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How to Become a Demagogue in Sixteen Easy Steps

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How to Become a Demagogue in Sixteen Easy Steps Trumpian Demagoguery: A New Era in Political Messaging Submitted to the Union College Department of Political Science, March 2021 1 Table of Contents Introduction 3 Chapter I: Anger, Fear and Hate 17 Chapter II: Self-Identifying Strategies 47 Chapter III: Rally Strategies 83 Chapter IV: False Narratives 103 Chapter V: Attack Strategies 141 Chapter VI: Lock Him Up! 167 Works Cited and Bibliography 177 2 3 Introduction Donald Trump will go down as the most divisive president in American history, beloved by his base and despised by almost everyone else. He has been coined a moron and a genius, tyrant and a liberator, a crook and law enforcer: the list goes on. No matter which side of the political aisle we lean to, Trump is always at the center of attention and dominates every conversation. For the last five years, Trump has captivated both a national and global audience with his unprecedented and radical form of politicking. His popularity with his most loyal supporters is undeniable, the attention he draws from media outlets across political leanings is borderline obsessive, and his impact on American politics is immeasurable. The question many Americans are asking is, what is the source of Trump’s popularity? A majority of Americans would agree that Trump’s personality is not necessarily likeable; he is abrasive, abusive, rude, and quite frankly annoying. These are not just my personal observations of Trump; polling suggests a general understanding that his personality is not his appeal: Figure 1 (Newport) 4 According to this Gallup poll, around 62% of Americans rated Trump with below average association to the categories of likeable, honest and admirable; he’s certainly no John F. Kennedy. Beyond just being relatively unlikeable, his resume is not relatable to most of his base; a New York raised, billionaire son of a billionaire real estate broker, whose favorite activities include playing golf at his private resort, hosting a reality TV show, avoiding taxes, and conning fellow elites through bankrupt business schemes. This stands in stark contrast to Trump’s base of middle-class service workers from generations of manufacturers and tradesmen. Prior to being elected President, he had no relevant political experience nor did he have any significant support from his party. From his very first political speech, he has been engulfed in scandal after scandal that would have ended other political careers in their tracks. Yet, somehow, he has managed to organize and captivate an audience of millions of loyal followers, many of whom have little in common to Trump’s lifestyle. If it is not his personality and not his background, then what about Trump has evoked this massive movement? The common answer is that he is a populist; his ideology and rhetoric have organized a certain portion of the electorate against elites and political establishment. I think this answer, while correct in its essence, is an easy way out that places Trump in a blanket of fellow populists without recognizing his uniqueness and therefore his danger. Trump has been able to achieve something that no fellow populist has done since Andrew Jackson: win the United States presidency. Pure-populists in the same category as Trump –William Jennings Brian and George Wallace to name two examples– have attempted to win presidential elections by stirring up popular support against elites to no avail. Their movements never garnered the same emotional connection and momentum that Trump currently yields. Neglecting to analyse what separates Trumpism from other populisms risks oversimplifying the nature of the Trump movement and 5 the potential longevity of it’s political supremacy; there is a reason Trump has seen more success than arguably any other American populist. Indeed, Trump has demonstrated classical populist narratives like speaking for “real Americans” and rejecting the established political and cultural elite. We have seen a similar rise in populism in Europe, take Hungary and Poland for example. I would contest that Trump’s brand is different based on the sheer fact that Europe and the U.S. exist in two separate global conditions: European populists [seek] to preserve their national institutions against encroaching Europeanization – a term they use sometimes interchangeably with globalization. Globalization is a force that has contributed to putting large numbers of people, particularly young people, out of work and facing a bleak future on both sides of the Atlantic. In contrast, Trump questions the legitimacy of political institutions and the reality of facts in a manner that European populists do not[...] Trump’s electoral victory is a peculiarly American product of working-class unemployment, a deep distrust of and resentment of educated elites[...] Trump exploited the fears, feelings of neglect and fantasies of his voters. He deploy[s] rhetoric that combine[s] a cadence of danger with megadoses of emotional empathy (Berezin). In Europe, populism stems partly out of resistance to globalization and the desire of nations to preserve their national identity rather than immerse themselves into a conglomerate of European states, which European populists believe do not share their same values. This can be seen with the Brexit vote and the anti-immigration rhetoric of European populists. As we know, this anti-immigration sentiment is mirrored by Trump. However, it is often done in a different context against not just immigrants from majority muslim countries, but immigrants from the southern border as well. Despite the nationalist sentiment which fuels European populists movement, the Nazi experience is also a factor which has created a significant barrier and general distaste for right wing parties which is not the case in the U.S. Additionally, the U.S.’s long history of slavery has created further societal divisions that are less prevelant in Europe. European governments may also create barriers for populism; the multi-party system used by many European states allows for the fracturing of right wing parties from moderate conservative 6 parties, whereas the GOP is forced to encompass “all of the above'' when it comes to conservative movements. These are just some of the factors that differentiate “Trumpism'' from European populism, but there is still more to the story. I believe that the classification of Trump as a populist is somewhat less important to understanding his success beyond recognizing that Trump capitalized on notions of populism among certain groups of Americans to propel his movement. Trump’s ideology is not entirely unique; politicians before Trump have been populists, racists, xenophobic, mysoginistic, anti-elite and have preyed upon the anxieties of certain parts of the population. But to my knowledge, there has never been an American political movement, populist or any other, where the follower’s very identity has been tied so closely to the main figurehead as is the case in Trump’s movement. This is the critical piece of Trump’s brand of populism that sets him apart from his European and past American counterparts. Berezin identifies this distinction as Trump’s unique ability to exploit the “fears, feelings of neglect and fantasies of his voters” combined with “megadoses of emotional empathy.” This is what I classify Trump’s deep ceded “emotional connection” to his base, formed by strategic messaging and rhetoric which, in my opinion, is the root of Trump’s popularity. To create fire there must be both fuel and a spark. Trump’s messaging is that spark which ignited his base with the fires of fear and anger towards anyone that Trump identified as an enemy. This highlights the uniqueness of the brand of Trump, and the way he has used messaging to form an authentic and impenetrable connection with his base of supporters. The messaging strategies that Trump has used in the last five years are remarkably different from nearly every other politician in the last decade. Not only is messaging the essence of Trump’s popularity, but it is the link between Republican party “policy” and the Trump movement which has transitioned the traditional GOP into a right-wing fear factory. Trump’s connection to his 7 base goes beyond policy and ideology; it is an emotional connection carefully crafted and refined through dynamic messaging. Trump is able to form this emotional connection through a deep and calculated understanding of the emotions, fears and desires of his base supporters. It is this base of supporters, who Trump is supremely loyal to and who rally behind him, that have given him immense power and protection. This power not only manifests itself in his election to the White House, but in his control over the Republican Party, right-wing media and the national news cycle. I refuse to submit that this support can simply be explained by political undercurrents that have given rise to a right wing populist movement where Trump was at the right place, with the right ideology, at the right time. As much as Democrats may hate to say it; there is something very special about Donald Trump. By identifying and analyzing a number of Trump’s messaging strategies, this thesis will demonstrate that Trump’s popularity with his base is a result of a deliberately crafted emotional connection, forged by a highly strategic messaging arsenal that withstands any moral, legal or political challenge and will last for the foreseeable future. In doing so, this paper will not only identify messaging as the source of Trump’s popularity and its longevity, it will also conclude that other political figures with demagogic instincts could form (and perhaps already are forming) similar connections to a Trump style base. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA) is certainly one example of someone using similarly controversial and combative rhetoric that resembles Trump’s. Other potential candidates may include Tom Cotton (R-Ark) or perhaps Madison Cawthorn (R-NC).
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