The Ukrainian Weekly 1994

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The Ukrainian Weekly 1994 1NS1DE: f ш Democratic initiatives gauges public opinion in Ukraine - page 3. p f ^ Text of tripartite declaration signed in Moscow - page 8. f ; - lllinois church dedicates memorial to famine victims - page 11. ; J– ^ THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY Published by the Ukrainian National Association inc., a fraternal non-profit association vol. LXII No. 4 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, JANUARY 23,1994 50 cents Crimea's future status is unclear Foreign Ministry: tripartite 'statement' as elections necessitate run-off requires no Parliamentary ratification by Roman Woronowycz advisor, were fired upon while driving Parliament studies document Kostiantyn Hryshchenko, director of Kyyiv Press Bureau towards Mr. Bagrov's home in the Foreign Ministry's Nuclear Armament Sevastopil, an incident that resulted in KYYiv - Amid violence and uncer– by Roman Woronowycz Control Division, said Ukraine's nuclear the deaths of the driver and a body guard. tainty over whether the Crimea will Kyyiv Press Bureau weapons had fallen into disrepair and No one has been charged with the shoot– before long would have been useless any– begin an eventual move away from ing. Mr. Mametov, a businessman, is the KYYiv - Representatives of Ukraine's Ukraine, no Crimean presidential candi– way. He refused to acknowledge earlier sole Crimean Tatar member of the Foreign Ministry, preparing for reverbera– Russian accusations that the warheads had date could garner the 50 percent voter Crimean Parliament. tions from the Parliament regarding the approval necessary to win in elections been leaking, but admitted, "Last year Moscow declaration, explained on they were safe. This year they became a held there on January 16. January 18 that the document signed by Reacting to Mr. Meshkov's strong concern. Next year, who knows. We felt it Yuriy Meshkov, head of the Russian President Leonid Kravchuk to give up showing in the Crimean elections, the was no longer worth maintaining them." Society of Ukraine, upset predictions that Ukraine's nuclear arsenal was merely a Ukrainian Parliament voted on Thursday, Mr. Hryshchenko added that Ukraine, by Leonid Grach, first secretary of the declaration, something Ukraine's deputies January 20, to change the existing keeping its nuclear potential, was slowly Crimean Communist Party, was moving have no right to bring to a question of rati– Constitution of Ukraine to stipulate that becoming a laughing stock of the world. "To to the presidency of this autonomous fication. They also gave further details the laws of the autonomous Republic of stop an aggressor the warheads must be republic that lies within the territorial regarding the document. Crimea must correspond to the laws of effective. The threat of use must be real, in borders of Ukraine by winning 38.5 per– Since January 14, when President cent of the vote. Ukraine. Dmytro Filipchenko reported Ukraine, the threat was no longer effective Kravchuk went to Moscow to meet with and therefore useless for deterrence," he said. Mr. Meshkov more than doubled his from Kyyiv that 324 deputies voted to empower the Ukrainian president to annul Russia's President Boris Yeltsin and Bill closest competitor's vote tally: Mykola Clinton, president of the United States, Declaration made public Bagrov, chairman of the Crimean laws passed by the Crimean legislature that contradict the Ukrainian Constitution. where they signed a declaration that eom– The document itself was released on Parliament, was supported by 17.5 per– mits Ukraine to denuclearizing, debate cent of the populace. Mr. Grach finished January 18, making public additional within Ukraine's government and in the information. a distant fourth behind Sergei The elections in the Crimea have been press has centered on whether the Although a specific timetable for the Shuvianikov. head of Crimea's Russian extremely controversial because many in Parliament would ratify such a document, removal and dismantling of the missiles Party. A run-off between the top two Ukraine believe the candidates running or whether it even had the right to do so. candidates will occur on January 30. has not yet been determined, in accor– were put in place by a Russian govern– Oleksander Chaly, head of the Laws dance with START 1 guidelines Ukraine However, Mr. Bagrov may withdraw ment that has expressed no fear at and Treaties Department of Ukraine's has seven years to rid itself of its nuclear from the elections before a majority vote attempting to reassert its influence over Foreign Ministry, who was present at talks weapons. But the declaration specifically is received. He told interfax on January the countries of the former Soviet Union. in Washington that led to the signing of the states that all SS-24 missiles, the most 17 that he would withhold his decision Because the Crimea is more than 50 per– document, unwaveringly said, "This is not modern of the nuclear weapons, will be on whether to stay in the race. cent Russian, it has been viewed as a a treaty, nor an accord, nor an agreement, out of Ukraine within 10 months. He may have his reasons. A day later, place where Russia may have an oppor– it is in fact a declaration that Ukraine he and iskander Mametov, an economic (Continued on page 9) agrees with Russia and the United States (Continued on page 8) that eventual removal of its nuclear contin– gent is inevitable." He explained that Ukraine has merely made public its deci– UNA execs review 1993 activity, sion to move to a denuclearized status. Rukh activist The Foreign Ministry was intent on explaining that neither the U.S. Senate reported missing focus on organizations centennial nor Russia's Parliament has expressed any intention of reviewing the document by Roman Woronowycz JERSEY C1TY, N.J. - The year-end English languages, respectively. as as government body. Therefore, nei– Kyyiv Press Bureau meeting of the Ukrainian National Present at the December 17, 1993, ther should Ukraine's Supreme Council. KYYiv - A leader of the Popular Association's Supreme Executive Executive Committee meeting were: it did, however, acknowledge that Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) has been Committee reviewed the fraternal organi– Supreme President Ulana Diachuk, Ukraine's Parliament has every right to missing since January 15, and police and zation's highly successful "Teaching Supreme vice-President Nestor question whether the 13 points it estab– Rukh leaders are calling it an abduction. English in Ukraine" program and looked Olesnycky, Supreme vice-Presidentess lished when it ratified START 1 with Rukh says it is another in an unnerving ahead to the UNA's centennial year in Gloria Paschen, Supreme Secretary conditions on November 18, 1993, were series of break-ins and violence directed 1994. Walter Sochan, Supreme Treasurer adhered to. "The Parliament can duly at its offices and members. As well, the Supreme Executive Alexander Blahitka and Stefan Hawrysz question whether the president stuck to Committee voted to continue supporting of the Supreme Auditing Committee. the 13 points," Mr. Chaly explained. Mykhailo Boychyshyn, deputy chair- independent Ukraine's athletes, specifi– As is customary, the meeting began "But it would be embarrassing for man of Rukh and head of its Secretariat, cally the team that will compete in the with officers' reports, and the supreme Ukraine if it begins a ratification process was last seen Saturday, January 15, 1994 Winter Olympics in Lillehammer, treasurer was the first to speak. when the U.S. Congress and the Russian between 9 p.m. and 9:30 p.m. at the Norway. The UNA has allocated a dona– Rukh press offices, where he had gone to Supreme treasurer's report Parliament are taking no such action. tion of S5,000 for the Olympic team, and There is no precedent for such a move. make several phone calls. Afterwards, he that sum has been transmitted via the UNA assets increased, as of Even the Helsinki Accord, which guaran– was scheduled to walk back to his apart– Ukrainian Sports Federation of the September 30, 1993, by 53,498,317 to tees the safety of Europe, was not ratified ment, which is just over 1 kilometer U.S.A. and Canada, which had S72,468,623. in comparison, during the by a single parliament or congress." away. He never made it. announced a fund drive to support the first nine months of 1992, assets Deputy Foreign Minister Borys vsevolod Sokolyk, a relative who is Ukrainian Olympic Committee. increased by only Si,229,375 to Tarasiuk, who was also in Washington, from Toronto, but is staying with Mr. The Supreme Executive Committee 867,132,842. For the 12-month period said that a negative reaction from Boychyshyn in Kyyiv while visiting also approved the official announcement ending September 30, 1993, UNA assets Parliament would adversely affect rela– here, said that at first he was not of the Ukrainian National Association's grew by 35,335,781 or 8 percent of book tions with the U.S. and Russia. "1 think it alarmed. "He is a busy man. He may 33rd quadrennial convention which assets, reported the supreme treasurer. is in Ukraine's best interest to keep its have gone to a reception, so 1 wasn't too begins May 6 in Pittsburgh. That During the first nine months of 1993 commitment so that it gets badly needed concerned when 1 returned to the apart– announcement has already been pub– 54,052,716 was recorded as annuity pre– economic relief. You can throw this doc– ment about 2 a.m. and he wasn't home," lished in both Svoboda and The miums received. The UNA also received ument out, but you must consider the said Mr. Sokolyk. Ukrainian Weekly, in the Ukrainian and (Continued on page 12) consequences," he underlined. (Continued on page 9) THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, JANUARY 23, І 994 No.; ANALYSlS: Ukrainian security fears mwsBBim justified in wake of Russian elections Ukraine9s fare relaxes Clinton ments and sought out a full transcript of by Tares Kuzio and Douglas Hurd, U.K.
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