Machine Gun in World War - 1: Impact on Battle Strategies and Scenario
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International Journal of History and Research (IJHR) ISSN (P): 2249–6963; ISSN (E): 2249–8079 Vol. 10, Issue 1, Jun 2020, 7–16 © TJPRC Pvt. Ltd . MACHINE GUN IN WORLD WAR - 1: IMPACT ON BATTLE STRATEGIES AND SCENARIO AMITABH SAH Indian Revenue Service (IRS) Officer Posted in Delhi, India ABSTRACT Among the weapons which made the maximum impact in the combat efforts and outcome, the machine gun can be rated as one whose introduction to the battlefield drastically changed the strategies and tactics used by all militaries in the future. Its biggest and most visible impact was in forcing the armies of all powers into the trenches. Further the supremacy of the cavalry had gone and the impact of scientific and industrial developments had become paramount in conflicts. The machine gun came to represent the use of technology applied to weaponry KEYWORDS: Initial Impact of the Machine Gun & Evolving Impact on the Battlefield Received: Oct 21 2019; Accepted: Nov 11, 2019; Published: Dec 23, 2019 ; Paper Id.: IJHRJUN20202 Original Article Article Original INTRODUCTION The World War I, which started on July 28, 1914 and ended on November 11, 1918 is a landmark war in the history of mankind. It was not just the spread of the war and its ferocity which engulfed the civilian population in an unprecedented scale which made it in a different league from the earlier great conflicts, but for being the symbiosis of military and civilian technology in a holistic manner which defined the progress in technology in a new manner. The soldiers who fought the war in harsh, trench conditions and braved wreckage and carnage so unwaveringly for so long, brought out a different saga of human spirit and resilience. The casualties at the end of the war was a staggering 9 million soldiers dead and 21 million wounded. Among the weapons which made the maximum impact in the combat efforts and outcome, the machine gun can be rated as one whose introduction to the battlefield drastically changed the strategies and tactics used by all militaries in the future. Its biggest and most visible impact was in forcing the armies of all powers into the trenches. Further the supremacy of the cavalry had gone and the impact of scientific and industrial developments had become paramount in conflicts. The machine gun came to represent the use of technology applied to weaponry. Hiram S. Maxim is credited with inventing the first automatic machine gun in the United States in 1884. Maxim’s machine gun was completely self-powered in which multiple bullets would get dislodged as a result the energy released in the firing cartridge with just one pull of a trigger. This was a path breaking technology of that time. It released an initial 600 rounds per minute, which was a damaging number for any opposing army for a great many years to come. The size and weight of the initial machine gun was a limiting factor but that did not stop it from doing its job and doing it well. www.tjprc.org [email protected] 8 Amitabh Sah Initial Impact of the Machine Gun One tends to look at the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–05 as the two most significant wars that influenced military theorists in the period preceding the World War -1. In the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese used the Hotchkiss machine guns in ample numbers and this revealed their impact in the following two ways: • that, if used in defence, the machine guns resulted in the digging of trenches, and • that a far larger offensive force could be decimated with the use of the machine guns. World militaries were aware of these outcomes, but they tended to view the battlefield developments as proof of Russian military weakness and not the result of the inherent defensive power of the machine gun or the inevitability of trench warfare. Machine guns had also, time and again, demonstrated their deadly impact in some colonial clashes around the world. However the European military theorists maintained that “just because machine guns had cut down Zulu Dervish cavalry did not mean they would be effective against naturally “superior” white troops.” They were still in the belief formed primarily by the manifestations of the strategies followed in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71. This war occurred in Europe and had been won using classic manoeuvre and encirclement tactics. It became the archetype for all of the European powers-particularly France and Germany-on how to conduct a successful military campaign. All European militaries envisaged a highly mobile offensive as the key to success in future battles. However a Polish writer named Jean de Bloch had, in his book “Future War and its economic consequences”(popularised as ‘Is war now impossible”) in 1898 argued that • “New arms technology (e.g. smokeless gunpowder, improved rifle design, Maxims) had rendered maneuvers over open ground, such as bayonet and cavalry charges, obsolete. • A war between the great powers would be a war of entrenchment and that rapid attacks and decisive victories were likewise a thing of the past. • Entrenched men would enjoy a fourfold advantage over infantry advancing across open ground. • Industrial societies would have to settle the resultant stalemate by committing armies numbering in the millions, as opposed to the tens of thousands of preceding wars. An enormous battlefront would develop. A war of this type could not be resolved quickly. • Such a war would become a duel of industrial might, a matter of total economic attrition. Severe economic and social dislocations would result in the imminent risk of famine, disease, the "break-up of the whole social organization" and revolutions from below .” Although his prediction turned out to be remarkably accurate, the professional militaries of the time dismissed his claims, citing once again the importance of troop morale and offensive spirit being of utmost importance in deciding the fate of war. The militaries also tended to undermine the work of Jean de Bloch by arguing that the overall message was bad for morale. The inability to accept his theories meant that the armies learnt by trial and error and the ensuing results were catastrophic and completely unforeseen by the military leadership. Impact Factor (JCC): 4.3084 NAAS Rating: 2.90 Machine Gun in World War - 1: Impact on Battle Strategies and Scenario 9 There is a thinking that the tactical and strategic significance of indirect (e.g., artillery) fire had greater impact in the battlefield in this war; or that the development of the armoured tank and military aircraft had more potential in shaping future battle outcomes. It is known that the machine guns did not cause as many casualties in the war as artillery fire did. But there is no denying the fact that they played a large role in determining the nature of combat, predominantly the trench warfare. The machinegun was perhaps the most potent weapon available to the infantry. Their firepower certainly converted the attacks on organized enemy positions enormously lethal and costly. The rapidity and hail of fire unleashed by Machine guns helped to tilt the balance in favour of the defenders and in this manner fashioned the stalemate of trench warfare. In the last phase of the war, the deadlock of trench warfare was also somewhat broken with the availability of more portable light machine guns as it gave the infantry the ability to cover its own attacks. Thus, both in attack and defence, the employment of machine gun had a large impact on the battle outcomes and lives of the soldiers at the front. How the Machines Evolved When the World War - 1 started, the machine gun was generally a fairly simple device and not the feared one it later became. But even at this time, all the major combatants were aware in fair measure of its lethal prowess and had provided their armies with machine guns on somewhat similar scales of issue. Russia, Germany and Britain used guns based on the Maxim system , while France and Austria-Hungary used indigenous designs – the Model 1907 "St Etienne " and the Schwarzlose respectively. However all these Machine guns were basically very heavy and distinctly unsuitable for use by rapidly advancing infantry troops due to portability issues. The guns generally weighed somewhere in the 30kg-60kg range - frequently without their mountings, carriages and supplies. These were more often than not, positioned on a horizontal plane tripod, and would entail a gun crew of four to six operators. In theory 400-600 small-calibre rounds per minute could be fired. Subsequent advances in technology during the course of the war almost doubled this figure. By this time the rounds of ammunition were fed via a fabric belt or a metal strip. The truth in this matter however was that the machine guns in practice at the beginning of the war had a tendency to rapidly overheat and thus got broken down unless some sort of cooling mechanisms was employed; they were consequently fired in short rather than sustained bursts. Cooling mechanisms usually were of two types: water cooled and, progressively more as the war developed, air cooled. In case of the former Water jackets were provided (which held around one gallon of liquid) and for the latter air vents would be built into the machine gun. Water cooled machine guns would still overheat relatively quickly (sometimes within two minutes), with the consequence that large supplies of water would need to be on hand in the heat of a battle - and, when these ran out, it was not unknown for a machine gun crew to solve the problem by urinating into the jacket.