Seventh Public Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States - Day Two
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SEVENTH PUBLIC HEARING OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES - DAY TWO SUBJECT: BORDERS, TRANSPORTATION, AND MANAGING RISK CHAIRED BY: THOMAS H. KEAN WITNESSES PANEL I: JANE F. GARVEY, FORMER ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; CATHAL L. "IRISH" FLYNN, FORMER ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; CLAUDIO MANNO, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; PANEL II: EDMOND L. SOLIDAY, FORMER VICE PRESIDENT OF SAFETY, QUALITY ASSURANCE, AND SECURITY, UNITED AIRLINES; ANDREW P. STUDDERT, FORMER CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, UNITED AIRLINES; GERARD J. ARPEY, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AMERICAN AIRLINES; TIMOTHY J. AHERN, VICE PRESIDENT - DFW HUB, AND FORMER VICE PRESIDENT OF SAFETY, SECURITY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL, AMERICAN AIRLINES; PANEL III: NYDIA GONZALEZ, MANAGER, SOUTHEAST RESERVATION CENTER, AMERICAN AIRLINES; PANEL IV: JAMES M. LOY, DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY LOCATION: 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. TIME: 9:00 A.M. EST DATE: TUESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2004 1 MR. THOMAS H. KEAN: I'd like to call the hearing to order. First I would like to enter into the record a statement on aviation security by Carol Ashley. Ms. Ashley is a member of the Family Steering Committee and if there's no objection, so ordered. Yesterday we heard testimony about how the 9/11 terrorists were able to circumvent the border controls the United States had in place at the time. Today, we will look at what confronted them in the final stage of their mission of mass murder: the American civil aviation security system as it existed in early September 2001. Both yesterday and today we looked at the system's vulnerabilities. We will start by examining two of the most important components of that system, the Federal Aviation Administration that regulated it and the airlines which had the responsibility of implementing some of its key elements. Our witnesses will be expected to shed some light not only on the systematic issues but on specifics of the 9/11 hijackings themselves. After these panels, we'll hear about one of the real heroes of Flight 11, Flight 11 attendant Betty Ong, from who's work on that day reflects well on her professionalism -- from another, rather, who's work on that day reflects well on her professionalism and her humanity, Ms. Nydia Gonzales. We will conclude with testimony from Admiral James Loy, deputy secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and formerly head of the Transportation Security Administration as well as commandant of the Coast Guard. We will focus on one key question with Admiral Loy, how do we, or should we, determine our priorities for homeland security, especially in the transportation sector. In order to provide commissioners and the listening public with context for the testimony we are about to receive, we will once again begin by hearing from the 9/11 Commission staff and what it has learned to date relevant to today's proceedings. I would caution our listeners to bear in mind that this statement is still a work in progress. It addresses the various civil aviation defense layers and how the hijackers beat them in gaining entry to the aircraft. The Commission staff will present a second staff statement immediately preceding Ms. Gonzales’ testimony. That statement will take up the story of the four hijacked flights. It too is a preliminary report, making public what our staff has learned to the present time. I want to caution our audience, especially the families and friends of the victims of 9/11, that today we will 2 be presenting a number of the harrowing facts, sights, and sounds of that particular day. On another note, today's session will not focus on the situational awareness of air traffic control system and the Department of Defense including NORAD. The Commission will deal with that important topic in another public hearing, this spring. I would like to call on Mr. Zelikow, executive director of the Commission, Mr. John Raidt and Mr. William Johnstone, who will present the statement of the Commission staff. MR. PHILIP D. ZELIKOW: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Members of the Commission, working with you, your staff has developed initial findings on how the individuals who carried out the 9/11 attacks defeated the civil aviation security system of the United States. We continue our investigation into the status of civil aviation security today and for the future. These findings and judgments may help your conduct of today's public hearing and will inform the development of your recommendations. The findings and judgments we report today are the results of the work so far. We remain ready to revise our understanding of these topics as our work continues. This staff statement represents the collective effort of the staff team on aviation and transportation security. Our staff was able to build upon investigative work that has been conducted by various agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Department of Homeland Security's Transportation Security Administration is fully cooperating with our investigators, as are the relevant airlines and the Federal Aviation Administration. I'd now like to turn to John Raidt to continue. MR. JOHN RAIDT: Thank you, Philip. Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, before September 11th, 2001 the aviation security system had been enjoying a period of relative peace. No U.S. flagged aircraft had been bombed or hijacked in over a decade. Domestic hijacking in particular seemed like a thing of the past, something that could only happen to foreign airlines that were less well protected. The public's own threat assessment before September 11th was sanguine about commercial aviation safety and security. In a Fox News opinion dynamic survey conducted at the end of the 1990s, 78 percent cited poor maintenance as a greater threat 3 to airline safety than terrorism. The demand for airline service was strong and was beginning to exceed the capacity of the system. Heeding constituents calls for improved air service and increased capacity, Congress focused its legislative and oversight attention on measures to address these problems including a passenger bill of rights to ensure a more efficient and convenient passenger experience. The leadership of the Federal Aviation Administration, FAA, also focused on safety, customer service, capacity and economic issues. The agency's security agenda was focused on efforts to implement a three-year-old congressional mandate to deploy explosive detection equipment at all major airports and complete a nearly five-year-old rule-making effort to improve checkpoint screening. This staff statement will not address certain security performance issues leading up to 9/11 at the airports from which the hijackers' planes departed. Such work is still ongoing. It should be noted that the airports themselves did not have operational or enforcement jurisdiction over checkpoint screening operations, passenger pre-screening and checkpoint screening, based on regulations from the FAA these were the responsibility of the air carriers. Nevertheless, airport authorities do play a key role in the overall civil aviation security system. Before September 11th, federal law required the FAA to set and enforce aviation security policies and regulations that would quote, "Protect passengers and property on an aircraft operating an air transportation or intrastate air transportation against an act of criminal violence or aircraft piracy." This layered system, one that recognized that no single security measure was flawless or impenetrable, was designed to provide a greater number of opportunities to foil those intending to do such violence. The civil aviation security system in place on September 11th was composed of seven layers of defense including: Intelligence, passenger pre-screening, airport access control, passenger checkpoint screening, passenger check baggage screening, cargo screening and onboard security. The civil aviation security system in place on September 11th no longer exists. We will document serious shortcomings in that system's design and implementation that made the 9/11 hijackings possible. We want to make clear that our findings of specific vulnerabilities and shortcomings do not necessarily apply to the current system. Two of the layers of defense, checked baggage screening and cargo screening are not relevant to the 9/11 plot, 4 they are not addressed in this statement. A third layer, airport access control is still under investigation and also will not be addressed in detail here. Compelling evidence, including video tape of hijackers entering through checkpoint screening stations, suggest that the hijackers gained access to the aircraft on September 11th through passenger checkpoints. What we do know is that the hijackers successfully evaded or defeated the remaining four layers of the security system. We approached the question of how the aviation security system failed on September 11th by starting from the perspective of the enemy, asking: What did al Qaeda have to do to complete its mission? Sometime during the late 1990s the al Qaeda leadership made the decision to hijack large commercial multi-engine aircraft and use them as a devastating weapon, as opposed to hijacking a commercial aircraft for use as a bargaining tool. To carry out that decision required unique skill sets. Among them, terrorists trained as pilots with specialized skill and confidence to successfully fly a large multi-engine aircraft already airborne into selected targets; tactics, techniques and procedures to successfully conduct in-flight hijacking; and three, operatives willing to die. To our knowledge, 9/11 was the first time in history that terrorists actually piloted a commercial jetliner in a terrorist operation. This was new. This could not happen overnight and would require long term planning and sequenced operational training. The terrorists had to determine the tactics and techniques needed to succeed and hijack an aircraft within the United States.