The : Vietnam Captain Keith F. Kopets, U.S. Marine Corps

“Of all our innovations in Viet- rines for security. enough to defend that amount of nam none was as successful, as CAP’s Origins territory. The local population lived lasting in effect, or as useful for CAP came naturally for the in six villages, each nominally de- the future as the Combined Ac- Marine Corps because counter- fended by a militia . Taylor tion Program [CAP],” wrote U.S. guerrilla warfare was already part and his officers brainstormed ideas Marine Corps (USMC) Lieutenant of the USMC heritage. From 1915 of how to improve the battalion’s General (LTG) Lewis Walt in his defensive posture. They looked to 1 to 1934, the Corps had a wealth of memoirs. British counterinsurgen- experience in foreign interventions a previously unused resource—the cy expert Sir Robert Thompson said fighting guerrillas in Nicaragua, militia . CAP was “the best idea I have seen Taylor’s executive officer, Major 2 Haiti, and Santo Domingo. For ex- in Vietnam.” ample, the Marines organized and Cullen C. Zimmerman drafted a The program, undertaken by the trained the Gendarmerie d’Haiti and plan to incorporate the militia pla- USMC during the , the Nacional Dominicana in Haiti toons into the battalion’s defense. was an innovative and unique ap- and Santo Domingo from 1915 to He proposed integrating the militia proach to pacification. In theory, 1934. In Nicaragua (1926-1933), platoons into the battalion’s rifle the program was simple; a Marine the Marines organized, trained, and squads to form a combined unit. rifle squad would join forces with a commanded the Guardia Nacional Taylor liked Zimmerman’s plan South Vietnamese militia platoon to de Nicaragua. These organizations and forwarded it to Colonel Ed- provide security for local villages. were nonpartisan, native constabu- win B. Wheeler, the regimental CAP’s modus operandi made it laries the Marines commanded until commander. Wheeler also liked unique. While assigned to com- host-nation forces could competent- the plan and pushed it all the bined units, Marines would actually ly assume command.3 way up the chain of command to live in a militia unit’s village. Senior USMC generals in Viet- Walt and Krulak. Both generals CAP was a response to the con- nam had studied as lieutenants liked the idea, and Walt sold the ditions in Vietnam. As the senior such interventions—called “small idea to South Vietnamese General command in the Tactical wars.” But more than that, As Nguyen Van Chuan. Chuan, who Zone, the Marines were responsi- Commanding General (CG), Fleet was responsible for the Vietnamese ble for securing more than 10,000 Marine Forces Pacific, LTG Victor military forces in Phu Bai, agreed square miles of land that included H. Krulak was responsible for train- to give Walt operational control the five northernmost provinces of ing and readiness of all the Marines over the militia platoons operating . More than 2-1/2 in Vietnam. As CG, III Marine in Taylor’s sector. million people lived in the I Corps Amphibious Force, Walt directed Taylor integrated four rifle area. Using the militia for local se- the operations of all the Marines squads from his battalion with curity made sense; there were not in I Corps. the six local militia platoons in enough Marines to go around. Krulak and Walt began their ca- early August 1965. First Lieuten- The Marines and the U.S. Mil- reers during the 1930s and 1940s ant Paul R. Ek commanded the itary Assistance Command, Viet- under the tutelage of such Carib- combined unit, known as a Joint nam, disagreed on war strategies. bean Campaign veterans as LTG Action Company. Ek, who had U.S. Army leaders wanted to search Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, Sr., and already served as an adviser to a and destroy the communists in the Major General (MG) Merritt “Red U.S. Army Special Forces unit in rural and less-populated areas of Mike” Edson. In Vietnam, Krulak Vietnam and spoke the language, South Vietnam; the Marines wanted and Walt applied the lessons they was well versed in coun-terguer- to clear and hold the populated ar- had learned about guerrilla fight- rilla warfare. The Marines in Ek’s eas. CAP was a manifestation of the ing.4 combined company were volunteers strategy the Marines felt best suited When the Marines arrived in from the 3d Battalion, 4th Ma- the conditions in Vietnam. rines, and each had been carefully South Vietnam in 1965, they oc- 6 With U.S. Marines living and cupied and defended three enclaves screened by Zimmerman. fighting side-by-side with the Viet- in the I Corps area: Phu Bai, Da The Phu Bai experiment yielded namese people, CAP seemed to Nang, and Chu Lai. CAP grew out promising results. The Marines in- rep-resent an effective, long-term, of an experiment that Lieutenant stilled an aggressive, offensive spir- around-the-clock commitment to Colonel (LTC) William W. Taylor’s it in their counterparts and gave the combating the Vietnamese com- 3d Battalion, , militia something it had never had munists at the grassroots level. conducted near Phu Bai.5 before—leadership. The Marines CAP worked well in some loca- Taylor’s infantry battalion de- also learned from the Vietnamese, tions; elsewhere, its results were fended 10 square miles and a crit- gaining knowledge of local terrain transitory at best—with villagers ical airfield at Phu Bai. He knew and learning Vietnamese customs becoming overreliant on the Ma- his three rifle companies were not and courtesies. Winning fights

78 July-August 2002 l MILITARY REVIEW against local enemy guerrillas, Ek’s needed to be volunteers, have al- Fort,’” he wrote.15 The platoon must combined unit upset the status quo ready served 2 months in country “conduct an active, aggressive de- by driving the communists out of yet still have at least 6 months fense [of its assigned village] to the villages. left on their tours, have a recom- prevent [communist] incursions Walt seized on the success of mendation from their commanding and attacks directed at the hamlet Ek’s unique company in Phu Bai officers, and once selected, had residents and officials.”16 and approached Vietnamese Gen- to attend a 2-week school, which In July 1967, Corson drafted a eral Nguyen Chanh Thi, his coun- offered instruction in Vietnamese set of standing operating proce- terpart, with a proposal to expand language and culture and small- dures charging each of his platoons the program to include unit tactics.10 with six different missions: and Chu Lai. Walt did not need Marine infantry commanders 1. Destroy the communist infra- to put the hard sell on Thi; he was were hesitant to release their best structure within the platoon’s area already impressed by the Phu Bai noncommissioned officers for duty of responsibility. experiment. with combined units; they knew 2. Protect public security; help they would not receive replace- maintain law and order. CAP Expansion ments. And because infantry com- Because of Walt and Thi’s en- 3. Organize local intelligence manders did not always give up nets. thusiasm, CAP stopped being an their best men for CAP, the quality experiment and started becoming 4. Participate in civic action and of combined platoons ranged from conduct propaganda against the an integral part of the Marine outstanding to abysmal, based on Corps’ war in the I Corps area. The communists. the amount of the Marines’ experi- 5. Motivate and instill pride, platoon became the program’s basic ence, proficiency, and maturity.11 tactical unit. A 35-man Vietnamese patriotism, and aggressiveness in Walt acted on these problems. In the militia. militia platoon, and a 13-Marine February 1967, he appointed LTC rifle squad, with one attached U.S. 6. Conduct training for all mem- William R. Corson as his Director bers of the combined-action platoon Navy hospital corpsman, formed 12 for Combined Action. Corson was in general military subjects, leader- the combined-action platoon. This the right man for the job. He had unit lived in and operated out of ship, and language, and increase the fought with the Marines in the Pa- proficiency of the militia platoon so the local village of the militia cific and Korea and had completed platoon.7 it could function effectively without a tour in Vietnam as a tank battal- the Marines.17 U.S. and Vietnamese chains of ion commander. Corson spoke four command remained separate. The Chinese dialects, held a doctor’s de- CAP Problems Marines were only supposed to gree in economics, and had expe- The relationship between the serve as advisers to their counter- rience in unconventional warfare in Marines and the Vietnamese militia parts, and they did—in garrison. Vietnam. He had also served with was the key to CAP’s success. The- In the bush, on patrol, the senior the Central Intelligence Agency in oretically, each combined platoon Marine present became the de facto Southeast Asia from 1958 to 1959, derived its strength from fusing the commander of the combined unit. organizing guerrilla operations two primary elements — the militia From the original 6 platoons against the Viet Minh.13 soldier and the U.S. Marine —into at the end of 1965, the number Corson believed CAP required a single operational entity. Because of combined units grew to 38 its own chain of command and the political climate did not allow platoons by July 1966. By Janu- objected to the existing command Americans to command Vietnamese ary 1967, 57 combined platoons forces, the Marines had no formal arrangement that gave local in- 18 operated throughout the I Corps fantry commanders control of the authority over the militia. Walt area — 31 platoons in the Da Nang combined units in their areas of and Corson hoped decentralized enclave and 13 each in the Phu Bai responsibility. He did not believe control and close coordination and Chu Lai enclaves. The number the average infantry battalion and cooperation could resolve any of combined platoons peaked at 114 commander in Vietnam knew problems caused by this tenuous in 1970, and the units had spread what it took to succeed in the busi- command relationship. throughout the five provinces in the ness of pacification. According to There were serious problems I Corps area.8 writer Robert A. Klyman, Corson with the Vietnamese militia. They Increasing the number of com- “was there to kill enemy. . . . His were woefully incapable of defend- bined platoons caused problems for mission was two up, one back, hot ing the villages by themselves. One Walt. For one, he needed more Ma- chow. Battalion commanders were official account reads: “In general, rines. He was robbing Peter to pay not in Vietnam to win the hearts the equipment and training of the Paul by taking men from his two and minds of the people. . . . They [militia] platoons and their un- infantry divisions and assigning were playing the game of . . . search imaginative use in static defensive them to combined units. Head- and destroy. They didn’t understand positions made them a slender quarters was not sending Walt more the nature of the war they were in- reed in the fight against the Viet men to make up the difference. A volved in.”14 Cong.”19 At US$19 a month, the limit on troop strength in Vietnam Corson wanted mobility in each militia soldier earned less than had already been set so as to meet of his platoons. “The [combined-ac- half that of his regular Vietnamese commitments elsewhere.9 tion platoon] will [not] function as Army counterpart.20 Corruption and To get into CAP, Marines the garrison of a so-called ‘French graft were accepted practices, and

MILITARY REVIEW l July-August 2002 79 village chiefs controlled the mili- main-force communist battalions rine Corps history: “I would like to tia and padded the muster rolls of posed the greatest threat to the believe, with some, that combined their platoons to extort the salaries government of South Vietnam, action was the best thing we did [in of “ghost” soldiers.21 not the guerrillas operating in Vietnam]. . . . In my experience, The Marines also had prob- the south. He pursued a strategy combined action was merely one lems. The combined platoons through which he could exploit more untenable article of faith. modus operandi — living and the U.S. advantage in mobility The truth, I suspect, is that where fighting alongside the Vietnamese and firepower to engage the most it seemed to work, combined action population — required the Marines threatening communist units. After wasn’t really needed, and where it to adapt to a culture radically dif- the United States won the “big was, combined action could never ferent from their own. Most of the unit” war against conventional work. Marines were junior enlisted men enemy formations, the South Viet- “The objective was certainly in their late teens or early twen- namese Army could focus on the sound. There was a demonstrable ties. Expecting men of these ages “other war” against the entrenched need for an effective grassroots to quickly adapt to such foreign communist political infrastructure. program targeted toward the [com- surroundings while also serving in This formed the philosophical munist] infrastructure, for the most a combat zone was a tall order.22 underpinning for the search and part left intact by large-scale search The majority of the Marines destroy attrition strategy.25 and destroy operations. But com- who served with combined units Krulak believed pacification and bined action came too little, too from 1965 to 1967 came directly protection of the South Vietnamese late. The [communist] infrastructure from the infantry. This was not population — a clear-and-hold ap- was too deeply entrenched, literally the case, though, as the war con- proach—was more appropriate as well as figuratively, in some tinued. From 1968 to 1970, many than the search-and-destroy at- places. They had had more than Marines joined combined platoons trition strategy. “If the people 20 years to win hearts and minds from rear-echelon support units were for you,” he wrote, “you before we blundered onto the scene. and lacked basic infantry skills. In would triumph in the end. If they We were naïve to think 13 Marines 1969, a senior CAP commander in were against you, the war would and a Navy corpsman could make Quang Tri province wrote of these bleed you dry, and you would be much difference in such a setting. shortcomings: “Sound tactics are defeated.”26 The cultural gulf was just unbridge- not God-given; they are not inher- Westmoreland believed popu- able out in the countryside.”30 ited or acquired automatically. Not lation security was a Vietnamese Even at its zenith of 2,220 men, one young corporal or sergeant in a task. However, he did write in CAP represented only 2.8 percent hundred has adequate competence his memoirs that CAP was one of of the 79,000 Marines in Vietnam. in this field. Their understanding of the more “ingenious innovations Yet during its 5-year lifespan, the proper use of terrain, the con- developed in South Vietnam.”27 combined units secured more than trol of the point element, all-around Westmoreland also offered this 800 hamlets in the I Corps area, security, fire and maneuver, fire su- explanation: “Although I dissemi- protecting more than 500,000 periority, fire control and discipline nated information on the [combined Vietnamese civilians.31 (to say nothing of the psychological action] platoons and their success CAP was not the magic ingre- and morale forces involved) leave to other commands, which were dient that would have won the war much to be desired. In six months, free to adopt the idea as local in Vietnam, but it was a viable I have yet to see any [combined- conditions might dictate, I simply approach to counterguerrilla war- unit] leader working to improve his had not enough numbers to put a fare, worthy of further study. What own knowledge or understanding of squad of Americans in every village better way was there for learning tactics.23 and hamlet; that would have been about the enemy in such a war than fragmenting resources and exposing fighting with the militia and living Vietnam Strategies 28 Notwithstanding its problems in them to defeat in detail.” with the local populace? No wonder execution, CAP seemed a viable A Viable Approach CAP Marines became some of the strategy for providing local security By 1970, “a total of 93 [com- best sources of intelligence in the in South Vietnam. Some analysts bined platoons] had been moved Vietnam war as well as some of the speculate there would have been to new locations from villages and best small-unit leaders. They had to a much different outcome to the hamlets deemed able to protect be, operating as they did, in order to war had the United States applied themselves. Of these former CAP survive. Air strikes, free-fire zones, the Marines’ strategy on a larger hamlets, the official Marine Corps and massive demonstrations of fire- scale.24 One of the main reasons history of the Vietnam war claims power were commonplace through- why the program never expanded that “none ever returned to Viet out South Vietnam, but such were beyond the borders of the I Corps Cong control.”29 These figures are rare occurrences near villages with area was because General William spurious at best, as are most other combined-action platoons. C. Westmoreland, the senior U.S. attempts to quantify the war in The Battle for Hue City and Army commander in Vietnam, sub- Vietnam. the siege at Khe Sanh dominate scribed to a different strategy. Edward Palm, an English pro- the literature about the Marines in Westmoreland believed the reg- fessor and former CAP Marine, is Vietnam. CAP, however, was the ular North Vietnamese Army and not as sanguine as the official Ma- Corps’ greatest innovation during

80 July-August 2002 l MILITARY REVIEW the war. MR Box 2, Pacification Study Docs [Documents], Marine terson, 285-91. Corps Historical Center (MCHC), Washington, DC; 19. Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The American Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam 1966: An Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds (Boulder, Expanding War (Washington, DC: History and Muse- CO: Westview Press, 1995), 34-35. NOTES ums Division, HQMC, 1982), 239-43; Gary L. Tefler, 20. Russel H. Stolfi, U.S. Marine Corps Civic 1. Lewis W. Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy: Lane Rogers, and V. Keith Fleming, Jr., U.S. Marines Action Efforts in Vietnam, March 1965-March 1966 A General’s Report on the War in Vietnam (New York: in Vietnam, 1967: Fighting the North Vietnamese (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G3 Division, Funk and Wagnalls, 1970), 105. (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1968), 39. 2. Quoted in Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The HQMC, 1984), 186-95; William R. Corson, The Be- 21. Krulak, 187-189; David H. Wagner, “A Handful Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, trayal (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968), 181-3. of Marines,” Marine Corps Gazette (March 1968), 1986), 174. 8. Shulimson, 239; Tefler, et al., 187; Weltsch, 45; Hunt, 91. 3. On the Marines in Nicaragua, see Neill Ma- 65. 22. Hunt, 39. caulay, The Sandino Affair (Chicago: Quadrangle 9. Corson, 178. 23. See Ltr, CO, CAF. Books, 1967). On the Marines in Hispaniola, see 10. CAP SOP; Corson, 183-4; Edward F. Palm, “Ti- 24. Ltr, CO 4th CAG. Hans Schmidt, Maverick Marine: General Smedley ger Papa Three: A Memoir of the Combined Action 25. Krepinevich, 172-7. Krepinevich argues in D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military Program,” Marine Corps Gazette (January 1988), 35; favor of expanding combined action throughout History (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, CAP School syllabus, 21 August-1 September 1967, Vietnam. Unfortunately, his approach does not take 1987), 74-95. See also Graham A. Cosmas, “Cacos and CAP School diploma, dated 25 February 1969, in full account of the recruiting problem that would ac- and Caudillos: Marines and in Michael E. Peterson, “The Combined Action Platoons: company such an expansion. Spector highlights a Hispaniola, 1915-1924,” in New Interpretations in The U.S. Marines’ Other War in Vietnam” (M.A. the- few of the problems: “The ideal CAP Marine was a Naval History: Selected Papers from the Ninth Naval sis, The University of Oregon, Eugene, 1988), 285- cool and efficient infantry fighter, not only expert in History Symposium, William R. Roberts and Jack 91. Peterson is a CAP veteran. Praeger Publishers the skills of combat but able to impart these skills Sweetman, eds. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute published this thesis in 1989. to an untrained, uneducated farmer who spoke little Press, 1991), 293-308. For a comparison of CAP 11. Ltr [Letter], CG [Commanding General], III MAF or no English. At the same time, he was a patient, with the constabularies the Marines organized in to CG FMFPac [Fleet Marine Force Pacific], sub: subtle, and resourceful community organizer, able to Latin America, see Lawrence A. Yates, “A Feather in Combined Action Group Headquarters, Organization, overcome cultural barriers and prejudice to win the their CAP? The Marines’ Combined Action Program Equipment, Functions and Concept of Operations, dtd hearts and minds of the villagers. Such men, if they in Vietnam,” in ibid., 320-1. 4 May 1967, MCHC; Ltr, CO [Commanding Officer], existed at all, were in short supply” (195). 4. Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View CAF to CG, XXIV Corps, sub: CORDS [Civil Opera- 26. George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: of the U.S. Marine Corps (Annapolis, MD: Naval In- tions for Rural Development Support] Survey of CAP The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 2d ed. stitute Press, 1984), 190-1; Walt, 29; Jon T. Hoffman, Villages, dtd 24 March 1970, MCHC (hereafter, Ltr, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986), 150; Allan R. Millett Once a Legend: “Red Mike” Edson of the Marine CO, CAF). See also Ronald H. Spector, After Tet: and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Raiders (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994), 98, 122- The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (New York: The Free Military History of the United States of America, rev 3. Puller and Edson, who served with distinction as Press, 1993), 195; Shulimson, 240; Klyman, 13. Kly- ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 580; Phillip B. officers in the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, also man quotes Colonel G.E. Jerue, a former regimental Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History, 1946-1975 served successively as small-wars instructors during commander in the 3d Marine Division: “Although the (New York, Oxford University Press, 1991), 352-4; the 1930s. Walt and Krulak were their students and, requirement states that they [CAP Marines] should be William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New as captains, served with Edson and Puller in the volunteers, it doesn’t demand volunteers. We more York: Dell, 1980), 215-6. Pacific during World War II. or less had to go by the rule of thumb that if the man 27. Krulak, 194; see also Neil Sheehan, A Bright 5. Ibid., 38-40. doesn’t object, he is a volunteer for it.” and Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Viet- 6. Robert A. Klyman, “The Combined Action 12. Corson, 179-80. nam (New York: Random House, 1988), 629-33. Program: An Alternative Not Taken” (Honors thesis, 13. Peterson (Praeger), 39-41. 28. Westmoreland, 216. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1986), 4-5; Michael 14. Klyman, 22. 29. Ibid. Duane Weltsch, “The Future Role of the Combined 15. CAP SOP. 30. Graham A. Cosmas and Terrence P. Murray, Action Program” (Master of Military Art and Science 16. Ibid. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: and Re- thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col- 17. Ltr, CO, 4th CAG [Combined Action Group] deployment, 1970-1971 (Washington, DC: History lege, Fort Leavenworth, 1991), 57-65. to 4th CAG CACO [Combined Action Company] and Museums Division, HQMC, 1986), 149. For a 7. III MAF [Marine Amphibious Force] Force Or- Commanders, sub: Tactical Operations, Policies and description of a successful combined platoon, see der 3121.4A, sub [subject]: SOP [Standing Operation Guidance, dtd 14 January 1969, MCHC (hereafter, Francis J. West, The Village (Madison: University of Procedures] for the Combined Action Program, dtd Ltr, CO, 4th CAG); Corson, 174-98; CAP SOP. Wisconsin Press, 1985). West tells the story of the [dated] 17 July 1967 (hereafter, CAP SOP), in CAF 18. CAP SOP; Corson, 183-4; Palm, 35; CAP Binh Nghia combined platoon, which operated from [Combined Action Force] History and SOP Folder, School syllabus and CAP School diploma in Pe- May 1966 to October 1967 near Chu Lai. M RBook Reviews

CHINA AND THE VIETNAM cratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) Sino-Vietnamese alliance and WARS, 1950-1975, Qiang Zhai, The is an important part of the People’s shows how events in and University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Republic of China’s (PRC) diplo- Cambodia influenced Chinese Hill, 2000, 320 pages, $49.95/$19.95. matic history and the Cold War in policy toward Vietnam. He es- China and the Vietnam Wars, Asia. Ho Chi Minh called the Chi- chews impersonal social scientific 1950-1975; is one of many about nese “comrades plus brothers” dur- models to explain change. Instead, Chinese involvement in the Indo- ing the height of their influence. he highlights the individual’s role in china Wars. Qiang Zhai is one of In the first 25 years of its ex- making history, framing his discus- the first to use recently opened istence, the PRC aided the DRV sion by identifying four interwoven Chinese archives; the many mem- against France and the United motives that influenced Chinese oirs, diaries, and documentary col- States. With varying degrees of suc- policy: geopolitical realities; a lections published in China over cess, the DRV used Chinese models sense of obligation and mission to the last decade; and secondary in the 1950s and 1960s to fight the aid a fraternal Communist party and works based on archival sources. French and rebuild the north after promote Asian anti-imperialist rev- He concentrates exclusively on the First Indochina War. However, olutionary movements; personality; the policies and personalities of between 1968 and 1972, China and using foreign affairs to promote those involved in China’s Vietnam adjusted its diplomatic strategy, a domestic political agenda. policy. This is not a definitive and the Sino-Vietnamese alliance Zhai emphasizes Mao Zedong’s study. Many American, Russian, slowly fell apart. By 1975, the al- role as a charismatic revolution- Chinese, and Vietnamese archives liance was in disarray, and China ary visionary who set the general are still closed, but it does begin to faced the prospect of an alliance framework of China’s foreign pol- shed light on reasons for Chinese between Vietnam and the Soviet icy. Mao made the crucial decisions behavior during the period. Union. to aid Ho Chi Minh, confront U.S. Chinese support for the Demo- Zhai traces the course of the pressure, accept or reject Soviet ini-

MILITARY REVIEW l July-August 2002 81