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The Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico and in the Americas, 2018/19: Taking the Pulse of Democracy

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The Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico and in the Americas, 2018/19: Taking the Pulse of Democracy The Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico and in the Americas, 2018/19: Taking the Pulse of Democracy By Vidal Romero, Ph.D. ITAM Pablo Parás, Ph.D. Georgetown University and Data Opinión Pública y Mercados Georgina Pizzolitto LAPOP Coordinator of Special Studies and Report Editor Vanderbilt University Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Ph.D. LAPOP Director and Series Editor Vanderbilt University May 2020 This study is made possible by the support of the American People through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents of this study are the sole responsibility of the authors and LAPOP and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government. Table of Contents Table of Contents List of Figures and Tables ....................................................................................................................................... v Preface .......................................................................................................................................................................... ix Introduction to the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer ...................................................................................... xi Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................................. xiii I. Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 1 II. Main Findings ............................................................................................................................. 4 III. Basic Tenets of Electoral Democracy ................................................................................. 4 Support for Democracy in the Abstract ...................................................................... 5 Rules of the Game: Tolerance of Military Coups ...................................................... 9 Tolerance of Executive Coups ..................................................................................... 13 IV. Evaluation of Democracy ...................................................................................................... 16 Satisfaction with Democracy ....................................................................................... 17 Democratic Status of Political System ...................................................................... 20 V. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 22 Appendix ......................................................................................................................................... 24 I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 25 II. Main Findings ........................................................................................................................... 27 III. System Support ...................................................................................................................... 28 IV. Specific Institutions and Actors ......................................................................................... 33 V. Political Tolerance .................................................................................................................. 38 VI. Dimensions of Democratic Legitimacy ............................................................................. 41 VII. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 44 Appendix ......................................................................................................................................... 46 I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 49 II. Main Findings ........................................................................................................................... 50 III. How Widely Used Are Social Media? ................................................................................. 51 IV. Who Uses Social Media? ...................................................................................................... 55 V. How Frequently Do They Use Social Media? ................................................................... 55 VI. Political Engagement on Social Media ............................................................................. 60 VII. Social Media Use and Political Attitudes ........................................................................ 63 Page | iii Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico, 2018/19 VIII. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 70 Appendix .......................................................................................................................................... 71 I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 75 II. Key Findings ............................................................................................................................. 76 III. Extortion in Mexico ............................................................................................................... 76 IV. Negative Impact of Extortion on the Evaluation of the Government and Democratic Regime ................................................................................................................ 78 Impact of Extortion ........................................................................................................ 82 V. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 86 I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 89 II. Key Findings ............................................................................................................................. 90 III. Trust in the Armed Forces and Presidential Approval ................................................. 90 IV. Support in Mexico for Military Coups .............................................................................. 97 V. Support in Mexico for Presidential Coups ........................................................................ 99 VI. Factors Associated with Executive Coups ..................................................................... 105 VII. Epilogue: The 2018-2019 Climate of Public Opinion in Mexico .............................. 109 VIII. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 113 I. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 115 II. Key Findings ............................................................................................................................ 116 III. Personal Experiences with Corruption ............................................................................ 117 IV. Justification. Do Mexicans Believe that Corruption Is Justifiable? .......................... 125 V. Perception. How Much Corruption Do Mexicans Perceive Among Political Elites? ....................................................................................................................................... 130 VI. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 135 Appendices .................................................................................................................................... 137 References ................................................................................................................................................................143 Appendices ................................................................................................................................................................ 153 Appendix A. Understanding Figures in this Study .............................................................. 155 Appendix B. Study Information Sheet .................................................................................... 157 Appendix C. Questionnaire ...................................................................................................... 159 Page | iv List of Figures and Tables List of Figures and Tables Figure 1.1. State of Democracy in the LAC-18 Region ................................................................................... 3 Figure 1.2. Cross-National Support for Democracy ...................................................................................... 6 Figure 1.3. Support for Democracy and the Level of Democracy ............................................................... 7 Figure 1.4. Support for Democracy, Mexico, 2004-2019 .............................................................................. 8 Figure 1.5. Demographic and Socio-Economic Correlates of Support for Democracy, Mexico 2019 .......................................................................................................................................................
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