China Policy Institute

Briefing Series – Issue 22

CHIEF EXECUTIVE ELECTION 2007: CONVERGING THE DEMOCRATISATION ROADMAPS OF BEIJING AND THE HKSAR

Sow Keat TOK

May 2007

China House University of Nottingham University Park Nottingham NG7 2RD United Kingdom Tel: +44 (0)115 846 7769 Fax: +44 (0)115 846 7900 Email: [email protected] Website: www.chinapolicyinstitute.org

The China Policy Institute was set up to analyse critical policy challenges faced by China in its rapid development. Its goals are to help expand the knowledge and understanding of contemporary China in Britain, Europe and worldwide, to help build a more informed dialogue between China and the UK and Europe, and to contribute to government and business strategies. Summary

Incumbent Donald Tsang Yam Kuen emerged the winner of the widelyanticipated Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) election for the post of Chief Executive (CE), held on 25 March 2007. The result came as a no surprise, considering the huge backing Tsang enjoyed in the 800member Election Committee dominated by a mainlandleaning membership.

What was surprising to many external observers was Tsang’s immense popularity during the campaigning period. Various opinion polls conducted throughout the campaign showed that Tsang consistently enjoyed an overwhelming lead over his fellow candidate, Alan Leong Kah Kit. This is contrary to the general belief that average, prodemocratic Hong Kongers would rally behind Leong, from the Civic Party, in his bid for the highest office in the HKSAR.

This election is notable as a watershed for posthandover Hong Kong politics, in many aspects. It was the first competitive CE election featuring two candidates from different political camps. Even though the election did not involve direct voting, in order to keep their competitive edge, both candidates ran campaigns that attempted to reach out to average Hong Kongers, each to varying degrees. As a result, the election agendas were better developed, both in terms of breadth and depth; two public forums were held to pit the two candidates against each other in their championing of issues, giving all Hong Kongers a glimpse of the candidates and information on their policy programmes through various publicaccessed media, including the Internet.

The final outcome was thus a ‘winwin’ result for both the HKSAR and its political masters in Beijing. For the SAR, the election ushered in a new era of political reconciliation between different political forces in the territory, in particular between the proBeijing and prodemocratic camps, offering the competing political forces the opportunity to raise awareness on various economic, social, and political concerns in the HKSAR. Compared to previous obsessions with economic issues, this election has brought about a diversification of the political agenda; meanwhile it also provided a common and institutionalised platform that allowed different political interests and viewpoints to converge and reconcile.

The election also highlighted the importance of organised political mobilisation, through political parties, in Hong Kong’s political life; organisation has allowed the prodemocrats to pool their resources and expertises. Tsang had not enjoyed the formal, institutional backing that his rival had acquired. Although favoured and backed by the Chinese top leadership, Tsang in reality found himself in the disadvantaged position of an independent candidate, having to rely on his personal popularity and networks to achieve his election target. The prodemocrats’ institutional capacity to run an effective campaign will certainly be a case for further studies for Beijing and its future candidates.

Meanwhile, this was Beijing’s first experience in a contested election in the SAR. The Chinese political leaders will undoubtedly enjoy a new boost of confidence in their management of Hong Kong affairs and its pace of democratisation, in all likelihood paving the way for significant political reforms in the HKSAR during Tsang’s second term in office, due to run from July 2007 to June 2012. Surrounded by his own popular support and Beijing’s committed political backing, Tsang is poised to work out a political reform plan that satisfies Beijing, its affiliated political forces, and the prodemocracy camp. Beijing is likely to be more agreeable to gradual expansions of the Election Committee and the proportion of Legislative Council members elected from the geographic constituencies in the years ahead, with a view to even greater changes, including universal suffrage, in subsequent elections in the years that follow.

Meanwhile, other forms of democratisation will continue to progress in the HKSAR. Parallel measures, such as reforming the legal status of political parties, will help to lay the foundation for a more stable political transition in the territory. These reforms will alter the structure of popular mobilisation and support, which, over time, contribute to more responsive governance, and possibly further democratic advancement in the HKSAR. CHIEF EXECUTIVE ELECTION 2007: CONVERGING THE DEMOCRATISATION ROADMAPS OF BEIJING AND THE HKSAR

Sow Keat TOK *

A ‘NoSurprise’ Election Result

1.1 Incumbent Donald Tsang Yam Kuen emerged the winner of the widely anticipated Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) election for the post of Chief Executive (CE), held on 25 March 2007. The result came as a no surprise, considering the huge backing Tsang enjoyed in the 800member Election Committee (more commonly known as the electoral college system) dominated by a mainlandleaning membership.

1.2 What was surprising to many external observers was Tsang’s immense popularity during the campaigning period. Various opinion polls conducted throughout the campaign showed that Tsang consistently enjoyed an overwhelming lead over his fellow candidate, Alan Leong Kah Kit. This is contrary to the general belief that average, prodemocratic Hong Kongers would rally behind Leong, from the Civic Party (a prodemocratic outfit), in his bid for the highest office in the HKSAR.

1.3 This election is notable as a watershed for posthandover Hong Kong politics, in many aspects. It was the first competitive CE election featuring two candidates from different political camps. Even though the election did not involve direct voting, in order to keep their competitive edge, both candidates ran campaigns that attempted to reach out to average Hong Kongers, each to varying degrees.

1.4 As a result, the election agendas were better developed, both in terms of breadth and depth; two public forums—yet another first in the history of HKSAR—were held to pit the two candidates against each other in their championing of issues, giving all Hong Kongers a glimpse of the candidates and information on their policy programmes through various media, including the Internet. 1

1.5 The final outcome was thus a ‘winwin’ result for both the HKSAR and its political masters in Beijing. For the SAR, the election ushered in a new era of political reconciliation between different political forces in the territory, in

* Sow Keat TOK is a Research Associate in the China Policy Institute, School of Contemporary China Studies, University of Nottingham. With support from the CPI, he was in Hong Kong in March 2007 to observe the election campaign; and he wishes to thank Director Richard Pascoe and Professor Yongnian Zheng for their support for this research, and invaluable comments on early drafts of this brief. It was written as a continuation of an earlier brief published by CPI, Sow Keat Tok, ‘Caught in the “One Country, Two Systems” Quandary: Background Notes on Democratisation in the HKSAR’, Briefing Series – Issue 19, Nottingham: China Policy Institute (February 2007). 1 For example, the radio and television feeds of the forum (conducted in Cantonese dialect) were available ‘live’ on the website of Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK), and remained downloadable even after the elections, at http://www.rthk.org.hk/special/ceelection2007/2007030119.asx and http://www.rthk.org.hk/special/ceelection2007/2007031520.asx. (Accessed 25 April 2007).

1 particular between the proBeijing and prodemocratic camps, offering the competing political forces the opportunity to raise awareness on various economic, social, and political concerns in the HKSAR. Compared to previous obsessions with economic issues, this election has brought about a diversification of the political agenda; meanwhile it also provided a common and institutionalised platform that allowed different political interests and viewpoints to converge and reconcile.

1.6 The election also highlighted the importance of organised political mobilisation, through political parties, in Hong Kong’s political life; organisation has allowed the prodemocrats to pool their resources and expertises. Tsang had not enjoyed the formal, institutional backing that his rival had acquired. Although favoured and backed by the Chinese top leadership, Tsang in reality found himself in the disadvantaged position of an independent candidate, having to rely on his personal popularity and networks to achieve his election target. The prodemocrats’ institutional capacity to run an effective campaign will certainly be a case for further studies for Beijing and its future candidates.

1.7 Meanwhile, this was Beijing’s first experience in a contested election in the SAR, albeit one that is rather limited in terms of suffrage. The Chinese political leaders will undoubtedly enjoy a new boost of confidence in their management of Hong Kong affairs and its pace of democratisation.

1.8 This scenario will likely pave the way for significant political reforms in the HKSAR during Tsang’s second term in office, due to run from July 2007 to June 2012. Surrounded by his own popular support (in terms of public opinion polling registered in the HKSAR) and Beijing’s committed political backing, Tsang is poised to work out a political reform plan that satisfies Beijing, its affiliated political forces, and the prodemocracy camp. This will not be an easy task for Tsang, though, as he embarks on the search for that thin overlap between the different political forces.

1.9 Nonetheless, with Tsang returned to the office, Beijing is likely to be more agreeable to gradual expansions of the Election Committee (EC) and the proportion of Legislative Council (Legco) members elected from the geographic constituencies in the years ahead, with a view toeven greater changes, including universal suffrage, in subsequent elections in the years that follow.

1.10 Meanwhile, other forms of democratisation will continue in the HKSAR. Parallel measures, such as reforming the legal status of political parties, will help to lay the foundation for a more stable political transition in the territory. These reforms will alter the structure of popular mobilisation and support, which, over time, contribute to more responsive governance, and possibly further democratic advancement in the HKSAR.

‘I will get the job done’: Donald Tsang Dominating the Election Campaign

2.1 The political scene in the HKSAR buzzed with excitement following the results of the EC Subsector elections on 10 December 2006. 114 candidates endorsed by the prodemocrats (out of 134, or a success rate of 83%) were

2 returned in that election. Together with the 20 prodemocrat votes from members of the Legco, the prodemocrats availed themselves of the opportunity to nominate a CE candidate, a nomination which, according to HKSAR’s election guidelines, ‘must be subscribed to by not less than 100 members of the EC’.2

2.2 This gave the Civic Party’s Alan Leong the ticket to run against the incumbent Donald Tsang (no party affiliation) in the March election. Leong took a very active approach to his campaign, beginning to present himself as a potential prodemocrat candidate as early as September 2006. A consensus was reached between a divided prodemocrat camp in October, and the Civic Party announced Leong’s candidacy in October that year.

2.3 The impact of an impending contested election was immediately felt. The media whipped up a whirl of frenzy around Leong, who, being a wellknown barrister in the HKSAR and a seasoned member of the Legco, was deemed a worthy challenger even by Beijing. In order to ‘neutralise’ this challenge, conventional views are that the HKSAR government was compelled in early December to retract a plan to introduce the highly unpopular consumption tax to the territory.3

2.4 Leong’s campaign trial went on full steam immediately after the subsector election. Leong, claimed the lion’s share of the media limelight, coming out ahead of his competitor, the incumbent Donald Tsang, on almost all fronts. Leong’s election team took little time to introduce his election agenda, which centred on the areas of democratic reforms, labour issues, antidiscrimination, solving income disparity, education and employment, improving environmental health, and public finance reforms.

2.5 Leong’s vigorous campaigning approach was in sharp contrast to Tsang’s impassiveness. While observers expected Tsang to respond swiftly and forcefully to Leong’s challenge, the former surprised many by taking an unconcerned, almost aloof, position. 4 On announcing his candidacy, Tsang evaded all media invitations, and ignored Leong’s constant pressure.

2.6 Tsang finally broke his silence in midJanuary, saying that he was ‘preparing for candidacy’, 5 but his official announcement did not materialise until early February. Tsang repeatedly stressed to the public media that his priority continued to be fulfilling his job expectations as the CE, rather than as a CE candidate. Although Tsang’s aloofness was harshly criticised by the pro democrats, his approach apparently threw Leong and his team offbalance.

2.7 To be fair, Tsang ran a rather uninspiring campaign. His election slogan ‘I will get the job done’ and his ‘parttime’ campaigning timetable all suggested a

2 Emphasis in original. ‘Chapter 3: Nomination of Candidates’, 2007 Chief Executive Election Guidelines, Electoral Affairs Commission, available at http://www.eac.gov.hk/pdf/chief/en/2007_CE_Guidelines/CE_Chap03.pdf (Accessed 25 April 2007). 3 ‘Hong Kong Retracts Plan to Implement Consumption Tax’, Lianhe Zaobao, 6 December 2006. 4 ‘Alan Leong Challenges Donald Tsang to an Earlier Campaign’, Hong Kong Economic Journal, 8 January 2007. 5 ‘Tsang: Preparing for Candidacy’, Ming Pao, 11 January 2007.

3 ‘thingsaspernormal’ approach to securing his second term. Even so, Tsang successfully impressed on Hong Kongers his confidence and professional attitude. He conveyed the strong message that the election should be no more than a minor distraction to getting his job done as the CE of the HKSAR.

2.8 Tsang’s approach appeared to have the desired effects. He practically dominated his challenger in terms of popular ratings despite his relative inactivity and lack of eloquence in public debate. In fact, public opinion was so strongly in favour of Tsang that his challenger, Leong, never achieved a rating higher than 20% in the rolling opinion polls conducted by the Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme between 26 February and 23 March. (See table 1)

2.9 To Hong Kongers, the incumbency and HKSARBeijing relations appeared to have taken precedence over the prodemocrats’ reformist agenda. Leong’s young, intelligent, vibrant and forwardlooking image that embodied the very ideals of Hong Kong and its people was effectively offset by Tsang’s cool and professional persona and his political relationships (guanxi) with the higher echelons of the Chinese political leadership.

100

60 Donald Tsang

50 Alan Leong

0 26/02 28/02 02/03 04/03 06/03 08/03 10/03 12/03 14/03 16/03 18/03 20/03 22/03 Table 1: If you were to vote for the Chief Executive tomorrow, which candidate would you choose? (Perforated lines indicate polling results taken the day after the election forums) HKUPOP, http://hkupop.hku.hk/ (Accessed 25 April 2007).

2.10 There is little that is surprising in this, given Hong Kong’s growing dependence on mainland China, especially in respect of its economy. Converging interests and gradual acceptance of Beijing as the HKSAR’s political overlord have made average Hong Kongers less averse to the idea of having a ‘Beijing man’ sitting in the office of the CE. Growing ease with the

4 ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement, and Beijing’s improving domestic image, have no doubt boosted this effect.

2.11 There were no surprises when, on the polling day on 25 March, Tsang was returned to office with a count of 649 votes, or 84%, of the 772 valid votes cast. Leong managed to collect 123 votes, which was 12 more than the 111 subscriptions that he had received on nomination day. Interestingly, Tsang’s eventual high vote count in the EC closely matched simulated public polling: on the eve of the election, one opinion poll reported that Tsang enjoyed a public rating of 81.3%, compared to Leong’s 12.3%.6

Multiple ‘Firsts’ Recorded during the CE Election Campaign

3.1 This election was widely touted in the media, and amongst current affairs commentators, as a breakthrough for political development in the HKSAR. Indeed, from many aspects, the March CE election has proven to be a watershed event, its effects likely to change the political climate in the territory in the long run.

3.2 It scored many ‘firsts’ in terms of posthandover political changes. To begin with, it was the first contested CE election that was held in the SAR. It was also the first time that a candidate (Leong) with political affiliation had run for the highest office in the territory, and who had utilised his party mechanisms to mobilise the public and votes during the campaigning period.7

3.3 Thirdly, this was the first time that alternative policy platforms were being offered to the Hong Kong public, giving the Beijingbacked contender a run for his money. Rising to all these challenges, Tsang sought to shed his image as a ‘Beijing candidate’.

3.4 In this election, the people of Hong Kong may have witnessed the closest thing ever to a fullycontested CE election, as allowed under current constitutional arrangement with Beijing. Tsang, in particular, tried to rise above partisan politics, presenting himself in a more dignified style as a CE candidate for Hong Kongers, an approach helped by Beijing’s handsoff attitude during the whole of the election period.8

6 ‘Tsang Expected to Score on “Two Fronts”; 81.3% Hong Kongers Supported Tsang, Leong Managed Mere 12.3%’, Hong Kong Economic Times, 24 March 2007. 7 The HKSAR election law requires that the CE cannot be a member of any political party during his/her term in office, as its Chief Executive Election Ordinance states the winning candidate must: (a) publicly make a statutory declaration to the effect that he is not a member of any political party; and (b) lodge with the Returning Officer a written undertaking to the effect that he will not, if appointed as the Chief Executive—(i) become a member of any political party; or (ii) do any act that has the effect of subjecting himself to the discipline of any political party, during his term of office as the Chief Executive. See ‘Chief Executive Election Ordinance’, available at http://www.info.gov.hk/cab/upload/20010721091840/Part1.pdf (Accessed 25 April 2007) 8 China’s lianghui (the meetings of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)) was coincidentally organised in the month of March, just prior to the CE election. China’s top leaders were observed to be avoiding comments on the ongoing election campaign in Hong Kong despite basking in the media limelight, whilst letting the NPC and CPPCC

5 3.5 A fourth ‘first’ was the holding and broadcasting of public forums involving all the candidates. Two forums were held during the campaigning period—one on 1 March, nominally organised by Legco, and the other on 15 March arranged by the main media corporations in Hong Kong—both of which were broadcast live, across all media channels, including the Internet.

3.6 The forums adopted a US Presidentialstyle format, where the direct questioning between the candidates was prohibited. Public involvement was limited, both in terms of attendance and the questionandanswer sessions; but its impact was nonetheless substantial. More than 2.3 million viewers in the HKSAR alone were estimated to have tuned in to the second broadcast, as live feeds were also carried to mainland Guangdong residents through Hong Kong freetoview media stations.9

3.7 Electioneering has provided the backdrop for one of the most comprehensive election campaigns ever run in the HKSAR. Despite the HKD 9.5 million cap per candidate in election expenses, Hong Kongers experienced a barrage of campaign messages through the printed materials, pinup boards, media interviews, candidates’ websites and personal ‘blogs’, to name a few. Other than the usual meetings with members of the EC, both candidates also carried out various activities, including petitioning and house visits, which involved members of the general public.

3.8 These activities brought about a wider level of public involvement than previously anticipated. Given the circumscribed nature of the HKSAR CE election, which was erstwhile dubbed a ‘smallcircle election’ by Hong Kong’s prodemocrats, 10 this watershed event opens up greater possibilities for democratisation, not only in spirit but in truth, in the territory as well as in mainland China.

Converging Democratisation Roadmaps

4.1 While Tsang may have been returned in a convincing manner, he was not the sole winner of this campaign. The competing HKSAR prodemocrats have earned themselves a boost to their political credibility—both in the eyes of Beijing and Hong Kongers—by challenging the existing system from within. By offering their own candidates and policy platforms, the prodemocrats have effectively declared themselves respectable contenders in a Beijing administered political environment.

4.2 This will add more pressure to Beijing to further open up the political space in the HKSAR. In order to secure its political control over the territory, Beijing will now need to keep closer tabs on popular sentiment in Hong Kong. Tsang’s campaign slogan ‘I will get the job done’, while adequate for this delegates enjoy a freer rein with the media. ‘NPC and CPPCC Delegates urge Election Committee not to Cast Invalid Votes’, Hong Kong Economic Journal, 13 March 2007. 9 ‘2.3 Million People Witnessed the Debate; Hong Kongers are the Largest Winner’, Wen Wei Po, 17 March 2007; ‘Chief Executive Election Debate Broadcasted “Live” in Hong Kong and Guangdong Province’, Lianhe Zaobao, 16 March 2007. 10 See Tok, op. cit., p. 5.

6 election, will likely find itself deficient in the long run. As the exit of Tung Cheehwa showed, Hong Kongers want someone who is accountable to them, not just to Beijing alone.1 1

4.3 Given greater expectations and intensifying political competition, Tsang will be likely to move closer towards the middle as his political agenda converges with that of his challenger. Deep into his second term, Tsang—and presumably Beijing as well—will have to seriously consider taking in some of those demands voiced by the prodemocrats, including moving ahead with measured political and constitutional reforms that will minimally satisfy popular sentiment in Hong Kong.

4.4 In other words, even when Tsang was not popularly elected under current electoral arrangements, his legitimacy has been increasingly embedded in his political popularity. By competing in the CE election, the prodemocrats as an ‘opposition’ are in effect institutionalising and regularising political tensions in the territory, thus minimising the social and political costs accumulated through the pursuit of extraelectoral activities, such as mass demonstrations.

4.5 Another important lesson was (re)learned during the campaign: improving effectiveness and competitiveness through organised political mobilisation in a contested setting. In this instance, the pandemocratic alliance forged between Hong Kong prodemocracy parties has served as an effective and efficient campaigning machine in support of Leong’s candidacy.

5.1 The rediscovery of political parties has the potential to transform political life in the HKSAR. Political organisation has allowed the prodemocrats to pool their resources and expertise, and the accumulated capacity to mobilise across different sectors of society has made Leong a more formidable opponent than was previously anticipated.

5.2 In comparison, Tsang did not enjoy the formal, institutional backing that his rival knew. Beijing’s support, however powerful and beneficial, remains informal, and cannot be institutionally transformed into mobilisation tools in the SAR. Although favoured and backed by the Chinese top leadership, Tsang in reality found himself in the disadvantaged position of an independent candidate. He had to rely on his personal popularity and networks to achieve his election target.

4.6 Tsang’s experience offers some food for thought, both to Beijing as well as its future CE candidates. By competing in elections, the prodemocrats are constantly accumulating election experiences and building up their capacity to become a welloiled election machine, whereas new Beijingbacked candidates will always have to relearn the skills of popular polling. At some point in time, Beijing will need to address this imbalance by introducing more institutionalised political support for its candidates.

11 See Yongnian Zheng and Sow Keat Tok, ‘Hong Kong Democratisation: a Crisis Brewing for Beijing?’ EAI Background Brief No. 191, Singapore: East Asian Institute (7 May 2004), pp. 46; Yongnian Zheng and Sow Keat Tok, ‘Can Donald Tsang End Hong Kong’s Governance Crisis?’ EAI Background Brief No. 235, Singapore: East Asian Institute (28 March 2005), pp. 710.

7 4.7 So far, the limited competition is providing a safeguard against complacency. The contending policy platforms and the championing of various social, economic and political issues by the candidates have raised Hong Kongers’ awareness of their civil rights. For once, they were given a choice—not directly, but a choice nonetheless—of shaping their own lives. Some of those issues, for example environmental concerns, are unlikely to disappear with a losing election campaign.

4.8 Awareness will drive further civil activism campaigns after the elections, forcing future CEs of all political persuasions to closely align their policy with popular appeals, which help to introduce elements of democracy into the system. For the HKSAR, while a liberal democracy may be far from taken shape, a culture of democratic practices is slowly emerging.

Direction of Future Reforms

5.3 With Beijing sitting more at ease with the manageability of political changes in the HKSAR, China’s top leaders are likely to be less adverse to broader reforms. While on his campaign trail, Tsang had indicated that the HKSAR government was in the midst of preparing a Green Paper on political reforms, set to be published before the new CE term, in June 2007. Tsang has since expressed the hope of including in the Green Paper a proposal from the pro democrats.1 2

5.4 As the incumbent candidate, Tsang has said that Hong Kongers would expect from him in his second term a ‘final solution’ to implementing universal suffrage in the HKSAR following the Green Paper; 13 as the ‘Beijing’s candidate’, that was as far as he can possibly go with an election promise, without committing to a firm democratisation roadmap and timetable.

5.5 Tsang is thus in a precarious position at this moment; expectations in the HKSAR run high following his convincing victory. His moves to invite members of the prodemocrats into his new administrative team, and his efforts at trying to achieve a broad consensus on reforms, across different political persuasions, are indeed commendable; 14 but at the end of the day, his hands remained tied to Beijing’s cautious approach, and he finds himself in the unenviable position of being sandwiched in between Beijing’s and Hong Kong’s interests.

5.6 Beijing’s reluctance to relinquish control over the pace of political reforms in the HKSAR makes it almost impossible for it (and Tsang) to set clear timelines for reforms. Nonetheless, there are enough indications to suggest the direction which reforms may take: Tsang’s aborted reform package in December 2005 is the starting point for Beijing’s current plans.

12 ‘Tsang Considers Solving the Political Reforms Issue as His Greatest Achievement’, Hong Kong Economic Journal, 5 February 2007. 13 ‘Tsang: “Will Go All Out” with Fellow Hong Kongers to Produce the “Final Solution” to Universal Suffrage’, Hong Kong Economic Journal, 22 March 2007. 14 ‘Rafael Hui Urged the Liberal Party to Consider Joining the Administration’, Ming Pao, 30 April 2007

8 5.7 At the moment, it appears that Beijing may well accept gradual expansions of the EC and the proportion of Legco members elected from the geographic constituencies for the years 2012, 2013, 2017 and 2018, with a view towards even greater changes, including universal suffrage, in the subsequent elections in the years that follow. Despite Tsang’s election promises, a clear roadmap beyond those years remains a distant possibility.

5.8 Even as Beijing procrastinates on the timetable for universal suffrage, other forms of democratisation will continue. Parallel reforms, such as reforming the legal status of political parties, will help to lay the foundation for a more stable political transition in the territory. 15 Together with the gradual expansion of suffrage, such reforms will alter the structure of popular mobilisation and support. Over time, this changing structure can only contribute to more responsive governance, and possibly further democratic advancement in the HKSAR.

15 Richard Cullen, ‘Regulating Political Parties in Hong Kong’, Legislative Council Paper No. CB(2)911/0405(01), February 2005. Reforming political parties is an ongoing project amongst many legal scholars in Hong Kong.