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The Case Study of the Bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010

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The Case Study of the Bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010 View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection 2016-12 A study on the failure of conventional deterrence: the case study of the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010 Lee, Jin Ki Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/51568 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS A STUDY ON THE FAILURE OF CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE: THE CASE STUDY OF THE BOMBARDMENT OF YEONPYEONG IN 2010 by Jin Ki Lee December 2016 Thesis Advisor: Wade L. Huntley Second Reader: Tristan J. Mabry Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) December 2016 Master’s thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS A STUDY ON THE FAILURE OF CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE: THE CASE STUDY OF THE BOMBARDMENT OF YEONPYEONG IN 2010 6. AUTHOR(S) Jin Ki Lee 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING / ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY N/A REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) In 2010, North Korea launched an artillery bombardment of South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island, killing four, wounding 18, and damaging over 100 buildings. Despite conventional military superiority, the Republic of Korea-United States (ROK-U.S.) alliance failed to deter this significant North Korean low- intensity provocation (LIP). This thesis examines the Yeonpyeong deterrence failure to ask how the ROK-U.S. alliance can deter North Korean LIP in the future. It examines the requirements for conventional deterrence, identifies traits that distinguish conventional and nuclear deterrence, and develops an original matrix of conventional deterrence criteria that can be applied to specific cases. The thesis then utilizes this matrix for a structured case study of the Yeonpyeong bombardment. The thesis finds that most of the criteria for successful conventional deterrence were absent prior to the Yeonpyeong bombardment, indicating multiple reasons for deterrence failure. Among other factors, the alliance ignored intelligence regarding increased North Korean military deployments near the island, and had not demonstrated a likelihood of response in similar incidents in the past. The conclusions provide numerous lessons applying to both future studies of conventional deterrence effectiveness and the policy requirements for the ROK-U.S. alliance to successfully deter LIP by an increasingly dangerous North Korean regime. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF conventional deterrence, The ROK-U.S. alliance, bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010, PAGES denial capability, punishment capability, credibility, military balance, past actions theory, red 125 line, North Korea, low intensity provocation, counter provocation plan, extended deterrence 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited A STUDY ON THE FAILURE OF CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE: THE CASE STUDY OF THE BOMBARDMENT OF YEONPYEONG IN 2010 Jin Ki Lee Major, Republic of Korea Air Force B.A., Republic of Korea Air Force Academy, 2004 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (FAR EAST, SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2016 Approved by: Wade L. Huntley Thesis Advisor Tristan J. Mabry Second Reader Mohammed M. Hafez Chair, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT In 2010, North Korea launched an artillery bombardment of South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island, killing four, wounding 18, and damaging over 100 buildings. Despite conventional military superiority, the Republic of Korea-United States (ROK- U.S.) alliance failed to deter this significant North Korean low-intensity provocation (LIP). This thesis examines the Yeonpyeong deterrence failure to ask how the ROK-U.S. alliance can deter North Korean LIP in the future. It examines the requirements for conventional deterrence, identifies traits that distinguish conventional and nuclear deterrence, and develops an original matrix of conventional deterrence criteria that can be applied to specific cases. The thesis then utilizes this matrix for a structured case study of the Yeonpyeong bombardment. The thesis finds that most of the criteria for successful conventional deterrence were absent prior to the Yeonpyeong bombardment, indicating multiple reasons for deterrence failure. Among other factors, the alliance ignored intelligence regarding increased North Korean military deployments near the island, and had not demonstrated a likelihood of response in similar incidents in the past. The conclusions provide numerous lessons applying to both future studies of conventional deterrence effectiveness and the policy requirements for the ROK-U.S. alliance to successfully deter LIP by an increasingly dangerous North Korean regime. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION..........................................................1 B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...........................2 C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................3 1. The ROK-U.S. Alliance and North Korean LIP .........................5 2. Conventional Deterrence and Nuclear Deterrence .....................7 3. Conventional Deterrence for North Korean LIP ......................10 D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES .....................14 E. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................15 F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE ............................15 II. CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE ..................................................................17 A. THE ROOTS OF CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE .......................17 1. Definition of Deterrence ..............................................................17 2. Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence Compared ....................20 B. REQUIREMENTS FOR CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE ..........23 1. Capability......................................................................................23 2. Credibility .....................................................................................29 3. Communication ............................................................................35 C. CONDITIONS FOR CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE FAILURE..................................................................................................40 1. The Motive of an Aggressor ........................................................41 2. Misperception of an Aggressor ...................................................41 3. Vulnerable Defender ....................................................................44 D. CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE OF LIP..........................................................................44 III. THE CASE STUDY OF THE BOMBARDMENT OF YEONPYEONG IN 2010 ..................................................................................................................47 A. OVERVIEW .............................................................................................47 B. ASSESSMENT OF THE FAILURE OF CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE ........................................................................................52 1. Capability......................................................................................52 2. Credibility .....................................................................................58 3. Communication ............................................................................65 4. Nevertheless, Provocation ...........................................................68 C. OVERALL ANALYSIS...........................................................................76
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