Kant and Kierkegaard: the Subjectivization of Faith
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Animus 3 (1998) www.swgc.mun.ca/animus Kant And Kierkegaard: The Subjectivization Of Faith Antoinette M. Stafford [email protected] Introduction Writing in polemical opposition to Hegelian philosophy, 1 Soren Kierkegaard strenuously criticized the tendency of his age to elevate the results of objective reflection (scientific/historical research) and the categories of Absolute Idealism over the standpoint of the ethically-existing, finite individual. Evincing a deep distrust of the antinomous, self-transcending concepts of speculative reason, he insists that "a firmness with respect to logical distinctions" must constitute the foundation of genuine human reflection on such conceptual dualities as finite-infinite, temporal-eternal, human-divine. Underlying all theoretical enquiry, as its presupposition and condition of possibility, lies the concrete reality of the ethico-religiously "interested" individual, whose quest for the fulness of selfhood takes primacy over any possible objective knowledge. Only if this fundamental existential insight is acknowledged can metaphysical hubris be held in check and a place reserved for the proper apprehension of the ineluctable truth of finite human subjectivity. Scholarly opinion is divided on the degree to which Kierkegaard's critique of speculative thinking presupposes a Kantian view of reason. For one recent commentator, Anthony Rudd, Kierkegaard's disavowal of universal philosophical reason in favour of the primacy of finite ethico-religious subjectivity places him in an antithetical relation not only to Hegel but also to Kant's transcendental idealist ethics. 2 Any apparent similarity in 1 Kierkegaard's familiarity with Hegel's writings was largely indirect, mediated through the work of a Danish disciple, Hans Lassen Martensen, whose theological writings attempted to resolve the current impasse between Christian orthodoxy and Enlightenment rationalism through an apparently Hegelian speculative mediation between these mutually contradictory poles. Yet Danish Hegelianism was by no means a mere application of Hegelian principles to local concerns, and studying Martensen's theology therefore offered no adequate substitute for familiarity with Hegel's own texts. Robert L. Horn, in his dissertation, "Positivity and Dialectic: A Study of the Theological Method of Hans Lassen Martensen" ( Ph.D. dissertation, Union Theological Seminary, New York, 1969) argues strongly for the distinctness of Danish Hegelianism, as developed by Martensen. 2 Anthony Rudd , Kierkegaard and the Limits of the Ethical, Oxford, 1993. Rudd comments: "It is quite frequently claimed that Kierkegaard's ethics is largely Kantian, but this seems to me about as radical an error as it is possible to make in the interpretation of Kierkegaard. Nowhere does he say anything about morality being a condition of rationally consistent action; his mockery of the 'pure subject' and his insistence on the need for passionate existential choice are diametrically opposed to the Kantian idea that morality can be proved to be a condition of action for any rational agent."( 71) Rudd reminds us that, far from seeing ethical choice in the Kantian manner as a subordination of individual interests to the requirements of universal law or consistency in action, Kierkegaard understands "the STAFFORD: KANT AND KIERKEGAARD: THE SUBJECTIVIZATION OF FAITH their divergent views Rudd traces to Kant's roots in Protestant pietist Christianity, which make it "no surprise that Kant often sounds as much like a Christian moralist as Kierkegaard."[Ibid. 136] This veneer of Christian ethics notwithstanding, Kant's version of ethics, Rudd argues, "leaves out belief in God", since Kantian morality is based on the radical autonomy of the rational agent, while religious faith emerges solely as a logical consequence of moral self-consciousness. From Rudd's perspective, Kierkegaard's thought, by contrast, affirms the irreducible independence of faith -- particularly Christian faith -- as a standpoint in which the finite subject "leaps" beyond the limits of ethical striving to a paradoxical relationship with the divine. Yet questions must be raised concerning the adequacy of this assessment. For although in Kant the movement from morality to faith is mediated by the demand for rational coherence, while in Kierkegaard the transition occurs via an unmediated leap, for both thinkers genuine religious consciousness presupposes a richly articulated ethical life and can arise only in response to the needs of the ethical agent. Those needs differ markedly -- for Kant, the moral life collapses into a rationally incoherent "absurdum practicum" when stripped of the practical/rational postulates of God and immortality, while for Kierkegaard, the ethical subject's need for God flows from the experienced impossibility of existential self-synthesis in the absence of divine intervention. In each case, however, the standpoint of the autonomous ethical subject is presupposed, the categories of faith functioning as vehicles for the completion of that subject's extra- religious goals. Despite the clear and proper distinction Rudd draws between Kant's rational transcendental idealism and Kierkegaard's anti-idealist Christian existentialism, I would argue that particularly in Kant's later thought, Christian categories figure largely in his efforts fully to characterize the structure of autonomous moral subjectivity, while Kierkegaard's version of Christian faith owes much of its character to a reliance on Kant's dualist epistemology. Another recent commentator, Ronald Green, admits a Kant/Kierkegaard link based on the shared principle of the "primacy of practical reason".3 He argues, however, that Kant's Enlightenment confidence in free, universal thought/action is supplanted in Kierkegaard by a vigorous defence of traditional Christianity. Green looks to Kant's concept of radical evil, developed in Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone, to support the claim that " ...Kant's powerful series of arguments in the Religion furnished Kierkegaard with much of the intellectual ammunition he needed for his project of defending Christian orthodoxy."4 universal disciplines" of ethics and religious faith primarily as means to achieving the goal of individual self-realization ( 135). In light of these existential preoccupations it would be perverse in Rudd's view to link Kierkegaard in any but the most superficial way to Kantian thought. 3 Ronald Green, Kierkegaard and Kant: the Hidden Debt,, Albany, New York, 1992. 4 Green, 175. Kant's chief deviation from Christian orthodoxy lies, for Green, in his insistence that man must be able to effect his own moral regeneration. Kant's Enlightenment principles cannot accommodate admission of the powerlessness of the moral individual before sin -- whereas Kierkegaard's orthodoxy lies in his assertion that the problem of sin constitutes an absolute barrier between man and God, such that no "immanent" solution to our moral failure is possible. I would argue that Kierkegaard's appeal to the historical Christ as mediator between sinful man and the divine is, however, no return to an orthodox 146 STAFFORD: KANT AND KIERKEGAARD: THE SUBJECTIVIZATION OF FAITH My intention here is to consider Kant's and Kierkegaard's understanding of religious faith and its relationship to moral life. In Sections A and B, I argue that Kant's Enlightenment confidence in the autonomy of the rational moral subject does ultimately require him to subordinate religious faith to the demands of ethical autonomy, and in particular to reduce central doctrines of the Christian religion to means for resolving certain contradictions which inevitably arise within moral experience as manifest in the context of his transcendental dualism. Then in C, I argue that despite contemporary appeals to Kierkegaard as defender of authentic Christianity against the encroachments of Enlightenment humanism, shared epistemological assumptions ensure that the existential subject's paradoxical Christian faith offers no genuine alternative, but rather is an extension of Kant's demythologized version of orthodox Christian principles. A. Kant's Practical Faith i) The Moral Grounds of Belief in God In Kant's concept of moral faith we see the emergence of a significant new strategy for justifying and comprehending religious experience. Traditionally, the Christian believer aspired to know the divine, both through conforming his consciousness to the revealed doctrines of the church, and through rational theological argument offering insight into God's being and nature. With the rise of Enlightenment methods of critical enquiry, however, the validity of both religious dogmas and rational theological doctrines was called into question. Empirical scientists joined forces with historical/biblical scholars to trace the natural roots of religious creeds, while appeals to absolute religious truths met with deepening scepticism, as rational understanding pursued its negative, critical deconstruction of both positive revelation and abstract, metaphysical claims to know God. Enlightenment thought challenged theological orthodoxy at every point, until in Kant's time there yawned a wide, antagonistic gulf between the claims of a free rational thought and those of a defensive, beleaguered religious faith. Kant regarded the rescue of religious faith from the sceptical encroachments of Enlightenment as one of the chief accomplishments of his transcendental critique of pure reason. By bifurcating reality into a phenomenal and