A Critical Examination of Tiie Death of God in Nietzsche: Pity, Revenge and Laughter G

Diálogos, 64 (1994) pp. 59--91.

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF TIIE DEATH OF GOD IN NIETZSCHE: PITY, REVENGE AND LAUGHTER G. STEVEN NEELEY

W'hen gods die> they always die severa/ kinds ofdeath .1

Nietzsche is known as the great trumpeter of the death of God. In several bold and dramatic passages, he informs us not only that God is dead, but also how His death was brought about. The reports on the ex­ act mode of death, however, are inconsistent. In several places, Nietzsche suggests that God fell victim to violence. Elsewhere, we are told that God died out of psychic trauma. A thorough examination of the various passages in whic\1 Nietzsche explicitly mentions the death of God will reveal an interesting weave of thought which has not yet been ade- · quately explored by the commentators. An investigation into this concep­ tual network will yield a richer appreciation of the death-of-God theme and will shed new light on Nietzsche's account of the emotions involved.

1 Tbe Deatb of God

The stray light of a madman illuminated the most tremendous event of human history. Nietzsche's prophetic tolle Mensch of The Gay Science ran into the market place, leaped into the midst of the crowd, and pierced them with his eyes:

"Whíther is God?" he cried; "I will tell you. We have kílled him-you and I. All of us are his murderers... Do we hear nothing as yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell nothing as

1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, i~ The Portable Nietzsche, trans., Walter Kaufmann, New York: Viking Press (1954) part 4, § 6.

59 yet of the divine decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. Finally, there is a curious passage in Zaratbustra which suggests that God remains dead. And we have killed him." God may have died out of a psychic trauma of an entirely different sort. "How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What Nietzsche informs us that the "old gods" met with a "good gay godlike was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled end": to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us?"2 They did not endin a 'twilight,' though this lie is told. lnstead: one day A similar tale of murder is spun by the "ug1iest man" of Zaratbustra they laugbed themselves to death. That happened when the most god­ who confesses that he murdered God out of the spirlt of revenge: less word issued from one of the gods themselves the word: 'There is one god. Thou shalt have no other god before me!' But be bad to die: he saw with eyes that saw everything; he saw man's (Nietzsche, Zarathustra., part 3, § 8) depths and ultimate grounds, all his concealed disgrace and ugliness. His pity knew no shame: he crawled into my dirtiest nooks. This most Kaufmann lists the many passages in Nietzsche in which we are ex­ curious, overobtrusive, overpitying one had to die. He always saw me: pressly told of the death of God.3 Of those passages, only those cited di­ on such a witness I wanted to ha ve revenge or not live myself. The god rectly above tell us the mode of God's death. The passages reveal that who saw everything, even man- this god had to die! Man cannot bear God may be said to have died in several different ways: He was mur­ it that such a witness should live. dered in the spirit of revenge; He died out of his pity for mankind; and (Nietzsche, Zarathustra, part 4, § 7) the "old gods" laughed themselves to death. Pity and revenge are two fundamental attitudes which play an important role in Nietzsche's Elsewhere, however, we are led to believe that God dies a less vio­ thought. Furthermore, pity and revenge are closely related attitudes in lent death. There are two passages in Zaratbustra in which God dies out the sense that pity is often a disguised forro of vengeance. Laughter is of pity. In the section aptly entitled "On The Pitying," Zarathustra con­ also an important lietmotif in Nietzsche's writing, which symbolizes, ínter fides: ''Thus spoke the devil to me once: 'God too has his hell: that is bis afia, the state of the spirit which is beyond tragedy. The primary goal of love of man.' And most recently 1 heard him say this: 'God is dead; God this paper is to ask-and hopefully, answer-the question: Why, out of a d.ied of his pity for man" (Ibid., part 2, § 3). Similarly, in the later section near infinite number of possible ways to die, did Nietzsche choose to entitled "Retired," Zarathustra asks the "old pope" if he knows how God portray the death of God through scenarios involving these particular died: "Is it true what they say, that pity strangled him, that he saw how emotions? There is considerable literature in the fi eld, and it is considered man hung on the cross and that he could not bear it, that Iove of man de riguer to at least mention the death-of-God theme in any serious work became his hell, and in the end his death?" (Ibid., part 4, § 6). Eventually, on Nietzsche. Yet none of the commentators have focused squarely on the "old pope" replies: the issue at hand. Moreover, the psychological dynamics of pity, revenge and laughter present a fertile and continuing source of interest in When he was young, this god out of the Orient, he was harsh and Nietzsche scholarship. Accordingly, a second and related goal will be to vengeful and he built himself a hell to amuse his favorites. Eventually, however, he became old and soft and mellow and pitying... Then he examine Nietzsche's thoughts on pity, revenge and laughter and to ex­ sat in his nook by the hearth, wilted, grieving over his weak legs, weary plore whatever connections they may have to the death-of-God theme. of the world, weary of willing, and one day he choked on his all-too­ great pity.

(Nietzsche, Zarathustra., part 4, § 6)

2 Friedrich Nietzsche, Tbe Gay Science, trans., Walter Kaufmann, New York: Vintage 3 The list occurs in Kaufmann's translation of Tbe Gay Science, supra, note 2, p . Books 0974) part 3, § 125. 167.

60 61 verse interpretation concerning whether the will-to-power denotes 11 Pity and Revenge something empirical or is rather a hypothesis entertained on Hollingdale suggests that pity and revenge are but two of a large methodological grounds alone, but the question arises concerning the number of effects which proceed from a single cause, namely: the will­ actual scope of the will-to-power. One might ask whether the will-to­ to-power.4 Near the beginning of the AntiChrist, Nietzsche presents a power properly pertains to the entire cosmos, only to the organic series of questions and answers which represent the very core and direc­ ldngdom, or merely to the realm of human psychology. Moreover, the tion of the philosophy of power as it has been built up and refined dur­ proposed analysis of pity and revenge is complicated even further by the ing the course of his writings: notion that the two emotions appear to occur on a variety of different levels. Thus, it is possible to address individual psychological states of What is good? Everything that heightens the feeling of power in man, these attitudes, or universal ontological states of pity and revenge. 7 At the will to power, power itself. bottom, any analysis which attempts to grapple with such elusive What is bad? Everything that is born of"weakness. concepts as the will-to-power or its various complex psychological manifestations is destined to be fraught with difficulty. Yet, despite an What is happiness? The feeling that power is growing, that resistance is overcome. S inevitable margin of imprecision, such an undertaking will be of real benefit towards the recognition of certain subtle nuances in Nietzsche's The bold identification of will-to-power with goodness, coupled with writings. Thus, invoking the jurisprudential prescript of deciding only the assertion that happiness is the feeling of enhanced power, provides a those matters which are necessary for resol u tion of the immediate penetrating insight into Nietzsche's thought. Thus, we see "a large range controversy, this paper will proceed simply upon the recognition that for of effects which it is suggested proceed from a single cause: gratitude, Nietzsche, the will-to-power applies at least to the field of psychology, moral evaluations, the desire to arouse pity, humility, teasing, lave of and that pity and revenge arise out of competing drives for power. knowledge, production of works of art, philosophizing, lawgiving, the As a psychologist, Nietzsche is not satisfied with a mere description idea of justice, all taking their origin from sorne aspect of the possession of mental scenery; his main concem is with the inner dynamics of human of, or the dríve to preserve, or the desire to enhance power" nature and with the complex interplay of forces which mould thought, (Hollingdale, p. 79). In short: "Will to power' as the basic psychological character, and conduct. 8 Viewed as manifestations of the will-to-power, drive in man, of which all other human activities are sublimations is pity and revenge are closely related emotions. Nietzsche often speaks of ' Nietzsche's specific psychological 'theory"' (Ibid., p. 183). pity as being a more subtle form of revenge, and from the very begin­ But what precisely is the will-to-power? At one place Nietzsche states: ning, the analysis is complex. To begin with, we are told that pity is "a "Tbis world is the will to power-and nothing besides! And you yourselves squandering of feeling, a parasite harmful to moral health, 'it cannot are also this will to power-and nothing besides. "6 Elsewhere in possibly be our duty to in crease the evil in the world.' If one does good Nietzsche's writings, we are given reason to believe that the will-to­ merely out of pity, it is oneself one really does good to, and not the power is not so much something empirical as it is a heuristic device em­ other. Pity does not depend upon maxims but upon affects; it is patho­ ployed for its explanatory prowess. Not only is there a possibility of di- logical. The suffering of others infects us, pity is an infection" (Nietzsche, The Will to Power, § 368). But if pity is an infection which mere! y in­ creases suffering, how am I doing good to myself at all by pitying an­ 4 R.]. Hollingdale, Nietzsche, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul (1973) pp. 76-77. other? Nietzsche's ostensible point seems to be that I am simply deluding S Friedrich Nietzsche, The AntiChrist, in The Portable Nietzsche, trans., Walter Kaufmann, New York: Viking Press (1954) § 2. 7 See, Joan Stambaugh, "Thoughts o'n Pity and Revenge," Nietzsche Studien, vol. 1, 6 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Wíll to Power, trans., Walter Kaufmann and R.J. pp. 27-35 (1972). Hollingdale, New York: Vintage Books 0968) § 1067. See also, Friedrich Nietzsche, 8 Georg e Allen Morgan, What Nietzscbe Means, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Beyond Good and Evil, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans., Walter Kaufmann, New Press (1941) p. 94. York: Modern Library (1968), part 2, § 36.

63 62 myself if I believe that I am pitying the other for the sake of the other. Pity becomes the antidote to self-destruction, as a sensation which in­ While a positive act of beneficence on my part may go far to alleviate the eludes pleasure and proffers the taste of superiority in small doses: it suffering of another, my simple act of pitying him alone will not help skims off our dross, makes the heart full, banishes fear and torpor, in­ him in the least. It will, however, increase global suffering by causing me cites us to words, complaint, and action-measured against the misery to suffer along with him. On a different leve! of analysis, Nietzsche seems of the knowledge which comes from all sides, hounds the individual to be making the somewhat inconsistent claim that if I do perform a into a dark narrow cerner and takes away his breath, it is a reiative good deed out of pity, it is really myself that I do good to. I do good to bappiness. myself because of an increased feeling of power which I derive from be­ (Nietzsche, Daybreak, part 2, § 136) ing in a position and of such a mind as to give balm to the suffering. My u is in this vein that pity exhibits its more subtle and diabolical nature: very position as benefactor heightens by feeling of power; as the more powerful being, I can display my magn~nimity by bestowing sorne bene­ Observe children who weep and wail in order tbat they shall be pitied, fit upon the sufferer, and in so doing, I can discharge my power. and therefore wait for the moment when their condition will be noticed; Similarly, because everything born out of weakness is bad, on this Ievel live among invalids and the mentally afflicted and ask yourself whether of interpretation, I bestow no benefit u pon the sufferer by reminding him their eloquent moaning and complaining, their displaying of misfortune, of his weakness. My positive act of beneficence may respond to the ma­ does not fundamentally have the objective of hurting those who are terial or physical needs of the unfortunate, but from the perspective of a with thcm: the pity which these then express is a consolation for the psychology analyzed in terms of will-to-power, it represents a further af­ weak and suffering, inasmuch as it shows them that, all their weakness front to one who is already downtrodden. notwithstanding, they possess at any rate one power: the jx5wer to burt. Nietzsche views pity as a contagious transmission of pain from the In this feeling of superiority of which the manifestation of pity makes him conscious, the unforrunate man gains a sort of pleasure; in the con­ recipient of pity to the agent. Pity "increases the amount of suffering in ceit of his imagination he is still of sufficient importance to cause afflic­ the world"9 and "makes suffering contagious" (Nietzsche, Tbe AntiChrist, tion in the world. The thirst for pity is thus a thirst for self-enjoyment, § 7 .) Under appropriate circumstances, "it m ay engender a total loss of and that at the expense of one's fellow men; it displays man in the life and vitality out of all proportion to the magnitude of the cause" whole ruthlessness of his own dear self. 11 (Ibid.). Pity also violares the naturallaw of selection: "It preserves what is ripe for destruction; it defends those who have been disinherited and Thus, the weak and oppressed are instinctively drawn to pity; it allows condemned by life; and by the abundance of the failures of all kinds them to experience the power of psychological manipulation. which it keeps alive, it gives life itself a gloomy and questionable aspect" Pity represents a symbiotic and mutually destructive relationship be­ (Ibid.). Pity "negares life and renders it more deservtng of negation";10 it tween the pitier and the pitied. Although the sufferer ratifies his own represents the very antithesis of life-affirmation. But despite its Ioath­ mournful existence by causing others to experience grief, the pitier also someness, pity holds a certain allure. It is particularly attractive to the bencfits: "When we see somebody suffer, we like to exploit this oppor­ weak and downtrodden, as it offers the possibility of sorne semblance of power. tunity to take possession of him; those who become his benefactors and pity him, for example, do this and call the lust for a new possession that awakens in them 'love'; and the pleasure they feel is comparable to that aroused by the prospect of a new conquest" (Nietzsche, Tbe Gay Science, 9 Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak, trans., R.J. HoHingdale, Cambridge: Cambridge part 1, § 14). Ostensibly, it appears as though the pitier cares for the per­ University Press (1982), part 2, § 134. son pitied out of lofty and virtuous motives such as altruism or love. But 10 . Note that pity negates life in the sense that it is antithetical to the joyous affirma- twn and acceptance of life wh.ich Nietzsche endorses. However, to whatever extent life itself is will-to-power, pity might be said to crave life because it seeks power through 11 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, vol. 1, trans., R.J. Hollingdale, manipulation of the pitier. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1986), § 50.

64 65 a more probing analysis in terms of competing drives for power suggests tors seem to follow a convention of using the terms "pity," "sympathy," that the benefactor pities the unfortunate in order to domínate and pos­ and "compassion" synonymously-as if, paraphrasing Cartwright, the sess him. A type of Sartrean relationship develops in which each person statements "God has compassion for man," "God has sympathy for man" struggles to appropriate the autonomy of the other.12 Furthermore, the and "God has pity forman," each mean the same thing (Ibid.). pitier usurps the value of the person pitied and elevates himself over the Few commentators explicitly differentiate between various transla­ object of his pity. "To savages the idea of being pitied evokes a moral tions of the word Mitleid or even acknowledge subtle contextua! varia­ shudder: it divests one of all virtue. To offer pity is as good as to offer tions in the use of the English etymon "pity." Those writers who are contempt" (Nietzsche, Daybreak, part 2, § 135). "Even in the most aware of the possible differences in the meaning of such terms do not favourable case, there is something degrading in suffering and something seem fully apprised of the import of this state of affairs. Schacht, for ex­ elevating and productive of superiority in pitying" (Ibid., part 2, § 138). ample, simply notes parenthetically that the term "Mitleid" is "also com­ But this conception of pity seems to .require a deeper analysis. Does monly rendered as 'sympathy' or 'compassion',"14 but later wants to dis­ Nietzsche really intend to advance the claim that one achieves a position tinguish a species of "compassionate" behavior which stems from a mo­ of superiority by "offering pity" (expressing sympathy?) for another? or, tive different from that of pity. Thus, Schacht suggests the "the 'noble that even in "the most favorable case" feelings akin to benevolence or human being' who helps the unfortunate does so 'not, or almost not, compassion secretly stem from a desire to domínate the other? If so, from pity, but prompted more by an urge begotten by excess of power' Nietzsche must have an understanding of this emotion which differs [citation omitted]. Here pity, while not absent, is not primary, for the ab­ markedly from convention. horrence of suffering is not the central opera ti ve principie ..It is generos­ The initial barrier to a proper understanding of Nietzsche' S concept of ity proceeding from strength, rather than commiseration issuing from pity stems from a problem of linguistic interpretation. There is only one weakness, which is the domínate theme in this case." 15 word in German -Mitleid- for a number of English terms which mean Kaufmann gropes fo r a distinction between "higher" and "lower" something akin to (though no quite synonymous with) pity. Cartwright forms of pity.I6 Without elaboration, he notes simply that lower forms of has aptly pointed out that "Mitleicf has an etymological structure analo­ pity stem from "bad love of ourselves" (Kaufmann, p. 323) and relate to gous to the English nouns 'sympathy' and 'compassion,' with each con­ "the creature in man' ... [that which] must be formed, broken, forged, veying the notion of 'suffering with another.' Thus it is not uncommon to torn ... and purified-that which necessarily must and should suffer" find Mitleid translated by these nouns as well as by the noun 'pity.'13 (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, part 7, § 225). Yet higher forms of pity Moreover, the major English-language translators have utilized all three originate from a superior love and seek the self-perfection of man as quasi-equivalent terms, although each seems to have a favoured transla­ creator (Kaufmann, p. 323). Thus, "our pity is a higher and more far ­ tion (Cartwright, Ibid.). Although one would expect that translations sighted pity: we see how man makes himself smaller, how ;ou make would be selected with due sensitivity to the context in which the term him smaller-and there are moments when we behold your pity with in- was employed, "careful observation will reveal. .. that this is not the case. Rather, the guiding principies for deviating from the primary rendering [of Mitleid into English] appear to be stylistic and grammatical and not 14 Richard Schacht, Nietzsche, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 0983) p. 360. dueto sorne change of basic meaning" (Ibid., p. 558). Thus, the trans1a- 15 lbid., pp. 459-460. (citing to Beyond Good and Evil, part 9, § 260). 16 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, AntiChrist, Princeton: Princeton University Press 0950). Kaufmann writes: Nietzsche's extensive polemic 12 The similarity between Nietzsche's description of the re1ationship of appropria­ against pity is colored by the literal meaning of the German word, Mítleid, which has tion between the benefactor and sufferer wlth certain related themes in Sartre ls unmis­ the same etymology as 'sympathy' and means 'suffering with.' To want pity is to want takable. See, Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans., Hazel E. Barnes, New others to suffer with us." Kaufmann, p. 158. Elsewhere, Kaufmann states that "Nietzsche York: Philosophical Library, part 3, chapter 2; § 2, and part 3, chapter 3, § l. himself concedes that he is opposed to only one kind of pity." Ibid., p. 318. Yet 13 David E. Cartwright, "Schopenhauer's Compasslon and Nietzsche's Pity." Kaufmann nowhere proceeds to distinguish between the various connotations of the Schopenhauer-]ahrbuch, vol. 69, pp. 557-567 (1988) p. 557. terms "pity," "sympathy" or "compassion."

66 67 describable anxiety ... You want, if possible ... to abolish sujfering. And reached an affinnative point of view in terms of his own experience, but we? ... u:e would rather have it higher and worse than ever" (Nietzsche he was never able to see that affirmation as a concrete reality for Beyond Good and Evil, part 7, § 225). ' mankind as a whole. Affirmation remained for him at best a possibility Stambaugh (ref. 7) distinguishes at. least three different concepts of intensely sought, but subject to the question of man's strength and abili­ pity (and two concepts of revenge). Thus, after cautioning that the term ties" (lbid.). "psychological" is used to refer to "individual, specific instances alone, Just how many distinct forros of "pity" are there in Nietzsche? The whereas 'ontological' refers to a more or less permanent attitude of qualifications just noted appear sound. How are we to understand the universal significance," (Stambaugh, p. 27). Stambaugh differentiates "1) term MitleicP. The commentators have employed (or misemployed) a full individual psychological pity explicit in Nietzsche 2) universal, onto­ reach of supposed "synonyms," including: pity, sympathy, compassion, logical pity implicit in Nietzsche and 3) compassion, not in Nietzsche at and commiseration. But as Cartwright has suggested, such terms may all. 1) Individual, psychological revenge explicit in Nietzsche [and] 2) hold an emotive significance which would mark them as fundamentally universal ontological revenge implicit in Nietzsche" (Ibid., p. 28). distinct from one another. Thus, as one minor example: "the use of the . Specifically, Sta.mbaugh asserts that "Nietzsche has two distinct con­ word 'pity' in a particular context seems to imply that the speaker is in cepts of pity which he fails to distinguish from each other. The one con­ sorne way better off than the person who is pitied"17 as "the pitier is su­ cept is the most explicit, and incorporares the idea that to pity someone perior in status to the pitied" (Cartwright, p. 559) while "our linguistic is to place oneself above him, to look down upon his unfortunate state practices concerning compassion lack the pejorative tones associated and feel sorry for him, not without a sense of self-elevation .... This kind with 'pity'" (lbid., p. 560). Worse yet, it does not even appear that the of ~ity líes very close to what Nietzsche calls ressentiment or a psycho­ English speaking commentators express real agreement on üre meaning logical fonn of revenge" (Ibid.). In fact, "individual psychological pity of the English terms employed. Thus, while Cartwright uses the term and individual psychological revenge are fundamentally identical. .. [but] "compassion" to signify "a morally desirable attitude towards evil, a de­ on~ological compassion and ontological revenge are dead opposites" sire to eliminare it" (Ibid.), Stambaugh employs the word "compassion" (Ibid.), The other concept of pity must be understood in "the sense of to represent "a true affirmation of life [which] would be able to affirm really 'feeling sorry for"' (Ibid., p. 29) -as if I were to equate the en tire even the most terrible suffering" (ref. 7, p. 31). being of the other with his state of misfortune. "Pity in the sense of feel­ Moreover, even the aforementioned litany of "synonyms" does not ing sorry f~~ seems to exclude all. else of significance, it simply engulfs quite exhaust fue full range of possible connotative nuances incident to the man p1t1ed and paralyzes him" (Ibid., p. 30). This type of pity-if any thorough discussion of the emotion(s) associated with the term appli~d in a broader context-"would mean to acknowledge and acqui­ "pity." Let us allow, arguendo, that the English word "pity" should be re­ esce m human suffering, in fact, to admit that the human condition is tained to signify that coloring of the emotion characterized by "looking one of suffering" (Ibid.). down upon another" with an air of contempt. Let us further agree that Freedom from any form of pity or revenge, according to Stambaugh, the term "compassion" should be employed in Stambaugh's sense of can be found only in a spirit of compassion that stems "from a true affir­ complete life-affirmation; the state of the spirit which would affirm un­ mation of life" (Ibid., p. 31) which "would be able to affirm even the grudgingly the whole of life. Finally, if we understand "commiseration" in most terrible suffering, not just commiserate with it" (Ibid.). Compassion the sense of "taking anothers' suffering as our own" (co-miseration) and "as distinct from any kind of pity in Nietzsche's sense of that word': thereby doubling the amount of pain involved in any given situation, (Ibid., p. 29) would embody a universallife affirmation and "would have then we can use the word "sympathy" to designare a type of intimare to be able to affinn all of life, not just its more pleasant moments" (lbid., "fellow-feeling" or "affinitive understanding" between persons. But isn't p. 31) But not only is this "an extremely difficult point of view to attain" (lbid.) for most of us, Nietzsche himself "vacilares in his thinking be­ tween the two extreme possibilities of nihilism and affirmation. He ofien 17 Cartwright, ref. 13, p. 559, citing Philip Mercer, Sympathy and Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1972) p. 18.

68 • 69 there still at least one more way to understand the core emotion under ts a second barrier to a complete understanding of Nietzsche's con­ scrutiny? Suppose, for example, that a dear friend were dying of a termi­ ~:;t of pity: words themselves are nothing more r_han artificial labels nal disease. We would not "look down upon" such a person with con­ constructed so that we might describe and commumcate. At bottom, all tempt. Nor would we be at all likely to joyously affirm his suffering or psychological impulses are manifestations of the will-to-pow~r. The psy­ even "walk away" out of a spirit of compassion. We would not want to chological drive to power discharges itself through certatn c~mmon accept his suffering as our own and make ourselves miserable. Rather, "channels" in much the same way that the circulatory system mtght be we would "understand" and "appreciate" the suffering of the other and said to discharge itself through various arteries and veins. Beca~se sorne would bear him witness and emoti9nal support to the end. Nietzsche has "channels" appear to be the major avenues of flow, they are g1ven spe­ no place for "sympathy" because he has no room for intimacy. The only cific names. But such titles-and perhaps even the channels them­ "fellow-feeling" he recognizes is part of the mentality of the herd, which selves-are a matter of convenience; when a vein is cauterized o: a is in turn construed as a mere selfish alliance of cowards. Yet it does "channel" is blocked, the "system" seeks alternative means of extendmg seem as though Nietzsche would allow for a special type of compas­ itself. In this sense, the various emotions are seen as nothing but the sion-or, perhaps empathy--in which one might understand and more common "channels" of expression for the will-to-power. Just as the intellectually identify with the plight of another but without becoming bloodstream will seek to re-route itself whenever a familiar "channel" is emo tionally ensnared by the circumstances. Such a spirit of altruistic blocked, so the will-to-power may sublimare and transform its mea~s of compassion appears to unselfishly and genuinely desire the good fortune expression from one emotion to another. So construed, any a_rbttrary of another. In this way, I might seek to assist an unfortunate person name appended to such a means of expression becomes .s_omethmg of a without degrading him and without dire risk of exposing myself to his misnomer. manipula tive influence. Thus, while the aforementioned commentators have done well to How many similar distinctions remain? Shall we continue this list ad distinguish: 1) "higher" from "lower" forms of pity (Kaufma~n, r~f. 1?, P· nauseum? It would seem that no catalogue of interpretive consttuctions 323) 2) "generosity proceeding from strength" from "commtseratton tssu­ could ever exhaust the rich mine of possible "meanings" behind ing from weakness" (Schacht, ref. 14, p. 460), and 3) "individual psycho­ Nietzsche's use of the word Mitleid. Not only is ordinary language itself logical pity" and "universal ontological pity" from a type of "compassion" inherently ambiguous, but Nietzsche enjoys a certain "malicious taste" (Stambaugh, ref. 7, p. 28). such distinctions may ultimately prove to be (Daybreak, Preface, § 5) in challenging his readers-daring them to keep only symptomatic of a deeper problem. Indeed, Nietzsche suggests that pace. Nietzsche sees himself as a "subterranean man": "one who tunnels words themselves may actually distort our comprehension: and mines and undermines" (Ibid., Preface, § 1, emphasis mine). However the reader might react, "Nietzsche is almost certain to be sev­ Words líe in our way.l -Whenever primitive mankind set up a word, era! moves ahead, anticipating or contradicting ones reactions ... Like all they believed they had made a discovery. How different the truth i~! the greatest thinkers, he will often make his readers feel fools. "18 -they had touched on a problem, and by supposing they had s~lved 1t they had created a hindrance to its solution. -Now with every ptece of Nietzsche delights in the double-entendre and any "meanings" assigned knowledge one has to stumble over dead, petrified words, and one to his employment of particular words must be viewed as something dy­ would sooner break a leg than a word. namic rather than static and as items which pose questions as frequently (Nietzsche, Daybreak, part 1, § 47) as they represent declarations. Moreover, a prolonged examination of the various nuances of the term Mitleid would detract from a larger point-a Moreover, ordinary Ianguage is particularly cumbersome when dealing point which the commentators have all but overlooked and which repre- with the more subtle shades of an emotion:

• Language and the prejudices upon which language is based are a mani­ 18 Michael Tanner, "Introduction" to Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak, trans., R.]. fold hindrance to us when we want to explain inner processes and Hollingdale, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1982) p. i:x.

70 71 · .· · ht have been the reverse: he. may have been the that the sttuatton mt.g . f drives: because of the fact, for example, that words really exist only for d I might have been the object of plty. Had the un ortunate superlatíve degrees of these processes and drives; and where words are bene f actor an d threat to my not landed in his predicament, he might well have pose a . . . lacking, we are accustomed to abandon exact observation because exact . . h. 1 take revenge for this mere posstbthty thinking there becomes painful. .. Anger, hatred, love, pity, desire, well-being By pttymg lm, f 1 . f ref 7 . 28). In this way' "to show pity is e t as a stgn o knowledge, joy, pain-all are names for extreme states: the milder, mid­ h dle degrees, not to speak of the lower degrees which are continually in c::~;gb~cau~e 'o~e has clearly ceased to be an object of fear as so~n e · ·red" (Nietzsche Human, All Too Human, vol. 2, part 2, § 5 ). play, elude us, and yet it is they which weave the web of our character 1 1 as one ts P ' h · · t "It is the very and our destiny. Pit is thereby inherently degrading to t e rectpten : . (Nietzsche, Daybreak, part 2, § 115) y e of the emotion of pity that it strips away from the suffenng of essenc 'b f tors' are more than others whatever is distinctively personal. Our ene ac ' . 1 The situation is complex. Our task in this section is to try to under­ . 1 ho make our worth and will smaller. .. one stmp y our enemtes, peop e w . . · th t are dis- stand Nietzsche's conception of pity. But the terms "pity," "sympathy," h. f the whole inner sequen ce and mtncaoes a "compassion" and «commiseration"-which supposedly express subtle knows not mg o f ou" (Nietzsche The Gay Science, part 4' § 338). tress for me or or Y ' · · w d not pity colorings of the German term Mitleid are, like the words we arbitrarily Accordingly, pity involves condescension and denston. e o affix to any of the emotions, simply misnomers for more primitive drives those we admire-only those who are beneath us. . . ' . . Although it may superf1oally ap- and instincts. Words exist only for the more superlative and paradigmatic Pity is essentially a selftsh emotwn. . examples of the emotions, while it is the milder and more deeply hidden ear that pity prompts one to care about anoth~r ~or th~ ~ake of that emotional states which actually "weave the web of our character" (Ibid.). ~ther-or, for the sake of all others19 -in truth, ptty ts egolSttc: (( We are none of us that which we appear to be in accordance with the . · . hy do we leap after some- states for which alone we have consciousness and words, and canse- Let us reflect seriously upon ttus questlon. w f l • quently praise and blame; those cruder outbursts of which alone we are one who has fallen into the water in front of us, ~ven tho~tgh we e_e . ~ h' Why do we feel pam and dtscomfort m aware make us misunderstand ourselves, we draw a conclusion on the kind of affect!On tOr tm....1 b . 11 d's no h h · may even e 1 - 1 - basis of data in which the exceptions outweigh the rule" (Ibid.) Nietzsche common with someone spitting blood ' t oug we . . . ? Out of pity· at that moment we are not thmkmg of remarks in a different vein that "we really ought to free ou.rselves from posed toward S hIITI. . l' f ourself-thus says ... thoughtlessness. The truth is: i~ the fee mg _o the seduction of words" (Beyond Good and Evil, part 1, § 16) and this . - . that which is usually and misleadmgly called ptty admonition is to be applied with particular force when dealing with p1ty-I mean m h' k f ourself . ff . 'th]--we are to be su re, not consciously t m . mg o states of emotion. "We always express our thoughts with the words that [su enng Wt ' . ¡ when if our foot but are doing so very strongly unconscwus y; as ' lie at hand. Or, to express my whole suspicion: we have at any moment only the thought for which we have to hand the words" (Daybreak, part . h · th t "pity-which he had ob- 19 Nietzsche credits Schope_nhauer wtth ~: ~;:wsou:ce of each and every moral 4, § 257). served so imperfectly a~d descnb~d s~rtb ~dl~ 133. See also, The Witlto Power, § 366. Given this pervasive context, the emotion of pity might well be inter­ action, past and future. Daybrea ,epthat .:only insofar as an action has sprung from preted as a disguised form of revenge. As we have seen, by pitying the Schopen~auer do~s of course argu e " Arthur Schopenhauer, On tbe Basis ofMorality, compasslOn does tt hav~ mora~ vaBlu b.b M ·¡¡ (1965) p 144. But Schopenhauer's no- sufferer, the benefactor effectively debases him and lowers his esteem. p e Indtanapohs: o s- ern · trans., E. FJ · · ayn • . , . d .d f the many ignoble nuances atten- Had the sufferer not been a suitable object for pity, he would have been . ht ll "compass!On - ts evOL o t.ion-what we mtg ca " . , " ee Cartwri ht pp. 557-567. Nietzsche argues that a suitable object for competition. "Against one who is suffering [those of dant to Nietzsche's concept of ptty. S . .t g h~ would have never thought of it in if Schopenhauer had ever correctly analyzed pt ~· ·h · to which Nietzsche proud natures] are often hard because he is not worthy of their aspira­ d . f ther's well-bemg. Yet t e passlOn tions and pride; but they are doubly obliging toward their peers whom it terms of an unse1ftsh es¡re or ano . d' t from Schopenhauer's conception of refers by the term "pity" is actually q~¡te lspara eed to any possíble good will we may would be honorable to fight if the occasion should ever arise" ''compassion." Thus, while Nietzsche lS .not oppos . t. . t' on of the selfish (Nietzsche, Tbe Gay Science, part 1, § 13). Thus, by taking pity u pon the have towards our fellow man, he is nonetheless adament m us re¡ec 1 unfortunate, I am also taking revenge against him for the ve1y possibility and pernicious emotion of "pity."

73 72 slips an acr of .which we are not immediateJy conscious we perform fore his soul all the misery available to him in his surroundings would the most pur~osiVe counter-motions and in doing so piainly em lo ou whole reasonmg faculty. P Y r ¡nevitably grow sick and melancholic" (Ibid., § 134). Our suffering per se will never alleviate the suffering of another. While Nietzsche would not (Nietzsche, Daybreak, part 2, § 13 ) 3 likely condemn a sort of altruistic compassion, he fervently rejects the . ~ccordi~gly, the misfortune of another alarms us of our own mortal­ emotion of pity. A feeling of altrnistic compassion20 (or perhaps even tty. An acctdent which happens to another offends us: it would make us empathy as I have earlier employed the term)-as distinguished from aware. of ~ur impotence, and perhaps of our cowardice, if we did not go Stambaugh's difficult conception of "compassion" which is "not in to asstst ~tm ... Or an accident and suffering incurred by another consti­ Nietzsche at all" (Stambaugh, ref. 7, p. 28) -recognizes the misfortune of tutes a Sig~post to sorne danger to us; and it can have a painful effect others, and may even seek to reduce such misfortune whenever possible. up~~ us. Simply a~ a. toke~ of human vulnerability and fragility in gen- But this particular species of compassion, unlike pity, does not take upon eral Ob1d.). The vtcttm of 1ll circumstance might ·ust as easily h b itself the desire to suffer along with the unfortunate. It is one thing to us and h · · 1 ave een ' . ts ext~tence presents an affront to our sensibility by serving as a recognize the suffering of others and even to render assistance, but it is remmder. In thts sense, pity can act as a type of defense mechanism and quite another thing to grovel in the unhappiness of another and to as­ can be seen to be w.holly self-regarding: sume all of his anguish as if it were your own. The proper attitude to maintain whenever we recognize the misfor­ ~e r~pel this kind of pain and offense and requite it through an act of tune of others but are forestalled in our efforts to help them, is the atti­ ptty; tt may contain a subtJe self-defense or even a piece of revenge. tude characterized by "passing by." Passing by involves ~l!e understand­ T~at at bottom we are thinking very strongly of ourselves can be di.- vmed from th d · · · ing that there is nothing we can do to help the sufferer. He is in pain, . . e ec1ston we arnve at in every case in which we can and we cannot help; taking his burden upon our shoulders will not avo~d the stght of the person suffering, perishing or complaining· we prove beneficia! to him, though it will prove injurious to us. We must grit dectde not to do .so if we can present ourselves as the more pow~rful our teeth and walk away. But the act, as well as the attitude of passing and as a helper, tf we are certain of applause, if we want to feel how by, requires strength of the will; it demands that hardness of the heart fboortun~te we are in contrast, or hope that the sight will relieve our redom. that is forged only through discipline. "The overcoming of pity I count among the noble virtues ... To remain the master at this point, to keep (Nietzsche, Daybreak, part 2, § 133) the eminente of one's task undefiled by the many lower and more my­ But Niet~sche again cautions: "we never do anything of this kind out of opic impulses that are at work in so-called selfless actions, that is the one ~1ottv~.:. ~11 of this, and other, much more subtle things in addition test, perhaps the ultimare test, which a Zarathustra must pass-his real constitute ptty: how coursely does Ianguage assault with its one word S~ polyphonous a being!" (Ibid.). 2J The reader should avoid the trap of getting bogged down with terminology h Overall, ~ietzsche views pity as an unsavory emotion, both for those alone-particularly is such terminology is not Nietzsche's. The essential point is simply that Stambaugh has already employed the term "compassion" to designare a spirit of V: o bestow It as well as for those who receive it. Pity "is a weakness universal life affirmation which "would ... affirm all of life, not just its more pleasant hk~ ev~ry losing of oneself through a hannjitl affect" (Ibid., § 134). B; moments." See, Stambaugh, ref. 7, p. 31. Yet Stambaugh suggests that this sense of taking .~r up.on ourselves to "suffer from another's ill-fortune as he himself "compassion" is "not in Nietzsche at all" (!bid., p. 28) because "Nietzsche vacillates in ~uffers (Ibtd., § 137) we effectively double the amount of pain involved his thinking between... nihilism and affirmation." (]bid., p. 31). Thus, while Nietzsche "often reached an affirmative point of view in terms of his own experience ... he was m an.y unfo~unate circumstance. Even if pity were not so intrfcately in- tertwmed wlth the spirit of · · never able to see that affirmation as a concrete reality for mankind as a whole." (Ibid.) . . revenge, tt would sttll be a useless and deb .l. Accordingly, I have employed the term altruístíc compassion in the effort to distinguish ~atmg. emotion: "H~ who for a period .of time made the experiment I~; a species of "compassionate" behavior which would recognize the misfortune of others mtentiOnally pursumg occasions for pity in his everyday life and set be- and seek to alleviate their suffering. Yet this sentiment would not seek to suffer along witb the other, nor would it act from selfish motives. It would encompass, rather, a simple and laudable desire to minimize the sum total of suffering.

74 75 21 proofof strength." "The most spiritual m en, as the strongest, find their ·n its more extreme forms, it may exist as a desire for destruction and a happiness where others would find their destruction: .. .in hardness 1 · h to effect the complete annihilation of the source of our ire. Like against themselves and others" (Nietzsche, Tbe AntiChrist, part 1, § 57). WISity revenge is an outcropping of the will-to-power, an d t h e preced' mg Accordingly, one must barden oneself against pity. pan alysis of pity illustrates a paradigmatic example. of the spirit of revenge. Pity is an affliction of the spiritually weak and represents the Iast re­ we have observed that both the sufferer and the benefactor are sort for those of herd-animal instinct who cry out for recognition and somewhat ambivalent about pity. The sufferer craves pity in order to gain strive for ~ne final attempt at power by dragging others into their tangled sorne semblance of power through the manipulation of the benefactor, web of ptty and revenge. While a spirit of altruistic compassion is a and the benefactor desires to pity in order to reinforce his feeling of proper vir~e, pity ~s a vice: "if you have a suffering friend, be a resting power by his position of superiority. But, at the same time, ~oth parties pl~ce fo~ ht,s suffenng, but a hard bed as it were, a field cot: thus you abhor pity. The benefactor incurs a loss of autonomy by vtrtue of the wtll profH htm best... Woe to all who love without having a height that is sufferer's ability to manipulare him, and the sufferer experiences a sense a~ove their pity!" (Nietzsche, Zarathustra, part 2, § 3). The higher man of humiliation and degradation because he is looked down upon by the wtll know no pity, and will expect no quarter: benefactor. The notion of revenge seems to crop up in this already complex scenario precisely because the parties involved loath pity as To tho~e hu~an bein~s who are of any concern to me 1 wish suffering, much as they crave it. Thus, although the sufferer desires pity as a vehi­ desolatlon, stckness, tlJ-treatment, indignities 1 wish that they should cle through which to achieve an enhanced feeling of power, he is also not remain unfamiliar with profound self-contempt, the torture of self­ mistrust, the wretchedness of the vanquished: I have no pity for them repulsed by the idea of actually becoming the object ~~ pity because because I wish them the only thing that can prove today whether one i~ such an emotion would degrade him. Because of the degradation and worth anything or not-that one endures. humiliation involved, the sufferer desires vengeance against his benefac­ tor. The form of vengeance taken is that of increased manipulation of the (Nietzsche, The Will to Pou.:er, § 910) benefactor. The benefactor, in turn, develops a desire for revenge against Thus, to be ttuly compassionate, one must speak from a Ievel that is the sufferer. Although the benefactor seeks to pity the sufferer in order to . above pity; to achieve salvation, one must have the hard heart of a satisfy his own urge for an increased feeling of power, he is repulsed by viking.u the possibility that the sufferer will be able to manipulare him. If the suf­ . Revenge _is a~other prominent theme in Nietzsche's writings. Revenge ferer is able to obtain sorne sort of control over the autonomy of the tnvo!ves an 111-':Ill towards another for past injury or insult. It may mani­ benefactor, the benefactor is likely to respond with a strong desire for fest Itself as a simple desire to even the score against our trespassers or vengeance against the sufferer. The revenge sought is similarly in the form of increased pity for the sufferer along with the attendant nuances 21 of degradation and dehumanization. Like a worm seeking to nourish it­ Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Horno, in On the Genealogy ofMorals and EcceHomo trans., Walter Kaufmann and R.]. Hollingdale, New York: Vintage Books (1966) book 1' self by devouring its own tail, the participants are locked into a brutal § 4. ) form of psychological combat. Both the sufferer and the benefactor dis­ 72 "The noble human being honors himself as one who is powerful also as one play various tendencies toward sadism and masochism-dependent upon w~o has power' over hin:self,_ who knows how to speak and be silent, who delights in the perspective taken. The heat of the battle is fueled even more by the bemg sever~ and hard With htmself and respects all severity and hardness. 'A hard heart fact that the patticipants are likely quite unaware of the dynamics of the Wo_tan put 1.nto my breast,' says an old Scandinavian saga: ¡¡ fitting poetic expression, seemg that 1t comes fro~ the soul of a proud Viking. Such a type of man is actually situation in which they are involved. The conscious leve! of emotion rep­ proud ?f the fact that he 1s not made for pity, and the hero of the saga therefore adds as resents merely the tip of the iceberg. For Nietzsche, consciousness a warnmg:. 'If the hea~ is not hard in youth it will never harden.' Noble and courageous proper and even reason itself are nothing more than manifestations or huma_n who thmk that way are furthest removed from that morality which finds _be1~gs outcroppings of primal instinct (Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §§ 423, the d!Stinctwn of morality precisely in pity." Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil part 9 § 260. ' ' ' 439), and the subliminal machinations of the will-to-power may never be

76 77 known to the actors themselves. Even to the limited extent that the sub- 19). Acts of retaliation in this sense can be viewed as therapeutic; a . 1, § h . . kl tle dynamics of the emotions are revealed at the conscious level, it is little revenge will allow the offended person to get t e p01son q~1c Y probable that the benefactor and sufferer will attach different values and out of his system. The aggrieved party wh~ has not yet .ach1eved different meanings to the phenomenon. The actors will likely value or complete mastery over his emotions, and who ts unable to qmckly vent disvalue the emotions of pity and revenge according to the extent to his feelings of aggression , may otherwise be consumed by an all- which such emotions fulfill their present needs; and the participants will encompassing feeling of resentment. . . assign "meanings" to such emotive states contingent upon their con­ A soul consumed by resentment is a ''gruesome sight" because tt ts scious view of the situation. -Which perspective correctly illustrates the caught in a maelstrom of impotent hatred and immeasurable envy. Such (l true" or "objective" interpretation? The question itself is perilous: there is a spirit wants nothing more than to achieve a t~.e act of vengeance but no God's eye perspective (Schacht, ref. 14, pp. 8-10), and yet all we have is thwarted in its attempt to do so. Only the sptntually resolute can ob­ are perspectives. tain revenge; Iesser men are incapable of acting. As between equals, ac~ Revenge considered apart from its connection with pity similarly mus­ of vengeance are possible; but as between master and sla:e·. the slave ts trates the influence of the will-to-power. When the avenger completes capable only of insipid loathing. Such incapacity festers w1thm the lesser his act of retaliation, he has gained sorne sort of power over his tres­ being, and ultimately consumes him entirely. passer, and the former trespasser is robbed of whatever power he may Nietzsche associates resentment with degeneracy ( On the Gen~alo~ have gained through the commission of the original trespass. If the oj Morals, part 3, §§ 15-18). The deg~nerate .is not only u~favored m th1s avenger succeeds in completely destroying the trespasser, his power over world but he is hypersensitive to h1s pred1cament. He .1$ too feeble to him is seemingly complete. It is in this general spirit of revenge, ward off adverse stimuli, and too spiritually weak to ign?re or f?rget. As Nietzsche contends, that the Christian dogma of resurrection made a new a result, everything wounds him. He cannot control h1s emot10nal r~­ doctrine of retribution possible. Those disfavored by nature and fortune sponse and there is no release for his mounting anger. The end result 1s may not only persist in their typically unchristian behavior, but they may a deep, all-encompassing desire for revenge. But becau~e. such an act of satisfy their thirst for revenge by nurturing the hope that their superiors revenge is not within the means of the degenerare, th~ vt~to~s cycle con­ will one day be condemned to eternal damnation.23 tinues its course, and the tension grows. The sufferer mstmcttvely seeks a To have the capacity for true acts of vengeance is indicative of cause of his suffering in the hopes of discovering a blameworthy agent power. But to have such capacity and yet choose not to exercise it is a n whoin he can vent his wrath, but when such an agent cannot be Upo . l" f 24 sign of even greater power and self-mastery. Thus, Zarathustra entreats: found, resentment may take the form of an attitu d e agamst 1 e. "Of all evil I deem you capable: therefore I want the good from you. Verily, I have often laughed at the weaklings who thought themselves 24 Thus, Stambaugh distinguishes between "individua l~ ps~c~o~ogi~al reven~e ex­ good because they had no claws" (Nietzsche, Zarathustra, part 2, § 13). plicit in Nietzsche" and "universal, ontological revenge Imphcit m Nietzsche. See, Those who possess the necessary claws and yet refrain from acts of Stambaugh, ref. 7, p. 28. At its simplest Jevel: vengeance symbolize that mastery of instinct and harnessing of drives 1 have the spirit of revenge against someone who has somehow harn;,ed ~e. which mark the higher man. Yet revenge per se is not a completely The motive of my revenge is to restare what I have lost or suffered by gettm.g back" at the person who harmed me. On the overt level, an example of th1s negative desire: "If you have been done a great wrong, then quickly add would be an old-fashioned duel at dawn for the sake of challenged h~nor ~r five little ones: a gruesome sight is a person single-mindedly obsessed by the shooting of an unfaithfullover. The .most subtle level of revenge rn1ght he a wrong ... A little revenge is more human than no revenge" ( Ibid., part in what Nietzsche calls ressentiment, whiCh appears to b~ ~ore a general st~te or feeling, whereas revenge implies at least the poss1blitty of sorne acttve retaliation. (Stambaugh, p. 28) 23 "Moral judgments and condemnations constitute the favorite revenge of the spiri­ tually Hmited against those less limited-also a sort of compensation for having been ill­ But "Nietzsche really takes revenge as an ontological concept, a c.oncept pervading all favored by nature-finally an opportunity for acquiring spirit and becoming refined­ experience" (Ibid., p. 31) and signifying impotent loathing and dental: malice spiritualized." Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, part 7, § 219.

78 79 Nietzsche believes that resentment originates out of the desire to stun pity and revenge in the preceding section, we are now in a position to pain. It differs drastically from a therapeutic act of revenge because it is re-examine the death-of-God passages in greater detail. unable to express itself by immediate action, and poisons and consumes The madman passage of The Gay Science is steeped in violence. The from within. In this sense, revenge liberates man from the stagnation of madman informs us that we are all co-conspirators in the death of God the soul which is attendant to the attitude of resentment. and that the enormity of the crime is almost beyond comprehension. We "There is an instinct for rank which, more than anything else, is a are the "murderers of all murderers"; what was "holiest and mightiest of sign of a high rank" (Beyond Good and Evil, part 9, § 263) and Nietzsche all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives" frequently calls for an ordering among men. Such an ordering is manifest (part 3, § 125). There has never been a greater deed, and we must be in the various ways in which men respond to the inclination towards re­ god-like ourselves in arder to have accomplished such a task. The mad­ venge. The highest of men, who live at the very summit of spirituality, man is shocked by the heinousness of the act and terrified of the ensuing are beyond the spirit of revenge. They are hardened to the challenge of consequences, and yet he acknowledges that those who come after us adversity, and revel in the conflict of life. Those who cannot achieve the will belong to "a higher history than all history hitherto" (Ibid.). But what pinnacle of self-mastery and walk the plains of ordinary men, must in­ perversion of nature could have prompted such doings?; How could ue voke the spirit of revenge to deliver themselves from the depths of in­ be responsible for the death of an omnipotent deity? Kaufmann points sipid resentment. Finally, the weakest of the weak fall head-long into the out that the solution to the question concerning what Nietzsche means chasm of resentment where impotent loathing becomes an attitude to­ by heralding the death of God can be found in the passages in The Gay wards life. Advocates of equality seek to deny this natural ordering of Science which immediately surround the parable of rhe madman. 25 men and thereby take revenge against their superiors. With tarantula Similarly, it is arguable that these and related passages provide at least hearts and revenge in their souls they vehemently proclaim the equality sorne explanation as to why we would take it upon ourselves to destroy of m en. "But I shall bring your secrets to light. .. I tear at your webs, that God. In large part, we have murdered God out of a spirit of revenge, and your rage may lure you out of your lie-holes and your revenge may leap in so doing, paved the way for the transvaluation of all values with out from behind your word justice. For that man be delivered from re­ which Nietzsche is so concerned. venge, that is to me the bridge to the highest hope, and a rainbow after God was harsh and vengeful, and had become a tyrant. He crippled long storms" (Nietzsche, Zarathustra, part 2, § 7). the development of man's higher instincts, and led men to become • ridiculous herd-animals. Ultimately, God was "an indelicacy against us m Necropsy of a Deity thinkers-at bottom merely a gross prohibition for us: you shall not think!" (Nietzsche, Ecce Horno, part 2, § 1). Those who followed Him In section I, we observed the various passages in which Nietzsche were forced to surrender whatever worth they may have placed upon gives explicit detail regarding the death of God. We observed that in two this world in exchange for a seductive promise in the world to come. He of these passages Nietzsche informs us that God was murdered in the demanded a high tribute from his underlings, requiring that they suffo­ spirit of revenge, and that in two different passages, we are led to cate their sense of reason and extinguish their last vestige of self-deter­ believe that God died out of pity. Having studied Nietzsche's views on mination. Those who would not submit to the tribute were sentenced to eternal damnation. God controlled the sciences as well as philosophy, and He established and promulgated an artificial set of mores to be im­ posed upon man. Worse yet, God had become an obstacle to the devel­ What happens when the spirit of revenge is not related to other human beings as sorne form of retaliation (ressentiment), but rather to life itself? This is opment of the overman. While God existed, all men were equal. perhaps the level of Nietzsche's most profound insight into the spirit of Furthermore, because there cannot be two ultimare sources of value in revenge. That insight is no longer concerned with the question of "getting back at" a person, but with the question of a furiously impotent denial of life. (Stambaugh, p. 32). 25 See Kaufmann's translation of The Gay Science, supra, ref. 2, p. 182, n. 20.

80 81 the universe, man was afraid to determine his own values. But when the nothing more than "Platonism for the masses"; the projected wish-fulfill­ lingering shadow of God finally ceases to eclipse the mind of man, the ment of human needs baffled by the real world" (Margan, ref. 8, p. 37). overman will become-at least-possible. Thus, under this interprctation, Christianity enshrines values which are irreconcilably opposed to life it appears that mankind found it incumbent to rise up and destroy the (Schacht, ref. 14, p. 121. See also, Nietzsche, The Will to Power, § 707). As mightiest of all tyrants; the slave took revenge against his master in order such, religious belief would appear to be inherently unstable due to a that he might become master himself. By avenging himself against his stark contrast between (other-worldly) value and (worldly) fact. Other­ maker and annihilating the former source of all ethical value, man laid worldliness has promised archetypal and anthropomorphic "truths": the essential groundwork for his own self-creation. "beauty," "justice," "good," even "truth" itself. And this preoccupation with "absolutes" has bred an uncompromising will to truth which must Yet the death of God takes place in a bourgeose society and a certain inevitably destroy its only adequate object (Morgan, ref. 8, p. 47). conflicting undercurrent seems to flow throughout the passage. How "Instead of leading to a supreme, all-satisfying reality, as once it seemed could such a society yearn for the overman? God has been violently to do, the quest for absolute truth is becoming a restless unmasking of murdered-the wellspring of all values has been destroyed-and yet the illusions: everything is false, it concludes, and the result is to intensify the significance of the act has not quite dawned upon the crowd. The initial pessimism derived from the self and contemporary civilization, by adding confrontation with nihilism has a certain '"anaesthetic essence': it is the the 'pessimism of the intellect"' (Ibid.} Thus, "belief in the Christian god unreflective nihilism exhibited in daily 'bons sens' and 'cheerfulness' after has become unbelievable ... ancient and profound trust has been turned the death of God. It is life without depth. "26 Nietzsche saw that the val­ into doubt" (Nietzsche, Tbe Gay Science, part 5, § 343). "Why atheism to- ues which had sustained European culture had become bankrupt, but he • day?" Nietzsche asks rhetorically. Because: knew that this realization was indigestible for his contemporaries (Magnus, Ibid.). The madman had come too early. "The father'' in God has been thoroughly refuted; ditto, "the judge," "the Moreover, this unprecedented act of revenge initially appears difficult rewarder." Also his "free will": he does not hear-and if he heard he to reconcile with Nietzsche's conception of the "slave revolt of morality." still would not know how to help. Worst of all: he seems incapable of Belief in a transcendent deity serves as the comerstone of the egalitarian clear communication: is he unclear. ("levelling") society in which Nietzsche bclievcd he lived. Since modetn This is what I found to be the causes for the decline of European the­ religion serves thc interests of the herd, why would the mass of mankind ism ... It.seems to me that the religious instinct is indeed in the process suddenly turn against God? The foregoing analysis suggests that t.his of growing powerfully-but the theistic satisfaction it refuses with deep phenomena might be at least partly explained in terms of a liberation suspicion. from oppression through vengeance. But it is also clear that the mores of (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, part 3, § 53) pity and revenge shield the mediocre masses from the superior few. As such, why would mankind as a whole27 suddenly rebel against God and Arguably then, the spread of atheism-the "death of God"-may be the democratic expetiment? attributable to the fact that the "religious instinct" towards the truth can There may be no ready solution to this quandary. However, its is no longer be satisfied with anthropomorphic conceptualizations of God. plausible that ccrtain indigenous aspects of the Western rcligious tradi­ Not only do anthropomorphic ascriptions of God fail to pass the scrutiny tion have led it to overcome itself. Christianity, according to Nietzsche, is of thinkers alert to Lhe illegitimacy of such procedures, but religious OO.. lief cannot be "commanded" by any being which is not readily compre­ hensible in human terms (Schacht, ref. 14, p. 123). In such an atmo­ 26 Bernd Magnus, Nietzsche's Existentiallmperative, Bloomington: Indiana Univer­ sity Press (1978) p. 12. sphere, Christianity becomes half-hearted and insincere. Without fear and 7:7 The madman makes clear that "we have killed {God]-you and l" and that "a ll of respect for a personified deity, the "crowd" tends to lose interest. The us are his murderers." Moreover, the entire passage is couched in terms of a violent act same "religious instinct" for other-worldly values and "absolutes" which of rcprisal: God "has bled to death under our knives." Nietzsche, Tbe Gay Science, part initially encouraged belief in God now heralds His decline. We have 3, § 125.

82 83 killed God in this sense because He is no Jonger taken seriousJy as a Despite the appearance that the "ugliest man" has destroyed his tenable hypothesis. greatest nemesis,29 he does not rejoice in the aftermath. Although he has A similar act of deicide is committed by the "ugliest man" of Jiberated himself from the intrusion of the ultimare shamer, he has not Zarathustra who kills God in the spirit of revenge in order to takc arms been transformed in the process as he is still too spiritually weak to against God's obtrusive overpitying watch. The (( ugliest man" is hounded overcome himself. With the death of God behind him, the degenerare by a god who "saw with eyes that saw everything" and felt a pity which should be in a position to become god-like himself. Indeed, in the mad­ "knew no shame" (Nietzsche, Zarathustra, part 4, § 7). The "ugliest man" man passage of Tbe Gay Science, Nietzsche suggests that one must be­ could not escape the watchful omniscience of God and ultimately took it come a god simply to appear worthy of deicide (part 3, § 125). Yet the upon himself to termínate God's tyranny as "man cannot bear it that such "ugliest man" of Zarathustra is not up to the task. After having murdered a witness should live" (lb id.). The human antagonist in the parable is God he can find no surrogate, and he is far too spiritually deprived to as­ dubbed the "ugliest man" because he is associated with degeneracy. sume that position himself. The "ugliest man" represents merely a first "Nothing is beautiful, except man alone: all aesthetics rests upon this step towards the attainment of the beautiful. If ugliness is precedent to na"iveté; which is its first truth. Let us immediately add the second: noth­ beauty, perhaps the ug1iest of men must precede the most beautiful of ing is ugly except the degenerating man-and with this the realm of men-ifthe most beautiful of men is to develop. "Manis a rope, tied be­ aesthetic judgment is circumscribed. "~ But Nietzsche also believes that tween beast and overman-a ro pe o ver an abyss. . .. What is great in man pain and ugliness are inextricably involved in the path to perfection is that he is a bridge and not an end" (Zarathustra, part 1, § 4). Thus, (Margan, ref. 8, p. 309). Ugliness is precedent to the creation of beauty. Zarathustra must look for the next link in the chain. The. "ugliest man," The "ugliest man" cannot bcar God's pity, and he can neither escape nor even if taken to be something integral to the process, is nevertheless hide. The only available altcrnative is to take action against the one who something which must be left behind. Zarathustra is concerned not with knows too much. In this scnse, the "ugliest man's" act of violence is both what man is, but what man might beco me: "Man ... is something that must an act of vengeancc as well as an act of sclf-defense. For no longer is be overcome" (Ibid., part 4, § 7). there an all-knowing, overpit ying deity who refuses to allow man e ven In two different passages of Zarathustra, Nietzsche informs us that the privacy of his own shame. Instead, there is a new order of things in God died out of pity. The devil told Zarathustra that God too has his which the "ugliest man" can escape into thc sanctuary of his own soli­ hell, and that it is precisely his love of mankind: "God died of his pity for tude and preserve, perhaps, sorne slight scmblance of dignity. man" (part 2, § 3). Later, when Zarathustra meets the "old pope," he is Zarathustra's pity honored thc "ugliest man" bccause the experiencing of told that God's love of man became his hell and eventually his death. pity caused Zarathustra to blush. Whilc cveryone else would have When God became "old and soft and mellow and pitying" he grew thrown alms to the "ugliest man," Zarathustra gucssed that he was 11 tOo "weary of the world, weary of willing, and one day he choked on his all­ rich, rich in what is great, in what is terrible, in what is ugliest, in what is too-great-pity" (part 4, § 8). In mundane cases of pity involving two hu­ inexpressible" (Zarathustra, part 4, § 7). Zarathustra cxperienced shame man beings, the emotion of pity can become destructive for both parties. for having pitied the "ugliest man," and by recognizing that even the However, in the two passages of Zarathustra in which we are informed ugliest of men are not fit objects for pity, Zarathustra allowed thc degen­ that God died out of his pity for man, the attitude of pity seems to take erare one last refuge. God's pity, to the contrary, was without shame. 1Ie on different ramifications. Pity is still obviously destructive for God, but it always saw the "ugliest man" through and through as the most degener­ lacks a destructive propensity for man. Man is neither benefitted nor in­ are of men and took pity upon him. Only by murdcring God could the jured by pity in the two passages under scrutiny. Indeed, it may well be "ugliest man" preserve the ptivacy of his own retrogradation. 29 The "ugliest man" perceived God as his greatest nemises. But it could be argued • that it is his own extreme spiritual depravity which is truly the "ugliest man's" greatest ~ Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Jdols, in The Portable Nietzsche, trans., Walter enemy. The degenerate man was able to destroy God, and yet he is still too spiritually Kaufmann, New York: Viking Press (1954), part 9, § 20. weak to transform himself.

84 85 the case that man is unaware of the fact that God pities him; God pities IV Laugbter man, but man does not reciprocally pity God, nor does man experience God's pity.3° To the extent man does not know that he is being pitied by By now we are in a position to speculate as to why Nietzsche chose God, God's pity lacks that element of degradation and humiliation found to illustrate the death of God through scenarios involving pity and re­ in ordinary cases of pity. Thus, the two immediate passages are quite dif­ venge. The death of God is the most tremendous event of all time. Pity ferent from the parable of the "ugliest man" in which the degenerare and revenge are important themes in Nietzsche's thought. By tying these feels belittled by God's pity. Moreover, if man is unaware of God's pity, prominent themes in with the death of God it is quite possible that the sufferer is unable to manipulate his benefactor but is simultaneously Nietzsche means to emphasize the importance of these themes to his spared the ímpetus for revenge which such knowledge would bring. In a philosophy as a whole. Furthermore, the death-of-God passages involv­ very real sense, manis impervious to the negative effects of God's pity as ing these prominent leitmotivs serve not only to further exemplify long as he remains oblivious to the situ~tion. Thus, it would follow that Nietzsche's theme that God is dead, but also to illustrate subtle features God is the only one destroyed by pity in such instances. of the emotions involved. It is also entirely possible that the pity involved in the last two pas­ But we are left with an unusual passage in Zaratbustra in which sages is simply of a different sort from that type of pity which Nietzsche Nietzsche informs us that the "old gods" met with a "good gay godlike associates with diabolical underpinnings. I have already argued that end ... one day they laugbed themselves to death" (part 3, § 8). What, if Nietzsche maintains a distinction between pHy and (what I have cometo anything, might Nietzsche have had in mind by suggesting that the gods perished in this fashion? call) altruístic compassion. While the higher man is beyond pity, he wi ll • nevertheless experience a certain sense of compassion for his fellow The passage in question occurs in the section "On Apostates" in man. Thus, "a man who is by nature a master-when such a man has which Nietzsche addrcsses the weary souls who have become pious pity, well this pity has value. But what good is the pity of those who suf­ again. Only recently had Zarathustra seen them run into the morning fer. Or those who, worse, preacb pity" (Beyond Good and Evil, part 9, light, joyous of the gift of knowledge that he had brought to them. But § 293). Under this interpretation, the immense sorrow that God feels for now, their young hearts were weary and '' they even slander the courage man is not properly characterized as pity-at least not in its diabolical they had in the morning" (Ibid.) Where many among them had once sense-but rather something like altruistic compassion. Hence, it would lifted their legs in dance, and were cheered by the laughter in seem that what Nietzsche might really have had in mind, is the notion Zarathustra's wisdom, now they were afraid of having too much free­ that God is overwhelmed by His feeling of sorrow over the plight of doro: "Just now I saw one groveling crawling back to the cross" (Ibid.). mankind. God is distressed over the human condition, and yet He har­ The apostates were pious again becausc a cowardly devil within them bors no ill-will towards man. His compassion is truly altruistic; He pur­ relentlessly encouraged them to shun the light of truth and to bury their portedly desires no retum for His love of mankind. But while the higher heads in the haze of theological dogma. Sorne of the apostates have even man assumes the attitude of "passing by" whenever he is unable to help become night watchmen: "now they know how to blow horns and to an unfortunate and his grief is in danger of becoming too great to bear, walk about at night and to awaken old things that had long gone to an omnipresent and omniscient God would be unable to isolate Himself sleep" (Ibid.). Two night watchmen evcn attempted to revive the old be­ lief in God, and when Zarathustra witnessed their activities his heart from the suffering. It is precisely because God is unable to assume the ' attitude of "passing by" that His sorrow for man becomes Bis undoing. twisted with Iaughter and wanted to break and did not know whither and sank into his diaphragm: "Verily, this will yet be my death, that I shall suffocate with laughter when I see asses drunk and night watchmen ~ It is interestlng to note the similarity between the passages in question and the thus doubting God. Is not the time long past for all such doubts too? orthodox doctrine concerning Christ's redemption of man on the cross. The God-man Who may still awaken such old sleeping, light-shunning things?" (Ibid.). is completely destroyed through his !ove of man, and yet mankind is unharmed, and ac­ Zarathustra was painfully aware of something that the night watchmen tually benefitted through the process.

86 87 were attempting to obscure, namely, that the "old gods" had laughed first sign of higher psychic life (Ibid., p. 422, quoting from a note found themselves to death long ago. One day an old grim-beard of a god forgot in Nietzsche) as the higher man laughs at the turbulence of this world himself and issued the proclamation that there was but one god. The from an elevated plane of existence. Thus, for example, Zarathustra other gods rocked with laughter and Ciied: "Is not just this godlike that laughs at the vengeful tarantulas who preach the equality of man: "1 there are gods but no God?" (Ibid., See also, in a different context, pan Iaugh in your faces with my laughter of the heights" (Zaratbustra, part 2, 3, § 12)- The absurdity of the situation was too much to bear, and the § 7); and he similarly scoffs at the lower men who are unable either to "old gods" simply laughed themselves into oblivion. rranscend or commit true acts of revenge: "1 have often laughed at the Laughter is also an important and recurrent theme in Nietzsche's weaklings who thought themselves good because they had no claws" thought. 31 It symbolizes, ínter alía, the state of existence whereby one is (part 2, § 13). Furthermore, Zarathustra suggests that laughter is the beyond tragedy and misfortune. Laughter represents the ultimare act of crown upon the head of the higher man: "I myself have put on this life-affirmation. To be able to laugh at the terrible irony of misfortune is crown, I myself have pronounced my laughter holy. Nobody else have I to place oneself above the situation-not in order to disassociate oneself found strong enough for this today ... you higher m en, learn to laugh" from the harsh realities of life, but rather to revel in the tragedy of exis­ (part 4, § 13). tence. To laugh boldly in the face of impending hardship is to elevare Hatab has argued that the tragic and the comic appear as two funda­ oneself above adversity. The higher man is one who can laugh at the mental existential conditions (Lawrence ]. Hatab, ref. 31, p. 68). The frowns of fortune and is exhilarated by the challenge of catastrophe. "I tragic involves a situation in which the inevitable finitude of existence or should actually risk an order of rank among philosophers depending on the destruction of life and meaning is displayed; the comic ·involves a sit­ the rank of their laughter-all the way up to those capable of golden uation in which the humorous side of existence is shown. While we are laughter. And supposing that gods, too, philosophize, which has been accustomed to assume that these two fundamental states are diametri­ suggested to me by many an inference-I snould not doubt that they cally opposed, for Nietzsche,"neither one is meant to be the opposite of also know how to laugh the while in a superhuman and new way-and the other" (Ibid.). The tragic and the comic are but two sides of the same at the expense of all serious things. Gods enjoy mockery: it seems they coin and the typically "comic" response of laughter "becomes a special cannot suppress laughter even during holy rights" (Nietzsche, Beyond way in which a tragic situation need not involve a negative state of Good and Evil, part 9, § 294).32 mind" (Ibid., pp. 68-69). Indeed, "Nietzsche recommends a special kind Laughter may appear as a sublimation of other desires; one often of joy and laughter as the only alternative to a pessimistic denial of exis­ Iaughs in order to avoid crying. It is also indicative of those stronger tence, or to an optimistic fantasy that negation and limits can somehow spirits who endeavor not to take serious things too seriously. As such, be resolved" (Ibid., p. 68). laughter represents an attitude towards life, and for Nietzsche, "laughter The spirit of laughter also serve~ a certain epistemic function: "we becomes less a physical phenomena than a symbol of the joyous affir­ should call every truth false which was not accompanied by at least one mation of life and of the refusal to bow before the spirit of gravity" laugh" (Nietzsche, Zarathustra, part 3, § 12). The truth revealed in laugh­ (Kaufmann, note 41 to § 294 of Beyond Good and Evil, p. 423). It is the ter is the shattering of a previously fixed truth-as if, within the laugh, "something deep and instinctive in human nature acknowledges and af­ firms the dismantling of structures and 'being"' (Hatab, ref. 31, p. 73). In 31 "Laughter is an important image in Nietzsche's writings; it is even expressed as this sense, Nietzsche's view of laughter is related to his critique of truth the consummate goal to which he is calling his readers ... [and) is a fundamental issue in his view of the worlcl." Lawrence ]. I-Iatab, "Laughter ln Nietzsche's Thought: A and foundations in western thought. The stifling "seriousness" of Philosophical Tragicomecly," lnternatíonal Stttdies in Philosophy, vol. 20, pp. 67-79 European philosophy and religion reveals its struggle for, and fixation (1988) p. 67. See also, John Lachs, "Comll!ents On 'Laughter In Nietzsche's Thought,"' on, truth and certainty in a world which is essentially chaos. Nietzschean Jnternational Studíes in Pbilosophy, vol. 20, pp. 81-83 (1988). laughter is a cry to abandon truth and certainty and to joyfully embrace 32 Kaufmann provides a number of important exccrpts from Nielzsche's writings the limits of knowledge and life (Ibid., p. 74). Laughter is then a part of concerning his views on laughter in footnote 41 to § 294. See pp. 421-423.

88 89 ' what he terms 'the wishes of our reverence' and 'our needs' (citing to wisdom. It is not contrary to serious issues, but rather a finale or overture Tbe Gay Science, § 346), along with a reluctance to face up to the prac­ to the issues as Nietzsche sees them (Ibid., p. 76). tical implications of doing so, stands in the way of our dealing with the Few passages in Zarathustra admit of either an easy or a definitive idea of and belief in 'our' God in a similar way. interpretation.33 The passage under scrutiny permits no exception to this (Schacht, ref. 14, pp. 128-129) norm. Yet even from this brief oveiView of Nietzsche's philosophy of laughter we might hazard the conjecture that the employment of this theme in the death of the "old gods" is intended to show-at least-that The God of Christianity has driven away deistic fictions. But because a "divine" spirit of laughter provides the appropriate response to tragic this God is Himself a fiction, the situation is painfully absurd. The con­ irony by overcoming stifling seriousness and negation. frontation with such absurdity suggests an irony befitting the gods and Under this view, the "old gods" might well have laughed themselves therefore demands laughter. to death because of the tremendous irony of the situation: "Is not just College ofMount Saint ]oseph this godlike that there are gods but no God?" (Nietzsche, Zarathustra, part 3, § 8). The irony is exacerbated by the notion that one god out of many would have the audacity to designare himself as the "one" god. The old gods of Olympus were content to live amongst themselves, and Zeus made no attempt to oust his confederares from the minds of men. But the God of the Old Testament was a jealous God who demanded • • that his underlings would place no other gods befare Him. Hence, there is a subtle irony in the very inception of Judea-Christian monotheism. Belief in the "one" God vanquished the reign of aH gods who had pre­ ceded Him. But why should one god dríve out the others; why should He be more worthy of homage than any other? One of Nietzsche's goals all along has been to attack the God-hy-, pothesis and to show that it is unreasonable to think of the concept of a transcendent deity as being anything other than a fiction. As Schacht ob­ serves:

If we are ever to be able to setlle the question of the existence of a transcendent deity, it is essential to begin by recognizing that what we are confronted with is an idea which people have conceived, and a be­ lief which people have held; and that our basic problem is to decide what is to be made of this idea and this belief. .. Philosophers do not hesitate simply to dismiss the idea of the gods of the early Greeks (not to mention those of more primitive peoples) and the belief in their exis­ tence in this way; and it is Nietzsche's contention rhar nothing beyond

33 Higgins states the matter succincúy: Zaratl:mstm is uan invitation rather than a set of pronouncements" and as such, ''can never be the object of a definitive commentary." Kathleen Marie Higgens, Nietzscbe's Zaratbustra, Philadelphia: Temple University Press (1987), p. ).'VÜÍ.

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