Insanity As a Defense to Crime in Louisiana W
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Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 8 | Issue 5 Article 4 1918 Insanity as a Defense to Crime in Louisiana W. O. Hart Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons Recommended Citation W. O. Hart, Insanity as a Defense to Crime in Louisiana, 8 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 658 (May 1917 to March 1918) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. INSANITY AS A DEFENSE TO CRLNME IN LOUISIANA3 2 W. 0. HART I find the first legislative reference to insanity in criminal cases in the Statutes of Louisiana in the year 1844, when by Act No. 32, of that year, approved February 24th, it was provided as follows: "Whenever any person who is or may be arrested, and in custody or in prison, to answer for any crime or crimes, offense or misdemeanor, before any of the courts of this state having criminal jurisdiction, shall be acquitted thereof by the jury of trials, or shall not be indicted by the grand jury by reason of the insanity or mental derangement of -such person, and the discharge and going at large of such person, shall be deemed ,by the same court to be dangerous to the safety of the citizens or to the peace of the commonwealth, the said court be and is hereby authorized and empowered to commit such person to the Insane Hospital of New Orleans, or any similar institution in any parish within the jurisdiction of the court, there to be detained until he or she be restored to his or her right mind, or otherwise delivered by due course of law. "Whenever the Grand Jury upon any inquiry which they may hereafter make as to the commission of any crime or misdemeanor by any person, shall omit to find a bill for the cause aforesaid, it shall be the duty of such jury to certify the same to the said court. "Whenever the jury of trials, upon the general issue of not guilty, shall acquit any person for the cause aforesaid, it shall be the duty of such jury, in giving in their verdict of not guilty, to state that it was for such cause." This law was re-enacted in 1855 (No. 121) and was carried into the last revision of the Statutes, 1870, as Sections 993, 994 and 995, and duplicated in 1778, 1779 and 1780, with the change, however, from the Insane Hospital of New Orleans to the State Insane Hospital, of which there are now two, but the criminal insane are sent to the one at Jackson. The jurisprudence of Louisiana, is, that when the question of insanity of the defendant in any case is at issue, the jury are to be told that every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient 'Read before the Congress of Alienists and Neurologists, Chicago, July, 1917. 2Member of the Bar of New Orleans, La. INSANITY AS A DEFENSE .degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to the satisfaction of the jury; and that to establish a defense on the ground of insanity it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing wrong. This principle was announced in the case of State v. Scott, 49th Louisiana Annual Reports, 253 (1897), where in the syllabus prepared by Mr. Justice Miller, who rendered the opinion, it was said: "The law presuming sanity, the burden is on the accused urging his insanity as a defense to prove it. "That proof must satisfy the jury the accused was not of sane ,mind at the time of the act charged. They should consider all the testimony before them, whether presented by the accused or the state, and give due weight to the presumption of sanity. If on the whole testimony and giving to the presumption of sanity its full operation, they are satisfied the accused was insane when the act was committed, they should acquit; but, if not thus satisfied, they should deem the accused sane and responsible." And the court reversed the judgment and set aside the verdict of the jury, remanding the case for a new trial, because the charge of the District Judge was not what it should have been in accordance with the reasoning of the court. Mr. Justice Breaux, afterwards Chief Justice, and now an honored member of the Louisiana Bar, to which he returned after serving on the court for twenty-four years, dissented and said: "Under the common law every man is presumed sane until the contrary be proven. "Insanity, as i plea, should be proved as a substantive fact by theaccused, on whom the burden of proof rests. Being of the opin- ion that the proof of insanity at the time of committing the act ought to be made as clear and satisfactory by the accused to secure his acquittal on the ground of -insanity as the proof of committingr he act ought to be made evident by the state in order to find a sane man guilty, I respectfully dissent." As the burden of proof of insanity is on the defendant, it is proper for the trial court to refuse to charge that the state must .prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prisoner was sane when he committed the act and not error on the contrary to charge, that the law presumes the sanity of every man, and that it devolves on the prisoner, under a plea of insanity, to satisfy the jury by a preponder- ance of proof that he was insane at the time of the commission of 660 W. 0. HART the act, with the qualification, however, given in the 'quotation from the Scott case above referred to." And, therefore, the Supreme Court in the case of State v. Colenta 8 held that it was proper for the District Judge to refuse to charge: "If some controlling disease was in truth the acting power within the prisoner which he could not resist, or if he had not a sufficient use of his reason to control the passion which prompted the act complained of, he is not responsible." When the presumption of sanity and insanity come in conflict, the latter must give way, and where all the ingredients of a crime, save sanity, are admitted or proved, and there is-no other evidence on the subject, the presumption of sanity is sufficient to establish or main- tain that condition, and to rebut the presumption of innocence. The mere plea of insanity does not affect the presumption of sanity, but in the face of such plea, unsupported by proof, it is the duty of the judge to instruct the jury that the law presumes the defendant to be sane, and that they ought to be governed by the law. As said in one case: "A plea of insanity, the last resort of im- periled criminals, will surely noi be listened to when the defendant's own witnesses disprove it." ' \ The case of Scott, supra, in holding that it was error to charge that sanity must be established beyond a reasonable doubt expressly overruled State v. Clements,5 State v. DeRance,6 and State v. Coleman, supra, where the contrary doctrine had been announced, though the court in the DeRance case found that the authorities and text writers were in conflict on this point, but adopted the rule that: "Insanity must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt," for prac- tically the same reasons as were given in the dissenting opinion of Justice Breaux, which I have before quoted in full. In the Scott case, the court quoted approvingly from State v. Coleman, supra, where it was held that the District judge did not err in refusing to charge:- "If the jury entertained any doubt of the prisoner's sanity they must acquit him of guilt," saying that: "The burden of proof is upon the party setting up the defense." Again referring to the Scott case, I quote the following from the opinion of the court: "It will suffice if the jury are told, in effect, that the burden of proof is on accused to establish by clear convincing proof the insanity 827th Louisiana Annual Reports, 691 (1875). 4State v. George, 37th Louisiana Annual Reports, 786 (1885). 547th Louisiana Annual Reports, 1008 (1895). 634th Louisiana Annual Reports, 186 (1882). INSANITY AS A DEFENSE he urges as a defense; that the presumption of sanity is to be taken into consideration, and exercise its full influence, along with all the testimony before them, whether produced by the accused, or by the state; and if, on the consideration of the whole testimony, giving due weight to the presumption of sanity, they are satisfied the accused was not of sane mind when the act charged was committed, they are to acquit, but, if not thus satisfied, they are to hold the accused sane and responsible." In disapproving the charge of the judge which caused the reversal of the sentence, the setting aside of the verdict, and the remanding of the case, the court said: "The charge in this case implies, if it does not express, that though there may be a preponderance of testimony before the jury to show that the accused was insane at the time of the act, yet they may convict.