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Future Directions in Technology-Enabled Crime: 2007–09

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Future directions in technology-enabled crime: 2007–09 Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo Russell G Smith Rob McCusker Research and Public Policy Series No. 78 Future directions in technology-enabled crime: 2007–09 Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo Russell G Smith Rob McCusker Research and Public Policy Series No. 78 © Australian Institute of Criminology 2007 ISSN 1326-6004 ISBN 978 1 921185 44 1 Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), no part of this publication may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Inquiries should be addressed to the publisher. Project no. 0074a Published by the Australian Institute of Criminology GPO Box 2944 Canberra ACT 2601 Tel: (02) 6260 9272 Fax: (02) 6260 9293 Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.aic.gov.au Please note: minor revisions are occasionally made to publications after release. The online versions available on the AIC website will always include any revisions. Edited by the Australian Institute of Criminology Typeset by CRE8IVE A full list of publications in the Research and Public Policy Series can be found on the Australian Institute of Criminology website at http://www.aic.gov.au Director’s introduction In September 2003, the Australian Institute of Criminology was engaged to undertake research services for the then newly-established Australian High Tech Crime Centre. The Centre is an internationally innovative approach to policing cyberspace where computer forensic specialists from state and territory police, government agencies, and the private sector work together in partnership with the Australian Federal Police to respond to the ever-expanding risks of technology-enabled crime. The present report brings together a number of aspects of the research which the Institute undertook for the Centre. Its aim was to identify the crime risks which will arise over the next two years (2007–09) out of the environment in which Australians use information and communications technologies. Particular focus was placed on the impact these future developments will have for law enforcement in terms of creating needs for additional resources, law reform, the development of cooperative arrangements between Australian and overseas public and private sector organisations, and the creation and dissemination of public information and educational resources to minimise the risk of widespread harm to the community. The report begins by identifying developments that will take place over the next two years that will be likely to facilitate technology-enabled crime. These include: • changes arising from globalisation of business and the emergence of new economies in China and India • developments in digitisation of information, especially relating to the widespread use of broadband services and mobile and wireless technologies • the evolution of electronic payment systems, especially those being used in connection with online gaming and auctions • changes in the use governments make of technology to allow members of the public to conduct transactions with government agencies securely and even to allow participation in democracy online. These, and other developments, create not only benefits for the community but also risks. This report identifies the most likely areas in which opportunities for illegality may arise including fraud, identity-related crime, computer vandalism, theft of information, dissemination of objectionable material online, and risks of organised crime and terrorism. The implications of these developments are then assessed in terms of their impact for policing, policy making and legislation. Suggestions are also made for responding effectively to these developments – a task that will entail close cooperation between government and those involved in developing new digital technologies and creating the infrastructure in which they operate. The solution to technology-enabled crime in the ensuing years will require iii government and business to be able to predict confidently how technological innovations will be misused by criminals, and to develop responses that will neutralise such opportunities before they arise. The present report should be invaluable in this. Not everyone will agree with our predicted course of events. We hope, however, that the proposed opportunities for crime reduction and reform will be addressed and prove to be effective in preventing many of the risks of technology-enabled crime which we have suggested might occur in the future. Toni Makkai Director Australian Institute of Criminology iv Contents Acknowledgments vii Disclaimer vii Glossary viii Executive summary ix Introduction 1 Technology-enabled crime 2 Motivations 3 Developing information risks 4 Business crime risks 5 Drivers of technology-enabled crime 6 Developments in information and communications technologies that may facilitate technology-enabled crime 10 Information and communications technologies take-up 11 Possible security threats to Australian e-businesses emanating from Asia 16 The path of technological development 16 E-commerce 18 Outsourcing of information technology operations 22 Expansion of wireless and mobile technologies 24 Digitisation of information: increased data holding and dissemination capabilities 30 Government access cards and biometric passports 41 Summary 43 Risk areas and opportunities 44 Computer-facilitated frauds 45 Unauthorised access 51 Evolution of malware 55 Intellectual property infringement 59 Industrial espionage 61 Child exploitation and offensive content 62 Exploitation of younger people 63 Transnational organised crime and terrorism 64 v Threats to national information infrastructure 65 Summary 70 Legal and evidentiary implications 71 Existing legislation 72 Legislative reforms 75 Criminal complicity 77 Jurisdictional issues 78 Criminal defences 79 Procedural and evidentiary powers 81 Computer forensic evidence 83 Possible threats to legislative solutions 85 Technology-enabled crime in the courts 87 Sentencing and punishment 89 Summary 90 Policing and preventive strategies 91 The role of the information and communications technologies security industry 92 Public–private sector partnerships 93 Information sharing 95 The role of task forces 97 Training and educational needs 97 Policing and technology-enabled crime prevention through deterrence 101 Intelligence and the anticipation of future technology-enabled crime 102 Summary 102 Conclusion 104 References 109 vi Acknowledgments This report was prepared with input from • Professor Roderic Broadhurst and Dr Nicholas Chantler (Queensland University of Technology) • Dr Tony Krone and Dr Gregor Urbas (former research analysts at the Australian Institute of Criminology) • Dr Shane McKenzie (Victoria Police Computer Crime Squad). It is based on research funded by the Australian High Tech Crime Centre. We would also like to thank staff at Australian High Tech Crime Centre and Dr Judy Putt for comments on earlier drafts. The permission of the Economist Intelligence Unit (Table 3) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (Figure 3) for use of their material is acknowledged. Disclaimer The views expressed do not necessarily represent the policies of the Australian Government or the Australian High Tech Crime Centre. vii Glossary AJAX Asynchronous JavaScript and extensible markup language EMP Electro magnetic pulse FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation (US) IC3 Internet Crime Complaint Center (US) ICT Information and communications technologies IFTI International funds transfer instructions IP Intellectual property ISP Internet service provider IT Information technology IRC Internet relay chat MEMS Micro-electromechanical systems MMOG Massively multiplayer online games MMORPG Massively multiplayer online role-playing games MMS Multimedia messaging services PDA Personal digital assistant RFID Radio frequency identification SMS Short message service VoIP Voice-over-Internet Protocol viii Executive summary This report examines the future environment in which Australians will use information and communications technologies (ICT) and how this environment will provide opportunities for illegality and infringement of current regulatory controls. In identifying future risk areas, particular focus is placed on the impact these will have for law enforcement, the need for additional resources, law reform, development of cooperative arrangements between Australian and overseas public and private sector organisations, and development of public information and educational resources to minimise the risk of widespread harm to the community. This report principally adopts the term ‘technology-enabled crime’ to refer to crimes which require the use of ICT for their commission. Where more specific forms of technology-enabled crime are discussed, terms including ‘cybercrime’, ‘cyberstalking’ and so on are used in conformity with Australian legislation such as the Cybercrime Act 2001 (Cth) and international instruments such as the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime. These types of crime are likely to continue to develop over the next two years, the period that constitutes the focus of this assessment. In this report, the term ‘organised criminal’ refers to criminals or cybercriminals who are involved in the use of an organisational structure to pursue illegitimate goals. Developments
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