1.1 Inside the Four Flights
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SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION RE'VIEW CHAPTER ONE "WE HAVE SOME PLANES" Tuesday, September 11, 2001, dawned temperate and nearly cloudless in the eastern United States. Millions of men and women readied themselves for work. Some made their way to the Twin Towers, the signature structures of the World Trade Center complex in New York City. Others went to the Pentagon, the world's largest office building. Across the Potomac river, the United States Congress was back in session. In Sarasota, Florida, President George W. Bush went for an early morning run. For those heading to an airport, weather conditions could not have been better for a safe and pleasant journey. Among the travelers were Mohamed Atta and Abdul Aziz al Omari, who arrived at the airport in Portland, Maine. 1.1 Inside the Four Flights Boarding the Flights Boston: American 11 and Ullited 175. Atta and a1 Omari boarded a 6:00a.m. flight from Portland to Boston's Logan International Airport.1 When he checked in for his flight to Boston, Atta was selected by a computerized prescreening system known as CAPPS created to identify passengers who should be subject to special security measures. Under security directives in place at the time, the only consequence of Atta's selection by CAPPS was that his checked bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that he had boarded the aircraft. This did not hinder 2 Atta's plans. · Atta and Omari arrived in Boston at 6:45. Seven minutes later, Atta apparently took a call from Marwan al Shehhi, a longtime colleague who was at another terminal at Logan airport. They talked for three minutes.3 It would be their final conversation. Between 6:45 and 7:40, Atta, Omari, Satam al Suqami, Wail al Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri checked in for and boarded .American Airlines Flight II, bound for Los Angeles. The flight was scheduled to depart at 7:45.4 In another Logan terminal, Shehhi, joined by Fayez Baniharnmad, Mohand al Shehri, Ahmed al Ghamdi, and Hamza ai Ghamdi checked in for United Airlines Flight 175, also bound for Los Angeles. A couple of Shehhi 's collea.b'lles were obviously unused to travel; the United ticket agent remembered that they had trouble understanding the standard security questions and she had to go over them slowly until they gave the routine, reassuring answers.5 Their flight was scheduled to depart at 8:00. Sl.JBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 1 Chapter One, Version 070204 - PPR SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW There was only one checkpoint, through which passengers, including Atta and his colJeagues, could have gained access to the American 11 gate. Globe Security operated it under a contract with American Airlines. In a different tenninal, United 175 passengers had to go through one checkpoint to reach their gate. This checkpoint was controlled by United Airlines, which had contracted with Huntleigh USA to perform the screening. 6 In passing through these checkpoints, each of the hijackers would have been screened by a walk-through metal detector calibrated to detect items with at least the metal content of a .22-caliber handgun. Anyone who might have set off the walk-through metal detector would have been screened with a hand wand metal detector-a procedure reqmring th.e screener to identify the item or items that caused the alarm. In addition, an X -ray machine would have screened the hijackers' carry-on belongings. The screening was in place to identify and confiscate weapons· and other items prohibited from being carried onto a commercial flight. .7 Neither the supen'isors on duty at the checkpoints nor any of the screeners reported obsenwg anything suspicious that morning. 8 While Atta had been selected by CAPPS in Portland, three members of his hijacking team, Suqami, Wail al Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri were selected in Boston. But their selection only affected the handling of th.eir checked bags. It would have no effect on the way they were screened at the checkpoint.All five men cleared the checkpnint and made their way to th.e gate for American 11. Atta, Omari, and Suqami took their seats in business class, rows 8 and 10 (seats 8D, 8G and lOB respectively). The Shehri brothers had adjacent seats in row 2 (Wail in 2A, Waleed in 2B), in the First Class cabin. They boarded American 11 between 7:31 and 7:40. The aircraft pushed back from the gate at 7:40, right after the last of the men boarded the plane. 9 Shehhi and his team, none of whom had been selected by CAPPS, boarded United 175 between 7:23 and 7:28 (Banihammad in 2A, al Shehri in 2B, al Shehbi in 6C, Hamza al Ghamdi in 9C and Ahmed al Ghamdi in 9D). Their aircraft pushed back from the gate just before 8:00. 10 \\"ashington-Dulles: American 77. Hundreds of miles southwest ofBoston, at Dulles Airport in the Virginia suburbs ofWashington, D.C., five more men were checking in for their early morning flight. At 7:15, a pair of them, Khalid al Mihdhar and Majed Moqed, checked in at the American Airlines ticket counter for Flight 77, bound for Los Angeles. Within the next twenty minutes, they would be followed by Rani Hanjour and two brothers, Nawaf al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi. 11 SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 2 Chapter One, Version 070204- PPR SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION RE\1EW Hani Hanjour, Khalid al Mihdhar and Majed Moqed met the CAPPS criteria. The I-Iazmi brothers were also made selectees by the airline's customer service representative who checked them in, perhaps because they were unable to answer standard security questions or did not present proper identification. It is not known why.. The only consequence of their selection by CAPPS was that their checked bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that they had hoarded the aircraft. 12 All five of the hijackers passed through the Main Terminal's West security screening checkpoint for which United Airlines was the responsible air carrier and had contracted out the work to Argenbright security.13 The checkpoint featured closed circuit television that recorded all passengers, including the hijackers, as they were screened. At 7:18, Mihdhar and Moqed entered the security checkpoint. Mihdhar and Moqed placed their carry-on bags on the x-ray machine belt and proceeded through the first metal detector. Both set off the alann. They were directed to a second metal detector. Mihdhar did not alarm the second metal detector and was permitted through the checkpoint. Moqed set it off. A screener wanded him. He passed this inspection. 14 About twenty minutes later, at 7:35, another passenger for Flight 77, Hani Hanjour, placed two carry-en bags on the x-ray belt in the Main Terminal West Checkpoint, and proceeded, without alarm, through the metal detector. A short time later, Nawaf and Salem al Hazmi entered the same checkpoint. Salem al Hazmi successfully cleared the metal detector and was permitted through the checkpoint. Nawaf al Hazmi set off the alarms for both the first and second metal detectors and was then hand-wanded before being passed. In addition, his shoulder-strap carry-on bag was swiped by an explosive trace detector and then passed. The video footage indicates that Nawaf al Hazmi was carrying an unidentified item in his back pocket that was clipped to the rim of the pocket. 15 The FAA's local civil aviation security office later investigated these security screening operations. The screeners recalled nothing out ofthe ordinary. They could not recall that any of the passengers they screened were CAPPS selectees. We asked a screening expert to review the videotape of the hand-wanding. The expert found the screener's work to have been "marginal at best." The screener should have "resolved" what set off the alarm, and in the case ofboth Moqed and Hazmi, it was clear that he did not. 16 At 7:50, Majed Moqed and Khalid al Mihdhar boarded the flight and were seated in 12A and 12B in Coach. Hani Hanjour, assigned to seat lB (First Class), soon followed. The Hazmi brothers, sitting in 5E and 5F, joined Hanjour in the First Class cabin a few minutes after him. 17 Newark: United 93. Between 7:03 and 7:39, Ziad Jarrah, Saeed al Gharndi, Ahmed al Nami, and Ahmad al Haznawi checked in at the United Airlines ticket counter for Flight 93, going to Los Angeles. Two checked bags; two did not. Jarrah was the last to check in. SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 3 Chapter One, Version 070204- PPR SUBJECT TO CLASSIFlCATION REVIEW Hazna\\'i was selected by CAPPS. His checked bag was screened for explosives and then loaded on the plane. 18 The four men passed through the security checkpoint, ovmed by United Airlines and operated under contract by Argenbright Security. As was the case with the Boston flights, the checkpoint did not feature closed circuit television surveillance so there is no documentary e\Yjdence to determine what time the hijackers passed through the checkpoint or what alarms may have been indicated or security procedures were administered. The FAA interviewed the SG"Teeners later; none recalled anything unusual or suspicious. 19 The four men boarded the plane between 7:39 and 7:48. All four had seats in the First Class cabin. Their plane did not-have a business class section. Jarrah was in seat lB, closest to the cockpit, a1 Nami was 3C, al Ghamdi in 3D and al Haznawi in 6B. 20 The nineteen men were aboard four transcontinental flights.