Advances in Destructive and Non-Destructive Analysis for Environmental Monitoring and Nuclear Forensics

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Advances in Destructive and Non-Destructive Analysis for Environmental Monitoring and Nuclear Forensics ADVANCES IN DESTRUCTIVE AND NON-DESTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND NUCLEAR FORENSICS Proceedings of an International Conference Karlsruhe, 21–23 October 2002 ADVANCES IN DESTRUCTIVE AND NON-DESTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND NUCLEAR FORENSICS © IAEA, 2003 Permission to reproduce or translate the information contained in this publication may be obtained by writing to the International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramer Strasse 5, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria. Printed by the IAEA in Austria November 2003 STI/PUB/1169 PROCEEDINGS SERIES ADVANCES IN DESTRUCTIVE AND NON-DESTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND NUCLEAR FORENSICS PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ADVANCES IN DESTRUCTIVE AND NON-DESTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND NUCLEAR FORENSICS ORGANIZED BY THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY CONVENED JOINTLY WITH THE INSTITUTE FOR TRANSURANIUM ELEMENTS HOSTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY AND HELD IN KARLSRUHE, 21–23 OCTOBER 2002 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY VIENNA, 2003 IAEA Library Cataloguing in Publication Data International Conference on Advances in Destructive and Non- Destructive Analysis for Environmental Monitoring and Nuclear Forensics (2002 : Karlsruhe, Germany) Advances in destructive and non-destructive analysis for environmental monitoring and nuclear forensics : proceedings of an International Conference on Advances in Destructive and Non-Destructive Analysis for Environmental Monitoring and Nuclear Forensics / organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency, convened jointly with the Institute for Transuranium Elements, hosted by the Government of Germany and held in Karlsruhe, 21–23 October 2002. —Vienna : The Agency, 2003. p. ; 24 cm. —(Proceedings series, ISSN 0074–1884) STI/PUB/1169 ISBN 92–0–110203–8 Includes bibliographical references. 1. Nuclear terrorism — Prevention — Congresses. 2. Chemistry, Forensic — Congresses. 3. Nuclear industry — Security measures — Congresses. I. International Atomic Energy Agency. II. European Institute for Transuranium Elements. III. Series: Proceedings Series (International Atomic Energy Agency). IAEAL 03–00344 FOREWORD The illicit trafficking of nuclear material has been an issue of concern since the first seizures in the early 1990s. This subject has gained increased attention in the context of the recent discussions on the possibilities of nuclear terrorism. In March 2002, the IAEA Board of Governors approved, in princi- ple, a set of specific proposals, or a plan of action, for protection against nuclear terrorism. While the plan emphasizes prevention, it also recognizes that mea- sures are required to detect and respond to malicious acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. The combating of illicit nuclear trafficking remains important in the plan of action. The need for nuclear forensic science has emerged from the concern over the smuggling of nuclear materials. Its role is to determine the nature of seized material, its intended use and its origin. Much can be learned from the analysis of reported cases of illicit trafficking. What specifically could the material have been used for? Where was the material obtained — in stock, scrap, or waste? Was the small amount seized only a sample of a much more significant quantity? These and many other questions can be answered through detailed technical characterization of seized material samples.The scientific methods used for this purpose are normally referred to as nuclear forensics, an indispensable tool for use in law enforcement investigations of nuclear trafficking. In international safeguards activities, some of these methods are used to analyse swipe samples from equipment or from the environs of nuclear facili- ties (referred to as ‘environmental sampling’). The analysis may identify iso- topes that reveal information about past nuclear activities. Nuclear material seized in trafficking can be identified, and a profile of its physical properties created. Such a profile may indicate the source of the material seized, as well as other characteristics that are essential in a criminal investigation. In order to identify the source of the material, comprehensive databases of known nuclear material sources are essential. The aim of this conference — convened by the IAEA jointly with the Institute for Transuranium Elements, Joint Research Centre, European Commission — was to promote the further development of nuclear forensic methods and international co-operation among laboratories. Another aim was to facilitate access to such capabilities by national law enforcement authorities in investigating and prosecuting nuclear crimes. It is hoped that this conference provided important incentives to enhance co-operation and to bring nuclear forensic methodology to a broader audience and encourage greater use. A total of 118 participants from 37 countries and 4 international organi- zations attended this conference, held in Karlsruhe, Germany. These proceed- ings include the keynote addresses, invited papers, poster presentations and summaries of the technical sessions. The conclusions and recommendations of the conference participants are given at the beginning of this volume. The IAEA gratefully acknowledges the co-operation of the Institute for Transuranium Elements in convening this conference and the generous hospi- tality extended to the participants by the Government of Germany. EDITORIAL NOTE The Proceedings have been edited to the extent considered necessary for the read- er’s assistance. The views expressed remain, however, the responsibility of the named authors or participants. In addition, the views are not necessarily those of the governments of the nominating Member States or of the nominating organizations. Although great care has been taken to maintain the accuracy of information con- tained in this publication, neither the IAEA nor its Member States assume any responsi- bility for consequences which may arise from its use. The use of particular designations of countries or territories does not imply any judgement by the publisher, the IAEA, as to the legal status of such countries or territo- ries, of their authorities and institutions or of the delimitation of their boundaries. The mention of names of specific companies or products (whether or not indicated as registered) does not imply any intention to infringe proprietary rights, nor should it be construed as an endorsement or recommendation on the part of the IAEA. The authors are responsible for having obtained the necessary permission for the IAEA to reproduce, translate or use material from sources already protected by copy- rights. Material prepared by authors who are in contractual relation with governments is copyrighted by the IAEA, as publisher, only to the extent permitted by the appropriate national regulations. CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . 1 THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR FORENSICS IN COMBATING ILLICIT TRAFFICKING AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM (Session 1) Keynote Address: The role of nuclear forensics in the prevention of acts of nuclear terrorism (IAEA-CN-98/1) . 7 A. Nilsson Keynote Address: From illicit trafficking to nuclear terrorism — The role of nuclear forensic science (IAEA-CN-98/2) . 9 R. Schenkel, O. Cromboom, P. Daures, W. Janssens, L. Koch, K. Mayer, I.L.F. Ray The nuclear smuggling International Technical Working Group: Making a difference in combating illicit trafficking (IAEA-CN-98/3) . 17 S. Niemeyer, L. Koch Federal Bureau of Investigation’s use of nuclear forensics in combating illicit trafficking and nuclear terrorism (Abstract) (IAEA-CN-98/4) . 21 J.M. Kaysak Role of Europol in the field of combating the illicit trafficking of nuclear material and radioactive substances (IAEA-CN-98/5) . 23 P. Gridling Forensic recovery within contaminated environments (Abstract) (IAEA-CN-98/6) . 25 S. Williams Development of an electronic archive on non-conventional fuels as an integral part of a nuclear forensics laboratory (IAEA-CN-98/7) . 27 Y. Dolgov, Y. Bibilashvili, A. Schubert CURRENT CAPABILITIES AND PAST EXPERIENCES (Session 2) International Technical Working Group round robin tests (IAEA-CN-98/8) . 41 G.B. Dudder, R.C. Hanlen, G.M.J. Herbillon Report on recent progress at the Central Analytical Laboratory (NRI Řež plc) for upgrading capabilities for identification of illicit nuclear materials (IAEA-CN-98/9) . 53 Z. Málek, F. Sus Application of isotopic fingerprinting in nuclear forensic investigations: A case study (IAEA-CN-98/11) . 63 K. Mayer, G. Rasmussen, M. Hild, E. Zuleger, H. Ottmar, S. Abousahl, E. Hrnecek Recent developments and case studies in nuclear forensic science (IAEA-CN-98/12) . 71 I.L.F. Ray, T. Wiss, H. Thiele Problems of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and safeguard strategies in the Republic of Tajikistan (IAEA-CN-98/13) . 77 U.M. Mirsaidov Nuclear forensic analysis capabilities and experience at the Oak Ridge Y-12 national security complex (IAEA-CN-98/14) . 83 E.R. Hinton, Jr., D.M. Hembree, J.A. Carter Combating and preventing illicit trafficking in Romania (IAEA-CN-98/15) . 93 L.L. Biro, E.V. Grama Forensic analysis of smuggled high enriched uranium interdicted in Bulgaria (IAEA-CN-98/16) . 105 S. Niemeyer, I. Hutcheon ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES (Session 3) Application of accelerator mass spectrometry to nuclear safeguards (IAEA-CN-98/17) . 109 M. Hotchkis, D. Child, C. Tuniz Ultratrace analysis of uranium and plutonium by mass spectrometry (IAEA-CN-98/18) . 115 J.F.Wacker, N.A. Wogman, K.B. Olsen, S.L. Petersen,
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