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Schlaglicht Israel 4-08 Schlaglicht Israel Nr. 4/08 Aktuelles aus israelischen Tageszeitungen 11. - 24. Februar 2008 1. Attentat auf Mughniya struggle against Israel, despite suffering from great limitations to his freedom of movement. […] Am 13.02.08 kam Imad Mughniyah, nach Hassan As testament to the relative isolation faced by Nasrallah Nr. 2 in der libanesischen Hisbollah, bei Nasrallah’s camp, only minor organizations and einem Attentat in Damaskus ums Leben. Der Top- various pariahs were quick to condemn the Terrorist, der für Anschläge gegen Israel, die USA assassination immediately after it was reported. […] und jüdische Einrichtungen mit vielen hundert A Lebanese source told Ynet: ‘Past experience Todesopfern verantwortlich sein soll, fungierte als shows that Hizbullah will certainly respond. The Militärchef der Hisbollah und stand in der westlichen question is not if, but rather, how, when, and in what Welt ganz oben auf den Fahndungslisten. Nach way. Logic dictates that the response will not seinem Tod kam es sofort zu Spekulationen über necessarily take place abroad, and that all options den Hintergrund seiner Ermordung. Die israelische are open.’ Regierung versteckte ihre Zufriedenheit mit dem So what’s in store? Starting today, Nasrallah will Anschlag nicht, dementierte jedoch eine Beteiligung. begin to provide the answers.” Allerdings vermittelten israelische Medien durchaus Roee Nahmias, JED 14.02.08 den Eindruck, dass israelische Geheimdienste ver- antwortlich sein könnten. Andererseits wurde auch The hit / Not merely revenge in Betracht gezogen, dass das Attentat von “Mughniyah's assassination - if it was carried out by amerikanischer Hand oder wegen interner Israel - strengthens the impression that Olmert is Streitigkeiten von der Hisbollah selbst ausgeführt unafraid of making complex defence decisions that worden sein könnte. involve considerable risks. […] In view of Anlässlich der Beerdigung von Mughniyah machte Mughniyah's status and the future risk he posed, it Nasrallah indes deutlich, dass er Israel die was absolutely justified to attack him.” Verantwortung für den Anschlag zuwies. Er drohte, Amos Harel, Avi Issacharoff, HAA 14.02.08 den Kampf gegen Israel von nun an, auch außer- halb von Israel und dem Libanon zu führen. Far more than the killing of one terrorist Israelische Sicherheitskräfte verstärkten daraufhin “The killing of Imad Mughniyeh - whoever is die Schutzmaßnahmen für israelische Einrichtungen responsible - represents a significant achievement im Ausland. for Israel and its allies, and a tremendous blow to its most sworn enemies, in particular Hizbullah and Great leap backwards Iran's radical Islamist regime. […] “From an organization that has a state, a group that His sudden loss will undoubtedly set back for some manages a war against another country, an time the operational capabilities not only of Hizbullah organization that is attempting to change the political and the various terror groups with which he was rules of the game in the country where it operates – linked, but the Iranian and Syrian intelligence Hizbullah shifted to being a hunted, embarrassed, agencies as well. Still, some degree of perspective and stunned terror group. […] This assassination is called for here. Mughniyeh was not a charismatic comes on top of the growing headache suffered by political figure, but a shadowy underground leader Hizbullah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. For and organizer, and such figures are always more than a year and a half this man has been in replaceable in the dark world in which he operated. hiding, determined to go on and firmly manage the Though his death was obviously a major setback for 1 Hizbullah, it will continue to carry on as before, as it Rattling the cage: When in doubt, bomb did in the wake of Israel's targeted killing in 1992 of “When I heard the news that Hizbullah's number one Hassan Nasrallah's predecessor, Abbas Musawi.” terrorist had been blown up in Damascus, I thought: Calev Ben-David, JPO 14.02.08. This wasn't Israel's doing. We've had a year-and-a- half of cease-fire with Hizbullah, nobody wants to No cause for celebration ruin that. We still haven't gotten over the last war in “Is the world a better place without Imad Lebanon, nobody's going to risk starting another one Mughniyah? The instinctive answer is ‘Yes.’ [...] But now, not when there's been 18 months of peace and a cost-and-benefit analysis could challenge the quiet on the northern border. validity of this response; if a car bomb explodes to- Well, imagine my surprise. With all the gloating and morrow next to a Jewish school in New Jersey […], back-slapping and winking going on in this country, I we'll be talking differently. On the other hand, if thought they were going to start passing out candy. Mughniyah's assassination prevented a few terror […] attacks that were in the works, then the answer is If Israel didn't kill Imad Mughniyeh last week, then obvious. It's all a matter of counting heads. this country is even more blind than I thought, There's at least one thing on which everyone because we seem to be doing everything we can to agreed: Mughniyah's elimination will not end terror, wave the assassination in Hizbullah's face, to taunt nor the war against it. […] them, to dare them to try to take revenge. So why all the joy, if that's the case? It's because I don't understand. Everybody knows they're going terror has been bound up with certain key figures, to hit back, or at least they're going to try as hard as while the causes behind the terror have been they can, and, based on experience, they probably ignored. […] will succeed sooner or later. […] But when peace agreements are perceived as con- It's too quiet around here. A tense quiet, as the cessions or as weakness […], there is nothing left tabloids say. The tension is eating us up. And the but to wage war against the symbols of terror, to surest, simplest way to stop worrying about whether eliminate the Hamas or Hezbollah leadership, to there's going to be a war or not is to start one.” point to a brilliant operational and intelligence Larry Derfner, JPO 21.02.08 victory, to count the victims of vengeance and to proceed to the next candidate.” Zvi Bar’el, HAA 17.02.08 2. Homosexuelle in der israelischen Gesellschaft The price they pay “Targeted killings have a major factor in their favor. Nach einer Entscheidung von Generalstaatsanwalt They work. Even if replacement leaders are even- Menachem Mazuz Anfang Februar dürfen tually found there is an inevitable disruption in the Homosexuelle die Kinder ihrer Partner adoptieren. operations of the network as well as a blow to Diskussionen zu diesem Thema waren vom morale. It is commonly believed that the select eli- Sozialministerium angefacht worden, das den minations helped put an end to the suicide bus bom- legalen Status homosexueller Partnerschaften mit bings. Doing nothing does, well, nothing. Worse Kindern klarstellen wollte. Die aktuelle Entscheidung than that: It shows the sort of weakness which in the ist Teil eines langjährigen rechtlichen Kampfes für Middle Eastern mind-set invites more attacks. […] die Gleichstellung von Homosexuellen, der 1994 In all the hype surrounding the initial reports of begann, als der Oberste Gerichtshof die Mughniyeh's death, I liked the quote I heard on Fluggesellschaft El Al anwies, dem männlichen Israel Radio that ‘even his bodyguards didn't know Partner eines Flugbegleiters Flugtickets zuzu- where he slept.’ He was too scared of being killed. gestehen. Mazuz gab in seiner Entscheidung auch And there is the added irony that a man who so an, dass Homosexuelle das Recht hätten, Kinder zu encouraged others to become martyrs was afraid to adoptieren, die nicht die Kinder ihrer Partner sind, die for the cause himself. das Kindeswohl stehe jedoch immer im The explosion echoed so loudly because it sent a Vordergrund. message to Hizbullah and Hamas leaders that they Die religiösen Parteien verurteilten die Entscheidung are not immune. Someone will always find out und reagierten – wie in der Vergangenheit – mit where they sleep.” Beleidigungen und Verwünschungen. Ein Liat Collins, JP 18.02.08 Knessetabgeordneter der religiösen Partei Shas 2 machte zudem auf sich aufmerksam, indem er call. I can only hope that the moderate members of Homosexuellen die Schuld an einem Erdbeben gab, the Haredi community I know who think differently das in der letzten Woche in Israel zu spüren war. will try to influence their leaders. Since liberals have made it clear time and again that Gay couples – Civil marriage we see the issue of gay rights as crucial for an open “The attorney general did well in not passing along society, I believe it is necessary to point out how the hot potato of same-sex couple adoption to the important gay-friendliness is from the standpoint of High Court of Justice again. Had he chosen this the economy. […] familiar and safe method, he would have spared The most consistent predictor for the attractiveness himself a great deal of criticism from religious of a city, country or company for creative people is - circles. But then the issue would have been on hold you may have guessed by now - gay-friendliness. for years at the expense of homosexual and lesbian There is some logic to this: Throughout history, couples as well as children who are candidates for tolerance has been the central factor in fostering adoption. […] creativity, and gay-friendliness turns out to be its Shas is not pleased, predictably, by the attorney strongest expression. […] general's decision, but it is hard to understand the Bnei Brak and Jerusalem are two of the poorest conditioning that causes them to react with slander cities in Israel, and both are, to put it mildly, not gay- and curses every time homosexuals and lesbians friendly.
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