Shared Reality 1 Shared Reality Gerald Echterhoff, E. Tory Higgins, and John M. Levine Shared Reality Experiencing Commonality With Others’ Inner States About the World Gerald Echterhoff,1 E. Tory Higgins,2 and John M. Levine3 1Bielefeld University, 2Columbia University, and 3University of Pittsburgh Address correspondence to Gerald Echterhoff, who is now at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Psychology Group, Jacobs University Bremen, Campus Ring 1, D-28759 Bremen, Germany; e-mail:
[email protected]. Shared Reality 2 ABSTRACT—Humans have a fundamental need to experience a shared reality with others. We present a new conceptualization of shared reality based on four conditions. We posit (a) that shared reality involves a (subjectively perceived) commonality of individuals’ inner states (not just observable behaviors); (b) that shared reality is about some target referent; (c) that for a shared reality to occur, the commonality of inner states must be appropriately motivated; and (d) that shared reality involves the experience of a successful connection to other people's inner states. In reviewing relevant evidence, we emphasize research on the saying-is-believing effect, which illustrates the creation of shared reality in interpersonal communication. We discuss why shared reality provides a better explanation of the findings from saying-is-believing studies than do other formulations. Finally, we examine relations between our conceptualization of shared reality and related constructs (including empathy, perspective taking, theory of mind, common ground, embodied synchrony, and socially distributed knowledge) and indicate how our approach may promote a comprehensive and differentiated understanding of social-sharing phenomena. Shared Reality 3 Shared Reality 4 Humans are distinct from other animals in their motivation to comprehend, manage, and share inner states, including beliefs, feelings, attitudes, goals, and standards (see Higgins & Pittman, 2008).