Problems and Politics of Anglo-American Cooperation for the World War II Second Front| from the Atlantic Conference in 1941 to Cairo-Teheran Conference in 1943
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University of Montana ScholarWorks at University of Montana Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers Graduate School 1967 Problems and politics of Anglo-American cooperation for the World War II second front| From the Atlantic Conference in 1941 to Cairo-Teheran Conference in 1943 Richard E. Scott The University of Montana Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Scott, Richard E., "Problems and politics of Anglo-American cooperation for the World War II second front| From the Atlantic Conference in 1941 to Cairo-Teheran Conference in 1943" (1967). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 3312. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/3312 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [email protected]. PROBLEMS AND POLITICS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN COOPERATION FOR THE WORLD WAR II SECOND FRONT : FROM THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE IN 1941 TO THE CAIRO-TEHERAN CONFERENCE IN 1943 By Richard E. J. Scott B. S. Municipal University of Omaha, 1954 Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA 1967 Approved by; chairman, Board of Examiners Dean^^Graduate School _______JUL 2 0 1967 Date UMI Number: EP35446 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMT P m rtiMan PubfcMnfl UMI EP35446 Published by ProQuest LLC (2012). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQuest ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 PREFACE Several years ago, as I read the minutes of a conference per taining to some problems between the United States and Great Britain, I wondered about the many problems involved in any wartime international collaboration and how the leaders contrived a course of successful action. The question remained in my mind, as a kind of general topic for later study, until I was faced with the choice for thesis work. Having been active in World War II and having been based in England during the finale of that Anglo-American enterprise, I chose to study the background and progress of the collaboration which caused, or rather, directed the forward action of which I was a part. The re sulting research led to the firm realization that national interests and respective leader interpretation of those interests guide the de cisions of international collaboration. In order to reduce the subject to manageable proportions, the view was narrowed to the really major figures, their formal meetings, and decisions for a primary action - the Second Front. Just as progress in a great international undertaking requires support from the parties involved, so my work was supported by the gracious ladies of the Army Pentagon Library, who manage the reference department and who render all possible assistance in locating a vital reference, suggesting available source material, and listening to their "customers'" ideas. ii Dr. Leo B. Lott, Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of Montana, and thesis director, furnished valuable support in the area of Ideas, expression of those Ideas, and overall encourage ment during the final period of compilation. Finally, my wife kept the spirit of completion alive when all the exigencies of daily living contrived to cancel the writing effort. She had a double and re-doubled task, for once having Father at the typewriter, she then had children to entertain elsewhere, because "Daddy is studying." iii CONTENTS Page PREFACE ................... ii Chapter I. INTRODUCTION ............................................. 1 II. PRELUDE TO COOPERATION .................................. 12 Roosevelt; Pre-War Cooperative Action and Long Range Goals Churchill: His Background for Cooperation and Goals Other Key People: Their Place in the Cooperative Role Summary of Prelude III THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE: CLOSER ASSOCIATION AND THE ATLANTIC CHARTER ...................................... 37 IV. THE ARCADIA CONFERENCE: ALLIED GRAND STRATEGY AND THE UNITED N A T I O N S .................................... 51 V. THE SECOND WASHINGTON CONFERENCE : STRATEGIC DIVERSION NORTH AFRICA • ..................................... 71 VI. MIDWAR CONFERENCES : THE SEARCH FOR COMPROMISE ....... 89 Casablanca; Expanded Mediterranean Action - Sicily Trident and Its Sequel : Decision for Italy Quadrant : A Plan is Agreed Cairo - Teheran: A Goal is Reached VII. CONCLUSION ............................... , . 138 iv Page Appendixes I. LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT ........................................ • • • 144 II. LIST OF PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE STUDY ,157 BIBLIOGRAPHY .......... 160 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The record of relations between nations contains many examples of crises as well as periods of stability, and the eventual easing of tensions or furthering of cooperation is proportional to the satis faction of national interests. This results from the fact that national interests are what states seek to protect or gain in relations with other states. It has been suggested that "an ideal foreign policy con tains a systematic formulation of national interests in which . the interests have been judged against one another in terms of priorities and the interests as a whole have been budgeted against the power of the state to achieve those interests."^ If they act rationally, nations with common interests will cooperate so long as their action furthers respective national objectives. However, even in the best of cooperative international enterprises, where optimum commonality of purpose is vital to achievement of goals, there is still variety in approach and diver gence in opinion. Even those nations which have much in common cultur ally, linguistically, economically, as well as in broad national inter ests, experience difficulty in achieving agreement in matters of policy, procedure, and goals. A case in point is that of Anglo-American cooper ation during World War II. ^Frederick H. Hartman, The Relations of Nations, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1957), p. S. Essentially three elements or Influencing threads of philosophy extend throughout the period of Anglo-American cooperation and contribute most heavily to decisions made. The first of these Influencing threads Is typified by the philosophy and apparent motivation of President Franklin D. Roosevelt: his overriding concern for achieving world peace by those methods embodied In President Woodrow Wilson's original Fourteen Points. Such was Roosevelt's primary objective In the Anglo- American cooperation. His was a long range goal. He was very careful to avoid direct conflict with his domestic political adversaries, because Isolationist political elements had destroyed Wilson's hope for control of war by International organization, and the President Intended to avoid the Wilson type of failure. England's Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill's philosophy and goals constitute the second dominant thread of Influencing factors. His primary goal was explicitly stated In the first speech he made following his elevation to power. "Our goal," Churchill said, "Is victory." Although the Prime Minister was admittedly a key figure along with Roosevelt In formulating the original statement regarding the Inter national organization which we call the United Nations, he was primarily motivated by the desire to attract to his cause the somewhat large and Influential segment of Internationalist thought prevalent In England. This he did by encouraging the establishment of an International organi zation. During the early Anglo-American cooperation, the urgency of his Immediate problems and the danger his country faced just for survival claimed his attention much more than did consideration of post-war actions. However, to the degree Churchill gave thought to the means of maintaining world peace, he favored the traditional balance of power, with Britain as the balancing nation. The third set of influences affecting the decisions described herein was voiced by the military staffs of both nations and took the form of argument over proper military strategy, politics notwithstanding From the beginning of joint military planning, the British espoused a strategy derived from their historical experience as a nation and which was based on the concept of a strong navy to offset the deficiencies of a small army. By using their navy, they were able to mount various land offenses, attain their objective, and retire to their naval base of operations. This strategy allowed them to strike then at another place with fairly consistent success. The United States, on the other hand, was a large land power and looked upon the European war as a land war which would require large armies. The American strategy envisioned the build up of a powerful striking force