DOCSLIB.ORG

The Trouble with Eyewitness Testimony

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Trouble with Eyewitness Testimony Begin with a demo…. Look carefully at the following faces and The trouble with try to remember them as best you can…. eyewitness testimony April 1, 2008 Dana Roark, Ph.D. End ….test later! 1 Again, DNA frees a convict 12:02 AM CST on Tuesday, October 31, 2006 The woman initially told police that she By ROBERT THARP / The Dallas Morning News could not provide a detailed description of the man beyond a vague idea of his skin tone, race and height. The attack DNA testing is unlocking prison doors for occurred about an hour before sunrise, another wrongfully convicted Dallas man and the only light in the room came from on Tuesday, bringing to 10 the number of a window and the dial from a small clock felony exonerations in the county after radio. such tests in the last five years. About a week after the attack, a After maintaining his innocence for more than detective showed the woman photos of 25 years, Larry Fuller, 58, is expected to be six men, including an image of Mr. released from custody without any opposition Fuller. from prosecutors after an afternoon hearing. He was convicted of aggravated rape in 1981 The woman told police that Mr. Fuller's and sentenced to 50 years in prison based on photo "looks a lot like the guy," but she a sexual assault victim's identification of him. was not positive. Mistaken eyewitness identifications account for up to 80% of all wrongful convictions (Scheck, Neufeld, & Dwyer, A detective returned a few days later with 2001) another photo lineup that included a more recent photo of Mr. Fuller with a beard. The woman identified Mr. Fuller's image but said she did not think her attacker had facial hair. During Mr. Fuller's trial, the victim testified that she was certain he was the man who raped her. Jurors deliberated 35 minutes before returning a guilty verdict. The perils of line-ups (Busey & Loftus, 2007) Juries find eyewitness testimony very compelling…especially when it is offered with a high level of confidence. Culprit presented along with 5 fillers who fit the description… Live or photographs “There is almost nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says “That’s the one!”---Elizabeth Challenge is to administer an identification Loftus, 1979 procedure that is unbiased An innocent suspect has no greater chance of being identified than do the fillers Research has shown no correlation between accuracy and confidence of eyewitnesses (Smith, Kassin, & Ellsworth 1989) 2 Oddball bias 4 main ways line-ups can be biased (Busey & Loftus, 2007) Physical bias: fillers don’t fit the witness description For example….”White male with gap between teeth” If fillers don’t fit, then then functional size of line-up is reduced Physical bias: oddball Suspects picture is physically different from the fillers’ Larger, smaller, different background, different clothing, •Real example of line-up used in Tacoma, WA etc. •Suspect chosen by participants 26% of the time (chance = 17%) •Oddball effect is problematic even if it is very subtle 4 main ways line-ups can be biased Social pressure (cont.) (Busey & Loftus, 2007) Eyewitnesses make errors if they have been pressured to provide a specific answer (Roebers & Schneider, 2000) Lack of double blind procedures “Exactly when did you first see the suspect?” Police officer conducting the line-up shouldn’t Pressure to come up with a memory know the who the suspect is Rarely done in practice More accurate testimony if (Roediger & McDermott, Officer may inadvertently lead the witness…. “Is 2000): there anyone else you think it might be?” people are allowed to report in their own words given sufficient time Unconscious transference allowed to say, “I don’t know.” Witness has viewed the suspect at some time other than at the crime Eyewitness compliance ---eagerness to live in the same neighborhood please (Ost et al., 2002) Familiarity may bias identification “Did you see the television fragments of 1997 fatal crash Dianna, Princess of Whales?” 44% said yes, although no footage of this event exists! The effect of positive feedback Psychological evidence Errors are more likely if suspects have been given positive feedback (Wells & Bradfield, 1998) “Is it number 3?” The “I-never-forget-a-face” idea “Good, you identified the suspect.” Even a simple “okay” can be enough to make participants report during trial that they are “very Only partly true sure” A little corroboration is a powerful thing Familiar faces vs. unfamiliar faces Even if during the line-up they took 30 minutes to make a decision People are very good at recognizing faces they Witnesses talking to one another right after the know well… incident 3 People are very poor at recognizing faces they’ve seen only briefly or met only recently Here comes your face recognition test… new classmates bank teller, etc. Why? the same face can look very different under different viewing conditions lighting changes different expression different viewpoints, etc. OLD OLD or NEW? 4 OLD or NEW? NEW OLD or NEW? NEW OLD or NEW? OLD 5 CONCLUSION •Face recognition can be quite difficult if the learning and test images are very different, image- wise…. •Unfamiliar face recognition is a much different kind of task than recognizing people you know well •such as an old friend or family relative…… 10 very different images of (ex) P.M. Tony Blair Demonstration 2… 20 very different images of Paul McCartney The suspect Do you think you could recognize this person from a line-up? What factors would make it easier or harder? 6 The lineup Other perceptual factors A 1997 murder case in Alaska involving the murder of a teenage boy, resulted in the trial of 2 suspects. viewing time lighting conditions degree of focused attention The centerpiece of the prosecution’s case was the testimony cross-racial effects of Arlo Olson, who, while drunk, had seen the perpetrators at distance of the viewer (example) night and from a distance of 450 ft. Equivalent representations of a face viewed from different distances The defense lawyers called upon Geoffrey Loftus as an expert witness to educate the jury about: 1. perceptual problems of memorizing suspects 2. why Mr. Olson would have chosen the suspects from the line-ups 3. how it was possible to have a clear, confident memory that was false { resizing the image blurring Simulated distance of the image a face viewed from 450 feet away 7 Flashbulb memories Lessons from eyewitness suggestibility Extremely vivid, long lasting memories for unexpected, emotionally laden and Memories are malleable consequential events A synthesis, not a video tape 9-11 Memories can change based on what we read, see, and are told OJ Simpson verdict Kennedy assassination Source confusions are common Being told about something vs. remembering something Are these memories more accurate than everyday memories? Psychological science has yet to determine a reliable method for telling whether a memory is Actual: NO true or false Perceived accuracy: YES Flashbulb memories Flashbulb memories 9/11 research (Talarico & Rubin, 2003) Results: Interviewed participants Sept 12 Enhanced vividness Also asked about an “everyday memory” Enhanced confidence When did you first hear the news? But no increase in accuracy for flashbulb vs. everyday memories Who first told you the information? Re-interviewed 7, 42, or 242 days later for both types of memories Flashbulb memories Memory is a “constructive” process The act of retrieving a memory often leads to distortions Impossible memories can be implanted with strong suggestion (Loftus, 1995, 1997) Retelling the story “You’re family told us about this event” Can help via rehearsal processes Lost in the mall But can also lead to insertions that become Rescued by a lifeguard incorporated into a memory for an event Spilled punchbowl at a wedding 8 Misleading post-event information Fake photographs Loftus, 1979 •Participants view one of two slides “Tell me everything you can remember about this •Afterwards given either consistent or inconsistent information event, no matter how trivial” (Wade et al., 2002) •Then asked to identify which picture they originally saw 50% partially or clearly recalled the event •75% accuracy when given consistent information Lots of detail… “I’m pretty sure it occurred when I •41% accuracy with inconsistent information was in 6th grade…I think my mum is on the ground taking the picture” Weapon Focus Errors are more likely if eyewitness’s attention has Eyewitness errors also can lead to failure to been distracted by something arousing during the convict a guilty person event Divided attention Juries may label an eyewitness unreliable if: Eyewitness misremembers details Story contradicts another story “Myths of memory” often drive a jury’s decisions What can be done to minimize the problems What can be done to minimize the problems associated with eyewitness memory? associated with eyewitness memory? 9.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Program Committee
    Welcome to SARMAC VIII this is that place kore ya kono of going away and coming back yuku mo kaeru mo of parting time and again wakarete wa both friends and strangers shiru mo shiranu mo the Ausaka Barrier Ausaka no Seki Semimaru, 9th century, Hyakunin Isshu (“One Hundred Poets, One Poem Each”) Welcome to Kyoto, and to the 8th SARMAC meeting. In this ancient city dotted with temples, shrines and gardens, we showcase the best of contemporary applied research in memory and cognition. It's a wide and varied program, sure to intrigue you. To those of you who have never joined us before, SARMAC is known for its friendliness: we don't have an "inner circle" here. To our long-time SARMACsters, welcome back. And to those of you who haven't been back for a while, welcome home. Maryanne Garry President, Governing Board Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition SARMAC Japan Program Committee Kazuo Mori, Tokyo University of Agriculture and Technology, Chair Amy Bradfield Douglass, Bates College Maryanne Garry, Victoria University of Wellington Harlene Hayne, University of Otago Emily Holmes, University of Oxford Christian Meissner, University of Texas at El Paso Makiko Naka, Hokkaido University Aldert Vrij, University of Portsmouth SARMAC Japan Organizing Committee Yukio Itsukushima, Nihon University, Chair Jun Kawaguchi, Nagoya University, Vice-Chair Yuji Itoh, Keio University, Secretary General Kazuo Mori, Tokyo University of Agriculture and Technology Makiko Naka, Hokkaido University Masanobu Takahashi, University of Sacred Heart Yuji
    [Show full text]
  • People V. Lerma, 2014 IL App (1St) 121880
    Illinois Official Reports Appellate Court People v. Lerma, 2014 IL App (1st) 121880 Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Caption EDUARDO LERMA, Defendant-Appellant. District & No. First District, First Division Docket No. 1-12-1880 Filed September 8, 2014 Rehearing denied October 8, 2014 Held Defendant’s convictions for first degree murder, personally (Note: This syllabus discharging a firearm that caused death, and aggravated discharge of a constitutes no part of the weapon in connection with a murder were reversed and the cause was opinion of the court but remanded for a new trial on the ground that the trial court committed has been prepared by the reversible error by denying defendant’s motion to present expert Reporter of Decisions testimony on the misconceptions commonly involved in evaluating for the convenience of identification testimony, since the record showed that the trial court the reader.) failed to give proper consideration to the proffered testimony, especially when defendant alleged that his convictions stemmed from factors underlying these misconceptions, and the trial court was directed to allow the expert testimony subject to Rule 702 of the Illinois Rules of Evidence. Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 08-CR-9899; the Review Hon. Timothy J. Joyce, Judge, presiding. Judgment Reversed and remanded with directions. Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Linda Olthoff, all of State Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and Janet C. Mahoney, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
    [Show full text]
  • Wednesday, July 2Nd
    abstracts SARMAC V ABSTRACTS Aberdeen, Scotland July 2-6 2003 Co-Chairs: Lauren R. Shapiro, Amina Memon, Fiona Gabbert, Rhiannon Ellis WEDNESDAY, JULY 2ND REGISTRATION 2:00 - 5:00 p.m. Auditorium SYMPOSIA 3:15 - 5:15 p.m. Cognitive aspects of anxiety and depression Chair: PAULA HERTEL Contact: [email protected] Keywords: Cognitive function, Emotion The symposium includes reports of recent research on a variety of topics related to cognition in emotionally disordered states: the interpretation of facial expression, the interpretation and recall of verbal material, autobiographical memory, and the generation of mental models. Selective processing of threatening facial expressions: The eyes have it! Elaine Fox Previous work suggests that threatening facial expressions are detected more efficiently than happy facial expressions in a visual search task. It is not clear, however, which component of the face indicates threat. Is it a conjunction of features that might indicate threat (e.g., a frown in conjunction with a downward turned mouth), or could the eye or mouth region alone indicate threat efficiently? The present study tested which features of the face produced a threat-superiority effect and whether the level of self-reported trait-anxiety further enhanced this effect. Participants were divided into high and low-anxious groups on the basis of their scores on standardized measures of trait (and state) anxiety. Across several experiments, it was found that the eye-region did produce a threat-superiority effect with upright faces but not with inverted faces, while the mouth region did not. However, high levels of trait-anxiety failed to influence the magnitude of this threat-superiority effect.
    [Show full text]
  • Memory and Ministry: Young Adult Nostalgia, Immigrant Amnesia
    Theological Studies Faculty Works Theological Studies 2010 Memory and Ministry: Young Adult Nostalgia, Immigrant Amnesia Brett C. Hoover Loyola Marymount University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/theo_fac Part of the Christianity Commons Recommended Citation Hoover, Brett C. “Memory and Ministry: Young Adult Nostalgia, Immigrant Amnesia,” New Theology Review 23, no. 1 (February 2010): 58-67. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Theological Studies at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theological Studies Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. new theology review • february 2010 Memory and Ministry Young Adult Nostalgia, Immigrant Amnesia Brett C. Hoover, C.S.P. A problem with memory occurs in two ways that directly affect pastoral issues: when we reconstruct our history as a community of faith in a way that romanticizes the past and anathematizes the present (nostalgia) or when we reconstruct the past eliminating crucial information we would rather ignore (amnesia), particular for ministry to and with the young and immigrants. Drawing on J. B. Metz’s approach to Christian memory, ministers can engage the dangerous memory in a way that coincides with the needs of young people and our nation’s newest residents. church of tradition is by definition a church of memory. Yet memory is a A precarious thing. As Christians, we remember what the God of Jesus Christ has done for us, and this powerfully impacts how we worship and minister to one another.
    [Show full text]
  • In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division
    Case: 1:13-cv-00221 Document #: 204 Filed: 08/18/16 Page 1 of 22 PageID #:<pageID> IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION RODELL SANDERS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Case No. 13 C 0221 v. ) ) CITY OF CHICAGO HEIGHTS, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge: On July 8, 2016, Defendant City of Chicago Heights, Illinois (“Chicago Heights” or the “City”) and individual Defendant Chicago Heights Police Officers Jeffrey Bohlen and Robert Pinnow moved to exclude the expert testimony of Plaintiff Rodell Sanders’ police practices expert Dr. William T. Gaut and Plaintiff’s eyewitness identification expert Dr. Geoffrey Loftus pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). This is Defendants’ second Daubert motion concerning Dr. Gaut, and the Court presumes familiarity with its May 2, 2016 Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part the first Daubert motion. Also, the Court presumes familiarity with its May 17, 2016 Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ summary judgment motions.1 For the following reasons, the Court, in its discretion, denies the present Daubert motion because Sanders has met his burden 1 The Court’s earlier rulings control the present Daubert motion under the law of the case doctrine. See Kathrein v. City of Evanston, Ill., 752 F.3d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 2014) (a “ruling made in an earlier phase of a litigation controls the later phases unless a good reason is shown to depart from it.”).
    [Show full text]
  • Unspringing the Witness Memory and Demeanor Trap: What Every Judge and Juror Needs to Know About Cognitive Psychology and Witness Credibility
    Unspringing The Witness Memory and Demeanor Trap: What Every Judge And Juror Needs to Know About Cognitive Psychology And Witness Credibility By: Mark W. Bennett Unspringing The Witness Memory and Demeanor Trap: What Every Judge And Juror Needs to Know About Cognitive Psychology And Witness Credibility 1 Mark W. Bennett The soul of America’s civil and criminal justice systems is the ability of jurors and judges to accurately determine the facts of a dispute. This invariably implicates the credibility of witnesses. In making credibility determinations, jurors and judges necessarily decide the accuracy of witnesses’ memories and the effect of the witnesses’ demeanor on their credibility. Almost all jurisdictions’ pattern jury instructions about witness credibility explain nothing about how a witness’s memories for events and conversations work—and how startlingly fallible memories actually are. They simply instruct the jurors to consider the witness’s “memory”—with no additional guidance. Similarly, the same pattern jury instructions on demeanor seldom do more than ask jurors to speculate about a witness’s demeanor by instructing them to merely observe “the manner of the witness” while testifying. Yet, thousands of cognitive psychological studies have provided major insights into witness memory and demeanor. The resulting cognitive psychological principles that are now widely accepted as the gold standard about witness memory and demeanor are often contrary to what jurors intuitively, but wrongly, believe. Most jurors believe that memory works like a video camera that can perfectly recall the details of past events. Rather, memory is more like a Wikipedia page where you can go in and change it, but so can others.
    [Show full text]
  • The Reality of Repressed Memories
    American Psychologist © 1993 by the American Psychological Association May 1993 Vol. 48, No. 5, 518-537 For personal use only--not for distribution. The Reality of Repressed Memories Elizabeth F. Loftus Department of Psychology University of Washington ABSTRACT Repression is one of the most haunting concepts in psychology. Something shocking happens, and the mind pushes it into some inaccessible corner of the unconscious. Later, the memory may emerge into consciousness. Repression is one of the foundation stones on which the structure of psychoanalysis rests. Recently there has been a rise in reported memories of childhood sexual abuse that were allegedly repressed for many years. With recent changes in legislation, people with recently unearthed memories are suing alleged perpetrators for events that happened 20, 30, even 40 or more years earlier. These new developments give rise to a number of questions: (a) How common is it for memories of child abuse to be repressed? (b) How are jurors and judges likely to react to these repressed memory claims? (c) When the memories surface, what are they like? and (d) How authentic are the memories? This article is an expanded version of an invited address, the Psi Chi/Frederick Howell Lewis Distinguished Lecture, presented at the 100th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Washington DC, August 1992. I thank Geoffrey Loftus, Ilene Bernstein, Lucy Berliner, Robert Koscielny, and Richard Ofshe for very helpful comments on earlier drafts. I thank many others, especially Ellen Bass, Mark Demos, Judie Alpert, Marsha Linehan, and Denise Park for illuminating discussion of the issues. My gratitude for the vast efforts of the members of the Repressed Memory Research Group at the University of Washington is beyond measure.
    [Show full text]
  • Reform of Statistical Inference in Psychology: the Case Of<Emphasis
    Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers 2004, 36 (2), 312-324 ARTICLES Reform of statistical inference in psychology: The case of Memory & Cognition SUE FINCH University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia and GEOFF CUMMING, JENNIFER WILLIAMS, LEE PALMER, ELVIRA GRIFFITH, CHRIS ALDERS, JAMES ANDERSON, and OLIVIA GOODMAN La Trobe University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia Geoffrey Loftus, Editor of Memory & Cognition from 1994 to 1997, strongly encouraged presenta- tion of figures with error bars and avoidance of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). The au- thors examined 696 Memory & Cognition articles published before, during, and after the Loftus edi- torship. Use of figures with bars increased to 47% under Loftus’s editorship and then declined. Bars were rarely used for interpretation, and NHST remained almost universal. Analysis of 309 articles in other psychology journals confirmed that Loftus’s influence was most evident in the articles he ac- cepted for publication, but was otherwise limited. An e-mail survey of authors of papers accepted by Loftus revealed some support for his policy, but allegiance to traditional practices as well. Reform of psychologists’ statistical practices would require more than editorial encouragement. Critics have long argued that null hypothesis signifi- the use of alternatives to NHST. Recommendations include cance testing (NHST) is often inappropriately used by the reporting of exact p values, effect sizes, and confidence psychologists to make binary decisions about whether an intervals (CIs) and use of graphical displays to investigate effect exists or not (e.g., Bakan, 1966; Carver, 1978, 1993; the data, and communicate information about their distrib- Cohen, 1990, 1994; Hammond, 1996; Harlow, Mulaik, & ution and inferential statistics.
    [Show full text]
  • The Corinthian 2014
    Old Stoic Society Committee President: Sir Richard Branson (Cobham/Lyttelton 68) Vice President: THE MAGAZINE FOR OLD STOICS Dr Anthony Wallersteiner (Headmaster) Chairman: Simon Shneerson (Temple 72) Issue 4 Vice Chairman: Patrick Cooper (Chatham 86) Director: Anna Semler (Nugent 05) Members: John Arkwright (Cobham 69) Peter Comber (Grenville 70) The Art of Giving Colin Dudgeon (Hon. Member) Gordon Darling (Grafton 39) is one Hannah Durden (Nugent 01) of Australia’s most significant living John Fingleton (Chatham 66) philanthropists and was instrumental Ivo Forde (Walpole 67) Jerome Starkey (Chandos 99) talks to in establishing the National Portrait Jonathon Hall (Bruce 79) our new President, Sir Richard Branson Gallery of Australia. Tim Hart (Chandos 92) (Cobham/Lyttelton 68). Katie Lamb (Lyttelton 06) Stowe: A Place Nigel Milne (Chandos 68) Ben Scholfield (Temple 99) of Influence Jules Walker (Lyttelton 82) James Furse-Roberts (Grafton 95) discovers the effect Stowe had on the work of two of our most acclaimed Old Stoic architects. Old Stoic Society Stowe School Stowe Buckingham MK18 5EH United Kingdom Telephone: +44 (0) 1280 818349 Email: [email protected] www.oldstoic.co.uk www.facebook.com/OldStoicSociety ISSN 2052-5494 Design and production: MCC Design, mccdesign.com THE MAGAZINE FOR OLD STOICS Issue 4 FEATURES 6 BRitain’S Best Loved 16 THE ART OF GIVING ENTREPRENEUR Gordon Darling (Grafton 39) is one Jerome Starkey (Chandos 99) talks of Australia’s most significant living to our new President, Sir Richard philanthropists and was instrumental Branson (Cobham/Lyttelton 68). in establishing the National Portrait Gallery of Australia. 12 OLYMPIC FLOWER TURF AT THE 18 STOWE: A PLACE OF INFLUENCE OLYMPIC OPENING CEREMONY James Furse-Roberts (Grafton 95) David Hewetson-Brown (Chatham 56) explains the history behind his farm discovers the effect Stowe had on the Tuesday 10 June 2014 and how he diversified to produce work of two of our most acclaimed 7.00pm – 12.30am wild flower turf for the Olympics.
    [Show full text]
  • CONDENSED SCHEDULE Thursday Morning Vision I (1-15) ..., ...8:30
    Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 241 1977, Vol. 10 (4),241-282 CONDENSED SCHEDULE Thursday Morning Vision I (1-15) ... .. .. ..... ... , .. .. ... ... ... ...... ...... 8:30-12:35, Empire Room Information Processing 1(16-33) ... .. .... .. ...... .. ... .. .. 8:30-12:45, Palladian Room Attention and Vigilance (34-41) .. .. ; .... ... ... .... .. ..... .... .. 8:30-10:35, Club Room A Performance and Reaction Time (42-48) ... .. .. ..... .... .. ... ... 10:50-12:25, Club Room A Psychopharmacology (49-63) ...... .... ... ..... , ...... ..... .. .. 8:30-12:15, Forum Room Animal Conditioning (64-78) .. ; . ... ... .. .. .. .. ...... 8:30-12:30, Diplomat Room Avoidance Learning (79-88) .... ... ................... .. .. .. .... 8:30-11: 15 , Tudor Room Thursday Afternoon Perception I (89-107) . ...... .. ........ .. ... ... .. .. ... ..... 1:00-5:05, Empire Room Information Processing II (108-128) .. ... ... ..... ........ ... ..... 1:00-5:35, Palladian Room Social-Personality Processes (I 29-142b) .. .. ... ........ .. .. .. 1: 00-4:40, Club Room A Physiological (143-154) .. .. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. ... ... .. .. ... ... 1: 15-3:55, Forum Room Animal Motivation (155-163) . .. .. ........ ....... .. .. .. ... .. ... 1:00-3 :20, Tudor Room Brain Function I (164-170) .. .... ...... ... .. .. ... .. .. ... .. ... ... ... 3:55-5 :10, Tudor Room Memory and Recall I (l71-185b) .. .. .. .. .. .... ..... .......... 1:00 -5 :05, Diplomat Room Friday Morning Memory and Recall II (186-199) . .. .. ... ... .... .. .. .... .. ...... 8:30-12:30, Empire
    [Show full text]
  • Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology
    Forthcoming in Behavioral and Brain Sciences Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience Ned Block New York University Abstract How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority, and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is ‘Yes’, then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is ‘Yes’? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! The paper argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. I argue that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things being equal) by the explanations it allows. Introduction In The Modularity of Mind, Jerry Fodor argued that significant early portions of our perceptual systems are modular in a number of respects, including that we do not have cognitive access to their internal states and representations of a sort that would allow reportability (Fodor, 1983; see also Pylylshyn, 2003; Sperber, 2001).
    [Show full text]
  • This Thesis Has Been Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for a Postgraduate Degree (E.G. Phd, Mphil, Dclinpsychol) at the University of Edinburgh
    This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree (e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following terms and conditions of use: This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author. The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author. When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. Blended Memory: Distributed Remembering and Forgetting through Digital Photography Tim Fawns PhD Education The University of Edinburgh 2016 ii Declaration I declare that this thesis has been composed by me and that it is my own work. The work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification. Publications derived from this research have been included at the end with the publishers’ permission. These publications are my own work, except where indicated. Signed: Tim Fawns iii iv Acknowledgements To my supervisors, Hamish Macleod and Ethel Quayle, thank you for creating an atmosphere of enjoyment, creativity, trust and curiosity, as well as for tolerating and guiding my many directions and slowly evolving understanding. To Fiona Hale, thank you for your generous moral and practical support.
    [Show full text]