Religio Today: the Concept of Religion in Martin Buber's Thought
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Irene Kajon Religio Today: The Concept of Religion in Martin Buber’sThought The aim of my contribution is to bring out the originality and contemporary rele- vanceofBuber’sconcept of religion. First,Ishalltry to show how original this concept is compared with the meaningsthathavebeengiven to the Latin term religio in the history of thought and culture. This term has been adopted by var- ious European languages: in present usage,the German word Religion,English religion,French religion,Spanish religión,and Italian religione have the same meaning the Latin term religio had. Therefore, probingthe denotations attributed to the original Latinterm perforceentails pondering the phenomenon of religion in present dayEurope and in all the societies influenced by European culture – from Western to Eastern countries.Second, Ishalltry to show how relevant Bub- er’sconcept of religion is for us, giventhe often unfortunate consequences reli- gio,ifcharacterized by violence and intolerance, has. The following exposition is divided in three parts. In the first Ishallfocus on the various meanings religio had in the Romanand Christian world, and note the historical impact these conceptions of religio have had up to present-day society. In the second part of the paper,Ishall consider the meaning that Buber givesthe term “religion,” with particular reference to Ichund Du (1923). Specifically, Iwill highlight his distinctive interpretation of religion as the onlypossibleway out of the existential crisis of contemporary man. In the third part,Ishalltry to clarify brieflyhow through meditations on biblical and philosophical texts – which he publishedinthe forties and fifties of the previous century – he sought to illumi- nate for his readersameans to re-appropriatereligion. The term religio: Does it derive from relegere or religare? In the Roman world it was Cicero(106–43 BCE) who provided an etymologyof the word religio when he distinguishesitfrom superstitio (superstition). In his work De naturadeorum he writes: Accipimus […]deorum cupiditates, aegritudines, iracundias.[…]Cultus autemdeorum est optimus idemquecastissimus atque sanctissimus plenissimusque pietatis ut eos semper pura, integra, incorrupta et menteetvoce veneremur.Non enim philosophi solum, DOI 10.1515/9783110402223-007, © 2018 Irene Kajon, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License. 102 Irene Kajon verum etiam maiores nostri superstitionem areligione separaverunt.Nam qui totos dies precabantur et immolabant ut sibi sui liberi superstites essent superstitiosi sunt appellati, quod nomen patuit postea latius.Qui autem omnia quae ad cultum deorum pertinerent dil- igenterretractarent et tamquam relegerent,sunt dicti religiosi ex relegendo ut elegantesex eligendo tamquam adiligendo diligentes, ex intellegendo intellegentes; his enim in verbis omnibus inest vis legendi eadem quae in religioso. Itafactum est in superstitiosoetreligio- so alterum vitii nomen, alterum laudis.¹ We receive […]the desires, diseases and furies of the gods. […]But the cult of the gods is excellent,absolutelypureand holy, and full of piety so that they areworshipped with both an uncorrupted mind and voice. Not onlythe philosophers, but our ancestors tooseparated superstition from religion. Those whooffered prayers and sacrifices every daysothat their children might survive them arecalled superstitious, aword[whose meaning] was extend- ed afterwards, while those who diligentlyreconsidered and seemed to be goingoverand over again everythingthat concerned the cultofthe gods,are called religious from relegen- do (reread),just as they arecalled elegant from eligendo (elect) and diligent from diligendo (favour), and intelligent from intellegendo (understand); all these verbs have the same force as “re-read” in religious.Inthis waythe superstitious and the religious acquired aname that was either reprehensible or praiseworthy. Ciceroascribes to the word religio ameaning that corresponds exactlytothe con- ception then current in ancient Rome regarding the proper attitude one was to assume towards the gods: those who follow scrupulouslythe ceremonies and practices established by tradition are deemed religious;those who love their children more thantheir parents,and so are incessantlyintroducing new forms of worship and prayer,almostasifthey wanted to forcethe gods to protect and defend their progeny,evenafter their death, are superstitious. Religio in the Roman world is expressed through the link between past and present,and be- tween the individual and the gods who dominate every particularaspect of life: religio consisted of liturgical and sacred practices in pre-determined times and places,either to be held in certain seasons of the year or on certain set oc- casions, or,inthe case of events that weresurprising or unexpected, of practices that could be introduced without breakingthe rules that allow continuity be- tween generations, however differentlythose rules might be applied. In the Christian worlditwas the Church Father Lactantius (250 –327) who in disputing Cicero’sconception of religio,also dwelt on the term’setymology. In book four, “De vera sapientia et religione”,ofhis work Divinae Institutiones,Lac- tantius, like Cicero, underlines the differencebetween religio and superstitio: Quae cum ita se habeant,utostendimus,apparetnullam aliam spem vitae homini esse pro- positam, nisi ut abjectis vanitatibus et erroremiserabili, Deum cognoscat et Deo serviat, Cicero, De naturadeorum,II, 70 – 72. Religio Today: The Concept of Religion in Martin Buber’sThought 103 nisi huic temporali renuntiet vitae, ac se rudimentis justitiae ad cultum verae religionis instituat.Hac enim conditione gignimur,utgeneranti nos Deo justa et debita obsequia praebeamus;hunc solum noverimus,hunc sequamur.Hoc vinculo pietatis obstricti Deo et religati sumus;unde ipsa religionomen accepit, non ut Cicero interpretatus est, arelegendo. […]Haec interpretatio quam inepta sit,exreipsa licet noscere. […]Sisemel facere, optimum est,quantomagis saepius?[…]Quod argumentum etiam ex contrario valet: si enim totosdies precari et immolare criminis est; ergo et semel. […]Nimirum religio veri cultusest,superstitio falsi. Et omnino quid colas interest,non quemadmodumcolas, sed quid precere. […]Superstitiosi ergo qui multosacfalsos deos colunt.Nos autemreligio- si, qui uni et vero Deo supplicamus.² Things beingaswehaveshown, it is clear that human life is givennoother hope than knowingGod and serving God, oncevanities and wretched errorhavebeen abandoned, re- nouncingthis earthlylife and dedicatingoneself to the principles of justicegoverningthe practice of the true religion. In fact we were created [literally, generated], so that we might offer the right and proper signsofsubmission to the God who has created [generated] us, that we might know Him onlyand follow Him only. With this bond of piety we aresubju- gated and bound to God; religion receivedits name from this and not,asCicero interpreted it,from “re-read”.[…]One can see from the thingitself how inappropriate this interpreta- tion is. […]Ifdoingsomethingonceonlyisexcellent,how much moresocan it be to do it moreoften?[…]This argument also holds ex contrario: if it is acrime to prayand sacrifice every day, then it is to do so even once. […]Ofcourse, religion is the cult of the truth, and superstition the cultofthe false. And onlywhat youadorematters, not how youadoreit, but what youpray. […]Sothose whoadoremanyfalse gods aresuperstitious,while we are religious because we pray to the one true God. Lactantius,wemay note, does not understand Cicero’sthought regarding the op- position of religio and superstitio: he simplyidentifies superstitio with an exces- sive repetition of acts of worship rather than with an attitude of the soul regard- ing those actions which involve arupture between fathersand sons, the past and the present,asmentioned above. UnlikeCicero, Lactantius does not regard con- duct as fundamental to religio,but knowledge of the true God.The God that Lac- tantius appeals to is the God who enters into relation with the individual, with- drawshim from the world, and ensureshis salvation in eternal life. Religion owes its name not to the heart and mind going back over what has already been done, to relegere,but to being bound to aGod who made himself known to men by cominginto the world, to religare. What is essentialtoreligio are truth as astate of thingsrevealed to men, and the relation between man and God: this relation isolates man from the world, obliges him to go back inside himself, to find in his inner life the presenceofaGod who redeems him by suf- fering on his behalf on the cross and rising again to eternal life. Religio means Lactantius, Divinae Institutiones,IV, 28. 104 Irene Kajon the bond between God and man: God will save him if he believes in Him and follows His example. In the history of European culture, these two contrasting meaningsofthe term religio – one current in the ancient world, the other affirmedatthe time of the formation of Christian theology – have been interwoven and have given rise to various manifestations. Accordingly, religio became further enriched and took on new connotations. Andthis interweaving and enrichment took place despite the Church’sconflict with paganism at the time of the decline of the Roman Empire. In order to appreciatehow religious practice and profession of the truth of the kinship of manwith God wereequallycelebratedand placed in close connection as two sides