CHAPTER V JIVA AND BRAHMA^T 151 CHAPTSR V JIVA AND BRAHMAN In the preceding chapter we considered in broad outline the way Vacaspati. understands the nature of 3rahinan and Jagat, and the pattern of relationship between I them. We also outlined the way SaAkara presents his account of them. This was done to present the fundamentally contrastive features anthem to enable the concerned to see that the former cannot be taken to be either extension of I the latter or to which Sankara's philosophy inevitably leads. In fact we argued that Vacaspati's account of Brahman, Jagat and relationship between them would not have been so different I from that of Sahara's# were he not influenced by sane t post-Sankara Advaitins on the one hand and some non-Advaitic trends of thought on the other. This means that Vacaspati's account under consideration takes the sort of shape it does I through his attempt to combine Sankara's Advaita and some post-Sankara Advaita trends and/or some non-Advaitic influences on him which he could not sever his relation from, as he was susceptible to them through his having written number of works pertaining to them. In this chapter we intend to consider Vacaspati's account of the nature of Jiva and its relation with Brahman to bring to the notice of the concerned some 152 important tenets of them and their marked differences with the account of Jiva and its relation with Brahman as given by Sankara. This would give us another clue to consider to what extent/ if at all, Vacaspati's Advalta could t>e said I to be an extension of Sankara's. Without anticipating our argument to follow we attempt to show that on this count too Vacaspati is led to adopt a different sort of stance I especially since the impact of post-Safikara Advaitic trends on the one hand and of certain non-Advaitic trends on the other has been too overwhelming on him. Thus, here also the same kind of combined and mixed forces seem to be at work which we noticed in the previous chapter. TH2 PROBLEM OF THE LOCUS (AEHARA) OF A'/IDYA We saw in the third chapter that according to 1 Sankara our being susceptible to confusion and error ori account of failure to discriminate between what is the case and what is otherwise is quite natural.^ Given this, it is ^ * • t philosophically unilluminat^ve^)according to Sankara to ask whose susceptibility it is, it being of anybody who falls 2 prey to it. The fundamental issue is not so much as to inquire into this question, but rather an investigation into the determinative condition of it, the methodological approach corrective of it and adoption of an appropriate perspective that is preventive of it. It is, therefore, no small wcnder t that Sankara not only does not raise the question of the 153 substratum of Avldya/ but anticipating such a kind of problem being posed by any of his adversaries argues that it is in no way philosophically promising to raise such 1 a question. Thus, on Sankara's account of the nature of Jiva it does not in any way hang upon inquiring into the problem of the locus of Avidya, for in any unartificial (akrtrima) consideration of the nature of Jiva, Avidya or Adhyasa does not belong to it as a structural or constitutive condition or feature of it. VACASPATI'3 ACCOUNT OF JIVA However, when one begins to consider Vacaspati's characteristically different account of the nature of Jjva and its relation with Brahman it does not escape one's attention that it basically revolves around four major problems, each one of which is thrown up by Vacaspati, although not altogether for the first time, I under the influence of post-Sankara Advaitins as well as non-Advaitins. The four problems under consideration are : 1. Relation between Jiva and Avidya, 2. The locus or substratum of Avidya, 3. Relation between J iva and 3rahman, and 4. The problem of the relation between unity/plurality of Jiva(s) and unity/plurality of Avidya(s). We hope to consider them in the same order, the reason of 154 which will become clear as we progress in our argument. In the process/ we also hope to bring out sane decisive features of Vacaspati's account of the nature of J!iva and its relation with Brahman. One cannot straight-forwardly consider the issue of the locus of Avidya, as it occupies very important * place in Vacaspati's account of Jiva. This is for two reasons : a) Without considering relation between Jiva and Avidya/ the issue of the locus or substratum of Avidya cannot be satisfactorily taken into account/ for to do so would be tantamount to ignoring important structural element of Jiva. b) Unless it is shown that Avidya/Adhyasa/Maya is somehow inextricably connected with Jiva, the question of considering Jiva to be the locus or substratum of Avidya/ as Vacaspati insists on, would appear to be a dispensable feature of his account of Jiva. As we shall see below/ instead of considering the Paramarthika J iva to be primary in his account of Jiva, f as Sankara dees, and which according to him is the same as Brahman considered microcosmically, Vacaspati seems to prefer to hold the Vyavaharika, if not sometimes the 155 Pratlbhaslka as well, Jjva to be primary and primordial. I And as Sankara holds it, if anything that is deviant from Paramartha or thing as it is,necessarily involves an element of distortion on account of our failure to discriminate between what is the case and what is otherwise. So, our being subject to the impact and influence of Avidya or Adhyasa/ then, no matter whether Vyavaharika or Pratibhasika/ is taken to be primordial - former in Vacaspati and the latter in Padmapada, though both are liable to oe sublated and hence negated - it cannot help involving an element of Avidya or Adhyasa. But Vacaspati does not differ from Sankara because in some way or the other he wants to set up his separate house. Far from it. At least declaratively, he I very much wants to follow Sankara and explain his thought as elaborately as he can.^ This he does, however, not I through following Sankara independently of any influence. On the contrary, as we shall endeavour to show below, he • . wants to widen the conceptual framework of Sankara and make it more flexible and accommodative. This, again, he does by combining Sankara's thought - better still Vacaspati's I ^ I ^ interpretation of Sankara's thought - with post-Sankara Advaitic trends together with certain non-Advaitic trends as well. That is, Vacaspati differs from Sankara not so much because he wants to, but rather because he succumbs to 156 the impact and influence of other Advaltic or non-Advaltic I trends of thought - be they prior or posterior to Sankara and independently of whether the trends under consideration were again Advaitic or otherwise. Vacaspati's account of the nature of Jiva and its relation with Brahman, too, is not, as we shall see, an exception to this. It could, however, be held that even though Avidya/Adhyasa is in some sense connected with Jiva as Vacaspati understands it, it could, nevertheless, be held to De an accidence of Jiva, no matter whether inseparable or otherwise. This prima facie plausible argument, however, cannot coherently be accepted within the conceptual frame - work of Vacaspati. This is because on the one hand it would mean that Avi dya is externally added to J iva and, on the other hand, it would also imply that Ayjdya is not essential for the very being of Jiva. Both these alternatives are unacceptable to Vacaspati. The former because the Vyavaharika conception of J iva that he adopts and makes so much capital about and out of, cannot be had independently of Avidya. But the latter because if Avidya is held to be dispensable feature of Jiva, there could be Jiva without it, not as emancipated, but inspite of emancipation. If this is accepted, then there would be no need to strive for sublation or annihilation of Avidya - the necessary condition of our direct comprehension of Brahman as Vacaspati understands it. This 157 latter point we shall investigate into in the next chapter. F o r the present suffice it to note that in Vacaspati's account of Jiva, Avidya is an essential and structural feature of Jiva such that without it the very being and coherent conception of Jiva itself would be not only not 4 available but unacceptable as well. As noted in the third chapter/ under the influence of Mandana# Vacaspati holds that Avidya, no matter whether it is understood as an entity or disposition, since Vacaspati is not always clear about it,^ exhibits itself in two important ways : concealment and projection/distortion. In fact it could be argued that Vacaspati accepts two-fold interpretation of Adhyasa/Avidya : in the sense of Jr^anadhyasa suggested oy Sankara without explicitly naming so, and Artha dhyasa - so much popularised by Padmapada and his followers.^ Further, taking the Vyavaharika conception of Jiva to oe crucial, Avidya has somehow to be shown to be either the sole or at least indispensable constitutive element of J iva. Vacaspati seems to do this in three-fold considerations : a) Being indebted quite overwhelmingly to Mandana he accepts • • from him the thesis that Jiva is the substratum of Avidya"^ - a thesis which for, Sankara is philosophically unilluminative and hence never considered, but which Mandana pioneered, which in turn is opposed to the thesis 158 that Brahman is the substratum of Avldya as pioneered by Padmapada and his followers.