Briefing Paper

briefing paper page 1 Broken Forever? Addressing Europe’s Multiple Crises Paola Subacchi and Stephen Pickford International Economics | March 2012 | IE BP 2012/01 Summary points zz Greece’s recent bailout is just the latest stage in a deep-rooted crisis for Europe’s monetary union that was exacerbated by the global financial crisis. Without measures to deal with the current crisis and to address the underlying problems of the euro area, it is hard to see EMU surviving in its current form. zz Countries in the euro periphery have suffered from long-standing fiscal problems, under-performing economies, imbalances and a widening gap in competitiveness with ‘core’ countries. zz These periphery countries now face problems requiring a combination of urgent and long-term measures. In the immediate future they have to convince markets that their fiscal plans will reduce debt without a collapse in growth, and to normalize their banks’ access to market funding. In the longer term they must achieve sustainable increases in growth, improve competitiveness and rebalance their external payments positions. They must adapt to the constraints of the single currency. zz Reforms are needed to help the periphery countries live with the euro. At the same time the incentives for correcting imbalances need strengthening, with the burden shared more equitably between deficit and surplus countries, in order to create an effective model for growth within the euro area. www.chathamhouse.org Broken Forever? Addressing Europe’s Multiple Crises page 2 Introduction 1957 and one of Europe’s largest economies, was deemed Despite the latest bailout for Greece, Europe’s sovereign necessary to the economic and political success of the euro, debt crisis, which began in 2010, continues. Rooted in and therefore was admitted on the assumption of future the financial and economic imbalances within Europe, fiscal consolidation. Greece’s bid for membership came the structural weaknesses of its model of growth, and the during the preparations for the 2004 Olympics when massive differences within the region, the crisis has exposed the investments had boosted economic growth. In any event, deficiencies in the governance of the European Monetary since it accounted for only about 2% of the total euro area Union (EMU) and shown the limits of its framework of economy, Greece was believed to be too small to have any policy cooperation. significant impact on the stability of the monetary union.2 The other countries primarily affected by the crisis – Ireland, Portugal and Spain – were faced with interest rates set by the European Central Bank (ECB) that were A monetary union that was not ‘ inappropriate for the pace of their economic growth and accompanied by a fiscal union their credit conditions. Loose monetary policy needed could only succeed by putting to be offset by suitable domestic policies, which did in place robust governance and not happen. Instead credit growth and private-sector borrowing remained excessive, and current account defi- strong rules. Yet over many cits widened, signalling the build-up of large imbalances. years rules in the euro area In the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in have been disregarded for the September 2008 most European governments intervened sake of politics to rescue their banking systems and to support economic ’ growth. As a result public deficits and debt widened, and Ireland, Spain and Portugal ended up joining the group of countries with long-term public finance problems. The euro crisis did not develop overnight, but incu- For Europe as a whole the banking crisis morphed into a bated over a number of years. Since EMU’s inception the sovereign debt crisis. political nature of European integration has taken priority The last two years have seen numerous attempts at the over sound economic principles. It has always been clear European level to address the crisis. But as well as taking that Europe falls short of the requirements for an optimal effective steps to deal with the immediate problems, it is currency area as envisaged in economic theory.1 A mone- necessary to address the longer-term issues that lie at the tary union that was not accompanied by a fiscal union origin of the protracted build-up of imbalances within could only succeed by putting in place robust governance the euro area. In addition, there are large issues about the and strong rules. Yet over many years rules in the euro future governance of the euro area (and of the EU as a area have been disregarded for the sake of politics. whole) that need to be addressed if the euro is to survive. Two of the countries that ended up at the centre of the This paper argues that structural measures to address sovereign debt crisis, Greece and Italy, were admitted to the the long-term challenges of rebalancing the euro economy, single currency union with public debts well in excess of dealing with regional growth differentials and supporting the 60% of GDP limit laid down in the Maastricht Treaty. GDP growth are needed for the future survival and stability But Italy, one of the signatories of the Treaty of Rome in of the euro. Changes to the governance of the euro are also 1 For a detailed discussion on optimal currency area, see Mundell (1961, 1963, 1973a and 1973b). In addition, for a discussion on Mundell’s work, the euro and optimal currency areas, see McKinnon (2000). 2 Unless otherwise mentioned, all the data used in this paper are from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook (IMF WEO), September 2011. www.chathamhouse.org Broken Forever? Addressing Europe’s Multiple Crises page 3 needed so that countries follow policies that are consistent and as the ECB’s Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) with the requirements of a common currency, and the facility has succeeded in stabilizing markets and buying time.3 burden of policy adjustment is borne more equitably. The cheap loans with a maturity of three years provided by the ECB have eased the funding pressures experienced by The critical outlook for the euro periphery banks in the single currency area and have contributed to The sovereign debt crisis has widened the divide between the bond rally in recent months. Italy, in particular, has European countries that are well adapted to survive and benefited from the LTRO and the austerity plan adopted by prosper within the monetary union and those that are the new government led by Mario Monti. Bond yields have not. Periphery countries with problematic debt positions steadily declined since mid-December 2011 from their peak saw sharp rises in government borrowing costs since the of 7.4% to under 5% in the first week of March 2012.4 crisis erupted and at each critical point in its development Greece, however, continues to be the major concern (Figure 1). Before January 2010 the periphery countries despite the latest bailout package from the EU and the were able to borrow at a similar cost to that of Germany. International Monetary Fund (IMF), and a deep ‘haircut’ But by exacerbating fundamental macroeconomic imbal- on private holdings of Greek debt. However, structural ances and eroding market confidence the euro crisis fiscal problems remain grave. It is an open question whether significantly increased the risk of sovereign default within Greece can implement the very tough fiscal measures EMU, and spilled over from Greece to other countries, required in the face of public protests and an election sched- such as Italy and Spain, with problematic but not critical uled for April. With GDP growth estimated to contract by positions. Most of all, massive capital outflows from 3% in 2012 and rise modestly by 0.5% in 2013, there is not problematic countries into ‘safe’ countries worsened the much scope for improvement in revenues, while a further already existing imbalances. dose of fiscal austerity is not feasible. Therefore the goal of In recent weeks confidence has recovered somewhat, as reducing Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio to 120% by 2020 looks the outlook for the world economy has improved slightly very ambitious and more likely unattainable. Figure 1: The cost of government borrowing (spread over German bunds) 4,000 3,500 3,000 Greece Portugal 2,500 Ireland 2,000 Italy Spain Basis points 1,500 Belgium 1,000 France 500 0 Jan 08 Apr 08 Jul 08 Oct 08 Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10 Jan 11 Apr 11 Jul 11 Oct 11 Jan 12 Apr 12 Note: Based on 10-year government bond yields. Source: Financial Times. 3 In order to support bank lending and liquidity in the euro area money market, the ECB undertook two LTROs with a maturity of three years and an option of early repayment after one year, on 21 December 2011 and 28 February 2012. Take-up by banks totalled over 1 trillion euros in the two operations. 4 But it has since moved upwards, to slightly above 5%. www.chathamhouse.org Broken Forever? Addressing Europe’s Multiple Crises page 4 The long genesis of the sovereign crisis concentrated in euro area countries that had fast but In the immediate aftermath of Lehman Brothers’ unsustainable growth in the pre-crisis years or that had collapse in September 2008, it seemed possible for pre-existing critical fiscal positions, or both. Europe to escape the worst effects of the global financial crisis. Initially, only those European countries that were Table 1: Sovereign debt (% of GDP) exposed through their banking and financial system, Euro area 2007 2011 such as the United Kingdom, Ireland and Spain, were Ireland 24.9 109.3 affected.

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