include risk reduction and level as shown in Figure 1. Capability CBDM framework and methods. building in disaster management, which cover sustained training and The CBDM training and public public awareness activities using local awareness activities ought to result in knowledge, language and culture, the formulation of a community should be supported and undertaken. counter disaster-plan. Alternatively It would enable communities to called the emergency/contingency increase participation and eventually plan, preparedness and mitigation sustain their own the CBDM activities. plan, or community disaster Basic to the training is an assessment management plan, the plan should of the nature and behavior of hazards chart the community’s progression prevailing in the community, the towards safety, disaster resilience and

Community Counter Disaster Plan

Capability Building in Partnerships in Disaster Disaster Management 41, 960 BARANGAYS Risk Reduction in 1,496 Municipalities and 115 Cities in Disaster Risk Reduction Community Disaster 80 Provinces Management and Development Organization Planning Integration

Figure 1. Requisites to Sustain and Institutionalize CBDM

74 people-centered (equitable and resources contribute to development sustainable) development. Doable for all. disaster management activities Partnerships in disaster risk before, during, and after periods of reduction should be forged between disaster enhance the community’s the vulnerable and less vulnerable capacities and reduce its vulnerabilities groups within the community. and disaster risk. Community networks with local To pursue the implementation of government, concerned government the plan and mobilize the community- agencies, NGOs and other at-large in undertaking preparedness communities are needed to implement and mitigation measures, the the CBDM plan, especially for formation and strengthening of vulnerabilities which the community community disaster response cannot address on its own. The organizations is necessary. The complementary and concerted action function of disaster management of stakeholders from various sectors, can be integrated into existing disciplines and levels of the community organizations, structures, Philippine disaster management and or volunteer teams. Aspects development planning system are of disaster management and needed to achieve safety, disaster organizational strengthening should resilience, and equitable and include leadership skills and values sustainable development for all. formation, studies on sectoral/ Although communities have acquired community/municipal to national local coping strategies and capacities scenarios and burning issues. to reduce some vulnerabilities through the experience of recurring disasters, The integration of community vulnerability is a complex web of disaster risk reduction into local societal conditions, factors, and development planning systems and processes (Anderson and Woodrow processes will lead to sustainable 1989, Blaikie et al. 1994, Anderson and equitable community 1995) which the community cannot development. When there are political untangle on its own. Immediately, constraints, the community should many necessary structural mitigation advocate for such integration so that measures involve big capital outlay. issues of public safety, poverty, Building a culture of safety and employment and livelihood security, disaster prevention entails a lot of housing, health services, education, commitment and effort, learning and management of the physical and unlearning, doing and undoing, natural environment or general well- involving all stakeholders. being of the community and public are addressed. Development planning The First National Conference on should take into consideration the CBDM pointed to immediate policy particular geographical and physical and operational issues in its characteristics of the country as well recommendations to adopt CBDM as as ensure that policy, programs, and a viable approach for reducing

75 Box 4. Meeting of Top-down and Bottom-up Approach in Capability Building for CBDM in Camiguin Province

The island province of Camiguin was devastated by Typhoon Nanang on 6-8 November 2001. The landslides, lahar and flashflood claimed 220 lives (including those declared missing), injured 146 persons and affected some 7,000 families. Damage to settlements, agriculture and infrastructure was placed at P201 Million. This recent disaster served as a wake-up call to enhance local and community capacity in disaster preparedness and mitigation. The Local Government Units (LGUs) of Camiguin have since April 2002 undertaken the “Enhancing Capacities in Disaster Preparedness, Prevention and Rehabilitation Project” with the support of the Local Government Support Program (LGSP). One of the key strategies for integrated, responsive, proactive and development-oriented disaster management involved the synchronization of improvements in capacity and the systematization of the community and local level with the provincial level (meeting of the top-down with the bottom-up approach or bibingka approach). Aside from training workshops on disaster preparedness and disaster management planning, a study tour was organized to Legaspi, Albay and Guagua, Pampanga to share and learn from those best practices in local and community level disaster management. At the barangay level, community organizations and residents participated in the capability building activities. The municipality of Mahinog suffered the most damages during Typhoon Nanang, and was prioritized for disaster preparedness and mitigation activities. The Community Risk Assessment held in May 2002 in Bgy. Hubangon was attended by 80 participants from all the sitios. During the Disaster Preparedness Training in the first week of July, the LGU personnel and community members realized that when it floods, the water level does not rise all at once, and there is opportunity to issue an early warning so long as a careful watch or monitoring is carried out. Their newly designed early warning and evacuation system was put to an initial test during Typhoon Milenyo in August 2002. Continuous ringing of the church bells and sirens means residents should evacuate to the Chapel and Mahinog National High School premises. The Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council has been reconstituted and is composed of 135 members. Even while “echo” seminars on disaster preparedness have still to be undertaken, the community members already value the barangay counter-disaster plan. The community level counter-disaster plans were then integrated into the municipal and provincial plans following the DM planning workshop in March 2003(LGSP 2003, CDP 2003a).

76 disaster frequency and loss: undertake CONCLUSION unified and purposive lobbying for an enabling legislation on CBDM; allow Experiences in the Philippines use of Local Calamity Fund allocation affirm the relevance, viability and funds for predisaster activities; effectiveness of involving communities institutionalize the Disaster in disaster management. CBDM, a Management Office at all levels of participatory approach, is making a government; empower local officials difference in the lives of Filipino to declare a state of calamity; integrate families and communities. However, disaster management into the to sustain, replicate and institu- government’s development planning; tionalize CBDM, the bottom-up take advantage of relief as an entry approach has to be combined with the point for developmental interventions; top-down approach. Vulnerabilities respect and strengthen existing which are rooted in the Philippines’ community coping mechanism and socio-economic political system structures; conduct research, training, and level of development (or sharing of information and experiences underdevelopment) cannot be reduced in CBDM; enhance coordination, by communities alone. The higher cooperation, partnerships and levels of the Philippine disaster volunteerism; espouse a Code of management and development Ethics of “Do no harm” among DM planning system have to support and practitioners; include disaster enable on-the-ground CBDM. To management in the school curriculum; realize the reduction of disaster educate media and donors; base risk and achieve safety, disaster disaster responses on damage and risk resilience, and development for all assessments; and formulate Filipinos, local knowledge, coping appropriate standards for relief packs, strategies and resources, especially in evacuation centers, and other vulnerable communities, have to be services. complemented with commitment and supportive actions from less vulnerable and multisectoral groups.

NOTES 1 The National Disaster Coordinating Council’s monitoring system from 1998 includes minor and major disasters. For the year 2000 alone, 259 disaster events were noted, affecting 9,078,236 persons with total cost of damage of Php 7.739 Billion (NDCC 2003). 2 A debilitating drought in 1983, six destructive typhoons and Mayon Volcano eruption in 1984 wrought havoc to the lives of Filipino communities. 3 Excluding some 22 observers, the Conference was attended by 82 participants from 69 national and local government agencies, NGOs, community organizations, and academe.

77 REFERENCES Abinales, Manuel 2002 Status Report on Activities of Buklod Tao. Anderson, Mary B. 1995 “Vulnerability to Disaster and Sustainable Development: A General Framework for Assessing Vulnerability.” In Disaster Prevention for Sustainable Development. World Bank and IDNDR, Washington, D.C. Anderson, Mary B. and Peter J. Woodrow 1989 Rising from the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times of Disaster. Paris: UNESCO. Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) 2000 Fourth International Course on Community Based Disaster Management Participants Workbook. Bangkok, Thailand: ADPC Asian Urban Disaster Mitigation Program (AUDMP) 2002 “Community Based Approaches to Disaster Mitigation.” In Proceedings of the Regional Workshop on Best Practices in Disaster Mitigation: Lessons Learned from the Asian Urban Disaster Mitigation Program and Other Initiatives. Bali Indonesia, 24-26 September. Blaikie, P., T. Cannon, I. Davis, and B. Wisner 1994 At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Disasters. London: Routledge. Center for Disaster Preparedness (CDP) 2002a Report on Disaster Preparedness Training in Bgy. Hubangon to the Local Government Support Program. 2002b Report on Disaster Preparedness Training with World Vision Development Foundation Inc. Partners in Palawan. Citizens’ Disaster Response Center (CDRC) 2000 Disasters in the Philippines: Population Affected by Disaster Type, 1991–1999. 2001 Disasters in the Philippines 2000. Delica-Willison, Z., A. Marcelino, and A. van der Veen 1999 “Evaluation of the Citizenry-based Development Oriented Disaster Response Approach of CDRC/N.” Report of the External Evaluation of CDRC/N submitted to the Core Donors.

78 Heijmans, Annelies and Lorna Victoria 2001 Citizenry-based and Development-Oriented Disaster Response: Experiences and Practices in Disaster Management of the Citizens’ Disaster Response Network in the Philippines. Quezon City: Center for Disaster Preparedness Foundation Inc. Local Government Support Program (LGSP) 2003 Presentation materials during the First National Conference on CBDM, 18-20 January. Maskrey, Andrew 1989 Disaster Mitigation: A Community Based Approach. Oxford, UK: Oxfam. Maskrey, Andrew and Sanny Jegillos 1997 “Promoting Community-based Approaches in Disaster Management.” Asian Disaster Management News 3 (2). Montanosa Relief & Rehabilitation Services (MRRS) 2001 Food Security Nutrition Improvement Program Case Study. Morillo, Odon 2001 “Towards A Community-Based Risk Reduction Approach.” Paper presented at the Disaster Management Practitioners Workshop, Da Nang, Vietnam, November. National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) 2003 Summary of Natural and Man-made Disaster Incidents: 1998-2002. Office of Civil Defense (OCD) 2001 Presentation materials during the Regional Working Group Meeting on Information Sharing and Networking, Partnerships for Disaster Reduction – Southeast Asia, September, Bangkok. 2003 Report on the First National Conference on Community Based Disaster Management jointly organized by the National Disaster Coordinating Council-Office of Civil Defense, National Defense College and Philippine Disaster Management Forum, 18-20 January. Philippine National Red Cross 2002 Presentation materials during the Forum Sharing on Good Practices in CBDM, Philippine Disaster Management Forum, 26 July. 2003 Presentation materials during the First National Conference on Community-Based Disaster Management, 18-20 January.

79 United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) 2001 “Mobilizing Local Communities in Reducing Disasters.” http:// www.unisdr.org/eng/public_aware/world_camp/2001/pdf/ kit%204%20Mobilizing%20Local%20Communities%in%20 R e d u c i n g %20Disasters.pdf Victoria, Lorna 2002 “Community Based Disaster Management in the Philippines: Making a Difference in People’s Lives.” Paper presented at the International Seminar on Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation jointly organized by UNDP-India, Government of India and the Chamber of Industries- India, Delhi, India, November.

80 Prevailing over Disasters through People’s Organized Action: A Continuing Engagement in Community-Based Disaster Management in Central Luzon

Eugene Orejas

INTRODUCTION COMMUNITY-BASED DISASTER MANAGEMENT (CBDM) On 11 January 2004 the houses of Adelyn Ramirez and some women in CBDM is an approach focused on the urban poor village of Baseco in increasing the capability of the Tondo, Manila were spared from communities to reduce their burning. However, the houses of vulnerabilities to disaster events. The 5,000 families or some 20,000 framework thus addresses the persons were razed to the ground. vulnerability of people on the ground, who are regarded as the main actors How did those in Adelyn’s group in the CBDM program and process. manage to save their homes and a few The salient features of the approach belongings ? They used mud as a fire include recognizing the existing breaker. This was a common practice capacities of victims, encouraging in Sitio Depensa, Orion, Bataan, a people’s participation, putting coastal community in the Central premium on the organizational Luzon province of Bataan. But this capacity especially of vulnerable practice is not known to many and, in sectors – they who have less in life the case of Adelyn’s group was only and so are more prone to dangers and rediscovered by necessity and out of the adverse effects of disasters. The desperation. The fire in Baseco, a activities of CBDM are in the areas of community of slum dwellers that was disaster prevention and preparedness, always vulnerable to such a disaster emergency response, mitigation could have been averted had the and rehabilitation. It is fully integrated residents been organized and able to into the campaign of organized put in place community disaster plans communities against landlessness, that included early warning signals, fire joblessness, and environmental breaks, an evacuation system, destruction that makes them resource generation, advocacy and vulnerable to disaster and renders health programs. These are some of them less able to cope with its the major activities of a Community- consequences. based Disaster Management (CBDM) program.

81 Founded in 1986, the Central roughly 11 percent of the country’s Luzon Center for Emergency Aid and population. Considered the third Rehabilitation, Inc. (CONCERN) smallest region in the country with 1.8 adopted and developed CBDM as an million hectares of land area, it approach with a corresponding ironically has the third biggest program in the course of assisting population (National Statistics 2000). calamity victims. The Mt. Pinatubo Four major volcanoes are also eruptions in 1991 and the subsequent located in the region – Pinatubo in destructive lahar (volcanic flows) and Zambales, Natib and Mariveles in floods in its wake provided more Bataan, and Arayat in Pampanga. opportunities to practice and further Three major earthquake fault systems refine CBDM. rock the region in varying intensities. Implemented on a regionwide scale The long stretches of coastline on through a network of people’s and Central Luzon’s eastern and western nongovernment organizations(NGOs) areas are prone to storm surges, heavy that are closely coordinated with the rains, and violent winds from the government for scientific information Pacific Ocean and South China Sea. and resource management, the CBDM, The basin-like shape of the plain makes as advocated by CONCERN has helped Central Luzon naturally prone to save more lives than dole-out type flooding. relief operations. Moreover, the CBDM Mountains outline the region’s experiences and lessons learned in the peripheries with some 771,174 Mt. Pinatubo disaster (eruptions, lahar hectares of potential forestland. flows, and later floods of much longer However, only about 194,500 duration) has proven the correctness, hectares are actually forested. This viability, and empowering elements of lopsided ratio is only exacerbated by such an approach. the increasing rate of deforestation – CBDM continues to be significant. estimated at an annual average of Given the unsustainable use of the 4,000 hectares – that endangers environment and the widespread forest wildlife and results in soil poverty and unemployment in erosion and river siltation. agricultural and urban areas, the The 1991 eruptions of Mt. approach needs to take root in more Pinatubo emitted some 800 million vulnerable communities. cubic meters of pyroclastic materials. Washed by strong rains from the slopes into the rivers that wind through THE CONTEXT OF DISASTERS the plains, volcanic flows as high as IN CENTRAL LUZON 15 meters drastically altered the The region lies at the heart of region’s landscape. Because the rivers Luzon, one of the three major islands overflowed with volcanic debris, the in the Philippines. By 2002, it region has lost its natural drainage, accounted for 8.03 million people or rendering it more vulnerable to floods.

82 Considered one of the world’s The region has also lost some most catastrophic events in the 5,918 hectares of farmland to twentieth century, lahar flows from residential, industrial and commercial the eruption buried and left uses through legal and illegal land use unproductive some 385,000 hectares conversions between 1994 and 2001 of agricultural lands, and changed the (PDI 2001). This trend, which remains biological composition of thirteen unchecked, affects thousands of small rivers. Lahar flows have also claimed land-owning farmers and tenants. the lives of 2,729 people in the past Then as now, this results in the 10 years, inundated more than 500 phenomenon of urban migration. villages and triggered floods that lasted More than 66 percent (5.3 million) from 30 days to 6 months in the of the region’s residents belong to provinces of Pampanga, Zambales and those considered as most vulnerable Tarlac. These are the provinces at the to disasters. They are the landless/ foothills of the Zambales mountain tenant farmers, workers, Aetas range (otherwise known as the (indigenous people), fisherfolks and Western Luzon Arc) where Mt. squatters. They are the farmers who Pinatubo lies. have no land, no equipment for Aside from disasters caused by production, and no control over the natural hazards, the region also bears domestic market. They are the the brunt of numerous human-made workers who are underpaid, have no disasters or a combination of natural stable jobs and suffer from unfair labor and human-made ones such as floods, practices. They are the indigenous droughts, landslides, armed conflicts, people who, because of poverty and development aggression, fires, red the lack of access to quality education, tides, epidemics, pest infestations, do not participate meaningfully in and pollution. decisions affecting their own lives. They are the fisherfolks and the Despite the region’s natural squatters who are equally poor, wealth, the lack of employment and homeless and without stable sources livelihood opportunities renders lives of food and income. For these people no better in Central Luzon that who are economically unprepared, elsewhere in the Philippines. Though disasters are simply part of their the official unemployment rate everyday struggle to eke a living. remains low compared to other regions, millions of the classified Efforts by poor parents to provide “employed” are actually engaged in education to their children as a way seasonal and contractual jobs. Added to improve their life status are rendered to this is the fact that the daily useless. Even when elementary and minimum wage of less than Php230 secondary public education is declared is less than half of the required Php534 free, parents have difficulties paying daily cost of living allowance for a the miscellaneous fees. Without formal family of six. education, the ability of their children to comprehend highly technical

83 information is diminished. They also density, has driven families to embrace have very limited access to more risks. People are driven to erect information through the media. Most shanties near major highways or along of the families in the remotest rural riverbanks, increasing the risk communities do not have television or of mishaps. Traditional coping radio, let alone, access to newspapers. mechanisms are also eroded when Thus, they are frequently misinformed families tend to fragment and disperse and thereby prone to wrong decisions in the face of disasters. or poorly-time actions. Dire poverty and marginalization CBDM APPLICATION IN have made it difficult for shattered families and communities to rebuild CENTRAL LUZON and recover in a way that might make Concern is a nongovernment them more resilient to a subsequent organization mandated to render disaster. A strong case in point is the services to disaster victims. Its mission plight of the Mt. Pinatubo victims. is to assist in developing the capability More than a decade after the of the most vulnerable sectors to eruptions, some 40,000 resettled pursue a people-based development- families transferred to resettlements oriented disaster response (PBDO-DR). continue to bear the brunt of the tail- end effects of the disaster (PDI 2001). To realize this, CONCERN has Displaced from their farms and worked to form a regional network of uprooted from their villages, these people’s organization committed to families remain in dire straits because PBDO-DR. It is a network that resettlement sites are too far from the addresses the vulnerabilities stemming main towns and cities; there are no from poverty, economic degradation farmlots; and there are few basic and ideologically-based armed conflict. social services as local governments It mobilizes resources and rallies its whose populations have dwindled constituency to mitigate the effects receive a lesser shares in national of disasters on its victims. It is a revenues. Of all disaster-stricken network whose understanding of its towns, it is, perhaps, Bacolor in framework deepens and whose Pampanga that has suffered the most. capability for giving life to such a The construction of a 56-km lahar- framework develops in the course of catching dike there occupied the site actual disaster response. What of 18 out of the 22 villages, making emerged from this effort were the the return of these residents next to Grassroots Disaster Response impossible. Machineries (GDRMs) organized into a single network that spans the Central Furthermore, environmental Luzon provinces. degradation has exacerbated the occurrence and impact of floods, As an institution, CONCERN has typhoons, and droughts. Rapid urban three programs. The first is the migration, along with population Disaster Preparedness Program (DPP)

84 which aims to develop the capability development has passed through of both organized and unorganized several phases or stages: first, a communities. The two major responding-to-actual-disaster components of DPP are Education and events framework from 1986 to 1989; Training. These are aimed at raising second, a community-based disaster awareness, building skills in development-oriented framework from disaster response management and 1990 to 1997; and lastly a shift to a organizing the formation of Grassroots people-based development-oriented Disaster Response Machineries framework from 1997 to the present. (GDRMs). The DPP assists in the drafting of Disaster Response Plans A. Responding-to-disaster-events through the conduct of Disaster framework, a reactive approach Response Management–related trainings, drills and resource From 1986 to 1989, CONCERN’s generation at the grassroots level. The services included relief operations to second is the Emergency Response 9,433 families affected by typhoons Program (ERP). This provides and floods and assistance in the immediate relief services to disaster- evacuation of 5,215 families affected stricken communities. Through the by armed conflict. In the aftermath of program, CONCERN coordinates or emergencies, CONCERN implemented cooperates with other organizations, small-scale rehabilitation projects such institutions and agencies for relief as agricultural support (palay seeds delivery operations, medical missions, and vegetables), credit, children’s stress-de-briefing sessions, evacuation educational assistance, irrigation and assistance and rescue operations. animal dispersal to 1,189 families. In Other support services include disaster these responses, CONCERN was monitoring, information dissemination, guided by a framework of “responding volunteer mobilization, resource to disaster events” instead of generation and advocacy of the addressing the vulnerabilities of the victims’ plight and related issues. The people. Its limitations were: third is the Rehabilitation Program. • The services focused on providing This aims to develop a comprehensive relief services to victims to address and integrated approach to their immediate needs and intervention in areas where the subsequent rehabilitation projects GDRM has attained the capability for aimed at ensuring that victims organized action. Organizing support, were able to cope economically skills training, livelihood assistance, from the effects of disasters; and environmental regeneration comprise the program’s holistic • CONCERN carried out the intervention in the communities. emergency response, with staff conducting data gathering, In its 17 years of operations, packaging of relief, identifying of CONCERN has evolved from simply a beneficiaries and other logistical relief institution into a comprehensive requirements – the victims were disaster management center. This merely recipients of relief goods;

85 • Small-scale projects were establishes pro-active, holistic and coordinated with people’s preventive response rather than organizations (POs) without doing palliative measures. It believes in the an assessment of their organi- inherent capability of the communities zational and management capa- to prevail over disasters. It seeks the bilities, resulting in many POs realization of organized communities experiencing difficulties in managing capable of changing their lives, and sustaining the project, and even mastering their conditions and charting at times contributing to existing their future. organizational problems; and It was in the eruption of Mt. • Other sectors were not fully Pinatubo that the CBDO framework mobilized to help the disaster was tested and developed. First, the victims; CONCERN relied mainly on people of Central Luzon were projects funded by international unprepared for disasters especially and local donors. with the magnitude of the Mt. Pinatubo’s eruptions. CONCERN’s While it cannot be denied that such institutional programs were inadequate responses benefited disaster victims, to serve the thousands of affected CONCERN realized the strategic people. limitations of adhering to a framework of “responding to actual disaster Taking up the challenges, events”. This framework was found CONCERN developed the concept of unsustainable and lacking in the values grassroots disaster response of participation and accountability. As machinery (GDRM). These units are it merely employed a “dole-out” mandated to immediately respond in approach, it also overlooked the the advent and aftermath of disasters significance of building the people’s and address their effects on the own capabilities through disaster community by generating and preparedness. mobilizing available resources and capacities inside and outside the B. Addressing vulnerabilities at the community. The capacity of the GDRM grassroots, local, regional and is built along more comprehensive national levels (1990 to present) community concerns and the realization that vulnerability is rooted In 1990, CONCERN was among in the socioeconomic condition of the proponents of a national network the people. As such, capacity building of disaster response centers to uphold for disaster response entails socio- the Citizen-Based and Development- economic empowerment. Oriented (CB-DO) DM orientation. The CB-DO is premised on the capability By 1996 or five years after the Mt building of the vulnerable sectors. It Pinatubo’s eruptions, CONCERN encourages broad grassroots carried out an evaluation of its practice participation and a sustainable over the last decade. The result was developmental approach, which the adoption of a People’s Based

86 Development Oriented (PBDO) This approach has resulted in the principle to replace the Community formation of a disaster response Based Development Oriented (CBDO) network (DRN) at the regional and at one. PBDO places emphasis on the provincial levels in Pampanga, increasing the capabilities of the Zambales, and Tarlac. Acting as the most vulnerable sectors and secretariat of the DRN in the regional emphasizing that disaster response is level from 1992 to 1996, CONCERN not the sole work of CONCERN. rendered relief operations to 217,597 Disaster response is actually a families, trained 3,528 people, and movement characterized by people’s provided rehabilitation support to organized actions aimed at 5,494 families from different sectors. vulnerability reduction. In churches, offices and schools, it campaigned for help and solicited Organizing communities for mainly relief items like canned goods, vulnerability and risk reduction is used clothes, mats and other kitchen crucial in all types of interventions utensils. because organized communities can better launch development Trained by CONCERN, the initiatives. People at the grassroots provincial networks composed of level have inherent but limited people’s organizations implement the capacity. What they need is to be entire DM work through their assisted in identifying their potentials secretariat. The secretariat unifies the and resources and in formulating POs on DM orientation. The provincial procedures to mobilize them. With DRN helps in formulating disaster functional organizations, people can preparedness plans, organizing better study their problems, plan out GDRMs, disseminating information, their moves, make use of their limited delivering goods, conducting resource resources and eventually gain from it. generation, implementing rehabilitation project and advocating for relief, rehabilitation and resettlement at the CBDM PRINCIPLES AND CASE provincial and regional level. The STUDIES* concerted effort is effective in addressing the needs of the victims. 1. DM work is not only the However, the sheer numbers make the responsibility of the institution. DM work daunting. work is an integral part of the cause of people’s In 1997, CONCERN spearheaded organizations. Disaster response the formation of the Oplan Sagip management can be best pursued Bayan (OSB), a national coalition when done in collaboration with against the La Nińa phenomenon in various stakeholders – people’s 1998. It comprised a little less than organizations, support institutions 50 NGOs, church organizations, such as CONCERN, individuals and academic organizations as well as private agencies. hundreds of individuals. The resources (goods, funds, volunteers) mobilized

87 by this coalition were directed to relief in the identification of evacuation sites operations, sandbagging work in and the listing of evacuated families. immediately threatened villages, For lack of funds to provide adequate advocacies through the media and food assistance and because the disaster preparedness training in worst-case scenario predicted by the Luzon, including Dumagats in remote Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Quezon province. Before the services Seismology did not eventuate were rendered, CONCERN unified the (happen), local government advised coalition to undertake the tasks along families to return to their villages. the PBDO framework. The OSB continues to render services. 2. DM work gives premium on organizing the people and building In 2001, CONCERN assisted their capability to prepare for its partner, the Zambales Disaster disasters. This is the core of Response Network in information addressing people’s vulnerabilities. dissemination and disaster By organizing the people through preparedness orientations in the formation of Grassroots Barangays San Juan, Paudpod, Disaster Response Machineries, Carael, Batonlapoc and Bangan in they are given the strength to cope Botolan. The threat of lahar flows and recover against the impact of burying these villages loomed as disasters, and eventually address government proceeded to breach the the underlying problems of their crater-lake of Mt. Pinatubo and release vulnerability that include poverty, water that would mobilize lahar landlessness, homelessness, downstream. Barangay-level GDRMs unemployment, low income and were immediately formed with strong disempowerment. linkages to existing community leadership structures. The GDRMs During the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, were able to respond to the impending a community-based course for threat of lahar and flashflood. They Disaster Preparedness and Evacuation linked up and conducted dialogues Center Management was designed with municipal officials for mitigation and conducted in 120 communities. measures. The municipal council The trainings resulted in the formation provided 500 sacks for the of 113 grassroots disaster response sandbagging operation in Barangay machineries. Baytan, which was located at the The GDRMs through its warning upstream portion of the Bucao River. committee in Manibaug Libutad in At the onset of the rainy season, Porac, Pampanga – (considered as one the GDRMs actively monitored the of the high risk areas for lahar flows) situation in their respective barangays. warned residents that the water level They were able to set-up an at the creek was rising and that they Emergency Operations Center (EOC) should prepare for evacuation. They in Batonlapoc. The GDRMs on the blew their whistles and immediately other hand, assisted barangay leaders mobilized the foot patrols that

88 contacted households. They informed The network actively campaigned the residents of the impending danger, for the relief, rehabilitation and instructed them to leave their houses resettlement of Pinatubo victims. By and to gather at the marketplace or a 1996, the advocacy campaigned school building that had previously against the usufruct scheme in which been identified during the disaster the victims are required to pay for lots preparedness training. A few hours and houses. The scheme was shelved, later, a one-meter high lahar claimed and in 2003 the government started houses upstream, while lahar of two issuing land titles to the settlers (PDI meters tall buried the houses 2003). However, this process has downstream. However, no one was moved so slowly that it required killed or hurt. another campaign to press for the swifter distribution of titles. But the GDRM concept also suffered setbacks during its formative 4. The program is integrated years. GDRMs formed without because it applies different but adequate linkage to people’s complementing strategies and organization that already existed in approaches at any point within its communities fizzled out after the duration. It seeks to address actual disaster event. To address this, both the short and long-term needs CONCERN ensured that GDRMs were of communities, assisting in next formed as committees within the the defense of local resources PO structure. In areas without POs, and environment as the people’s the organizational skills of GDRMs livelihood base through leaders were strengthened. advocacies. Concretely, this program is an integration of the 3. In the course of building people’s three main strategies applied by capabilities, DM work initiates the institutions namely, disaster advocacy campaigns for the preparedness through organizing reduction of vulnerabilities and for and training, emergency response, accessing services. Advocacies for which includes health services, a sustainable environment vis-ŕ-vis and rehabilitation which includes local occurrences of deforestation, small-scale and multicomponent river siltation, and mangrove livelihood projects. destruction were pursued. Advocacies for welfare services The project in Masantol, Pampanga include resettlement, relief began with relief assistance. A year assistance and rehabilitation later, the Emergency Response (seeds, potable water, etc.) Committee evolved into a people’ Leaders were encouraged to organization covering ten barangays. mobilize their constituents and It has addressed concerns relating to their resources to generate public floods and other problems confronting opinion or influence local policy- the communities. making bodies to effect life- nurturing policies and measures.

89 Flooding has worsened over the children could resume classes. The years in Masantol and in the nearby initiative paved the way for the local towns of Macabebe, Calumpit, and government to cement the Apalit in the aftermath of the Mt. sandbagged structure. Pinatubo eruptions. This can be The Sagip Cabalen ning Masantol observed in the greater occurrence of (Save the People of Masantol), as a floods despite moderate rains, municipal-level GDRM, managed to get floodwater levels that reach an five potable pumps after they average of two feet after only campaigned for safe drinking water. moderate rains and four feet after It also called for dredging to improve heavy downpours, and the occurrence the drainage capacity of the river. It of a longer period of inundation that launched a bayanihan (working can last for as long as more than together) activity for sandbagging and six months. These detrimental pushed the town’s vice mayor, who developments can be partly attributed heads the local legislative body, to to the destruction of the remaining pass a resolution protecting the mangrove forests. Coastal villages remaining mangroves. have been stripped of their natural defense against the battering waves 5. Women’s role in disaster of Manila Bay and rendered more management is important and it vulnerable to erosion. Through the needs to be enhanced. Being half years, due to salt intrusion and of the population who take up frequent flooding, many people have most of the domestic concerns as shifted from rice farming to inland their principal responsibility, aquaculture to raise prawns and crabs women have much to share in or do a combination of both carrying out community-based simultaneously. initiatives at disaster management. CONCERN held relief operations in They should be given venues to the ten flood-affected barangays of express and develop their Masantol in August 2002 in the leadership potentials so they can aftermath of typhoon “Gloria.” The have more significant participation project assisted 1,000 families. in the development process. Because residents were involved in Barangay Saluysoy-Pandayan is a assessing the situation, on who squatter’s community along the needed help most, what help was dilapidated railway in Meycauayan, most needed, and how this help should Bulacan. It is part of the so-called be offered, the participatory process Daang Bakal, connected to other led to the formation of a municipal- communities by a long stretch of wide GDRM in Masantol. Even during railway tracks previously operated for an emergency response, CONCERN public transport by the Philippine tapped the inherent capacity of National Railways. The squatters the victims. In Palimpe, the Emergency together with the other similar Response Committees held communities in Daang Bakal have been sandbagging activities so that 300

90 declared public land and the residents assistance. In less than a week after as illegal occupants or “squatters”. the fire, the GDRM was among the However, without places to move to, first to conduct relief delivery families are forced to remain despite operation but since the resources were the many threats of demolitions. not enough for the 400 families, they prioritized those who were most in The project assisted in the need. After CONCERN’s relief delivery, formation of a ‘railroad-wide’ GDRM other organizations and local with a functioning leadership government followed. structure. It conducted a disaster preparedness training attended by 19 6. The genuine participation of selected community leaders. Thirteen disaster victims in all aspects of (13) of these participants were women disaster management is at the core (65%). The GDRM conducted of successful intervention. The contingency planning for disaster people are the primary forces or response, hazard mapping, dialogues stakeholders whose future relies with barangay officials regarding road mainly on their own decision and development and with provincial determination to pursue DM. The officials regarding demolition, a actual participation of the people community-wide Operation Clean-up, is best expressed in their and herbal preparation training. The involvement in decision-making. project also helped form the Barangay The role of NGOs is to guide them Fire Brigade (BFB). The BFB initiated a and unite them around particular 12-hour monitoring during the dry principles. Different views should months of March until May to prevent be encouraged to come up with any fire hazard. The GDRM gathered better judgment and resolution on resources to support the BFB by certain issues. providing bread and coffee to members Barangay Sta. Isabel is a rural on patrol. There had been several village in the central portion of attempts to burn down the community Dinalupihan town in Bataan. but these have been prevented Considered one of the poorest because of the sustained monitoring communities in the fourth-class town, of the BFB. the community is located on a low- In March 2002, a fire broke out in lying plain surrounded by privately- another squatters’ community some owned tracts of agricultural lands that 500 meters away from Saluysoy- were previously tilled for sugarcane. Pandayan. Overcoming parochial About five hectares of the village concerns, leaders of the GDRM helped has been declared under dispute by in the rescue and evacuation of some the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office 400 of the affected families. They (MARO). Three different clans claim assisted the local government unit in ownership of this land which is part identifying and preparing evacuation of a 20-hectare property that had been sites. They initiated an appeal on left idle for two decades. The disputed behalf of the affected families for relief land unfortunately has been the home

91 and source of food to 48 families for management and herbal plant several years. Faced by the possibility preparation. They initiated monthly of eviction since 1998, the residents communitywide cleanups of the organized themselves and formed the waterways; procured medicines, Balikatan ng Mamamayan (People’s rubber boats, life vests and canned Cooperation) to assert their tenure to foods; and accessed water pumps as the land. a source of potable water. In July 2000, immediately after When typhoons “Reming” and typhoons “Ditang” and “Edeng” left “Seniang” hit Central Luzon in Sta. Isabel under four feet of water November 2002, the community was for several days, CONCERN conducted relatively well-prepared. They were a DNCA (Damage-Needs-Capacities equipped with monitoring gadgets, Assessment). CONCERN discovered ropes, medicines, rescue/evacuation that more than 20 families that had facilities and a stockpile of canned been evacuated at the height of the food. They also identified and typhoons were forced to return prioritized the most flood-prone areas because of inadequate space at the for evacuation. Through these evacuation site. After the rains, some initiatives, the community suffered of the families chose to remain on their less from the flood, which remained roofs rather than go elsewhere. The for three days at the height of the urgency of providing food and typhoons. Despite the number of medicines prompted CONCERN to families needing to evacuate their include Sta. Isabel in the top priority homes, no personal property was for relief assistance. damaged as these had been earlier transferred to safer places. CONCERN assisted by helping form a Disaster Response Committee Even after the project had ended, or GDRM, instructing the community CONCERN sustained its support to in the step-by-step procedure of Balikatan by helping in the campaign emergency response, and helping to remain on the disputed land. It also them systematize their operation. The supported the local PO on its disaster residents organized a DR Committee mitigation campaign concerning a under the leadership of Balikatan proposed dike system. In June 2001, instead of creating another structure. while the project was in progress, Through the leadership of Balikatan, CONCERN designed a livelihood members of the DR Committee helped project seeking to improve income. CONCERN identify the needs and The proposal was submitted to the enumerate the beneficiaries. They also Small Grants Programme of the New prepared the program and technical Zealand Embassy. It was approved for requirements of the relief delivery implementation in January 2002. operation. 7. Capability building for Through the project, local people organizational strengthening and gained knowledge and skills on project management is crucial disaster preparedness, health

92 to project sustainability. Project aftermath of disasters as well as their success cannot always be onsets but also the entire range of effectively measured in terms of disaster response work. It gives achieving project objectives as utmost priority to assisting vulnerable designed but rather in terms of communities to prepare for the onset how effectively the local people of any disaster event in the context and their organization have of addressing their vulnerability and undergone the process of building their capacity to manage achieving the project objectives. disasters. It involves the provision of relief assistance as well as the CONCERN, in line with the PBDO important task of extending framework developed an Integrated knowledge, skills and opportunities for Program for Development (IPD) for the resumption of economic activities Aetas in the upland communities of that can help people rebuild their lives. Batiawan and Malipano in It is essentially pro-active and is not Floridablanca, Pampanga. The IPD, by content with mere stopgap measures design, strengthened the capacities of or reactive interventions. the people’s organization through socio-economic empowerment. The But there are challenges as well. program resulted in the reforestation First, there is a need to lobby for a of 10 hectares in upland areas of the government legislation to create an villages, the training of 50 adult Aetas independent body or structure for in functional literacy and numeracy, disaster management. The increasing and access to potable water to less occurrences of disasters and the dire than 100 Aeta families. Besides the lack of comprehensive DM work benefits from livelihood projects and necessitates the creation of that body social services, the program also with year-round work. facilitated the long-lost unity between Second, it is high time for the Aetas and the upland settlers government and funding donors to against whom they harbored negative give emphasis to disaster prevention, feelings as “land grabbers”. Through preparedness, and mitigation instead the program, they began to cooperate. of relief assistance. Actual Guided by the program, the local PO engagement in disaster management then campaigned against land grabbing (DM) is hampered by the lack of and illegal logging in their knowledge and expertise on it. There communities. remains a dearth of development NGOs involved in DM work either through services or advocacy of CONCLUSION AND CHALLENGES disaster-related issues. Most NGOs The CBDM guided by a people- involved in disasters only tackle the based development-oriented (PBDO) relief aspects of the work and there framework is both comprehensive and are only a few NGOs engaged in integrated. It is comprehensive comprehensive DM let alone in the because it not only tackles the training and development of DM

93 practitioners in communities, schools, military budget which already areas of work, and even within consumes a large share of the budget. government. DM practitioners should look into how local governments use calamity funds Third, the five percent calamity (Business World 2003). fund should be confined to services such as relief and other preparedness Lastly, CBDM should be integrated activities. In South Cotabato, the into the programs of the people’s calamity funds were reportedly being organizations so as to save more lives. used to hire three companies of These organizations can identify the CAFGU (Citizens Armed Forces hazards, mobilize the people, advocate Geographical Unit) to fight against the for services and reforms and work with Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). barangay disaster coordinating Although armed conflict is considered council (BDCC). To date, the DM a human-induced disaster, scarce networks in the Philippines are still funds should not be allocated for composed of NGOs and private services that effectively increase the groups.

NOTE * Taken from materials of CONCERN (n.d.).

REFERENCES Business World 2003 “Mindanao Local Exec to Use Calamity Fund for Security.” Business World, 10 April. CONCERN n.d. CONCERN’s CBDM Unpublished Case Project Reports. National Statistics 2000 National Statistics Central Luzon Population. Philippine Daily Inquirer 2001 “Group says Pinatubo Tragedy not Over.” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 16 June. 2001 “5,900 Hectares of Farmlands Converted in Luzon.” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 19 June. 2003 “Pinatubo Settlers to get Land Titles.” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 30 May.

94 The Psychosocial Impact of Internal Displacement: Case Studies from a Complex Emergency Situation on Mindanao

Kaloy A. Anasarias

In the Philippines, where the prevailing and Indonesia as countries with the idea of a disaster are those brought most number of internally displaced about by typhoons, earthquakes and persons. floods, the phenomenon of internal When disasters such as internal displacement, as a consequence of displacement strike, the physical armed conflict, has already reached a effects are obvious and are the ones proportion that can no longer be usually noticed – loss of life, ignored. More than 1 million people destruction of home, properties, have been affected by armed clashes livestock, workspaces and houses of since the government responded with worship. Too often, the emotional an all-out military assault against Moro effects of disasters are taken as a revolutionary fronts in Mindanao three normal reaction to a tragedy – which years ago. This is nearly as many as they truly are — but are taken for those displaced by natural calamities granted as a passing response to an estimated by the Global IDP Project extraordinary situation. State of the Norwegian Refugee Council to authorities, government social workers be approximately 1.5 million people in and private service providers seldom 2001. Though the total war policy consider that even more than the was lifted by President Gloria physical effects of disasters, the Macapagal Arroyo when she became traumatic effects cause long lasting chief executive in 2001, bombing suffering, disability that impairs the operations and military actions against normal and meaningful functioning of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) individuals, families, and communities. have produced 300,000 more evacuees over the last four months of this year (2003) in Southern Philippines. According to a report of TRAUMATIC STRESS the US Committee for Refugees But what really happens to a (USCR), this places the Philippines on person when he or she goes through the list of top 40 countries where a traumatic event such as war and internal displacement is considered as internal displacement? What do the a great disaster. In Southeast Asia, evacuees feel and experience under the Philippines ranks third after Burma such circumstances? The story of one

95 case being served by Balay in Parang, tragic event persist, leaving an Maguindanao illustrates the experience indelibly horrendous image in the common to traumatized evacuees who hearts and minds of the displaced had survived the armed conflict in persons. They grieve for the death of Mindanao: their loved ones and wonder how they survived. Not a few dwell on feelings  It was night time when the military of guilt for not being able to save their attacked. My family was roused parents, siblings or kin. Others feel from our sleep by the sound of devastated by the loss of their homes; planes and gunfire. Without for the destruction of treasured warning, the bombs fell. Mortar personal belongings such as school shells rained near our house. We uniforms, family pictures, pets, for lost heard shouting everywhere. documents, and for the loss of friends People were running, wailing. and familiar neighborhoods. Children were crying. My heart pounded very hard. My mouth was The extraordinary prevalence of dry. I was stunned, I could barely such strong physiological, cognitive, speak. My body was tensed. My and emotional responses to forcible senses were on high-alert. Anxiety displacement indicates that these are washed over my body. Terror normal reactions to an extreme gripped my mind. I could hardly situation. The trauma being suffered move. I could not understand what by internally displaced persons is not was going on. All I knew was that a sign of “mental illness” or “moral our lives are in peril. weakness.” They do not signify that traumatized people are going “crazy”  My parents told me to pick up my or weak. However, unless their younger sister and grab a few psychosocial disturbance is resolved clothes. We were moving out to relatively quickly, their distress may get as far as possible from the sight interfere with their ability to and sound of war. We walked and reconstruct their lives and shatter ran under the cover of darkness. I family and community relations. It may could imagine our house being hit even lead to dysfunction and other by bombs. After two days, we debilitating emotional and behavioral arrived in the town center where conditions that will have devastating many other evacuees had sought effects on the individual, their family, refuge in a schoolhouse. We were and their community. tired and had not eaten, but I was too shocked and afraid to feel hungry. I could not believe that FAMILY DISTRESS AND RECOVERY tragedy could happen to us. Staying for long periods of time in Shock, a sense of unreality, and evacuation centers, forces displaced fear dominate long after the fighting persons to confront their ordeal in an is over. At the evacuation centers the unrelenting way. In addition to the sight, sounds, smell, and feeling of the mental and emotional distress, they

96 have to bear with the loss of privacy enough to feed her children, she has in overcrowded temporary shelters. to face up to the responsibility of Moreover, poor sanitation, inadequate raising her family by herself. Feeling shelters and contaminated water may tired most of the time and uncertain result in outbreaks of disease and lead over their future, she became to deaths. unusually impatient and irritable which manifested itself in her attitude Having to rely on government towards her children. agencies and private service providers for relief rations and other basic During a parent-child encounter, necessities to survive another day, the she realized that her stress has been evacuees also have to confront their getting on her boy’s nerves and it was loss of independence. In many cases, this that drove him to shout back at this situation aggravates the her. She also learned that her son felt deterioration in self-esteem especially irritated by her continual stream of among those who were economically orders, especially when he is studying. productive prior to their displacement. According to the boy, he was trying When usual family activities and hard to catch up with the studies that economic preoccupation are he missed when they evacuated. He disrupted, the authority of traditional said that most of his friends were breadwinners is also undercut, thus ahead of him now that gave him a altering family dynamics. Women who sense of self-pity and sham. When lost their husbands at the height of given the chance to resume his the conflict are driven to take on roles education through Balay’s educational usually culturally relegated to menfolk. assistance, he considered it as an Older children may also have to opportunity to erase that stigma. His assume functions in the family passion for his studies and the need inappropriate for their age. of her overburdened mother for Subsequently, parent-child conflict and somebody to lighten up their family marital distress could arise. load has led to family stress which they eventually resolved through An Iranun mother receiving dialogue, counseling, self-awareness psychosocial services from Balay in activities, scheduling of chores and Parang, Maguindanao complained that household responsibilities, and her 8-year old son is a constant source livelihood assistance from their of headaches to her since they partner-NGO. returned to their village after the military left. Her boy, she observed, shouts back at her. It was also difficult COMMUNITY DISCORD for her to ask him to perform his usual household chores. The woman said AND HEALING that life had been doubly stressful for The destruction of communities her since her husband died at the and the sociocultural fabric of height of the armed conflict in their internally displaced persons also cut village. Aside from trying to earn deep wounds in their hearts and minds.

97 People reel from the loss of their the point that interfaith and inter- cultural activities and social identities. cultural marriages became possible To evacuees, their mass exodus has and acceptable among them. separated them from their familiar But when armed conflict erupted world, or from a homeland where they in their midst, the Moros and the draw their sense of safety and settlers separated and moved to traditional subsistence, and where different evacuation sites. Feelings of they find meaning in their lives as animosity emerged as they blamed one individuals and as a people. To many, another in an effort to make sense of the ensuing feelings of loss and grief the tragedy that had happened to their drive them to doubt themselves and community. Old neighbors refused to their capabilities to go on with their look one another in the eye. lives. They can also develop feelings Friendships between Muslim and of mistrust towards one another, Christian children were broken. Balay especially to authorities and people counselors provided the occasion for they view as responsible for their the community to restore their respect misery. and trust for each other. Through a In one community being served by peace camp, Moro and Christian Balay in North Cotabato, a schism children were given the chance to play developed in the harmonious co- with each other once more. Those who habitation of Moro and the non-Moro showed signs of deep-seated anger population following a violent incident. and hostility during the activities were As cohesion in the village was lost diagnosed as needing sustained due to their displacement, the psychosocial intervention. They were traditional divisions in the community subsequently processed with the help along ethnic and religious lines of their families. Through structured resurfaced. Memories of social learning exercises and games, the oppression and feelings of children recalled the good memories marginalization were exacerbated. of their community prior to their Before their displacement, the Moros displacement. Their sharing of stories who are Muslims and the non-Moro enabled them to make more sense of Christian settlers who came from other the tragic events that had overtaken parts of the country had been living their village and to realize the ties that together in that village as one bound them together as peace community since the 1930s. They builders. shared food, helped each other in For the children’s parents, the tending their farms, respected each activity proved to be therapeutic as other’s rituals, and allowed their well. They bridged whatever children to play together. And being reservations they had and participated good neighbors whatever little in the preparation of the summer misunderstanding that came their way camp. Muslims and Christian parents was resolved in a non-antagonistic offered to cook food for the children. manner. Throughout the years, their Some built sheds where the games and community bonding grew stronger to

98 other activities were held. As their INTERRELATED EFFECTS elders rekindled their ties with other community members, the kids were The impact of armed conflict and encouraged to restore their relations internal displacement to individuals, with one another. families and communities are interrelated and inseparable. The Balay provided psychosocial care trauma affecting the emotional and to other families and individuals who behavioral responses of an individual were experiencing prolonged take its toll in one way or the other on bereavement and behavioral disorders. the relationship between, or among, Family and group therapies were parents and siblings. Social disruption introduced. Trauma as a result of the both reduces and interferes with the violent incident was explained to healing effects of the family and the community members. Orientation on community and is in itself an enormous psychosocial intervention was also source of stress on the individuals who given to them, while a number of make up the family and the volunteers completed a counselor’s community. training. Human rights education and peer-counselors training were also For many victims, these symptoms extended to both adults and youth fade with time. But for many others, alike. there may be longer-term emotional effects, both obvious and subtle, A year after Balay started its especially if no psychological psychosocial work in the community, intervention is introduced. As the days Muslims and Christian neighbors are and weeks pass by in an evacuation visiting each other again. They also center, a displaced person may begin invite each other to join in the to experience a wide variety of observance of each other’s rituals. The emotional disturbances such as children formed a Christian-Muslim chronic grief, depression, anxiety and youth organization. The adults guilt. Others may show signs of organized a cooperative participated irritability and hostility. Some may in by both Moros and non-Moros alike. demonstrate difficulties in controlling As of 2003, preparations are anger and suspiciousness. It is also not underway for them to participate in a uncommon for traumatized evacuees training on disaster preparedness and to keep to themselves and shun other management where they can form people. Sleep disturbances due to coordinating committees to respond in nightmares and flashbacks haunt an organized and collective manner in many of them. During waking hours, case another tragedy befalls their the sights and sound of their ordeal community. Though the villagers still may return to them as if the disaster feel anxious about the possibility of is happening all over again, reinforcing the recurrence of armed conflict, they their sense of helplessness and have somehow managed to face their hopelessness. life one day at a time and get on with the usual flow of life and coexistence.

99 RESPONSE PATTERNS who come from villages destroyed by military operations blame There may be cultural variations in soldiers and leaders from the the precise patterns in which disaster- national government for their related symptoms appear but findings misery. Those who returned to from ongoing Balay case studies on their place of origin and discovered the psychosocial impact of internal that their homes and place of displacement in seven armed conflict- worship had been ransacked, affected communities in Mindanao vandalized or desecrated, harbor indicate that the emotional responses feelings of hatred, if not to disasters are broadly similar. vengeance. These responses may However, the degree of risk to adverse not be as strong, if manifest at all, mental and emotional consequences among survivors of extreme tends to be influenced by a number of natural events such as floods, factors. earthquakes and tsunamis. 1. The more severe the disaster and 3. In addition to the effects of internal the more terrifying the experiences displacement, the negative of an individual, family or experiences of evacuees in community, the greater the temporary shelters, “tent cities,” likelihood of intense and lasting and other evacuation centers psychological effects. Balay cases (malnutrition, epidemics, physical that have lost a family member or assaults, and other human rights have come close to death violations) produce adverse themselves are seen to be emotional and behavioral effects suffering from more intense grief and psychological disorders. An and abnormal bereavement than old Kalagan woman whose two those who escaped from harm. sons were abducted by suspected Children who barely survived in the military forces in Mati, Davao violent conflicts and those who Oriental in the aftermath of their lost their treasured personal displacement suffered from shock. belongings such as books, pets and For months, she would not speak, school uniforms exhibit aggression spending her time staring blankly and hostility. They also take more as tears welled in her eyes. She time to restore their social relations could hardly eat either. Her eldest with other children. daughter had to force food into her 2. The mental and physical mouth. While her sons remain consequences of a disaster that are missing, she was able to get over intentionally inflicted by others, her shock and depression with the such as a military assault, are likely help of her family and Balay to be greater than those disasters counselors. which may have been produced by 4. Being forcibly separated from a natural causes such as typhoons place that provides a source of or floods. Many displaced persons security and subsistence prolongs

100 the trauma and retards self- intellectual, religious and social healing. But contrary to the education of children and youth. common notion, a disaster does In Sirawai, Zamboanga del Norte, not end for many displaced people the literacy and numeracy program after they have returned to their initiated by Balay served to place of origin. They often remain enhance the coping resources of in highly stressful, even repeatedly the displaced Kolibugans and traumatic situations, especially if contributed to rebuilding family and the armed men whom they community solidarity. considered as the cause of their Many of those who have survived oppression still occupy their and coped with a similar kind of villages. The lack of rehabilitation disaster in the past, such as those who assistance to rebuild their lives and have repeatedly experienced or been mend mental anguish reinforces exposed to armed conflict and internal their negative feelings about displacement show more resilience in themselves and their ordeals. confronting their ordeal. A number of 5. The availability of a social support Moro evacuees in an evacuation center network — sympathetic clan in Maguindanao indicated that they members or relatives, friends, had become “immune” to such community, religious leaders and tragedies, suggesting that they had institutions, and partner service come to accept it as a consequence providers — reduces the likelihood of the military response to their of lasting emotional and mental aspiration to have an independent trauma. In a number of “tent homeland. cities,” the evacuees who are Since armed conflict-induced mostly blood relatives share disasters and internal displacements whatever meager rations they affect different individuals, families have. Others moved in with their and communities to different relatives and friends in town degrees, and because many of the centers that are relatively far from psychological effects of dis- the sites of battle. Some political placement are created or affected by and religious leaders offered their the direct social and economic land as temporary settlement sites circumstances, responses to this kind for the displaced, such as in Aflek of disaster ought not to be purely in T’boli, South Cotabato and in physical, psychological nor economical Simuay, Sultan Kudarat in relief, but psychosocial as well. Maguindanao. The ustadzes, imams and datus can often contribute to strengthening the moral and spiritual resilience of PSYCHOSOCIAL INTERVENTION their displaced constituencies. In responding to a catastrophic Wherever accessible, the madrasas event, when would be the best time or Arabic schools provide to conduct psychosocial intervention? continuity in the form of the In the aftermath of an armed conflict

101 and internal displacement, it is seldom sense of order and control the possible that a victim is found to be in a stable occurrence of an untoward incident are mental state. What matters most to part of creating safety for the victims. the evacuees immediately after Not being able to do so this only invites escaping death and leaving their chaos and reinforces the trauma of homes behind is direct concrete relief. displaced persons. Psychosocial intervention during this period should be directed at meeting their urgent need for access to food, DISPLACEMENT AFTERMATH water, clothing and shelter. Many of In the days following displacement, them may also need immediate some victims may begin to show signs medical attention, physical safety and of severe distress such as intense security. Families that are separated anxiety or panic, uncontrollable crying, require reuniting. The whereabouts of disorientation, or incoherence which bodies of dead family members or creates more discord in their already relatives must also be determined and difficult situation. At this point, recovered as soon as possible to be psychosocial workers may provide given proper burial rites. Providing “psychological first aid” to comfort these immediate support services them and reduce their stress. Letting contributes to the stabilization of their victims express their feelings and physical conditions and mitigates their regain a sense of control can be a big mental and emotional suffering. Failure help, as does facilitating stress to do this, however, only reinforces reduction exercises. Helping victims their distress and heightens the trauma get in touch with family members, caused by their forcible displacement. neighbors, and friends who can make Disaster management experts call up their own “comfort zone” and this phase the “emergency period.” restore their social or emotional At this point, the conduct of relief, support system shores-up their coping medical and psychosocial missions is resources and prevents the further most desirable and timely, but not deterioration of their emotional and necessarily easy. Schoolhouses, mental state. government buildings, places of Many evacuees are not worship, or public parks serving as immediately receptive to psychosocial evacuation centers or “tent cities” are intervention, days or weeks after their always teeming with people. Many of displacement. Some are too dazed to them will be seeking help, sometimes respond to debriefing, and would at the point of clawing at each other rather try to make sense of the disaster to get their share of whatever relief in an introspective way. Some claim rations are offered. Some may be that they do not need help at all, hanging around just to exploit the especially those who are in denial. situation, even if they are not actually Others are simply unaware that what victims. Others are present only to they are going through emotionally, satisfy their curiosity. The efforts of mentally and behaviorally is indicative the service providers to provide a

102 of trauma that ought to be processed. assemblies, dialogue with the Many tend to view the psychosocial council of elders and religious or workers or community counselors with political leaders, meeting with mistrust, particularly if they are village officials and youth camps. “outsiders” who came from other 3. To establish a healing alliance places, who do not speak their with individuals, families and language or practice their religion. communities for focused There are a host of psychosocial psychosocial intervention. Once interventions appropriate at this stage partnership is ensured concrete in the aftermath of a disaster. The support that matches the needs principle to be observed is that the and intervention goals of the responses of service providers match caseload are provided. This the phase of emotional needs and includes debriefing, defusing and relief requirements of the displaced other crisis intervention persons. At this point, focusing on the approaches, trauma awareness identification of those that require education, educational assistance, a therapeutic partnership and livelihood support, and medical sustained intervention to reduce and health assistance. emotional, psychological or behavioral 4. To conduct conflict mediation, dysfunction is essential. Some of the peace camps, community edu- measures undertaken by Balay at this cation, disaster management phase are: training, human rights awareness 1. To identify those who show signs programs, training of community- of intense distress and are in need based counselors, assistance to of prolonged services. The priority community organizing and is those who have lost a loved one advocacy. or treasured possession and are suffering from grief trauma, intense anxiety and maladaptive CONTINUING INTERVENTION behavior. Others are those who Many internally displaced persons have come close to death in Mindanao remain in evacuation themselves or have seen centers for months, even years. While somebody close to them die. government agencies regard most of 2. To detect and diagnose them as already having resettled for traumatized evacuees through fear of returning to their place of origin, “area scanning,” profiling of their environments can not be exactly communities and direct victims, considered as permanent. In fact, their and trauma diagnosis using situation is far from ideal for complete standard documentation tools. healing. Nevertheless, there are ways This may be done in a number of wherein individuals and families can ways such as, but not limited to, be encouraged to create a semblance individual and family interviews, of “normal” life. home visits, community

103 Even within the evacuation center, evacuation centers for those who people can work at keeping their family want to pursue their religious, cultural ties intact and adjust to their new and educational enrichment. family dynamics. Though coming from Psychosocial work at this phase different villages, they can also be helps in the reconstruction and assisted in building new structures for rehabilitation of displaced persons and their “community of displaced aids them to take hold of their lives in persons.” This may involve worshiping the evacuation center. Through the together and engaging in other provision of such services, it is hoped meaningful social interaction. They can that displaced persons will be able to engage in collective farming, provide eventually return with dignity to a camp security, and participate in peaceful community of their own rituals and recreational or cultural choice. A community, that is, where activities. An evacuation camp can they can truly rebuild their lives also provide an opportunity to learn according to their cultural and political new skills for alternative source of preference, and determine their own subsistence. Children can be assisted development in a way that helps them in continuing their education in the rediscover meaning in their lives as public schools. Arabic schools or individuals and as a people. madrasas can also be built in their

104 Mobilizing the Support of Less Vulnerable Sectors for Disaster Resilient Communities

Celso B. Dulce

In community-based disaster the consequent vulnerability of the management, the participation of the majority of the country’s population vulnerable sectors as primary actors complete the scenario of frequent and is essential to building disaster resilient chronic disasters of severe magnitude. communities. Equally important is the The same widespread poverty limits mobilization of less vulnerable sectors. the capacity of Filipinos to recover While they are external to a disaster from a disaster and to be better situation, their support to diverse prepared for the next hazardous disaster management activities event. It does not help that initiated by the vulnerable sectors is government has not given disaster vital to increasing the resiliency fo their management sufficient attention it communities. deserves. A review of the Philippine medium term development plans and The very definition of disaster the annual general appropriations acts, denotes the need for external support. for instance, show that disaster For example, the Center for Research management (DM) has not permeated on the Epidemiology of Disasters government planning and not enough defines disaster as “a situation or resources are allocated for DM event which overwhelms local programs. capacity, necessitating a request to national or international level for Any person, group, organization or external assistance.” A cursory community external to a disaster area Internet search would reveal that the is a potential source of support for World Health Organization (WHO), building community resilience to the American Red Cross, and many disasters, even among vulnerable other organizations subscribe to similar groups and disaster victims. The if not identical definitions. farmers of vegetable-growing Baguio City, for example, are known to The requirement for external contribute part of their produce to assistance becomes even more disaster relief efforts. The community necessary in the context of disaster preparedness committees impoverished countries like the organized by Tabang sa mga Biktima Philippines. Situated in an area of high sa Bicol (TABI) in the Bicol Region are seismic, volcanic, and tropical cyclone also known to part with some of their activity, the Philippines is predisposed meager produce in support of TABI’s to disasters. Widespread poverty and

105 relief effort, on top of participating as students are all of one weave. volunteers of the NGO. Regardless of amount, they are all “donations” in support of vulnerable The less vulnerable sectors have sectors. better means to support the disaster management initiatives of the Some NGOs involved in disaster vulnerable sectors. They posses management, such as the Citizens’ appropriate knowledge and skills and Disaster Response Center/Network are financially and materially in a good (CDRC/N) and the Philippine National position to assist the vulnerable Red Cross take on the singular role of sectors. More importantly, however, mobilizing support, both local and they are similarly moved by overseas, to the at-risk communities compassion, charity, humanitarian and vulnerable sectors in the concern, and the universal aspiration Philippines. This mobilizing role for full human development. involves but is not limited to launching local fund campaigns, organizing The less vulnerable sectors include volunteers, and accessing foreign students who do volunteer work grants and donations. during major emergencies, and members of the academe who contribute to increasing disaster MOBILIZING OVERSEAS SUPPORT awareness by integrating disaster management into the regular FOR COMMUNITY INITIATIVES curriculum and launching fund-raising TOWARDS DISASTER RESILIENCE campaigns during emergencies. In a situation where numerous They also include scientists and hazards escalate into disasters and professionals who contribute their government lacks the resources, skills in developing and implementing foresight and the will to decisively disaster management projects, as well address disaster-related and as entrepreneurs and corporations who development issues, NGOs have donate either cash or other resources become significant actors in disaster to disaster management endeavors. management. They assume a range The less vulnerable sector, in its of functions, from criticizing broadest sense, even include foreign government’s deficiencies and donors, be they nongovernment advocating positive action to organizations (NGOs), governments, or complementing its work by delivering multilateral agencies. services that fill ‘gaps’ in Disaster management, particularly government’s disaster management relief programs, often connote foreign programs. While they augment donors or donations that are much government work, NGOs are quick to bigger compared to resources argue that government should not pass contributed locally. However, large on NGOs the responsibility of external grants for entire programs, the attending to the general welfare of free services of medical professionals, disaster victims and at-risk and the volunteer time rendered by communities.

106 NGOs often look to foreign grants to conform to a specific guideline and to finance their operations. The format but experience proves that it budgets of many NGOs are largely is much more than that. sourced overseas. Foreign grant- In the recent Emergency Southeast seeking is a highly competitive Asia Network (EM-SEANET) Workshop endeavor with uncertain results but on Improving Data Quality for Natural grant-seekers persist because the Disasters and Complex Emergencies, substantial support from foreign grant discussions inevitably led to the same givers far outstrips local grant-giving issue of donors adopting different capacity. Substantial grants mean grant-giving guidelines.* A participant greater program coverage, benefiting coming from a Philippine government more disaster victims and at-risk agency forwarded a less popular view groups. Substantial grants also mean that grant-seekers have no choice but more comprehensive interventions, to accept this reality. A more non- whose probability of program success conformist view, supported by many in terms of making a difference in the participants, however, was to lives of disaster victims and at-risk advocate for the development, and communities is greater compared to adoption by donors, of standard piece-meal projects that are resorted guidelines. The international workshop to because of funding shortage. participants, most of them with long Moreover, from an administrative point years of experience in disaster of view, there is almost the same management, and representing amount of effort put to implementing governments, academe, NGOs and a PhP500,000.00 project and a PhP5 multilateral agencies, believed that million project. standardization of donor guidelines is But partnerships with foreign a realistic objective. grant-givers are not made in heaven. The issues on guidelines, reports, It is not uncommon for southern NGOs indicators, monitoring and evaluation to bemoan, albeit privately or among are variations of the theme of themselves, increasingly stringent accountability and performance. donor requirements: different Donors in general entrust humanitarian guidelines (for applications, proposals aid and grants to NGOs or other and reports), performance indicators, intermediary organizations with the financial reports and monitoring expectation that the latter will act as systems of funding donors as well as responsible stewards of the resources changing policies and priorities. The intended for identified program grumbling is not completely without beneficiaries. They expect that aid will basis. Imagine a relief or other program be used efficiently and in a manner where several donors contribute funds. that will be most beneficial to program In terms of reporting alone, the NGO beneficiaries. for a single project will prepare a different report for each of the Grant-seeking and grant-giving can contributing donors. Some say it is a be portrayed as an accountability matter of cutting and pasting in order chain, where the southern NGO is

107 accountable to the northern NGO, and people’s organizations and the northern NGO is accountable to communities. This practice is the back donor, if the northern NGO indicative of the fact that the accesses back donor funding for the efforts to transform and empower southern NGO’s project. The southern communities and people’s orga- NGO must satisfy the demands for nizations are bearing fruit, and that the accountability and transparency of the relationship between NGOs, POs and northern NGO who must in turn satisfy communities is healthy and vibrant. the demands of the back donor. The Nevertheless, the present arrange- back donor must also satisfy the ments put the southern NGO at the demands of some other higher receiving end of accountability and authority. Finally, all are being held transparency demands from the top accountable by the public, especially (northern NGO and back donor) and if they receive public contributions or the bottom (people’s organization and donations. community). In the Philippines, there is even the additional demand from In the biannual meeting of the government agencies, which by Active Learning Network for legislative fiat have licensing and Accountability and Professionalism in accreditation powers over NGOs. Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) held in New Delhi in October 2002, a “radical” Southern NGOs are sensitive to view on accountability was forwarded. this issue because many lack the Drawing from her long experience with institutional capabilities necessary for CDRC and later the Asian Disaster them to satisfy competing demands Preparedness Center (ADPC), Zenaida coming from various sources – Delica-Willison observed that the issue demands that are often not backed up of accountability is often a top-to- by requisite capability building support bottom affair. She proposed that that will enable NGOs to meet rising ‘upwards accountability’ should also expectations. Many grants do not be increasingly looked into in the provide sufficient support for program relationships among grant-givers and administration, expecting that this will grant-seekers. be part of the local contribution of the southern NGOs. Institutional capability The proposition was radical building projects also often don’t get because most participants to the funded. This disqualifies small NGOs biannual meeting came from who may have developed good multilateral agencies, governments projects in collaboration with POs and and northern NGOs. There was only communities. a sprinkling of southern NGOs. But upward accountability is not a totally In the less than ideal situation that new concept. In the Philippines, currently prevails, the proposal to people’s organizations demand develop and adopt common guidelines transparency and accountability from for monitoring and reporting disaster NGOs, who often act as intermediaries events, for project applications and for seeking funding for the projects of monitoring and reporting project

108 implementation is a welcome centers approached this issue by development. However, how this showing DRA that they were capable progresses or if this will progress at of meeting the requirements. At the all remains to be seen. Meanwhile, same time, CDRC and CDRN pointed southern NGOs have no other recourse out to the donor that the requirements but to work bilaterally on improving were drawing staff from away from relationships with donors to a level of operational concerns, and that it was trust that would allow for minimal therefore in the best interests of the narrative and financial reporting and program and the program beneficiaries monitoring visits. This would give the that the requirements were relaxed. NGOs more time to pay more attention Over time, as CDRC and the regional to operational program concerns. centers proved their reliability and with Achieving this level of trust presumes built-up donor trust, reporting of course that the funding relationships requirements were significantly entered into by the NGO are a product reduced. The resulting partnership of diligent and responsible matching between the two organizations thus of PO and community needs and became even stronger. capacities (including that of the NGO) The strong collaboration between with the resources being made CDRC and CARE Nederland facilitated available by donors and a clear the successful implementation of specification of donor expectations of projects that increased community NGO, the PO and the community awareness of disasters, provided concerned. community members basic disaster The development of the preparedness skills, enhanced relationship between CDRC and the community capacity to respond to Dutch Relief and Rehabilitation Agency emergencies, and trained them to (now CARE Nederland) is illustrative implement and manage simple disaster of how building mutual confidence and mitigation projects. trust can reduce the administrative But even well-developed burden of NGOs. In 1997, when CDRC partnerships characterized by such and DRA collaborated on their first values as transparency and mutual project, DRA required monthly trust, respect of internal processes and narrative and financial reports, on top organizational independence, well- of quarterly monitoring visits. This was defined and observed roles and the first demanding engagement of responsibilities, close cooperation and CDRC in terms of frequency of reports long-term support, and commonality and monitoring visits. While it had the of development framework do not capability to meet this demand being ensure sufficient and uninterrupted a relatively big and stable organization, support. Grant-giving bodies change CDRC’s regional centers had less policies and priorities. They are also personnel and would therefore have sensitive to public opinion and mass to exert more effort to meet CDRC and media pressure (which is the donor’s reporting and monitoring understandable, as the funds they demands. CDRC and the regional

109 dispense often come from public Response (CNDR), through which sources). Thus, even in partnerships member-corporations course their that have lasted the better part of two relief and other forms of assistance, decades, it is not surprising to find the has to tap foreign grant giving bodies financing of NGO programs drying up such as the USAID for major projects or, at the very least, reduced. However, NGOs must still aim to Changing priorities and reduced funds strike a balance between mobilizing pose a big challenge to NGOs, who local resources and tapping foreign have taken on the responsibility of grants for financing humanitarian and facilitating the match between the disaster management projects. needs and capabilities of the Employing more creative means, NGOs vulnerable sectors and the kind of must increasingly mobilize local support being offered by grant-givers. financial, material and human Eventually, as the need for resources. financing relief programs and other disaster management activities persists because of recurring and MOBILIZING LOCAL SUPPORT chronic disasters, grant-seeking NGOs While local donors cannot yet are usually told to seek assistance supplant the financial capacity of elsewhere, and to increasingly tap foreign donors, they nevertheless local sources. Reversing the balance possess a unique character that is between foreign and local financing in equally important for community- favor of the latter is even suggested. based disaster management and in It is true that NGOs have yet to building community resilience to take full advantage of local resources disasters. Local resource mobilization in their various forms. On the other is usually associated with fund hand, to suggest reliance on local campaigns. Such campaigns often sources as the primary source of accumulate goods such like used financing operations over overseas clothes, food items ranging from rice, sources is self-delusion and a cop-out. canned goods, instant noodles, milk Local resources are simply not and bottled water, and to a limited sufficient to take the place of extent, cash donations. (The value of international humanitarian assistance. locally donated goods always far The economy does not create enough surpasses local cash donations.) Not surplus resources to finance sufficiently recognized, however, are humanitarian action. The reality is that the brain and brawn power, of local for many more years, this balance will donors which are valuable remain tilted in favor of support contributions in and of themselves. coming from outside the country, if The CDRN has long recognized the disaster management programs of the role of the less vulnerable sectors the NGOs are to make a significant in disaster management. Mobilizing impact on the country. Even the local resources and sustaining local Corporate Network for Disaster partnerships are accorded great

110 importance by the network because it campaigning during actual disasters entails more sacrifice to contribute to intrudes into emergency operations, disaster management in the context although CDRC recognizes the reality of chronic crisis. Local contributions that donors are more responsive to are valued because they are appeals during actual emergencies. statements of solidarity with and Institutional partnership building support for vulnerable sectors. There and volunteer organizing is the solid is greater empathy between the two foundation on which the successes of groups as they experience the same the fund campaigns are built. disasters, although they differ in the Institutional partnership agreements degree of their vulnerability. The often include explicit provisions to motivation on the part of the donors initiate or support CDRC’s fund therefore goes beyond simple campaigns, especially during major humanitarian concern to the shared emergencies. Volunteers also initiate aspiration of becoming more resilient their own fund campaigns in support to disasters by jointly addressing both of CDRC, or support the regular CDRC immediate post-disaster needs and staff tasked with running the fund long-term vulnerability reduction. campaign. CDRC mobilizes the solidarity and Institutional partnership building is support of the less vulnerable sectors premised on mutually beneficial through its local partnership relations, graduating from the one-way development program which consists flow of benefits where the partner of three inter-related components: institution contributes to the needs networking and institutional of CDRC without getting anything partnership building, volunteer beyond psychic income in return. This organizing, and sustained local fund practice was reversed in 2000 when campaigns. CDRC, with UNICEF support, assisted The sustained, year-long, local the Philippine Women’s University fund campaigns evolved from CDRC’s (PWU) in improving their level of earlier practice of issuing a public disaster preparedness. It conducted appeal for donations each time a major disaster preparedness training among disaster occurs. Realizing that the teaching and nonteaching personnel, stockpiling of relief goods is an helped update the disaster important disaster preparedness task, contingency plan of the university, and the one time fund campaigns conducted a campus-wide evacuation developed into sustained year-long drill. At the time, the PWU had been ones. Designed to develop a culture a consistent benefactor of CDRC’s of preparedness among CDRC partners fund campaigns. and contacts, such campaigns also The PWU experiment in two-way contribute to the network’s efficiency partnership proved successful. It in delivering services during actual increased disaster awareness among emergencies. Afterall, from an students, faculty and nonteaching operational point of view, fund

111 personnel, improving the university’s care were conducted by SOS level of disaster preparedness, while volunteers. boosting the fund raising efforts of For the perspective of SOS, on the CDRC. This experience has since been other hand, their partnership with replicated in many schools and CDRC allowed them to fulfill their universities such as the St. mission even if they fail to raise Scholastica’s College, Miriam College, the funds necessary to finance their San Beda College, Philippine Science emergency operations. Their High School, all in Metro Manila, in volunteers have also gained greater Maharlika Institute of Technology in awareness of disasters and disaster- Tawi-Tawi, and the Mambajao related issues because of their National High School in Camiguin. involvement in the operations. CDRC’s partnership with Consequently, SOS has committed Samahang Operasyon Sagip (SOS) itself to continue volunteering their is another case of an institutional professional skills for future disaster linkage based on mutually beneficial relief efforts. relations, although of a slightly Judging from CDRC’s experience different nature. SOS is a volunteer with SOS, science and technology organization of medical students and and other professional organizations health professionals that provides free can be tapped for their specialized medical services during disasters. skills to undertake or support network By agreement, CDRC taps SOS for activities such as participatory rapid volunteers when disaster situations appraisal, disaster risk assessments, require emergency health services,. and post-disaster field surveys. This arrangement was first tested Business groups can be asked to during the implementation of an ECHO address warehousing needs or to (European Commission Humanitarian supply relief goods at competitive Aid Office)-funded relief program prices and on short notice. The range in 1999. of institutional partnership The arrangement was a success arrangements that can be set up are from the perspective of CDRC and numerous and varied. SOS. From CDRC’s viewpoint, the CDRC’s institutional partnerships health component of the relief program with schools and universities have was completed according to schedule facilitated volunteer work. The and specific component objectives presence of a formal institutional were met. In fact, the component partnership, however, is not a surpassed the planned results prerequisite to volunteer organizing. because SOS combined dispensing Volunteer organizing involves emergency health care with education the formation of quick reaction teams inputs to health care. While patients and disaster volunteer teams in were waiting for their turn to be schools. Quick reaction teams attended to by volunteer health activated during emergencies practitioners, mini-seminars on health

112 undertake a wide range of emergency CONCLUSION response-related activities such as fund raising, information NGOs perform a very important dissemination, participation in field role in transforming at-risk assessment surveys, disaster communities into disaster resilient monitoring, and repacking and ones – that of mobilizing support to distribution of relief goods. In fact, initiatives of communities and people’s disaster volunteer teams can have organizations. This role demands a annual plans and undertake year- deep sense of responsibility on the part round activities. Aside from engaging of NGOs, who must see to it that in fund raising and participating in in the mad scramble for financing emergency response activities, they for humanitarian and disaster may also involve themselves in management programs, they do not advocacy activities, project lose sight of the reason for seeking implementation and monitoring, grant, which is to facilitate the delivery community integration, training and of assistance appropriate to the needs education. CDRC has organized quick and capabilities of disaster victims reaction teams and disaster volunteer and at-risk communities. The debate teams in schools and universities in over policies, guidelines, reports, Metro Manila as well as in far-away monitoring visits and evaluations can Camiguin and Tawi-tawi provinces. be seen as driven by the common desire of all disaster management The possibilities inherent in local actors to improve the system’s ability volunteer organizing, networking, to deliver the assistance to engaged institutional partnership building and target beneficiaries on the ground. resource generation are wide-ranging, as the experience of CDRC and CDRN The southern NGOs, the attest. This is one of their sources of organizations responsible for strength. The regional centers operations on the ground, work in very in particular, despite the limited difficult environments. Limited number of regular staff working on resources allow them to maintain a shoestring budgets are able to very lean staff. Since NGOs cannot undertake large operations and deliver provide competitive compensation, significant support to communities sufficient means of transportion, and and people’s organizations as a result adequate communications and office of local volunteer organizing, equipment, they often lose good networking, institutional partnership people to other organizations. While building and resource generation. In working with NGOs, the staff is often one sense, CDRN is a network of exposed to potentially dangerous networks, as each member develops security situations. Yet NGOs and nurtures its own volunteers, persevere in their work, driven by their partners, and networks. commitment to provide humanitarian assistance, save lives and property, and make a difference in the lives of

113 disaster victims and at-risk communities, can make the work of communities. aiding and comforting disaster victims and at-risk communities less difficult The economic realities of a and more fruitful through standard developing and disaster-prone country guidelines for applications and like the Philippines limits the potential reporting. of local support to outpace international support and the Community-based disaster possibility of freeing the country from management provides a fresh relying on humanitarian assistance approach and opens up a new arena from the international community, at for mobilizing the support of less least in the immediate future. vulnerable local groups to disaster However, this remains a long-term management initiatives at the goal. community level. With imagination and creativity, local support can still be At present, the issues about substantially boosted. The unique guidelines, reports, monitoring and character of such support can be evaluation can best be addressed effectively combined with overseas bilaterally by both grant-seekers and contributions to create a synergy that grant-givers. Building mutual trust external substantial grants by and respect, fostering greater themselves might not be able to cooperation and understanding, and achieve. There is enough evidence to underscoring the common motivation show the positive contributions of of compassion, charity, humanitarian overseas support to the transformation concern, and the aspiration for full of at-risk communities into more human development are means of resilient ones. The full potential of ensuring productive bilateral local support is just not being discussions. By not losing sight of actualized. The challenge to all disaster the joint mission of donors and management actors — vulnerable NGOs, which is to aid and comfort sectors, people’s organizations, non- disaster victims and at-risk government organizations, and donors communities, grant-givers and grant- — is to contribute their share to seekers may be able to resolve unleashing the power of combining outstanding issues. It is not overseas and local support to building unreasonable to expect though disaster resilient communities and that northern NGOs and back donors, replicating them all over the country. collaborating with southern NGOs, people’s organizations, and

NOTE * Organized by the Centre for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), University of Louvain in Belgium, and the University of the Philippines in Manila, held in Manila 3-4 June 2003, with funding support from the European Union.

114 Socioeconomic Influences on Livelihood Recovery of Filipino Families Experiencing Recurrent Lahars1

Kathleen S. Crittenden, Corazon B. Lamug, Gloria Luz Nelson

In the aftermath of the 1991 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in Central Luzon, the residents of Bacolor town in Pampanga Province incurred recurrent threats to life, livelihood, and property from lahars—flowing mixtures of volcanic debris and water—triggered by heavy monsoon and typhoon rains. A series of lahars beginning in 1991 severely damaged all but one of the villages of the town, burying them one or more times in deposits up to nine meters thick. We report findings based on interviews with 163 women in Bacolor households sampled from three buried communities. Drawing on a vulnerability perspective, we consider the damage to these households from exposure to the lahar hazard (event vulnerability) and also to their ability to recover from such exposure (consequence vulnerability). Multiple regression is used to predict the lahar damage experienced by a household in 1991, 1994, and 1995. Lahar damage was so widespread it was an equal-opportunity hazard, unrelated to family income, education, or home ownership. However, recovery from disaster varied by social class. Using multiple ordinary-least-squares and logistic regression, we ask what factors influenced family recovery of livelihood. The family’s ability to recover their livelihood was greatly affected by level of education. The lahar years exaggerated the economic distinctions between families with more and less education.

INTRODUCTION The 1991 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, a are flowing mixtures of volcanic debris volcano in Central Luzon Island, was and water—triggered by heavy the world’s largest in the past 100 monsoon and typhoon rains. years (Janda et al. 1996). The Resembling freshly-mixed concrete in explosive eruption expelled sand-sized behavior and consistency and ashfall that blanketed hundreds of containing 60-90 percent solid square kilometers. In addition, materials by weight, lahars flow down pyroclastic flows — rapid, ground- the channels of rivers that drain the hugging, searingly-hot mixtures of gas volcano at speeds of up to 35 and volcanic debris — deposited on kilometers per hour on the slopes. As the volcano slopes several cubic they reach the plains, lahars spread kilometers of particles ranging in size out and can bury large areas in debris from silt to boulders. In the aftermath several meters thick in a few minutes of the eruption, residents in the (Umbal and Rodolfo 1996). surrounding area incurred recurrent threats to life, livelihood, and property The municipality most affected by from lahars (Rodolfo 1995). Lahars the Pinatubo lahars is Bacolor, Pampanga, 39 km east-southeast of

115 the Pinatubo summit and 65 km north- necessarily constitute a disaster, northwest of Manila. At the time of becoming one only when it causes so the eruption, this historic town had much damage to a human community 67,259 residents and 21 barangays that it swamps the community’s ability or villages (NSO 1990). The to cope with it. In the words of Oliver- townspeople spoke Capampangan as Smith (1992: 13): a first language and were ...a disaster occurs when a natural predominantly of Catholic faith. This phenomenon brings damage or loss pretty town with 600 years of rich to the major social, organizational, history had been the provincial capital and physical facilities of a of Pampanga for 160 years until 1904; community to the degree that the for a brief period (1762-1764), the essential functions of the society capital of the Philippines; and from are interrupted or destroyed, 1942 to 1944, even the main resulting in individual stress and headquarters of the occupying social disorganization of varying Japanese Imperial Army (Henson severity. 1955). It had been a commercial center even before the Spanish arrived By this definition, there is no in Pampanga in 1571. During the question that the lahar experience periods of Spanish and American constituted a disaster for Bacolor colonial rule, Bacolor was known for residents. The town had experienced its culture, arts, and fine ancestral various natural, medical, and political homes (Larkin 1993). Located in the calamities in the past but none recent heart of the fertile central Luzon or of such magnitude (Lamug et al. agricultural district that supplies rice 1999). and sugar cane to much of the Philippines, Bacolor at the time of the The multiple years of lahars and eruption was a quiet farming and the widespread destruction and bedroom community nestled between displacement of people damaged the three urban centers – San Fernando regional economy, increased the to the east, Guagua to the west, and demands on the national as well as Angeles City to the north. The Pasig- the provincial and local governments, Potrero River, a lahar channel that and devastated the finances of drains the volcano, passes through the affected families. This study examines town just before it enters the flat plain the effects of the lahars on the town- of the Pampanga delta and spreads people’s lives — their economic out. Between 1991 and 1995, almost wellbeing – and the factors that the entire town of Bacolor was buried predict the extent of these effects. The at least once in lahar deposits up to very first step in a family’s financial nine meters thick. All of its barangays recovery is to reestablish hanapbuhay, were affected, and all but one was or livelihood. We focus on this first severely damaged. step, using as our unit of analysis the family or, more precisely, the An extreme natural hazard event household – which often comprises an such as a major lahar does not

116 extended family. Our specific research Cabetican, a residential community questions are as follows: 1) What in the town proper, was buried 2 factors predict the lahar damage meters in 1991, 1 meter in 1994, and experienced by a household in three another 3.5 meters in 1995. In all, years of major flows? 2) What factors the barangay was buried by 6.5 meters influenced the ability of a family to of deposits. By 1996, 52 percent of rebuild their livelihood capacity? the families had raised their house one or more times, including 8 percent who History of lahars in three had done so twice and 5 percent who Bacolor barangays had done so three times. Not all Bacolor barangays had the Cabalantian, a suburban same experience with lahars in any community to the east of the town given year, although all were affected proper, experienced flooding but no eventually. Over a several year period, lahars from 1991 through most of the lahars buried all the houses in most 1995 rainy season. Then, in October barangays up to the second-story level 1995, the entire barangay was buried or higher. Yet many families were by 8 to 9 meters without warning in a determined to stay. Struggling to single calamitous event lasting six reclaim their homes and to protect hours. In 1996, no families resided in them from future flows, some town- the barangay and no rebuilding activity people raised their houses on stilts or had occurred. added rooms or new stories on top of their existing houses.2 The following Vulnerability, entitlement, is a brief history of the lahar burial and deprivation experience in three buried barangays A disaster involves an encounter in the five-year period following the between an extremely hazardous 1991 eruption. event and a vulnerable human Cabambangan is the poblacion or population. According to Blaikie and downtown barangay in the town others, the defining characteristic of proper of Bacolor. According to a disaster is that “a significant number household heads, the barangay was of vulnerable people experience a buried by 1 meter of lahar deposits in hazard and suffer severe damage and/ 1991, 1 meter in 1992, 1.5 meters in or disruption of their livelihood system 1994, and finally 2.5 meters in 1995, in such a way that recovery is unlikely a year of several lahar events. Over without external aid”(Blaikie et the five year period, the total al.1994: 21). deposition was 6 meters (Lacsamana But what is vulnerability? Given the and Crittenden 1997). By 1996, 73 occurrence of an extreme natural percent of the families in hazard, vulnerability is the likelihood Cabambangan had raised their house that a person or community will be at least once, including 12 percent negatively affected by that hazard who had done so twice. (Bolin and Stanford 1998). It is the

117 degree to which life and livelihood are calamity. People’s vulnerability comes put at risk (Blaikie et al. 1994). As from exposure to a hazard in such, it is grounded in people’s combination with the social, capacity to avoid, cope with, resist, economic, and political factors that and recover from the impact of the constrain their ability to cope with it hazard (Blaikie et al. 1994, Bolin and (Bolin and Stanford 1998). The most Stanford 1998). vulnerable are those with the fewest choices, whose lives are constrained The human effects of disasters are by socioeconomic factors such as not random. It is well documented poverty, education and access to that some societal groups, particularly employment (Blaikie et al. 1994). the poor, are more susceptible than Vulnerability analysis considers how others to loss and suffering from socioeconomic and political inequality natural hazards, and are less likely than structures the impact of a natural others to recover from these effects hazard on people’s lives. (Hewitt 1983, Blaikie et al. 1994, Bolin and Stanford 1998, Morrow 1999). Access to resources, always Risks are unevenly distributed among unequally allocated across society, individuals, households, communities, affects not only the losses that people and nations. experience in a disaster, but also the recovery strategies available to them The vulnerability perspective, first (Bolin and Stanford 1998). Thus, to systematized by Hewitt (1983), has understand why a disastrous event emerged as a scholarly response to harms some people more than others, these observed social patterns. one must consider unequal exposure According to this perspective, to hazards and unequal access to vulnerability to a natural hazard is resources for dealing with them, both largely a social characteristic grounded of which may be structured by in the socioeconomic processes that socioeconomic status (Cannon 1994). structure daily life circumstances (Wisner 1993, Blaikie et al. 1994, Sen’s (1981) analysis of depri- Cannon 1994, Hewitt 1997, Bolin and vation and entitlement can be applied Stanford 1998). In addition to an to the problem of securing livelihood understanding of physical hazards, in a damaged economy. This approach vulnerability analysis considers the suggests that a family’s unem- social inequalities that affect people’s ployment or underemployment (a capacities to cope with these hazards. deprivation) is best understood not as In sum, risks are viewed as a a simple function of the supply of jobs complex combination of hazard and but also as a function of the family’s vulnerability. entitlement, based on the resources its members command, to the means Groups differ in their vulnerability of livelihood (a commodity) that are to natural hazards not because of their available. The family’s ability to intrinsic characteristics, but because exchange its resources, such as land, of the resources they can mobilize capital, skills, educational credentials, when confronted with a potential

118 or labor power, for livelihood will of damage experience. The second depend on the family’s place in the question, concerning factors related to class structure as well as prevailing recovery of livelihood, addresses the rules governing entitlement to convert issue of consequence vulnerability. these resources into livelihood. These rules depend in part on social and Event vulnerability political factors as well as the nature and health of the economy. Sen’s Disasters caused by natural approach encourages us not just to hazards are global phenomena, but describe patterns of vulnerability but increasingly their burden is also to seek explanations for these disproportionately borne by people in patterns. developing countries and, within these countries, people lower on the Differential vulnerability may also socioeconomic continuum (Aptekar reflect political, religious, ethnic, 1994). Several explanations have been and national divisions. Given its ethnic offered for the relationship between and religious homogeneity, the Bacolor socioeconomic status and vulnerability populace is stratified primarily in to the direct impact of a hazardous terms of social class. Its political event. First, for economic reasons, an sources of vulnerability, arising from increasing proportion of people live on external factors such as a chaotic, land that is susceptible to damage indecisive, and overstretched national from physical hazards, such as a government and from fierce floodplains, steep hillsides, or volcano competition between towns to slopes (Aptekar 1994, Blaikie et al. influence hazard mitigation policy and 1994, Berke and Beatley 1997, practice, are discussed elsewhere Morrow 1999). To the extent that they (Crittenden 2001, Lamug et al. 1999). recognize the hazard, people with In this article we focus on differential more economic resources can avoid vulnerability among Bacolor families. these dangerous places. If they nonetheless choose them, like wealthy To facilitate understanding of the Californians who desire the prestige effects of the lahars on the lives of and view of a mountainside building Bacolor families over a period of site, their resources allow them to time, we elaborate the vulnerability anticipate, mitigate, and cope with the perspective by drawing on the Nigg risk (Aptekar 1994, Bolin and Stanford and Miller (1994) distinction between 1991, 1998). For example, they may event and consequence vulnerability. purchase housing insurance that will Event vulnerability refers to reduce any losses incurred as a result vulnerability to damage from the direct of an untoward event. Second, people impact of a hazard. Consequence with higher socioeconomic status tend vulnerability is that associated with to live in more substantial housing or the process of recovery from exposure housing that is better engineered to to the hazard. Our first research withstand known hazards (Bolin and question focuses on factors that Stanford 1991, Aptekar 1994, Nigg predict event vulnerability in the form

119 and Miller 1994, Berke and Beatley 1991). Recovery involves restoration 1997, Morrow 1999). These first two of physical and psychological health, explanations may not apply to the physical resources, and the social Bacolor lahars as well as to other relations required to use them (Blaikie disaster contexts. Mt. Pinatubo had et al. 1994). The adverse effects of a not erupted within recorded history, disaster on employment may last for so there was no reason to suspect that years (Berke and Beatley 1997). We Bacolor was unsafe or, for that reason, focus here on recovery of livelihood. an undesirable place to live. Rich and Social class is an important poor lived in close proximity in all the predictor of the extent and timing of study barangays. Clearly, wealthier household recovery from a disaster families lived in more substantial (Bolin and Bolton 1986, Oliver-Smith houses than poorer families. However, 1992, Berke and Beatley 1997). The once lahars flowed out of the river disaster may produce losses for channels as they approached the plain, wealthy and poor families alike, but they slowed down and filled and poorer and less advantaged surrounded every structure, however households recover more slowly and flimsy or sturdy, without destroying it less completely (Bolin and Stanford in the process. The only advantage a 1991). Families with fewer resources more substantial house might have have more difficulty reconstructing would be its height. Except in the their livelihoods. This means they may calamitous Cabalantian event, a taller be more vulnerable to the effects of house was less likely to be totally subsequent hazard events. Disasters buried in any given lahar event. A caused by natural hazards often second story might remain intact magnify social inequalities that existed above the buried first story. beforehand (Oliver-Smith 1992, Bolin A final explanation is that people and Stanford 1991, Nigg and Miller with more resources have greater 1994). access to protection from the hazard Residential tenure — whether a agent in the form of preparedness and family owns or rents its home – is an hazard mitigation on the part of the important aspect of class (Bolin and household or community (Wisner Stanford 1998). Some disaster 1993). Although little preparation for assistance programs explicitly exclude the initial lahars was possible, this the poorest families. For example, the explanation is more plausible with Philippine government resettlement respect to the impact of later lahar program for families dislocated by seasons. Pinatubo lahars was limited to those who could prove ownership of their Consequence vulnerability house and lot. To recover from exposure to a Families with more resources are hazard is to achieve a state that would better able to invest in human capital, have been achieved if the hazard had such as education, enabling them to not occurred (Bolin and Stanford

120 obtain more stable, better-paying jobs burial by lahars. We did not consider (Becker 1993). Education is a general, the many outlying barangays that were transferable resource that promotes completely destroyed before 1994 nor one’s ability to adjust to changing labor two additional barangays in the town market conditions, and that retains its proper whose lahar history was similar value when one moves to a new to Cabambangan and Cabetican. Also location. Thus, education is a excluded from this analysis was particularly valuable resource for Calibutbut, the only barangay whose maximizing employment opportunities residential areas never were reached in a depressed post-disaster economy. by lahars. Education may also be associated with We sampled families from these proficiency in gaining access to barangays in four categories of assistance programs (Morrow 1999). resettlement status: those who stayed in the community; those involved in the national government’s METHODS temporary staging centers; those in newly constructed resettlement Design and sample communities; and those who had Our research is based on a relocated to other towns without community survey conducted in 1996 government assistance. The particular about the experience of families in the sites we chose were popular aftermath of the eruption (Lamug et destinations for families from the al. 1999). We interviewed 163 adult selected barangays. Table 1 women informants, those designated summarizes the distribution of as the “woman of the house”, whose respondents by barangay of origin and families had resided at the time of the resettlement status. The sample from eruption in the three barangays chosen the three affected barangays includes because of their differing histories of mainly those who were relocating with

Table 1. Distribution of Respondents by Barangay of Origin and Current Status of Resettlement (in percent)

Barangay of Origin Resettlement Status Cabalantian Cabambangan Cabetican Total Stayed in Barangay 26.8 27.1 16.6 In Staging Center 79.4 7.3 11.9 36.8 In Resettlement Community 4.8 56.1 42.4 31.3 Moved Elsewhere 15.9 9.8 18.6 15.3 Total 100.1 100.0 100.0 100.0

(Base N) (63) (41) (59) (163)

121 government assistance, but also a few family was employed in 1996; b) who stayed or resettled on their own. family monthly per capita income in Almost 80 percent of the residents of 1996; and c) poverty status in 1996, Cabalantian, the most recently hit estimated according to the annual per community, were in temporary staging capita poverty threshold for 1994 centers, and none resided in the (NEDA 1995). For each indicator, the barangay. Cabambangan and 1991 level was used as the baseline. Cabetican residents were in all four categories of resettlement status. Our Analysis results are limited in generalizability to the particular barangays and For each major outcome, we began resettlement sites included. We treat our analysis by describing the trends barangay and resettlement status as over time. Then, to answer our fixed factors in our analysis. research questions we used ordinary- least-squares multiple regression for Outcome measures continuous outcome measures or multiple logistic regression analysis for To answer our research questions, dichotomous outcomes, in our we considered several outcomes: the predictive models. damage experienced by the family in each of the lahar years – 1991, 1994, Predictors and 1995 – and overall; and family livelihood over the five-year period We used two dummy variables for following the eruption. Cabambangan and Cabetican to represent the barangay of origin. Damage experience Cabalantian was the omitted reference category. Respondents reported the level Cumulative damage experience of damage to their family’s was used as a predictor in the models neighborhood, house or home, and for predicting recovery of livelihood. place of livelihood for each year of lahars. The damage experience index, Several indicators of socio- assessed in 1991, 1994, and 1995, economic status (SES) were used as was a count of items for which the predictors in the models. Poverty woman reported moderate or severe status in 1991 was determined using damage (range: 0 to 3). In addition, the NEDA (1991) formula. Monthly we computed a cumulative damage per capita income in 1991, computed index by summing damage across the from respondent reports, was logged three years (range: 0 to 9). to normalize the distribution. With respect to level of education, mother’s Family recovery of livelihood education and father’s education yielded such similar results in all our We assessed livelihood recovery analyses that we combined these into over the five-year period with three a single variable, family level of indicators: a) whether the father of the education. We coded the respondent’s

122 and her spouse’s level of education community and indicators of as 1 for less than high school, 2 for socioeconomic status: home high school, and 3 for a credential ownership, 1991 poverty status or log beyond high school. The family’s level per capita monthly income, and family of education was an average of these education. Table 2 summarizes the two. By this definition, 43.6 percent version of these models that includes of the families had less than high poverty status as an indicator of family school education (< 2) and 16.6 economic level. In each of the four percent had more than high school models, damage experience was a education (3). High school education function of where a family lived. was the omitted reference category Reported damage in 1991 and 1994 in the regression equations. Home was greater in barangays ownership was defined as family Cabambangan and Cabetican than in ownership of their house and its lot. Cabalantian. In 1995, the damage By this definition, 67 percent of the was greater in Cabalantian. families were home owners. Respondents from Cabambangan and Cabetican reported more cumulative Resettlement status was damage over the three lahar seasons. represented by three dichotomous dummy variables: staging center; In all four models, reported damage resettlement community; and experience was unrelated to family elsewhere. Stayed in the barangay socioeconomic characteristics, was the omitted reference category. including home ownership, poverty status, or education. An alternative set of equations not shown in Table RESULTS 2, with 1991 logged per capita income substituted for poverty status as a Damage experienced predictor in each model, yielded similar results. The models explain Trends comparable proportions of the variation in damage, and family income For the total sample, the reported had no predictive power, except in damage experienced by families 1994, when 1991 log per capita increased over time, with a mean of income was positively related to 1.08 for 1991 (SD = 1.24); 1.62 damage experienced that year (b = (1.28) for 1994; and finally, 2.31 .58, p < .05). The effects of other (1.03) in 1995. predictors were unchanged. Predicting damage Lahar burial was so widespread in these communities as to represent an We estimated models for equal-opportunity hazard, with predicting the damage experienced by damage unrelated to family income, families each separate year as well as education, or home ownership. In this cumulative damage experienced. sense, the lahar crisis in Bacolor was Predictors in these models are the an atypical disaster. All of the families

123 Table 2. Multiple Regression Equations Predicting Damage Experienced by Families by Year and Overall

1991 1994 1995 Cumulative 91-95 Predictors Ba SEb Pc B SE P B SE P B SE P

Community Cabambangan 1.00 .24 <.01 1.68 .22 <.01 -.55 .23 <.05 2.13 .49 <.01 Cabetican 1.55 .20 <.01 1.90 .19 <.01 -.71 .19 <.01 2.74 .40 <.01 SES Home Owner .13 .19 N.S. .04 .17 N.S. -.20 .18 N.S. -.03 .37 N.S. In Poverty 1991 .30 .28 N.S. -.31 .25 N.S. .02 .26 N.S. .01 .55 N.S. Family Education Less than H.S. -.08 .20 N.S. -.05 .19 N.S. .10 .19 N.S. -.04 .41 N.S. More than H.S. .39 .26 N.S. -.19 .24 N.S. -.25 .25 N.S. -.06 .52 N.S. Intercept .16 N.S. .56 <.05 2.82 <.01 3.53 <.01 R2 (Adjusted) .320 <.01 .467 <.01 .100 <.01 .249 <.01 a Unstandardized regression coefficient b Standard error c Two-tailed probability in our study – poor or rich – lost their loans for homebuilding were not houses by the end of the 1995 lahar available. Many families also needed season. Many also lost livelihood and to find new livelihoods. a few, even loved ones. All of them Although lahars are an equal- faced the monumental challenge of opportunity hazard, the ability to rebuilding homes and lives in the midst recover from disaster is not the same of turmoil, the threat of future lahars, for the rich and the poor. We turn and a crippled economy. Rebuilding now to ask what factors helped a residence is a major expense for any families in the lahar-stricken barangays family, and the lahar crisis had limited to recover their ability to earn a the resources available to families for livelihood. meeting even day-to-day needs. A family with a mortgage on its Recovery of livelihood destroyed home was faced with the prospect of repaying the debt in What were the effects of the lahar addition to securing a new domicile. years on the livelihood capacity of Private home insurance is prohibitively Bacolor families? Eighty-six percent expensive and quite rare, and of our survey respondents reported insurance attached to a government that the lahars had harmed their mortgage protects only the lender, not family’s ability to earn a living. When the homeowner. Except for assistance asked to specify the harm, their most from family members living elsewhere, common responses fell into the

124 following categories: loss of work or employed in 1996, summarized in decreased income (39%); burial of Table 4. In the first model, predictors farm land (12%); necessity to seek were community of origin, cumulative employment far from home (7%); and damage, home ownership, family loss of everything (6%). education, and resettlement status. The second model added a control for Trends the father’s employment in 1991. Table 3 summarizes the changes In the 27 families with more than in the economic wellbeing of families high school education for both parents, from 1991 to 1996, with respect to all of the fathers were working in livelihood. In 1991, 42 percent of the 1996. This “perfect” relationship made respondents and almost all of their it impossible to estimate the models. spouses were employed. By 1996, To solve this problem, we looked for employment had declined to 31percent families in which one spouse had high of the wives and 72 percent of the school education and the other had husbands. Over the five year period, more than high school and in which monthly per capita income increased the father of the family was not by a tiny amount, P150 per capita. employed. There were five such However, the per capita poverty families. We reclassified one of them threshold (NEDA 1991, 1995) as more than high school to weaken increased much faster, so that the the relationship between education poverty rate for families in the sample and employment. Which family to almost tripled, reaching 30.5 perent reclassify was an arbitrary choice, but by 1996. all choices yielded equivalent results. After this adjustment, the first model Predicting father’s employment in 1996 accounted for about 35 percent of the variation in the likelihood of We estimated two logistic working; the likelihood of the father regression models for predicting working was lower in families from whether the father of the family, or Cabambangan, relative to Cabalantian, the respondent’s husband, was and those who owned their home.

Table 3. Economic Wellbeing of 163 Families, 1991 and 1996

Indicator 1991 1996 Change Wife working (%) 41.60 31.30 -10.30 Husband working (%) 92.20 72.50 -19.70 Monthly per capita income (pesos) 1,800.00 1,950.00 +150.00 In poverty (%) 11.30 30.50 +19.20

125 Table 4. Multiple Logistic Regression Models Predicting Father’s Employment in 1996

Model 1 Model 2 Predictors Ba ORb Pc B OR P Community Cabambangan -2.48 .08 <.05 -2.55 .08 N.S. Cabetican -1.43 .24 N.S. -1.52 .22 N.S. Cumulative Damage -.22 .80 N.S. -.26 .77 N.S. SES Home Owner -2.09 .12 <.01 -1.97 .14 <.01 Family Education Less than H.S. -1.10 .33 <.05 -1.26 .28 <.05 More than H.S.d 2.66 14.36 <.05 2.75 15.67 <.05 Father Employed 1991 — — 3.47 32.03 <.01 Resettlement Status Staging Center -1.46 .23 N.S. -1.37 .25 N.S. Resettlement Community .74 2.09 N.S. 1.65 5.21 <.05 Elsewhere 1.12 3.08 N.S. 1.10 2.75 N.S. Intercept 5.47 <.01 2.29 N.S. -2 Log Likelihood 114.144 100.922 Nagelkerke R2 .352 .460 Model C2 (df) 35.396 (9) <.01 48.618 (10) <.01 a Logistic regression coefficient b Odds ratio c Two-tailed probability d Adjusted to weaken the relationship

Father’s employment was least likely if the family was located in a in families with less than high school resettlement community. education (p < .05) and most likely in those with more than high school Predicting monthly per capita income education (p < .05). In the second in 1996 model, which accounted for about 46 percent of the variation in the We estimated two multiple dependent variable, the likelihood of regression models for predicting log the father working in 1996 was monthly per capita income (Table 5). decreased by home ownership and low The first model predicted income on family education. The father was more the basis of community, cumulative likely to be employed if he was damage, home ownership, family working in 1991, if both parents had education, and resettlement status. more than high school education, and This equation explained about 30 percent of the variation in income as

126 Table 5. Multiple Regression Models Predicting Log Monthly Per Capita Income in 1991 and 1996

Model 1 Model 2 Predictors Ba SEb Pc B SE P Community Cabambangan -.12 .10 N.S. -.10 .13 N.S. Cabetican -.10 .09 N.S. -.08 .08 N.S. Cumulative Damage -.01 .01 N.S. -.02 .01 N.S. SES Home Owner .10 .06 <.10 .05 .05 N.S. Family Education Less than H.S. .01 .06 N.S. .02 .06 N.S. More than H.S. .46 .08 <.01 .38 .08 <.01 Log Per Capita Income 1991 .44 .07 <.01 Resettlement Status Staging Center -.08 .10 N.S. -.15 .10 N.S. Resettlement Community .06 .08 N.S. -.02 .07 N.S. Elsewhere .11 .11 N.S. -.03 .10 N.S. Intercept .07 N.S. .18 N.S. R2 (Adjusted) .299 <.01 .447 <.01 a Unstandardized regression coefficient b Standard error c Two-tailed probability a positive function of home ownership origin, the total damage experienced, (one-tailed p < .05) and more than home ownership, or resettlement high school education (p < .01). status. When log monthly per capita income for 1991 was added as a control, Predicting poverty status in 1996 model 2 accounted for almost 45 Table 6 summarizes two multiple percent of the variation in 1996 logistic regression models for income. In this final model, the only significant predictors were 1991 predicting the likelihood that a family income and education greater than would be poor in 1996. The first model high school, both positively related to predicted this likelihood on the basis 1996 income. Controlling for initial of community of origin, home ownership, family education, and per capita income, families in which resettlement status. The second model both spouses had an educational credential beyond high school earned was the same except that poverty Php2,610 more per person in unlogged status in 1991 was added as a control. 1996 monthly income than did those The first model, in which education in which one had only high school was the only significant predictor, accounted for approximately 16 education. Income in 1996 was not percent of the variation in 1996 related to the original community of

127 Table 6. Multiple Logistic Regression Models Predicting Family Poverty Status in 1996

Model 1 Model 2 Predictors Ba ORb Pc B OR P Community Cabambangan .37 1.44 N.S. .29 1.33 N.S. Cabetican .32 1.37 N.S. .34 1.41 N.S. Cumulative Damage .09 1.10 N.S. .13 1.14 N.S. SES Home Owner -.23 .79 N.S. -.17 .84 N.S. Family Education Less than H.S. -.44 .65 N.S. -.50 .61 N.S. More than H.S. -2.46 .08 <.05 -2.36 .09 <.05 Poverty in 1991 — — 1.79 5.98 <.01 Resettlement Status Staging Center .28 1.32 N.S. .52 1.68 N.S. Resettlement Community -.60 .55 N.S. -.35 .70 N.S. Elsewhere -.64 .52 N.S. -.34 .72 N.S. Intercept -.74 N.S. -.17 N.S. -2 Log likelihood 157.623 145.788 Nagelkerke R2 .163 .244 Model X2 (df) 17.425 (9) <.05 26.215 (10) <.01 a Logistic regression coefficient b Odds ratio c Two-tailed probability

poverty status. In particular, if both status was unrelated to the original parents had more than high school community, the total damage education, a family’s likelihood of experienced, home ownership, or being poor in 1996 was less than one resettlement status. tenth as high as if at least one had only high school. The second model, The importance of education in with initial poverty status added as a recovering livelihood predictor, accounted for about 24 percent of the variation in 1996 We have examined the factors that poverty status. Not surprisingly, a related to a family’s ability to begin family that was poor in 1991 was economic recovery from the eruption more likely than others to be poor in and its aftermath. In particular, we 1996. Controlling for poverty status have considered the predictors of three in 1991, education beyond high school aspects of the family’s ability to earn still decreased the likelihood of a family a livelihood in 1996: whether the falling into poverty by 1996 by over father of the family is employed; 90 percent. In both models, poverty monthly per capita income; and

128 poverty status. In each case, after of the men of the household were controlling for the pre-eruption level employed, and their likelihood of of the livelihood indicator, we have having a job was not significantly found that the most important factor related to level of education. By determining the family’s economic contrast, each increase in level of wellbeing in 1996 is the educational education increased the likelihood of background of the parents. Higher the father’s employment in 1996. education on the part of the Monthly per capita income was respondent and her spouse markedly positively related to level of education enhanced the family’s ability, when even in 1991, but the relationship was faced with the personal and much stronger in 1996. Over the five- community devastation from the year period, per capita income Pinatubo lahars, to recover income, to increased only in families with higher secure employment in a damaged education, whereas those with high economy, and to avoid plunging into school education suffered an absolute poverty. Less than high school decline. The poverty rate for families education had the additional effect of in the three communities was much hindering the family’s ability to secure lower in 1991, and the level of employment for the man of the education in the family was not household. significantly related to poverty status at that time. By 1996, there was a Table 7 summarizes the relation of marked difference in the poverty rates family education level to the three of families with and without higher aspects of livelihood before and after education. the lahar devastation. In 1991, most

Table 7. Economic Wellbeing by Family Level of Education

Level of Education Indicator/Year H.S. Fa gb Pc Father Working (%) 1991 91.9 91.5 95.0 .075 N.S. 1996 61.0 74.6 100.0 .533 <.01 Monthly Per Capita Income (mean pesos) 1991 1,343. 1,620. 3,483. 9.89 <.01 1996 1,344. 1,424. 4,599. 32.95 <.01 In Poverty (%) 1991 12.9 14.3 0.0 -.269 N.S. 1996 32.8 38.1 7.4 -.238 <.05 a F-test for comparing means b Goodman and Kruskal gamma, a measure of ordinal association c Non-directional p value for F, directional value for g

129 Table 8. Distribution of Father’s Occupational Category in 1991 and 1996, Ranked by Modal Educational Credential for the Category

Occupational Category Modal Education 1991 (%) 1996 (%)

Professional, Technical, Administrative More than high school 4.3 5.1 Clerical More than high school 6.4 5.8 Sales Manager More than high school 5.0 4.3 Other High school or more 3.5 5.0 Service High school 5.7 5.1 Construction High school 28.4 23.9 Skilled Labor High school 21.3 18.8 Overseas Contract Worker High school 6.4 4.3 Not Working, Retired High school 7.8 27.5 Production High school or less 1.4 0.0 Agriculture Less than high school 9.9 0.0 Total 100.1 99.8

Why was education so much more livelihood in the enterprises of land important to a family’s livelihood owners. capacity in the troubled post-lahar Within the limitations of our small economy than before the eruption? Of sample of families, we can gain some course, employment was a scarcer insight into the changes in the commodity in 1996 than in 1991. economy during the lahar years by However, Sen’s (1981) approach considering the occupations fathers directs us to seek an explanation for held in 1991 and 1996 and the typical variation in deprivation of and (modal) level of education for men in entitlement to this commodity in the those occupations in 1991. Our mode of production in the economy occupational categories, based on and the relationship of families to these respondents’ open-ended reports are modes. Before the eruption, both the crude; for example, the agricultural economy and the status system of category might include large land- Bacolor were primarily based on land owning farmers, farmers working their ownership. The majority of families own small plots, and farm laborers. did own land, often inherited land. In Table 8 shows that father’s addition to housing the family, this land employment contracted overall, from often provided livelihood. Land owners 92 percent in 1991 to 72 percent in farmed their land, rented it to others, 1996. Most occupational categories and opened business enterprises on it. contracted between 1991 and 1995, People without land worked for

130 but those in which the modal Although families with more or educational credential was lowest – fewer resources all suffered major agriculture and production, together losses, they had unequal capacity to comprising over 11 percent of the recover their livelihoods. In general, fathers in 1991 – disappeared during destruction from the post-eruption the five years after the eruption. lahars exacerbated existing inequalities These likely were the occupations and created new ones. most tied to local land, which could Education was the most important no longer be converted into livelihood. socioeconomic resource in the Occupations for which the typical recovery period. It was not very educational credential was more than important in determining a family’s high school – professional, technical, level of economic wellbeing before the administrative, clerical, and sales eruption, and it was unrelated to the manager — contracted little, from 15.7 damage that a family suffered from percent to 15.2 percent over the same the lahars. However, the ability to period. recover livelihood was greatly helped by higher education. Sen’s entitlement and deprivation approach provides CONCLUSIONS insight into why the years of lahars We have used a vulnerability exaggerated the economic distinctions perspective to understand the between families with more and less patterning of the effects of the education. Other forms of wealth, Pinatubo eruption and its laharic such as home ownership, were of little aftermath on families in three Bacolor use to an affected family in the five- communities. For this particular year eruption aftermath. Most real disaster context, the distinction estate was damaged by lahars and between event and consequence could not be used for livelihood vulnerability is a useful addition to the production. Before the eruption, perspective, because the factors that education beyond high school was a predicted initial damage differed useful, but not necessary credential markedly from those that predicted for employment. It became a critical recovery of livelihood and resource when livelihood was scarcer psychological wellbeing. and land ownership in Bacolor could not be used to create livelihood. Unlike The lahars that buried Bacolor in real estate and other material goods, the five years following the Pinatubo education is a transferable resource eruption were no respecters of social that cannot be taken away by a stature and privilege. Damage and disaster and that can be exchanged losses were incurred equally by rich for livelihood in various localities. and poor, more and less educated, and were determined only by location relative to the hazard.

131 NOTES 1 Funded by the Center for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines. A previous version was presented at the meeting of the Asian Association of Social Psychology, Manila, Philippines, July 30, 2003. 2 See Crittenden (2001) and Crittenden and Rodolfo (2002) for more details on the house-raising processes developed by town residents.

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132 Crittenden, Kathleen S., and Kelvin S. Rodolfo 2002 “Bacolor Town and Pinatubo Volcano: Coping with Recurrent Lahar Disaster.” In R. Torrence and J. Grattan (eds.) Natural Disasters and Cultural Change. London: Routledge, 43-65. Henson, M. A. 1955 The Province of Pampanga and its Towns. Manila, Philippines: Villanueva Book Store. Hewitt, Kenneth 1983 Interpretations of Calamity from the Perspective of Human Ecology. London: Allen and Unwin. 1997 Regions of Risk: A Geographical Introduction to Disasters. London: Longman. Janda, R.J., A.S. Daag, P.J. delos Reyes, C.G. Newhall, T.C. Pierson, R.S. Punongbayan, K.S. Rodolfo, R.U. Solidum, and J.V. Umbal 1996 “Assessment and Response to Lahar Hazard around Mount Pinatubo, 1991-1993.” In C.G. Newhall and R.S. Punongbayan (eds.) Fire and Mud. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 107-139. Lacsamana, R. and K.S. Crittenden 1997 Unofficial census of current residents of the Barangays Cabambangan, Sn. Vicente, Sta. Ines and Cabetican, Bacolor, Pampanga. Lamug, Corazon B., Kathleen S. Crittenden, and Gloria Luz M. Nelson 1999 Processes through which Families in Bacolor (Pampanga) Respond to Natural Disaster, with Emphasis on Relocation. Quezon City, Philippines: Center for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines System. Larkin, J. A. 1993 The Pampangans: Colonial Society in a Philippine Province. Manila, Philippines: New Day Publishers. Morrow, Betty Hearn 1999 “Identifying and Mapping Community Vulnerability.” Disasters 23:1- 18. National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) 1991 NEDA Philippine Statistical Yearbook 1991. Quezon City: Republic of the Philippines. 1995 NEDA Philippine Statistical Yearbook 1994. Quezon City: Republic of the Philippines.

133 National Statistics Office (NSO) 1990 Pampanga Census of Population and Housing. Quezon City: Republic of the Philippines. Nigg, Joanne M. and Kristen Miller 1994 “Event and Consequence Vulnerability: Effects on the Disaster Recovery Process.” University of Delaware Disaster Research Center Preliminary Paper #217. Oliver-Smith, Anthony 1992 The Martyred City: Death and Rebirth in the Andes. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. Rodolfo, Kelvin S. 1995 Pinatubo and the Politics of Lahar: Eruption and Aftermath, 1991. Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines Press. Sen, Amartya 1981 Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Umbal, J. V., and K.S. Rodolfo 1996 “The 1991 Lahars of Southwestern Mount Pinatubo, Philippines, and the Evolution of a Lahar-dammed Lake.” In C.G. Newhall and R.S. Punongbayan (eds.) Fire and Mud. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 951-970. Wisner, B. 1993 “Disaster Vulnerability: Scale, Power and Daily Life.” GeoJournal 30:127-144.

134 Endogenous System of Response to River Flooding as a Disaster Subculture: A Case Study of Bula, Camarines Sur1

Emma nuel M. Luna

People, communities, and institutions prone to disasters develop learned responses to them. For instance, constant exposure and experiences with flooding have given rise to endogenous systems of managing floods. While such systems alleviate suffering in the course of disaster, they do not often adequately address the roots of vulnerability. In some instances, they may even be used legitimation tools for inappropriate and unwarranted responses. For this reason, disaster management systems that develop endogenously would have to be open to innovations and facilitate change.

INTRODUCTION The development and responses to systems of community and local river flooding have been conventionally institutional responses in areas biased for highly technical and capital vulnerable to flooding. The ultimate intensive structural measures such as objective of the study is to contribute dams, embankments, dikes, to the eventual formulation of a more underground tunnels and the like. In appropriate, integrated and disaster- many cases, however, mitigating sensitive local development planning measures such as these are resisted system. The municipality of Bula, a because of their inappropriateness, the flood-prone area in Camarines Sur was lack of consultation with people in the selected as the study site. The Bicol site of the physical intervention and River meets another river, the Pawili the perceived negative impacts of River, in Bula. Although flood control these measures on other aspects of projects were implemented in the community life. past, the municipality continues to suffer from flooding because of the This paper does not argue against intersection of the two rivers and Lake the role of technological advancement Bula in the area. in the development process. It simply asserts that by itself, technology is not Although the people in the a sufficient response to disaster. locality are the first to suffer the consequences of floods in the area, The discussion in this paper is the responsibility of responding to the based on field research in 1999-2000 affected communities have generally that aimed to discover endogenous

135 fallen on support groups such as interrelated set of attitudes and the local governments, the practices among groups at various nongovernment organizations levels that make them better prepared (NGOs), the voluntary private groups, to cope with and respond to new the local church and other entities in disasters” (Dynes 1992: 19, citing the area. For this reason, the study Wenger 1978). involved these stakeholders in various As one of the world’s most research activities. The researcher disaster-prone countries with visited the community to obtain inadequate resources to invest in people’s perspectives on disaster, their disaster reduction programs, it is vulnerability, and the endogenous logical to assume the coexistence of system of responding to flooding in various disaster subcultures in the area. In-depth interviews of key Philippine communities. An exploration informants including officials were of these subcultures—systems of conducted to gather information and preparing for disasters, mitigating validate findings. Workshops and their adverse impacts, managing focus group discussions were also emergency situations, and organized to reconstruct, critique, and rehabilitating communities affected validate responses to disasters. A total by river flooding would not only yield of 178 individuals provided data for inputs for community-based disaster the study. This number excludes management but also demonstrate community respondents and other the operation of Filipino values such LGU officials from within and outside as bayanihan 4 , pakikiisa 5 , Bula who shared valuable information pagdadamayan6 , pagmamalasakit7 , and insights in informal discussions. pakikiramay8. In this regard, the pakikipag-usap2 and pagtatanong-tanong3 methods of Filipino psychology proved extremely useful in generating data from informal FLOOD HAZARD AND PEOPLE’S respondents who spontaneously VULNERABILITY shared their views while riding in a The effects of flooding on people banca or a tricycle, eating in a turo- vary with their vulnerability. While turo restaurant, waiting for a meeting, communities that have developed or just relaxing and having fun. capacities to manage hazards reduce the overall vulnerability of their constituents, some members even of A DISASTER SUBCULTURE such communities are still more It is hypothesized that developing vulnerable than others. In the countries with extensive experience in Philippine context, the poor are the disasters have more enhanced abilities most vulnerable. They do not usually to respond to them. The frequent have the means to protect themselves occurrence of disasters in these such as having better houses, countries account for the emergence insurance for their crops, extra food of of disaster subcultures involving an and supplies to store, or a life saver

136 or banca for evacuation. Moreover, response from the outside (Luna 1997; they are the ones more likely to live in Conaco, Hernandez, Racillo, and Sycip dangerous areas such as flood plains 1993). The initial responses are and riverbanks. instinctive and are geared towards survival and salvaging whatever can be salvaged. They also include the ENDOGENOUS SYSTEM organized efforts of people learned OF RESPONSE through several experiences with flooding. An endogenous system of disaster response approximates the disaster Both community and the subculture posed by Wenger (as cited institutional responses are supposed by Dynes 1992:19) In this paper, the to be complementary. However, there endogenous system covers the whole is usually a gap between the range of disaster management two that makes the local disaster activities of people and institutions management process more prob- within the affected space, from lematic. Theoretically, it is best if the prevention, mitigation, preparedness, community’s endogenous system is emergency response during the integrated into the planning of disaster,and rehabilitation and institutional responses. It is even development. While the activities and better for the community to be norms surrounding them may not be involved in these processes. After all, purely indigenous, they may planning and action would have to be nevertheless be part of an endogenous at the community level for them to system because practices that may have the greatest potential impact in have come from outside the disaster mitigation. community fuse with indigenous Local communities are those social practices and adapt to the particular units where there is the greatest setting of the community. potential for impact.…as a Endogenous systems can be collectivity has greater resources effective tools to minimize, if not to to respond to the social disruption prevent the adverse impact of flood than do individuals, groups and hazards. As flood hazards escalate into organizations…..local communities disasters, the initial responses are are likely to become involved in expected to come from within responding to disasters prior to the communities and local institutions involvement of social units in the since they are the ones directly larger society or international affected. The endogenous responses system….In addition, the local of both the community and the local community is a generic form of institutions are followed by exogenous social organization in every responses only after some time. Based society, since it has a territorial on experiences with previous disasters base and is organized to “solve” in the country, there is always a time certain problems for that gap between disaster impact and population (Dynes 1992: 16).

137 Among the endogenous systems development and disaster workers developed by communities are coping to be aware of such concepts…so mechanisms that help individuals and that they can be more sensitive families through difficult periods. At when helping villagers; the institutional level, they include the It is important to take a family, the extended family, religious • systems approach (economic, organizations and clans…formal environmental and sociocultural) in organizations such as villages and local understanding the effects of government” (Cuny 1983: 80). At the marginality in creating a context person level, coping mechansms for disaster and the importance of include various means of taking stock traditional mechanisms when of the situation (e.g. religion) and accessed and activated in bringing transcending the traumatic experience. about recovery (cited by Elangovan A comparative study of coping 1992: 55). mechanisms in two Third World In the Philippines, research has countries by Holand and Vorasdaler shown various elements, processes, (1986) reveal how people and issues, problems, and effects of communities respond to disasters. community responses to disaster. The They found out that: following are some of the significant • Traditional “open” peasant findings in the literature. communities wait for government A survey among 16 villages on aid whereas “closed” ones initiate how the people’s organizations (POs), the recovery process; NGOs and government agencies • Familial ties, reciprocity, respond to natural and human-induced supernatural beliefs, and certain calamities, specifically typhoon and customs aided the villagers to internal refugees, found out that the satisfactorily cope with the victims had the “capacity of mounting physical and psychological effects a certain level of response”. However, of the disaster; these were often inadequate because of their failure to take preventive and Emergency preparedness can be • mitigating measures. NGOs and other improved in these areas by grassroots organizations can facilitate enhancing the indigenous coping in mobilizing a variety of resources and mechanisms already present within structures to meet the people’s the impacted population – through emergency needs. But there were the use of large graphic illustrations problems of coordination among them and posters which depict and “lack of integration of the simple emergency preparedness necessary processes, resources, skills, measures; attitude, and disaster awareness at the • Another way of enhancing community level” (CPD 1989:78-80). awareness of indigenous A study was also done on the coping mechanisms is to train dynamics of the total help system

138 during the disaster impact and The way communities respond rehabilitation phase in Ormoc City to disaster is also influenced by where more than 4000 people died exogenous factors that introduce or due to a flash flood in 1991. The study apply new technologies and looked at the experiences and insights approaches to disaster management. of fieldworkers. Being victims For example, in the field of community themselves, the disaster workers were development (CD), the principles of not able to respond immediately to the participation, empowerment and needs of the community. They also people-centered development, as well had to attend to their own personal as the processes of community problems. There were strong analysis, community education and indications in this study that disaster conscientization, community victims would like to be involved in organization and mobilization, and the process of helping. Thus, they participatory planning have been were frustrated and angered by the integrated into community-based inability of some outside NGOs disaster management processes. workers to involve the victims, and the Unlike in the past where the responses tendency of these workers to be too to disaster were associated with relief aggressive and pushy. At the other bags that only engendered a dole-out extreme were victims who thought mentality and dependency, there have differently believing government and been several efforts, especially among other agencies should take care of NGOs to break away from these them since they already suffered practices. The CD approach maintains tremendous losses. Another significant that relief operations only play a insight was the realization that significant role at a particular stage of “Filipino values and virtues are good disaster management. At the end of fallback positions and are often best the day, it remains an emergency demonstrated during times of crises” response; the paramount goals are still (Conaco, Hernandez, Racillo, and to rehabilitate and develop self- Sycip 1993: 337-348). propelling communities (Luna 1998). A study on disaster management One of the popular approaches during the Ormoc disaster “confirmed applied by NGOs involved in disaster that victims living in riverside areas management today is the Citizenry– had the characteristics commonly Based Development Disaster Response associated with the poorer class, i.e. (CBDO-DR). Developed in 1984 by the low income, low educational Citizens’ Disaster Response Center background, limited options in terms Foundation, Inc., the approach is seen of employment and a place to live and as an alternative approach in the low priority given to disaster Philippines. management” (DPB 1994: 19). The CBDO-DR nurtures partnership However, as in the Conaco et al. with grassroots organizations that study, survivors in the sample were carry out disaster management willing to participate in disaster function as well as other sectoral and management activities.

139 local issues in the community. These These functions cover the pre-, grassroots partners are called during, and post-disaster activities. Grassroots Disaster Response Thus far, the GDRMs have been Machineries (GDRM) whose successful in “harnessing the organizational expression ranges from initiatives and participation of women, a committee of an existing people’s formation and strengthening of organization, to a full-blown community organizations; participation community organization, or even a of the victims themselves/vulnerable network of POs and NGOs engaged in groups in the various phases of disaster response. In an exploratory disaster response and community study of one NGO and five GDRMs in development efforts; mobilization of Camarines Sur and Albay, a strong the support of the less vulnerable development orientation was groups; inter-barangay coordination; observed. “TABI (Tabang Sa Biktima and more assertion of rights” (Victoria sa Bikol) considers its disaster 1998: 108-109). response work as part of the people’s movement to change social and economic relations and structures FLOODING EPISODES: which marginalize and restrict the ENDOGENOUSLY SIGNIFICANT, development of Bicolanos” (Victoria EXOGENOUSLY UNKNOWN 1998: 72-73). The same study identified the tasks and functions of Flooding in the municipality of Bula the GDRMs as: is a taken-for-granted reality because of its perennial occurrence. However, • Giving warning/calls for pre- in the flood of 1995 is remembered paredness; for being one big flood. It was never • Surveying damages immediately publicized and other parts of the nation after a disaster; were unaware of it. Athough it was not as severe as the Ormoc flash • Coordinating with the barangay flood,or as devastating as the lahar council for the emergency flood in Central Luzon, the 1995 flood activities, relief, rehabilitation and in Bula is was nevertheless damaging disaster preparedness; to the affected municipalities. The old Bula residents claim that the floods of • Working with TABI for relief, 1994, 1995 and 1996 were bad rehabilitation, and disaster compared to what they experienced preparedness; in their youth. Of these three episodes, • Ensuring the smooth conduct of the 1995 flood was the worst and the the relief delivery operation; most unforgettable. • Assisting beneficiaries; and It was All Saint’s Day when typhoon Rosing struck. Unexpectedly, • Conducting mass education on by 2 November 1995, floodwaters disaster preparedness and disaster- rose to a height of 7-20 feet. Although related issues (Victoria 1998: 82). the rise occurred at different times

140 because of the varying elevations of Nagising kami ng umagang iyon na the areas, 11 barangays were basa ang tinutulugan namin. submerged and the whole poblacion Naivacuate ng tatay ko yong comprised of three barangays was kapatid kong maysakit. Pero noong under water. Floodwater above the ako na, masyado nang mataas ang provincial road was three-feet high tubig at hindi na namin kayang while the residential areas were four umalis. Sa bubong kami tumira ng to ten feet under water. Floodwater tatlong araw. Ang hirap…..ang reached 12-20 feet in other rural hirap-hirap talaga. Ang lamig-lamig barangays. As people recalled, sa gabi, tapos ang init-init ng “Everywhere you saw water. It was bubong kapag tanghali. Hindi ka like the sea. There was no land makaapak sa init kaya naglalagi transportation and Bula was isolated. kami sa puno ng mangga. Pinilit Only boats were used for transport. It kong umalis dahil hindi ko na kaya. was a very difficult situation”. Lumubog yong bangkang sinasakyan ko. Buti na lang The flood lasted for weeks and sinundan ako ni Tatay at naisalba even months in some areas. In the niya ako. poblacion, the road was flooded for two weeks. In Barangays San Jose, We woke up that morning wet in San Miguel, and Ombao Polpog, the our bed. My father evacuated my water remained until January 1996 sick brother, but when it was my or almost two and a half months. The turn, the floodwater was already people did not celebrate Christmas very high. We were not able to that year. “Wala kaming makain. leave. We stayed in the rooftop for Walang hanapbuhay. Huminto lahat. three days. It was very difficult. It Ang mga bata lang ang masaya dahil was very cold in the evening and walang pasok at naglalaro sa tubig. very hot at noontime. You can not [We had nothing to eat. We had no step on the roof so we stayed in livelihood. Everything stopped. Only the mango tree. I tried to leave the children were happy because they because I could no longer bear it, had no classes and they played in the but the banca I was riding floodwater]” For the people of Bula, capsized. It was good that my the 1995 flood was different because father followed and saved me. the water rose very fast to higher There were very few lives lost, levels than before; it also took a long only five, a feat that people attributed time to subside, resulting in bigger to their resilience and familiarity with damages. flooding events in their community. One municipal worker, a lady and But the damages as summarized in a a graduate of an exclusive college for special report were enormous, girls in Naga City kept on shaking her amounting to Php115.78 million. head as she narrated her story. She There were 3,626 housing units was18 years old and a college student partially damaged and 1,107 totally at the time: destroyed.

141 Despite these damages, the 1995 faster than the rate of drainage, flood in Bula did not receive wide causing the run-off to accumulate attention. One barangay captain said while seeking its own level. This that she heard a radio report for the happens when the rivers are not province mentioning the names of all yet full and therefore can still the municipalities affected by flood. accommodate the run-off. The Sad to say, she never heard Bula people refer to this as “dumaraan mentioned. She went to the radio lang na baha” [passing floodwater]. station to inform the province that Bula This kind of flood subsides after was highly devastated also. one to three hours. Apparently, the report overlooked Bula 2. Lake Overflow – Lake Bula rises because the poblacion is not along the and sometimes overflows when it national highway. rains. However, the people The researcher’s interaction with consider floods resulting from this the people of Bula reveals that they as not dangerous because water were very much aware of the causes rises very slowly. The areas of flooding. There was general affected are the rice fields acceptance that their municipality was surrounding the lake. Because this prone to flooding. “Basin kasi itong flooding happens every time there Bula. Parang palanggana na sinasahod is heavy rain, the fields are usually ang tubig na nanggagaling mula sa flooded more than once a year. The Albay at sa Camarines Sur. Tapos, height of the flood ranges from leg bagyuhin pa ang Bicol.” [Bula is like a to waist deep, depending on the basin that holds the floodwater coming amount of rain and the location of from the provinces of Albay and the field relative to the lake. Camarines Sur. The Bicol region is also 3. Basin Flooding without River very prone to typhoon.] Interestingly, Overflow – The lowest portion of the people understood in layman’s the basin is found in the rice fields terms the natural explanation for the in Barangay San Miguel, Sagrada occurrence of flood in their area. and Ombao-Polpog. In these areas, The physical or topographical the flood can be as high as breast attributes of Bula, the climate and the deep even if the two rivers, Pawili social forces all contribute to flooding and Bicol, are not overflowing. The in the municipality. Four types of floodwater comes from upper flooding have been identified in Bula. areas in the north that drains into the basin through simple gravity. 1. Run-off Flood without River Since the rivers do not overflow, Overflow – Almost all barangays the basic is still able to in the lowland areas experience accommodate the flood from the flooding right after heavy rainfall. field. However, the floodwater Because of the volume of does not drain easily because of rainwater and the limited capacity infrastructure projects such as the of the drainage system, or the lack irrigation regulation control, bridge of it, the rate of input is much

142 construction and the absence of did not take place. The people felt that an effective drainage system. The they were left on their own when the flood in these areas usually takes disaster struck. Even local government from one day to one week to officials felt this way, saying that the suside. focus had been the city of Naga, even if the degree of flooding was worst in 4. River Overflow – Two days and their municipality. two nights of continuous heavy rains can cause both the Pawili and The vulnerability of people in Bula Bicol rivers to flood all the differed on the basis of age, sex, barangays in the basin. According physical attribute, and economic to those who have witnessed this, status. There was more mention of the Pawili River current flows children, the elderly, women and those downstream very fast. When the with disabilities whose lives were put water flows back, then it means in danger more than the men, the that the Bicol River downstream adults, and those without physical is already full. The current then disabilities. For example, a girl jumped flows backward and sideward out from the window when she saw instead of draining downstream, the floodwater coming into her house, spreading into nearby unmindful of the fact that the water communities. Even if the rain outside was higher. A boy accidentally stops, rivers continue to flow slipped from his mother’s arms while strongly and, in fact, become evacuating form a breast–deep flood. heavier due to the run-off coming A grandmother who could not walk from the upper provinces of had to wait for her children so she Camarines Sur and Albay. could be brought to safer ground. The women and children were also more vulnerable to social harassment as PEOPLE’S LOCAL KNOWLEDGE mothers ended up in conflict with each AND INNER WILL other over petty quarrels among their children. Women and children were Bula is vulnerable to perennial also the most affected by the health flooding, which, as the 1995 flooding and sanitation situation. shows, occasionally reaches disastrous proportions. However, the Access to resources and decision- lack of national awareness of the making processes are factors that municipality’s situation increases the affect levels of vulnerability. Lower vulnerability of its people. As the 1995 income groups and the poor have very flood experience reveals, external limited access to land, occupation, support was not provided immediately, income and services and are, prolonging the suffering of affected therefore, most vulnerable. The communities. Needed resources were location of their homes aggravate their not allocated and people felt unduly situation. neglected. The principle of the Four levels of vulnerability are “invulnerable helping the vulnerable” apparent in the study:

143 Level I: The most vulnerable group courage and determination that reflect with less inner capacity and very the people’s inner strength and limited support system from the capacity. For instance, a mother community. They are the poor who bravely threaded a breast-deep flood live in depressed rural communities to save her children. When one of them with very inadequate facilities and accidentally slipped from her arms, she resources. plunged back into the water and grabbed the boy’s hair. Level II: The ‘vulnerable group with less inner capacity but greater There were also instances during support system within the the fieldwork when the researcher’s community. They are the poor who attention was caught by an live in urban barangays which are interviewee’s local knowledge. For more accessible and have more example, while an outsider might facilities and resources. consider a rubber tire as a safety floater during a flood, the farmers said Level III: The less vulnerable group that they do not use tires because they with inner capacity but less puncture too easily once hit by support system within the bamboo, sharp wire or other objects. community. They are the higher Instead, the Bula residents use banana income families who have more rafts. Another farmer said that these resources but similarly suffer from rafts are fenced with bamboo poles flooding in rural communities. to prevent animals from falling into the Level IV: The least vulnerable group floodwater. The banana rafts virtually with inner capacity and greater serve as floating pens for chicken, support system within the ducks or pigs. As the floodwater rises, community. In addition to their the floating pen also rises with the family resources, they also live in animals on it. the poblacion that is very accessible and provided with greater facilities and amenities. THE ENDOGENOUS RESPONSE AS A WAY TO MOVE FORWARD Those who belong to the less or the least vulnerable groups are Communities vulnerable to flooding endowed with greater resources and have developed an endogenous have greater capacity and options to response system that enables them to respond to disasters, enabling them to adapt to disaster events. Such provide a support mechanism to the adaptation does not mean that people vulnerable and the most vulnerable would avoid losses but that groups. communities have developed mechanisms for responding to those Interestingly, even the most losses, enabling them to move on once vulnerable population is able to rise to the disaster event is over. A local and the occasion when the disaster struck. endogenous response system Key informants narrated stories of connotes not just the spatial dimension

144 of the activities but also the social available. Among the lower-income dynamics underlying it. For purposes group, the most common of the discussion, these responses are improvements include the installation categorized into those elicited before, of a platform near the ceiling where during, and after disaster events. they can place their belonging. They now use hollow blocks for walls Pre-disaster responses instead of light materials such as sawali, bamboo and nipa. Those who The residents of Bula have shown could not afford a concrete housing their capacity in the past to resist strengthened their houses by an exogenous project that they tightening the support system at the deemed contributory to flooding in base. their communities—the national government’s Bicol River Flood Control Among the upper-income group, and Irrigation Project (BRFCIP). The the improvements include the project aimed to construct dykes along construction of a mezzanine or a the river and lake banks to control second floor. One family fenced-in the flooding and store water for irrigation. house to redirect the floodwater but Since the project entailed dredging this proved effective only when the and enlarging the river and lake area, river was not yet overflowing. Those the people believed that its who can afford construct new houses implementation would increase their that are bigger, higher and sturdier. vulnerability. They claimed that they As one approaches the poblacion of would be dislocated by the destruction Bula, one notices a housing of their economic and social base. construction boom. The new design After all, they used the land to be and the construction of the houses submerged for planting crops during itself is not only preparing the people the dry season and as a fishing ground for flooding, but is giving the during the rainy months. Accordingly, municipality a facelift. Even some of their displacement would also destroy the mausoleums in the cemetery have their endogenous response to floods now a second floor. which is anchored in neighborliness. Another preparedness mechanism By resisting the project through employed by the community is the petition, mass mobilization and procurement of tools, equipment, and advocacy, they successfully prevented other instruments that can be used in its implementation. the event of a disaster. The barangay To reduce their vulnerability, a council and some families have number of families redesigned and purchased boats that can be used for reconstructed their houses to make rescue, evacuation and transportation them more resistant to flooding. Both during a flood. In Barangay Ombao- the lower income and the upper- Polpog, the boat is also used for their income families have their own way religious procession on the river. The of improving and reconstructing their municipality also allotted an amount houses, depending on the resource for the purchase of a boat and

145 handsaw. Unlike in other barangays could evacuate. There were very few where development funds are spent houses with a second floor that could on beautification projects, the Bula accommodate other people. The communities focused on reducing their schools and the chapels were also vulnerability to flooding. flooded. The evacuation centers used were also right in the center of the Community preparedness through flooded community. Nevertheless, the the organization and mobilization of bayanihan spirit was alive and well in the people was also evident. Both Bula. Upper income groups in the government and nongovernment municipality opened their houses to organizations have mechanisms for their neighbors for temporary shelter preparing the people for disaster. The and shared their boats for transporting barangay tanod trained by the goods and people. Department of Local Government in rescue operations. On the other hand, Post-disaster response there are Disaster Management Committees trained by an NGO in The post disaster response was the the various phases of disaster weakest point in the disaster management. They have counter management system. After a brief disaster plans and socioeconomic period of relief distribution, the people activities that increase their capacities. were left on their own.

Emergency response during disaster The amount of losses suffered by families in the wake of the disaster There are community-based depended on their socioeconomic systems of warning and rescue status. In absolute term, the higher- operations. While the mass media is income families had greater losses an important source of information on since they had more property typhoons, the people rely more on an destroyed, or opportunities lost. But endogenous warning system that is in a real and moral sense, the poor more personal and direct. Their were the ones who lost more—their experiences with previous typhoons cooking utensils, bedding and literally and floods and their observation of the the shirts on their back. The higher– behavior of the river form the basis of income families were able to recover their predictions about flooding. at a faster rate than the poor because Warnings made by community leaders they had more resources, through house-to-house calls were opportunities, and means of effective, especially when people saw recovering. On the other hand, the their neighbors and relatives moving poor found it very difficult to recover. out towards the evacuation centers. It took years for some of them to do The bandwagon has played an so. Some have not even able to repair important role in mass evacuation in their houses at the time of the study Bula. in 2003. When the flood struck in 1995, Despite the losses, people did not there were limited places where people feel the need to account for them.

146 Although the government estimated such as the local government units the damages inflicted on infrastructure (LGUs) and NGOs were inadequate. and agriculture, the people themselves The endogenous system of the did not exert any effort to cost the community has not been integrated impact of the disaster on whatever into institutional processes of disaster assets they possessed. Doing so management. would not only have made them sad The relief distribution was not but dwelling on their losses would commensurate to the material needs have prolonged their agony. They of the flood victims. For a flood that simply moved on psychologically. lasted more than two months in some The role of kinship in rehabilitation communities and that destroyed the was very significant. For those whose crops and other sources of livelihood, houses were totally destroyed, families the relief consisted of three kilos of temporarily lived with their relatives. rice, three cans of sardines and Some lent them money so that they packages of noodles. It might have could rebuild their house or buy new satisfied hunger for a day or two; in household utensils. There was no effect, the families were left on their mention of people receiving assistance own to source food and income. from the government for rehabilitation What is notable is that the demand purposes. for relief goods did not come only from In the absence of effective means the poor. Those from higher income for the rehabilitation of agriculture, groups also felt bad when they did not farmers had no other recourse but to receive relief goods. The importance borrow again from private lenders who of the relief pack was more than just charged them high interest rates. In a few days food. The respondents also effect, they had to pay two sets of saw it as symbolic of “pakikiramay, loans for one cropping season. Worse, pakikiisa, pakikidalamhati”. It was akin there were situations when the new to giving a condolence card to a seeds planted had not yet matured but middle-income family who might not were destroyed by another typhoon need the money but the sympathy. or flood. In this regard, farmers would The interviews reveal an simply say that the situation was interesting dimension of relief beyond their control. operations. While it is imperative for It is interesting to note that disaster victims to receive adequate psycho-social intervention was never relief goods, the act of distributing mentioned as a rehabilitation measure such goods is double-edged. While it by any of the staff or people in the can foster dependency and apathy, it community. can also be used as an expression of concern that could ease the healing Institutional response process for victims. They would feel that other people cared about them. The respondents of the study agree Moreover, they did not have to suffer that the responses of local institutions the added burden of worrying about

147 where their next meal would come prone to flooding, there was no from. outright statement on how to prepare communities to manage flooding. On the part of LGUs, key informants expressed the difficulty of As noted previously, the people of re-channeling their services to disaster Bula have their own way of responding victims when they themselves were to flooding. However, they do not have victims of the same disaster. access to the institutional processes Nevertheless, many of them heroically for disaster management in the LGU, attend to their duties. The staff of the which hardly exist. It is ironic that the Health Office went to the communities municipality does not have the and provided chlorinated water and necessary preparations for floods. The health and medical services. The local plans were not attuned to this Department of Social Welfare and perennial hazard. Of the five barangays Development led in the distribution of covered, only Barangay San Joe and the relief. The Integrated National Barangay Fabrica had disaster Police led in the rescue and in the preparedness plans drawn up with the security function. Despite their assistance from an NGO based in Naga heroism, however, the staff City. interviewed were one in saying that As expected, the disaster the resources of the municipality were mitigation measures that require not enough for a disaster of that structural development were also magnitude. For instance, beyond the capacity of the LGU. Due transportation facilities were to limited financial resources for inadequate. The municipality did not structural development, the LGU has have any boat to reach far-flung to rely on external assistance, either communities. from the DPWH or from the Office of Similarly, planning for disaster the Governor. This is the reason why management was very inadequate. all the Sangguniang Pambayan could Based on the researchers’ assessment do was to pass resolutions requesting of the disaster plan, it seemed that the national agencies to allocate the plan was done just to meet the budget for their structural projects. minimum requirements of the law Some NGO and community leaders where each municipality must have a expressed concern about the ability of counter disaster plan. It merely listed government to plan and undertake activities without any assessment of large scale and capital-intensive the hazards; specification of strategies projects like the Bicol River Basin Flood for disaster prevention, mitigation and Control and Irrigation Project and their preparedness; and an outline of the inability to underwrite small-scale means of implementing the plan. structural projects to mitigate the Similarly, the comprehensive plan of adverse impact of flooding. the municipality showed little concern for flooding in the municipality. While it recognized that the municipality was

148 CONCLUSION against other areas that are much more endowed with natural and human- As a consequence of continuing decided resources. Just imagine a poor interaction with the environment, municipality having an annual budget people and communities have learned that is smaller than that of the annual to adapt to situations that put them in budget of a barangay in ‘rich’ Metro danger. However, there are times Manila. How can such a municipality when the environment has changed respond effectively when the considerably that the learned behavior resources are so disproportionately for managing hazards is no longer good allocated? Money is not all that enough. The people in the perennially matters. Their capacity to respond is flooded communities of Bula are used limited by existing institutional and to flooding. But it is evident in their structural arrangements that require case that when the 1995 floods came, some modifications. Unfortunately for they were not prepared to mitigate its the municipalities, the power to decide impact.. on these modifications is not in their It is heartening that endogenous hands but in the hands of the responses in true bayanihan spirit legislative and national administration. were observed by Bula residents at the The endogenous system of height of their suffering. However, response by both the communities and such responses can be seen as institutions are not a closed system reinforcing a subculture for reactive that excludes the possibility of and ameliorative behavior to disaster assimilation and innovations from the events. In the long run, relying on outside. For example, as a result of these responses might distract from this research, a Disaster Response addressing the underlying causes of Sectoral Plan was developed for the people’s vulnerability. the municipal comprehensive plan of What is needed is a more Bula. It is time now for the LGU to progressive endogenous response that seriously consider the integration and addresses the roots of vulnerability – implementation of the sectoral plan, the inequitable distribution of the basic part of which is the resources, the apologetic and institutionalization of disaster conformist consciousness, the management planning by enhancing unresponsive institutions with the LGU’s capacity to respond. lopsided programs and policies, and The integration of the community’s the oppressive relationships in the endogenous system of response to communities that leave the vulnerable disaster with development concerns at the mercy of those who are in is another factor to consider in the power. planning process. This can be Small municipalities and local facilitated if the working relationship governments that are very vulnerable between the communities and to disaster are in the same situation nongovernmental organizations as their people when they are matched specializing in disaster management

149 are strengthened. At this time, there needed is to open up existing systems are already linkages among NGOs and of managing disasters to this individuals who can be mobilized partnership. as partners in this endeavor. What is

NOTES 1 The research from which this paper was based was supported by the Office of the Vice-Chancellor of Research and Development, University of the Philippines, Diliman. 2 Casual conversation. 3 Informal way of asking questions. 4 Voluntarily providing help and support to a person in need in the community. 5 Being united with as one in support to a person. 6 Acting together in mutual support. 7 Expressing one’s concern and providing help to prevent an untoward event. 8 Expressing one’s concern and providing help during and after an untoward event.

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153 In Times of Affliction: God and Preparedness are our Protection

Manuel Abinales

The Environmental Constraints Map of arable land planted with vegetables, San Mateo, Rizal depicts Libis in Dońa corn, watermelon, and other root Pepeng Subdivision as one of the crops. The land was degraded by a thirteen areas that is prone to flooding. construction company that was Libis is more or less a seven-hectare erecting a cement batching plant right patch of land located at the on top of the tumana. Buklod Tao was embankment of a major waterway, the formed at the height of this community San Mateo-Marikina River and its protest. It registered as a non-stock, tributary, the Nangka River. Dwellers non-profit peoples’ organization on 1 have set-up their houses on this February 1996 with the Securities and elongated strip of land. The Exchange Commission. southwestern tip of Libis community abuts onto the juncture where the Nangka River feeds into the San THE ORIGINS OF BUKLOD TAO Mateo-Marikina River on an almost 45 All organizations have their initial degree angle. During heavy and acid test. Ours came with the continuous rains, the waters of the monsoon rains that accompanied Nangka River slam into the turbulent Typhoon Ibiang on 18 August 1997 – flow of the San Mateo-Marikina River only month and 27 days after the and pushes water back upstream. formation of our rescue services. The Floodwaters then begin to inundate three newly formed all male rescue houses, arable land, and, in the last teams and the all-female health and few years, erode the river banks and relief teams implemented a disaster- undermine the foundation of houses, preparedness plan that quickly causing them to slide into the river. formulated in time for the flooding The origins of Buklod Tao date season. back to October 1995 when the The plan evolved from a one-day inhabitants of Dońa Pepeng seminar-workshop on hazard mapping subdivision, North and South Libis of conducted on 22 June 1997 at our Barangay Banaba in San Mateo community chapel. The workshop contested the legality of on-going concretized the concepts of hazard, activities on an adjacent patch of vulnerability and risk assessment as agricultural land that residents used applied to our community. The as their tumana – i.e., their piece of

154 afternoon session focused on the CBDM because the river systems of formation of three rescue teams: one Mt. Oro and Boso-Boso feed into San each for South Libis, North Libis, and Mateo-Marikina river. With very high the sentro of South and North Libis. accumulation of surface runoff, the Our newly organized CBDM charged water level gauge for the San Mateo- each team with the following tasks: Marikina River in Montalban topped 25 (1) setting up an early warning system meters at 10:00 p.m. on 18 August.1 utilizing megaphones; (2) rescuing It started to recede at only 5:00 a.m. flood victims using boats, ropes, and on 19 August. flashlights; (3) providing evacuation Throughout that ominous night on assistance to two identified evacuation 18 August until dawn the following centers in the community; and (4) day, all our DM teams were dispatched formulating a simplified counter- with their paraphernalia to their disaster plan. Our seminar-workshop respective areas to conduct early culminated in an oath-taking by new warning, rescue families trapped in the members, the inspection of the flood, evacuate people to the chapel fiberglass mould for our boats, and its and elementary school, and keep a transport (hand-carried by members) record of the number and whereabouts to the shop of another member who of evacuees. We realized this was fabricates fiberglass items for preparedness during a disaster event. motorcycles. The three rescue teams were subsequently equipped with The Buklod Tao Reading Center boats, ropes, megaphones, first-aid was the site of our emergency kits, and flashlights. They drilled by operations. The meetings throughout the river with neighborhood children the typhoon and the evaluation after loaded inside the boats. the flooding were held in the Center. On normal days, the Center, based at Typhoon Ibiang (international code the carport of our residence as name, Winnie) with 160 kph winds, founding President, offers reading rising to gusts of 195 kph near the materials on the eonvironment to center was inside the Philippine Area adults and children. When the weather of Responsibility from 15-17 August was fine, children from two to twelve 1997. On its way to eastern China, years old, usually congregate in the the typhoon enhanced the southwest Reading Center to read or simply gaze monsoon, bringing heavy rains to the at the colorful pictures of land and sea western sections of Luzon and animals, trees, rocks, shells and Visayas. On 18 August 1997, the Mt. minerals. Some would choose to color Oro rainfall intensity gauge in outline sketches of houses, boys, girls, Montalban recorded a total rainfall of animals and trees on the pages of 146 mm, up from the 5mm registered donated used books. the previous day. Similar rainfall figures were documented at the Boso- In the wake of the typhoon, there Boso rainfall intensity gauge. The were still hungry evacuees at the readings were significant for the chapel and the school turned

155 evacuation center. The third phase of our relief team weighed and repacked disaster management commenced. the goods. Actual distribution Buklod Tao’s CBDM called for relief commenced mid-afternoon and lasted deliveries to those most affected by till 9:00 p.m. that night. the flood. After the one-hour This was the first official contact emergency evaluation meeting, Buklod of Buklod Tao with CDRC. It was not Tao’s EOC contacted the National my first time to interact with the Office of the Department of Social Center, however. In August 1995, a Welfare and Development (DSWD) and group of trainers from CDRC were the Citizens Disaster Response Center commissioned by the Ministry of (CDRC). DSWD advised Buklod Tao to Social and Human Development/ coordinate their relief operations with Social Action Center of the Diocese the local DSWD. Upon the advice of of Antipolo to conduct a three-day live- the parish priest who saw the extent in seminar/workshop on Disaster of the needs of the evacuees, I, as Management. I attended the training the association’s president went to the as a tagadiwa (animator) for the Basic Municipal Hall to see the local DSWD Ecclesial Communities (BEC) of the head who endorsed the request for parish at the time. relief packs for the Dona Pepeng evacuees. The BEC formation is one of the programs of the Ministry. It aims to The Typhoon Ibiang experience, introduce peripheral communities of however, disclosed a good partner in the parish to the life of communal CDRC. Its Metro Manila Coordinator prayer, love, and communion that assured us over the phone that the characterized the small communities needed relief items would be delivered of early Christians. The poor and either that afternoon or early the next marginalized are given priority in the morning. BEC, which envisioned a participatory On the morning of 20 August, a church with preferential option for the CDRC pick-up vehicle arrived at the poor. In line with the participatory Buklod Tao Emergency Operations character of the BEC, I organized as Center (EOC) and unloaded: two sacks tagadiwa, six buklod or cells of 10 to of rice, forty-five small cans of 12 neighbors in North and South Libis sardines, three kilos of mongo beans, that met weekly. Since the meetings one kilo of dried fish (dilis), and two were held on weekdays, the five-gallon containers of potable water. housewives were the ones who CDRC staff also provided blank forms represented their family in the buklod’s to be filled in by the head of our relief liturgical discussions. team for appropriate reporting on the The participatory spirit of the BEC manner in which Buklod Tao and the existence of community-based conducted its relief delivery cells made it easier to tap into the operations. Numbered stubs were CDRC training on CBDM because their distributed to the evacuees that underlying philosophies resonated with afternoon, while the lady members of each other. The training inspired me

156 to integrate the approach in the deep well within the 40-meter buklods, an idea that was not easement to extract groundwater for immediately acceptable to the majority the industrial use of its proposed of buklod members. It took another cement batching plant. Interestingly, two years for the seeds of CBDM to an earlier attempt in 1991 by a quarry germinate in our community. Following operator from the town of Montalban is an account of how this came to be. to establish a rock crushing plant on the tumana had been overwhelmingly rejected by subdivision homeowners. MOBILIZING A COMMUNITY However, the cement company had a much easier time because it acquired In the latter part of September the title to the land in November 1995 1995, Sitio Dońa Pepeng (the site of after winning the contract to construct Buklod Tao) was surprised to learn that the Batasan-San Mateo Bridge located the nearby tumana, an 18,105 square about 200 meters from the tumana. meter-piece of arable land located on Inquiries lodged at the municipal office the embankment of the San Mateo- revealed that the construction of a Marikina River was purchased by a cement batching plant was allowed construction company. Since 1947, to expedite the construction of the the community had been self-sufficient bridge. In fact, the company had the in fresh vegetables, thanks to the full support of the Sangguniang Bayan plants grown and harvested in the and the Mayor who passed a series of tumana. Apart from its provision of municipal resolutions (Resolutions No. food, the tumana also served as a 95-110 and 95-112) approving the natural catchment for floodwaters project and re-classifying the tumana from the San Mateo-Marikina and from agricultural land to industrial Nangka Rivers. The tumana no longer use.2 serves this function. A free patent land title awarded to a well-to-do The six buklods were consulted physician and resident of the nearby during their weekly ‘bibliarasal’, a one town of Marikina in 1968, which was and a half hour session in which cell sold to the construction company, members pray the rosary, read the gave the latter discretion to disregard gospel for the coming Sunday, engage the provision in the land title to in a few minutes of silent meditation demarcate and preserve as permanent and share insights. Since the sharing timberland a 40 meter strip of land was headed by the tagadiwa, the from the riverbanks. The proviso discussions after the liturgical stipulated that the land strip was to exercises served as the group’s be planted exclusively to trees of informal perception survey at the known economic value and ought not grassroots level on the construction. be cleared even for ordinary farming The discussions revealed an purposes. overwhelming opposition to the construction of the cement batching The construction company did not plant for many reasons, among them: follow this proviso. It started drilling a

157 • Exposure of children to the very such a cement batching plant adjacent real risk of being run-over by to our community. As a community, traversing cement mixer trucks; we decided to have none of these. • Inhalation of cement dust day in We embarked on a program of and day out; community advocacy for our own and our children’s sake and instituted a Pollution of the San Mateo- • program of disaster mitigation, albeit Marikina River with cement sludge; of a non-structural nature. First, we • Disappearance of our tumana; sought assistance from Saligan, an alternative lawyers group based at the • Likelihood of water shortage; Institute for Social Order in Ateneo de • Possible illegality of the cement Manila University. Saligan, in turn, batching plant near a major river referred us to Tanggol Kalikasan, the and its being built on agricultural legal arm of the Haribon Foundation, land despite municipal resolutions since our issue was environmental in and ordinances to the contrary; nature. We wrote the Sangguniang Bayan requesting a public hearing to • Noise levels; and discuss the merits and demerits of the • Changes to the elevation of the project and were accompanied to the tumana area as dumped filling subsequent session by a lawyer from materials would make the level of Tanggol Kalikasan who acted as our our houses lower, increasing our counsel. A signature-gathering vulnerability to flooding. campaign was launched in the community to dramatize to the Mayor Our community wasted no time in of San Mateo our strong opposition organizing ourselves to oppose the to the establishment of a cement construction of the cement batching batching plant in our vicinity. To plant. For its part, the construction prevent the truck haulers from company quickly commenced its illegal dumping filling materials on the activities: dumping filling materials tumana, we barricaded the entrance at the tumana area until late at night, to the site with tree trunks, cement drilling holes to extract underground posts and old galvanized iron sheets water for industrial use, and and posted placards with messages constructing a perimeter wall to denouncing the project. People joined protect the site from floodwaters, so the picket, lighting bonfire through the rendering the immediate residents long nights of protests. more vulnerable. Through our own initiatives, the These acts aroused our communal issue was elevated to the office of the survival instinct. We had no choice but Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Rizal to move against perceived hazards and province and letters were sent to all risks. We foresaw our vulnerability and the board members stating our case witnessed it increase with the and requesting their support. On two construction and eventual operation of separate occasions, three board

158 members conducted on-site close communication and liaison with inspections to acquaint themselves the diocese. The presence of the with the situation. The municipal diocesan in-charge of BEC and the agrarian reform officer of San Mateo diocesan program coordinator for the followed suit and also conducted her Social Action Center during the public own investigation. In February 1996, hearing at the Sangguniang Bayan the whole community including the greatly uplifted all the buklods. As a school children staged a protest march final step, we sent an open letter to to the town plaza to gather in front of the Mayor, questioning the legality of the munisipiyo. Just as we were the municipal resolutions and leaving the subdivision, our way was ordinance that approved the blocked by a squad of policemen conversion of the land from agricultural determined to prevent us from to industrial use. proceeding any further. However, thanks to the timely intervention of Throughout the protests, our SP board member Atty. Enrique buklods were undergoing a rite of Rodriguez who was able to mediate passage, a maturing of sorts. From a with the police officer-in-charge, we mere liturgical-bible reading- were permitted to continue with our meditation-sharing of insights group protest march. that held weekly gatherings, we had journeyed to a new level of liberation Through the legal assistance of that I had been told about during the Tanggol Kalikasan, we also lodged a BEC-CO training of the diocese. formal complaint to the executive Although this word ‘liberation’ was director of the National Water never uttered during the entire Resources Board (NWRB) on the issue advocacy process, it manifested itself of the illegal extraction of ground in the praxis for the community: we water for industrial use by the had no other option but to act and construction company. The complaint free ourselves from the clutches of resulted in two appearances at the political arrogance, utter disregard for quasi-judicial board of the NWRB. Key the welfare of the marginalized by the officers and members of Buklod Tao more influential and the rich, and the were present at a conference called eventual enslavement of the entire by the technical director of the community to the clutches of flash Environmental Management for floods, inundation, siltation and Protected Areas Systems of the pollution of the nearby rivers. Region 4 Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Our predisaster, nonstructural (DENR). Moreover, we were mitigation initiatives lasted seven summoned to attend a public hearing months. Buklod Tao emerged at the Laguna Lake Development victorious in many different ways. We Authority in the provincial capitol to were able to prove that the united discuss air, water and noise pollution voice of the peripheral communities relative to the cement batching plant. could become a resounding clarion call At all times, I was anxious to maintain for concerned government agencies

159 Counter Disaster Plan sa Panahon ng Baha SENARYO I: Patuloy na malakas na buhos ng ulan sa loob ng anim na oras. PAGKILOS: Bantay-ilog; iaktibo ang EOC at ROC; early warning; pasimula ng komunikasyon sa CDRC, DDMC- parish at diocesan. SENARYO II: Pag-apaw ng ilog Marikina at Nangka. PAGKILOS: Paglikas ng mga bata, matanda, babae sa classroom at sa kapilya; headcounting ng mga evacuees; ibayong warning/alarm. SENARYO III: Baha umabot sa buong tumana at kalsada at dalawang libis. PAGKILOS: Malawakang paggamit ng rescue boat, rescue rope, ibayong warning, ibayong communication link. Paglikas ng mga pamilya o tao na hindi kumilos sa senaryo II at nakulong na ng lumaking baha. SENARYO IV: Baha umabot na sa buong subdivison at aabot pa sa Gen. Luna National Road (Worst Case Scenario). PAGKILOS: Ibayong warning – matagal na pagrepeke ng kampana ng kapilya, pagdulog sa transportasyon ng mga tao, rescue ng mga naiwan pa sa mga bahay, massive evacuation ng buong sitio papunta sa BANCOM at MARVI HILLS, ibayong communication link sa CDRC, DDMC, sa parokya at head-counting ng mga evacuees.

and civil society to take notice and Desist Order and a resolution nullifying eventually extend support to a and voiding the municipal ordinances legitimate cause. It was a triumph for that were directed against our welfare. the rule of law in upholding the Water The whole episode also served notice Code of the Philippines, the rules and to the local politicos of our town that regulations of the National Water they could not just simply adopt Resources Board, and the Laguna Lake resolutions and ordinances at whim or Development Authority. Even if we did upon the dictates of the rich and the not find allies in the Sangguniang influential without first consulting the Bayan of San Mateo, we were able to affected stakeholders. establish rapport with the Region 4 Despite our relative success, Office of the DENR and the damage had been inflicted on our Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Rizal immediate environment. Thus, our pre- province which issued a Cease and disaster preparedness needed to be

160 reinforced. Preparedness after all is an June 24, 1997: Purchase of ropes, on-going process rather than a one megaphones, flashlights, and first shot deal. We could not stop with aid kits; obtaining a single policy or piece of June 27, 1997: completion and legislation. We had to keep our delivery of our first fiber glass boat; functional cohesiveness intact for the common good by developing plans to June 30, 1997: completion and sustain and reinforce our organization. delivery of our second fiber glass boat; Buklod Tao was a mere fledgling peoples’ organization in 1996. Freshly July 2, 1997: completion and delivery scarred from political innuendos, of our third fiber glass boat; harassments, and even legal suits, we set our goals towards the acquisition July 5, 1997: Meeting of DM teams of much needed resources. and the creation of a Counter Disaster Plan; and Earlier this paper described the formation and equipping of our three July 12, 1997: Rescue drill at the river DM teams in a one-day seminar. and distribution of equipment to Buklod Tao was able to conduct the the three teams. activity with a small grant from the On 18 August or 57 days after Royal Netherlands Embassy in Manila. we formally organized for disaster Thirty thousand pesos were earmarked management, Typhoon Ibiang brought for the disaster preparedness its heavy rains. Although several component of our project with the houses were swept away by the Embassy. That small amount was well waters, no one was killed and many spent: Php 6,000 for the production people were able to save their of training kits and the Citizens’ belongings. Since then, everyone felt Disaster Response Center DM less insecure during typhoons because Handbook, Bagyo, Lindol, Bulkan at Iba of flood-level monitoring, early warning Pa; and Php 26,000 for the fabrication monitoring, rescue operations, and the of three rescue fiber glass boats, and relief assistance activities of the DRC the purchase of ropes, flashlights, and Buklod Tao. batteries, megaphones, and first aid kits. The second phase of our pre- POSTSCRIPT disaster preparedness initiatives Although Buklod Tao is the only (following the first phase or the people’s organization in the community’s all-out opposition against newly formed Philippine Disaster the cement batching plant) can be Management Forum, it ensures that chronicled as follows: the presence, voices and interests of June 22, 1997: One-day seminar/ communities in CBDM are felt, heard, workshop on disaster management and upheld. After successfully in our community chapel; engaging in disaster preparedness and

161 emergency response activities, Buklod Libis, Riverside Dulo, Riverside Tao has expanded the scope of its Bungad, and Pulang Lupa, all part of operations to other vulnerable Barangay Santo Nińo. In June 2002, communities in building-up their own a two-day DPT was held in Sitio Gipit. capacities in CBDM. A year later, a counter disaster planning session was held and a DRC Word of Buklod Tao’s activities formed. Upon referral by the Social have gone the rounds and neighboring Action Center of the diocese of communities have requested Antipolo, Buklod Tao even assisted in assistance in the training and the formation of a disaster formation of their own Disaster Rescue management committee in a far-flung Committee (DRC). Aside from rural community at Barangay Calawis engaging in major community (Antipolo City), some 40 kilometers programs, Buklod Tao members have from Manila. After a two-day DPT, the also helped Banaba Extension prepare Calawis Community-based Disaster for disasters. A one-day Disaster Group was formed. Management Orientation (DMO) was followed by a two-day Disaster Buklod Tao was even given the Preparedness Training (DPT) in opportunity to present its disaster January 2002 culminating in the response and mitigation activities formation of a DRC. Buklod Tao has in the First National Conference continued to help this DRC by passing on Community-based Disaster on its old but still serviceable Management that was organized by preparedness logistics. the National Disaster Coordinating Council, the National Defense College Hazard, capacity, and vulnerability of the Philippines, and the Philippine assessments workshops with Buklod Disaster Management Forum on 28- Tao leaders as resource persons were 30 January 2003 to showcase “good also conducted with villagers in four practices” in CBDM and to aid in the other nearby communities: Riverside process of building safer and more disaster- resilient communities.

NOTES 1 Effective Flood Control Operation System (EFCOS) posted the following water level information for the same river on that night: 11:00pm – 25.19 meters.; 12:00am – 25.23 meters; 1:00am, 19 Aug. – 25.36 meters; 2:00am – 25.52 meters; 3:00am – 25.71 meters; 4:00am – 25.84 meters; 5:00am – 25.87 meters. 2 These ordinances and a subsequent one (Ordinance No. 96-02) reaffirming this intent were later overturned by a resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Rizal province (Resolution No. 96-38) that adopted: “A Resolution declaring Ordinance No. 96-02 of the Municipality of San Mateo, Rizal as null and void.” Furthermore the SP Resolution also “resolved to order the Municipal Government of San Mateo and their assignees to cease and desist from any further action relative to same ordinance.” 162 Natural Hazards and Cultural Change Among Traditional Philippine Communities: An Alternative Framework of Analysis

Jean-Christophe Gaillard

Natural hazards are natural phenomena that pose a threat to people, structure or economic assets and which may cause disasters (adapted from UN-DHA 1992). Natural hazards include earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides, tsunamis, storms and cyclones, droughts, floods and storm surges, among others. The cultural impact of natural hazards on traditional communities has been the object of debate in the international literature. There is particular disagreement on the capacity of traditional communities to recover on their own without relying on external support, which is itself a possible vector of cultural change. This article focuses on this issue. It begins with a critical review of existing models of responses of traditional communities to natural hazards as illustrated by examples from the Philippines. An alternative framework incorporating factors accounting for culture change in the wake of hazardous natural events is eventually proposed. It is worth mentioning that this study only covers fast- onset and contemporary events and thus excludes ancient disasters and those resulting from slow-onset hazards like droughts, subsidence, and climatic changes.

NATURAL HAZARDS AND TRADITIONAL COMMUNITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES The existing literature on natural Geophysical and Astronomical hazards and traditional communities in Services Administration (PAGASA), the Philippines is very sparse. Most of and the Ugnayang Pang-Aghamtao the studies dealing with this issue Foundation, Inc. (UGAT) during the concern the 1991 eruption of Mt. late 1990s on disaster management Pinatubo and its impact on the Aeta among Filipino cultural communities communities living on the flanks of the (see Phivolcs et al. 1998, for a volcano (Shimizu 1992, 2001; Seitz summary). This overall assessment 1998, 2000, 2004; Gaillard and Leone covers ‘cultural communities’ of the 2000). Other notable works include Caraballo Mountains, Cagayan Valley the 12-volume compilation made and Batanes, the Igorots of the by the Philippine Institute of Northern Luzon Cordillera, the Volcanology and Seismology Negritoes of Luzon, Visayas and (Phivolcs), the Philippine Atmospheric, Mindanao, the Mangyans of Mindoro,

163 the Subanen of the Zamboanga the larger spectrum of the international Peninsula, the Manobo and Mandayas literature, it is possible to differentiate of Central Mindanao, the T’Bolis, three models of response of Philippine Tedurays, Bagobos and B’laan of traditional communities (Figure 1). Southern Mindanao, and the Maranaw, The first, so-called dominant, Maguindanao, Tausug, Samal and model (Kates 1971, Burton 1972, Yakan Muslim groups. However, it Mileti et al. 1975, Dynes 1976, chiefly focuses on coping mechanisms Burton et al. 1992), maintains that and indigenous mitigation strategies traditional communities, which closely rather than on the impact of natural depend on natural resources for a living hazards on cultural and ethnic identity. are fragile and incapable of overcoming Blolong (1996) also studied the the occurrence of large natural hazards cultural adaptation of the Ivatan of by themselves. Environmental damage Batanes to typhoon hazards, while is usually so severe that affected Insauriga (1999) concentrated on the communities are deprived of their main awareness and preparedness of resources and are thus forced to rely Bagobo communities to face different on acculturating external aid in order hazards. When seen in tandem with

Traditional communities

 Occurence of a natural hazard Depletion of the natural resources

Resort to external Resort to external Temporary socio- acculturating aid acculturating aid cultural adjustments    Cultural Catalysm of pre-existing Cultural

changes cultural changes continutity

  

Dominant model Cultural changes Radical model

Figure 1. The Different Models of Response of Traditional Communities Following Natural Disasters

164 to survive. This model correlates the the Batanes who are able to surmount results of several studies conducted by themselves the havoc brought on following the brutal awakening of Mt. by repeated typhoons, thanks to a Pinatubo among the Aeta Negrito wide range of indigenous communities who previously resided techniques: multi-cropping, crop on the upper slopes of the mountain compartmentalization, and crop (Shimizu 1992 and 2001; Seitz 1998, rotation. 2000, and 2004; Gaillard and Leone The third response model adopts 2000). The thick and hot pyroclastic a moderate and intermediary and ash deposits blanketing the upper approach. This approach (Blong 1984, flanks of the volcano prevented the Oliver-Smith 1996) argues that natural Aetas from going back to their hazards act as catalysts for ongoing ancestral lands and forced them to cultural changes. The acceleration of relocate on the foothills of Mt. trends of pre-existing acculturation has Pinatubo, which were already been witnessed among the Aeta occupied by lowland ethnic groups. communities that were inhabiting the This caused increasing and intense lower eastern flanks of Mt Pinatubo economic, social and political before its violent awakening in 1991 interactions that led the Aetas to (Gaillard and Leone 2000). Unlike their integrate foreign socioeconomic and ethnic counterpart from the upper cultural elements including settlement slopes of the volcano, the Aetas of pattern, religion, language, medicinal the foothills were already living for a treatments, clothing, diet, land tenure, long time in close contact with lowland and farming activities. groups and American servicemen on The second model of response of duty at the neighbouring Clark Air traditional communities is based on a Base. By further increasing the social, radically different thesis. Some economic and political dependency of researchers (Sjoberg 1962, Torry the Aetas on the lowland people, the 1978 and 1979) have indeed eruption accelerated the diffusion of demonstrated that traditional western socioeconomic references communities may be very resistant and already widespread before the capable of overcoming the occurrence eruption. of serious natural hazards by In this short synthesis of studies themselves. This approach asserts dealing with the responses of that the environmental consequences Philippine traditional communities of large scale events force traditional following the occurrence of violent and communities to temporary or more contemporary natural hazards, I permanent adjustments which do not distinguished three theoretical models. modify the fundamentals of their social It is our contention that further organization. In the Philippines, this empirical evidence implies that these model is fuelled by the studies of require further critical reflection. Blolong (1996) and Cayabyab and de Guzman (1998) among the Ivatans of

165 LIMITATIONS OF THE MODELS of the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption, therefore, should be more nuanced and The opposing conclusions of the replaced within a longer temporal models described above lead to a scale. questioning of the validity of such generalizing approaches. Two issues The second problem encountered may be raised. The first one, recently when trying to model the cultural tackled by Hoffman (1999) and impact of natural hazards on traditional Torrence (2003), is the scale of communities is linked to the difficulty temporal analysis. Indeed, socio- of comparing different events. This cultural changes viewed as major trouble has its roots in the uniqueness transformations a few months, years of each case. During the last two or even decades after the occurrence decades, considerable attention has of a natural hazard may be seen as been given to this question in the slight adjustments over the longer hazard literature (e.g., Susman et al. term. The example of the 1991 Mt. 1983, Maskrey 1993, Blaikie et al. Pinatubo eruption and its impact on 1994, Hewitt 1997). Natural hazards the Aeta Negrito communities is like volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, significant. Ten years after the landslides, typhoons or floods have eruption, the changes that occurred different inherent characteristics such among the communities previously as diverse speeds of onset, temporal located on the upper slopes of the spacing and magnitudes. Moreover, volcano may seem important (Gaillard they occur in very different and Leone 2000, Seitz 2004) but geographical, social, political and when placed in a longer temporal cultural contexts that shape the frame, the impact of this event responses and adjustments of the appears to be far less significant. victims. The distinctiveness of the During their long history which may events and the dissimilarity of their date back to the Pleistocene period, contexts of occurrence lead me to the Aetas have had to cope with major question the existence of universal environmental and cultural models or patterns of cultural response disturbances, including several to natural hazards as those mentioned powerful eruptions of Mt. Pinatubo above. It seems that cultural changes and earthquakes, climate changes, the are commanded by an intricate arrival of the Austronesian interrelation of several factors that agriculturists, the coming of the vary in time and space, from one event Spaniards, and finally the to another. These factors are physical, establishment of American military sociocultural, geographical, and bases on their territory. Yet, they have political in nature. The following managed to retain specific cultural discussion describe each of them in traits that still distinguish them light of a new framework for from the majority of Filipino approaching the cultural impact of ethnolinguistic groups today. Cultural violent and contemporary natural changes and adjustments in the wake phenomena on traditional societies.

166 The nature of the hazard eruption, most of the Aeta villages were buried under several meters of I have already mentioned that hot pyroclastic and onward ashfall natural hazards have different intrinsic deposits, preventing the immediate characteristics. The magnitude and the reoccupation of the upper slopes of temporal spacing of the hazards the volcano. Relocation downhill in the directly control the impact of such immediate vicinity of other ethnic event on traditional communities. In groups, with whom acculturating the Philippines, several studies have interactions eventually occurred, was demonstrated the capacity of such a must and no other alternatives were communities to deal with moderate- open to the Aetas. On the other hand, magnitude and recurrent phenomena phenomena like typhoons and floods like the frequent typhoons that sweep more easily allow post-event the archipelago during the rainy reoccupation of the stricken area thus season. This is particularly true for the helping the victims to recover Ivatans of Batanes (Blolong 1996, promptly, as shown by the sample of Cayabyab and de Guzman 1998), the the Ivatans of Batanes. Igorots of the Northern Luzon Cordillera (Ramos 1998), the The sociocultural context Mangyans of Mindoro (Rellin 1998), before the event the Manobos of Central Mindanao, the Mandayas of Southeastern Mindanao The pre-event sociocultural (Villar 1998), the Yakan of Basilan, context includes the level of the Samal and Tausug of Sulu acculturation, the relationships (Valeroso and Javier 1998) who between the affected group and its developed a wide spectrum of neighbours, the diversity of livelihoods, indigenous practices to cope with the cultural attachment to the these phenomena (e.g. adapted devastated site and the size of the agricultural strategies, typhoon- affected community. The international resistant houses, typhoon shelters, literature indicates that the deepest seawalls, forest conservation, etc.). cultural changes in response to the Conversely, the magnitude of the occurrence of a natural hazard happen 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption, which among the most traditional led to significant short and middle-term communities. Among the most cultural changes among the Aeta acculturated communities, the natural communities, was far greater. phenomenon rather acted as a catalyst Moreover, the Aeta had to deal with for pre-existing processes. Following an unfamiliar phenomenon because the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption in the the eruption occurred after five Philippines, the deepest sociocultural centuries of volcanic inactivity. changes similarly occurred among the communities which were less The extent of damages also played acculturated before the eruption, while a crucial role in the impact of natural the most acculturated communities in hazards on traditional communities. In 1990 underwent little adjustments to the case of the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo

167 the new environmental and socio- used to rely on several livelihoods economic contexts (Gaillard and Leone turned out to be less affected by the 2000). eruption. The wider range of resources allowed them to rely less on external The second factor influencing and acculturating support. Similarly, cultural change among traditional the Ivatans of Batanes plant a large communities is the amplitude of socio- variety of crops guaranteeing food cultural differences between the security in the event that some would affected ethnic group and its be damaged by typhoons (Blolong neighbours, as well as the intensity of 1996, Cayabyab and de Guzman inter-group interactions before the 1998). This strategy prevents them event. It seems that the larger the gap from depending on external assistance and the less the interactions, the in times of crisis. deeper the cultural changes. Following the 1991 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, the The cultural attachment to the site Aetas from the upper slopes of the devastated by a natural hazard is also volcano, who discovered the way of decisive. In the cases of Mt. Pinatubo, life of the lowlanders during their stay the mountain plays a major spiritual in the evacuation centres, were the role and is the centre of traditional most permeable to cultural change. religious beliefs (LAKAS 1991). The Conversely, changes were less post-disaster relocation away from the profound among communities from slopes of the volcano constituted a the foothills of the mountain that had painful cultural rupture for the Aetas long interacted with neighbouring communities affected. Likewise, T’boli groups. people resettled following the 1976 tsunami and the 1995 floods that The diversity of livelihood is devastated the southern coast of another factor of cultural resistance. Mindanao displayed a strong The communities that are most attachment to their homeland and vulnerable to cultural changes seem rapidly returned to their former to be those relying on a unique settlements after the events (Phivolcs livelihood. It is evident that et al. 1998). communities relying exclusively on the natural resources available in their Finally, the size and extent of the immediate environment are much more community affected seem to be vulnerable in the event of partial or directly linked to cultural change. If total destruction of these resources. the whole community is hit by a In the case of the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo hazardous natural phenomenon, eruption, uphill communities resistance to cultural changes looks exclusively dependent on agriculture unlikely, especially because of the for their living were rendered helpless absence of communities that are able by the destruction of their fields by to play the role of guardian of the pre- metres of pyroclastic deposits. On the event traditions. The 1991 Mt. other hand, the communities located Pinatubo eruption did not spare any on the foothills of the volcano which Aeta community (Seitz 1998, 2000,

168 and 2004; Gaillard and Leone 2000). The rehabilitation policy of the All the Aetas experienced the affected area set up by evacuation and resettlement centers the authorities where contacts with the lowlanders first occurred for the uphill The fourth and last factor affecting communities. The absence of any cultural change among traditional intact village, which could have communities is the post-event maintained Aeta traditions, did not rehabilitation policy pursued up by the allow a retreat toward a preserved authorities. Several studies all over the sociocultural environment. world (1976 Guatemala and 1982 Yemen earthquakes, 1994 eruption of The geographic setting Mt. Rabaul in Papua New Guinea, 1943-1952 eruption of Paricutín The importance of the geographic volcano in Mexico) have shown that setting in cultural change following the some cultural changes have been occurrence of natural hazards is premeditated by the authorities in directly linked to the magnitude of the charge of the rehabilitation of the event, the extent of damage and the affected areas. In the Philippines, pre-event sociocultural context. It following the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo essentially includes the existence of eruption, some government officials enough space in homeland-like were also boasting of trying to environment for relocation without “civilize” the Aeta through the encroachment upon other ethnic rehabilitation program set up following groups and cultures. In the case of the the disaster, especially through the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption, there was resettlement policy and social definitely no space available in programmes (Bennagen 1996). homeland-like environment for However, if it is true that education spontaneous relocation. The within the resettlement centres resettlement sites selected by the contributed to enlarging the cultural government encroached on lowlander references of the young, major socio- territories and favoured contacts cultural changes among the Aeta between Aetas and their neighbours. communities did not occur directly in Foothill sites, where other Aeta response to inputs of the government communities spontaneously resettled, but rather as a progressive process due also trespassed on lowlander’s lands to geographic proximity which led to (Gaillard and Leone 2000, Seitz 2004). increasing interactions with external The role of the geographic setting lowland culture. This is particularly would be even more evident in the evident because a large number of event of a natural phenomenon striking Aetas spontaneously chose to leave a small island, as has occurred the relocation centers to settle on elsewhere in the world (e.g. Tristan available lands in the surrounding de Cunha) and that might happen in foothills (Gaillard and Leone 2000, the Philippines. Seitz 2004).

169 The post-event rehabilitation communities in the face of violent and program cannot be detached from the contemporary hazardous natural national government policy toward events (Figure 2). It is evident that the traditional communities. In most nature of the hazard, the pre-event developing countries severely affected sociocultural context, the geographic by natural hazards, the recognition of setting, and the rehabilitation policy traditional communities is often non- set up by the authorities greatly vary existent. For example, at the time of in time and space, from one case to the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption, there another. were no specific governmental The nature of the hazard is guidelines to protect and defend ethnic certainly one of the most significant minority rights in the Philippines. elements because it largely conditions Hence, it was most unlikely that the the existence or absence of a Philippine government had appropriate homeland-like-environment for measures for the preservation of the relocation (geographic setting) and the Aeta culture at this time. rehabilitation policy set up by the authorities. It turns out that volcanic eruptions, due to their relative rarity, CONCLUSION their violence and the large areas The previous discussion described covered by volcanic deposits are several factors influencing the among the most powerful vectors of responses of Philippine traditional cultural change among traditional

Pre-event Nature of the hazard socio-cultural setting - Magnitude - Level of acculturation - Temporal spacing - Diversity of the livelihood

- Extent of Damage - Size of the community  

Cultural change   Government Policy Geographic setting - Post event rehabilitation - Availability of space for policy relocation in homeland- - National government policy like environment toward cultural minorities

Figure 2. Factors of Cultural Change among Traditional Communities

170 communities. This is clear in the case tolerated. They further note that of the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption and “people prefer to bear known ills rather its impact on the Aeta ethnolinguistic than take action the outcome of which group. Conversely, traditional may be equivocal or uncertain” (Burton communities seem to be very resistant et al. 1993: 223). The sociocultural to recurrent phenomena like floods or mechanisms leading to such behaviour tropical typhoons, which allow the remain to be explored and research immediate reoccupation of the stricken perspectives at the societal level site, as shown by the Ivatan require further examination. inhabitants of Batanes Islands. Finally, the relatively easy The capacity and latitude of differentiation of the hazards and pre- response of traditional communities to event sociocultural contexts a given hazardous natural event rather mentioned above should not hide the lies in the pre-event sociocultural fact that cultural changes in the wake context. Indeed, the level of of natural hazards are deeply anchored acculturation, the relationships in local sociocultural and political between the affected group and its contexts. These deserve the proper neighbours, the diversity of livelihoods, attention in the larger field of natural the cultural attachment to the hazard management. Limited for a long devastated site and the size of the time to the transfer of experience, community affected are of great knowledge and technologies from importance in constraining or industrialized to developing countries, facilitating the recovery of traditional natural hazard management programs communities. Small, “very traditional,” are now focused toward a more local isolated, and exclusively environment- approach of the problems (see Chester dependent communities seem to be 1993 and Chester et al. 2002, for a the most exposed to cultural change comprehensive account). From this in the event of the occurrence of a point of view, theoretical models, like hazardous natural phenomenon while those existing to evaluate the cultural larger and fairly acculturated groups impact of natural hazards on traditional look less vulnerable. communities, are not as useful from an instrumentalist perspective. This remark regarding diffe- Instead, I highlight a need to assess rentiated vulnerabilities leads to the the local variations of several factors larger debate of coping strategies and as detailed in the present paper. resilience to hazardous natural events. Together, these factors may constitute Burton et al. (1993: 221) have named an alternative framework for “loss acceptance” the mode of coping anticipating the consequences of of traditional communities. This means future hazardous natural events. that the loss is recognized and

171 REFERENCES Bennagen, P.L. 1996 “Amin ito: Who Controls Disaster Management.” Aghamtao 8, 56- 64. Blaikie, P., T. Cannon, I. Davis, and B. Wisner 1994 At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability, and Disasters. London: Routledge. Blolong, R.R. 1996 “The Ivatan Cultural Adaptation to Typhoons: A Portrait of a Self- reliant Community from the Indigenous Development Perspective.” Aghamtao 8, 13-24. Blong, R.J. 1984 Volcanic Hazards: A Sourcebook on the Effects of Eruptions. Sydney: Academic Press. Burton, I. 1972 “Culture and Personality Variables in the Perception of Natural Nazards.” In J.F. Wohlwill and D.H. Carson (eds.) Environment and the Social Sciences: Perspectives and Applications. Washington: American Psychological Association Inc, 184-195. Burton, I., R.W. Kates, and G.F. White 1993 The Environment as Hazard. New York: The Guilford Press. Cannon, T. 1994 “Vulnerability Analysis and the Explanation of ‘Natural’ Disasters.” In A. Varley (ed.) Disasters, Development and Environment. Chichester: J. Wiley & Sons Ltd., 13-30. Cayabyab, F.F. 1998 Natural Disaster Management among the Ibanag, Gaddangs, Bugkalots and Ivatans. Quezon City: Philvolcs, PAGASA, and UGAT. Chester, D.K. 1993 Volcanoes and Society. London: Edward Arnold. Chester, D.K., C.J.L. Dibben, and A.M. Duncan 2002 “Volcanic Hazard Assessment in Western Europe.” Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research 115, 411-435. Dynes, R. 1976 “The Comparative Study of Disaster: A Social Organizational Approach.” Mass Emergencies 1 (1), 21-32.

172 Gaillard, J-C. and F. Leone 2000 “Implications Territoriales de l’Eruption du Mont Pinatubo pour la Minorité Ethnique Aeta: Cas des Basins Versants des Rivičres Pasig et Sacobia (provinces de Pampanga et Tarlac, Philippines).” Cahiers Savoisiens de Géographie 1 (2000), 53-68. Hewitt, K. 1997 Regions of Risk: A Geographical Introduction to Disasters. Harlow: Longman. Hoffman, S.M. 1999 “After Atlas Shrugs: Cultural Change or Persistence after a Disaster.” In A. Oliver-Smith and S.M. Hoffman (eds.), The Angry Earth: Disaster in Anthropological Perspective. London: Routledge, 302-325. Insauriga, S.I. 1999 Natural Hazard Awareness and Disaster Preparedness among the Bagobos of Mindanao. MS thesis, University of Santo Tomas, Manila. Kates, R.W. 1971 “Natural Hazard in Human Ecological Perspective: Hypotheses and Models.” Economic Geography 47 (3), 438-451. Lubos na Alyansa ng mga Katutubong Ayta ng Sambales (LAKAS) 1991 Eruption and Exodus: Mt. Pinatubo and the Aytas of Zambales. Botolan: LAKAS. Maskrey, A. 1993 Los Desastres no son Naturales. Lima: La Red. Mileti, D.S., T.E. Drabek, and J.E. Haas 1975 Human Systems in Extreme Environments: A Sociological Perspective. Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado. Oliver-Smith, A. 1996 “Anthropological Research on Hazards and Disasters.” Annual Review of Anthropology 25, 303-328. Phivolcs, PAGASA and UGAT 1998 Natural Disaster Management among Filipino Cultural Communities. Quezon City: Phivolcs, PAGASA and UGAT. Ramos, M. 1998 Natural disaster management among the Igorots or people of the Cordilleras. Quezon City: Phivolcs, PAGASA and UGAT. Relin, M. 1998 Natural Disaster Management among the Mangyans. Quezon City: Phivolcs, PAGASA and UGAT..

173 Seitz, S. 1998 “Coping Strategies in an Ethnic Minority Group: The Aetas of Mt. Pinatubo.” Disasters 22 (1), 76-90. 2000 “Bewältigung Einer Naturalkatastrophe: Die Aeta am Mt. Pinatubo (Philippinen).” Geographische Rundschau 52 (4), 49-55. 2004 The Aeta at the Mt. Pinatubo, Philippines: A Minority Group Coping with Disaster. Quezon City: New Day Publishers. Shimizu, H. 1992 After the Eruption: Pinatubo Aetas at the Crisis of their Survival. Tokyo: Foundation for Human Rights in Asia. 2001 The Orphans of Pinatubo: The Ayta Struggle for Existence. Quezon City: Solidaridad Publishing House. Sjoberg, G. 1962 “Disasters and Social Change.” In G.W. Baker and D.W. Chapman (eds.) Man and Society in Disaster. New York: Basic Books, 356- 384. Susman, P., P. O’Keefe, and B. Wisner 1983 “Global Disasters, a Radical Interpretation.” In K. Hewitt (ed.) Interpretation of Calamities. Boston: Allen & Unwin Inc., 263-283. Torrence, R. 2003 “Gradual vs. Punctuated Change: The Importance of Scale in Evaluating Disasters.” Presentation during the 5th session of the ‘World Archaeological Congress’, 21-26 June 2003, Washington D.C. (USA). Torry, W.I. 1978 “Natural Disasters, Social Structure and Change in Traditional Societies.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 13 (3-4), 167-183. 1979 “Anthropological Studies in Hazardous Environments: Past Trends and New Horizons.” Current Anthropology 20 (3), 517-540. United Nations – Department of Humanitarian Affairs 1992 Glossaire International Multilingue Agréé de Termes Relatifs ŕ la Gestion des Catastrophes. Genčve: UNDHA. Valeroso, I.I. and D.V. Javier 1998 Natural disaster management among the Tausugs, Samals and Yakans. Quezon City: Phivolcs, PAGASA, and UGAT. Villar, A.A. 1998 Natural disaster management among the Manobo tribes. Quezon City: Phivolcs, PAGASA, and UGAT.

174 CONTRIBUTORS

Manuel Abinales, Founding President, Buklod Tao Kaloy Anasarias, National Program Coordinator, Balay George Bankoff, Associate Professor, School of Asian Studies, University of Auckland and Visiting Professor of Disaster Management, School of Science & Environment, Coventry University Arnel Capili, Regional Director for Bicol, Office of Civil Defense and Executive Officer, Bicol Regional Disaster Coordinating Council Kathleen S. Crittenden, Professor Emerita of Sociology at the University of Illinois at Chicago Zenaida Delica-Willison, Advisor on Disaster Risk Reduction for the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation at the United Nations Development Programme Regional Center in Bangkok, Thailand Celso B. Dulce Jr., former Executive Director, Citizens’ Disaster Response Center (1999-2003) and independent consultant, CARE Jean-Christophe Gaillard, Institut de Geographie Alpine, Universite Joseph Fourier Corazon B. Lamug, Professor of Sociology and Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, University of the Philippines – Los Bańos, Laguna Emmanuel M. Luna, Associate Professor of Community Development, University of the Philippines-Diliman, Quezon City Gloria Luz Nelson, Department of Social Sciences, University of the Philippines- Los Bańos, Laguna Eugene Orejas, Central Luzon Center for Emergency Aid and Rehabilitation, Inc. (CONCERN), San Fernando, Pampanga Cristina T. Remotigue, National Institute of Geological Sciences, University of the Philippines-Diliman, Quezon City Kelvin S. Rodolfo, Adjunct Professor, National Institute of Geological Sciences, University of the Philippines and Professor Emeritus, Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Illinois at Chicago Fernando P. Siringan, National Institute of Geological Sciences, University of the Philippines-Diliman, Quezon City Lorna P. Victoria, Director, Center for Disaster Preparedness

175 Guidelines for Contributors: Notes and References

Prospective contributors are requested to observe the following guidelines: 1. Standard length of papers is 6000 words (approximately 20 pages typed double spaced with generous margins at the top, bottom, and sides of the page), but shorter contributions are also welcomed. 2. Include a brief abstract of 100-200 words summarizing the findings and at most five key words on a separate sheet of paper (without author information). 3. Title, author’s name, affiliation(s), full address (including telephone and email address) and a brief biographical note should be typed on a separate sheet. 4. Notes should contain more than a mere reference, although it is recommended to use notes only for substantive observation and to limit the length. They must be numbered serially and presented at the end of the article in a separate endnotes section that appears before the References. 5. All illustrations, diagrams, and tables to be referred to as “Figures” and “Tables” and numbered according to the sequence in the text. Figures should be referred to by number (Figure I) rather than by placement (See Figure below). Each table and figure must include a descriptive title. 6. Please use The Chicago Manual of Style, 14th ed. a) The following examples illustrate the format for referencing in the text: (Banzon-Bautista 1998: 21) (Lynch & Makil 1968) Zialcita (2005)

For Filipinos, the “outside” world is “a place of power, wealth, cleanliness, beauty, glamour and enjoyment” (Cannell 1995: 223). Source: Saloma 2001

“After all,” he said, “pinoy can be seen along national lines.” Source: Saloma 2001

176 b) List two or more works by different authors who are cited within the same parentheses in alphabetical order by the first author’s surname. Separate the citations with semicolons. For example: Scholars (Karaos 1997, Porio 1997, Tapales 1996)

c). All references cited in the text must be listed in the References section. The details should be listed in full, alphabetically by author. The following examples illustrate the format for references. Journal or Magazine Article Marcuse, P. 1989. “Dual City: A Muddy Metaphor for a Quartered City.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 13, 697-720. Newspaper Article Estopace, D. 2005. “The business of poverty.“ Today. 25 January, p. B3 Article from the Internet Mershon, D. H. 1998. “Star Trek on the Brain: Alien Minds, Human Minds.” American Scientist 86, 585. Retrieved 29 July 1999, from Expanded Academic ASAP database. Cabrera, R. E. 2003. “Renewable Energy Program for Mindanao.” Retrieved 26 July, from http://www.amore.org.ph Book Berner, E. 1997. Defending a Place in the City. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. Book Article or Chapter Racelis, M. 1988. “Becoming an Urbanite: The Neighborhood as a Learning Environment.” In J. Gugler (ed.), The Urbanization of the Third World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 219-224. Conference paper Sassen, S. 1994. “Identity in the Global City: Economic and Cultural Encasements.” Paper presented at the conference on The Geography of Identity. University of Michigan, 4-5 February.

177 Philippine Sociological Review Official Journal of the Philippine Sociological Society

Volume 51 January-December 2003

Cultures of Coping: Adaptation to Hazard and Living with Disaster in the Philippines Greg Bankoff 1 Worsening Floods around Northern Manila Bay, Philippines: Research-Based Analysis from Physical and Social Science Perspectives K.S. Rodolfo, F.P. Siringan, C.T. Remotigue, and C.B. Lamug 17 How Should Disasters be Managed? The Government’s View on Community-Based Disaster Management Arnel Capili 41 Community-Based Disaster Risk Management: Gaining Ground in the Hazard-Prone Communities in Asia Zenaida Delica-Willison 49 Community-Based Disaster Management in the Philippines: Making a Difference in People’s Lives Lorna P. Victoria 65 Prevailing over Disasters through People’s Organized Action: A Continuing Engagement in Community-Based Disaster Management in Central Luzon Eugene Orejas 81 The Psychosocial Impact of Internal Displacement: Case Studies from a Complex Emergency Situation on Mindanao Kaloy A. Anasarias 95 Mobilizing the Support of Less Vulnerable Sectors for Disaster Resilient Communities Celso B. Dulce 105 Socioeconomic Influences on Livelihood Recovery of Filipino Families Experiencing Recurrent Lahars Kathleen S. Crittenden, Corazon B. Lamug, and Gloria Luz Nelson 115 Endogenous System of Response to River Flooding as a Disaster Subculture: A Case Study of Bula, Camarines Sur Emmanuel M. Luna 135 In Times of Affliction: God and Preparedness are Our Protection Manuel Abinales 154 Natural Hazards and Cultural Change among Traditional Philippine Communities: An Alternative Framework of Analysis Jean-Christophe Gaillard 163 CONTRIBUTORS 175

178 PHILIPPINE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY (2003-2004)

President Nanette C. Dungo Vice President Ma. Elena C. Javier Secretary Exaltacion E. Lamberte Treasurer Jesusa M. Marco Directors at Large Mary Racelis (Luzon) Lorna P. Makil (Visayas) Erlinda M. Burton (Mindanao) Emma Porio (ex-officio)

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ISSN 0031-7810

Official Journal of the Philippine Sociological Society 179 Philippine Sociological Rev i ew

Volume 51 January-December 2003

Cultures of Coping: Adaptation to Hazard and Living with Disaster in the Philippines Greg Bankoff Worsening Floods around Northern Manila Bay, Philippines: Research-Based Analysis from Physical and Social Science Perspectives K.S. Rodolfo, F.P. Siringan, C.T. Remotigue, and C.B. Lamug How Should Disasters be Managed? The Government’s View on Community-Based Disaster Management Arnel Capili Community-Based Disaster Risk Management: Gaining Ground in the Hazard-Prone Communities in Asia Zenaida Delica-Willison Community-Based Disaster Management in the Philippines: Making a Difference in People’s Lives Lorna P. Victoria Prevailing over Disasters through People’s Organized Action: A Continuing Engagement in Community-Based Disaster Management in Central Luzon Eugene Orejas The Psychosocial Impact of Internal Displacement: Case Studies from a Complex Emergency Situation on Mindanao Kaloy A. Anasarias Mobilizing the Support of Less Vulnerable Sectors for Disaster Resilient Communities Celso B. Dulce Socioeconomic Influences on Livelihood Recovery of Filipino Families Experiencing Recurrent Lahars Kathleen S. Crittenden, Corazon B. Lamug, and Gloria Luz Nelson Endogenous System of Response to River Flooding as a Disaster Subculture: A Case Study of Bula, Camarines Sur Emmanuel M. Luna In Times of Affliction: God and Preparedness are Our Protection Manuel Abinales Natural Hazards and Cultural Change among Traditional Philippine Communities: An Alternative Framework of Analysis Jean-Christophe Gaillard

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Volume 51 January-December 2003

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