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Consistent Sdns Through Network State Fuzzing

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Consistent Sdns Through Network State Fuzzing 1 Consistent SDNs through Network State Fuzzing Apoorv Shukla1 S. Jawad Saidi2 Stefan Schmid3 Marco Canini4 Thomas Zinner1 Anja Feldmann2;5 TU Berlin1 MPI-Informatics2 University of Vienna3 KAUST4 UDS5 Abstract—The conventional wisdom is that a software-defined network (SDN) operates under the premise that the logically Policy (P) Management “Traffic A should [26-42] take Path X” (P ≣ R ) centralized control plane has an accurate representation of the Plane logical (P ≣ P ) actual data plane state. Unfortunately, bugs, misconfigurations, logical faults or attacks can introduce inconsistencies that undermine Logical + correct operation. Previous work in this area, however, lacks a Rules Logical [5, 21-25] (Rlogical) Logical Paths Topology (Tlogical) ≣ holistic methodology to tackle this problem and thus, addresses Control Plane (P ) (P Pphysical) only certain parts of the problem. Yet, the consistency of the logical [20] overall system is only as good as its least consistent part. Data Plane (P ≣ P ) Physical logical physical Motivated by an analogy of network consistency checking Rules + [2, 18, 19] (R ) physical (R ≣ R ) with program testing, we propose to add active probe-based Physical Forwarding logical physical Paths (P ) Topology (Tphysical) physical network state fuzzing to our consistency check repertoire. Hereby, our system, PAZZ, combines production traffic with Figure 1: Overview of consistency checks described in the literature. active probes to periodically test if the actual forwarding path and decision elements (on the data plane) correspond to the expected ones (on the control plane). Our insight is that active lighted by Figure1. Monocle [4], RuleScope [18], and traffic covers the inconsistency cases beyond the ones identified RuleChecker [19] use active probing to verify whether the by passive traffic. PAZZ prototype was built and evaluated on topologies of varying scale and complexity. Our results show that logical rules Rlogical are the same as the rules Rphysical of the PAZZ requires minimal network resources to detect persistent data plane. ATPG [2] creates test packets based on the control data plane faults through fuzzing and localize them quickly plane rules to verify whether paths taken by the packets on while outperforming baseline approaches. the data plane P physical are the same as the expected path Index Terms—Consistency, Fuzzing, Network verification, from the high-level policy P without giving attention to the Software defined networking. matched rules. VeriDP [20] in SDNs and P4CONSIST [21] in P4 SDNs use production traffic to only verify whether NTRODUCTION I. I paths taken by the packets on the data plane P physical are The correctness of a software-defined network (SDN) the same as the expected path from the control plane crucially depends on the consistency between the manage- P logical. NetSight [22], PathQuery [23], CherryPick [24], ment, the control and the data plane. There are, however, and PathDump [25] use production traffic whereas SDN many causes that may trigger inconsistencies at run time, Traceroute [26] uses active probes to verify P ≡ P physical. including, switch hardware failures [1], [2], bit flips [3]–[8], Control plane solutions focus on verifying network-wide misconfigurations [9]–[11], priority bugs [12], [13], control invariants such as reachability, forwarding loops, slicing, and and switch software bugs [14]–[16]. When an inconsistency black hole detection against high-level network policies both occurs, the actual data plane state does not correspond to for stateless and stateful policies. This includes tools [27]– what the control plane expects it to be. Even worse, a [37] that monitor and verify some or all of the network-wide malicious user may actively try to trigger inconsistencies as invariants by comparing the high-level network policy with arXiv:1904.08977v2 [cs.NI] 2 May 2020 part of an attack vector. the logical rule set that translates to the logical path set at Figure1 shows a visualization inspired by the one by the control plane, i.e., P ≡ Rlogical or P ≡ P logical. These Heller et al. [17] highlighting where consistency checks systems, however, only model the network behavior which operate. The figure illustrates the three network planes – man- is insufficient to capture firmware and hardware bugs as agement, control, and data plane – with their components. “modeling” and verifying the control-data plane consistency The management plane establishes the network-wide policy are significantly different techniques. P , which corresponds to the network operator’s intent. To Typically, previous approaches to consistency checking realize this policy, the control plane governs a set of logical proceed “top-down,” starting from what is known to the rules (Rlogical) over a logical topology (T logical), which yield management and control planes, and subsequently checking a set of logical paths (P logical). The data plane consists of whether the data plane is consistent. We claim that this is the actual topology (T physical), the rules (Rphysical), and the insufficient and underline this with several examples (§II-C) resulting forwarding paths (P physical). wherein data plane inconsistencies would go undetected. This Consistency checking is a complex problem. Prior work can be critical, as analogous to security, the overall system has tackled individual subpieces of the problem as high- consistency is only as good as the weakest link in the chain. 2 We argue that we need to complement existing top- in all experimental topologies while consuming minimal down approaches with a bottom-up approach. To this end, resources as compared to Header Space Analysis to detect we rely on an analogy to program testing. Programs can and localize data plane faults (§IV); have a huge state space, just like networks. There are two basic approaches to test program correctness: one is static II. BACKGROUND &MOTIVATION testing and the other is dynamic testing using fuzz testing or fuzzing [38]. Hereby, the latter is often needed as the former This section briefly navigates the landscape of faults and cannot capture the actual run-time behavior. We realize that reviews the symptoms and causes (§II-A) to set the stage for the same holds true for network state. the program testing analogy in networks (§II-B). Finally, we Fuzz testing involves testing a program with invalid, un- highlight the scenarios of data plane faults manifesting as expected, or random data as inputs. The art of designing inconsistency (§II-C). an effective fuzzer lies in generating semi-valid inputs that A. Landscape of Faults: Frequency, Causes and Symptoms are valid enough so that they are not directly rejected by As per the survey [1], the top primary causes for abnormal the parser, but do create unexpected behaviors deeper in network behaviour or failures in the order of their frequency the program, and are invalid enough to expose corner cases of occurence are the following: that have not been dealt with properly. For a network, 1) Software bugs: code errors, bugs, etc., 2) Hardware fail- this corresponds to checking its behavior not only with the ures or bugs: bit errors or bitflips, switch failures, etc., 3) At- expected production traffic but with unexpected or abnormal tacks and external causes: compromised security, DoS/DDos, packets [39]. However, in networking, what is expected or etc., and 4) Misconfigurations: ACL /protocol misconfigs, etc. unexpected depends not only on the input (ingress) port but In SDNs, the above causes still exist and are persis- also the topology till the exit (egress) port and configuration tent [2]–[4], [12]–[16], [40]–[42]. We, however, realized that i.e., rules on the switches. Thus, there is a huge state the symptoms [1] of the above causes can manifest either space to explore. Relying only on production traffic is not as functional or performance-based problems on the data sufficient because production traffic may or may not trigger plane. To clarify further, the symptoms are either functional inconsistencies. However, having faults that can be triggered (reachability, security policy correctness, forwarding loops, at any point in time, due to a change in production traffic e.g., broadcast/multicast storms) or performance-based (Router malicious or accidental, is undesirable for a stable network. CPU high utilization, congestion, latency/throughput, inter- Thus, we need fuzz testing for checking network consistency. mittent connectivity). To abstract the analysis, if we disregard Accordingly, this paper introduces PAZZ which combines the performance-based symptoms, we realize the functional such capabilities with previous approaches to verify SDNs problems can be reduced to the verification of network against persistent data plane faults. Therefore, similar to correctness. Making the situation worse, the faults manifest program testing we ask: “How far to go with consistency in the form of inconsistency where the expected network state checks?” at control plane is different to the actual data plane state. Our Contributions: A physical network or network data plane comprises of devices and links. In SDNs, such devices are SDN switches • We identify and categorize the causes and symptoms connected through links. The data plane of the SDNs is all of data plane faults which are currently unaddressed about the network behaviour when subjected to input in the to provide some useful insights into the limitations of form of traffic. Just like in programs, we need different test existing approaches by investigating their frequency of cases as inputs with different coverage to test the code cov- occurence. Based on our insights, we make a case for erage. Similarly, in order to dynamically test the network be- fuzz testing mechanism for campus and private datacenter haviour thoroughly, we need input in the form of traffic with SDNs (§II); different coverage [43]. Historically, the network correctness or functional verification on the data plane has been either a • We introduce a novel methodology, PAZZ which detects path-based verification (network-wide) [20], [22]–[26], [44] and later, localizes faults by comparing control vs.
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