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CHAPTER ONE

"WE HAVE SOME PLANES"

Tuesday, , 2001, dawned temperate and nearly cloudless in the eastern United States. Millions of men and women readied themselves for work. Some made their way to the Twin Towers, the signature structures of the World Trade Center complex in . Others went to , the world's largest office building. Across the Potomac river, the United States Congress was back in session. In Sarasota, Florida, President George W. Bush went for an early morning run.

For those heading to an airport, weather conditions could not have been better for a safe and pleasant journey. Among the travelers were and Abdul Aziz al Omari, who arrived at the airport in Portland, Maine.

1.1 Inside the Four Flights

Boarding the Flights

Boston: American 11 and Ullited 175. Atta and a1 Omari boarded a 6:00a.m. flight from Portland to Boston's Logan International Airport.1

When he checked in for his flight to Boston, Atta was selected by a computerized prescreening system known as CAPPS created to identify passengers who should be subject to special security measures. Under security directives in place at the time, the only consequence of Atta's selection by CAPPS was that his checked bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that he had boarded the aircraft. This did not hinder 2 Atta's plans. ·

Atta and Omari arrived in Boston at 6:45. Seven minutes later, Atta apparently took a call from Marwan al Shehhi, a longtime colleague who was at another terminal at Logan airport. They talked for three minutes.3 It would be their final conversation.

Between 6:45 and 7:40, Atta, Omari, Satam al Suqami, Wail al Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri checked in for and boarded . Flight II, bound for . The flight was scheduled to depart at 7:45.4

In another Logan terminal, Shehhi, joined by Fayez Baniharnmad, Mohand al Shehri, Ahmed al Ghamdi, and Hamza ai Ghamdi checked in for United Airlines Flight 175, also bound for Los Angeles. A couple of Shehhi 's collea.b'lles were obviously unused to travel; the United ticket agent remembered that they had trouble understanding the standard security questions and she had to go over them slowly until they gave the routine, reassuring answers.5 Their flight was scheduled to depart at 8:00.

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There was only one checkpoint, through which passengers, including Atta and his colJeagues, could have gained access to the American 11 gate. Globe Security operated it under a contract with American Airlines. In a different tenninal, United 175 passengers had to go through one checkpoint to reach their gate. This checkpoint was controlled by United Airlines, which had contracted with Huntleigh USA to perform the screening. 6

In passing through these checkpoints, each of the hijackers would have been screened by a walk-through metal detector calibrated to detect items with at least the metal content of a .22-caliber handgun. Anyone who might have set off the walk-through metal detector would have been screened with a hand wand metal detector-a procedure reqmring th.e screener to identify the item or items that caused the alarm. In addition, an X -ray machine would have screened the hijackers' carry-on belongings. The screening was in place to identify and confiscate weapons· and other items prohibited from being carried onto a commercial flight. .7

Neither the supen'isors on duty at the checkpoints nor any of the screeners reported obsenwg anything suspicious that morning. 8

While Atta had been selected by CAPPS in Portland, three members of his hijacking team, Suqami, Wail al Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri were selected in Boston. But their selection only affected the handling of th.eir checked bags. It would have no effect on the way they were screened at the checkpoint.All five men cleared the checkpnint and made their way to th.e gate for American 11. Atta, Omari, and Suqami took their seats in business class, rows 8 and 10 (seats 8D, 8G and lOB respectively). The Shehri brothers had adjacent seats in row 2 (Wail in 2A, Waleed in 2B), in the First Class cabin. They boarded American 11 between 7:31 and 7:40. The aircraft pushed back from the gate at 7:40, right after the last of the men boarded the plane. 9

Shehhi and his team, none of whom had been selected by CAPPS, boarded United 175 between 7:23 and 7:28 (Banihammad in 2A, al Shehri in 2B, al Shehbi in 6C, Hamza al Ghamdi in 9C and Ahmed al Ghamdi in 9D). Their aircraft pushed back from the gate just before 8:00. 10

\\"ashington-Dulles: American 77. Hundreds of miles southwest ofBoston, at Dulles Airport in the Virginia suburbs ofWashington, D.C., five more men were checking in for their early morning flight. At 7:15, a pair of them, Khalid al Mihdhar and Majed Moqed, checked in at the American Airlines ticket counter for Flight 77, bound for Los Angeles. Within the next twenty minutes, they would be followed by Rani Hanjour and two brothers, Nawaf al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi. 11

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Hani Hanjour, Khalid al Mihdhar and Majed Moqed met the CAPPS criteria. The I-Iazmi brothers were also made selectees by the airline's customer service representative who checked them in, perhaps because they were unable to answer standard security questions or did not present proper identification. It is not known why.. The only consequence of their selection by CAPPS was that their checked bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that they had hoarded the aircraft. 12

All five of the hijackers passed through the Main Terminal's West security screening checkpoint for which United Airlines was the responsible air carrier and had contracted out the work to Argenbright security.13 The checkpoint featured closed circuit television that recorded all passengers, including the hijackers, as they were screened. At 7:18, Mihdhar and Moqed entered the security checkpoint.

Mihdhar and Moqed placed their carry-on bags on the x-ray machine belt and proceeded through the first metal detector. Both set off the alann. They were directed to a second metal detector. Mihdhar did not alarm the second metal detector and was permitted through the checkpoint. Moqed set it off. A screener wanded him. He passed this inspection. 14

About twenty minutes later, at 7:35, another passenger for Flight 77, , placed two carry-en bags on the x-ray belt in the Main Terminal West Checkpoint, and proceeded, without alarm, through the metal detector. A short time later, Nawaf and Salem al Hazmi entered the same checkpoint. Salem al Hazmi successfully cleared the metal detector and was permitted through the checkpoint. Nawaf al Hazmi set off the alarms for both the first and second metal detectors and was then hand-wanded before being passed. In addition, his shoulder-strap carry-on bag was swiped by an explosive trace detector and then passed. The video footage indicates that Nawaf al Hazmi was carrying an unidentified item in his back pocket that was clipped to the rim of the pocket. 15

The FAA's local civil aviation security office later investigated these security screening operations. The screeners recalled nothing out ofthe ordinary. They could not recall that any of the passengers they screened were CAPPS selectees. We asked a screening expert to review the videotape of the hand-wanding. The expert found the screener's work to have been "marginal at best." The screener should have "resolved" what set off the alarm, and in the case ofboth Moqed and Hazmi, it was clear that he did not. 16

At 7:50, Majed Moqed and Khalid al Mihdhar boarded the flight and were seated in 12A and 12B in Coach. Hani Hanjour, assigned to seat lB (First Class), soon followed. The Hazmi brothers, sitting in 5E and 5F, joined Hanjour in the First Class cabin a few minutes after him. 17

Newark: United 93. Between 7:03 and 7:39, , Saeed al Gharndi, Ahmed al Nami, and Ahmad al Haznawi checked in at the United Airlines ticket counter for Flight 93, going to Los Angeles. Two checked bags; two did not. Jarrah was the last to check in.

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Hazna\\'i was selected by CAPPS. His checked bag was screened for explosives and then loaded on the plane. 18

The four men passed through the security checkpoint, ovmed by United Airlines and operated under contract by Argenbright Security. As was the case with the Boston flights, the checkpoint did not feature closed circuit television surveillance so there is no documentary e\Yjdence to determine what time the hijackers passed through the checkpoint or what alarms may have been indicated or security procedures were administered. The FAA interviewed the SG"Teeners later; none recalled anything unusual or suspicious. 19

The four men boarded the plane between 7:39 and 7:48. All four had seats in the First Class cabin. Their plane did not-have a business class section. Jarrah was in seat lB, closest to the cockpit, a1 Nami was 3C, al Ghamdi in 3D and al Haznawi in 6B. 20

The nineteen men were aboard four transcontinental flights. 21 They were planning to hijack these planes and turn them into large guided missiles, loaded with up to 11,400 gallons ofjet fuel. By 8:00a.m. on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, they had defeated all of the security layers that America's civil aviation security system then had in place to prevent a hijacking.

The Hijacking ofAmerican I I lunerican Airlines Flight 11 provided daily, non-stop service from Boston to Los Angeles. The aircraft used for the flight on September 11, 2001 was a Boeing 767. Captain and First Officer Thomas McGuinness piloted the plane. It carried its full capacity of nine Flight Attendants. Eighty-one passengers boarded the flight with them (including the :five terrorists). 22

The plane took off at 7:59. Just before 8:14, it had climbed to 26,000 feet, and had not quite reached its initial assigned cruising altitude of29,000 feet. All communications and flight profile data were normal. About this time the "Fasten Seatbelt" sign would usually be turned off and the flight attendants would have bee,run preparing for cabin service. 23

At that same time, American 11 had its last routine communication with the ground when it acknowledged navigational instructions from the FAA's Air Traffic Control (ATC) center in Boston. Sixteen seconds after that transmission, Air Traffic Control instructed the aircraft's pilots to climb to 35,000 feet. That message and all subsequentattempts by ATC to contact the flight were never acknowledged. From this fact and other eviden.ce, we believe the hijacking began at 8:14 or shortly thereafter. 24

Reports from two flight attendants in the Coach cabin, Betty and Madeline "'Amy'' Sweeney, tell us most of what we know about how the hijacking happened. Initially some of the hijackers-most likely Wail al Shehri and Waleed al Shehri, who were seated in row 2 in First Class-stabbed the two unanned flight attendants who would have been

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preparing for cabin service. Neither stabbing was fatal, though one of them was wounded very seriously?5

At the time of the hijacking, American Airllnes flight attendants all carried cockpit keys on their person. Under FAA rules cockpit doors were to remain closed and locked during flight. We do not know exactly how the hijackers gained access to the cockpit. Ong speculated at one point that they had "jammed their way" in. The terrorists might have stabbed the flight attendants to get their cockpit key, to force one of them to open the cockpit door, or to lure the Captain or First Officer out of the cockpit. Or the flight attendants may just have been in their way. 26

At the same time, or shortly thereafter, Atta--the only terrorist on board trained to fly a jet-would have moved to the cockpit from his Business Class seat, possibly accompanied by Omari. As this was happening, passenger , who was in seat 9B, in the row just behind Atta and al Omari, had his throat slashed by one of the hijackers (probably Satam a1 Suqami, who was in the row just behind Lewin).27 As reported in press accounts, Lewin, 31, had served four years as an officer in the Israeli military. He may have made an attempt to stop the hijackers, not realizing that one of them was sitting behind him.

We do not k11ow what happened at the front of the aircraft except that the hijackers quickly gained control of the aircraft and sprayed pepper spray or mace, or something like it, in the First Class cabin, in order to force the passengers and Flight Attendants to vacate the front part of the plane. They claimed they had a bomb. 28

About five minutes after the hijacking began, contacted the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina via an AT&T air phone to report an emergency aboard the flight. This was to be the first of several occasions on 9/11 when Flight Attendants on the hijacked aircraft had to 1mprovise and go beyond their emergency training, which emphasized that they were to communicate their reports to the cod.']Jit crew in the event of a hijacking. The emergency call lasted approximately 25 minutes, as Ong calmly, professionally relayed information about events taking place aboard the airplane to authorities on the ground. 29

At 8: I 9 Ong reported that "The cockpit is not answering, somebody's stabbed in business class ... and 1 think there's mace ... that we can't breathe .. .I don't know, I think we're getting hijacked.'' She then reported on the stabbings of the two flight attendants.30

At 8:21 the transponder on Flight 11 was shut oft: while the aircraft was at 29,000 feet. One ofthe American employees receiving Ong's call in North Carolina, Nydia Gonzalez, alerted the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) in Ft. Worth, , reaching Craig Marquis, the manager on duty,. Marquis soon realized this was an emergency and instructed the airline's dispatcher responsible for the flight to contact the cocl1Jit. At 8:23 am., the dispatcher tried unsuccessfully to contact the aircraft. Six minutes later the air traffic control specialist in American's SOC contacted the FAA's \..~,. eooa:.i.i. ~ '. t:tL SlJBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIE\V 5 Chapter One, Version 070204 - PPR I SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW

Boston air traffic control center about the flight. The center was already aware of the problem. 31

Boston Center knew of a problem on the flight in part because at 8:25 the hijackers attempted to communicate with the passengers. The microphone was keyed, and immediately one of the hijackers stated: "Nobody move! Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet." Air traffic controllers heard the transmission. Betty Ong did not. The hijackers probably did not know how to operate the cockpit radio communication system correctly, so they inadvertently broadcast their message over the air traffic control channel instead of the cabin public address channel. Also at 8:25, flight attendant Madeline "Amy" Sweeney got through to the American Flight Services Office in Boston but the connection was cut off after she reported someone was hurt aboard the flight. Seven minutes later Sweeney was reconnected to the office and began relaj.ring updates to the manager Michael Woodward. 32

At 8:26 Ong reported that the plane was "flying erratically." A minute later Flight 11 turned south. Americm also began getting identifications of the hijackers, as Ong and then Sweeney passed on some of the seat numbers of passengers who had gained unauthorized access to the cockpit. 33

Sweeney calmly reported on her line that the plane had been hijacked; a man :in first class had his throat slashed, two flight attendants had been stabbed-one was seriously hurt and was on oxygen while the other's wounds were not as serious and she seemed to be okay, a doctor had been paged, the flight attendants were unable to contact the cockpit, and there was a bomb in the cock-pit. Sweeney told Woodward that she and Ong were trying to relay as much information as they could to people on the ground.34

At 8:3 8 Ong told Gonzalez the plane was flying erratically again. Around this time Sweeney told Woodward that the hijackers were Middle Easterners, naming three of their seat numbers. One spoke very little English and one spoke excellent English. The hijackers had gained entry to the cockpit. She did not know how. The aircraft was in a rapid descent. 35

At 8:41 Sweeney told Woodward that passengers in coach were under the impression that there was a routine medical emergency in First Class. Flight attendant-; were busy at duties such as getting medical supplies while Ong and Sv.·eeney were reporting the 36 events. .

A18:41, in the American Airlines SOC in Ft. Worth, Marquis confirmed that others understood this was a hijacking. A colleague told hin1 that the air traffic controllers "think he's (American 11) headed toward Kennedy [airport in New Y ark City] ... they're moving everybody out of the way ... They seem to have him on a primary radar. They seem to think that he is descending."37

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At 8:44. Gonzalez reported losing phone contact with Ong. About this same time Sweeney reported to Woodward, "Something is vvrong. We are in a rapid descent ...we are all over the place." Woodward asked Sweeney to look out the window to see if she could determine where they were. Sweeney: ''We are flying low. We are flying very, very low. We are flying way too low." Seconds later she said "Oh my God we are way too low." The phone call ended. 38

At 8:46:40, American Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. 39 All 92 individuals on board and hundreds more in the tower were killed instantly.

The Hijacking ofUnited 175

United Airlines Flight 175 was scheduled to depart daily for Los Angeles at 8:00a.m. The aircraft was a Boeing 767. Captain Victor Saracini and First Officer Michael Horrocks piloted the plane. Seven flight attendants were onboard. Fifty-six passengers boarded the flight. Fayez Banihammad and Mohand al Shehri sat together in First Class. Marwan al Shehhi was in Business Class, along with Hamza and Ahmed al Ghamdi. 40

United 175 pushed back from its gate at 7:58, and departed Logan Airport at 8:14. By 8:33 a.m. United Airlines Flight 175 had reached its assigned cruising altitude of 31, 000. The flight attendants would have begun their cabin service. 41

The flight had taken offjust as American 11 was being hijacked, and at 8:42 the United 17 5 flight crew completed their report on a "suspicious transmission" from another plane (which turned out to have been Flight 11) they had overheard just after take-off. This represented United 175's last routine communication with the ground. 42

The hijackers attacked sometime between 8:42 and 8:46. They used knives (as reported by two passengers and a flight attendant), mace (reported by one passenger) and the threat of a bomb (reported by the same passenger). They stabbed members of the flight crew (as reported by a flight attendant and one passenger). Both pilots had been killed (reported by one flight attendant). All of the eyewitness accounts carne from calls made from the rear of the plane, even though both of the passengers who made calls were originally seated much further forward in the cabin, thus indicating that passengers and perhaps crew had been moved to the back of the aircraft. Given the similarities to Flight 11 in hijacker seating and in the eyewitness reports of tactics and weapons, as well as the close contact between presumed team leaders Atta and Shehhi, we presume the tactics were similar on both flights. 43

The first operational evidence that something abnonnal was occurring on llnited 175 came at 8:47, when the aircraft changed beacon codes twice within a one-minute period. At 8:51 the flight deviated from its assigned altitude and a minute later New Y ark air traffic controllers began repeatedly and unsuccessfully trying to contact the flight. 44

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At 8:52, in Easton, Connecticut, a man named Lee Hanson received a phone call from his son Peter, a passenger on United 175. As he heard what his son had to say, he began quickly taking notes. According to the notes, his son stated: "I think they've taken over the cockpit ... An attendant has been stabbed ... and someone else up front may have been killed. The plane is making strange moves. Call United Airlines ... Tell them it's Flight 175, Boston to LA.'' Lee Hanson then called the Easton Police Department and relayed what he had heard. 45

Also at 8:52, a male flight attendant (possibly Robert Fangman) called a United office in , reaching Marc Policastro. The flight attendant reported that the flight had been hijacked. Both pilots had been killed. A flight attendant had been stabbed, and the hijackers were probably flying the plane. The call lasted approximately two minutes, after which Policastro and a colleague tried unsuccessfully to contact the flight. 46

One minute later the flight took a heading toward New York City and resumed its descent.47

At 8:59 Flight 175 passenger Brian David Sweeney tried to call his wife, Julie. He left a message on their home answering machine that the plane had been hijacked. He then called his mother, Louise Sweeney, told her the flight had been hijacked, and added that the passengers were thinking about storming the cockpit to take control of the plane away from the hijackers .. 48

At 9:00, Lee Hanson received a second call from his son Peter, which he reconstructed from his notes:

It's getting bad, Dad ...A stewardess was stabbed ... They seem to have knives and mace ...They said they have a bomb ... It's getting very bad on the plane ... Passengers are throwing up and getting sick ... The plane is making jerky movements .. .I don't think the pilot is flying the plane ... I think we are going down .. .I think they intend to go to Chicago or someplace and fly into a building ... Don't worry, Dad .. .Ifit happens, it'll be very fast.. .My God, my God. 49

The call ended abruptly. Lee Hanson had heard a woman scream just before it cut off. He turned on his TV. From her horne, Louise Sweeney was turning on her TV too. Both then saw the second aircraft hit the World Trade Center. 5°

At 9:03:11, United Airlines Flight 175 struck the South Tower of the V\1orld Trade Center. 51 All 65 individuals on board were killed instantly, along with an unknown number of people in the tower.

The fl(jacking ofA.merican 77

American Airlines Flight 77 was scheduled to depart from Washington Dulles for Los Angeles at 8:10. The aircraft was a Boeing 757. The pilot was Captain Charles F.

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Burlingame; the First Officer David Charlesbois. There were four flight attendants. On September 11, the flight carri~d 58 passengers. 52

American 77 pushed back from its gate at 8:09 and took off at 8:20. At 8:46 the flight reached its assigned cruising altitude of 35,000 feet. Cabin service would have bef:,run. At R:51, American 77 transmitted its last routine radio communication. The hijacking began between 8:51 and 8:54. As on American 1 1 and United 175, the hijackers used knives (reported by one passenger), and had moved all of the passengers (and possibly crew) to the rear of the aircraft (reported by one flight attendant and one passenger). Unlike on the earlier fl.ights, the Flight 77 hijackers were reported by a passenger to have possessed box cutters. Finally, a pa.c;senger reported that an announcement had been made by the "pilot" that the plane had been hljacked. Neither of the first hand accounts to come from American 77, from flight attenqant Renee May and from passenger Barbara Olson, mentioned any stabbings or the threat or use of either a bomb or mace, though both of these witnesses began the flight in the First Class cabin. 53

At 8:54 the aircraft deviated from its assigned course, turning south. A minute later the transponder was turned off and even primary radar contact with the aircraft was lost. The lnd.ianapolis Air Traffic Control Center tried repeatedly and failed to contact the aircraft. American Airlines dispatchers also tried, without success. 54

At 9:00, American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerald iupey learned that e-ommunications had been lost with American 77. Thls was now the second American aircraft in trouble. He ordered all American Airlines flights that had not taken off in the northeast to remain on the ground. Between 9:05 and 9: 10 the American Airlines SOC learned that United had lost communication vvith one of its flights too. Arpey extended the ground stop nationwide. At about this time officials in the American Airlines SOC, having just realized that American 77 had been hijacked a few minutes earlier, concluded that the second aircraft to hit the World Trade Center might have been Flight 77. 55

At 9:12 American 77 flight attendant Renee May called her mother, Nancy May, in Las Vegas. She said her flight was being hljacked by six individuals who had moved them to the rear of the plane. She asked her mother to call American Airlines and make sure that they knew about the hljacking, giving her phone numbers to calL Nancy May and her husband promptly contacted American and relayed the information. 56

At some point between 9:16 and 9:26, American 77 passenger Barbara Olson calJed her husband, Ted Olson, the Solicitor General of the United States. He spoke to his wife for approximately one minute before the call wa.." cut off. She reported that the flight had been hijacked, and the hijackers had knives and box cutters. She further indicated that the hljackers were not aware of her phone call, and that they had put all the passengers in the back of the plane. The call was then cut off Solicitor General Olson tried unsuccessfully to reach Attorney General John Ashcroft. 57

Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:31 a.m., Barbara Olson reached her husband aguin. She reported that the pilot had announced that the flight had been hijacked, and she asked her husband

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what she should tell the captain to do. Ted Olson asked for her location and she replied that the aircraft was then flying over houses. Another passenger told her they were traveling northeast. The Solicitor General then infonned his wife of the two previous hijackings and cra..l"lhes. She did not display signs of panic and did not indicate any awareness of an impending crash. At that point, the second call wa..

At 9:34 controllers at the Dul1es Terminal Radar Approach Control "observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed." This was later determined to have been Flight 77. At 9:29 the autopilot on American 77 was disengaged, with the aircraft at 7,000 feet and approximately 38 miles west of the Pentagon. 59

At 9:34, Reagan National advised the Secret Service of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the White HoUBe. At 9:34 American 77 was 5 miles West/Southwest of the Pentagon and began a 330-degree right turn, essentially a circle, lining up the aircraft going towards the Pentagon and downtown Washington. At the end of the turn, the aircraft was descending through 2,200 feet about five miles southwest of the Pentagon. The hijacker pilot then advanced the throttles to maximum power and dove towards the 60 Pentagon. .

At 9:37:46, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon Building in Arlington, Virginia. At the moment of impact the aircraft was traveling at approximately 530 miles per hour.61 All64 individuals on board were killed instantly, as were many civilian and military personnel in the Pentagon.

The Battle for United 93

At 8:42, United Airlines Flight 93 took off from Newark (New Jersey) Liberty International i\.irport bound for San Francisco. The aircraft was piloted by Jason Dahl and Leroy Homer. There were five flight attendants. Thirty seven passengers boarded the plane including the hijackers. Scheduled to depart the gate at 8:00a.m., the Boeing 757's take-off was delayed because of the airport's typically heavy morning traffic. 62

The hijackers had planned to take flights scheduled to depart at 7:45 (American 11 ), 8:00 'United 175 and United 93), and 8:10 (American 77). Three of the flights had actually taken off within 10 to 15 minutes of their scheduled departure times. American 11 had taken off at 7:59; United 175 at 8:14; American 77 at 8:20. United 93 would ordinarily have taken off about 15 minutes after pulling away from the gate. Vv'hen it took off at 8:42 the flight was running over 25 minutes late.63

No one at the FAA or the airlines that day had ever dealt with multiple, com1ected hijackings. It had never happened before in the United States. It had not happened anywhere in the world in more than thirty years. As news of the hijacking of American· 11 filtered through the FAA and American Airlines systems after 8:20, it does not seem to have occurred to the system's leadership that they needed to alert other aircraft in the air that they too might be hijacked. 64 65

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United 175 was hijacked between 8:42 and 8:46, and the system began to realize it after 8:51. American 77 was hijacked between 8:51 and 8:54. By 9:00, FA.A. and airline officials began to comprehend that attackers were going after multiple aircraft. American Airlines's nationwide ground stop between 9:05 and 9:10 was followed by a lJnited Airlines groundstop issued later. F.A.A control1ers at the alert Boston Center, which had tracked the first two hijackings, requested at 9:07a.m. that Herndon Command Center "get messages to airborne aircraft to increase security for the cockpit." There is no evidence that Herndon took such action. Boston Center immediately began speculating about other aircraft that might be in danger, leading them to worry about a transcontinental-bound aircraft- Delta 1989- that in fact was not hijacked. At 9:19, FAi\'s New England regional office called Herndon and asked that Cleveland Center advise Delta 1989 to use extra cockpit security, 66

l\.B United 93 left Newark at 8:42, the flight's two pilots and five flight attendants were unaware of the hijacking of American 11. Around 9:00, the FAA.., American and United Airlines were facing the staggering realization of apparent multiple hijackings. At 9:03 they would see another aircraft strike the World Trade Center. Crisis managers at FAA and the airlines did not yet act to warn other aircraft. 67

Several FAA officials told us it was the air carriers' responsibility to notifY their planes of securit" problems. One senior FAA Air Traffic Control manager said that it was 68 simplyn~ the FA/i.'s place to order the airlines what to tell thei;pilots. We believe c:::: ::::··• such statements do not reflect an adequate appreciation of the FAA's responsibility for the safety and security of civil aviation.

United Airlines had responsibility too. United (and for that matter American) was facing an escalating number of conflicting and in most cases what turned out to be erroneous reports about other flights, as well as a continuing lack of vital information from the FAA about communications it had received from both American 11 and United 175. By about 9:03 the FAA's Boston Center realized that a message overheard from the hijacker pilot of American 11 included the phrase, "We have planes ...." 69

United's first decisive action to notify its airborne aircraft to take defensive action came a.t 9:19, when a United flight dispatcher, Ed Ballinger, took the initiative to begin transmitting warnings to his 16 transcontinental flights: "Beware any cockpit intrusion ... Two aic [aircraft] hit World Trade Center." One ofthe flight'> that received the warning was United 93. Because Ballinger was still responsible for his other flights (unlike the American system which "isolated" hijacked flights), his warning message was not transmitted to Flight 93 until 9:23.70

By all accounts, the first 47 minutes of Flight 93's cross-country trip proceeded routinely. Radio communications from the plane were normal. Heading, speed and altitude ran according to plan. At 9:24, BaUinger's warning to United 93 was received in the cockpit. Within two minutes, at 9:26, the pilot, Jason Dahl, re1'>1JOnded with a note of puzzlement: ''Ed, confirm latest mssg plz .. .Jason." Dahl did not have much time to reflect upon the warning, or what he could do about it. 71

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The hijackers attacked at 9:28. While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly and precipitously dropped 700 feet. Eleven seconds into the descent the FAA's air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the aircraft. During the first broadcast the pilot or first officer could be heard declaring "mayday" amid the som1ds of a physical struggle taking place in the cockpit. The second radio transmission, thirty five seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing. The pilot or first officer could be heard shouting: "Hey get out of here ... get out of here ... get out ofhere." 72

On the morning of 9/11, there were only 3 7 passengers on United 93 - 33 in addition to the four hijackers. This was below the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001.73 But there is no evidence that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels or purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation.

The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11 operated in five-man teams. They initiated their cockpit takeover operations within thirty minutes of takeoff, most likely after the seatbelt sign had been turned off and the flight attendants were beginning cabin service. On Flight 93, however, there were only four hijackers. The operative likely destined to round out the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry by a sus~icious immigration inspector at Orlando airport, in Florida, more than a month earlier. 4

The hijackers waited an unusually long time to begin their takeover of the flight. We do not know why. Of the four pilots, Jarrah had been the most reluctant, the one most tied to 75 family and a girlfriend. That morning, he had been the last to get on the plane.

Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit 'jump seat" from the outset of the flight. FAA rules allow use of this seat by documented and approved individuals, usually air carrier personnel such as other pilots or operators. We have reviewed the question and found no evidence that one of the hijackers, or anyone else, used the cockpit jump seat on this flight. All of the hijackers had assigned seats in Pirst Class. They seem to have used them. We believe it is more likely that Jarra~ the crucial pilot-trained mt.mber of their team, remained seated and inconspicuous until after seizure of the cockpit, and then would not have been visible to the passengers. 76 ln accordance with FAA regulations, United 93's cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the last 31 minutes of som1ds from the cockpit via microphones in the headsets ofboth the pilot and first officer, and in the overhead panel of the flight deck. United 93's CVR is the only one from the hijacked airplanes that survived the impact and ens';iing fire. <&\-:,~.oM n~ We have analyzed its contents with care, obtaining the help of om ovm Arabic-language interpreter to verify the work done by government translators. 77

At 9:32 a hijacker, probably Jarrah, made, or attempted to make, the following announcement to the passengers ofFligbt 93: "Ladies and Gentlemen: Here the captain,

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please sit down keep remaining seating. We have a bomb on board. So, sit." The Flight Data Recorder (also recovered) indicates that Jarrah then instruc.1ed the plane's autopilot to turn around and head east. 78

This segment of the cockpit recording also indicates that a female, most likely a flight attendant, was being held captive in the cockpit by the hijackers. We do not know why. The cockpit voice recorder indicates a struggle with her, with Janah or one of the other hijackers possibly killing or otherwise silencing her?1

Back in the cabin, the passengers and remaining flight crew began a series of calls from persona] cell phones and GTE airfones (one installed in each row of seats on both sides of the aisle) to report what was happening aboard the plane. These phone calls among family, friends and colleagues, would take place intem1ittently up until the end of the flight. TI1e calls would provide people on the ground with first-hand accounts of what was transpiring on the plane. Moreover, the calls provided pa

At 9:39am., a few minutes after the phone calls began, the F ..c\A's Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center overheard the following announcement, probably from .T arrah: "i\.h, this is the captain. I would like to all remain seated. There is a bomb aboard and we are going to go back to the airport and to have our demands ... so please remain quiet',s1 ~'hi]e apparently it was not heard by the passengers, this announcement, like those on Flight 11 and Flight 77 was a tactic to deceive the passengers about their periL Jarrah, like Atta earher, may have inadvertently broadcast the message because he did not know how to operate the radio and the intercom. None of them had ever flown an actual airliner before.

At least three callers from the flight reported that the hijackers knew that passengers were making calls but did not seem to care. It is quite possible .Tarrah knew that the attacks on the WTC had succeeded. He could have learned of this by messages being sent by United Airlines to the cockpits of its transcontinental flights, including Flight 93 warning of cockpit intrusion and telling of the attacks in New York. But, even ifJarrah had not read these messages, he would certainly have understood that given Flight 93's tardy departure from Newark, the attacks on the World Trade Center would already have unfolded. If Jarrah did knoV~· that the passengers were making calls, it might not have occurred to him that that the passengers were certain to learn of the New Y ark attacks, thereby defeating the hijackers' attempts at deception. 82

At least 10 passengers and two crew members shared vital infonnation with fam:ily, mends, colleagues or others on the ground. Our understanding of what tbey said is based on recordings of several of the calls, as well as notes taken and accounts given by the recipients. All understood the plane had been hijacked. They said the hijackers wielded ktrives. They had said they had a bomb. They were wearing red bandanas. They forced the passengers to the hack of the aircraft. 83

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Callers reported that a passenger had been stabbed and that two people were lying on the floor of the cabin, injured or dead, possibly the Captain and First Officer. One caller reported that a flight attendant had been killed. 84

One of the callers from United 93 also reported that he thought the hijackers might possess a !,TUn. But none of the other reports from callers who noted the hijacker's weaponry reported the presence of a firearm. According to the recipient of a separate call from the aircraft, she specifically asked her caller whether the hijackers had guns. The passenger replied that he did not see one. No firearms or identifiable remains of firearms were found in evidence at the crash site of the aircraft. There is no indication from the cockpit voice recorder of a gun being fired or mentioned at any time. If the hijackers had possessed a gun, we believe that they would have used it during the la.. <:>t minutes of flight a() the passengers fought back. ss

Passengers on three flights reported the hijacker claim that they had a bomb. The FBI told us they found no trace of explosives at the crash sites ofUnited 93 or American 77. One of the passengers who called to report the bomb expressed his beljefthat it was not real. Lacking any evidence that the hijackers attempted to smuggle such illegal items past the security screening checkpoints, we believe that if there were any bombs, they probably were fakes. 86

.A..mong the passengers' phone calls, there were at least five contacts during which information was shared about the attacks that had occurred earlier in the morning at the World Trade Center. The passengers and surviving crew members prepared to revolt against the hijackers. The callers talked about duty, resolve, determination and team work. The passengers and crew, according to one call, voted on whether to rush the terrorists in an attempt to retake the plane. They decided, and acted. 87

The passengers rushed toward the cockpit. Two passengers terminated calls with loved ones in order to join the revolt. One of the callers ended her message as follows: "Everyone's running up to First Class. I've got to go. Bye." 88

The assault began at 9:57. The cockpit voice recorder captured the sounds, of the revolt muffled by the intervening cockpit door, moving toward the cockpit. Some family members who listened to the recording report that they can hear the voice of a loved one among the din. We cannot identify the source of individual voices. But the ac;sault was sustained.

At 9:58, Jarrah began to shout orders and maneuver the aircraft in an attempt to knock the pa<:>sengers off their feet. For the next two minutes he rolled the plane onto one side and then the other, jerking the yoke hard left then hard right 42 times. He then yanked the nose of the plane violently up and then down over 14 times, fo11owed by another series of twists. Experts tell us that no one would have been able to remain standing through these maneuvers. 89

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Befbre the counterattack of the passengers began at 9:57, the aircraft was traveling at 8,400 feet heading directly toward the Washington area at an air speed of 335 miles per hour. Jarrah was finnly in control. Only after the counterattack began did Jarrah initiate his defensive maneuvers. 90

During the violent turning and lurching of the aircraft, the recorder captured the sounds of dishes and glasses smashing. A loud noise began after 10:00.91 The aircraft's wild swings tossed anything and anyone not lashed down, but the sounds of struggle never abated.

Jarrah remained at the controls, but apparently judged that the passengers were going to succeed in overcoming him and his fellow hijackers. At I 0:00 one of the hijackers, in response to the counterattack, stated "When they all come, we finish it off." Shortly thereafter he must have believed he had only seconds left before th.e passengers prevailed. With the aircraft still descending and traveling at a high rate of speed, J arrah turned the control yoke hard to the right. The airplane began to roll onto its back before plowing into an empty field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania at 580 miles per hour, no more than 20 minutes flying time from Washington, D.C. 92

Jarrah's objective was to cras:b his jet airliner, with its thousands of gallons jet fuel, into the domed Capitol ofthe United States or into the Vlhite House.. More than any other targets, Jarrah's chief, Usama Bin Ladin, had hoped to strike one ofthose symbols ofthe American republic. He was stopped by the alerted, unarmed passengers ofUnjted 93. 93

1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense

The FAA and NORAD

On 9/11 the defense ofU.S. air space depended on close interaction between two federal agencies: the FAA and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). The last hijacking that involved U.S. air traffic controllers, FAA management, and ..,., military coordination, had occurred in 1993. In order to understand how the two agencies ,,( '1. \ " r "\ >./ ~t c"" interacted eight years later, we -vvill review their missions, command-and-control .:,}~... .r ,. • ... I) .Jf. structures, and working relationship on the morning of 9/11. i.· ~ ~-~. _,., .\, ., . ,, . ., . . ""\"" ·,.) ...-\"" 1 FAA Mzsswn and Structure f>-:. -~~ • "·· .., - } ..~· .. t ~ " ' t f" II L ~ <;'.. .,,,. .,. As of September 11, 2001, the FA..<\ was mandated by law to regulate the safety and K<·~./ ;~~ ~ f" ;. security of civil aviation. From an air traffic controller's perspective, that meant i" ..,,'-J ..~ ·" 1 . V'' mamtauung. . - a sa1e.-: d'1stance between au. b orne aircraft. 94 '\vL ,:.-'• ;;;·""· lJ.' lie: A\. ~~ ·r:gv vJ Many controllers work at the FAA's@Air Route Traffic Control Centers. They are grouped under regjonal offices and coordinate closely with the national Air Traffic Control System Command Center, which oversees daily traffic flow within the entire

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airspace system. It is located in Hemdon, Virginia. Regional offices report to FAA headquarters in Washin&rton, DC. FAA headquarters is ultimately responsible for the management ofthe National Airspace Svstem. An Operations Center located at FAA headquarters receives notifications ofin~idents, including accidents and hijackings. 95

FAA Control Centers often receive information and make operational decisions independent of one another. On 9/11, the four hijacked airLTaft were monitored mainly by four of these FAA Air Route Traffic Control Centers, based in Boston, New York, Cleveland, and Indianapolis. Each Center thus had part of the knowledge of what was • .,:\c' going on across the system. But it is important to remember that what Boston Center )!' knew was not necessarily known by centers in New Y ark, Cleveland, or Indianapolis, or ._.,· for that matter by the Command Center in Hemdon or FAA Headquarters in Washington. 11° v"' ' (' v> ..)' ·. :Ii ' Controllers track airliners like the four aircraft hijacked on 9/11 primarily by watching ~c. ,•\.r1''""~) J;'' the data from a signal emitted by the aircraft's transponder equipment. The four aircra:ft,.::..-v-- ~! ., t hijacked on 9/ll,like all aircraft traveling above 10,000 feet, were required to emit a ("--· unique transponder signal while in flight. 96

On 9/11, the terrorists turned off the transponders on three of the four hijacked aircraft. With the transponder turned off, it is possible, although more difficult, to track an aircraft by its primary radar returns. A primary radar return occurs when the signal sent from a radar site bounces off an object in the sl)' and indicates the presence of that object. But primary radar returns do not include the transponder data, which show the aircraft's identity and altitude. Controllers at Centers rely on transponder signals and usually do not display primary radar returns on their scopes. But they can change the configuratiori of their radar scopes so they can see primary radar returns. In fact, the controllers did just that on 9/11 when the transponders were turned off in three of the four hijacked aircraft. Tower or terminal approach controllers handle a wider variety oflower-flying aircraft; they .ofte!r use primary radar returns as well as transponder signals. 97 •·"' 1f't"'1, .... {,-(',.l +.v On 9111, it was not unheard of for a commercial aircraft to deviate slightly from its course, or for an FAA controller to lose radio contact with a pilot for a brief period of time. A controller could also briefly lose a commc.,"fcial aircraft's transponder signal, although this happened much less frequently. However, the simultaneous loss of radio and transponder signal would be a rare and alarming occurrence, and would nonnally indicate a catastrophic system failure or an aircraft crash. In all of these instances, the job of a controller was to reach out to the aircraft, the parent company of the aircraft, and other planes in the vicinity in an attem t t reestablish communications and set the aircraft back on course. Prior to 9ill alann bells would not start Iingin~ until these efforts-···which could take five minutes or more\.were tried and failed. 8 eo~:s ~s+o cta.nft) tyt.(~ (.(') er- NORAD Mission and Structure

NORAD is a bi-national command established in 1958 between the United States and Canada. lts mission was, and is, to defend the aerospace ofNorth America and protect

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the continent. l11at mission does not distinguish between internal and external threats. Because NOR.AD was created to counter the Soviet threat, it came to define its job as defending against external attacks.99

The threat of Soviet bombers diminished significantly as the Cold War ended. The number ofNORAD alert sites was reduced from its Cold War high of26. Some within the Pentagon argued in the 1990s that the alert sites should be eliminated entirely. In an effort to preserve the mission, members of the air defense community touted the importance of air sovereignty against emerging "asymmetric threats.'' They identified the threats to U.S. air sovereignty as drug smuggling, "non-state and state-sponsored terrorists," and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technol0!,')'. 100

NOR.AJ) perceived the dominant airborne threat to be from cruise missiles, though other terrorist threats from the air were identified during the late 1990's and included the use of general aviation and commercial aviation aircraft as weapons. Exercises were conducted to counter the use of airplanes as weapons, but these exercises were not based on actual intelligence. In most instances, the primary concern among planners was the use of such aircraft to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

To the extent the shootdown of a commercial aircraft was contemplated prior to 9/11, it was understood that the National Command Authority- a phrase used to describe the President and Secretary of Defense- would have to issue the order. It was also assumed that the aircraft would originate from outside the United States, and thus there would be time to identify the target and scramble interceptors. The threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airliners within the United States-and using them as guided missiles-was not recognized by NORAD before 9/11. 101

Notwithstanding the identification of these emerging threats, and the worries of some NORAD commanders that NORAD was not postured adequately to protect the United States' air sovereignty, by 9/11 there were only seven alert sites le.ft in the United States, each with two fighter aircraft on alert. 102

In the United States, NORAD is divided into three sectors. On 9/11, all ofthe hijacked aircraft were in NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector (also known as NEADS). NEADS is based in Rome, New York. That morning it could call on two alert sites, each with one pair of ready fighters. These were the Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, and Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Virginia. 103 Other facilities, not on "alert," would need time to ann the fighters and organize crews.

NEADS reported to the Continental Region headquarters in Florida, which reported to NORAD headquarters, in Colorado Springs, Colorado. 104

Interagency Collaboration

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Most FAA centers had a civilian employee to coordinate with NOR.i\D, for situations like training exercises. The FAA and NORAD had developed protocols for working together in the event of a hijacking. As they existed on 9/1 1, the protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NOR.AD required multiple levels of notification and approval at the highest levels of government. 105

FAA guidance to controllers on hijack procedures assumed that the aircraft pilot would notii}: the controller of the hijack via radio communication or by "squawking" a transponder code of"7500"-the universal code for a hijack in pro!,'Tess. Controllers would notify their supervisors, who in turn would inform management all the way up to FAA headquarters in Washington. Headquarters had a ''hijack coordinator" who was the Director or his designate of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security. 106

If a hijack was confirmed, procedures called for the hijack coordinator on duty to contact the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (NMCC) and to ask for a military "escort aircraft" to follow the flight, report anything unusual, and aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency. The NMCC would then seek approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide military assistance. If approved, the orders would be transmitted down NORAD's chain of command, which would direct the sector to launch a fighter escort. 107

The N"MCC would keep the F.t\A hijack coordinator up-to-date and would help the E.t\ .. A centers coordinate directly with the military. NORAD, and its NEADS sec...1or, would receive tracking information for the hijacked aircraft from either joint use radar or the relevant FAA air traffic control facility. Every attempt would be made to have the hijacked aircraft squawk 7500 to help 1'-cTEA.DS track the aircraft. 108

The protocols did not contemplate an intercept. They assumed the fighter escort would be discreet, "vectored to a position five miles directly behind the hijacked aircraft," where it could perform its mission to monitor the flight path of the aircraft. 109

In sum, the protocols in place on 9/1 1 for the E.c\A and NORAD to respond to a hijacking presumed that:

(l) the hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not attempt to disappear;

{2) there would be time to address the problem through the appropriate FAA and NORAD chains of command; and

(3) the hijacking would take the traditional form, not a suicide hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile.

On the morning of9/l 1, the existing protocol was unsuited in every respect for what was about to happen. \7\lhat ensued \\'as the hurried attempt to create an improvised defense by officials who had never encountered or trained against the situation they faced.

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American Airlines Flight 11

FAA Awareness

Although the Boston Center air traffic controJler realized at an early stage that there was something wrong with flight American 1 1, he did not immediately recognize the plane's distress as a sign that it had been hijacked. At 8:14, when the flight failed to respond to his instruction to climb to 35,000 feet, the controller repeated the command seconds later, and then tried continuallv to raise the flight. He used the emergency frequency to try to reach the pilot. Though there was no response, he kept trying to contact the aircraft. no

At 8:21, American 11 turned off its transponder, immediately degrading the available information about the aircraft. The controller told his supervisor that he thought something was seriously wrong with the plane. At this po:in~ neither the controller nor his supervisor suspected a hijacking. The supervisor instructed the controller to follow standard operating procedures for handling a "no radio" aircraft. 11 1

The controller checked to see if American Airlines could establish communication lh>ith i\merican 11. He became even more concerned as its route changed, moving into another sector's airspace. Controllers immediately began to move aircraft out of its path, and searched from aircraft to aircraft in an effort to have another pilot contact American 11.112

At 8:24:38, the following transmission came from American 11:

American 11: We have some planes. Just stay quiet, and you'll be O.K. We are returning to the airport.

The controller only heard something unintelligible; he did not hear the specific words "[w]e have some planes." The next transmission came seconds later:

American 11: Nobody move. Eve1ything ~ovill be O.K. Ifyou try to make any moves, you 'II endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet. 113

Hearing that, the controller told us he then knew it was a hijacking. The controller alerted his supervisor, who assigned another controller to assist him, and redoubled efforts to ascertain the flight's altitude. Because the controller didn't understand the initial transmission, the Manager of Boston Center instructed the Center's Quality Assurance Specialist to "pull the tape" of the radio transmission, listen to it closely, and report back.114

Between 8:25 and 8:32, in accordance with the FAA protocol, Boston Center managers started notifying their chain of command that American 11 had been hijacked. At 8:28, Boston Center called the Cmmnand Center in Herndon, Vir&rinia to advise management that it believed American 11 had been hijacked and was heading toward New York

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Center's airspace. By this point in time, American 11 had taken a dramatic turn to the south. At 8:32, the Command Center passed word of a possible hijacking to the Operations Center at FAA headquarters. The duty officer replied that security personnel at headquarters had just begun discussing the hijack situation on a conference call with the New England Regional office. FAA headquarters did not follow the hijack protocol and did not contact the NMCC to request a fighter escort. 115

The Herndon Command Center immediately established a teleconference between Boston, New York, and Cleveland Centers so that Boston Center could help the others understand what was happerung. 116

At 8:34, the Boston Center controller received a third transmission from American 11:

American 11: Nobody move please. We are going back to the airport. Don 't try to make any stupid moves. 117

In the succeeding minutes, controllers were attempting to ascertain the altitude of the southbound Flight 11. 1 18

Military Not~fication and Response

Boston Center did not follow the routine protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescnbed chain of command. In addition to making notifications within the FAA, Boston Center took the initiative, at 8:34, to contact the military through the FAA's Cape Cod facility. The Center also tried to obtain assistance from a former alert site in Atlantic City, unaware it had been phased out. At 8:3 7:52, Boston Center reached NEADS. This was the first notification received by the military-at any level-that American 11 had been hijacked:119

FAA: Hi. Boston Center TMU, we have a problem here. We have a hUacked aircraft headed towards New York, and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble someF-16s or something up there, help us out.

NEADS: Is this real-world or exercise?

F4• •-1:" 1vo,1.! t h.zs zs. not an exerczse,. not a test. 120

NEADS promptly ordered to battle stations the two F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base, aboutl53 miles away from New York City. The air defense of .America began with this calL 121

At NEADS, the reported hijacking was relayed immediately to Battle Commander Colonel Robert Marr. After orde:ting the Otis fighters to battle stations, Colonel Marr phoned Major General Larry Arnold, commanding General of the First Air Force and the Continental Region. Marr sought authorization to scramble the Otis fighters. General

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Arnold instructed Marr "to go ahead and scramble the airplanes, and we'd get permission ~ ~~ later." General Arnold then called NORA.D headquarters to report. -

F-15 fighters were ordered scrambled at 8:46 from Otis Air Force Base. But NEADS did not know where to send the alert fighter aircraft; its Senior Weapons Director, the officer in charge of directing the fighters stated: "1 don't know where I'm scrambling these guys to. I need a direction, a destination." Because the hijackers had turned off the plane's transponder, NEADS personnel spent the next minutes searching their radar scopes for the elusive primary radar return. American 11 impacted the World Trade Center's North Tower at 8:46:40. Shortly after 8:50, while NEADS personnel were still trying to locate American 11, word reached them that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. 123

Radar data show the Otis fighters were airborne at 8:53. Lacking a target, they were vectored toward military controlled airspace off the Long Island coast. To avoid New Yark area air traffic and uncertain about what to do, the fighters were brought down to military air space to ''bold as needed." From 9:09 to 9:13, the Otis fighters were in this holding pattern. 124

In summary, NEWS received notice of the hijacking nine minutes before it impacted the north tower. That nine minutes' notice was the most the military would receive that morning of any of the four hijackings. 125

United Airlines Flight 175

FAA Awareness

One of the last transmissions from United Airlines Flight 175 is, in retrospect, chilling. By 8:40, controllers at the FAA's New York Center were seeking information on American 11. At approximately 8:42a.m., shortly after entering New York Center's airspace, the pilot of United 175 broke in with the following transmission:

UAL liS: New York U4L 175 heavy.

FAA: UAL 175 go ahead.

UALI 75: Yeah. We figured we'd wait to go to your center. Ah, we heard a suspicious r.ransmission on our departure out ofBoston, ah, with someone, ah, it sounded lik!' someone keyed the mikes and said ah everyone ah stay in your seats.

FAA: Oh, okay. 1 'll pass that a long over here. 126

Minutes later United 175 turned southwest with c1earance from air traffic control. The New York controller spoke to several other flights about trying to locate American Airlines Flight 11, and greeted other flights as they were passed to him. At 8:46:37, nearly simultaneously with the impact of American 11 into the World Trade Center, United Flight 175's assigned transponder code changed from 1470 to .3020, and then

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again to 3321. These changes were not noticed for several minutes, however, because at this time the same New York Center controller was assigned to both American 11 and United 175. The controller knew American 11 was hijacked, was focused on transferring other flights on his scope to other controllers, and then started searching for the primary radar track of American 11 after it disappeared at 8:46. 127

At 8:48, while the controller was still trying to locate American 11, aNew York Center manager provided the following report on a Command Center teleconference about American 11, including information that had been relayed by the airline:

Manager, New York Center: Okay. This is New York Center. We're watching the airplane. I also had conversation with American Airlines, and they've told us that they believe that one oftheir stewardesses was stabbed and that there are people in the cockpit that have control ofthe aircraft, and that's all the information they have right now. 128

The New York Center controller and manager were unaware that American 11 had already crashed.

At 8:51, the controller noticed the change in the transponder reading from United 175. The controller asked United 175 to go back to the proper code. There was no response. Begilming at 8:52, the controller made repeated attempts to reach the crew of United 175. Still no response. The controller checked that his radio equipment was working and kept trying to reach United 175. He contacted another controller at 8:53, and worried that "we may have a hijack" and that he could not find the aircraft. 129

..A..nother commercial aircraft in the vicinity then radioed in with ~·reports over the radio of a commuter plane hitting the World Trade Center." The controller spent the next several minutes banding off the other flights on his scope to other controllers and moving aircraft out of the way of the unidentified aircraft (believed to be United 17 5) as it moved southwest and then turned northeast toward New York City. 130

At approximately 8:55, the controller-in-charge notified a New York Center manager that she believed United 175 had also been hijacked. The manager tried to notify the regional managers and was told that the managers were discussing a hijacked aircraft (presumably American 11) and refused to be disturbed. At 8:58, the New York Center controller searching for United 175 told another New York controller "we might have a hijack over here. two of them." 131

Between 9:01 and 9:02, a manager from New York Center told the Command Center in Herndon:

.Manager, New rork Center: JFe hcn•e several siruations going on here. it's escalating big, big time. We need to get the militaJ}' involved with us ....

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T1'e 're, we're involved l'Vith something else, we have other aircraft that may have a szmz' 'l ar sztuatwn. ~ . gomg . on h ere. ... 132

The "other aircraft" New York Center referred to was United 175. Evidence indicates that this conversation was the only notice received prior to the second crash by either FAA headquarters or the Herndon Command Center that there was a second hijack.

\Vhi.1e Command Center was told about this "other aircraft" at 9:01, New York Center contacted New York terminal approach control and asked for help in locating United 175.

Terminal: I got somebody who keeps coasting but it looks like he's going into one ofthe small airports do11'11 there.

Center: Hold on a second. I'm trying to bring him up here and get you- There he is right there. Hold on.

Terminal: Got him. just out o(9,500-9,000. now.

Center: Do you know who he is?

Terminal: We're just, we just we don 't know who he is. We're just picking him up now.

Center (at 9:02): Alright. Heads up man, it looks like another one coming in. 133

The controllers observed the plane in a rapid descent; the radar data terminated over lower . At 9:03:02, United 175 crashed into the South Tower. 134

Meanwhile, a manager from Boston Center reported that they had deciphered what they had heard in one of the first hijacker transmissions from American 11:

Boston Center: Hey ... you still there?

New Engla11d Region: Yes, I am.

Boston Center: I'm gonna reconfirm with, with dm·vnstairs, but the, as far as the tape, Bobb_v seemed to think the guy said that "we have planes. "Now, I don 't /mow if it was because it vvas the accent, or (f there's more than one, but I'm gonna, I'm gonna recm?firm that for you, and I'll get back to you real quick. Okay?

Neu• England Region: Appreciate it.

Unident(fied Female Voice: They have what?

Boston Center: Planes, as in plural.

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Boston Center: It sounds like. we're ialking to New York, that there's another one aimed at the Ulorld Trade Center.

New England Region: J11ere 's another aircrafi?

Boston Center: A second one ju.•;t hit the Trade Center.

New England Region: Okay. Yeah, we gotta get-we gotta alert the military real quick on this. 135

Boston Center immediately advised the New England Region that it was going to stop all aircraft scheduled to depart from any airport within Boston Center. At 9:05, Boston Center confirmed for both FAA Command Center and New England Region that the hija.ckers aboard American 11 said "we have planes.'' At the same time, New York ... ~· corrcd Ce~ter declared "ATC zero"-m:aning that air~aft were n?t permitted :o d~art :from,1 ~ e.11n, h'of'l. &t" amve at, or travel through New )· mk Center's a.:rrspace unt1l further notice. · _) A1L -o ~ I"-* 5e* oV Within minutes of the second impact, Boston Center's Operations Manager instructed all Ccwvv'l"(/\.:t'$'~ air traffic controllers in his center to use the radio frequencies to jnform all aircraft in Boston Center of the events unfolding in New York and to advise aircraft to heighten cockpit security. Boston Center asked Herndon Command Center to issue a similar cockpit security alert to all aircraft nationwide. \Ve have found no evidence to suggest that Command Center managers instructed any Centers to issue a cockpit security alert/ Military Notification and Response

The first indication that the NORAD air defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft, United 175, came in a phone call from New York Center to NEADS at 9:03. The notice came in at about the time the plane was hitting the South Tower. 138

By 9:08, the Mission Crew Commander at NEADS learned of the second explosion at the World Trade Center and decided against holding the fighters in military air space away from Manhattan:

Mission Crew Commander, NEADS: This is what J.foresee that we probably need to do. Tfe need to talk to FAA. We need to tell 'em f{ this stuff is gonna keep on going, we need to take those fighters, put 'em over Manhattan. That's best thing, that's the best play right now. So coordinate with the FAA. Tell 'em if there's more out there, which we don't laW'Io', let's get 'em over .Manhattan. At least we got some kind o.fplay. 139

The FAA cleared the a]r space. Radar data shows that, at 9:13, the Otis fighters exited their holding pattern over military airspace, and set a course direct for Manhattan. At this time they were approximately I 15 miles away. The fighers arrived at 9:25, and t!stablished a Combat Air Patrol over the city. 140

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Because the Otis fighters had expended a &'Teat deal of fuel in flying first to military air space and then to New York, the battle commanders were concerned about refueling. NEADS considered scrambling alert fighters from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia to New York, to provide back-up. The Langley fighters were placed on battJe stations at 9:09. 141 NORAD had no indication that any other plane had been hijacked.

American Airlines Flight 77

FAA Awareness

American 77 began deviating from its flight plan at 8:54, first with a slight tum toward the south. Two minutes later it disappeared completely from radar at the Indianapolis Center that was controlling the flight. 142

The controller tracking American 77 told us he first noticed the aircraft turning to the southwest, and then saw the data disappear. The controller looked for primary radar returns. He searched along its projected flight path and the airspace to the southwest where it had started to turn. No primary targets appeared. He tried the radios, first calling the aircraft directly, then the airline. Again there was nothing. At this point, the Indianapolis controller had no knowledge of the situation in New York. He did not know that other aircraft had been hijacked. He believed American 77 had experienced serious electrical and/or mechanical failure, and was gone. 143

Shortly after 9:00, Indianapolis Center started notifying other agencies that Am.erican 77 was missing and had possibly crashed. At 9:08, Indianapolis Center contacted Air Force Search and Rescue at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, and told them to look out for a downed aircraft. The Center also contacted the West Virginia State Police, and asked whether they had any reports of a downed aircraft. At 9:09, the Center reported the loss of contact to the FAA regional center, which passed this information to F A.A.. headquarters at 9:24. 144

By 9:20, Indianapolis Center learned that there were other hijacked aircraft in the system, and began to doubt its initial assumption that American 77 had crashed. A discussion of this concern between the manager at Indianapolis and the Command Center in Herndon prompted the Command Center to notify some FAA field facilities that American 71 was lost. By 9:21, the Command Center, some FAA field facilities, and American Airlines had started to search for American 77. They feared it had been hijacked. At 9:25, the Command Center advised FA/\ headquarters that American 77 was lost in Indianapolis Center's airspace, and that Indianapolis Center had no primary radar track, and was looking for the aircraft. 145

The failure to find a primary radar return tor ,-\merican 77 led us to investigate this issue further. Radar reconstructions performed after 9/ J 1 reveal that EA.A radar equipment tracked the flight from the moment lts transponder was turned off at R:56. But for eight minutes and thirteen seconds, between 8:56 and 9:05, this primary radar infonnation on

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American 77 was not displayed to controllers at Indianapolis Center. 146 The reasons are technical, arising from the way the software processed radar infonnation, as well as from poor primary radar coverage where American 77 was flying.

According to the radar reconstruction, American 77 re-emerged as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes at 9:05, easi of its last known position. The target remained in Indianapolis Center's airspace for another six minutes, then crossed into the western portion of Washington Center's airspace at 9:1 0. As Indianapolis Center continued searching for the aircraft, two managers and the controller responsible for lunerican 77looked to the west and southwest along the flight's projected path, not east-where the aircraft was now heading. The managers did not instruct other controllers at Indianapolis Center to turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for American 77. 147

In sum, Indianapolis Center never saw Flight 77 turn around. By the time it reappeared in primary radar coverage, controllers had either stopped looking for the aircraft because they thought it had crashed or were looking toward the west. In addition, although the Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, neither it nor FAA headquarters ic;sued > an ''all points bulletin" to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. / i\merican 77 traveled undetected for 36 minutes on a course heading due east for Washington, DC.148 ~

By 9:25, FAA's Herndon Command Center and FA.!\ headquarters knew the following. They knew two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center. They knew American 77 was lost. They knew that a hijacker on board American 11 had said "we have some planes." Concerns over the safety of other aircraft began to mount. A manager at the Herndon Command Center asked FAA headquarters if they wanted to order a '> "nationwide ground stop." \Vhile executives at FAA headquarters discu.'ised it, the Command Center ordered one at 9:25. 149

The Command Center kept looking for American 77. At 9:21, it advised the Dulles terminal control facility, which urged its controllers to look for primary targets. At 9:32, they fmmd one. Several of the Dulles controllers "observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed" and notified Reagan Airport FAA personnel at both Reagan and Dulles airports notified the Secret Service. The identity or aircraft type was unknown. 150

Reagan Airport controllers then vectored an unanned National Guard C-130H cargo aircraft, which had just taken off en route to Minnesota, to identify and follow the suspicious aircraft. The C-130H pilot spotted it, identified it as a Boeing 757, attempted to follow its path, and at 9:38, seconds after impact, ref:orted to Washin&Tton Tower: "looks like that aircraft crashed into the Pentagon sir." 51

MilitmJ' Not(fication and Response

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NORAD heard nothing about the search for American 77. Instead, the NEADS air defenders heard renewed reports about a .plane that no longer existed: American 11.

At 9:21, NEADS received a report from the F.A.A:

FAA: Military, Boston Center. I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it's on its way towards-heading towards Washington.

NEADS: Okay. American 11 is still in the air?

FAA: Yes.

NEADS: On its way towards Tf"ashington?

FAA: That was another-it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower. That's the latest report we have.

NE4DS: Okay.

FAA: I'm going to try to confirm an JD for you, but 1 would assume he's somewhere over, uh, either NeM' Jersey or somewhere further south

NEADS: Okay. So American 11 isn't the hijack at all then, right?

FAA: No, he is a hijack.

NEADS: He-American 11 is a hijack?

FAA: Yes.

NEADS: And he's heading into Washington?

FAA: Yes. This could be a third aircrafi. 152

The mention of a "third aircraft" was not a reference to American 77. There was confusion at that moment in the FAA. Two planes had struck the World Trade Center, and Boston Center had heard from FAA headquarters in Washington that American I l was still airborne. We have been unable to identify the source of this mistaken F A.A. information.

The NEADS technician who took this cali from the FAA immediately passed the word to the Mission Crew Commander. He reported to the NEADS Battle Commander:

Mission Creu• Commander, JI{EADS: Okay, uh, American Airlines is still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he's heading towards Washington. Okay? 1 think

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we need ro scramble Lpngley right now. And I'm gonna take the.fightersfi·om Otis, try to chase this guy d(rwn ~ll can find him. 153

Aftt.:r consulting with NEADS command, the MCC issued the order at 9:23: "Okay ... scramble Langley. Head them towards the Washington area .... [I]fthey're there then we'll run on them .... These guys are smart." That order was processed and transmitted to Langley Air Force Ba.<>e at 9:24. Radar data show the Langley fighters airborne at 9:30. NEADS decided to keep the Otis fighters over New York. The heading of the Langley fighters was adjusted to send them to the Baltimore area. The Mission Crew Commander explained to us that the purpose was to position the Langley fighters between the reported southbound American 11 and the nation's capital. 154

At the suggestion of the Boston, Center's military liaison, NEADS contacted the FAA's Washington Center to ac:.:k about American 11. In the course of the conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEADS that "We're looking-we also lost .American 77." The time was 9:34. This was the first notice to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance. If NEADS had not placed that call, the "N'EADS air defenders would have received no information whatsoever that American 77 was even missing, although the FAA had been searching for it. No one at FAA Command 155 Center or headquarters ever asked for military assistance with 1<\merican 77. ,

At 9:36, the FAA's Boston Center called NEADS and relayed the discovery about the aircraft closing in on Washington, an aircraft that still had not been linked with the missing American 77. The FAA told NK.t\DS: "Latest report. Aircraft VFR [Visual Flight Rules] six miles southeast of the Vlhite House . ... Six, southwest. Six, southwest of the Vvrrute House, deviating away.'' This startling news prompted the Mission Crew Commander at NEADS to take immediate control of the airspace to clear a flight path for the Langley fighters: "Okay, we're going to tum it ... crank it up .... Run them to the \Vh:ite House." He then discovered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north toward the Baltimore area as instructed, but east over the ocean. "I don't care how many windows you break," he said. "Damn it. .. Okay. Push them back." 156

The Langley fighters were heading east, not north, for three reasons. First, unlike a l}ormal scramble order, this order did not include a distance to the target, or the target's location. Second, a "generic" flight plan incorrectly led the Langley fighters to believe they were ordered to fly due east (090) for 60 miles. The purpose oftbe generic flight plan was to get the aircraft airbome and out oflocal airspace quickly. Third, the lead pilot and local FAA controller incorrectly assumed the flight plan instruction to go ''090 for 60" was newer guidance that superseded the originatscramble order. 157

After the 9:36 call to NE.ADS about the unidentified aireraft a few miles from the Vv'hite House, the Langley fighters were ordered to Washin!:,rton, DC. Controllers at NEADS located an unknown primary radar track, but "it kind of faded" over Washinf:,rton. The time was 9:38. The Pentagon had been struck by American 77 at 9:37:46. The Umgley tighters were approximately 150 miles away. 158

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Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. 1t was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all. After the second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized both aircraft were transcontinental, 767 jetliners that departed Logan Airport. Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center had guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that departed Logan Airport destined for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland air traffic control center to watch Delta 1989. The FAA's Herndon Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft in the system. The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second. 159

NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it. The :flight never turned off its transponder. NEADS soon learned, however, that the aircraft was not hijacked, and tracked Delta 1989 as it reversed course over Toledo, headed east, and landed in Cleveland. 160 But another aircraft was heading toward Washington, an aircraft about which NORAD had heard nothing: United 93.

United Airlines Flight 93

F:4A Awareness

At 9:28, after having been in the air for nearly fifty minutes, United 93 acknowledged a tr!Ulsmission from the Cleveland Center controller. This was the last normal contact the F.t\A had with United 93. 161

Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin ... "162

The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?" This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming and someone yelling "Get out of here, get out ofhere," again from an unknown source. The Cleveland Center controllers began to try to identify the possib]e source of the transmissions, and noticed that United 93 had descended some 700 feet. The controller attempted again to raise United 93 several times, with rio response. At 9:30, the controller began to poll the other flights on his frequencv to determine if the\j heard the screaming; several said they had. 163 - J At 9:32, a third radio transmission came over the frequency: "Keep remaining sitting. 'Ne have a bomb on board." The controller understood, but chose to respond: "Calling Cleveland center, you're unreadable. Say again. slowly." He notified his supervisor, who passed the notice up the chain of command. By 9:34, word of the hijacking had reached FA'\ headquarters. 164

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FAA headquarters had by this time established an open line of communication vvith the Command Center at Herndon and instructed it to poll all the Centers about suspect aircraft. The Command Center executed the request and, a minute later, Cleveland Center reported that "United 93 may have a bomb on board." In less than two minutes, at 9:34 a.m., Command Center relayed the information concerning United 93 to FAA Headquarters. At approximately 9:36, Cleveland Center advised Command Center that it was still tracking United 93 and inquired specifically whether someone had requested the military to launch fighter air<--raft to intercept United 93. Cleveland Center even told Command Center it was prepared to contact a nearby military base to make the request. Command Center told Cleveland Center that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command had to make the decision to request military assistance and were working the issue. 165

Between 9:34·and 9:38, the Cleveland controller observed United 93 climbing to 40,700 feet and immediately moved several aircraft out its way. The controller continued to try to contact United 93, and asked whether the pilot could confirm that he had been hiJac. ked ' .166 Th ere was no response.

Then, at 9:39, a fourth radio transmission came over the radio frequency from United 93:

Ziad Jan·ah: Uh, is the captain. Would like you all to remain seated. There is a bomb on board and are going back to the airport. and to have our demands [unintelligible]. Please remain quiet.

The controller responded: "United 93, understand you have a bomb on board. Go ahead." The flight did not respond. 167 ~::1 !$~ From 9:34 a.m. to 10:08 a.m., a Command Center facility l)l.81lag provided frequent updates to the Deputy Administrator and other executives at FAA Headquarters as United 93 headed towards Washington, D.C. At 9:41, Cleveland Center lost United 93's transponder signal. The controller located it on primary radar, matched its position with 168 visual sightings from other air<--raft, and tracked the flight as it turned east, then south.

At 9:42, Command Center learned from television news reports that a plane had struck the Pentagon. The Command Center's National Operations Manager, Ben Sliney, ordered all F.A.A facilities to instruct all airborne aircraft to land at the nearest airport. This was a totally unprecedented order. The air traffic control system handled it with great skill, as 169 about 4.500 commercia] and general aviation aircraft soon landed without incident.

At 9:46 and again two minutes later, Command Center updated FAA headquarters that United 93 was now "twenty-nine minutes out of Washington, DC."170

A minute after that, at 9:49, 13 minutes after getting the question from Cleveland Center about military help, Command Center suggested that someone at headquarters should decide whether to request military assistance:

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FAA Headquarters: Tkc:v 'rc pulling J4faway to go talk about United 93.

Command Center: Uh. do ·we want to think, uh. about scrambling aircraft?

FAA Headquarters: Uh. God, 1 don't know.

Command Center: Uh. that 's a decision somebod.v 's gonna have to make probab~v in the next ten minutes.

FAA Headquarters: Uh, ya /..:71011' everJJbody just left the room. l7l

At 9:53, FAA headquarters informed Command Center that the Deputy Director for Air Traffic Services was talking to Deputy Administrator Monte Belger about scrambling aircraft. Then Command Center informed headquarters controllers had lost track of United 93 over the Pittsburgh area. Within seconds, Command Center received a visual report from another aircraft, and informed headquarters that the aircraft was 20 miles northwest of Johnstown. United 93 was spotted by another aircraft, and, at 10:01, · Command Center advised FAA headquarters that one of the aircraft had seen United 93 ''waving his wings."The aircraft had witnessed the radical gyrations in what we believe was the hijackers' effort to defeat the passenger counter-attack. United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03:11, 125 miles from Washington, DC. The precise crash time has been the subject of some dispute. The 10:03:11 impact time is supported by previous NTSB analysis and by evidence from the staff's analysis of radar. the flight data recorder, 172 the cockpit voice recorder, infrared satellite data, and air traffic control transmissions.

Five minutes later, Command Center forwarded this update to headquarters:

Command Center: O.K. Uh. there is now on that United 93.

FAA Headquarters: Yes.

Command Center: There is a report ofblack smoke in the last position I gave you, fifteen miles south ofJohnstown.

FAA Headquarters: From the aiTplane orfrom the g-round?

Command Center: Uh. th(:)' 're speculating it 's.kom the aircraft.

FAA Headquarters: Okay.

Command Center: Uh, who, it hit the ground. That :y what they're speculating, that's speculation on{F. 173

The aircraft that spotted the "black smoke" was the same unrumed Air National Guard cargo plane that had seen American 77 crash into the Pentagon 27 minutes earlier. It had resumed its flight to Minnesota and saw the smoke from the crash of United 93, less than

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two minutes after the plane went down. At 10: I 9, Command Center advised headquarters of its conclusion that United 93 had indeed crashed. 114

Despite the discussions about military assistance, no one from FA.A headquarters requested military assistance regarding United 93. Nor did any manager at FAA headquarters pass any of the information it had about United 93 to the military.

Military Notification and Response

NEADS first received a call about United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center at 10:07. Unaware that the aircraft had already crashed, Cleveland passed to NEADS the aircraft's last known latitude and longitude. NEADS was never able to locate United 93 on radar because it was already in the ground. 175

At the same time, the NEADS Mission Crew Commander was dealing with the arrival of the Langley fighters over Wa..;;bington. DC. He was sorting out what their orders were with respect to potential targets. Shortly after 10:10, and having no knowledge either that United 93 had been heading toward Washington, DC or that it had crashed, the Mission Crew Commander explicitly instructed the Langley fighters: "negative-negative clearance to shoot" aircraft over the nation's capitaL 176

The news of a reported bomb on board Unite.d 93 spread quickly at NEADS. The air defenders searched for United 93's primary radar return and tried to locate assets to scramble toward the plane. NEADS called Washington Center to report: '~ l:Dc'~ NEADS: I also want to give you a heads-up, Washington. k'11?1 }I ~--'>FAA (DC): Go ahead.

]\lEADS: United nine three, have you got information on that yet?

FAA: Yeah, he's doHrn.

NEADS: He's dmvn?

FAA: Yes.

NEADS: FVhen did he land? 'Cause we have got cm~firmation-

FAA: He did not land.

ArE4DS: Oh, he's down? Dcm··n?

FAA: Yes. Somewhere up northeast of Camp David

Nh"ADS: Northeast of Camp David.

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171 r:4A: That's the last report. The.v don ·r know exact~)' where.····

The time of notification of the crash of United 93 wac; 10:15. 178 The NEADS air defenders never located the flight or followed it on their radar scopes. The flight had already crashed by the time they learned it was hijacked.

Clarifying the Record 179

The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accordance with preexisting training and protocols. It was improvised by civilians who had never handled a hiJ. ack that attempted to disappear, and by a military unprepared for the transformation of ( commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction. As a consequence, the NEADS air --.._:_:-..•s .•- defenders had nine minutes' notice on the first hijacked plane, no advance notice on the second, no advance notice on the third, and no advance notice on the fourth.

We do not believe that understanding the truth about the events of that morning reflects discredit on the operational pL--rsonnel from NEADS or FA.A facilities. The NRADS commanders and floor officers reached out in seeking information, and made the best judgments they could based on the information they received. Individual FAA cDntrol1ers, facility managers, and Command Center managers thought "outside the box" in recommending a nationwide alert, in ground-stopping local traffic, and, ultimately, in deciding to land all aircraft and executing that unprecedented order flawlessly.

More than the actual events, inaccurate government accounts of those events made it appear that the military was notified in time to respond to two of the hijackings, thus raising questions about supposed delays in the military's interception of the hijacked aircraft. Those accounts had the effect of deflecting questions about the military's capacity to obtain timely and accurate information from its own resources. In addition, they overstated the FAA's ability to provide the military timely and useful information that morning. ~

In May 2003 public testimony before this Commission, for instance, NOR..AD officials >I~:::; stated that, at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification ofUnited 93 from the FAA. This a_ -l.f ' statement was incorrect. There was no hijack to report at 9:16. United 93 was proceeding normally at that time.

In this sam~ public testimony, NORAD officials stated that, at 9:24, NEADS received notification of the hijacking of American 77. This statement was also incorrect. The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was not about American 77. It was notification that American 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for \Vashington, DC. A 9:24 entry in a NEADS event log records: "American Airlines #N334_A.A hijacked."180 This is the tail number of American 11.

In their testimony, and in other public statements, NORAD officials also stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notifications about American 77

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and/or United 93. These statements were incorrect as well. Then-port of American 11 heading south as the cause of the Langley scramble is reflected not just in taped conversations at NEADS, but in taped conversation.'! at FAA centers, on contemporaneous logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NOR...L\.D, and in other records.

Yet this response to a phantom aircraft, American 11, was not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by FAA or DOD. Instead, since 9/11, the scramble of the Langley fighters was described as a response to the reported hjjacldng of American 77, 181 or United 93, or some combination of the two. These inaccurate accounts created the appearance that the Langley scramble was a logical response to an actual hijacked aircraft.

Not only was the scrdiilble prompted by the mistaken infonnation about American 11, but NEADS never received notice that American 77 was hijacked. It was notified at 9:34 that American 77 was lost. Then, minutes later, NEADS was told that an unknown plane was six miles southwest of the White House. Only then did the already scrambled airplanes start moving directly to Washington, DC.

Thus the military did not have 14 minutes to respond to i'unerican 77, as testimony to the ~ td ~ ~ Cormnission in May 2003 suggested. It had at most one or two minutes to respond to the C~l~~ 1 unidentified plane approaching Washington, and the fighters were in the wrong place to . · . be able to help. They had been responding to a report about an aircraft that did not exist. lh'l~j)~ ~ 11 r~Lq,,1 Nor did the military have 47 minutes to respond to United 93, as would be implied by the>. ~ f5f account that it received notice about it at 9:16. By the time the military learned about the 3> 1\1 flight, it had crashed. 3 \../'

We now tum to the timing and circumstances of that shoot down authorization-and the role of national leadership in the events that morning.

1.3 National Crisis Management

\\'hen American 11 struck the World Trade Center at 8:46, no one in the White House or traveling with the President knew that it had been hijacked. \\'hile that infonnation circulated within the FAA we found no evidence that the hijacking was reported to any other agency in Wa.'lhington before 8:46. 182

Most federal agencies learned about the crash in New York from CNN. Nearly everyone we interviewed at the national level told us they understood it to he a ''small" or '1win engine'' aircraft that first crashed into the World Trade Center 183

Within the F A.A.., the Administrator, Jane Garvey, and her deputy, Monte Belger, had not been told of a confim1ed hijacking before they learned from television that a plane had 1 4 crashed. Others in the agency were aware, as we explained earlier in this chapter. "

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Inside the National Military Command Center. the deputy director of operations and his 185 assistant began notifying senior Pentagon officials of the incident

At about 9:00, the senior NMCC operations officer reached out to the FAA operations 186 center for information. The scrambling ofjets was not discussed in this conversation.

In Sarasota, Florida, the President's motorcade was just arriving at the Emma E. Booker Elementary School where President Bush was to read to a class and talk about education. White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card told us he was standing with the President outside the classroom when Senior Advisor to the President Karl Rove first informed them that a small, twin engine plane had crashed into the World Trade Center. The President's reaction was that the incident must have been caused by pilot error. 187

At 8:55, before entering the classroom, the President spoke to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, who was at the White House. She recalled first telling the President it was a twin engine aircraft, then that it was commercial, saying "that's all we know right now, Mr. President."188

At the \Vbite House, the Vice President had just sat down for a meeting when his assistant told him to turn on his television because a plane had struck the North Tower of the World Trade Center. The Vice President was wondering "how the heU could a plane bit the World Trade Center" when he saw the second aircraft strike the South Tower.J 89

Elsewhere in the White House, a series of 9:00 meetings ~bout to begin. Rice, for example, entered the Situation Room and started a meeting with her senior staff. In the absence of information that the crash was anything other than an accident, the White House staff monitored the news as they went ahead with regular schedules.190

The Agencies Confer

\Vhen they learned a second plane had struck the World Trade Center, nearly everyone in the White House told us they immediately knew it was not an accident. The Secret Service initiated a number of security enhancements around the Vlhite House Complex. The officials who issued these orders did not k.11ow that there were additional hijacked aircraft, or that one such aircraft was en route to Washinfon. These measures were precautionary steps because of the strikes in New York. 1 1

The J;:4A and Jf1zite House Telecoriferences

The FAA, the \Vhite House, and the Defense Department each initiated a multi-agency teleconference before 9:30 .. The purpose of such teleconferences in a crisis is to minimize the fog of war, provide for command and control and assign operational responsibilities. Because none of these teleconferences included the right officials from both the FAA and Defense Department-at least before 10:00-each failed to provide a meaningful way to coordinate the military and FAA response to the hijackings.

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At 9:20. security persmmel at FAA headquarters set up a hijacking teleconferenc~() appr~tely with several agencies, including the Defense Department. The NMCC ofticer who participated in this conference told us that he and a lower ranking individual periodically monitored the call that morning. He explained to us that they did not continuously monitor the line because the flow of information was very sporadic; the information being conveyed was oflittle value; and they were working on other important tasks. The FAA manager of the teleconference also remembered that the military was on the conference tor only a short period of time, before the Pentagon was hit. Both individuals agreed that the teleconference played no role in coordinating a response to the attacks of 9!11. Acting Deputy FAA Administrator Belger was frustrated and upset to learn later in the morning that the military had not been on the call. 192

At the White House, the video teleconference was run by Richard Clarke out of the Situation Room. The conference began at 9:25 and included the CIA, FBI, the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, the FAA, and the Vlhite House shelter. The FAA and CIA joined at 9:40. The first topic addressed in the Vlhite House video teleconference-- at about 9:40 -- was the physical security of the President, White House, and other federal agencies. hnmediately thereafter it was reported that a plane had hit the Pentagon. We found no e-vidence that video conference participants had any prior information that American 77 had been hijacked and was heading directly toward Washington. Indeed, it is not clear to us that the conference was even operational before 9:38, when the Pentagon was struck193

The F A.A. Administrator, Deputy Administrator, and other senior officials from headquarters participated in this video teleconference at various times. We do not know who participated in the teleconference from the Defense Department, but we know it was not any of the personnel involved in managing the crisis. None of the information conveyed in the White House video teleconference, at least in the first hour, was being passed to the NMCC. As one witness described, "[It] was almost like there were parallel decisionmaking processes going on; one was a voice conference orchestrated by the NMCC ... and then there was the [White House video conference] .. .in my mind they were 194 competing venues for command and control and decisionmaking." .

At 10:03, the conference received reports of more missing aircraft, "2 possibly 3 aloft," and learned of a combat air patrol over W ashin&tton. There was discussion of the need for rules of engagement. Clarke reported that they were asking the President for authority to shoot down aircraft. Confimmtion of that authority can1e at 10:25, but the commands \Vere already being conveyed in more direct contacts with the Pentagon. 195

The Pentagon Teleconferences

Inside the National 1\1ilitary Command Center, the deputy director fbr operations immediately thought the second strike was a terrorist attack. He called an all pUIJlose "Significant Event" conference. It began at 9:29, with a brief recap: two aircraft had struck the World Trade Center, there iivas a confirmed hijacking of .t\J.nerican 11, and Otis

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fighters had been scrambled. The FAA was asked to provide an update, but the line wa.c; silent because the FAA had not been added to the call. A minute later the deputy director stated that it had just been confinned American 11 was still airborne and heading to DC. He directed the transition to an Air Threat Conference call. NORA.D confirmed that American 11 was airborne and heading to Wa.c;hinftrton, relaying erroneous infonnation from the FAA. The call then ended. at about 9:34. 96

It resumed at 9:37 as an Air Threat Conference call." This teleconference lasted over eight hours. The President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Deputy National Security Advisor all participated in the Air Threat Conference at various points in the day, as did military personnel from the White House underground shelter. So did the President's military aide on Air Force One. 197

Operators worked feverishly to include the FAA in this teleconference, but they had equipment problems and difficulty finding secure phone numbers. NORAD asked three times before 10:03 to confirm the presence ofFAA on the conference, to provide an update on hijackings. The FAA did not join the call until10:17. The F.AA representative who joined the call had no familiarity with or responsibility for a hijack situation, had no access to decisionmakers, and had none of the information available to senior FAA officials by that time. 198

We found no evidence that, at this critical time, during the morning of September 11, NOR.A.D's top commanders, in Florida or Cheyenne Mountain, ever coordinated with their counterparts at FAA headquarters to improve situational awareness and organize a common response. Lower-level officials improvised- for example, the FAA's Boston Center bypassed the chain of command and directly contacted NEADS after the first hijacking. But the highest level Defense Department officials relied on the NMCC's Air Threat Conference, in which F A.A. did not participate until 10:17. 199

At 9:39, the NMCC's deputy director for operations, a military officer, opened the call from the Pentagon, which had just been struck by a Boeing 757 airliner. He began: "An air attack against North America may be in progress. NORAD, what's the situation?"200 hlORAD said it had conflicting reports. Its latest infom1ation was "of a possible hijacked aircraft taking off out of JFK en route to Washington D.C ....." 201

The :NM CC mentioned reports of a crash into the mal1 side of the Pentagon and requested ~rP that the Secretary of Defense be added to the conference.~'-

At 9:44, NORAD briefed the conference on the possible hijacking of Delta Flight 1989. Two minutes later the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Vice Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that they were still trying to track down the Secretary and Vice Chairman, and bring them into the conference. The Chairman was out ofthe country.:Z03

' All times given for this conference call are our estimates, which we believe to be accurate within a :L 3 minute margin of error.

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At 9:48, a representative from the underground she1ter at the \.Vhite House asked if there were any indications of another hijacked aircraft. The NMCC deputy director for operations mentioned the Delta flight and concluded ''that would he the fourth possible hijack." At 9:49, the commander ofNORAD directed all air sovereignty aircraft to battle stations fulJy anned.-?04

At 9:59, an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel working in the White House Military Office joined the conference and stated that he had just talked to Deputy National Security Advisor Steve Hadley. The V/hite House requested: (1) the implementation of continuity of government measures, (2) fighter escorts for 1<\ir Force One, and (3) the establishment of a fighter combat air patrol over Washington, DC. 205

By 10:03, when United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania, the FAA had not yet been added to the conference, and there had been no mention on the conference of the hijacking of United 93.206

The President and the Vice President

The President was seated in a classroom of second graders when, at approximately 9:05, Andrew Card, his chief of staff, wlrispered to him: "A second plane hit the second tower. America is under attack" The President told us his instinct was to project calm, not to have the country see an excited reaction at a moment of crisis. The national press corps was standing behind the children in the classroom; he saw their phones and pagers start to ring. The President felt he should ~roject strength and calm until he could better 2 understand what was happening. ·

The President remained in the classroom for another five to seven minutes, while the children continued reading. He then returned to a holding room shortly before 9:15, where he was briefed by staff and saw television coverage. He then spoke to Vice President Cheney, Dr. Rice, Governor Pataki, and FBI Director Mueller. He decided to make a brief statement from the school before leaving for the airport. The Secret Service told us they were anxious to move the President to a safer location, but did not think it imperative for him to run out the door. 208

Between 9:15 and 9:30, the staff was busy arranging a return to Vhshington, while the President consulted his senior advisers about his remarks. No one in the traveling party had any infonnation during this time that other aircraft were hijacked or missing. As far as we know. no one was in contact with the Pentagon. The focus was on the President's statement to the nation. No decisions were made during this time, other than the decision to return to Washington. 209

The President's motorcade departed at 9:35, and arrived at the airport between 9:42 and 9:45. During the ride the President learned about the attack on the Pentagon. He boarded the aircraft. asked the Secret Service about the safety ofhis family, and called the Vice President. According to notes of the call, at about 9:45 the President told the Vice

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President: "Sounds like we have a minor war going on here, 1 heard about the Pentagon. We're at war. ... sornehody's going to pay."::! 10

About this time Card, the lead Secret Service agent, the President's military aide, and the pilot were conferring on a possible destination for Air Force One. The Secret Service agent felt strongly that the situation in Washington was too unstable to return. Card agreed. The President, however, needed convincing. All witnesses agreed that the President strongly wanted to return to Washington and only grudgingly agreed to go elsewhere. The issue was still undecided when the President conferred with the Vice President at about the time Air Force One was taking off. The Vice President recalled urging the President not to carne back to Washington. Air Force One departed at approximately 9:54, with no destination at take-off. The objective was to get up in the air-as fast and as high as possible-and then decide where to go?11

At 9:33, the tower supervisor at Reagan National Airport picked up a hotline to the Secret Service and told the Service's operations center that "an aircraft [is] coming at you and not talking with us." This was the first specific report to the Secret Service of a direct threat to the "White House. No move was made to evacuate the Vice President at this time. As the officer who took the call explained, "[J was J about to push the alert button when the tower advised that the aircraft was turning south and approaching Reagan National Airport.'.212

American 77 began turrung south, away from the White House, at 9:34. It continued heading south for roughly a minute, before turning west, and beginning to circle back. This news prompted the Secret Service to order the immediate evacuation of the Vice President and the V.'hite House just before 9:36. Agents propelled him out of his chair and told him he had 54 seconds to get to the bunker. The Vice President entered the underground tunnel that Jed to the shelter at 9:37. 213

Once inside, Vice President Cheney and the agents paused in an area of the tunnel that had a secure phone, a bench, and television. The Vice President asked to speak to the President, but it took time for the call to be connected. He learned in the tunnel that the Pentagon had been hit, and saw television coverage of smoke coming from the building. 214

The Secret Service logged Mrs. Cheney's arrival at the Vvbite House at 9:52. She joined her husband in the tunnel. According to contemporaneous notes, at 9:55 the Vice President was still on the phone v,rith the President advising that three planes were missing and one had hit the Pentagon. We believe this is the same call initiated close to the time Air Force One took off: in which the Vice President joined the chorus of advisers urging the President not to return to Washington. The call ended. She and the Vice President moved from the tunnel to the shelter conference roorn. 215

United 93 and the Shootdown Order

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There was not an opt:n line of communication between the President and Vice President on the morning of9/l1, but rather a series of calls between the two leadt-'J"S. The President told us he ·was frustrated with the poor communications that morning. He could not reach key officials, including Secretary Rumsfeld, for a period of time. The line t~ the \Vhite 16 House shelter conference room- and the Vice President- kept cutting off. -

The Vice President remembered placing a call to the President just after entering the shelter conference room. There is conflicting evidence about when the Vice President arrived in the shelter conference room. We have concluded, from the available evidence, that the Vice President arrived in the shelter conference room shortly before 10:00, perhaps at 9:58. The Vice President recalls being told, just after his arrival, that an Air Force combat air patrol (CAP) was up over Washington. At 9:59, a White House request 217 for such a CAP was communicated to the military through the Air Threat Conference.

The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules of engagement for the CAP. He recalled he felt it did not do any good to establish the CAP unless the pilots had instructions to tell them whether they were authorized to shoot if the plane would not divert. He said the President signed off on that concept The President said he remembered such a conversation, and that it reminded him of when be had been an interceptor pilot. The President emphasized to us that he had authorized th.e shoot down of hijacked aircraft 218

The Vice President's military aide told us he believed the Vice President spoke to the President just after entering the conference room, but be did not hear what they said. Rice, who entered the conference room shortly after the Vice President and sat next to him, recalled hearing the Vice President inform the President that, "Sir, the CAPs are up. Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." Then she recalled hearing him say, "Yes sir." She believed this conversation occurred a few minutes, perhaps five, after they entered the conference room.219

We believe this calJ would have taken place some time before 10:1 0 to 10:15. Among the sources that reflect other important events that morning there is no documentary evidence for this call, although the relevant sources are incomplete. Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President's Chief of Staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs. Chenev. did not note a call between the President and Vice President immediately aft~; the Vice President entered the conference room.220

At I 0:02, the communicators in the shelter began receiving reports from the Secret Service of an inbound aircraft-presumably hijacked-heading toward Washine.rton. That aircraft was United 93.121

The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA, through its links to that agency. The Service's operations center, and their contacts with the FAA, may have been tracking the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path, not its actual radar return. Thus, for a time, the Set..'J"et Service was not av.'are the aircraft

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was down in Pennsylvania, and were providing updates to the PEOC based on United 93's projected path to Washin&rton. 222

At some time between 10:10 and 10:15, a military aide told the Vice President and others that the aircraft was 80 miles out. Vice President Cheney was asked for authority to engage the aircraft.223

The Vice President's reaction was described by Scooter Libby as quick and decisive: "in about the time it takes a batter to decide to swing." He authorized fighter aircraft to engage the inbound plane. He told us this was based on his prior conversation with the President. The military aide returned a few minutes later, probably between 10:12 and 10:18, and said the aircraft was 60 miles out. He again asked for authorization to engage. The Vice President again said yes. 224

At the conferen.ce room table was Vlhite House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment," suggested that the Vice President get in touch "dth the President and confirm the engage order. Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. He said he had not heard any prior conversation on the subject with the President.225

The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a two-minute call that obtained the confirmation. On Air Force One the President's press secretary was taking notes. According to his notes, at 10:20, the President told Fleischer he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. 226

Minutes went by and word arrived of an aircraft down over Pennsylvania. Those in the conference room wondered ifperhaps the aircraft had been shot down pursuant to these directions. 227

At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only five to ten miles out. Believing they had only a minute or two, once again the Vice President communicated authority to "engage or "take out" the airborne aircraft. At I 0:33, Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley passed that guidance on the Air Threat Conference call: "I need to get word to Dick Myers that our reports are there's an inbound aircraft flying low 5 miles out The Vice President's guidance was we need to take them out. ... "228

Once again, there was no immediate infonnation about the fate of the inbound aircraft As one witness to the event described, "It drops below the radar screen and it's just continually hovering in your imagination; you don't know where it is or what happens to it." Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker five miles away had been a Medevac helicoptcr.229

Transmission of the Authorization from the '''hite House to the Pilots

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The National Mi1itary Command Center learned ofthe hijacking ofUnited 93 at about 10:03. The FAA had not yet been connected to the Air Threat Conference and in general had practically no contact with the military at the level of national command. The NMCC instead received news about the hijacking of United 93 from the White House. The \\'hite 230 House had received the word from the Secret Service's contacts v.rith the FAA.

NORAD had no information either. In response to questions, the NORAD representative on the Air Threat Conference stated at 10:07 that NOR.AD had "[n]o indication of hijack heading to DC at this time."231

Repeatedly between 10:14 and 10:19, a lieutenant colonel at the White House relayed the information to the National Military Command Center that the Vice President had confinned fighters were cleared to engage the inbound aircraft if they could verify that the aircraft was hijacked.232

The commander ofNORAD, General Eberhart. was en route to the NORAD operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado when the shoot down order was communicated on the Air Threat Conference. He told us that by the time he arrived at the Mountain the order had already been passed down the NORAD chain of command.233

It is not clear how the shoot down order was communicated to the Continental Region headquarters. But we know that, at 10:31, General Larry Arnold instructed his stafJ to broadcast the following message over a NORAD chat log: "10:31 Vice president has cleared to us to intercept tracks of interest and shoot them down if they do not respond per CON"R CC [General Amold]."234

In upstate New York, NE..WS personnel first learned of the shoot down order from that chat log message:

Floor Leadership: You need to read this... The Region Commander has declared that we can shoot down aircraft that do not respond to our direction. Copy that?

Controllers: Copy that, sir.

Floor Leadership: So ~fyou 're llJling to divert somebod_v and he 1-von 't divert-

Controllers: DO [Director of Operations] is saying no.

f1oor Leader.'•;hip: No? It came over the chat ... You got a COJ!flict 011 that direction?

CtJntrollers: Right now no, but-

Floor Leadership: Okay? Okay, you read thatfrom the Vice President, right? Vice President has cleared. Vice President has cleared us to intercept traffic and 235 shoot them dovm ~f they do not respond per CONR CC [General Amold}.

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In interviews with us, NEADS personnel expressed considerable confusion over the nature and effect of the order.

The NEADS Commander told us he did not pass along the order because he was unaware of its ramifications. Both the mission commander and the senior weapons director indicated they did not pass the order to the fighters circling Washington and New York City because they were unsure how the pilots would, or should, proceed v.rith this guidance. In short, while leaders in Washington believed the fighters circling above them had been instructed to "take out" hostile aircraft, the only orders actually conveyed to the Langley pilots were to ''ID type and tai1."236

In most cases the chain of command in authorizing the use of force runs from the President to the Seeretary of Defense and from the Secretary to the combatant commander. The President apparently spoke to Secretary Rumsfeld briefly sometime after 10:00, but no one can recall any content beyond a general request to alert forces. The President and the Secretary did not discuss the use of force against hijacked airliners in this conversation?37

The Secretary did not become part of the chain of command for those orders to engage until he arrived in the 1\~CC. At 10:39, the Vice President tried to bring the Secretary up to date as both participated in the Air Threat Conference:

J1ce President: There 's been at least three instances here where we've had reports ofaircraft approaching Washington-a couple were confirmed hijack. And. pursuant to the President's instructions I gave authorization for them to be taken out. Hello?

SecDef: Yes. I understand. JiVho did you give that direction to?

J7ice President: It was passed from here through the [operations] center at the JiVhite House, from the [shelter].

SecDef: OK, let me ask the question here. Has that directil•e been transmitted to the aircraft?

J'ice President: Yes, ir has.

SecDef: So we 'vc got a couple ofaircraft up there thai have those instructions at this present time?

Vice President: That is con·ecl. And it:\' m.v understanding they've already taken a couple ofaircraft out.

SecDef: rVe can 'r cm~firm that. f'Vc 're told that one aircr{{{t is dmvn but we do not 23 have a pilot report that did it. R

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As this exchange shows. Secretary Rumsfe]d was not involved when the shoot down order was first passed on the Air Threat Conference. After the Pentagon was hit, See-Tetary Rumsfe]d went to the parking lot to assist with rescue efforts. He arrived in the National Military Command Center shortly before 10:30. He told us he was just gaining situational awareness when he spoke with the Vice President, and that his primary concern was ensuring that the pilots had a clear understanding oftheir rules of engagement.-"39

The Vice President was mistaken in his belief that shoot down authorization had been passed to the pilots flying at NORAD's direction. By 10:45 there was, however, another set of fighters circling Washington that had entirely different rules of engagement. These fighters, part of the I 13th Wing of the DC Air National Guard, launched out of Andrews Air Force Base ba.<;ed on infonnation passed to them by the Secret Service. The first of the Andrews fighters was airborne at 10:38.240

General Wherley-the commander of the 1 13th Wing-reached out to the Secret Service after hearing second hand reports that it wanted fighters airborne. A Secret Service agent had a phone in each ear, one to '\Vherley and one to a fellow agent at the \Vhite House, relaying instructions that the ~'bite House agt-"111 said he was getting from the Vice President. The guidance for \\'herley was to send up the aircraft, with orders to protect the \Vhite House and take out any aircraft that threatened the Capitol. General Wherley translated this in military terms to "weapons free,'' \Vhich means the decision to shoot rests in the cockpit, or in this case the cockpit of the lead pilot. He passed these instructions to the pilots that launched at 10:42 and afterward.241

Thus, while the fighter pilots under NORAD direction who had scrambled out of Langley never received any type of engagement order, the .Andrews pilots were operating under "weapons free"-a permissive rule of engagement. The President and the Vice President told us they had not been aware that fighters had been scrambled out of Andrews, at the request of the Secret Service and outside of the military chain of command. There is no evidence that NORAD Headquarters or military officials in the NMCC knew--i:luring the morning of September 11 -that the .Al1drews planes were airborne and operating under different rules of engagement.242

~'hat if?

NORAD officials have maintained consistently that, had the passengers on board United 93 not caused the plane to crash, the military would have prevented it from reaching its target in Washin&Iton, DC. That conclusion is based on a version of events that we now know is incorrect. TI1e Langley fighters were not scrambled in response to the reported hijacking of United 93; NORAD did not have forty-seven minutes to prepare to intercept the flight; NORAD did not even know the plane \vas hijacked until after it had crashed. It is appropriate, therefore, to reconsider whether United 93 would have been intercepted.

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Had it not crashed in Petmsvlvania at 10:03, we estimate that United 93 could not have reached Washington, DC ~y earlier than 10:13, and most probably would have arrived before J0:23 ..There was only one set of fighters orbiting Wa..'lhington, DC during this timeframe-the Langley F-16s. They were anned and under NORl1..D's controL After its notification at J 0:07, NOR.I\D would have had anywhere from 6 to 16 minutes to locate the flight, receive authorization to shoot it down, communicate the order to the pilots, 743 244 auth enttcate'. t h e or d er, mterccpt. t h e fl.ghw t, and execut e th e ord er. - ·

At 10:07, the Langley pilots did not know the nature of the threat, NEADS did not know the location ofUnited 93, and there was no shootdov.'Il authorization.

The Langley pilots were never briefed about the reason they were scrambled. As the lead pilot explained, "I reverted to the Russian threat. . .I'm thinking cruise missile threat from the sea. You know you look down and see the Pentagon burning and I thought the bastards snuck one by us .... [l:1ou couldn't see any airplanes, and no one told us anything." The pilots knew their mission was to identify and divert aircraft flying within a certain radius of Washington, but did not know that th.e threat came from hijacked commerct.al au. 1. mers. 245·

NEADS did not know the location of United 93 when it first heard about the hijacking from FAA at 10:07. Presumably FAA would have provided the information, but we do not know how long it would have taken, nor how long it would have taken NEADS to find and track the target on its ovm equipment

Shootdown authority was not communicated to NEADS during this timeframe; it was first communicated at 10:31. Because the United States was cle-arly under attack , it is possible that NORAD commanders would have ordered a shootdmvn in the absence of the authorization communicated by the Vice President. Given the gravity of the decision to shoot doVvn a commercial airliner, the emphatic instruction at 10:10 that there was no clearance to fire, and NOR.I\D's caution that a mistake not be made, we view this possibility as unlikely?46

NORAD officials have maintained that they would have intercepted and shot doVvTI United 93. We are not so sure. We are sure that the nation owes a debt to the passengers of United 93. Their actions saved the lives of countless others, and may have saved either the U.S. Capitol or the \Vhite House from destruction.

The details of what happened on the morning of September 11 are complex. But the details play out a simple theme. NORAD and the FAA were unprepared fbr the type of attacks launched against the United States on September 11, 2001. They struggled, under difficult circumstances, to improvise a homeland defense against an unprecedented challenge they had never encountered and had never trained to meet.

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At 10:02 that morning, an assistant to the Mission Crew Commander at NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector in Rome, New York, was working with his colleagues on the floor of the command center. In a brief moment of reflection, he was recorded remarking that: "This is a new type of war. "247

He was, and is, right. But the conflict did not begin on 9/1 1. It had been publicly declared years earlier, most notably in a declaration faxed early in 1998 to an Arabic-language newspaper in London. Few Americans had noticed it. The fax had been sent from thousands of miles away by the followers of a Saudi exile gathered in one of the most remote and primitive countries on earth.

1 .A..s was the case with the other two airports used for the 9111 hijacked flights (Newark Liberty International Airport and Washington-Dulles Jntemational.l\irport), Boston's Logan International Airport was designated as a ''Category X" airport by the FAA. This category represented the largest and most potentially threatened facilities generally subject to greater security requirements. See FAA, "Civil Aviation Security Reference Handbook," May 1999, pp. 117-118. (SSI) Though Logan was selected for two of the hijackings (as were both American and United Airlines), the Commission has found no evidence that the terrorists targeted particular airports or airlines. Based on all of the performance results it has examined, nothing stands out about any of them w'ith respect to the only security layer that was relevant to the actual hijackings: checkpoint screening. See FAA, "Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, E'WR, and lAD," (SSI). There was local reporting of security problems at Logan, including two Fox 25 television investigative reports that aired in February and April of 2001 which demonstrated the ease with which checkpoints could be breached using knives. A former FAA special agent, Brian Sullivan, '\\'rOte the agency's leadership regarding his concems about lax security at the airport. See Brian Sullivan interview. However, there is no evidence to suggest that such issues entered into the terrorists' targeting of heavily fueled eas1-to-west transcontinental flights oflarge Boeing aircraft they trained to fly. They simply booked such flights that took off (or were scheduled to take off) nearly simultaneously. See Tom Kinton interview (Nov. 6, 2003). With regard to the reasons why Atta and Omari drove to Portland, Maine from Boston on the morning of September 10, only to return to Logan International Airp0rt on Flight #5930 on the morning of September II, no physical, documentary or analytical evidence derived either by the Commission or law enforcement provides a clear or convincing explanation. One theory about Atta and al Omari's travel to l)ortland is that the hijackers chose to fly into Boston to avoid suspicion that may have bet.'Il aroused if they had arrived via car at Logan at approximately the same time as eight other young Middle Eastern males to check-in for American Airlines Flight #11 and United Airlines Flight #175. One piece of e.-idence to support this theory is that the agent who checked in the two hijackers recalled that when he handed Atta his boarding pass Atta looked through the materials and asked why he wasn't given his boarding pass for his American Airlines flight from Boston. The agent explained to Atta that he would have to check-in with American J~Jrlines in Boston to obtain the boarding pass for the second leg of his itinerary. The agent

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remembered that Atta clenched his jaw and looked as though he was about to get angry. Atta stated that he had been assured of having "one step check-in." The agent told the two individuals that they had better get going if they were to make their flight. He said that Atta looked as if he were about to say something in anger but spun around to leave. At that point, both Atta and al Omari left the check-in counter for the security checkpoint. See Michael Tuohey interview (May '27, 2004). A related possibility is that Atta and al Omari may have tested whether the hijackers' operational security had been compromised by U.S. intelligence or law enforcement, or by the U.S. aviation security system. Being apprehended during their check-in at the Portland airport would have been preferable to being stopped at Logan Airport where three additional Flight 11 hijackers and the entire terrorist team intending to hijack United Flight 175 would be assembling. As the operational leader it is likely that Mohamed Atta would have been particularly subject to such concerns. Whatever the reason for the flight, the Portland Jetport was the nearest airport to Boston with a 9/11 flight that would have arrived at Logan in time for the passengers to transfer to American Airlines Flight #1 1, which had a scheduled departure time of7:45. See Site visit to Portland International Jetport, Portland, ME (Aug. i8, 2003).

2 [SSI] The Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) was an F A..ts.-designed automated system run by the airlines designed to identify individuals who may pose a threat to civil aviation based on their passenger profile. The system also chose passengers at random to received additional security scrutiny under CAPPS procedures. The fact of Atta's CA.PPS selection, which came to the Coll1Ill.ission's attention after its January 27, 2004 hearing, means that ten out of the 19 hijackers (including nine out often on the two American flights) were identified via the CAPPS system. Under the CAPPS system in use by the airline on 9/11, in addition to those selected by the CAPPS algorithm, American's ticket agents were to mark as "selectees'' those passengers who did not provide correct responses to the required security questions, failed to show proper identification or held a passport: from one of nine foreign countries.. See FM "Air Carrier Standard Security Program." May 31, 2000, pp. 75-76; FAA intervie·w of Donna Thompson, Sept. 23, 2001; C'buck Severence interview (Aprill5, 2004); Jim Dillon interview (.t\pr. 15, 2004), Diane Graney interview (Apr. 16, 2004). It appears that Atta was selected at random. See _.t\..1 Hickson briefing (June 8, 2004).

3 The call was placed from a pay phone in Terminal C (between the screening checkpoint and United .Airlines flight I 75's boarding gate). We presume Shehhi made the call; we cannot be sure. Logan site visit and briefing (Aug. 15, 2003). See also FBI, "Documents in Response to and in Lieu ofBriefing Request #6, Topic 11" (LES)

4 The police recovered a car leased by Waleed al Shehri at the Logan parking facility. A ticket stub for the parking garage showed entry at 6:45a.m. on 911 ]!2001. See: FBI Penttbom evidence ..LIJ Suqami and the al Shehris parked their car at Logan's central parking facility at 6:45. See FBI, "Location Timeline of Wail al Shehri." Flighl 11 pushed back from Gate 32 in Terminal Bat 7:40. See A'\L, ''American's Response to the February 3, 2004 Requests," Mar. 15, 2004.

5 See UAL "Flight 175- l!SepOl Passenger ACJ Check-in History," July I l, 2002. Customer senrice representative Gail Jawahir recalled that her encounter with the AI-Ghamdi's occurred at "shortly before 7 a.m." and when shcl\vn photos of the hijackers she indicated that Mohand Al-Shehri resembled one of the two she checked in. Thus, her experience may have actually been with Fayez Banihammad and Mohand AJ-Shehri, who checked in al 6:53. However, Jawahir recalled that the two individuals she spoke with had the same last name and had assigned seats on Row 9, both of which fit the Al-Ghamdis and therefore that accounl has been adopted here. In either case, it is almost certain that she was dealing witl1 one set of the Flight 11 hijackers. See FBI interviews of Gail Jawahir, Sept. 21 and 28,2001. (LES) One of the two indicated to Jawahir that he needed a ticket, but she obsen'ed that he already had a UA envelope \Vith itinerary in his hand. Therefore, she told him that he didn't need a ticket but could go directly to check-in. She recalled thai each man had "problems" in responding to the standard security questions, and that she had to go over the questions again "very slowly" before receiving the responses that allowed them to c1ear

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the check-in process. The two individuals then departed the counter area for the security ched.'Point gate as directed hy Ms. Jawahir. See FBl interview of Gail Jawahir, Sept. 16, 2001. (LES)

6 Screening for Flight 11 was conducted at the North (or Main) Checkpoint (B5) in Terminal B. A comprehensive assessment of the checkpoint conducted by the F ,A,.A on October 30, 2000 found no security weaknesses or violations. The previou.c; such assessment on October 20, 1999 made three findings of se.,'Curity weaknesses, all related to the explosives trace detection system. Between September 11, 1999 and September I I, 2001, the FAA conducted 40 screener evaluations at checkpoint B5. In the thirteen tests involving the metal detectors, the test object was detected in 62.5 percent of the cases. In seven physical search tests, the detection rate was 100 percent, while in the 20 x-ray tests the detection rate wa.c; 84.21 percent. With respect to FY2001 national averages, B5 screeners mel or exceeded the average for overall, physical search and x-ray detection, while falling below the norm for metal detection. No FAA Special Assessments ("Red Team") were done at Logan security checkpoints over the two years prior to 9/1 1/01. See FAA, "Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EV.'R, and IAD," Oct. 24,2001. (SSI) Screening for flight 175 ·was done at Checkpoint C3 in Terminal C.. For Logan Checkpoint C3, Comprehensive checkpoint assessments for C3 done by the FAA on December 14, 1999 and November 15, 2000 uncovered no security weaknesses or violations. Between September 1 I, 1999 and September 11, 2001, the FAA conducted 49 screener evaluations at checkpoint C3. In the flfteen tests involving the metal detectors, the te:n object was detected in 67 percent of the cases. In four physical search tests, the detection rate was 75%, while in the 30 x-ray tests, the detection rate was R7 percent. With respect to fiscal year 2001 national averages, C3 screeners met or exceeded the average for overall, physical search and x-ray detection. while falling below the norm for metal detection. No FAA Special A.ssessments ("Red Team") were done at Logan security ched.'])oints over the two years prior to 9/1 I /01. See FAA. "Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, Bl/R, and IAD," Oct 24, 2001. (SSI)

7 See FA-\, "Air Carriers Checkpoint Operations Guide,'' Aug. 1999; FAA, "Air Carrier Standard Security Program," Appendix VI, June 28, 1999.

8 Mary Carol Turano interview (Mar. 11, 2004).

9 See TSA, "The Selectee Status of the 9!11 Hijackers." {SSI) For boarding and seating information, see AAL, "SABRE Information on Flight 11 ," Sept. 11, 2001. These boarding times from the American system are approximate only; for flight 11 they indicated that some passengers had "boarded" after the aircraft had pushed back from the gate. See Letter from Desmond Bany, Jr, "Response to Commission question I 1.8," March I 5, 2004.

I 0 Sec TSA, "Selectee Status of the 9/11 Hijackers." (SSI) See also UAL, "Flight 17 5 - I I SepO 1 Passenger ACI Check-in History," July 11, 2002.

II The al Hazmis checked-in at 7:29, but the airline has not yet been able to confinn the time ofHanjour's check-in. However, the checkpoint videotape places the latter at the checkpoint at 7:35, thus his check-in bad to have taken place by that time. See .t\A..L, "SABRE Information on Flight 77 ," Sept. I 1, 200 l (SSI); Letter from Desmond T. Barry, Jr., Response to Commission Question 11.8, Mar. 15. 1004; MWAA, video of main tenninal checkpoints, Sept 11, 100 L (SST)

12 See TSA "Selectee Status of September 11 Hijackers." (SSl) See also FAA "Selectee List A.A.LA #77." (SST)

13 The West checkpoint (IAD02) was subjected to a comprehensive FAA assessment on November 13, 2000, which detected no violations or security weaknesses at the checkpoint Over the twenty-four months preceding 9/J J!OL 46 screener evaluations were conducted by the FAA at JAD02. Of these, 14 involved the metal detectors. :five were phy11ical searches and 27 were with the x-ray machine. with detection rates of 57 percent. 100 percent and 63 percent respectively. While the physical search results exceeded the national average. both the metal detector and x-ray n.:sulls were below average. See FAA, "Assessment and Testing Data for BOS. EWR, and lAD," Oct 24. 2001. (SSI)

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14 MW AA, video of main terminal ched."'Points. Sept. ll , 2001. (SSI) See also Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 12. 2004 ).

15 MW .A.A video of main terminal checkpoints, Sept. 11, 2001. (SSI) See also Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 2004).

16 Immediately after the event, the F.A.A's Washington Civil Aviation Security Field Office began an investigation into the screening operations at Dulles on 9111. After interviewing 43 of the 44 screeners (the other individual was in the hospital) identified by Argenbright as being on duty on September 11, 2001, the office reported that: "Overall, the responses provided by the screeners were consistent. They reported nothing out of ordinary or suspicious activity on the morning of 9/11. None of the screeners on duty at the East and West checkpoints recalled handling any passengers identified as selectees." See FAA, "American Airlines Flight #77: Hijacking and Crash into Pentagon." Sept. 11, 200 I. See also Tim Jackson interview {Apr. 12. 2004).

17 A.AL, ''American Airlines SABRE response for Flight 77 ," Sept. 11, 2001. See Letter from Desmond Barry, Jr, "Response to Commission question 77.8," March 15,2004.

18 UAL, "Flight 93 11 Sep EWR Bag Loading Status," Sept. II, 200l; UAL. "Flight 93 11 Sep EWR ACI Passenger History," Sept 11,2001; UAL, "Flight 93 11 Sep E\VRFull Bag History," Sept. 11, 2001; TSA, ''Selectee Status of September II Hijackers;" FBI, "The Fina124 Hours," Dec. 8, 2003. (S)

19 A.n October 27, 2000 comprehensive checkpoint assessment by the FAA found two security violations at Nevvark's A-1, both of which involved explosives trace detection (ETD). In the twe,nty-four months prior to 9111/01, the FAA conducted 45 screener evaluation tests at the cbe~kpoint, including 10 metal detector tests, 12 physical search tests and 23 x-ray tests. For metal detection, the teSt object was detected in 80% of the tests. The detection rates for physical searches and x-rays were 92% and 87% respectively. All of these detection rates met or exceeded the national averages for this time period. No FAA Special Assessments {"Red Team") were done at Newark security checkpoints over the two years prior to 9/11/01. See F A.A,., "Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EWR and lAD," Oct. 24, 2001. (SSI) See also FAA, "United Airlines Flight 93, September 11, 2001, Executive Report," Jan. 30, 2002.

20 UAL, Flight 93 check-in and boarding information. (SSI) See also FBI, "The Final24 Hours," Dec. 8, 2003. (S)

21 The Commission found no evidence to indicate that the hijackers manipulated the passenger loads on the aircraft they hijacked. Financial records did not reveal the purchase of any tickets beyond those they used for tl1em.c;elves. See FBI, "Documents in Response to and in-lieu of Briefing Request #6, Topic 8."

22 See A.AL, "American's Response to tl1e February 3, 2004 Requests," Mar. 15. 2004; AAL, "Dispatch Environmental ControL'Weekly Flight Summary Flight 11," Sept. 11,2001: i\A.L, "Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locatio11s During Takeoff and Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service for Flights 11 and 77:'' AAL, "Pac;senger Name List Flight 11/Scptember 11." The percentage of seats occupied on the aircraft (also known as ''load factor") on September II, 2001 was 51.26 percent, compared to an average load factor of 38.6 percent (for.~ #11 flights that operated on Tuesday's over the three months preceding 9/11/200 l ). These facts show that load factors on this flight were somewhat above the norm. The evidence does not suggest that passenger levels were manipulated by the hijackers in order to reduce the number of passengers they would be required to control. See AAL "Average Load Factor by Day-of-the-Week."

23 Based 011 NTSB and EM Air Traffic Control data. See AAL, "Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary: Flight 11," Sept. 1 L 2001; 1\'TSB, "Flight Path Study-. American Airlines Flight 11 "; Bill Halleck and Peggy Houck interview (Jan. 8, 2004). TI1e initial service assignments for Flight Attendants on AA Flight #11 would have placed Karen Martin working in the First Class cabin, with Bobbi

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A.restegui m the First Class Galley. Sara Low and Jean Roger would have been ~erving Business Class passengers. with Dianne Snyder ill the Mid-Galley. Betty Ong and Amy Sweeney would have been working in the Coach section, with Karen Nicosia in the aft galley. Jeftrey Collman would have been assigned to work in Coach, but to assist in First Class if needed.23 Given the higher "load factor" in First Class compared to Coach on 9/l I, it is possible he would have started in First Class. See AAL, "Flight Attendant .lump Seat Locations During Takeoff and Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service for Flights 11 and 77"; Bob Jordan briefing (Nov. 20, 2003).

24 Based on NTSB .Air Traffic Control Recording Factual Report and FAA Air Traffic Control data. See NTSB, "AAJ 1 Radio Communications;" NTSB, "UAL 175 Radio Communications." Given the fact that the cocl'"]Jit crew of American Flight 11 had been acknowledging all previous instructions from A TC that morning within a matter of seconds, and that when the first reporting of the hijacking was received a short time later (the 8:18:47 Betty Ong call) a number of actions had already been taken by the hijackers, it is most likely that the hijacking of Flight 11 occurred at 8:14 a.m.

25 On 9/ll an early draft of an executive summary prepared by FAA security staff for the agency's leadership included reference to an alleged report of a shooting aboard Flight 11. The Commission believes this was an erroneous report for the reason stated in Commission Staff Statement 4 (January 27m, 2004), including the fact that neither Betty Ong nor Amy Sweeney, the only two people v.tb.o communicated to the ground from aboard the aircraft. reported the presence of a gun or a shooting. Both reported knives and stabbings. AAL, transcript of call from Betty Ong - Nydia Gonzalez, Sept 11, 2001; A.Al., transcripts of call from Nydia Gonzalez - Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001; Al\l., transcripts of call ·from Nancy Wyatt- Ray Howland, Sept. 11, 2001; Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004). 26 Craig Marqui.;; interview (Nov. 19, 2003); Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004); Jim Dillon interview (Apr. 15, 2004). See also Ali, transcript of call from Betty Ong -Nydia Gonzalez, Sept ll, 2001.

27 AAL, transcript of call from Nydia Gonzalez- Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001.

2 8 AAL, transcript of call from Betty Ong - Nydia Gonzalez, Sept. 11, 2001; AAL transcript of call from Nydia Gonzalez - Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001. Regarding the clailn of a bomb, see Michael Woodward interview (Jan . .25, 2004).

29 American's flight attendants were well acquainted with the Reservations Office's 800-phone number because they call it frequently to help passengers with reservations questions. Calls to the number are routed to the first open line at one of several reservations facilities, including the reservations center in Cary. See Nydia Gonzalez interview (Nov. 19, 2003). Regarding the "Common Strategy," see F A.A., .. Air Carrier Standard Security Program," pp. 139j -139o, June 28, 1999 (SSI); Don Dillman briefing (Nov. 18, 2003): Bob Jordan briefing (Nov. 20, 2003). The cal1 from Ms. Ong was received initially at the Reservations Office by American Airlines employee Vanessa Minter, and then taken over by her r..:olleague Winston Sadler. Realizing the urgency of the siruation Mr. Sadler pushed an emergency button that simultaneously initiated a tape recording of the call and sent an alarm notifying Nydia Gonzalez, the reservations office supervisor, to pick up on the line. Gonzalez was paged to respond to the alarm and joined the call a short time later. Only the first four minutes of the phone call between Ong and the reservations center {Minter, Sadler and Gonzalez) was tape recorded be,cause the recently installed recording system in that office was designed with such a rer.;ording time limit on its tapes. Sec Nydia Gonzalez interview (Nov. 19, 2003); Nydia Gonzalez testimony, Jan. 27, 2004.

30 AAL, transcript of call from Betty Ong - Nydia Gonzalez, Sept. 11, 200 l.

31 FA.A. rules require all aircraft traveling above I 0,000 feet to emit a unique transponder signal. 111is signal was received by the FAA to create a radar image providing key flight data. The primary radar return occurs when the signal sent from a radar site bounces off an object in the sl'Y and indicates the presence of that object. Since the transponder signal identifies the aircraft's altitude to Air Traffic Control, precise information on Flight II 's altitude was lost from this point. See NTSB, "Flight Path Study- American S1JBJECT TO CLASSJFICA TION REVIEW 50 Chapter One, Version 070204- PPR SUBJECT TO CLASSIFJCA TION REVIEW

Airlines Flight 11." See also Nydia Gonzalez interview (Nov. 19, 2003); Craig Marquis interview (Nov. 19. 2003); Craig Marquis interview (Apr. 26, 2004); AAL, "Dispatch Envirorunental Control/Weekly Flight Summary: Flight 11 ," Sept. 11, 2001; AAL, transcript of call from Bill Halleck BOS A TC, Sept. 11, 2001. The Air Carrier Standard Security Program required airlines to immediately notify the FAA and FBI upon receiving information that an act or suspected act of airplane piracy has been committed.

32 See FAA recording, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, position 46R, at 8:25 a.m.: NTSB, "AA II Radio Communications." Flight Attendant Madeline "A.my" Sweeney aboard AA Flight #11 attempted to contact the American Airlines flight services office at Logan International Airport by GTE airphone, starting at 8:22 a.m. The office Ms. Sweeney was attempting to call managed the scheduling and operation of flight attendants and the phone number was well known to the American flight attendants operating out of Boston. Ms. Sweeney's first attempt to get through to the office failed, as did a second attempt at 8:24 a.m. When she got through to Ms. Nunez, the latter thought she had reported her flight as #12. Michael Woodward, supervisor at the Boston office, hearing that a problem had been reported aboard an .1\merican airplane went to American's gate area at Logan with his colleague Beth Williams. Woodward noted that the morning bank of .flights had all departed Boston and the gate area was quiet. He further realized that Flight 12 was a flight to Boston from the West Coast that had not even departed yet, so he and Williams retul1'led to the office to try to clarify the situation. See FBI, "American Airlines Airphone Usage," Sept. 20,2001 (LES); Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004). The phone call between Ms. Sweeney and Mr. Woodward lasted approximately twelve minutes (8:32a.m-8:44a.m.). This phone call was not taped. See AAL email, Woodward to Schmidt, "Flight 11 Account of Event~," Sept. 19, 2001; A..-\L, Michael Woodward notes, Sept 11, 2001; FBI interview of Michael Woodward, Sept. 13,2001; AAL interview of Michael Woodward, Sept. 11, 2001 ; A-\L, transcript of call from Nancy Wyatt -Ray Howland, Sept 11, 2001.

33 See AA.L, transcript of call from Nydia GollZalez- Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001; 1\'TSB, ''Flight Path Study American Airlines Flight 11 ;" A.AL, transcript of call from Nydia Gonzalez - Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001; A.AL, transcript of call from Nancy Wyatt- Ray Howland, Sept. 11,2001.

34 Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004).

35 };,.A.L, transcript of call from Nydia Gonzalez- Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001; Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004); 1'\.AL, Michael Woodward notes, Sept. 11, 200L Also at this time American Airlines completed its "lockout" procedure for Flight 11. This procedure restricted access to information about a hijacked flight in accordance with the Air Carrier Standard Security program which required air carriers to "take all reasonable steps to ensure that its employees and contractors who obtain details about the hijacking do not divulge information to persons other than those with operational need to know." See FAA., "Air Carrier Standard Security Program," June 28, 1999, p. 110.

36 AAL, transcript of call from Nancy Wyatt Ray Howland, Sept. 11, 2001; Michael Woodward intervie\v (Jan. 25. 2004).

37 AA.L. transcript of call from Nydia Gonzalez- Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001.

38 A.A.L, transcript of call from Nydia GollZalez- Craig Marquis, Sept. 11. 2001: Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004).

39 NTSB, "Flight Path Study- American Airlines Flight 11."

40 See UAL, ''Flight 175: Flight Attendant Positions/Jumpseats.'' (SSI) FAA, "Executive Summary September 12, 200 1." and FAA, "Executive Summary Chronology of a Multiple Hijacking Crisis, September 11, 2001," September 17. 2001; UAL, "Flight 175 A CARS Report," Sept. 11, 2001; UA..L, "Flight 175 Flight Data Recap," Sept. 11, 2001. The 56 passengers represented a load factor of 33.33 percent of the plane's passenger capacity of 168. This figure is considerably below the 49.22 percent average load factor for Flight 175 for Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September 11 (June 11

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through September 4, 2001), and in fact represents the third lowest load factor among all the 93 scheduled flights in that time period. UA 175 was cancelled on Monday, July 16, 2001 and contained a load factor of only 28.57 percent on Wednesday, August 29,2001. See UAL, "Flight I 75 BOS-LAX Load Factors." However, the September 11, 2001 passenger load was similar to the loads on comparable Tuesday dates in 1999 (37.2 percent on 9/14/99) and 2000 (36.6 percent on 9!12/00). See UAL, "Explanation of Load Factors."

41 FAA, "Executive Summary September 12, 2001 ,"and FA.A, "Executive Summary Chronolo&'Y of a Multiple Hijacking Crisis, September ll, 2001 ,"September 17, 2001; NTSB, "Flight Path Study- United Airlines Flight 175;" NTSB, "UAL 175 Radio Communications." At or around this time, Flight Attendants Kathryn Laborie and Alfred Marchand would have begun cabin service in First Class, while Flight Attendants Amy King and Robert Fangman would have done the same in Business Class, and Michael Tarrou, iuny Jarret and Alicia Titus would be doing so in Economy Cla.'lS. Unlike at American, United Flight Att~ndant.s were oot given cockpit la:::ys as of 9/11. Instead, such keys were stowed in the cabin. On Flight 175, a cockpit .key was located in the overhead bin above Seats 1A and 1B in First Class. See Don Dillman briefing (Nov. 18, 2003); Bob Jordan briefing {Nov. 20, 2003); UAL, "Flight 175: Flight Attendant Positions/Jumpseats." (SSI)

42 Flight 175 had been asked by air traffic controllers to look for an American Airlines 767 (Flight 11) back at 8:37, and had reported spotting the ai:roraft at 8:38. At 8:41, the #175 flight crew reported having "heard a suspicious transmission" fmm another aircraft shortly after takeo.ti, "like someone keyed the mike and said everyone stay in your seats." See NTSB, "UAL 175 Radio Communications."

43 See FBI interview ofLee Hanson, Sept. I1, 2001 (LES}; Marc Policastro interview (Nov. 21, 2003); FBI interview ofMarc Policastro, Sept. 11, 2001 (LES); and FBI interview ofLouise Sweeney, Sept. 28, 2001. (LES) Peter Hanson was assigned to seat 19E, but called from row 30CDE. Garnet Bailey was seated in 6F, but called from row 32CDE, and Brian Sweeney was originally in 15A, but called from 31 AB. The Flight Attendant calls to star-fix were made from row 3I. See DOJ briefing on cell and phone calls from UA Flight 175, May 13, 2004. (LES) Both flight II and flight 175 were Boeing 767 double­ aisled aircraft. In both cases the hijackers had two non-pilots seated in first class close to the cockpit door; the pilot sat in the middle aisle close behind; and a least one hijacker seated close behind the pilot On both flights non-pilot hijackers were seated next to the left and right aisle for operational purposes. Flight 77 and flight 93 were Boeing 757 single-aisle aircraft. The hijackers seating patterns on the two flights resembled each other with the pilot-hijacker seated in the first row closest to the cockpit door. See A.AL, schematics for flight'i 11 and 77; U. .<\L, schematics for flights 175 and 93; Hijacker seat assignments.

44 NTSB, "Flight Path Study- United Airlines Flight 175;" l'.'TSB, "UAL 175 Radio Communications."

45 DOJ briefmg, "Phone Calls from UA Flights 175 and 93," May I3, 2004. (LES) FBI interview of Lee Hanson, Sept. 1 L 2001. (LES)

46111e time of8:52 a.m. is based on GTE-Airfone records, which indicate two completed calls to the SAMC Star-fix location from flight 175, the first of75 seconds duration beginning at 8:52:01 a.m. Eastern Time. and the second of31 seconds beginning at 8:56:19 a.m. Eastern Time. The recipient of the Star-fix call(s) from flight 175, Marc Policastro, recalled only one such communication. United investigators determined that there was only one call. See UAL letter, Jeff Plantz to David J. Novak, "lJnited States v. Zacarias Moussaoui Flight 175 •Fix Calls," July 31, 2002. (SSI) Whether or not there were two calls or only one, the longer first communication is more consistent with Policastro's recollection of the duration and information imparted during the call. See Marc Policastro interview (Nov. 21, 2003). Flight crew onboard UAL aircraft could contact the United office in San Francisco simply by dialing *349 on an airphonc. See FBI intervjew of David Price, Jan. 24, 2002. (LES) Though he believed the Flight Attendant had identified himself at the time ofthe call, Policastro was not sure of the identity afterward. However, when read the name of the three male flight attendants he was certain that the caller was not either Alfred Marchand or Michael Tarrou, and tlms he thought it must have been Robert Fangman. See Marc Policastro interview {Nov. 2I, 2003); FBI interview ofMarc Policastro, Sept.Jl, 2001. (LES)

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47 NTSB, "Flight Path Study-- United Airlines Flight 175 "

48 See DO.l briefing on cell and phone calls from lJA Flight 175, May 13, 2004 (LES); FBI interview of Julie Sweeney, Oct. 2, 2001 (LES); FBI interview of Louise Sweeney, Sept.. 28,2001 (LES)

49 See DOJ briefing on cell and phone calls from UA Flight 175, May 13, 2004 (LES); FBI interview of Lee Hanson, Sept. 11,2001 (LES).

50 See FBI interview of Lee Hanson, Sept. 11, 2001 (LES); FBI interview of Louise Sweeney, Sept. 28, 2001. (LES)

51 NTSB, "Flight Path Study United Airlines Flight I 75"

52 .r\AL, "Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff And Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service for Flights 11 and 77;" AAL email, Juanice Young to Andrea Clark, "Flight Crews," Sept. 12, 2001, The 58 pa.~sengers represented a load factor of 3 2.95 percent of the plane's passenger capacity of 176. This figure is almost identical to the 32.8 percent average load factor for Flight 77 for Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September 11 (June 11 through September 4, 2001). In this three-month period, Tuesdays were the least trnveled day for Flight 77, with Wednesday's next lowest at 40.3 percent. See AAL, "Average Load Factor by Day-of-Week for Flights 11 and 77;" A..AL email, Christopher R. Christensen to Jolm Raidt, "Kean Commission- Supplemental Document Requests," Jan. 20,2004. Regarding the jump seats, see AAL Letter, Desmond Barry to JohnRaidt., "American's response to the February 2, 2004 Requests," Mar. 15, 2004, p. 12. Regarding the guarding of the keys, see Craig Marquis, Craig Parfitt, Joe Bertapelle and Mike Mulcahy interview (Nov. 19, 2003).

53 .AAL, chronological listing by the SOCC (Systems Operations Command Center), Sept. 11, 2001, p. 2; NTSB, "Flight Path Study- American Airlines Flight 77."; Flight Attendant Renee May would likely have started working in the First Class Galley between the cockpit and First Class, Michele Heidenberger would have been in the Aft Galley at the rear of the plane, Jennifer Lewis would have been circulating in First Class, and Kenneth Lewis would have been in circulating in the Main Cabin. See AAL, "Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff And Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Position& During Start of Cabin Service for Flights 11 and 77;" NTSB, "Flight Path Study American Airlines Flight 77 ."FAA recording, Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center, position HNN R, Sept. 11, 200 I. FBI interview of , Sept. 11, 2001 (LES); FBI interview of Ronald and Nancy May, Sept. 12, 2001 (LES); AAJ, "Dispatch Environmental ControL'W eekly Summary, Flight 77", Sept. 11, 2001.

54 See NTSB, "Flight Path Study American Airlines Flight 77 ." Secondary radar contact for Flight 77 was lost because the hijackers turned off the transponder. Primary radar contact for Flight 77 was lost because the "preferred" radar covering this geohrraphic area did not have a primary radar system, the "supplemental" radar had poor primary coverage in this geographic area, and because the FAA A TC software did not allow the display of primary radar data from the "tertiary'' and "quadrary" radars for this geographic area.'' On Flight ll the transponder signal was turned off at 8:21 a.m.; on flight 175 the transponder code was changed at 8:47a.m; On flight 77 the transponder signal was turned off at R:56 a.m.; On flight 93 the tram;ponder signal was turned off at 0:41 a.m. See F..<\A, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001 ,"Sept. 17, 200 I; Richard Byard inlervinv (Sept. 24, 2003); Linda Poviuelli interview (Sept. 24, 2003). See also NTSB, ''AA 77 Radio Communications;" AA.L, ''Dispatch Environmental Control1Weekly Flight Summary: Flight 77, September 11, 2001."

55 Larry Wansley interview (Jan. 8, 2004); Gerard Arpey interview (Jan. 8, 2004); AAL, "'Systems Operation Command Center (SOCC) Chronology for September 11, 2001."

56 FBI, "American Airlines Airphone Usage," Sept. 20, 2001 (l.. ES): and DOJ briefing on t:ell and phone calls from AA Flight 77, .May 20.2004 (LES); FBI interview of Ronald and Nancy May, Sept. 12. 200]. (LES)

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57 The records available for the phone calls from A.li.L Flight 77 do not allow for a detennination of which of four "connected calls to unknown numbers" represent the two connections between Barbara and Ted Olson, although it is believed by the FBI and the DOJ that all four of these calls represent communications between Barbara Olson and her husband's office (based on the fact that all family members of the Flight 77 passengers and crew were canvassed to see if they had received any phone calls from the hijacked flight, and only Renee May's parents and Ted Olson indicated that they had received such calls). The four calls were at 9:15:34 a.m. for one minute, 42 seconds; 9:20:15 a.m. for four minutes, 34 seconds; 9:25:48 a.m. for two minutes, 34 seconds; and 9:30:56 a.m. for four minutes, 20 seconds. See DOJ briefing on cell and phone calls from AA Flight 77, May 20, 2004. (LES) FBI interview of1heodore Olson, Sept. 11, 2001 (LES); FBI interview of Helen Voss, Sept 14, 2001 (LES); AAL email, Christopher Christensen to John Raidt, "Kean Commission- Supplemental Document Request," Jan. 20, 2004.

58 DOJ brief.mg on cell and phone calls from AA Flight 77, May 20,2004 (LES); FBI interview of Thoodore Olson, Sept. 11,2001 (LES); FBI interview of Allen Ferber, Sept. 14,2001. (LES)

59 FAA, "Summary of Air Traffic HUackEvents: September 11, 2001," Sept. 17, 2001; NTSB, "Flight Path Study - American Airlines Flight 77" and staff analysis of radar data.

60 FAA, "Summary of.tili Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001," Sept. 17,2001; NfSB, "Flight Path Study-American Airlines Flight 77;" FAA., "Report of Aircraft Accident," Nov. 13,2001.

61 NTSB, "Flight Path Study- American Airlines Flight 77;" FAA, "Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation 200l,"p. 41.

62 The flight attendant assignment;; and seating included: Chief Flight Attendant Deborah Welsh (First Class, Seat Jl at takeoff); Sandra Bradshaw {Coach, Seat 15); Wanda Green (First Class, Seat 14); Lorraine Bay (Coach, Seat 13); and CeeCee Lyles {Coach, Seat J6). See letter from Susan Ellis, "Response to Questiom for the Record for UA Flight 93," Apri15, 2004; FAA., "Chronology of the and Subsequent Events through October 24, 2001;" UAL, copies of electronic boarding passes for flight 93, Sept. 11, 2001; Bob Varcadipane interview and Newark Tower briefing (May4, 2004).

63 Although the flight schedule indicates an 8:00a.m. "departure," this was the plane's departure from the gate area. F ..t\A Air Traffic Control Tower at Newark Llberty told the Commission that normal taxi-time from the gate to the runway for departure was approximately 15 minutes. See Bob Varcadipane interview and Newark Tower briefmg (May 4, 2004).

14 ; FAA knew or strongly suspected that Flight 11 was a hijacking 11 minutes after it was taken over and that Flight 175 was a hijacking 9 minutes after it was taken over. There is no evidence to indicate that FA.<\ recognized Flight 77 as a hijacking until it crashed into the Pentagon.

65 On September 6, 1970, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked a Pan American Boeing 747, a TWA Boeing 707, and a Swissair DC-8. On September 9, a British VC-1 0 was hijacked as well. An attempt to hijack an Israeli airliner was thwarted. 'Ibe Pan American plane landed in Cairo. It~ passengers were released and the aircraft was blown up. The other three aircraft were floV~-'Il to Dawson Field, near Amman, Jordan. The passengers were held captive; the planes were destroyed. The hijacking crisis turned into a civil war in Jordan and an international crisis, as the Jordaniai'l government used force to restore its control of the country. See, F A.A, Civil Aviation Refe~ndbook, "Appendix D: Chronology of Significant Events in Civil Aviation History," May 1999. ~-the FA.t\'s Air Traffic Control center in Boston recommended to the FAA Command Center that a cockpit warning be sent to the pilots of all commercial aircraft in the sk')' on the morning of9/11 to secure their cockpits. While Boston Center sent out such warnings to the commercial nights in its sector, we could fmd no evidence that a nationwide warning was issued hy the Air Traffic Control system.

66 FAA Certified Tape, Herndon Conm1and Center, Line 5114, 9:07:13; fAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, position 15, 9:1 9 a.m.

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6 7 Based on FAA Air Traffic Control data. Regarding the FAA's awareness of multiple hijackings, see AAL, transcript of call from Nydia Gonzalez - Craig Marquis, Sept. II, 200 I ; Craig Marquis interview (Nov. 19, 2003); AAL, "Systems Operation Command Center (SOCC) Chronology for September II, 2001"; UAL. briefing on UAL System Operations Control Center and Crisis Center, Nov. 20, 2003; Rich ''Doc" Miles interview (Nov. 21, 2003); UAL, "Timeline for DiJ>'Patch/SMFDO Activities- Terrorist Crisis," Sept. 11, 2001.

6& See Ellen King interview (Apr. 5, 2004 ). FAA i\.ir Traffic Conrrol tapes indicate that at 9:19 a.m. the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon, Virginia ordered controllers to send a cockpit warning to Delta Flight 1989 because, like AAL flight 11 and UA.L flight 175 was a transcontinental flight departing Boston's Logan lnternational Airport.

69 ZBW-ARTCC-148, 46R, at 8:24:38 and 8:24:56; Peter Zalewili interview (Sept 23, 2003).

70 Ed Ballinger interview (Apr. 14, 2004). A company-wide order for dispatchers to warn cockpits was not issued until 9:21 a.m.. See UA.L, "Timeline for Di'ipatchiSMFDO Activities- Terrorist Crisis, September 11, 200 1. We could find no evidence that American Airlines sent any cockpit warnings to their aircraft on 9/1 1 whatsoever. See AAL briefing, Apr. 26, 2004. While one of Ballinger's colleagues assisted him, Ballinger remained responsible for multiple flights. American Airline's policy was to remove the dispatcher's responsibilities for all other flights so that the dispatcher could Rx:us on the hijacked aircraft. See Al1.L, transcript of cu.ll from Nydia Gonzalez - Craig Marquis, Sept 11, 200 I; Ed Ballinger interview (Apr. 14, 2004)

71 Based on Commission staff review of:t-.'TSB Flight Data Recording and Cockpit Voice Recording of data, and of Aircraft Communication and Reporting System (ACARS) messages sent to and from Flight 93. NTSB, "United Airlines Flight 93, Pennsylvania;". See UAL, "Ed Ballinger A CARS Log," Sept. 11, 2001; ACARS documents indicate time of message transmission and receipt.

72 Based on Commission staff review ofNTSB Flight Data Recording and Cockpit Voice Recording of data, l'.!ISB, "United lililines Flight 93, Pennsylvania;" .FAA, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 200 1," Sept 17, 200 I. See FBI, "Transcript of the Flight Voice Recorder for United Flight 93," Dec. 4, 2003. See NTSB, "Transcript of ATC communications with aB-757 (UAFlight 93) which crashed near Shanksville, PA on September 11, 2001."

73. The thirty seven passengers represented a load factor of20.33%ofthe plane's seating capacity of 182. This figure is considerably below the 52.09% average load factor for Flight 93 on Tuesdays in the three month period prior to September 11 (June 11 September 4, 2001). See UJ\, "Flight 93 EWR-SFO load factors." There were five passengers holding reservations for Flight 93 who did not show for the flight. This was below the number of average no shows for the Tuesday flight from June 11 - September 4, 2001. All five "no shows" were interviewed and cleared by the FBI. See FBI, "No Shows for 9/11 Flights, Sept. 18. 200].

14 INS. \Vithdrawal of Application for Admi8sion, Record of Mohammad .t>J Kahtani, Aug. 4, 200 I.

75 FBI. Pentbom Summary, Feb. 29, 2004, p. 69. (Ll~S)

76 See 14 CFR, Chapter 1, Section 121.547, "Admission to Flight Deck;'' UAL, "United flight 93 copies of boarding passes," Sept. 11, 2001. One passenger reported that 10 first class passengers were aboard the flight. If that number is accurate. it would include the four hijackers. See FBI interview of Lisa Jefferson, Sept 11, 20()]. United Airlines manifest records fur Flight 93 show that passengers Thomas Burnett, . Joseph DeLuca, Edward Felt, Linda Grondlund, and Mark Rothenberg were the six passengers holding first class cabin seats. See UAL, flight 93 pas~enger manifest, Sept II. 2001. All but Rothenberg communicated with the ground during the flight. None mentioned all)'One from their cabin having gone into the cock-pit before the hijacking. Moreover, the pilot and co-pilot of Flight 93 were experienced, well­ regarded professionals, who would be quite unlikely tD allow an observer into the cock'}Jit pre or post take-

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off who had not obtained tbt proper permission for such privileges prior to the flight. See UI\L, data from personnel files ofFlight 93 pilots. For jumpseat information see "llnited Airlines Weight and Balance Information: Flight number 93-2001-09-11."

77 11Je CVRs and FDR's from America11 Flight 11 and United Flight 175 were not found, and the CVR from American Flight 77 was burned to the extent that data were not recoverable .. See FBl, "Transcript of the Flight Voice Recorder for United Flight 93," Dec. 4, 2003. See also 14 CFR 25.1457,91.609,91-1045 and 121.359.

78 As with Atta on Flight 11, Jarrah apparently did not know how to operate the communication radios, thus his attempt<> to communicate with the passengers were broadcast on the ACT channeL See FBI, "Trdllscript of the Flight Voice Recorder for United Flight 93," Dec. 4, 2003.

79 Evidence derived from audio read-out of Cockpit Voice Recorder from Flight 93. A transcript of CVR was prepared by the National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.. See FBI, "Transcript of the Flight Voice Recorder for United Flight 93," Dec. 4, 2003.

80 The airphone system was capable of transmitting only eigh1 calls at any one time.

81 Evidence derived from tape recordings of radio transmissions over FAA Air Traffic Control radio frequencies, and by the Flight 93 Cockpit Voice Recorder data. FBI, "Transcript of the Flight Voice Recorder for United Flight 93," Dec. 4, 2003.

82 FBI report, , Sept, 11, 2001; f"'BI report, Sandy Bradshaw, Sept. 11, 2001. Text messages warning the cockpit of Flight 93 were sent to the aircraft by United _-\irlines Flight Dispatcher Ed Ballinger at 9:24a.m. See UAL, "Ed Ballinger's ACARS Log," Sept. 11,2001.

83 We have relied mainly on the record of FBI interviews with the people who received calls. The FBI interviews were conducted while memories were still fresh, and less likely to have been affected by reading the accounts of others or hearing stories in the media. In some cases we have conducted our own interviews to supplement or verifY the record. See FBI report, Todd Beamer, Sept, 11, 2001; FBI report, Mark Bingham, Sept. 13, 2001; FBI report, Marion Britton, Sept. 14, 200 l; FBI report, Thomas Burnett, Sept 11, 2001; FBI report, Joseph DeLuca, Sept. 13, 2001; FBI report, Edward Felt, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI report, , Sept. l 1, 2001; FBI report, Lauren Grandcolas, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI report, Linda Gronlund, Sept. 1 1, 2001: FBI report, Honor Wainio, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI report, Sandy Bradshaw, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI report, CeeCee Lyles, Sept. 15, 2001.

84 FBI report, Thomas Burnett, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI report, Marion Britton, Sept. 14, 2001; Lisa Jefferson interview (May 1l, 2004): FBI interview of Lisa Jefferson, Sept. 11, 2001; Richard Beirne interview (Nov. 21, 2003).

85 See Jere Longman, Among the Heroes--United Flight 93 & the Passengers & Crew Who Fought Back (Harper-Collins Publishers. 2002). p. 107; Deena Burnett interview (Apr. 26, 2004); FBI report, Jeremy Glick, Sept. 11. 2001; Lyzbeth Glick interview (Apr. 22, 2004). Experts told us that a gunshot would definitely be audible on the CVR. The FBI found no evidence of a firearm at the crash site of Flight 93. See FBl, "Document~ in Respon~e to and in Lieu of Briefing Request #6, Topic 11" (LES); The FBI collected 14 pieces of evidence of knives or portions of knives at the Flight 93 crash site, see FBI "Knives Found at the UA Flight 93 Crash Site."

86 See also FBI. "Documents in Response to and in Lieu of Briefing Request #6, Topic 11" (LES) FBI report, Jeremy Glick. Sept. 11, 2001

87 FBI report, Sandy Bradshaw, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI report, Jeremy Glick, Sept. 11. 2001; FBI report, Thomas Burnett, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI report, Marion Britton, Sept. 14, 2001; FBI report, Linda Gronlund,

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Sept. 11. 2001; FBI report, CeeCee Lyles. Sept. 15, 200 l; FBI rt'Port, Sandy Bradshaw, Sept. 11. 2001; FBI report, Todd Beamer, Sept, 11, 2001; FBI repon, Honor Wainio, Sept 11,2001.

8R FBI report, Honor Wainio, Sept l I, 2001; FBI report, Sandy Bradsl1aw, Sept 11, 2001; Philip Bradshaw interview (June 15, 2004).

89 Based on NTSB, Flight Data Recording and Cockpit Voice Recording data. 1'-i'TSB, "United luriines Flight 93, Pennsylvania;" FBI, "Transcript of the Flight Voice Recorder for United Flight 93," Dec. 4, 2003.

90 Ba~ed on NTSB Flight Data Recording data. At 9:55: II a.m. Jarrah would dial in the VOR frequency for the VOR Navaid at Washington National Airport further indicating that the attack was planned for the Nation's capital.

91 92 The cockpit voice recorder clearly captures the words of a hijacker including words in Arabic from the microphone in the pilot headset up to the en.d of the flight. The hijackers statements, the clarity of the recording, the position of the microphone in the pilot headset and the corresponding manipulation of flight controls provide tl1e evidence. The quote was taken from !he cockpit voice recorder. The flying time was calculated according to the distance from the crash site to Washington, DC, given the aircraft's airspeed.

93 Flight 93 was loaded with 48,700 lbs of jet fuel at take-off. See UAL, "Kean Commission New Questions for the Record," Apr. 5, 2004, p. 6.

94 The second half of the 20th Century \Vitnessed a tremendous gwwth of the ai.r transport industry and corresponding responsibilities for the FAA. The total number of worldv.'ide airliner passengers gre>v :from 177 million in 1965 to an estimated 1.84 billion in 2001, and the number of U.S. passengers increased from I 03 million to over 672 million over the same period. 94 Throughout that time, the F •.<\A (renamed the Federal Aviation Admini

95 FAA, "Administrator's Fact Book," July 200 l; FAA, "Administrator's Fact Book" Mar. 2004; Benedict Slmey interview (May 2L 2004}: John McCartney interview (Dec. 17. 2003).

96 F:\J\, "Federal Aviation Regulation Sec. 91.215 Air Traffic Control transponder and altitude reporting equipment and use," Amdt. 91-267, 66 FR 21066, Apr. 27.2001.

97 DOD ~4th Radar Evaluation Squadron compact disk, "9/11 Autoplay;'' Charles 111omas interview (May 4. 2004); John TI1omas interview (May 4, 2004); Joe Cooper interview (Sept. 22. 2003): Tim Spence (Sept. 30. 2003). For background information on terminal approach control, see FAA, air traffic publications online at w>vw.faa.goviATPubslAJM1Chap4iaim0401.html. Times attributed to audio tran&missions were derived by Commission staff from files provided by the Federal A\'iation Administration (FAA) and the Northeast Air Defense Sector based on audio time stamps contained within the files provided by the sender.

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FAA tapes are certified accumte to Universal Coordinated Time hy Quality Assurance specialists at FAA air traffic facilities. Northeast Air Defense Sector files are time stamped as accurate to the Naval Observatory clock. Staff also compared audio times to certified transcripts when available. Key times were verified independently at both the New York and the GSA offices.

98 Fl\A briefing, "Boston Center, New England Region," Sept. 22-24, 2003.

99 NORAD's mission is set forth in a series of renewable agreements between the United States and Canada. According to the agreement in effect on 9ill, the "primary missions" ofNORAD were "aerospace warning" and "aerospace control" for North America. "Aerospace wllllling" wa..<~ defmed as "the monitoring of man-made objects in space and the detection, validation, and warning of attack against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles ...." "Aerospace control" was defined as "prmriding 8W"Veillance and control of the airspace of Canada and the United States." See State Department memo, Exchange of Notes Between Canada and the United States Regarding Extension of the NORAD Agreement, Mar. 28, 1996. For NORAD defining its job as defending against external attacks, see DOD Publication, Leslie Filson, Air War Over America (First Air Force 2003) at pp. 6-7 ("One thing was constant before during and after the Cold War, the mission was always focused outward.").

100 "NOR.A..D Strategy Review" July 1992, p. 55.

Wl DOD briefing, "NORAD Headquarters Merchant and Goddard)" Mar. 4, 2004. For the authority to shoot down a commercial aircraft prior to 9/11, see General Myers interview (Feb 17., 2004), describing how NORAD requested authority from the President to shoot down golfer Payne Stewart's plane-- after the pilot and passengers lost consciousness-- to prevent the aircraft from flying into a major city. The authority was granted, but the issue became moot when the plane ran out of fuel and crashed in a South Dakota field. See also Chuck Green interview (April21. 2004), in which he described a White House table top exercise in 1999, chaired by Richard Clarke, that included a scenario in which a terrorist group loaded a lear jet with explosives and took off for a suicide mission to Washington. According to Green, military officials participating in the exercise said they could scramble fighter jet'; from Langley .P..ir Force Base to chase the aircraft, but they would need "executive" orders to do so.

102 For information on NORAD/CONR command and control, see NOR/ill's webpage online at wv.'w.norad.mil/index.cfin'1fuseaction=home.flash. Also see interviev.'S with Ralph Eberhart (Mar. 1, 2004) (S); Larry Arnold (Feb. 3, 2004); Alan Scott (Feb. 4, 2004); Roben Marr (Jan. 23, 2004) for information on how these military commanders interacted on 9/1 1. Also see Adam J. Herbert, "The Return ofNOR.t\D", Air Force Magazine, February 2002.

103 Donald Quenneville interview (Jan. 7, 2004); Langley Air Force Base I 19th Fighter Wing briefing (Oct. 6-7, 2003).

104 Adam J. Herbert, "The Return ofNOR.i\D", Air Force Magazine, February 2002; http:i/v.n.vv.·.norad.mil

105 Collin Scoggins interview (Sept. 12, 2003); Collin Scoggins interview (Jan. 8, 2004); FAA, "Crisis Management Handbook for Significant Events," Feb. 15, 2000: DOD CJCS instruction, "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict .AJrborne Objects," June 1, 2001.

106 See FAA air traffic publications, "10-2-6, Hijacked Aircraft"; David Bottiglia interview (Oct. 1, 2003). ''In addition to activation of the Aviation Crisis Center at FAA. Headquarters, a Crisis Management Team is established at the applicable regional operations center by the regional civil aviation security division, and an onsite command center iii established for the operations of an onsite decision making team. The onsite command center. as a minimum, will be composed of an FAA security representative and representatives of the FBl, affected air carrier, and airpon operator, if appropriate," See F.A.A, "Crisis Management Handbook," Feb., 2000. Commission staff leamed through interviews of controllers at various FAA

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Centers that an air traffic controller"s first response to an aircraft incident is to notify a supervisor. The ~upervisor then notifies the Traffic Management Unit and the Operations Manager itl Charge. The FA..A. Center then notifies the appropriate Regional Operations Center (ROC). Tile ROC in rum contacts FAA Headquarters. See Terry Biggio (Sept. 22, 2003 ). According to Biggio, prior to 9/11, loss of radio communications with an airplane (i.e., NORDO aircraft) for a brief period of time was a frequent occurrence. Loss of an aircraft's trlill8ponder signal was relatively infrequent, but not unheard of. An airplane that had deviated significantly from its intended course was indicative of a serious mechanical problem. Biggio did not recall any specific instance of an aircraft deviating from its course as severely as American 11 did on 9111. Biggio stated that the combination of three factors--loss of radio contact, loss of transponder signal and course deviation-which occurred with AAII, was serious enough for Biggio to contact the Regional Operations Center in Burlington, M.<\. However, without hearing the threatening commlmication from the cockpit, he doubts AA11 Boston Center would have been recognized or labeled AA 11 "a hijll.ck.." For more on the ATC notification procedure, see FAA air traffic publications, "Order 711 0.65M, section 10-2-6, Hijacked Aircraft, part B," which in.~tructs controllers to "notify supervisory personnel of the situation." See also FAA air traffic publications, Order 7610.4, Special Military Operations, section 7-1-1 and 7-1-2; Shirley Miller interview (Mar. 30, 2004); Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004).

107 FAA air traffic publications, "Order 7610.4, Section 7-1-2, Requests for Service," Feb. 24, 2000; DOD CJCS instruction, "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objet.'l:S," June 1, 2001.

108 Ralph Eberhart interview (.Mar. 1, 2004) (S); Alan Scott interview (Feb. 4, 2004); Robert Marr interview (Jan. 23, 2004); FAA air traffic publications, "Order 7610.4, Section 7-4-2, Position Report within NORAD Radar Coverage," Feb. 24, 2000; DOD letterhead memorandum, "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destru...'iion of Derelict Airborne Objects," June 1, 200 I; DOD CJSC instruction, "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects," June 1, 2001.

109 FA>\ air traffic publications, "Order 7 61 0.4, Section 7-1-6, Air/Ground Communications Security," Feb. 24, 2000;" FAA air traffic publications, "Order 7610.4, Section 7-2-3, Vectors," Feb. 24, 2000.

110 Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 22, 2003); Terry Biggio interview (Sept. 22, 2003); Terry Biggio interview (January 8, 2004); Collin Scoggins interview (Sept. 22, 2003); Daniel Bueno interview (Sept. 22, 2003). For evidence of the numerous attempts by air traffic control to raise AAL I I, see FAA letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcript; aircraft accident; AAL 11; New York, NY; September 11, 2001," Feb. 15, 2002,p. 7.

Ill DOD 84lh Radar Evaluation Squadron compact disk, "9/1 I Autoplay- Multiple Incident Response, WTC Incident Aircraft #1 ," 8:20:50 a.m.; Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 22, 2003); John Schippani interview (Sept. 22, 2003).

1 12 Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 22, 2003); John Schippani interview (Sept. 22, 2003).

113 FAA letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcript; aircraft accident; AAL 11; New York, Nr; September 11, 2001 ,"Feb. 15, 2002. p. 11; Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 23, 2003).

114 Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 23, 2003); John Schippani intervie\v (Sept. 22, 2003);Terry Biggio interview (Sept. 22, 2003); Terry Biggio interview (Jan. 8, 2004); Robert Jones interview (Sept. 22, 2003).

115 F A.A. audio file. Boston Center, Traffic Management Uniti Severe Weather Position, at 8:27:53 a.m; FAA letterhead memorandum. "Full Transcript; A.ircraft Accident,'' p. 2; FAA, "Boston Center Daily Record of Facility Operation," Sept. 11, 2001; Terry Biggio interview (Sept. 22, 2003); Terry Biggio interview (Jan. 8, 2004); Daniel Bueno interv1ew (Sept. 22, 2004); See FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, pos1tion 14, line 5114,8:28 a.m. (or see excerpt from transcript completed by Miller Reponing Co.); FAA letterhead memorandum, "Transcription of9/11 Tapes," Sept. 29, 2003, p.2; FAA audio file. Herndon Command Center, line 4525, 8:32- 8:33 a.m.

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116 See FAA letterhead memorandum, "Transcription of9/11 Tapes," Sept. 29, 2003; FAA audio tile, Herndon Command Center, line 4525, 8:31 ~8:33a.m.; FAA, "September 11, 2001 New England Region Daily Log"; Daniel Bueno interview (Sept. 2003 ); Terry Biggio interview (Sept. ::!2, 2003); Terry Biggio interview (Jan. 8, 2004).

117 FAA letterhead memorandum, "full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; AAL I 1; New York, 1'-'Y; September II, 2001 :·Feb. 15,2002, p. 12; Fi\A audio file, Boston Center, position 46R, 8:33:59 a.m.

118 FAA letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; .1\.AL 11; New Y ark. 1'-<'Y; September II, 2001 ,"Jan. 28. 2002, p. 5; FAA audio file, Boston Center, posilion 20R, 8:36:04 a.m.

119 FAA letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; AAL 11; New York. NY; September II, 2001," Apr. 19, 2002, p. 5; FAA audio file, Boston Center, position severe weather/ traffic management unit, 8:33:50 a.m.; Terry Biggio interview (Sept. 22, 2003); Collin Scoggins interview (Sept 21, 2003); Collin Scoggins interview (Jan. 8, 2004); Daniel Bueno interview (Sept. 22, 2003).

l?n On 9/ll NORAD was scheduled to conduct a military exercise, Vigilant Guardian, which postulated a bomber attack from the former Soviet Union. Commission staff investigated whether military preparations for the large-scale exercise compromised the military's response to the real-world terrorist attack on 9/11. According to General Eberhart, "it took about 30 seconds," to make the adjustment to the real world situation. See Ralph Eberhart testimony, June 17, 2004. TI1e response was, if anything, expedited by the increased number of staff at the sectors and at NORAD due to the scheduled exercise. Commission staff agrees with this assessment. See Robert Marr {Jan. 23, 2004).

121 For the distance between Otis Air Force Ba..'>e and New York City, see Alan Scott testimony, May 17, 2003. For order from NEA.DS to Otis to placeF-15s at battle stations, see NEADS audio file, Weapons Director Technician Position, recorder 2, channell4, 8:37:15 a.m. Also see interviews with Otis and NE..<\DS personnel: Jeremy Powell interview (Oct. 27, 2003): Michael Kelly interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Donald Quenneville interview (Jan. 7, 2004). Also see interviews with Otis fighter pilots: Daniel Nash interview (Oct. 14, 1003) and Timothy Duffy (Jan. 7, 2004). According to the Joseph Cooper from Boston Center, "I coordinated with Huntress. I advised Huntress we had a hijacked aircraft. I requested some assistance. Huntress requested and I supplied pertinent information. I was advised aircraft might be sent from Otis." See FAA, personnel statement ofJosepb Cooper, Oct. 30,2001.

122 Robert Marr interview (Jan. 23, 2004); Leslie Filson, Air War Over America (Headquarters 1st Air Force Public i\ffairs Office, 1003) p. 56; Larry Arnold, Feb.3, 2004.

123 NEADS audio file, Weapons Director Technician Position, recorder 1, channell4; Daniel Nash interview (Oct. 14. 2003); Michael Kelly interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Donald Quenneville interview (Jan. 7, 2004); Timothy Duffy interview (Jan. 7, 2004); NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander Position, Recorder 1, Channell, 8:44:58 a.m.; NEADS audio file, Identification Technician Position, Recorder 1, ChannelS. 8:51:13 a.m.

124 See FAA audio file, Boston Center. Position 31R; NEADS audio file, Mission Cre\V Commander Position, Recorder 1, Cham1el 1, 8:58:00 a.m.; NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Conmmnder Position, Recorder 1, Channell, 8:54:55 a.m. There were no tapes available for Commission staff to listen to regarding the positions at NEADS that controlled the Otis fighters. During visits to NEADS and to NORli.D, staff was informed those two channels were not recorded at NEADS on 9/11 for technical reasons undetected at the time. Those channel~> correspond to the Senior Weaporu; Director and Weapons Director Technician positiolls responsible for controlling the Otis scramble. Staff found a single communication from the Weapons Director or his Technician on the Guard frequency at approximately 9: II a.m. cautioning the Otis fighters: "remain at current position (holding pattern] until FAA requests assistance" (see NEADS audio file, Recorder I, C.nannel24). That corresponds to the time after the Otis fighters entered the holding pattern nne! before they headed for New York At the same time, NEADS

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controllers were working with a tanker to relocate in proximity to the Otis fighters. Prior to that communication to the fighters on Guard, at 9: I 0 a.m. the Senior DirectDr on the NEADS floor told the Weapons Director that "I want those fighters closer in" (see NE.I\DS audio file, Identification Technician Position, Recorder I, Channel 5). At 9:1 0:::!.2 a.m. the Otis fighters were told by Boston Center that the second tower had been struck {See FAA.. audio files, Boston Center, Position 31R). At 9:12:54 a.m., the Otis fighters told their Boston Center controller that they needed to CAP New York (see FAA audio file, Boston Center, Position 31R). Immediately thereafter, the Otis fighters headed for New York City. This series of communications explains why the Otis fighters briefly entered and then soon departed the holding pattern as depicted by the radar reconstruction of their flight (see DOD filtered radar file, 84!1' Radar Evaluation Squadron).

125 Commission staff compared NOR/ill's response time to the Oct 25. 1999 plane crash that killed Payne Stewart to NORAD's response time to the hijacking of .A.AL 11. The last normal transmission from the Stewan flight was at 9:27:10 a.m. The Southeast Air Defense Sector was notified of the event at 9:55 a.m., 28 minutes after the crash. A NORAD summary of the Stewart incident states, "1400Z FAA notified SEADS of incident and requested assistance" [Miles will provide DOD document NCT0070330). In the case of AAL 11, the last normal communication from the plane wa..<; at 8: 13 a.m. The Northeast Air Defense Sector was notified ai 93R a.m., 25 minutes later. Commission staff concludes there is no significant difference in NORAD's reaction to the two incidents.

26 ! FAA audio file, New York Center, Position 42, 8:41:28-8:41:51 a.m.; FAA letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL 175; New York, NY; Sept. 11, 200 I," May 8, 2002, pp. 5-6.

127 FAA audio flle, New York Center, Position R4.2, 8:4.2 a.m. 8:45 a.m.; FA..-\ letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL 175; New York, J\r; Sept. 11, 2001 ,"May 8, 2002, pp. 6-8; DOD filtered radar flle, 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron. "Multiple Incident Response, WTC incident Aircraft #2." The FAA produced timeline continues: "ZN'Y air traffic computers do not correlate either of these codes wit UAL 175. Coru~equently, the secondary radar return (tranSponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and flight information begins to coast and is no longer associated with the primary radar return. NOTE: The controller communicating with UAL175 is also monitDring the flight track of A.<\1.11. Based on coordination received from ZBW iudicating a possible hijack, most of the controller's attention is focused on AA..L 11." See FAA, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001 ," Sept. 17, 2001; David Bottiglia (Oct. 1, 2003); FAA audio ftle, New York Center, position R42, 8:46:18- 8:49:03 a.m.; FAA letterhead memorandum, ''Full transcript; Aircraft Accident; Ul\1. 175; New York, l'i'Y; September 11, 2001," May 8, 2002, p. 9.

128 FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, New York Center Position, line 5114, 8:48a.m.; 9/11 Commission transcript produced by Miller Reporting, Co., "9/11 Cmmnission Position 14 Parts 1 through 4," pp. 3-4.

129 FAA audio file, New York Center, Position R42, 8:52a.m., 8:53:24 a.m.; FAA letterhead memorandum, "Full Tr.mscript; Aircraft Accident: UAL 175; New York. !'-.'Y; September II, 2001 ,"May 8. 2002, p. 12. 14.

130 FAA audio file, New York Center, Position R42. 8:54:07 a.m.; FA;\ letterhead memorandum. "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175: New York NY: September 11, 2001." May H, 2002, p. 15. At 8:57a.m., the follo\ving exchange between controllers occurred: "T got some handoffs for you. We got some incidents going over here. Is Delta 2433 going to be okay at thirty-three? I had to clin1b him for traffic. llet you United 175 just took off out ofuh thing we might have a hijack over here. Two of them." See FAA audio file, New York Center, Position R42, 8:54:00 9:04: a.m.; FAA letterhead memorandum, ''Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL J 75: New York, NY: September 11, 2001," May 8, 2002

13 J See FAA, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September ll, :WO 1 ,"Sept. I7, 2001; Evanna Dowis interview (Sept. JO, 2004); Michael McCorn1ick interview (Dec. I5, 2003); FAA. personnel statement of Michael McCom1ick, Oct. 17, 200 l. FAA audio file, New York Center, Position R42, 8:57:52

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a.m.; FAI\ letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident: U.A.. .L 175 New York, NY; September 11, 2001 ,"May 8, 2002, p. 17 ..

132 FAA. audio file, National Operations Manager, line 5134,9:01-9:02 a.m.; "FAA letterhead memorandum, Full Transcript; Command Center; NOM Operational Position; September II, 2001 ,"Oct. 14, 2003,pp 15-17.

133 See FAA letterhead memorandum, "United Airlines 175- Section 10. Facility Action Notification Record,"p. 3.

134 In the FAA produced timeline, at I 0:30a.m.: "0900:00 [a.m.} This time is approximate based on personnel statements from New York Terminal Radar Approach control {N90). N90 controller stated 'at approximately 9:00a.m, 1 observed an unk.no·wn aircraft south of the Newark, New Jersey Airport, northeast bound and descending olll of twelve thousand nine hundred feet in a rapid rate of descent, the radar target terminated at the World Trade Center." See FAA, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September II, 2001 ,"Sept. 17, 2001. Regarding the crash of 175, former NORAD official Alan Scott testified that the time of impact was 9:02 a.m. See Alan Scott testimony, May 22, 2003. NTSB data indicates the impact occurred at 9:02:40 a.m.

135 FA.A audio file, Herndon Command Center, New York Center Position, line 5114; 9111 Commission transcript produced by Miller Reporting, Co., "Position 14 Parts 1 through 4," p. 16. 136 FAA andio file, Herndon Command Center, New York Center Position. line 5114, 9:03 a.m.; 9/11 Commission transcript produced by Miller Reporti.ng, Co., "Position 14 Parts 1 through 4," p. 16; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, Cleveland/Boston Position, line 5115, 9:05 a.m.; 9111 Commission transcript produced by Miller Reporting. Co., "Position 15 Parts 2 and 3," p. 28; Michael McCormick interview (Oct. 1, 2003); David LaCates interview {Oct. 2, 2003).

137 9/11 CO!Illl'lission transcript produced by Miller Reporting Co., "9/11 Commiss-ion Position ~ Pans 2 and 3," p. 37; FAA .t\.udio File. Herndon Command Center, Boston Center Position, Line 5115, 9:05 to 9:07a.m.

138 Joseph McCain interview (Oct.l8, 2003); Robert Marr (Jan. 23, 2004); James Fox interview (Oct. 29, 2003); Dawne Deskins interview (Oct. 30, 2003).

139 NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander Position, Recorder 1, Channel 2, 9:07:32 a.m.; 9!11 Commission transcript produced by Alderson Reporting Co., "DR..Ml DAT2 Ch. 2 MCC OP," p. 30. 140 Daniel Nash interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Timothy Duffy interview (Jan. 7, 2004).

41 ; Because the Otis fighters had expended a great deal of fuel in flying first to military air space and then to New York, the battle commanders were concerned about refueling. As NE.IDS personnel looked for refueling tankers in the vicinity ofNew York. the Mission Crew Commander considered scrambling the Langley fighters to New York to provide back-up for the Otis fighters until the NEADS Battle Cab ordered "[b jattle stations only at Langley." The alert fighters at Langley Air Force Base were ordered to battle stations at 9:09a.m. Col . .Marr, the battle commander at NE.A.DS, and General Arnold, the CO~'R Commander, both recall that the planes were held on battle stations. as opposed to scrambling, because they might be called upon to relieve the Otis fighters over New York City if a refueling tanker was not located, and also because of the general uncertainty of the situation in the sky. According to Col. Alan Scott at the Commission's May 23,2003 hearing, "At9:09 [a.m.], Langley F-16s are directed to battle stations, just based on the general situation and the breaking news, and the general developing feeling about what's 1 going on." See 9/11 Commission transcript produced by .Alderson Reporting Co., "Q ] I NE.WS Tape Transcription DRMI DAT2 CH. 2 MCC OP," at 9:08:36; Robert Marr interview (Oct. 2003); Larry Arnold interview (Feb. 3, 2004). See also statement by Colonel Marrin Leslie Filson, Air War Over America, p. 60, "The plan was to protect New York City."

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14 ~ 'TI1is detennination is based on 9/ll Commission analysis of FAA radar and Air Traffic Control transmissions.

14 3 The Indianapolis Center controller advised other Indianapolis Center personnel of the developing situation. They agreed to "sterilize" the airspace along the flight's westerly route so the safety of other planes wouJd not be affected. See John Thomas intenriew (May 4, 2004).

144 See John Thomas interview (Sept. 24, 1003). According to the FAA produced rimeline, at 9:09a.m., Indianapolis Center "notified Great Lakes Regional Operations Center a possible aircraft accident of AMERICAN 77 due to the simultaneous loss of radio communications and radar identification." See FAA, "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001," Sept. 17,2001

145 FAA audio ftle, Herndon Command Center, National Operations Manager Position, line 4525. Also see 9/11 Commission transcript produced by Miller Reporting, Co., "Position 25B, Parts 2 thru 4," pp. 5-6; FAA audio file, Hernd

146 From FA.A and 9111 Commission analysis ofFAA radar data and air traffic control software logic.

147

14 ~ John Thomas inten·iew (May 4, 2004); Charles Thomas inteniew (May 4, 2004). Commission staff has reviewed all FAA documents, transcripts and tape recordings related to Americ:m 77 and has found no evidence that FAA Headquarters issued a directive to surrounding Centers to search for primary radar targets. The review of the same materials also indicates no one within the FAA located American 77 for approximately 36 minutes until the aircraft was identified by controllers at Dulles TRACON at 9:32.

149 John \\'bite interview (May 7, 2004); Ellen King intenriew (Apr. 5, 2004), Linda Schuessler interview (Apr. 6, 2004); Benedict Sliney interview (May :!l, 2004): Et\A audio file, Herndon Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer .Ea!>1 Position, line 4530; FAA letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcription; .Aill Traffic Control System Command Center; National Traffic Management Officer East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21,2003, p. 14, 27.

150 John Hendershot inteniew (Dec. 22, 2003).

151 FAA audio file, Washington Tower, Tyson/Fluk-y Position, 9:38:52 a.m., FAA letterhead memorandum, "Partial Transcript; Aircraft Accident; A.AL 77; Washington, DC; September 11, 2001," Sept. 20, 2001, p. 7.

!52 NEADS audio file, Identification Technician Position, Recorder 1, Channel 7, 0:21:10 a.m.; 9lJ 1 Commission transcript produced by Alderson Reporting, Co .. "9!11 NEADS Tape Transcription DR.lv.fl DAT:::! Channel 7ID OJ).'' pp. 1R-20.

153 NEADS audio file. Mission Crew Commander. Recorder 1, Channel 2. 9:21:50 a.m.; 9111 Commission transcript produced by Alderson Reporting, Co., "9111 NEADS Tape Transcript "DRM1 DAT2 Ch. 2 MCC OP," pp. 38-40; Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 2:::!-23, 2004).

154 NEADS audio tile, Mission Crew Commander, Recorder 1, Channel 2, 9:22:34 a.m.; 91] 1 Commission transcript produced by Alderson Reporting, Co .• "911 1 NEA.DS Tape Transcript "DlUv11 DAT2 Ch. 2 MCC OP," pp. 39-40. "Nasypnny thought to put the Langley scramble over Baltimore. and place a 'barrier cap' between the hijack and Washington, D.C." See Kevin Nasypany inten,iew (Jan. 21-13. 2004).

155 NE.I\DS audio file, Identification Te~.:hnician Position. Recc,rder 1, Channel 5. 9:32:10 and 9:33:58 a.m.

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156 For first quote see NEADS audio file, Identification Technician Position, Recorder 1, Channel 5, 9:35:50 a.m.; 9/11 Commission transcription produced by Alderson Reponing, Co., "9/11 ATCSCC Tape Transcription DRM1 DATI Channel SID TK," p. 23. For second quote see NEADS audio file, Identification Teclmician Position, Recorder 1, Channel 7, 9:36:34 a.m.; 9/11 Commission transcription produced by Alderson Reporting, Co., "9111 NEADS Tape Transcription DRMI DATI Channel 7ID OP," pp. 27-28; Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22-23, 20040. For third quote see NEADS audio flle, Mission Crew Commander, Recorder I, Channel2, 9:39a.m. and 9:39:37 a.m.; 9111 Commission transcript produced by Alderson Reporting, Co., "9111 NEADS Tape Transcript "DRMI DAT2 Ch. 2 MCC OP," p. 57; Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22-23, 2004).

157 Dean Eckmann interview (Dec. 1, 2003); FAA letterhead memorandum, "Partial Transcript; Scramble l\.ircraft; QUIT2S (Peninsula Radar); September I J, 2001 ," Sept 4, 2003, pp. 2-4; FAA letterhead memorandum, "Partial Transcript; Scramble Aircraft (East Feeder Radar);" Sept 4, 2003, pp. 2-5.

158 NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, Recorder I, Channel 2, 9:38:0:! a.m.; 9/11 Commission transcript produced by Alderson Reporting, Co., "9/11 NEADS Tape Transcript "DR-NII DAT2 Ch. 2 MCC OP," pp. 58-60; DawneDeskins interview (Oct. 30, 2003). The estimated time of impact of Flight 77 into the Pentagon is based on 9/11 Commission analysis offlight Data Recorder, Air Traffic Control, radar, and Pentagon elevation and impact site data.

159 Joseph Cooper interview (Sept. 2003); NEAJ)S audio file, Identification Technician Position, Recorder 1, Channel?, 9:41a.m.

160 NEWS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, Recorder 1, Channell, 9:42:08 a.m.

161 FAA audio file, Cleveland Center, Lorain Radar Position, 9:28a.m.; FAA letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcript, Aircraft Accident; UAL 93; Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May I 0, 2002, p. 12.

162 FA...A.. audio file, Cleveland Center, Position Lorain Radar; F A...A,. letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL 93; Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10,2002, p. 10.

163 The United 93 timeline in the FAA "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 200 1," dated Sept 17, 2001, states that at 9:28:54 "A second radio transmission, mostly unintelligible, again with sounds of possible screaming or a struggle and a statement, 'get out of here, get out of here' from an unknown origin was heard over the ZOB radio." FAA audio flle, Cleveland Center, Position Lorain Radar; FAA letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL 93; Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001 ,"May 10, 2002· p. II; FAA audio file, Cleveland Center, Position Lorain Radar; FA.A letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL 93; Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002' p. 13. At 9:31.21 a.m., ExecJet 56 also called in, reporting that "we'rejust answering your call. We did hear that, uh, yelling too." The F.A.A responded, at 9:31:51 a.m.: "Okay, thanks. We're just trying to figure out what's going on."

164 FAA audio file, Cleveland Center, Position Lorain Radar; FAA letterl1ead memorandum, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL 93: Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10,2002, p. 15.

165 FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, National Traffic Management Office East Position, line 4530: F A...A. letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcript; Air Traffic Control System Command Center; National Traffic Management Officer, East Position: September 11, 2001," Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 10, 13. FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, New York Center Position, line 5154. ; 9111 Commission transcript produced by Alderson Reporting, Co., pp. 34-35.

J 66 FAt\ audio file, Cleveland Center. Position Lorain Radar: FAA letterhead memorandum. ''Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL 93; Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10.2002, p. 19. Squawking "trip," in FAA parlance, means transmitting the hijack code.

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167 FAA audio fJle, Cleveland Center. Position Lorain Radar; FA~ letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL 93; Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001 ,"May l 0, 2002. p. 13.

168 FAA audio file, Hemdon Command Center, National Traffic Management Office East Position, line 4530, ; FAA letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcript; Air Trnffic Control System Conunand Center; National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21,2003, pp. 16-17; FAA audio file, Cleveland Center, Position Lorain Radar; FAA letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL 93; Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001," May 10, 2002, pp. 26-32.

169 FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer East Position, line 4530; FAA letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcript; Air Traffic Control System Command Center; National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21,2003, pp. 17-19.

170 FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer East Position, line 4530; F.M letterhead memomndurn, "Full Transcript; Air Traffic Control System Colillilfli1d Center; National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001," Oct. 21,2003, pp. 19-20.

171 fAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer East Position, line 4530; FAA letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcript; Air Traffic Control System Command Center; National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001 ,"Oct 21, 2003, p. 21.

172 FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer East Position. line 4530; FA.<\ letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcript; .A..ir Traffic Control System Command Center; National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September II, 2001,'' Oct. 21,2003, pp. 23-27. The 9-11 Commission also reviewed a report regarding seismic observations on September 11, 2001, in which the authors conclude that the impact time of United 93 was '1 0:06:05 +/-5 (EDT).' The seismic data that the authors based this estimate on are far too weak in signal to noise ratio and far too speculative in terms of signal source to be used as a means of contradicting the impact time established by the very accurate combination ofFDR, OlR, ATC, radar, and impact site data sets. The combined FDR, CVR, ATC, radar, and impact site data setc; constrain United Flight 93's impact time to within 1 second, are airplane and crash site specific, and are based on GPS clock time. GPS clock time is established and correlated between each data set based on the lrig B time code automatically recorded in the ATC audio tapes for the FAA Centers, and through the common-parameter relationship shared by the data sets, such as microphone keying and altitude. This time correlation process is internationally accepted within the aviation accident investigation community.

173 FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer East Position, line 4530; FAA letterhead memorandum, "Full Transcript; Air Traffic Control System Command Center; National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001 ,"Oct. 21, 2003, p. 31. At this time, the same National Guard C-1301-1 cargo aircraft that watched American 77 impact the Pentagon told a Cleveland Center controller he saw black smoke in the vicinity where Cleveland Center lost radar contact with United 93. The smoke was from the crash site of United 93.

174 fAA audio file, Hcmdon Command Center. National TratTic Management Officer East Position, line 4530: FA.<\ letterhead memorandum, "full Transcript Air Traffic Control System Command Center; National Tmffic Management Officer. East Position: September T I, 2001 :·Oct. 21. 2003. p. 34. Note that tllis report from the C-130 was recorded on ATC audio about l minute and 3 7 seconds after the impact time of United Flight 93 as established by the NTTSB and 9-ll Commission. lt is also more:- than a minute before the earliest impact time speculated by the authors of the seismic data report. "l11is ATC audio evidence refutes the l 0:06:05 impact time speculated by the seismic report authors. and supports the 10:03:11 impact time established by the FDR, CVR, radar, and impact data sets.

175 9/ ll Commission transcript produced by Alderson Reporting, Co., "91]1 :!'i'EADS Tape Tran<;cription DRM l, DAT2, Channcl4 lD op," pp. 46-7.

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17 (' 9/11 Commission transcript produced by Alderson Reporting, Co., "9!!1 .N"EADS Tape Transcription DRMl, DAT2, Ch. 2 MCC OP," pp. 1\8-89.

rn 9/11 Commission transcript produced by Alderson Reporting Co., "9/11 NE.I\DS Tape Transcript, DR.Ml DAT2 CH. 4 ID Op," at I 0:14a.m.

178 DOD log, "NEADS MCC/T log," Sept. l I, 2001.

179 In this section of the report, the Commission compares and contrasts its findings regarding the timeline of events for the four hijacked aircraft to testimony presented to the Commission by representatives of both the FAA and NORAD at the Conunission hearings held on May 17, 2003. Specifically, the Commission notes statements made by NORAD officials in the May 2003 public testimony regarding the times at which NEADS received notification from the FAA that American 77 and United 93 had been hijacked were incorrect. In addition, the Commission notes statements made by NORI\D officials in the May 2003 public testimony regarding the reason for the scramble of the Langley fighters was incorrect. For instance, Colonel Alan Scott stated ''9: 16, now FAA reports a possible hijack of United Flight 93 ... at 9:24 the FAA reports a possible hijack of 77. That's sometime after they had been traclci.ng this primary target. And at. that moment as well is when the Langley F-16s were scrambled out of Langley" (Testimony of CoL Alan Scott, May 17, 2003) and General Lany Arnold stated "that 9:24 was the first time we had been advised of American 77 as a possible hijacked airplane. Our focus- you have got to remember that there's a lot of other things going on simultaneously here was on United 93, which w.-as being pointed out to us very aggressively I might say be the FAA." (Testimony of Gen. Larry Arnold, May 17, 2003 ).

180 DOD, "NEADS MCCT log," Sept. 11, 2001; DOD, "Surveillance Book," Sept 1 1, 2001, p. 1 [U], p. 2-4 !SIRELJ

181 Alan Scott testimony, May 23, 2003 (see NOR.ID Timeline).

181 For no one in the \l>lhite House or traveling \vith the President knowing about the hijacking, see, e.g., \\1rite House memo, transcript of Andrew Card's interview with Ron Fournier, Aug. 7, 2004. For the information circulating v.ithin the FAA, see supra pp ..

183 For federal agencies learning about the crash from CNN, see White House note, Situation Room Log, Sept. 11, 2001; White House note, PEOC Watch Log, Sept. 11, 2001; DOD note, Senior Operations Officer Chronolog, Sept. 11, 2001. For national-level officials' erroneous understanding, see, e.g., Charles Leidig interview (Apr. 29, 2004); Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004).

18~ For Garvey not being told, see Jane Garvey inten•iew {Jun. 30, 2004). For Belger not being told, see Monte Belger inter.'iew (Apr. 20, 2004). For awareness by others in the FAA.., see suprd pp ..

1 ~ 5 One of the first notifications was to the J-34. tl1e office within DOD's Joint Staff responsible for combating . DOD note. Assistant Deputy Director Operations Passdown Log, Sept. 11, 2001; see also Charles Leidig interview (Apr. 29. 2004).

!Hr. The log entry of the call to the F.I\ .. A. reads: ··9:00 NMCC called FAA. briefed of explosion at \VTC possibly from aircraft crash. Also, hijacking of An1erican Flight 11 from Boston to LA, now enroute to Kennedy." DOD note, Senior Operations Officer Chronolog, September II, 2001. For the scrambling of jet~ not discussed, see Ryan Gonsalves interview (May 14, 2004).

"'According to Secret Service records, the motorcade aiTived at the school sometime between 8:50 and 8:55. See USSS note. shift log, Sept. II, 2001 (8:55); USSS note, Command Post Protectee Log, Sept. 11, 2001 (8:50). For Andrew Card's recollection, see Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). For the President's reaction. see i\ndrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004); White House memo, transcript of President's interview with Bob Schieffer, Apr. 17, 2002 ("And I remember commenting to the people with

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me - I said, that had to be one really fouled up pilot, or it looked like pilot error. ... Accident yes. And 1 was an old pilot. I'm saying this man must have been totally disoriented.").

18 ~ For Dr. Rice speaking with the President, see White House note, President's Daily Diary, Sept. 1 1, 2001: (TS) White House note, Situation Room Log, Sept. 11, 200] . (TS) For her statement to the President, see White House memo, transcript of Dr. Rice's interview with Evan Thomas. Nov. 1, .2001, p. 2.

IR<) White House memo, transcript of Vice President's interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 1.

I% For Rice's meeting, White House memo, transcript of Dr. Rice's interview with Bob Woodward, Oct 24, .2001, pp. 360-361; White House memo, transcript ofDr. Rice's interview with Evan Thomas, Nov. 11, .2001, pp. 387-388. For White House staff monitoring the news, see, e.g., \llhite House memo, transcript of Dr. Rice's interview with Evan Thomas, Nov. 11,2001, p. 388.

191 For White House staff knowing it wa'i not an accident, see \\'bite House memo, transcript of Dr. Rice's interview with Bob Woodward, Oct. 24, 2001, p. 361; Andrew Card interview (Mar. 31, 2004). For security enhancements, see USSS memo, Interview with SAIC Carl Truscott, Oct. l, 2001, p. 1. {S) For the measures being precautionary, see Carl Truscott interview (Apr. 15, 2004); Brian Free meeting (Apr. 15, 2004).

192 For the time of the conference, see FAA note, Chronology ADA-30, Sept. 11, .2001; Michael Weikert interview (May 7, 2004). For recollections of the NMCC officer, see Charles Chambers interview (Apr. 23, 2004). For recollections of the FAA manager, see Michael Weikert inten,iew (May 7, 2004). See Belger testimony to the Commission, June 17, 2004.

m For the Clarke conference call at 9:25, see Vv'hite House note, Situation Room Communications Log, Sept. 11, 2001. For CV\representatives joining at 9:40, see Cl.A~ note, Cofer Black timeline, Sept. 11, .2001. For FAA representatives joining at 9:40, see F A.A. note, Chronology ADA-30, Sept. 11, 2001.

194 For Garvey participating, see Jane Garvey interview (Oct. 21, 2003). For Belger participating, see Monty Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004). For F •.<\.1'. J\.ssistant Director of A.ir Traffic Control Jeff Griffith participating, see Jeff Griffith interview (Mar. 31, 2004). For the teleconference not involving Defense Department officials who were managing the crisis, see John Brunderman interview (May 17, 2004). From a logistical standpoint, the \Vhite House's videoconference capability was not connected into the area of the National Military Command Center where the crisis was being managed. That meant that the director of the operations team-who was on the phone with NORAD-did not have the benefit of information being shared on the White House's videoconference. Charles Leidig interview (Apr. 29, 2004); Montague Winfield interview (Apr. 26, 2004); Patrick Gardner interview (May 12, 2004); John Brundennan interview (May 17, 2004). The separation also meant that later on-when the Secretary and Vice Chairman did participate in the White House video conference-they were necessarily absent from the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and unable to provide guidance to the operations team. See DOD note, OT-2 Analysis ofNMCC Response to Terrorist Attack on 11 SEP 01. Oct. 4, 2001; John Brundem1an interview (May 17, 2004). For the quotation, see Patrick Gardner interview (May 12. 2004).

1 ''" For reports of planes aloft, combat air patrols, and the need to clarify rules of engagement. see NSC note, notes of Paul Kurtz, Sept. 11, 2001; Paul Kurtz meeting (Dec. 2.::.!, 2003). For confinnation coming at 10:25, sec NSC note. notes of Paul K.unz. Sept. 1 L 2001. For the commands having been conveyed already, see DOD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. (TS)

IW· For the deputy director for operations thinking thai it was a terrorist attack. and for the decision to convene a Significant Event Conference. see Charles Joseph Leidig interview (Apr. 29. :::!004 ). Secure teleconfCrcnce~ are the primary means by which the NMCC coordinates emergency situations. Conferences are divided into iwo categories: "event" and "threat.'' "Event" conferences ~eek to gather information from relevant agencies about a given situation; if the situation escalates, a "threat'' conference may be convened. On 9/11, there was no protocol or conference for a situation involving a domestic terrorist attack; the

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Significant Event conference wa'l the closest to what is now in place to manage domestic attacks. NMCC and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (f..TMJIC) briefing (.July 21, 2003 ); see also Patrick Gardner interview (May 12, 2004). For the contents of the Significant Event and Air Threat Conferences, see DOD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference CalL Sept. 11, 200 l. (TS)

197 For participants on the conference, see DOD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference call, Sept. 11, 2001. (TS) For involvement of the President's military aide, see White House note, notes of Thomas Gould, Sept. 11 , 200 1. (TS)

19 R For the difficulties in including the FAA in the conference, see NMCC and NMJIC briefing (July 21, 2003); John Brunderman interview (May 17, 2004). For NOR.A..D asking three times to confirm the FAA's participation, and F A.A. joining at 10:17, see DOD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 1 1, 2001. (TS) For awarene8s of the FAA representative who joined the conference, see Rayford Brooks interview (Apr. 15, 2004).

199 For FAA's Boston Center bypassing the chain of command, see supra p .. For high-level Defense officials relying on the Air Threat Conference, see Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17, 2004); Charles Leidig interview (Apr. 29, 2004).

200 DOD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference Call, Sept 11, 20CH. (TS)

201 DOD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference Call, Sept 11, 2001. (TS)

202 DOD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 1 1, 2001. (TS)

203 For the content of the conference, see DOD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 1 l, 2001. (TS) For the Chairman being out of the country, see DOD note, Deputy Director for Operations Passdown Log, Sept 11,2001. (TS)

204 DoD note, transcript of Air Tlrreat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. (TS)

205 DoD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 1 1, 2001. {TS)

206 DoD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. (TS)

207 For the President being informed at 9:05, see White House note, President's Daily Diary, Sept. 11, 2001. (TS) For Andrew Card's statement, see Vv'hite House memo, transcript of Andrew Card's interview with Ron Fournier, August 7, 2002. For the President's reaction, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).

20 ' For the President remaining in the cla<;sroom, see Education Channel, "Raw Footage of President Bush ar Emma E. Booker Elementary School," Sept I 1, 2001. For his activities in the holding room, see Deborah Loewer meeting {Feb. 6, 2004). For his call to the Vice President at 9:15, see White House note, President's Daily Diary, Sept 11, 2001. (TS) For his call to Dr. Rice, see Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6. 2004). For his call to Governor Pataki, sec President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, .2004). For his call to the FBI Director. sec White House note, Secure Switchboard Log, Sept. 1 L 2001. (S) According to this log, the President requested to speak to the FBI Director at 9:16; the call was connected at 9:23 and disconnected at 9:24. For the President's decision to make a brief statement, see Ari Fleischer inten'iew (Apr. 22, 2004). Fleischer stressed to us the important value placed on communicating with the nation. For the Secret Service's perspective, see Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004).

209 For the staff arranging the President's return to Washington, see Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004), .1\ndrew Card meeting {Mar. 31, 2004). For the President consulting with his senior advisers, see Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004). For no one having information that additional aircraft were hijacked or missing, see, e.g., Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). For the focus being on the President's speech and

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no dec1sions made, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 19, 2004): .t\ri Fleischer interview I Apr. 22, 2004 ); Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004 ).

110 For the President's departure and ani val times, see USSS note, shift log, Sept. 11, 200I (departing 9:35, aniving 9:45); USSS note, Command Post Protectee Log, Sept. I L 2001 (departing 9:36, aniving 9:42). The President could not recall who told him about the strike at the Pentagon, or specifically what information he received. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting {Apr. 29, 2004). Fleischer deduced from his notes that the 1'residen1 learned the information while in the motorcade. A.ri Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004). For the President's actions and statements to the Vice President, see Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004); White House note, notes of Ari Fleischer, Sept. 11, 200 I. 211 For the Secret Service's views on not returning to Washington and the President's reaction, see Edward Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 1004): USSS memo, interview of Edward Marinzel, October 3, 2001. For Card's views on these issues, see Andrew Card meeting (Mar. 31, 2004). For additional sources on the President wanting to return to Washington, see White House memo, transcript of Vice President's interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 5. For the Vice President's recollection, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). For the time of departure, see USSS note, Command Post Protectee Log, Sept. 11,2001. For Air Force One's objectives on take-off, see Marinzel interview (Apr. 21, 2004).

212 For the hotline call, see USSS memo, interview of Gregory LaDow, Oct. 1, 200I, p. 1. (S) This call was not the first time that morning that the Secret Service received information that there were other aircraft missing or thought to be hijacked. Shortly after the second attack in New York, a senior agent from the President's detail-charged with coordiiUiting the President's movemen~~~established an open line with his counterpart at the FA ..A. .. The F A.l>,. official had direct access to local radar information and other pieces of data, which he conveyed to the senior agent throughout the morning. Shortly after the line was opened, the F A..t.,. official told the senior agent thar there were more unaccounted for airplanes-·-possibly hijacked­ in addition to the two planes that had already crashed inw the World Trade Center. The senior agent told someone to convey this infol'Illiiltion to the Secret Service's operations center. 1bis information was either not passed or passed but not disseminated within the operations center. In either event, the infonnation did not reach agents assigned to the Vice President, and the Vice President was not evacuated at this time. See Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004 ); USSS note, interview with Nelson Garabito, Oct. 1, 2001 (S); see also Terry Van Steenbergen interview (Mar. 30, 2004). For the officer's quotation, see USSS note, interview with Gregory Ladow, Oct. 1, 2001, p. I. (S) 113 For American 77's route, see 9-llCommission analysis of FAA and U.S. Air Force radar data. For the Secret Service's order to evacuate, see USSS memo, interview with Rocco Delmonico, Oct. 1, 2001. For evacuation of the Vice President, see White House memo, transcript of Vice President's interview with Newsweek, Nov. I9, 2001, p. 2. See also \Vhite House note, notes of Mary Matalin, September 11, 2001 ~ For the time that the Vice President entered t.~e tunnel, see USSS repon, "Executive Sununa:ry: U.S. Secret Service Tin1eline of Events, September 11 October 3, 2001," Oct 3, 2001, p. 2. (S) Service personnel asse1ted to us that tl1e 9:3 7 entry time in the Secret Service timeline was based on alarm data, which is no longer retrievable. USSS briefing, (Jan. 29, 2004).

214 White House memo. transc1ipt ofVice President's inten·iew with Newsweek, Nov. 19. 2001, p. 4: President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 19, 2004).

15 ' for Mrs. Cheney's t1me of arrival. see USSS report. "Executive Summary: U.S. Secret Service Timeline of Eve111s. September J J - October 3. 200 1." Oct. 3, 2001, p. 2. (S) For Mrs. Cheney joining the Vice President. see White House memo. transcript of intervie"· of Lynne Cheney by Newsweek, Nov. 9, 200 l, p. 2. For the contemporaneous notes, see White House note, notes ofLyrme Cheney, Sept. 11, 2001 For the Vice President's call being the one in which the President's advisers argued against his returning to Washington, see White House memo, transcript of Vice President's interview with Newsweek Nov. 19, ::!001, p. 5. According to the Vice Pre~;ident. there was "[o]ne phone call from the tunnel. And basically I called to let him know that we were a target and I strongly urged him not to return to Washington right away, that he delay his return until we could fmd out what the hell was going on.'' For the Vice President's and Mrs. Cheney's movements after the call, see White House memo, transcript of Vice President's

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interview with Newsweek, No\'. I 9, 200 I, p. 5; White House memo, transcript of Lynne Cheney's i11terview with Newsweek Nov. 9, 200 I. p. 2.

~II> lnten,iew with President Bush and Vice President Cheney, April29.2004.

217 For there being no open communication line between the President and the Vice President, see, e.g., Deborah Loewer meeting (Feb. 6, 2004). For the Vice President placing a call to the President after arriving in the shelter, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004). For the Vice President's time of arrival in the shelter conference room, see PEOC Shelter Log, Sept. I 1, 2001 ("9 :58: Received Vice President into shelter"); USSS memo, Office of the Vice President 9/11 Timeline, Nov. 17, 2001 ("0952 hrs [Mrs. Cheney] arrived White House and was moved to a secure location."); Whire House note, notes of Lynne Cheney ("9:55- RBC on phone with POTUS); Vlhite House memo, transcript of Lynne Cheney's interview with Newsweek, Nov. 9, 2001, p. 2 ("And when I got there, he was on the phone ·with the President. He was on the phone with the President many times that day. But from that fl.rst place where I ran into him. I moved with him into what they call the PEOC ... "); \\'hite House memo, transcript of Vice President's interview with Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2001, p. 4 ("Well, tlley moved me down there, it's around 9:35a.m. or 9:36a.m.... And I v.-as down there for about, oh, 15 minutes or so."); USSS note, Intelligence Division timeline, Sept. 11, 2001 (Rice in shelter at 10:00); Carl Truscott interview, Apr. 15, 2004 (Truscott moved with Rice and the Vice President from tunnel to conference room and reported their arrival to headquarters immediately upon entering conference room); President Bush and Vice Pre..~ident Cb.eney meeting, Apr.29, 2004 (saw television footage of Pentagon ablaze while in tunnel); White House memo, transcript of Dr. Rice's inten~ew with Evan Thomas, Nov. I, 2001, p. 388 (saw television footage of Pentagon ablaze before leaving Situation Room for shelter). For the Vice President's recollection about the combat air patrol, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (A.pr. 29, 2004); Vi'bite House memo, transcript of President's interview with Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, Dec. 17, 2001. p. 16. For the request for combat air patrols, see DOD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference Call, September 11, 2001. (TS)

218 President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).

m For the military aide's recollection, see Douglas Cochrane meeting (Apr. 16. 2004). For Rice entering a few minutes after the Vice President, see USSS report, ''Executive Summary: U.S. Secret Sen~ce Timeline of Events, September 11-0ctober 3, 2001 ,"Oct. 3, 200 I, p. 2; (S) Carl Truscott interView (Apr. 15, 2004). For Rice's recollections, see Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).

:!l~he Commission relied on the following contemporaneous documentary sources to reconstruct events that occurred in the PEOC on the morning of 9/ II. ( 1) Phone logs of the \Vhite Hou. ..o:;e switchboard; (2) Notes of Scooter Libby, Mrs. Cheney, and Ari Fleischer; (3) The tape (and then transcript) of the .till Threat Conference Call; and (4) Logs of the Secret Sen'ice and the ·white House Situation Room, as well as four separate logs of the White House Military Office (the PEOC Watch Log, the PEOC Shelter Log, the PEOC Communications Log and the 9111 Log of the White House Military Office). (TS)

221 See DOD note, transcript oL-'\ir Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 200l.(TS) At 10:02 the PEOC informed participants on the .1\ir Threat Conferem:e Call that the Secret Serv.ice operations center was reporting an inbound aircraft 25 minutes out and asked whether assets from Andrews Air Force Base had been contacted.

:z:>:c For Secret Service links to the FAA. see supra note. At Secret Service headquarters, personnel fmm the intellige.nce division were also on a phone conference with FAA headquarters. Se.e Chu::k Green interviev.· (March 10. 2004 ). For notification of an inbound aircraft at 10:02, see USSS record. Intelligence Division timeline, September II. 2001 (S); USSS record, Crisis Center Incident Monitor. September 11, 2001. (S) For the F/\.i\ projecting a path of United 93, see Tim Grovack inten·iew (Apr. 8. 2004). For the Secret Service providing updates tn the PEOC on the inbound aircraft, see DCJD note, transcript of the Air Threat Conference CalL Sept. 11, 2001. (TS)

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22 ' See White House note, notes of Lynne Cheney, Sept II, 2001; White House note, notes of Scooter Libby, Sept. 1 1, .2001. (TS)

224 For the immediacy of the Vice President's decision, see White House note, transcript of Scooter Libby's interview with Newsweek. For the Vice President's statement, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004) For the second authorization, see White House note, notes of Lynn Cheney, Sept 11, 2001; White House note, notes of Scooter Libby, Sept 1l, 2001. (TS)

225 Joshua Bolten interview (Mar. 18, 2004). Bolten's suggestion to contact the Jlresident is captured as follows bv the notes of Scooter Libhv: "I 0: 15-1 0: 18: Aircraft 60 miles out, confirmed as hijack- engage? VP: Yes[~} JB [Joshua Bolten]: Get President and confinn engage order." \1/hite House note, notes of Scooter Libby, Sept 1 J, 2otll. (TS)

226 For the Vice President's call, see White House note, Secure Switchboard Log, Sept. 1I, 2001 ("[Vice President] requested to speak with President. Call connected 10: 18. Call disconnected I 0:20. "); White House note, President's Daily Diary, Sept. 11,2001 (10:18-10:20) (TS); White House note, notes of Scooter Libby, Sept 11,2001 (10:20). For Fleischer's recollection, see Ari Fleischer interview (Apr. 22, 2004). The frrst mention of shoot down authority is reflected at I 0:20 in }ui Fleischer's notes. White House note, notes of A.ri Fleischer, Sept. 11, 2001. (TS)

217 DOD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 200 I . (TS)

228 For the shelter receiving reports of another plane, see White House note, notes of Lynne Cheney, Sept. II, 200 I; Vv"hite House note, notes of Scooter Libby, Sept. I1, 2001. (TS) For the Vice President's authorization, see \\'bite House note, notes: of Scooter Libby, Sept 1I, 2001; (TS) DOD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 200 I. (TS) For Hadley's statement, see DOD note, tran,.;;cript of Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11 , 200 1. (TS)

229 For the quotation, see White House memo, transcript of Scooter Libby's interview with Newsweek,. For the aircraft's identity, see White House note, "White House Military Office Log, Sept. 11, 2001. (TS)

230 For the NMCC learning about the hijacking of United 93 from the White House, see DOD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. (TS) For the Secret Service's contacts with the FAA, see supra notes. For the Secret Service conveying information to the Vv'hite House, see DOD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 1I, 200 I {TS); Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004 ).

~ 31 DOD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference Call, Sept Il, 2001. (TS)

23~ DOD note, transcript of Air 11:Jreat Conference Call, Sept 11, 2001. (TS)

33 " On the morning of9/1l General Eberhart was in his office at headquarters-roughly 30 minutes away from Cheyenne Mountain, where the operations center is located. At 8:45, he was informed that there was a suspected hijacking on the East Coast Within minutes, Eberhart saw the CNN broadcast of the explosion at the World Trade Center. He asked his staff if the hijacked aircraft was the same air;;raft that reportedly caused the explosion. and he was told that they were not. Ralph Eberhart interview (Mar. 1, 2004)

~'4 DOD note, Continental Region chat log, Sept 11. 2001. ns For the rext of the chat log message, see Continental Region chat log, Sept. 1 L 2001. For the quotation, see NEADS audio file. Mission Crew Commander Position, Recorder J, Chmmel2, 10:32:12.

ZJt For the NEADS Commander's statement, see interview with Robert Marr (Jan. 23. 2004). For the mission commander's and senior weapons director's statements, see Kevin Nasypany intenriew (Jan. 22, 2004); James Fox interview (Oct. 29, 2004 ). For the understanding of1eaders in Washington regarding shoot down orders, see DOD note, transcript of Air Threat Conference Call, September II, 200 I. (TS) For

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the acmal order conveyed w Langley pilots, see NEADS audio file, Weapons Director Position, Recorder I, Channel 2, 10: J0-1 J.

m For evidence that the President spoke with Secretary Rumsfeld. see White House note, notes of 1\ri Fleischer, Sept. 11, 20(1]. (TS) For lack of recall about this conversation. see Donald Rumsfeld interview (Jan. 30, 2004).

~38 DOD note, transcript of Air Tirreat Conference Call, Sept. II, 2001. (TS)

239 For Secretary Rumsfeld assisting with rescue efforts, see DOD report, historical interview with Donald H. Rumsfeld, Dec. 23, 2002, p. 5. For Rumsfeld entering the f..I'MCC, seeking situational awareness, and being concerned primarily with the pilots' understanding, see Donald Rumsfeld intenriew (Jan. 30, 2004).

4 J u Commission interview with David Wherley (Feb. 27, 2004).

141 11 The 113 ' Wing frrst beard from the FAA tower at /rndrews that the Secret Service wanted fighters airborne. The FAA tower had been contacted by personnel from the Presidential Movements Office at FAA headquarters, who were on an open line with senior agent~ from the President's detail. See supra note; Terry Van Steenbergen interview (Mar. 30, 2004). For the Secret Senrice agent relaying instructions, see USSS memo, Beauchamp to AD-Inspection, September 11 experience, Feb. 23, 2004. (S) For Gen. Wherley's "weapons free" order, see David "Wherley interview (Feb, 27, 2004); DOD report, National Guard Bureau Air Guard historical interview of David \Vherley, Jr., Oct. 3, 2001, p. 12.

1 ~2 For the President and Vice President's statements, see President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. ::!9, 2004).

243 These estimates are based on analysis of Boeing 757 maximum operating speed data, F• .<\.A and U.S. Air Force radar data, and Commission assumptions regarding the manner in which the aiiplane would be operated on its route to tbe Washington., DC area. The shortest tirneframe assumes maximum speed ·without regard to overspeed warnings, straight line pa~ and no time allowed for maneuvering or slowing to aim and crash the airplane into its target. The probable timeframe allows for speeds consistent v.:ith the observed operation of tbe airplane prior to the :final maneuvers and crash as well as for maneuvers and slowing in the DC area to aim and crash the airplane into its target.

244 According to radar data, the fighters from Langley Air Force Base arrived over Washington at about 10:00. Two of the three Langley fighters were fully armed (i.e., with missiles and guns); the third fighter carried only guns. Craig Borgstrom mterview (Dec. 1, 2003).

2 '~ For the quotation. see Dean Eckmann interview (Dec. I, 2003). For the Langley pilots' situation awareness, see Dean Eckmann interview (Dec. 1,2003); DOD memo, tran..'lciipt of intenriew with Dean Eckmann. Oct. 9, 2001; Bradley Derrig interview (Dec. I. 2003); DOD memo, transcript of interview with Bradley Derrig, Oct. 16.2001: Craig Borgstrom interview (Dec. 1, 2003); DOD memo, transcript of interview with Craig Borgstrom, Oct. 25. 2001.

24 t' Larry Arnold interview (Feb. 2, 2004).

~4 ·1 NEWS audio file, Identification Teclmician Position, Recorder 1, Channel4, I 0:02:22.

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