DOCSLIB.ORG

Nord-Tillabéri : Analyse Du Conflit Lié À L’Accès Aux Ressources Naturelles Le Transfrontalier Au Cœur De L’Analyse Et De L’Action

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Nord-Tillabéri : Analyse Du Conflit Lié À L’Accès Aux Ressources Naturelles Le Transfrontalier Au Cœur De L’Analyse Et De L’Action Nord-Tillabéri : analyse du conflit lié à l’accès aux ressources naturelles Le transfrontalier au cœur de l’analyse et de l’action 1 Nord-Tillabéri : analyse du conflit lié à l’accès aux ressources naturelles Le transfrontalier au cœur de l’analyse et de l’action Herrick Mouafo Djontu et Karine Gatelier Avec la collaboration de l’équipe de chercheurs de la HACP Sorab Ibrahim, Mohamed Mouhamadou, Zalika Abdoulaye et Dounama Biri Les opinions exprimées dans cette publication sont le fruit du travail d’une équipe de chercheurs de l’institut Modus Operandi en appui aux experts de la HACP, elles ne reflètent pas nécessairement l’opinion de la HACP en tant qu’institution. Ce travail rentre dans le cadre d’un programme de renforcement des capacités en analyse de conflits (financement UE, Instrument contribuant à la Stabilité et à la Paix). 2 Nord-Tillabéri : analyse du conflit lié à l’accès aux ressources naturelles Le transfrontalier au cœur de l’analyse et de l’action LISTE DES SIGLES ET ABREVIATIONS CEDEAO Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest CICR Comité International de la Croix Rouge CTCCP Comité Technique Consultatif à la Consolidation de la Paix G5-Sahel Cadre institutionnel de coordination et de suivi de la coopération régionale en matière de politiques de développement et de sécurité regroupant la Mauritanie, le Mali, le Burkina Faso, le Niger et le Tchad. FDS Forces de Défense et de Sécurité HACP Haute Autorité à la Consolidation de la Paix, Niamey HCR Haut-Commissariat pour les Réfugiés des Nations Unies HD Humanitarian Dialogue MNLA Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad MODOP Modus operandi MSA Mouvement pour le Salut de l’Azawad MUJAO Mouvement pour l'Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest ONG Organisation Non-Gouvernementale OXFAM International Oxford Committee for Famine Relief PMCT Partenariat Militaire de Coopération Transfrontalière PTF Partenaires techniques et financiers UE Union Européenne UNICEF Fonds des Nations Unies pour l’Enfance 3 Nord-Tillabéri : analyse du conflit lié à l’accès aux ressources naturelles Le transfrontalier au cœur de l’analyse et de l’action TABLE DES MATIERES Index (des cartes, encadrés, schémas et tableaux)............................................................................6 Résumé................................................................................................................................................7 Introduction.........................................................................................................................................9 PARTIE 1 LA FRONTIÈRE AU CENTRE DES ANALYSES : APPROCHE ET HYPOTHÈSE............................16 1.1 Quand les dynamiques humaines opèrent le glissement des notions de zone et région à espace..............................................................................................16 1.1.1 D’une lecture du territoire avec les notions de zone et de région…................17 1.1.2 … à une lecture sociologique des dynamiques humaines via la notion d’espace......................................................................................................................18 1.2 De la frontière au transfrontalier................................................................................19 1.3 La frontière au Nord-Tillabéri.....................................................................................22 PARTIE 2 L'ESPACE TRANSFRONTALIER DU NORD-TILLABÉRI. LA NOUVELLE ÉCHELLE SOCIO-SPATIALE.......................................................................................................24 2.1 Comment les populations modèlent l'espace : lieux de socialisation.......................25 2.1.1 Les lieux de socialisation produits par les pratiques économiques..................26 2.1.2 Les lieux de socialisation produits par les pratiques sociales............................34 2.1.3 Les lieux de socialisation produits par les pratiques culturelles.......................36 2.1.4 Pourquoi considérer les lieux de socialisation dans les marges comme des « arènes ».............................................................................................................39 2.1.5 Quelle frontière ?..............................................................................................41 2.2 Les vecteurs de connexion – Les vecteurs de divisions.............................................44 2.2.1Les vecteurs de connexion.................................................................................44 2.2.2 Les vecteurs de division.....................................................................................48 2.3 Les espaces qui divisent : la violence transfrontalière...............................................60 2.3.1La violence à la frontière....................................................................................60 2.3.2La violence directe..............................................................................................62 2.3.3La violence structurelle.......................................................................................64 2.3.4 La violence culturelle.........................................................................................65 2.3.5 La violence, vecteur de transformation.............................................................66 PARTIE 3 LA DÉLIVRANCE DU BIEN PUBLIC DANS UN ESPACE TRANSFRONTALIER............................71 3.1 Biens publics et souverainisme face aux dynamiques des populations au Nord Tillabéri..............................................................................................................71 3.1.1 De l’identification du problème aux modalités d’action : Quels enseignements ?.........................................................................................................71 3.1.2L’école et la santé comme biens structurants dans l’espace transfrontalier.............................................................................................................74 3.1.3 Un intérêt partagé autour de la présence des marchés : Quand la circulation des personnes qui s’y rendent va au-delà de la frontière.......................77 3.1.4 La justice et la sécurité face à la méfiance des populations............................79 3.2 L’interdépendance des secteurs dans l’espace transfrontalier du Nord Tillabéri..............................................................................................................81 4 Nord-Tillabéri : analyse du conflit lié à l’accès aux ressources naturelles Le transfrontalier au cœur de l’analyse et de l’action PARTE 4 QUE PEUT FAIRE L’ÉTAT DANS CET ESPACE TRANSFRONTALIER ?............................................85 4.1 Analyser les fondements de la violence pour penser l'action....................................85 4.2 Ouvrir la frontière pour la sécuriser............................................................................89 4.2.1 Ce que nous dit la théorie.......................................................................... .......89 4.2.2 Comment la théorie peut irriguer la conceptualisation de l'action..................92 4.2.3 Sécuriser une frontière ouverte et fluide..........................................................94 4.3 Accorder une importance et une cohérence entre les politiques et les données locales....................................................................................................... ...95 4.4 Centrer le regard sur la place de la géo-économie et de la circulation des populations.................................................................................................................97 4.5 Tenir compte des contraintes environnementales et climatiques.............................98 4.6 Affirmer l’importance du « cousinage à plaisanterie » : logiques d’appartenance des populations versus mythe des élites providentielles.............................................................................................................99 4.7 Sortir du rapport marge/centre : Voir l’espace transfrontalier comme un centre......................................................................................................101 4.8 Le positionnement de la HACP comme centre de production d’analyse des espaces transfrontaliers du Sahel......................................................103 Conclusion.........................................................................................................................................105 Bibliographie.............................................................................................................................. .......108 5 Nord-Tillabéri : analyse du conflit lié à l’accès aux ressources naturelles Le transfrontalier au cœur de l’analyse et de l’action INDEX DES CARTES Carte 1: Le Niger......................................................................................................................................9 Carte 2: Les villages visités.....................................................................................................................12 Carte 3: Les mouvements internes et externes des populations.........................................................25 Carte 4: Les zones pastorales qui font figurer la limite Nord des cultures...........................................27 Carte 5 : Les ressources de l'économie pastorale.................................................................................29 Carte 6 : Les marchés recensés.............................................................................................................31
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Niger: Frequently Asked Questions About the October 2017 Attack on U.S
    Niger: Frequently Asked Questions About the October 2017 Attack on U.S. Soldiers Alexis Arieff, Coordinator Specialist in African Affairs Lauren Ploch Blanchard Specialist in African Affairs Andrew Feickert Specialist in Military Ground Forces Kathleen J. McInnis Analyst in International Security John W. Rollins Specialist in Terrorism and National Security Matthew C. Weed Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation October 27, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R44995 Niger: Frequently Asked Questions About the October 2017 Attack on U.S. Soldiers Summary A deadly attack on U.S. soldiers in Niger and their local counterparts on October 4, 2017, has prompted many questions from Members of Congress about the incident. It has also highlighted a range of broader issues for Congress pertaining to oversight and authorization of U.S. military deployments, evolving U.S. global counterterrorism activities and strategy, interagency security assistance and cooperation efforts, and U.S. engagement with countries historically considered peripheral to core U.S. national security interests. This report provides background information in response to the following frequently asked questions: What is the security situation in Niger? How big is the U.S. military presence in Niger? For what purposes are U.S. military personnel in Niger, and what role has Congress played in the U.S. military presence there? Is the U.S. military presence in Niger related to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)? What is the state of U.S.-Niger relations and aid? Where else in Africa are U.S. military personnel deployed? Medical evacuation: What is the “golden hour” and does it apply to troop deployments in Africa? What are the broader implications of building partner capacity in Niger for DOD? Who were the four U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Insecurity, Terrorism, and Arms Trafficking in Niger
    Small Arms Survey Maison de la Paix Report Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E January 1202 Geneva 2018 Switzerland t +41 22 908 5777 f +41 22 732 2738 e [email protected] At the Crossroads of Sahelian Conflicts Sahelian of the Crossroads At About the Small Arms Survey The Small Arms Survey is a global centre of excellence whose mandate is to generate impar- tial, evidence-based, and policy-relevant knowledge on all aspects of small arms and armed AT THE CROSSROADS OF violence. It is the principal international source of expertise, information, and analysis on small arms and armed violence issues, and acts as a resource for governments, policy- makers, researchers, and civil society. It is located in Geneva, Switzerland, at the Graduate SAHELIAN CONFLICTS Institute of International and Development Studies. The Survey has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political science, Insecurity, Terrorism, and law, economics, development studies, sociology, and criminology, and collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions, non-governmental organizations, and govern- Arms Trafficking in Niger ments in more than 50 countries. For more information, please visit: www.smallarmssurvey.org. Savannah de Tessières A publication of the Small Arms Survey/SANA project, with the support of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Global Affairs Canada, and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs A T THE CROSSROADS OF SAHELian CONFLictS Insecurity, Terrorism, and Arms Trafficking in Niger Savannah de Tessières A publication of the Small Arms Survey/SANA project, with the support of the Netherlands Min. of Foreign Affairs, Global Affairs Canada, & the Swiss Federal Dept.
    [Show full text]
  • Niger 2020 OSAC Crime & Safety Report
    Niger 2020 OSAC Crime & Safety Report This is an annual report produced in conjunction with the Regional Security Office at the U.S. Embassy in Niamey. OSAC encourages travelers to use this report to gain baseline knowledge of security conditions in Niger. For more in-depth information, review OSAC’s Niger country page for original OSAC reporting, consular messages, and contact information, some of which may be available only to private-sector representatives with an OSAC password. Travel Advisory The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report’s publication assesses Niger at Level 3, indicating travelers should reconsider travel to Niger due to crime, terrorism, and kidnapping. Avoid travel to Niger’s border regions, particularly the Malian border area, Diffa region, and the Lake Chad region due to terrorism. Review OSAC’s report, Understanding the Consular Travel Advisory System. Overall Crime and Safety Situation Crime Threats The U.S. Department of State has assessed Niamey as being a HIGH-threat location for crime directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests. Crime occurs at all hours in Niger. Non-violent crimes (e.g. pickpocketing, purse snatching, backpack/cell phone theft) are present in major cities, notably in/around places where Westerners gather. Within Niamey, avoid the Night Market; criminals loiter in the area, which is notorious for pickpocketing, purse snatching, mugging, and assaults. Other markets, the area around the Gaweye and Grand Hotels, the National Museum, and Kennedy Bridge are also high-risk areas. Review OSAC’s reports, All That You Should Leave Behind.
    [Show full text]
  • Risk and Resilience Assessment Niger
    Risk and Resilience Assessment Niger 2016 Annex 2: Niger Risk and Resilience Assessment 1) Background Niger at a glance The republic of Niger is a landlocked country located where northern and sub-Saharan Africa meet. It is a vast territory of 1,3 million km2, with a low population density given its 19.1 million inhabitants (2014 census). Niger has the highest demographic growth rate in the world, at 3,9 percent per year, and a very young population, 50 percent of which is under the age of fifteen. It is home to several ethnic groups, including the Hausa (which compose around half the population, present in the South East), Djerma (South West), Tuareg (North), Fulani (South-West), Arab (South), and Kanuri (South East). Niger’s economy largely depends on the agriculture and livestock sectors. Extractive industries are also a major contributor to the economy, amounting to 10 percent of the GDP and 50 percent of exportation revenues. Niger is the fourth-largest uranium producer in the world and could become second if the Imouraren site is finally put in production.1 Gold mining has remained largely informal to date, but recently authorities have adopted measures to begin formalizing the sector. Niger is faced with a high incidence of poverty and low human development. In 2014, 44.5 percent of the population was poor,2 and Niger ranked second to last out of 188 countries on the 2016 Human Development Index. Although poverty dropped between 2005 and 2014, it was unable to outpace the rate of demographic growth, which was four times higher during the same period,3 and as a result the absolute number of poor continues to rise.
    [Show full text]
  • The United Nations Foundation Team Traveled to Bamako, Gao, And
    The United Nations Foundation team traveled to Bamako, Gao, and Timbuktu from September 16-26, 2018, to learn more about the United Nations Integrated Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). During our visit, we met with more than 50 UN officials, civil society groups, Western diplomats, and international forces including leadership in MINUSMA, Barkhane, and the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Below you will find our observations. Background The landlocked country of Mali, once a French colony and a cultural hub of West Africa, was overrun in January 2012 by a coalition of Tuareg and terrorist groups moving south towards the capital of Bamako. At the time, the Tuareg movement (MNLA) in northern Mali held legitimate grievances against the government and aligned itself with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine (Defenders of Faith), the Islamic militants and jihadists in the region. Simultaneously, a mutiny of soldiers launched a military coup d’ etat led by Captain Amadou Sonogo, who took power from then President Amadou Toumani Touré and dissolved government institutions, consequently leading to a complete collapse of institutions in the northern part of the country. This Tuareg movement declared Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu an Independent State of Azawad by April 2012. However, soon after, the Tuareg move- ment was pushed out by the jihadists, Ansar Dine and Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).1 In the early days of the conflict, the UN and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) put together a power-sharing framework which led to the resignation of President Toure. Dioncounda Traoré was subsequently appointed interim President and a transitional government was established.
    [Show full text]
  • Niger 2019 Crime & Safety Report
    Niger 2019 Crime & Safety Report This is an annual report produced in conjunction with the Regional Security Office at the U.S. Embassy in Niamey, Niger. The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report’s publication assesses Niger at Level 3, indicating travelers should reconsider travel to the country due to crime, terrorism, and kidnapping. Overall Crime and Safety Situation The U.S. Embassy in Niamey does not assume responsibility for the professional ability or integrity of the persons or firms appearing in this report. The American Citizen Services (ACS) Unit cannot recommend a particular individual or location and assumes no responsibility for the quality of service provided. Review OSAC’s Niger-specific webpage for original OSAC reporting, consular messages, and contact information, some of which may be available only to private-sector representatives with an OSAC password. Crime Threats There is considerable risk from crime in Niamey. Crime occurs at all hours in Niger. Non-violent crimes (e.g. pickpocketing, purse snatching, and backpack/cell phone theft) are present in major cities, notably in/around places where Westerners gather. Within Niamey, avoid the Night Market; criminals loiter in the area, which is notorious for pickpocketing, purse snatching, mugging, and assaults. Other markets, the area around the Gaweye and Grand Hotels, the National Museum, and Kennedy Bridge are also high-risk areas. Violent crimes (e.g. muggings, assaults) are not as common as non-violent crimes, and typically occur after dark. Assailants may be aggressive and display a weapon during a robbery; knives are the most frequently employed weapon, as some Nigeriens carry knives or machetes as part of their normal dress.
    [Show full text]
  • Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa Marco Cochi
    Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa Marco Cochi ► Jihadist groups that formed the provinces of the Islamic State have proved to be fundamental to carry out apocalyptic al-Baghdadi's project of Salafi fundamentalist hegemony, allowing to its organization to continue to exercise its significance, even after the loss of Syrian and Iraqis territories. Among the various groups that in sub-Saharan Africa and in the Sahel have sworn loyalty to the Caliphate, one in particular stood out for the high lethality and the wide range of action. This group is known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) led by the emir Adnan al-Sahrawi. The impact of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara on security in the Sahel region On the first day of Ramadan in 2014, Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)1, announced the restoration of the Caliphate and decided to change the name of the group to Islamic State (IS)2. The proclamation led thousands of foreign fighters to decide to leave for Syria and Iraq to join the militias of the new Caliphate. Four months later, through official propaganda IS's bodies (al-Furqan Media Foundation and Dabiq Magazine), the terrorist organization announced that other jihadist groups had declared their affiliation to the Caliphate, assuming the name of provinces (wilayats) of the Islamic State. However, before swearing allegiance to the caliph al- Baghdadi, these groups would have to implement the military strategy and the government system of central core. Over time, the wilayats proved to be fundamental to carry out the apocalyptic al- Baghdadi's project of Salafi fundamentalist hegemony.
    [Show full text]
  • Mali Situation April - June 2019
    REGIONAL SITUATION UPDATE Mali Situation April - June 2019 An escalation of security incidents were reported in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali during the reporting period. This situation is impacting negatively on the protection environment for civilians and limiting activities of humanitarian actors as they have in recent weeks become significant targets. Despite the deployment of Malian forces and MINUSMA as part of Operation Oryx, the central region of Mali continues to be the subject of a disturbing combination of inter-communal conflict, criminality and attacks by armed groups. The porous borders with Burkina Faso and Niger and the difficulty for government forces to deploy in the adjacent areas have allowed many non-state actors (armed groups, militias, drug traffickers) to operate freely, thereby making travel by road precarious. According to security assessments, the prevailing insecurity and violence are likely to continue and will result in worsening levels of vulnerability among populations of concern and additional forced displacements. Since the last issue of the Mali situation report (January-March 2019), the number of persons of concern has increased by 23%. KEY STATISTICS (AS OF 30 JUNE) MAIN HIGHLIGHTS . In Mali, at least 95 people were confirmed dead and at least 19 missing following an attack on 10 June of Sobane- 139,994 Malian refugees Kou, a village of on a rural Dogon community, ( Mopti region). Although no group has claimed responsibility, the in Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger Malian government has blamed "armed men suspected of being terrorists". The Chair of UNHCR’s governing Executive Committee Burkinabe refugees 8,457 (Excom), Ambassador Boudjemaa Delmi, visited in Mali Mauritania (27-29 April) and Burkina Faso (1-4 May).
    [Show full text]
  • Niger - Région De Tillabéri - Département De Ouallam Pour Usage Humanitaire Uniquement CARTE DE REFERENCE Date De Production : 21 Mars 2018
    Niger - Région de Tillabéri - Département de Ouallam Pour Usage Humanitaire Uniquement CARTE DE REFERENCE Date de production : 21 mars 2018 1°40'0"E 2°30'0"E "Inteylalene Kalachi " Mali Im"bouga Inates " " Abankor "Inassarara "Hama Golare "Inzouett Gaba Gorou" "Tinfitawan "Bangou Banda " Gaba Gorou Sinka Kouara "Tafougaye " "Kouarategui "Dey Koukou " Intagarmey Berey "Tirzawane "Tagdounatt "Kouara Zeno " " " " Sey Bangou Zaganda " Inatès Walou Kouara " Baki Kouara " Koyan Salka Damna " "Holle Hamani A" fikoum Elhadji Kouara " Banibangou " Si"rfitiloua Soumana Koura " " Sifitiloua Tinni Kouara " Intedene Banna Kouara " " " Li Kouara" Gouno Kouara Maoura Kouara " " " " Bella Kouara " Agaye Kouara " Bimbila Kaina " Islam Kouara " Kodo" Kouara "Gnandou Kouara Amalgou Barrey Fandou " " "Bella Beri " Hameau De Bourbourey "Tamagaste "Sine Godar Issoufou " " Anza Bab" a Kouara " " " "Alfa Kouara Moribane Tinazagaz "Langa Kouara " "Tamako " "Takaou " "Kouara Peulh Intoussan " Bourbourey Kouara Zeno " " Haguaye Peul " Tiguezefan Issa " " Banibangou Bourgett " "Sabara Bangou Baney Kokorbe " Kosseye " Bimbila Beri Gardi Baba Kouara " " " Ban" izoumbou Titahoune " " " Fando Bon Saidou Kouara Kokorbe" Alfa " Koloukta Peulh " B" aba Koukou Kouara "Inekar "Gueno Kouara Bo"uriyey " " " "Bissaou "Innabagal Tabatoul "Tezguene Zoumari Kouara " Farkaye Bangou "Miel " Ingaralaitane Ingaba " " Ganganora I Ganganora Ii Tongo Tongo " Garin Dogo " Akarwane "Mimandey " "Tangouchmane Ii Tarwaye " " "Wedou Bangou Peulh "Komakoukou "Tilloa Indiguini " Weidou Bangou
    [Show full text]
  • Regions at Risk: Preventing Mass Atrocities in Mali
    AUTHORS Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim is an Early Warning Fellow with the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide. He is a PhD candidate in Political Science and a research associate with the Sahel Research Group at the University of Florida. Mollie Zapata is a Research Associate with the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The Simon-Skjodt Center would like to thank the Malian men and women who agreed to be interviewed for this report. Staff are particularly indebted to those who took the time to share their personal stories, experiences, and perspectives. We thank colleagues who reviewed and commented on an early draft, especially Alexis Arieff, Kamissa Camara, Corinne Dufka, Andrew Lebovich, Michael Shurkin, and Alex Thurston. REGIONS AT RISK: PREVENTING MASS ATROCITIES IN MALI Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ 2 Actor Table ......................................................................................................................... 4 Mali Recent Conflict Timeline ............................................................................................. 6 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 6 Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 7 Structural Risk Factors in Northern and Central Mali ........................................................
    [Show full text]
  • At the Crossroads of Sahelian Conflicts: Insecurity, Terrorism, and Arms Trafficking in Niger
    A T THE CROSSROADS OF SAHELian CONFLictS Insecurity, Terrorism, and Arms Trafficking in Niger Savannah de Tessières A publication of the Small Arms Survey/SANA project, with the support of the Netherlands Min. of Foreign Affairs, Global Affairs Canada, & the Swiss Federal Dept. of Foreign Affairs Copyright Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey © Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 2017 First published in January 2018 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior permission in writing of the Small Arms Survey, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprograph- ics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Publications Manager, Small Arms Survey, at the address below. Small Arms Survey Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Maison de la Paix, Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Series editor: Matt Johnson Copy-edited by: Deborah Eade Proofread by: Stephanie Huitson ([email protected]) Typeset in Meta by Rick Jones ([email protected]) Printed by Gonnet in France ISBN 978-2-940548-48-4 Cover photo: Boko Haram members attack Bosso military camp, Bosso, Niger, 2016. Source: Still from the video about the Bosso attack (Jihadology, 2017) 2 R eport January 2018 de Tessières At the Crossroads of Sahelian Conflicts 3 About the author Savannah de Tessières is a Senior Consultant for the Small Arms Survey and the UN and has worked for more than 12 years in the international security and arms fields, includ- ing extensive field research across Africa and the MENA region.
    [Show full text]
  • Defending Forward: Securing America by Projecting Military Power Abroad
    Defending Forward Securing America by Projecting Military Power Abroad Foreword by former Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta Edited by Bradley Bowman December 2020 FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES FOUNDATION Defending Forward Securing America by Projecting Military Power Abroad Foreword by former Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta Edited by Bradley Bowman December 2020 FDD PRESS A division of the FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES Washington, DC Defending Forward: Securing America by Projecting Military Power Abroad Table of Contents FOREWORD ....................................................................................................................................... 6 THE BIG DEBATE AND LOOMING CHALLENGES .................................................................... 9 The Retrenchment Syndrome .......................................................................................................................10 “Endless Wars” and the Danger of Ignoring History .................................................................................14 Retain American Power, Do Not Restrain It...............................................................................................18 CENTRAL COMMAND ..................................................................................................................... 23 The Jihadist Threat Persists ...........................................................................................................................24 Avoiding a Self-Inflicted Wound in the
    [Show full text]